EQUATORIAL GUINEA vs.

FRANCE (2018)
FACTS:

 On June 13, 2016 Equatorial Guinea filed an Application instituting proceedings against
France before the International Court of Justice (ICJ or ‘the Court’) claiming that certain
ongoing criminal proceedings in France against the Equatoguinean Second Vice-
President – Mr. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue – constituted a violation of the immunity
from criminal jurisdiction he is entitled to under international law. The Application also
claimed that the seizing of a building located in Paris used for the purposes of the
diplomatic mission of Equatorial Guinea in France constituted a breach of the norm on the
inviolability of the premises of diplomatic missions.

 The Applicant maintained that the ICJ had jurisdiction both on the basis of the Optional
Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961(the ‘Optional Protocol’) and of Art. 35 of the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 15 November 2000 (the
‘Palermo Convention’).

 In the third of its preliminary objections of 30 March 2017, France affirmed that the case’s
referral to the ICJ is ‘completely artificial,’ because ‘Equatorial Guinea links its claims to
conventional provisions which, given the facts of the case, cannot be regarded as a
credible basis for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction’ and, as claimed in the oral
proceedings, ‘en l’absence manifeste de toute voie de droit’ (i.e.through an abuse of
process). France also upheld that the Application filed by Equatorial Guinea constituted
an abuse of rights and should, therefore, be dismissed.

 The Applicant allegedly reversed the ordinary procedural sequence, claiming breaches by
the Respondent of its international obligations and requesting the Court to make a finding
to that effect, but remaining ‘evasive’ and ‘cursory’ as to the basis for the exercise of the
Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore – as argued by France – the conduct of Equatorial Guinea
is in contrast to the fundamental principle of international law, which provides that no State
may be subject to the jurisdiction of an international court without its consent.

 According to the Respondent, the Application contained similar submissions to those

articulated in a previous one, dated September 25, 2012, when France had not accepted
the exercise of the ICJ’s jurisdiction, which has led Equatorial Guinea to find a strategy to
devise that lack of consent in the present case. This strategy consisted, on the one hand,
in acceding to the Optional Protocol – yet without specifying which provision of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations is at the origin of the dispute with France – and, on
the other, in invoking the Palermo Convention, whose provisions, according to France, do
not concern the present facts.

 On its part, in its written statement, Equatorial Guinea contended that it had recourse to
dispute settlement procedures in good faith and in accordance with the conditions and
requirements laid down in the Optional Protocol and in the Palermo Convention. In
particular, the Applicant maintained that seizing the ICJ, ‘even immediately after accepting
its jurisdiction’, does not constitute an abuse of process and that under international law
‘there is no limitation period for invoking bases of jurisdiction’.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to entertain Equatorial Guinea’s Application
under the Palermo Convention.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention.
3. Whether or not the Equatorial Guinea’s Application is inadmissible on grounds of process
or abuse of rights.
DECISION:
1. The Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction pursuant to the Palermo Convention to
entertain Equatorial Guinea’s Application.
2. The Court further concludes that it has jurisdiction pursuant to the Optional Protocol to the
Vienna Convention to entertain the submission of Equatorial Guinea relating to the status
of the building at 42 Avenue Foch in Paris as diplomatic premises, including any claims
relating to the seizure of certain furnishings and other property present on the above-
mentioned premises.
3. The Court finds that Equatorial Guinea’s Application is not inadmissible on grounds of
abuse of process or abuse of rights. The ruling of the Court confirms that abuse of process
only comes into play as a preliminary objection as to admissibility. The concept is defined
in very narrow terms by the judges, so as to raise the threshold of application.
Furthermore, a clear explanation of why the abuse of process did not occur in the present
case is hardly substantiated. Judges seem to assert that when a valid title of jurisdiction
is present, hardly ever an abuse of process can prevent the continuance of proceedings.
In so doing, the Court seems almost to put those two distinct concepts on a hierarchical
scale of values, with the one corresponding to a valid title of jurisdiction prevailing.
 EQUATORIAL GUINEA vs. FRANCE

PS 108: INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

TF 9:30 – 11:30 N7006

Submitted to:
Mrs. Sonia G. Masaoay

Submitted by:
Golocan, Lisle
Jovenal, Jade Nove R.
Magno, Alexis Joyce
Tadifa , Allory A.