006. Liang v.

People
G.R. No. 125865/26 March 2001/First Division/Motion for Reconsideration on SC Decision
Jeffrey Liang (Huefeng) – petitioner
People of the Philippines – respondent
Decision by J. Ynares-Santiago, Digest by Pip (Gagamitin mo na nga na sample yung digest at format
ko Chua, kay Anne Curtis mo pa icre-credit? For shame!)

Short Version: Liang was charged with grave oral defamation. He argued that he was covered by the
absolute immunity of the ADB, where he worked. The Court ruled that his immunity did not cover the
alleged acts of oral defamation, since such could not be considered to be acts performed in his official
capacity.

Facts:
Jeffrey Liang (Hue Feng)
Chinese national employed as an economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Two informations for grave oral defamation were filed against him alleging that on separate
occasions (the 28th and 31st of January of 1994) he uttered defamatory words to Joyce v. Cabal, a
member of the clerical staff of ADB, for the imputation of theft.

MeTC Mandaluyong
Issued warrant, but Liang was released to the custody of the ADB Security Officer

Acting pursuant to advice from the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes, by
virtue of an Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government, dismissed the
informations against him.

People of the Philippines

On petition for certiorari and mandamus

RTC Pasig
Annulled and set aside the MeTC’s order.

Liang
Petition for review, Supreme Court.

SC
January 2000, denied the petition for review.
a) Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA
that petitioner is covered by any immunity.
i) DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts.

ii) MeTC erred in receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu
proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution,
a) the latters right to due process was violated.

iii) mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the
dropping of the charges

b) Under Section 45 of the Agreement- the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute,
but subject to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity."
i) It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit
of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to
rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its
controverting evidence, should it so desire.
 c) Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty
i) The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions.

ii) Well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction

d) Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming

that Liang indeed is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.
i) As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official
duty.

e) That there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that

preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC
i) Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only
when specifically granted by law

ii) Rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is

required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

iii) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the courts
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render
it defective.

Motion for Reconsideration:

Liang
MR, argued
That the DFA’s determination of immunity is a political question to be made by the
executive branch of the government and is conclusive upon the courts.

Furthermore, the immunity of international organizations is absolute and extends to all

its staff.

Issue:
Were the statements allegedly made by Liang uttered while in the performance of his official functions?
NO.

SC:

1) First, the Court emphasized that its earlier decision did not deny diplomatic immunity at all. Rather,
the Court merely ruled as to whether Liang’s alleged words fell squarely under the provisions of Section
45(a) of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippines, where officers and staff for the bank
(including experts and consultants performing missions for the bank) enjoy immunity from legal process
with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity.

Again, the Court ruled that the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be
considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers
and personnel.

Slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official

capacity.
The issue of whether Liang’s utterances in fact constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to
determine.

Voting: C.J. Davide, Jr., concurring in J. Puno’s concurring opinion.

Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

J. Puno’s concurring opinion: He basically argued that international officials are entitled to
immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations
which enjoy absolute immunity. (This in apparent response to Liang’s insistence that ADB’s absolute
immunity extended to him.)