964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

No. L-15499. April 23, 1962.

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANUEL UY

& SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.

Legal redemption; Sale of undivided interest in property;

Purchaser charged with notice that acquisition is subject to
redemption by any co-owner.—The purchaser of an univided
interest in a property is charged with notice that its acquisition is
subject to redemption by any other co-owner within the statutory
30-day period. The identity of the redemptioner is immaterial so
far as the purchaser is concerned.

Same; Same; Damages not presumed.—Damages are not

presumed, specially where, as in the present case, there has been
no showing that the fruits of the undivided portion of the property
purchased by the appellee would exceed the interest and profits
that could have been earned by the amount that he should have
paid over to effectuate the legal redemption.

MOTION to reconsider decision.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Delgado, Flores & Macapagal for plaintiff-appellant.
     Pelaez & Jalandoni for defendant-appellee.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION TO
RECONSIDER DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., has timely asked for a recon-

sideration of our main decision on the grounds (1) that the
consignation of P500,000.00 by appellant Mrs. Butte was
actually withdrawn by her on August 24, 1959, as shown by
the certification of the Chief Accountant of

965

VOL. 4, APRIL 23, 1962 965

Rutte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

the Department of Justice under date March 8. 1962,

hence, appellee should not be made accountable for rents
and profits from and after January 15, 1959 until payment
of the redemption price is actually made; (b) that the
appellant is not entitled to exercise legal redemption; and
(c) that the certificate of title did not show that appellee
was a co-owner of the property covered by said certificate.
Appellant Angela M. Butte opposed the reconsideration
prayed for on the ground that the withdrawal of the
amount consigned does not alter the appellee's
responsibility for damages due to its mora in refusing to
allow redemption of the property when the amount was
first tendered, and that the other grounds were amply
discussed in the briefs and the decision.
The first ground is meritorious. The actual withdrawal
of the P500,000 originally consigned in court was not taken
into account because it did not appear of record when our
main decision was rendered; but the withdrawal is not
denied by the appellee, and is supported besides by an
official certification; hence, it must be conceded as an
actual fact. While the lack of withdrawal of the
consignation does not affect appellant's right of
redemption, such redemption being optional and not
compulsory, and the price tendered in due time, still the
fact remains that no actual redemption would have been
legally made until the price is in fact paid to the appellee
Uy 6 . Son s, I The latter, therefore, continues to be the
owner of the undivided sixth share sold to it by the former
co-owner, Maria Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, and is entitled
to the fruits and benefits accruing to it by reason of that
share, until the redemption price is actually delivered.
Granting that, as contended for appellant, Uy & Sons,
Inc., and that said appellant Angela B. Butte is entitled the
redemption of the undivided share it had purchased from
Mrs. Garnier, such mora does not necessarily entitle
appellant to recover damages, in the absence of proof, as to
the reality of such damage and of the extent thereof.
Damages are not presumed, specially in this case where
there has been no showing that the fruits of the undivided
sixth purchased by appellee Uy would exceed the interest

966

966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

and profits that could have been earned by the P500,000

that appellee should have paid over to effectuate the legal
redemption.
We find no merit in the other grounds adduced by
appellant in its motion to reconsider. The right of appellee
to redeem the undivided sixth in question and the
timeliness of the tender of the redemption price have been
amply discussed in our main decision, and no new
arguments are adduced. The fact that the certificate of title
covering the Sta. Cruz property did not show that appellant
Angela M. Butte was one of the co-owners is irrelevant,
since the appellee Uy 6 . Son s, I nc. well knew th at a
stranger to the co-ownership, and that it was buying an
undivided interest therein. Under these conditions, the
purchaser is in law charged with notice that its acquisition
is subject to redemption by any other co-owner within the
statutory 30-day period, and the identity of the
redemptioner is immaterial so far as the purchaser is
concerned.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the dispositive part of
our decision of February 28, 1962 is hereby modified to
read as follows:

"(a) Declaring the tender of P500,000 made by appellant

Angela M. Butte duly and properly made;
(b) Declaring that by such tender made in due time,
the appellant has preserved her right to redeem the
onesixth (1/6) portion of the land covered by
Certificate of Title No. 59363 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, sold on
December 9, 1958 by Marie Garnier Vda. de
Ramirez to appellee Manuel Uy 6 . Son Inc., and
that said appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to a
reconveyance of said one-sixth portion upon
 payment of the amount of P500,000 to Manuel Uy
& Sons, Inc.
(c) Ordering appellee Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., to
execute a deed of conveyance of the undivided
portion abovereferred to in favor of Angela M. Butte
upon payment by the latter of the sum of P500,000
within sixty (60) day from the time our decision
becomes final;
(d) Ordering the return of the records to the court of
origin for execution conformably to this opinion.

