CASES

RULES OF PROCEDURE

APPEAL

Corporate Inn The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and
Hotel vs. Lizo
in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional. Non-compliance
therewith is fatal and it renders the judgment final and executory.
Noncompliance with the required procedure deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much
less, to entertain the appeal. The requirements for the perfection
of an appeal are intended to discourage employers from using
the appeal to delay or evade their obligations to their
employees. It also assures employees that the money judgment
in their favor will be satisfied.

McBurnie vs. 178117 While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer,
Ganzon
this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the
bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a
reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted
by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce
bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an
appeal.

all motions to reduce bond that are to be filed with the NLRC
shall be accompanied by the posting of a cash or surety bond
equivalent to 10% of the monetary award that is subject of the
appeal, which shall provisionally be deemed the reasonable
amount of the bond in the meantime that an appellant motion
is pending resolution by the Commission.In conformity with the
NLRC Rules, the monetary award, for the purpose of computing
the necessary appeal bond, shall exclude damages and
attorney fees. Only after the posting of a bond in the required
percentage shall an appellant period to perfect an appeal
under the NLRC Rules be deemed suspended.
 APPEAL

Lepanto vs. The Court ruled that Lepanto substantially complied with the
Icao
appeal bond requirement.

1st. There is no question that the appeal was filed within the 10-
day reglementary period. Except for the alleged failure to post
an appeal bond, the appeal to the NLRC was in order.

2nd. It is undisputed that Lepanto had an unencumbered amount

of money in the form of cash in the custody of the NLRC.

3rd. The amount of cash bond posted in the other case is more
than enough to cover the appeal bond required in the present
case.

4th. There was no showing at all of any attempt on the part of

Lepanto to evade the posting of the appeal bond.

Sara Lee vs. 180147 Should the NLRC, after considering the merit of the motion to
Macatlang
reduce appeal bond determine that a greater amount or the full
amount of the bond needs to be posted by the Appeallant then
the partt shall comply accordingly. The appellant shall be given
a period of 10 days from notice of the NLRC order within which
to perfect an appeal by posting required bond.

The petitioners are the directed to post the amoubt of 725 M In

cash or surety bond within 10 days of decision to continue with
determination of the merits of the alleged illegally dismissed
respondents through NLRC.
JURISDICTION

Labor Arbiter

Malvar vs. Kraft Yes, such agreement between the parties is valid and under the
Foods Phils
NLRC Rules of Procedure Rule 5, Sec. 8: compromise agreement
Inc.
duly entered into in accordance with this Section

shall be final and binding upon the parties and shall have the
force and effect of a

judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter.

A compromise agreement is a contract, whereby the parties

undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation, or put an
end to one already commenced. The client may enter into a
compromise agreement with the adverse party to terminate the
litigation before a judgment is rendered therein. If the
compromise agreement is found to be in order and not contrary
to law, morals, good customs and public policy, its judicial
approval is in order. A compromise agreement, once approved
by final order of the court, has the force of res judicata between
the parties and will not be disturbed except for vices of consent
or forgery.
 Labor Arbiter

Cosare vs. It is not an intra-corporate dispute, hence, it is the Labor Arbiter,

Broadcom
not the regular courts which has the original jurisdiction over the
subject controversy.

As regards the issue of jurisdiction, the Court has

determined that contrary to the ruling of the CA, it is the LA, and
not the regular courts, which has the original jurisdiction over the
subject controversy. An intra-corporate controversy, which falls
within the jurisdiction of regular courts

Applying the foregoing to the present case, the LA had

the original jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal
because Cosare, although an officer of Broadcom for being its
AVP for Sales, was not a "corporate officer" as the term is defined
by law.

Voluntary Arbitration

Maneja vs.  However, Article 217(c) should be read in conjunction

NLRC
with Article 261 of the Labor Code which grants to
voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of the collective
bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies. Note the phrase “unresolved grievances.”

Estate of Filipino seafarers who are covered by CBA’s should therefore

Nelson Dulay
submit their dispute or claim to the jurisdiction of a VA or panel of
vs. Aboitiz
Jebsen arbitrators. It is only in the absence of a CBA that parties may opt
Maritime Inc. to submit the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
 Voluntary Arbitration

Ace Navigation 197309 It bears stressing at this point that we areupholding the jurisdiction
vs. Fernandez
of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators over
the present dispute, not only because of the clear language of
the parties’ CBA on the matter; more importantly, we so uphold
the voluntaryarbitrator’s jurisdiction, in recognition of the State’s
express preference for voluntary modes of dispute
settlement,such as conciliation and voluntary arbitration as
expressed in the Constitution, the law and the rules.It is settled
that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for
resolving grievances and to submit adispute to voluntary
arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed

7K Corporation 182295 A. Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters . . . x x x x

vs. Eddie 2013
Albarico

(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or

implementation of collective bargaining agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company procedure/policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitrator as may be provided
in said agreement.
 Reinstatement

Bergonio vs. 195227 the reinstatement of an

SEAir 2014

employee found illegally dismissed is immediately executory

even during the pendency of the

employer’s appeal from the decision. Under this provision, the

employer must reinstate the

employee either by physically admitting him under the

conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal,

and paying his wages, or within the option of the employer to

reinstate him in the payroll.

Baronda vs. 161006 Voluntary Arbitrator's order of reinstatement of

Hideco Sugar 2015
the petitioner was immediately executory
Milling Co. Inc

Computation of Backwages

Nacar vs. 189871 For backwages, it will be computed from the date of illegal
Gallery Frames 2013 dismissal until the date of the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
But if the employer appeals, then the end date shall be
extended until the day when the appellate court’s
decision shall become final. Hence, as a consequence, the
liability of the employer, if he loses on appeal, will increase
– this is just but a risk that the employer cannot avoid when
it continued to seek recourses against the Labor Arbiter’s
decision. This is also in accordance with Article 279 of the
Labor Code.
 Computation of Backwages

Session 172149 Yes. As a rule, backwages is computed from the time of the
Delights Ice 2010
illegal dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. If
Cream vs. CA
reinstatement is no longer possible, it is computed until the finality
of the decision. In this case, the decision became final when
Session Delights no longer appealed the CA decision affirming
the finding of illegal dismissal against Session Delights or on July
29, 2003. Hence, the original computation made by the labor
arbiter in its February 2001 decision must be recomputed to
include the period until July 29, 2003. The fact that Session
Delight’s liability increased from P41k to P253k (less the erroneous
inclusions) is but an unavoidable consequence of Session
Delight’s appeal since it lost on appeal.

