Liang vs. People

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G.R. No.

125865, January 28, 2000


JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Article 2 - Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of
preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but
also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their
functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined
in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994,
for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before
the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between
the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on
the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed
by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant
of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case
to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner’s case covered with immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government?

SALVA, CHELSEA O. | 1R | ORA, ORA ET LABORA, LABORA, LABORA 1


RULING:
NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It is only preliminary which
has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the accused
but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”. It is well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused
by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. Therefore,
slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not
allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

SALVA, CHELSEA O. | 1R | ORA, ORA ET LABORA, LABORA, LABORA 2

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