Without finding as to costs. So ordered.

967

VOL. 4, APRIL 23, 1962 967

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

     Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,

Concepcion and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Decision modified.

ANNOTATION
LEGAL REDEMPTION

I. Concept and Nature

Definition.—Manresa defined legal redemption as a right
created by law by reason of public interest which is not
opposed but rather
1
is in harmony with the interest of
private parties. Our new Civil Code has improved the
definition by providing in its Article 1619 that: "Legal
redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same
terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the
place of one who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in
payment, or by any other transaction whereby ownership is
transmitted by onerous title."
Legal basis.—The right of legal redemption is a
substantive right which,
2
in the absence of a statutory basis,
would never exist. Conformably with this principle, the
Civil Code expressly provides for specific instances of legal
redemption, viz: (a) redemption by a co-heir who sells his
 3
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition; (b)
redemption by a co-owner in case the shares of all the other
4
co-owners or any one of them, are sold to a third person; (c)
redemption by owners of adjoining lands in case a piece of5
rural land, not exceeding one hectare in area, is alienated;
and (d) redemption by an6 adjoining owner in the case of a
small piece of urban land.

_______________

1 Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol. 10, p. 317.

2 Castillo v. Samonte, L -1346, Jan. 30, 1960; Semplo v. Del Rosario, 44
Phil. 1.
3 Art. 10 88, N.C.C.
4 Art. 16 20, id.
5 Art. 16 21, id.
6 Art. 16 22, id. As to other cases of legal redemption, see Art. 1643,
N.C.C.; Sec. 376, Rev. Adm. Code; Sec. 29, Rule 39, Rev. Rules of Court;
and Sec. 3, Rule 68, id.

968

968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTA

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

Purpose or object.—The purpose of Article 1620 in

establishing the right of legal redemption between the
coowners is to reduce the number of participants until the
community is done away with, being a hindrance to the
development and better administration of the property, and
this reason exists while the community subsists and the
participants continue
7
to be so whether they be the original
co-owners or not.
The object of Article 1621 in establishing the right of
legal redemption in favor of adjacent owners. is to prevent
an adjoining rural estate belonging to another, the area of
which does not exceed one hectare, from passing into the
hands of a person other than someone among the adjacent
owners. This is due in turn, to the desire and intention of
promoting or protecting agriculture by the union of small
agricultural lands and those adjoining thereto
8
under one
single owner for their better exploitation.
The situation or problem contemplated in Article 1622
has occurred in many instances in our rapidly growing
 9
cities. The solution given is believed to be just.
Nature.—Legal redemption is in the nature of a
privilege created by law, partly by reason of public policy,
and partly for the benefit and convenience of the
redemptioner to afford him a way out of what might be a
disagreeable 10or inconvenient association into which he has
been thrust. One case, however, held that the right of
legal redemption11
works only one way—in favor of the
redemptioner. For the legal redemptioner can compel the
purchaser to sell12 but he (the redemptioner) cannot be
compelled to buy.

_______________

7 De Castro v. Castro, 51 O.G. 5612; Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31.

8 Del Pilar v. Catindig, 35 Phil. 263; Cortez vs. Flores, 47 Phil. 992;
Caindec v. Parel, CA-G.R. No. 17183-R, May 24, 1957.
9 Capistrano, Civil Code Annotated, 1951 ed., Vol. IV, p. 188.
10 Villasor v. Medel, 81 Phil. 546.
11 Hidalgo v. Baltazar (C.A.), 55 O.G. 1788; Cf. also Villasor v. Medalla,
46 O.G. Supp. 1. p. 334; CA-G.A. No. 8677, Sept. 29, 1948.
12 Villasor v. Medalla, supra.