But does this violate the principle of immutability of

judgment considering the fact that the original decision of the
labor arbiter already provided for a computation?

No. In these types of cases, there are two parts of the

decision issued by the arbiter. The first part is the finding of illegal
dismissal against the employer. The second part is the
computation of whatever is due to the employee who was
illegally dismissed. The decision of the arbiter is immediately final
and executory subject to a timely appeal by the losing party. As
a rule, if a decision is affirmed on appeal, the dispositive portion
of the original decision controls (subject of course to
modifications made by the appellate court). In this case, the
finding of illegal dismissal stays, but the computation must be
done again pursuant to the rule that the end period must be until
the finality of the decision. This does not violate the principle of
immutability of judgment.
 Requirements

Jacinto vs 190190  As to verification, noncompliance therewith or a defect

Gumaru 6.
therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
2014
defective. The court may order its submission or correction
or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be
served thereby.

 Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be

executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons,
the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a
Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of
record to sign on his behalf.

Atty. Agustin 174564 NO. The court of appeals did not violate the Principle of Res
vs. Herrera
Judicata. Under the law, the final judgment does not preclude
the client feom entering into a compromise agreement. Rights
may be waived notwithstanding a final judgement provided that
compromise agreement is shown to have been voluntarily, freely,
and intelligently executed the parties abd is not contrary to law,
morals, good cuatoms, and public policy.

Further, the motivating force behind the settlement was not to

deprive or prejudice Atty. AGUSTIN's fees but rather the inability
of a dissolved corporationto freely abid to its adjudged liability.
 JURISDICTION; PROCEDURE

Bombo Radyo 179652 Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of
vs. SOLE 2012 this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to issue
compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards
provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based
on the findings of labor employment and enforcement
officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course
of inspection.

The provision is explicit that the visitorial and enforcement power

of the DOLE comes into play only “in cases when the relationship
of employer-employee still exists.” This clause signifies that the
employer-employee relationship must have existed even before
the emergence of the controversy. Necessarily, the DOLE’s
power does not apply in two instances, namely: (i) where the
employer-employee relationship has ceased; and (ii) where no
such relationship has ever existed.

Norkis Trading 182018 The Court emphasize, nonetheless, that these findings are not
vs. Buena Vista 2012 infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at
arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be
examined by the courts. The CA can then grant a petition for
certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or
resolution, has made a factual finding that is not supported by
substantial evidence. It is within the jurisdiction of the CA, whose
jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review the
findings of the NLRC.
 JURISDICTION; PROCEDURE

Portillo vs. 196539 and claims no benefits under the Labor Code. The
Lietz 2012
primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a
contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not labor
benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in
labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime
compensation or separation pay. The items claimed are the
natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation,
intrinsically a civil dispute. Furthermore, non-compete clause, as
in the "Goodwill Clause" refers to post-employment relations of
the parties. The "Goodwill Clause" or the "Non-Compete Clause"
is a contractual undertaking effective after the cessation of the
employment relationship between the parties. In accordance
with jurisprudence, breach of the undertaking is a civil law
dispute, not a labor law case. As it is, petitioner does not ask for
any relief under the Labor Code. It merely seeks to recover
damages based on the parties’ contract of employment as
redress for respondents breach thereof. Such cause of action is
within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy
belongs to the regular courts. More so must this be in the present
case, what with the reality that the stipulation refers to the
postemployment relations of the parties.
 JURISDICTION; PROCEDURE

Republic vs. 178593 It is a well-established rule that a motion for recon is an

Pantranco 2012
indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to
the special civil action for certiorari. A motion for recon of the
order, resolution or decision of the NLRC should be seasonably
filed as a precondition for pursuing any further or subsequent
recourse; otherwise, the order, resolution or decision would
become final and executory after 10 calendar days from receipt
thereof.

Such rule, however, is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid

down exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is
proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for
reconsideration, to wit: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
 JURISDICTION; PROCEDURE

Philtranco 180962 YES, this court reiterates that, the Secretary of Labor may assume
Services 2014
jurisdiction over disputes involving companies whose business is
Enterprises vs.
PWU-AGLO imbued with public interest. It cannot be said that in taking
cognizance of above case, the Secretary of Labor did so in a
limited capacity, i.e., as a voluntary arbitrator.

The fact is undeniable that by referring the case to the Secretary

of Labor, Conciliator-Mediator Aglibut conceded that the case
fell within the coverage of Article 263 of the Labor Code; the
impending strike in Philtranco, a public transportation company
whose business is imbued with public interest, required that the
Secretary of Labor assume jurisdiction over the case, which he in
fact did.

By assuming jurisdiction over the case, the provisions of Article 263

became applicable, any representation to the contrary or that
he is deciding the case in his capacity as a voluntary arbitrator
notwithstanding.

Ando vs. 184007 1. Yes, RTC correctly ruled that it has no jurisdiction over
Campo 2011
the case. The regular courts have no jurisdiction to
hear and decide questions which arise from and are
incidental to the enforcement of decisions, order, and
awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate
officers and tribunals of DOLE. To hold otherwise is to
sanction splitting jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the
orderly administration of justice.

Thus, it is, first and foremost, the NLRC Manual on the Execution
of Judgment that governs any question on the execution of a
judgment of that body. Petitioner need not look further than that.
The Rules of Court apply only by analogy or in a suppletory
character.
 CONTEMPT

Robosa vs 176085 Yes. Under Article 218 the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor
NLRC 2012
arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt, directly or
indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with
law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either
imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on whether
the contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The
Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the
Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner
prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate
indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode
is to be observed only when there is no law granting them
contempt powers. As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor
Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has
jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or
indirect contempt. Robosa, et al., therefore, have not improperly
brought the indirect contempt charges against the respondents
before the NLRC.

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

Goya vs. Goya 170054 The Court ruled that Goya is not guilty of ULP in engaging the
Inc. Employees 2013
services of PESO. ULP is committed only if there is gross violation
Union
of the CBA. They are, however, directed to observe and comply
with its commitment under the CBA as it pertains to the hiring of
employees.

The engagement of PESO is not in keeping with the intent and

spirit of the CBA provision in question. However, the right of
management to outsource parts of its operations is not totally
eliminated but is merely limited by the CBA.

A collective bargaining agreement is the law between the

parties: It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that
the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to
comply with its provisions.
 ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

Samar-Med 162385 1. The onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed
Distribution vs. 2013
or, if dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal fully rests on the
NLRC
employer, and the failure to discharge the onus would
mean that the dismissal was not justified and was illegal.

In Gutang’s case, Roleda tendered no showing outside of his

mere allegations to substantiate his averment of abandonment
by Gutang. Moreover, although Gutang had undoubtedly
stopped working for Samar-Med, his doing so had been for a
justifiable reason, consisting in the non-payment of his salary
since November 1995 and his being forced to stop working for
Samar Med to enable him to seek employment elsewhere, albeit
temporarily, in order to survive.

Thus, court grants the petition for review; and reverses and set
aside the NLRC decision. And ordering them to pay Gutang the
sum of P30,000 by way of nominal damages for non-compliance
with statutory due process.
 ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

Serrano vs. 117040 An employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy

NLRC 2000
program is not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the
services of an independent contractor to replace the services of
the terminated employees to promote economy and efficiency.
Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary
manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment
by an employer.

If termination of employment is not for any of the cause

provided by law, it is illegal and the employee should be
reinstated and paid backwages. To contend that even if the
termination is for a just cause, the employee concerned should
be reinstated and paid backwages would be to amend Art 279
by adding another ground for considering dismissal illegal.

If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of

the causes mentioned in Art 283, the in accordance with that
article, he should not be reinstated but must be paid backwages
from the time his employment was terminated until it is
determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause
because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the
termination without legal effect.
RIGHT TO SELF ORGANIZATION

NORECO vs. In the instant case, there is no persuasive evidence

SOLE
to show that there are indeed supervisory and
members and confidential employees in appellant union who
co-owners of
cooperative,
under the law are disqualified to join the same."8
not eligible to
join or form the union was composed of both rank-and-file and
union
supervisory employees in violation of law" was
belatedly raised in the case at bar and was
sought to be ventilated only before the Court of
Appeals in the petition for certiorari. Time and
again, this Court has ruled that factual matters are
not proper subjects for certiorari.

Finally, the instant petition ambiguously states

that "NORECO1 is an electric cooperative and all
the employees of the subject union are members
of the cooperative", but submitted "a certified list
of employees who are members-co-owners of the
petitioner electric cooperative." Impliedly, there
are rank-and-file employees of the petitioner who
are not themselves members-co-owners, or who
are the ones qualified to form or join a labor
organization.
Victoriano vs. To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop
Elizalde Rope
Worker’s Union arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced
an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of
Exemption of
employees
the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but
belonging to a such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sect religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
from imposition
of any union members in any such labor organization".
security clause Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure
agreement
from the application and coverage of the closed
shop agreement the employees belonging to any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members with any labor organization. What the
exception provides, therefore, is that members of
said religious sects cannot be compelled or
coerced to join labor unions even when said
unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects
cannot be refused employment or dismissed from
their jobs on the sole ground that they are not
members of the collective bargaining union. It is
clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from
infringing the constitutional provision on freedom
of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does
not prohibit the members of said religious sects
from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to
said members the liberty and the power to
affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the
members of said religious sects prefer to sign up
with the labor union, they can do so. If in
deference and fealty to their religious faith, they
refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does
not coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining; and neither may the
employer or labor union compel them to join.
Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate
the constitutional provision on freedom of
association.
Metrolab vs. Metrolab, however, maintains that executive secretaries of the
Roldan General Manager and the executive secretaries of the Quality
Confessor Assurance Manager, Product Development Manager, Finance
Director, Management System Manager, Human Resources Manager,
Confidential Marketing Director, Engineering Manager, Materials Manager and
Employees Production Manager, who are all members of the companys
Management Committee should not only be exempted from the
closed-shop provision but should be excluded from membership in the
bargaining unit of the rank and file employees as well on grounds that
their executive secretaries are confidential employees, having access
to vital labor information.[19]

Although Article 245 of the Labor Code[20] limits the ineligibility to

join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees,
jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees
or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are
required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial
employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly
confidential records.

The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if
these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated
with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to
the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can
also become company-dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership.

Confidential employees cannot be

classified as rank and file. As previously
discussed, the nature of employment of
confidential employees is quite distinct from
the rank and file, thus, warranting a
separate category. Excluding confidential
employees from the rank and file
bargaining unit, therefore, is not tantamount
to discrimination.
TUNAY NA
PAGKAKAISA NG
As can be gleaned from the above listing, it is rather curious that there
MANGGAGAWA SA would be several secretaries/clerks for just one (1)
ASIA BREWERY vs.
ASIA BREWERY, INC department/division performing tasks which are mostly routine and
clerical. Respondent insisted they fall under the "Confidential and
Executive Secretaries" expressly excluded by the CBA from the rank-
and-file bargaining unit. However, perusal of the job descriptions of
these secretaries/clerks reveals that their assigned duties and
responsibilities involve routine activities of recording and monitoring,
and other paper works for their respective departments while
secretarial tasks such as receiving telephone calls and filing of office
Those who were
correspondence appear to have been commonly imposed as
expressly mentioned in additional duties.23 Respondent failed to indicate who among these
the CBA to be excluded
as members of the numerous secretaries/clerks have access to confidential data relating
union, if found to be
belonging to the rank
to management policies that could give rise to potential conflict of
and file, contrary to the interest with their Union membership. Clearly, the rationale under our
assertions of the
company that they are previous rulings for the exclusion of executive secretaries or division
confidential employees,
may still join the union.
secretaries would have little or no significance considering the lack of
or very limited access to confidential information of these
secretaries/clerks. It is not even farfetched that the job category may
exist only on paper since they are all daily-paid workers. Quite
understandably, petitioner had earlier expressed the view that the
positions were just being "reclassified" as these employees actually
discharged routine functions.