969

VOL. 4, APRIL 23, 1962 969

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

The 13right of legal redemption proceeds by operation of

law. The vendee is presumed to know the law that the co-
heirs or co-owners are entitled to redeem the portion sold
within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale. In
effect, he is a vendee with notice of the right of redemption
by the vendor's co-heirs. If the sale contains a warranty
against eviction, the remedy of the vendee whose property
is subject to redemption, is to file a third party complaint
for whatever claim or indemnity he may 14
have against the
vendor pursuant to the Rules of Court.
The right of legal redemption gives rise to reciprocal
obligations—on the part of the redemptioner, that of
returning the purchase price; on the part of the vendee,
that of delivering the property and executing a deed of sale
therefor, pursuant
15
to Article 1445 (now Art. 1458) of the
Civil Code.
 Any subsequent act of the buyer and the16seller cannot
prejudice the prospective redemptioner. Even the
repurchase of the land by the17original vendor cannot defeat
the right of legal redemption.

II. Scope and Limitation

Particular property or interest covered.—Under Article 1088
the sale concerns the hereditary right itself, fully or in part,
in the abstract sense, without specifying any particular
object. The word "thing" (cosa) used
18
in Article 1619 covers
both real and personal property. There is no sound reason
why the exercise of legal19redemption should be limited to
immovable property only.
The right of legal redemption under Article 1620 may

_______________

13 Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., L-15499, April 23, 1962; Oblefias,
et al. v. Mendoza, et al. (C.A.), 53 O.G. 5672.
14 Castillo v. Samonte, id.
15 Cf. Torrijos v. Crisolo, et al., L-17734, Sept. 29, 1962; Santos v.
Fernando (C.A.), 47 O.G. 4694.
16 Caindec v. Parel (C.A.), G.R. No. 77183-R, May 24, 1957.
17 10 Manresa 320.
18 U.S. v. Caballero, 25 Phil. 365.
19 10 Manresa 360-361.

970

970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

be exercised whether the thing 20

owned in common be
essentially indivisible or not. The law must be so
interpreted, not only because it is in accordance with the
spirit thereof, but because there is nothing in its provision
which expressly, or by inference, limits the right of legal
redemption to essentially indivisible things only.
A piece of adjoining rural land, not exceeding one
hectare in area, is the subject of Article 1621. If the lands
are not really adjoining ones because they are separated by
brooks, drains, ravines, roads and other apparent
servitudes for the benefit of other
21
estates, they do not come
within the purview of said rule. The object under Article
1622 is a piece of urban land which is so small and so
situated that a major portion thereof cannot be used for
any practical purpose within a reasonable time, having
been bought
22
merely for speculation, and about to be
resold. In effect, Article 1622 modified the decision in
Cortez v. Flores, 47 Phil. 992, which denied the right of
redemption because the land sought to be redeemed in the
action is urban.
Limitation.—Article 1088 presupposes the fact that
there has as yet been no distribution of the estate among
the heirs. The moment such distribution has taken place,
and the heirs have taken possession of the hereditary
properties, even in a state of indivision, they ceased to be
co-heirs and become co-owners; hence, the redemption 23
provided for in Article 1620 would be the one available.
The right of legal redemption under Article 1620 given
to a co-owner in case any one of the other co-heirs or
coowners sells his share to a third person, cannot also be
invoked where the property24had already been partitioned
judicially or extra-judicially. A co-owner, therefore,

_______________

20 Cf. 10 Manresa 364-365; Viola v. Tecson, 49 Phil. 808.

21 10 Manresa 373-374.
22 Art. 1622, N.C.C.
23 De Castro v. Castro, 51 O.G. 5612; Castro v. Caballo (C.A.), 43 O.G.
2266; De Jesus v. Manglapus, 81 Phil. 114; Saturnino v. Paulino, L-7385,
May 19, 1955; Caram v. Court of Appeals, L-7820, April 30, 1957.
24 Umengan v. Butucan, et al., L-16036, Feb. 28, 1963; Saturnino v.
Paulino, supra.

971

VOL. 4, APRIL 23, 1962 971

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

who disposes of his share in the ownership, may not

thereafter repurchase it nor that of the shares of the other
coowners which have been sold to strangers, for the simple
reason that he has relinquished his status as co-owner,
25
which is the basis and origin of his right to redeem.
The right of redemption by adjacent owners cannot be
exercised by any of them against a stranger who acquires
from any one of them, by purchase or gift in payment, or by
any other title for value, a rural estate as fixed by law. The
purpose of the right of action granted in such a case to the
redemptioner (in connection with the right provided for in
Articles 1619 and 1621 of the Civil Code to subrogate
himself, under the same conditions stipulated in the
contract, in place of the person who acquired the property
by any of the means mentioned) is to give preference to any
of the owners of the adjacent lands as against the
purchaser (that is, against third persons who, not being an
adjacent owner, acquired the property) in order that he
may have and hold the land under the same 26
conditions as
those stipulated in the respective contract.
The right of legal redemption under Article 1620 can be
exercised only when the purchaser is a stranger to the co-
ownership. Thus, when two persons purchase, at the same
time, the shares of two different co-owners, they are
considered as co-owners as between themselves, and
neither can27
exercise the right of legal redemption against
the other. But if a stranger makes the purchase, even for
the purpose of accommodating a co-owner, and with money
of the latter, he can28
be obliged to subrogate the other co-
owners in his right.
The right of legal redemption created by Article 1619
includes every purchase, dation in payment or any other
transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous
title. It includes every transmission of ownership whose
special nature does not bar subrogation, which is the
essence of legal redemption. It has been opined, however,

_______________

25 De la Cruz v. Marcelino, 84 Phil. 709.

26 Del Pilar v. Catindig. 35 Phil. 263.
27 Estrada v. Reyes, id.
28 A lcover v. Panaganan, O.G. Supp.. Nov. 1, 1941, p. 16.

972

972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

that the article is

29
not applicable to barter or acquisition by
hereditary title. Similarly, the co-owner's right of legal
redemption
30
does not31exist where there has been only a
lease or a mortgage.
To be effective, the exercise of the right of legal
redemption
32
must be asserted in time and in the proper
form in pursuant to the following provision of law:

"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not

be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing
by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be.
The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners."
"The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of
adjoining owners."

III. Conditions Precedent for Valid Exercise of Right of

Legal Redemption
Nature of the period of redemption.—The period for legal
redemption is not a prescriptive period, but is more a
requisite or condition precedent to the exercise of the right
of legal redemption; it is a period provided by law to
restrict the33 right of the person exercising the legal
redemption. If a redemptioner, therefore, has offered to
redeem the property within the period fixed, he has
complied with the condition prescribed by the law and may
thereafter, bring an action to enforce the redemption. If, on
the other hand, the period is allowed to lapse before the
right is made use of, then the action to enforce the
redemption will not prosper, 34
even if brought within the
ordinary prescription period.

_______________

29 Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated July 9, 1903; 10

Manresa 348-349.
30 De la Cruz v. Marcelino, supra.
31 Torres v. Raffiñan, CA-G.R. No. 19634-R, June 24, 1963.
32 Cf. Article 1623, N.C.C.; Lim Tuico v. Cu Unjieng, 21 Phil. 493.
33 De Conejero, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21812, April 29,
1966, 16 SCRA 775; Lim Tuico v. Cu Unjieng, 21 Phil. 493; Alcover v.
Panaganan, C.A., O.G., Supp., Nov. 1, 1941, p. 16.
34 Castillo v. Samonte, L-13146, Jan. 30, 1960; Sempio v. Del Rosario,
44 Phil.1; Daza v. Tomacruz, 58 Phil. 414..
 973

VOL. 4, APRIL 23, 1962 973

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

From the above consideration, the nature of the period of

redemption, both under Article 1524 of the old Civil Code of
1899 and under
35
Article 1623 of the new Civil Code, remains
unaltered.
The period within which the right of legal redemption or
pre-emption may be exercised (Art. 1623, 36
N.C.C.) is non-
extendible; and it cannot be relaxed. Minority of the
would-be redemptioner during the specified period for
redemption does not suspend the running of the period for
legal redemption. It would hardly be contended that a
period of grace might be claimed by a vendor with the right
of repurchase or his 37
successor by reason of mental
disability or non-age.
Purpose of the written notice.—The written notice
required by Article 1623 was obviously exacted by the code
to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and
validity,38and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not
definite. Stating it a little differently, the main purpose of
the law (Art. 1623) is to apprise a co-owner of the new
existing set-up of legal relation arising out of disposition by
a co-owner of his or her share in the common property. The
notice must be in writing to avoid any doubt that might
arise. It is in a way, so to say, an invitation to the co-owner
to exercise the preferential
39
right given to him by law, and
regulated by law.
Abandonment of the old rule on method of notification.—
Rulings under Article 1524 of the old Civil Code were to the
effect that the running of the period of redemption may
start from the date of the registration of the sale or from
the time the40
redemptioner had actual (verbal) knowledge of
such sale. This view was based