Not being confidential employees, the

secretaries/clerks and checkers are not
disqualified from membership in the Union of
respondent’s rank-and-file employees. Petitioner
argues that respondent’s act of unilaterally
stopping the deduction of union dues from these
employees constitutes unfair labor practice as it
"restrained" the workers’ exercise of their right to
self-organization, as provided in Article 248 (a) of
the Labor Code.
 SMCEU vs. In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is
SMPPE-PDMP
a legitimate labor organization, it has no power to
trade union has directly create a local or chapter. Thus, SMPPEU-
no power to
issue local
PDMP cannot be created under the more lenient
charter requirements for chartering, but must have
certificate complied with the more stringent rules for creation
and registration of an independent union,
including the 20% membership requirement.

Although, a local chapter, given legitimacy or legal personality by the

national or federation union in which it is affiliated, may seek
registration with BLR without having to comply with the 20%
requirement, the same does not apply when the national chapter was
a trade union which the law does not give the power to issue local
charter certificate, hence it still has to comply with the rigid
requirement provided under the law

SMCC-SUPER after a labor organization has been registered, it

vs. Charter
Chemical and may exercise all the rights and privileges of a
Coating legitimate labor organization. Any mingling
Corporation
between supervisory and rank-and-file employees
Mixture of in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for
membership, is that is not among the grounds for cancellation of
not a ground
for cancellation its registration
of registration,
but only
automatic
removal on the
membership
lists of hat the inclusion in a union of disqualified
disqualified
employees employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud.
 NUBE vs. A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its
PEMA
mother union or declare its autonomy. A local
As a result of union, being a separate and voluntary
disaffiliation,
the mother
association, is free to serve the interests of all its
union no longer members including the freedom to disaffiliate or
has the declare its autonomy from the federation which it
entitlement to
receive dues belongs when circumstances warrant, in
as the accordance with the constitutional guarantee of
relationship
has already
freedom of association.
severed.

Also, in effect, NUBE loses it right to collect all

union dues held in its trust by PNB. The moment
that PEMA separated from and left NUBE and
exists as an independent labor organization with a
certificate of registration, the former is no longer
obliged to pay dues and assessments to the latter;
naturally, there would be no longer any reason or
occasion for PNB to continue making deductions.42
As we said in Volkschel Labor Union v. Bureau of
Labor Relations:43

x x x In other words, ALUMETAL [NUBE in this

case] is entitled to receive the dues from
respondent companies as long as petitioner union
is affiliated with it and respondent companies are
authorized by their employees (members of
petitioner union) to deduct union dues. Without
said affiliation, the employer has no link to the
mother union. The obligation of an employee to
pay union dues is coterminous with his affiliation or
membership. "The employees' check-off
authorization, even if declared irrevocable, is good
only as long as they remain members of the union
concerned." A contract between an employer and
the parent organization as bargaining agent for the
employees is terminated bv the disaffiliation ofthe
local of which the employees are members. x x x44
 Cirtek It is well-settled that the Secretary of Labor, in the
Employees
Labor Union exercise of his power to assume jurisdiction under
vs. Cirtek Art. 263 (g)11of the Labor Code, may resolve all
Electronic Inc.
issues involved in the controversy including the
SOLE, by award of wage increases and benefits.12 While an
virtue of his arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an
assumption,
may not be agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties
restricted by because it requires the intervention and imposing
the contents of
a MOA entered
power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor
into by both the when he assumes jurisdiction, the arbitral award
union and can be considered an approximation of a collective
company, nor
does it have bargaining agreement which would otherwise have
the effect of been entered into by the parties, hence, it has the
divesting the
SOLE of his
force and effect of a valid contract obligation.13
jurisdiction. He
may award That the arbitral award was higher than that which
higher than
what is stated
was purportedly agreed upon in the MOA is of no
in the MOA. moment. For the Secretary, in resolving the CBA
deadlock, is not limited to considering the MOA as
basis in computing the wage increases. He could,
as he did, consider the financial documents14
submitted by respondent as well as the parties’
bargaining history and respondent’s financial
outlook and improvements as stated in its
website.15

It bears noting that since the filing and submission

of the MOA did not have the effect of divesting the
Secretary of his jurisdiction, or of automatically
disposing the controversy, then neither should the
provisions of the MOA restrict the Secretary’s
leeway in deciding the matters before him. 1avvphi1

Legend Int’l The legitimacy of the legal personality of a union cannot be

Resorts collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election, but only
Limited vs. through a separate action instituted particularly or the purpose of
KMU- assailing it.
Independent
 St. James The members of Samahang Manggagawa are employees in the
School of Tandang Sora campus. Under its constitution and by-laws, Samahang
Quezon City Manggagawa seeks to represent the motor pool, construction and
vs. SMSJS transportation employees of the Tandang Sora campus.20 Thus, the
computation of the quorum should be based on the rank and file
motor pool, construction and transportation employees of the
Tandang Sora campus and not on all the employees in St. James’ five
campuses.
 Philippine
Diamond Hotel
and Resort Inc.
vs. Manila
Diamond Otel As the appellate court correctly held, the union
Employees officers should be dismissed for staging and
Union participating in the illegal strike, following
Illegal Strike paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code
which provides that ". . .[a]ny union officer who
Union Officers
- mere knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
participation in worker or union officer who knowingly participates
the illegal strike in the commission of illegal acts during strike may
will cost their
employment be declared to have lost his employment status . .
status, ."
Members -
need to An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be
participate in dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike.
the strike AND
commit illegal There must be proof that he committed illegal acts
acts in order to during a strike, unlike a union officer who may be
be dismissed. dismissed by mere knowingly participating in an
illegal strike and/or committing an illegal act during
a strike.51

The appellate court found no convincing and

substantial proof, however, that the strikers-
members of respondent who participated in the
illegal strike committed illegal acts.

The age-old rule governing the relation between

labor and capital or management and employee is
that of a "fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor." If
there is no work performed by the employee there
can be no wage or pay, unless of course, the
laborer was able, willing and ready to work but
was illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended.
It is hardly fair or just for an employee or laborer
to fight or litigate against his employer on the
employer’s time.

only those members of the union who did not

commit illegal acts during the course of the
illegal strike should be reinstated but without
backwages.
Sta. Lucia East The employer may voluntarily recognize the
Corp vs. SOLE
representation status of a union in unorganized
When the establishments.12SLECC was not an unorganized
voluntary
recognition is
establishment when it voluntarily recognized
void, contract SMSLEC as its exclusive bargaining
bar rule does representative on 20 July 2001. CLUP-SLECC and
not apply.
its Affiliates Workers Union filed a petition for
certification election on 27 February 2001 and this
petition remained pending as of 20 July 2001.
Thus, SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC
on 20 July 2001, the subsequent negotiations and
resulting registration of a CBA executed by SLECC
and SMSLEC are void and cannot bar CLUP-
SLECCWA’s present petition for certification
election.