_______________

35 See Villasor v. Medel, 81 Phil. 546; Castillo v. Samonte, et al., supra.

36 Oblefias v. Mendoza, C.A., 53 O.G. 5672.
37 Villasor v. Medel, supra; Mangulad v. Arugay, C.A., 55 O.G. 9454.
38 De Conejero v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.
 39 Oblefias v. Mendoza (C.A.) 53 O.G. 5672.
40 Hernaez v. Hernaez, 32 Phil. 214; Caindec v. Parel, id.; Paez v.
Magno. L-793, April 27, 1949; Manaois v. Zamora, 98 Phil. 269.

974

974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTA

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

on the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain dated June

30, 1910 and December 14, 1905 which held that the date
of registration of the sale was intended to be applied to all
cases where the date of actual knowledge is unknown, the
idea being that knowledge 41of the sale may be presumed
from its mere registration. The rulings and view afore-
mentioned have been abandoned and altered in favor of the
rule prescribed in Article 1623 of the present Civil Code.
Thus, in Castillo v. Samonte, L-13146, January 30, 1960,
Mr. Justice Barrera, speaking for the unanimous Supreme
Court, emphatically declared:

"x x x the Court a quo correctly observed that 'Both the letter and
spirit of the new Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen
the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by including
therein any kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration. If the
intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or any other
means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice,
then there would have been no necessity or reasons to specify in
Article 1088 of the new Civil Code that the said notice be made in
writing, for, under the old law, a verbal notice or information was
sufficient."

Reiteration of the above ruling was made in De Conejero, et

al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., where Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, likewise speaking for the unanimous Supreme
Court, construed the import of Article 1623 in the following
language:

"With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that

such notice is indispensable, and that, in view of the terms in
which Article 1623 of the Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere
knowledge of the sale, acquired in some other manner by the
redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute. The written notice was
obviously exacted by the Code to remove all uncertainty as to the
sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the
alienation is not definitive. The statute not having provided for
any alternative, the method of notification prescribed remains
exclusive."

No particular form of written notice is required under

Article 1623.—While it is true that the Castillo and
Conejero cases cited held that notice in writing or written
notice to possible redemptioners is required by Article

_______________

41 Cf. 10 Manresa, 4th ed., p. 340.

975

VOL. 4, APRIL 23, 1962 975

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

1623, it is equally true that the same "Article 1623 does not
prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive
method for notifying the redemptioner." "So long, therefore,
as the latter is informed in writing of the sale and the
particulars thereof, the 30 days for redemption start
running, and the redemptioner has no real cause to
complain." (De Conejero, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
supra.) In the same Conejero case, therefore, where the co-
owner-vendor showed and gave a copy of the disputed deed
of sale to the redemptioner, the Supreme Court ruled:

"The furnishing of this copy was equivalent to the giving of

written notice required by law; it came from the vendor and made
available in writing the details and finality of the sale. In fact, as
argued for the respondents at bar, it served all the purposes of the
written notice, in a more authentic manner than any other
42
writing could have done."

Conformably with the Conejero ruling, the Court of Appeals

held that a petition filed in Court in a partition
proceedings, alleging that the vendors sold to a third party
"the whole of Lot No. 2155 and Lot No. 2156-B, with an
area of 3,199 sq. m., under the terms and conditions
stipulated in the deed of sale, copy attached as Annex 'F',
copy of which petition was served upon the redemptioners,
is a substantial compliance with the requirement of Article
 43
1623." The Court reasoned out that it cannot adopt 44
a
stand of having to sacrif ice substance to technicality.
Effect of a clause in a deed that notice of sale was given
to possible redemptioners.—A sworn statement or clause in
a deed of sale to the effect that a written notice of the sale
was given to possible redemptioners or other co-owners
might be used to determine whether an offer to redeem was
made on or out of time, or whether there was substantial 45
compliance with the requirement of said Article 1623.
Under the rule on "substantial