Employer’s Participation in a Petition for

Certification Election

We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC,

filed a motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWA’s
petition for certification election. In petitions for
certification election, the employer is a mere
bystander and cannot oppose the petition or
appeal the Med-Arbiter’s decision. The exception
to this rule, which happens when the employer is
requested to bargain collectively, is not present in
the case before us.13
 Kiok Loy vs. Lock, Stock, and Barrel Doctrine
NLRC

A Company's refusal
to make counter
proposal if considered
in relation to the entire declared the draft proposal of the Union for a collective bargaining
bargaining process, agreement as the governing collective bargaining agreement between
may indicate bad faith the employees and the management
and this is specially
true where the
Union's request for a
counter proposal is
left unanswered.

From the over-all conduct of petitioner company

in relation to the task of negotiation, there can be
no doubt that the Union has a valid cause to
complain against its (Company's) attitude, the
totality of which is indicative of the latter's
disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is
enjoined by the Labor Code — to bargain in good
faith.

We are in total conformity with respondent NLRC's pronouncement

that petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice. It has
been indubitably established that (1) respondent Union was a duly
certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request to bargain,
accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining
Agreement, to the Company not only once but twice which were left
unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no
counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of
a sincere desire to negotiate. 8 A Company's refusal to make counter
proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process,
may indicate bad faith and this is specially true where the Union's
request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. 9 Even during the
period of compulsory arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner
Company's approach and attitude-stalling the negotiation by a series
of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and
undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other
conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an
agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced
good faith or willingness to discuss freely and fully the claims and
demands set forth by the Union much less justify its opposition
thereto.
 Divine Lock Stock and Barrel
University of
Tacloban vs.
SOLE ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. – Any
Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall,
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of
five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be
conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-
day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years
after its execution….

GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union
is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse
that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as
it turned out to be utterly baseless.

Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the

union’s proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it
liable for unfair labor practice.
 Guagua It is settled that a "no strike, no lock-out" provision in the
National CBA "may [only] be invoked by [an] employer when the
Colleges vs strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to
GNCFLU
force wage or other agreements from the employer that are
no strike-no not mandated to be granted by law. It [is not applicable
lockout clause when the strike] is grounded on unfair labor practice."48
does not apply Here, while respondents enumerated four grounds in their
when the notice of strike, the facts of the case reveal that what
ground used by primarily impelled them to file said notice was their
the union is perception of bad faith bargaining and violation of the duty
ULP
to bargain collectively by GNC - charges which constitute
unfair labor practice under Article 248(g) of the Labor Code.

Jurisdiction does not fall within that of voluntary arbitration when ULP is the cause of the

strike.
law

Juri

jur
 Samahan ng Clearly, there is nothing in the foregoing implementing rules
Manggagwa which provides that workers, with definite employers, cannot
sa. Hanjin form or join a workers' association for mutual aid and
Shipyard vs
protection. Section 2 thereof even broadens the coverage of
BLR
workers who can form or join a workers' association. Thus,
Employees the Court agrees with Samahan's argument that the right to
with definite form a workers' association is not exclusive to ambulant,
Employers may intermittent and itinerant workers. The option to form or join
form worker’s a union or a workers' association lies with the workers
association for themselves, and whether they have definite employers or
their mutual aid
not.
and protection

Misrepresentati
on must be
serious in
character for it
No misrepresentation on the part of Samahan to warrant
to be a ground
fro cancellation cancellation of registration
of registration.

In this case, Samahan's registration was cancelled not

because its members were prohibited from forming a
workers' association but because they allegedly committed
misrepresentation for using the phrase, "KAMI, ang mga
Manggagawa sa HAN JIN Shipyard.”

The records of this case reveal no deliberate or malicious intent to

commit misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The use of such
words "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard" in the
preamble of the constitution and by-laws did not constitute
misrepresentation so as to warrant the cancellation of Samahan's
certificate of registration. Hanjin failed to indicate how this phrase
constitutes a malicious and deliberate misrepresentation. Neither was
there any showing that the alleged misrepresentation was serious in
character. Misrepresentation is a devious charge that cannot simply
be entertained by mere surmises and conjectures.

Even granting arguendo that Samahan's members misrepresented

themselves as employees or workers of Hanjin, said
misrepresentation does not relate to the adoption or ratification of its
constitution and by-laws or to the election of its officers.

University of
Immaculate
Conception vs
SOLE
 Insular Hotel
Employees
Union NFL vs.
Waterfront
Insular Hotel
Davao

Coca-Cola
Bottlers Phils.
Inc. vs. Ilocos
Professional
and Technical
Employees
Union

Rivera vs.
Espiritu

Visayan
Electric Co.
Employees
Union vs.
Visayan
Electric Co.
Inc.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE

ULP

Totality of 191714 The Company was held guilty of ULP when its various acts taken
Conduct Rule 2014 together, reasonably support an inference that such were all
orchestrated to restrict the union’s free exercise of their right to self-
T&H organization.
Shopfitters vs.
T&H
Shopfitters
Union

DLSU vs. 177283

DLSUEA- 2009
NAFTEU

St. John 167892

Academy vs. 2006
St. John
Academy
Faculty and
Employees
Union
 ULP

Digitel 184903
Telecommuni -04
catios Phils 2012
Inc. vs. DEU

BPIEU vs. BPI 174912

2013

STRIKE AND LOCKOUT

STRIKE AND LOCKOUT

Naranjo vs. 193789

Biomedica 2012

ILEU, FFU vs. 142824

Interphil 2001
Laboratories

NUHWRAIN vs 163942 The Union is guilty of committing illegal

CA and
166295
strike.
2008 First, Union’s violation of the Hotel's
Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and
concerted action to undermine the authority of and to
embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a
protected action. The appearances of the Hotel
employees directly reflect the character and well-
being of the Hotel, being a Five-star hotel
 STRIKE AND LOCKOUT

Capiol 147080 Respondent Union failed to comply with the mandatory twenty-
Medical 2005 four (24) hour notice to the NCMB for the conduct of a strike
Center vs
NLRC vote.
“Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the
meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote,
the NCMB would be unable to supervise the holding of the
same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of
supervision.”
NSFW vs 59743
Ovejera 1982

NFSW strike is illegall

The NFSW declared the strike six (6) days

after filing a strike notice, i.e., before the lapse of the mandatory
cooling-off period. It also failed to file with the MOLE
before launching the strike a report on the strike-vote, when it
should have filed such report "at least seven (7) days before the
intended strike."

Abaria vs. 154113 Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance
NLRC 2011 with the procedural requirements, a strike may still be held
illegal where the means employed are illegal falling within the
prohibitions under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code.

Supported by actual blocking benches and obstructions, what

the union demonstrated was a very persuasive and quietly
intimidating strategy whose chief aim was to paralyze the
operations of the company, not solely by the work stoppage of
the participating workers, but by excluding the company
officials and non-striking employees from access to and exit
from the company premises. No doubt, the strike caused the
company operations considerable damage.
 STRIKE AND LOCKOUT

G.S. Transport 16030

vs. Infante 2010 an ordinary striking employee cannot be
terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be proof that he
committed illegal acts during the strike
and the striker who participated in the
commission of illegal act must be
identified. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required. Substantial
evidence available under the attendant
circumstances, which may justify the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal,
may suffice.
Automotive 160138
Engine
Rebuilders
Inc. vs
Progresibong
Unyon ng mga
Mangagawa
sa AER
SECURITY OF TENURE
Kinds of Employees

1. Regular
2. Non-Regular
 PROJECT EMPLOYEES

GMA Network 176419 These jobs and undertakings are clearly within the
vs. Fabriga et
al regular or usual business of the employer company
and are not identifiably distinct or separate from the
other undertakings of the company. There is no
denying that the manning of the operations center
to air commercials, acting as transmitter/VTR men,
maintaining the equipment, and acting as
cameramen are not undertakings separate or
distinct from the business of a broadcasting
company.

….if respondents were indeed project employees,

petitioner should have reported the completion of
its projects and the dismissal of respondents in its
finished projects…..

…..private respondents had rendered more than

one (1) year of service at the time of their dismissal
which overturns petitioner’s allegations that private
respondents were hired for a specific or fixed
undertaking for a limited period of time…..

REQUISITES FOR A PROJECT EMPLOYEE TO

ACQUIRE REGULAR EMPLOYMENT STATUS

1) There is a continuous rehiring of project

employees even after cessation of a project; and

2) The tasks performed by the alleged project

employee are vital, necessary and indispensable to
the usual business or trade of the employer.
 Quebral vs. 221897 employers claiming that their workers are project-based
Angbus employees have the burden to prove that these two requisites
Construction concur: (a) the employees were assigned to carry out a
specific project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope
of which were specified at the time they were engaged for such
project.37

When no other evidence is offered, the absence of

employment contracts raises a serious question of whether the
employees were sufficiently apprised at the start of their
employment of their status as project employees.39 Absent
such proof, it is presumed that they are regular employees,
thus, can only be dismissed for just or authorized causes upon
compliance with procedural due process.40

2.2 Indicators of project employment. - Either one or more

of the following circumstances, among others, may be
considered as indicators that an employee is a project
employee.

(a) The duration of the specific/identified undertaking for

which the worker is engaged is reasonably determinable.

(b) Such duration, as well as the specific work/service to be

performed, is defined in an employment agreement and is
made clear to the employee at the time of hiring.

(c) The work/service performed by the employee is in

connection with the particular project/undertaking for which
he is engaged.
(d) The employee, while not employed and awaiting
engagement, is free to offer his services to any other
employer.

(e) The termination of his employment in the particular

project/undertaking is reported to the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office having jurisdiction
over the workplace within 30 days following

the date of his separation from work, using the prescribed

form on employees' terminations/dismissals/suspensions.

(f) An undertaking in the employment contract by the

employer to pay completion bonus to the project employee as
practiced by most construction companies.

By the provision's tenor, the submission of this report, by and

of itself, is therefore not conclusive to confirm the status of
the terminated employees as project employees
 PROJECT EMPLOYEES

Felipe et. al. 218009 length of service or the re-hiring of construction

vs. DDTKI workers on a project-to-project basis does not confer
upon them regular employment status, since their, re-
hiring is only a natural consequence of the fact that
experienced construction workers are preferred. Employees
who are hired for carrying out a separate job, distinct from the
other undertakings of the company, the scope and duration of
which has been determined and made known to the employees
at the time of the employment, are properly treated as project
employees and their services may be lawfully terminated upon
the completion of a project.

Gadia vs. 209499 Verily, for an employee to be considered project-

Sykes Asia
based, the employer must show compliance with
two (2) requisites, namely that: (a) the employee
was assigned to carry out a specific project or
undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of
which were specified at the time they were
engaged for such project.

In this light, the CA correctly ruled that petitioners

were indeed project-based employees,
considering that: (a) they were hired to carry out a
specific undertaking, i.e., the Alltel Project; and (b)
the duration and scope of such project were made
known to them at the time of their engagement, i.e.,
"co-terminus with the project."

As regards the second requisite, the CA correctly

stressed that "[t]he law and jurisprudence dictate
that ‘the duration of the undertaking begins and
ends at determined or determinable times’" while
clarifying that "[t]he phrase ‘determinable times’
simply means capable of being determined or
fixed.