_______________

42 De Conejero v. Court of Appeals, id.

43 Oblefias v. Mendoza, id.
44 Ibid.
45 Cabacungan, et al. v. Corrales, et al., 95 Phil. 919.

976

976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

not literal
46
compliance" enunciated in the Oblefias-Mendoza
case and under the principle of "equivalent to the giving47
of
written notice" carved out of the Conejero decision, a
sworn statement or clause (under oath) in a deed of sale, to
the effect that such notice was given to possible
redemptioners, is a substantial compliance of the provision
of Article 1623. This consideration acquires more weight in,
and applies with more force to, a case where, with the
knowledge of the redemptioner, the vendee "had already
planted in the land 339 coconut trees, which are now four
years old, more than 200 banana plants, and fruit trees,"
and for almost four years said redemptioner, assuming he
had the right to redeem,48
"kept silent of his intention" to
redeem said property. For under such a situation the
doctrine of laches will apply aptly against
49
the would-be
redemptioner to bar his right to redeem.
It must be observed in50this connection that the holding
in Varona v. Ablen, et al. that "the addition of the clause
'that written notice was given to the co-owner' in a deed of
sale does not satisfy the legal requirement of Article 1623"
is inapplicable to the foregoing consideration of the rule,
because the clause in question in the Varona case was not
under oath and the deed of sale therein, covering a land
registered under Act 496, expressly showed that another
co-owner's share was reserved and not included in the
conveyance.
Tender of the entire repurchase price is indispensable in
legal redemption.—The ruling in De la Cruz v. Marcelino,
L-1610, Oct. 12, 1949, 84 Phil. 709, and Torio v. Rosario, 93
Phil. 800, that a valid tender or offer of the redemption
price is not an essential requisite in legal re-

_______________

46 53 O.G. 5672.
47 L-21812, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 775.
48 Cf. Torre v. Belloc, CA-G.R. No. 33979-R, Aug. 20, 1965.
49 See Mejia v. Gamponia, 53 O.G. 677; Concurring Op. of Justice
Lucero in Sales v. Gumotea, 59 O.G. 8087; and Manguland v. Arugay, 58
O.G. 9454, which held that the equitable defense of laches may extinguish
one's right to redeem.
50 CA-G.R. No. 31695-R, Nov. 18, 1964, 62 O.G. No. 18, p 3006.

977

VOL. 4, APRIL 23, 1962 977

Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

demption, is no longer the correct rule and the same does

not represent the present law. This was explained in the
following portions of the Supreme Court's decision:

"The next query is: did petitioners effectuate all the steps
required for the redemption? We agree with the Court of Appeals
that they did not, for they failed to make a valid tender of the
price of the sale paid by the Raffiñans within the period fixed by
law. Conejero merely offered a check for P10,000, which was not
even legal tender and which the Raff iñans rejected, in lieu of the
price of P28,000 recited by the deed of sale. The factual finding of
the Court of Appeals to this effect is o f in al and conclusi
xxx      xxx      xxx
"It is not difficult to discern why the redemption price should
either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in
court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the
offer to redeem is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer
can not be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without
attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to
accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different rule would
leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots,
as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period,
contrary to the policy of the law. While consignation of the
tendered price is not always necessary because legal redemption
50a
is not made to discharge a preexisting debt, a valid tender is
indispensable, for the reasons already stated. Of course,
consignation of the price would remove all controversy as to the
51
redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time."

Another potent reason in support of the proposition that

valid tender of the entire purchase price is indispensable in
legal redemption is this: By the precept of Article 1619,
legal redemption is the right to be subrogated in the place
of the one who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in
payment; that is to say, that it puts 52the person exercising
the right in the shoes of the former. Commenting on the
predecessor of said Article 1619, Manresa wrote: The
conditions stipulated remain unaltered. These conditions
are the ones agreed upon be-

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50a Asturias Sugar Central v. Cane Molasses Co., 60 Phil. 253.

51 De Conejero, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., Id.
52 Capistrano, Civil Code Annotated, 1951 ed., Vol. IV, p. 183.

978

978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Llanto

tween the vendor and vendee, and the redemptioner must

respect 53them and comply with them, if he chooses to
redeem. —JUDGE DOMINGO LUCENARIO.

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