AJNP vs. Commented [1]:

Caramol
SEASONAL EMPLOYEES
Universal 186439 To exclude the asserted "seasonal" employee from
Robina Sugar those classified as regular employees, the
Milling Corp employer must show that: (1) the employee must
vs. Acibo et. be performing work or services that are seasonal
al. in nature; and (2) he had been employed for the
duration of the season.26 Hence, when the
"seasonal" workers are continuously and
repeatedly hired to perform the same tasks or
activities for several seasons or even after the
cessation of the season, this length of time may
likewise serve as badge of regular employment.27
In fact, even though denominated as "seasonal
workers," if these workers are called to work from
time to time and are only temporarily laid off during
the off-season, the law does not consider them
separated from the service during the off-season
period. The law simply considers these seasonal
workers on leave until re-employed.28

To exclude the asserted "seasonal" employee from

those classified as regular employees, the
employer must show that: (1) the employee must
be performing work or services that are seasonal
in nature; and (2) he had been employed for the
duration of the season.26 Hence, when the
"seasonal" workers are continuously and
repeatedly hired to perform the same tasks or
activities for several seasons or even after the
cessation of the season, this length of time may
likewise serve as badge of regular employment.27
In fact, even though denominated as "seasonal
workers," if these workers are called to work from
time to time and are only temporarily laid off during
the off-season, the law does not consider them
separated from the service during the off-season
period. The law simply considers these seasonal
workers on leave until re-employed.28
 SEASONAL EMPLOYEES

Paz vs. 199554 while it may appear that the work of petitioners is
Northern seasonal, inasmuch as petitioners have served the
Tobacco company for many years, some for over 20 years,
Redrying Inc.
performing services necessary and indispensable to
LUTORCO’s business, serve as badges of regular
employment. Moreover, the fact that petitioners do not
work continuously for one whole year but only for the
duration of the tobacco season does not detract from
considering them in regular employment since in a litany
of cases this Court has already settled that seasonal workers
who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily
laid off during off-season are not separated from service in
said period, but are merely considered on leave until re-
employed.

In addition, this court agrees with the Court of Appeals’ award

of financial assistance in the amount of P60,356.2597 by
applying the following formula: one-half-month pay98
multiplied by 29 years in service and then divided by 2.99 cralawred

The amount of P12,487.50 is indeed too meager to support

petitioner Paz who has become old, weak, and unable to find
employment.100 cralawred

Republic Act No. 7641 is a social legislation101 with the purpose

of “provid[ing] for the retiree’s sustenance and hopefully even
comfort, when he [or she] no longer has the stamina to
continue earning his [or her] livelihood.”102 cralawred

Hacienda 179640 SSS Contributions

Cataywa vs.
Lorezo
 CASUAL EMPLOYEES

Kay Products 162472

vs. Austria While the actual regularization of these employees
Martinez entails the mechanical act of issuing regular appointment
papers and compliance with such other operating procedures
as may be adopted by the employer, it is more in keeping with
the intent and spirit of the law to rule that the status of regular
employment attaches to the casual worker on the day
immediately after the end of his first year of service. To rule
otherwise, and to instead make their regularization dependent
on the happening of some contingency or the fulfillment of
certain requirements, is to impose a burden on the employee
which is not sanctioned by law.[23]

FIXED TERM EMPLOYEES

Samonte vs. 193350 Time and again we have held that the power of control refers
La Salle to the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual
Greenhills exercise thereof, nor is it essential for the employer to actually
supervise the performance of duties of the employee.17 It is
enough that the employer has the right to wield that power.

In all, given the following: (1) repeated renewal of petitioners'

contract for fifteen years, interrupted only by the close of the
school year; (2) the necessity of the work performed by
petitioners as school physicians and dentists; and (3) the
existence of LSGI's power of control over the means and
method pursued by petitioners in the performance of their job,
we rule that petitioners attained regular employment, entitled
to security of tenure who could only be dismissed for just and
authorized causes. Consequently, petitioners were illegally
dismissed and are entitled to the twin remedies of payment of
separation pay and full back wages. We order separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement given the time that has lapsed, twelve
years, in the litigation of this case.
 FIXED TERM EMPLOYEES

Convoy 199683 That Albia has become a regular employee is evident from the
Marketing Inc. Delivery Agency Agreements (For Driver)19 - executed for the
vs. Albia periods of November 22, 2002 to April 22, 2003, May 29, 2003
to October 29, 2003, November 11, 2003 to April 10, 2004,
and April 13, 2004 to September 13, 2004 - which indicate
that he had rendered at least one year of broken service with
respect to the same activity in which he was employed from
the time he was hired as a driver on November 22, 2002 until
he was terminated on July 23, 2004.

Purefoods 194969 In the instant case, the private respondents activities

Corp vs. NLRC consisted in the receiving, skinning, loining, packing, and
casing-up of tuna fish which were then exported by the
petitioner. Indisputably, they were performing activities
which were necessary and desirable in petitioners business
or trade.
This scheme of the petitioner was apparently
designed to prevent the private respondents and the other
casual employees from attaining the status of a regular
employee. It was a clear circumvention of the employees
right to security of tenure and to other benefits like minimum
wage, cost-of-living allowance, sick leave, holiday pay, and
13th month pay. [11] Indeed, the petitioner succeeded in
evading the application of labor laws. Also, it saved itself
from the trouble or burden of establishing a just cause for
terminating employees by the simple expedient of refusing
to renew the employment contracts.
The five-month period specified in private
respondents employment contracts having been imposed
precisely to circumvent the constitutional guarantee on
security of tenure should, therefore, be struck down or
disregarded as contrary to public policy or morals. [12] To
uphold the contractual arrangement between the petitioner
and the private respondents would, in effect, permit the
former to avoid hiring permanent or regular employees by
simply hiring them on a temporary or casual basis, thereby
violating the employees security of tenure in their jobs.[13]

122563
 FIXED TERM EMPLOYEES

ABS-CBN 184977 To the mind of the Court, respondents’ repeated

hiring of petitioners for its long-running news
program positively indicates that the latter were
ABS-CBN’s regular employees

If the employee has been performing the job for at

least one year, even if the performance is not
continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems
the repeated or continuing performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not
indispensability of that activity in the business.29
Indeed, an employment stops being co-terminous
with specific projects where the employee is
continuously re-hired due to the demands of the
employer’s business.30 When circumstances show,
moreover, that contractually stipulated periods of
employment have been imposed to preclude the
acquisition of tenurial security by the employee,
this Court has not hesitated in striking down such
arrangements as contrary to public policy, morals,
good customs or public order.31 The nature of the
employment depends, after all, on the nature of the
activities to be performed by the employee,
considering the nature of the employer’s business,
the duration and scope to be done, and, in some
cases, even the length of time of the performance
and its continued existence.32 In the same manner
that the practice of having fixed-term contracts in
the industry does not automatically make all talent
contracts valid and compliant with labor law, it has,
consequently, been ruled that the assertion that a
talent contract exists does not necessarily prevent
a regular employment status.33

199166
 PROBATIONARY
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 183200 Firstly, if the clause in the appointment letter did
OIL COMPANY-ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT -01
CORPORATION vs. cause an ambiguity in the employment status of
BUENVIAJE
183253 Buenviaje, we hold that the ambiguity should be
183257
resolved in her favor. This is in line with the policy
under our Labor Code to afford protection to labor
and to construe doubts in favor of labor.

Of equal significance, the job description attached

to Buenviaje's appointment letter merely answers
the question: "what duties and responsibilities does
the position entail?", but fails to provide the
answer/s to the question: "how would the employer
gauge the performance of the probationary
employee?". The job description merely contains
her job identification, her immediate superior and
subordinates, a list of her job objectives, duties and
responsibilities, and the qualification guidelines
required of her position (i.e., minimum education,
minimum experience, and special skills). There is
no question that performance of duties and
responsibilities is a necessary standard for
qualifying for regular employment. It does not stop
on mere performance, however. There must be a
measure as to how poor, fair, satisfactory, or
excellent the performance has been. PNOC-EDC,
in fact, used an appraisal form when it evaluated
the performance of Buenviaje twice. A copy of this
appraisal form, unlike in Abbot, was not given to
Buenviaje at any time prior to, during the time of
her engagement, and the incipient stages of her
employment. A comparison of the job description
and the standards in the appraisal form reveals
that they are distinct. The job description is just
that, an enumeration of the duties and
responsibilities of Buenviaje.
Abbott vs. 192571 First off, the Court must correct Alcaraz’s mistaken
Alcaraz
notion: it is not the probationary employee’s job
description but the adequate performance of his
duties and responsibilities which constitutes the
inherent and implied standard for regularization. To
echo the fundamental point of the Decision, if the
probationary employee had been fully apprised by
his employer of these duties and responsibilities,
then basic knowledge and common sense dictate
that he must adequately perform the same, else he
fails to pass the probationary trial and may
therefore be subject to termination.8

The determination of "adequate performance" is

not, in all cases, measurable by quantitative
specification, such as that of a sales quota in
Alcaraz’s example. It is also hinged on the
qualitative assessment of the employee’s work; by
its nature, this largely rests on the reasonable
exercise of the employer’s management
prerogative. While in some instances the
standards used in measuring the quality of work
may be conveyed – such as workers who construct
tangible products which follow particular metrics,
not all standards of quality measurement may be
reducible to hard figures or are readily articulable
in specific pre-engagement descriptions. A good
example would be the case of probationary
employees whose tasks involve the application of
discretion and intellect, such as – to name a few –
lawyers, artists, and journalists. In these kinds of
occupation, the best that the employer can do at
the time of engagement is to inform the
probationary employee of his duties and
responsibilities and to orient him on how to
properly proceed with the same. The employer
cannot bear out in exacting detail at the beginning
of the engagement what he deems as "quality
work" especially since the probationary employee
has yet to submit the required output. In the
ultimate analysis, the communication of
performance standards should be perceived within
the context of the nature of the probationary
employee’s duties and responsibilities.

The same logic applies to a probationary

managerial employee who is tasked to supervise a
particular department, as Alcaraz in this case. It is
1âwphi1

hardly possible for the employer, at the time of the

employee’s engagement, to map into technical
indicators, or convey in precise detail the quality
standards by which the latter should effectively
manage the department. Factors which gauge the
ability of the managerial employee to either deal
with his subordinates (e.g., how to spur their
performance, or command respect and obedience
from them), or to organize office policies, are hardly
conveyable at the outset of the engagement since
the employee has yet to be immersed into the work
itself. Given that a managerial role essentially
connotes an exercise of discretion, the quality of
effective management can only be determined
through subsequent assessment. While at the time
of engagement, reason dictates that the employer
can only inform the probationary managerial
employee of his duties and responsibilities as such
and provide the allowable parameters for the
same. Verily, as stated in the Decision, the
adequate performance of such duties and
responsibilities is, by and of itself, an implied
standard of regularization.
 PROBATIONARY

182072 It is primordial that at the start of the probationary

period, the standards for regularization be made
known to the probationary employee.31 In this case,
as held by the CA, petitioner failed to present
adequate evidence to substantiate its claim that
respondent was apprised of said standards. It is
evident from the LA and NLRC decisions that they
merely relied on surmises and presumptions in
concluding that respondent should have known the
standards considering his educational background
as a law graduate. Equally important is the
requirement that in order to invoke "failure to meet
the probationary standards" as a justification for
dismissal, the employer must show how these
standards have been applied to the subject
employee. In this case, aside from its bare
allegation, it was not shown that a performance
evaluation was conducted to prove that his
performance was indeed unsatisfactory.

495
Phil
706

CONTRACTUAL

Petron vs 182255 From the foregoing, it is clear that Petron failed to

Caberte
discharge its burden of proving that ABC is not a
labor-only contractor. Consequently, and as
warranted by the facts, the Court declares ABC as
a mere labor-only contractor. "A finding that a
contractor is a ‘labor-only’ contractor is equivalent
to declaring that there is an employer-employee
relationship between the principal and the
employees of the supposed contractor, and the
‘labor-only’ contractor is considered as a mere
agent of the principal, the real employer."52
Accordingly in this case, Petron is declared to be
the true employer of respondents who are
considered regular employees in view of the fact
that they have been regularly performing activities
 PROBATIONARY

which are necessary and desirable to the usual

business of Petron for a number of years.

Termination of Employment

1. Just Causes

SERIOUS MISCONDUCT

197556

188465

212070

194884

187226

187417

115791

116568

187605

193676

211497

208163

121035

177 scra 626

 SERIOUS MISCONDUCT

124617
2.

WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE

194813

181490

153150
3.

GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT

168215

172044

ABANDONMENT OF WORK

168317

188771

FRAUD and WILLFUL BREACH OF TRUST REPOSED

169564

176893

192587

198620

185122

COMMISSION OF A CRIME

OTHER ANALOGOUS CASES

167286

174893

170287
2. AUTHORIZED CAUSES

INSTALLATION OF LABOR SAVING DEVICES

165594

RETRENCHMENT

181738

192518

165381