1st Case

Marriage as Special Contract; Marriage as a Social Institution; Essential Requisites of Marriage

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North
Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo
cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change
of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex
in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207,
impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita
Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth
(birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that
he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors
in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel,
as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now
possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should
not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting
the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner
and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and
publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change
the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel
Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the
ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to
413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial
court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry
changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name
is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change
of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of
first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent
and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition
for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not
alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20
In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that
court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could
be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under
RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where
his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice
him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his
first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical
errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed
only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of
nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It
is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization;
(11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on
the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name).
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a
person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights
in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce,
and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status.
In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s
cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or,
in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth
in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil
registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent
of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone;
(d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations
to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the
civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being
no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function
that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces
ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register
Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included
in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed
that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the
trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-
female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be
granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in
the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else.
The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of
their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation
do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed
an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his Bachelor of Science in Statistics and Master of Arts, in
the University of the Philippines. He took up Population Studies Program, Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor of
Philosophy in Sociology at the University of Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
2 This consisted of "penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral oschiectomy [or orchiectomy which is the surgical
excision of the testes] penile skin inversion vaginoplasty [plastic surgery of the vagina] clitoral hood reconstruction and
augmentation mammoplasty [surgical enhancement of the size and shape of the breasts]." Id.

3 On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.

4 Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.

5 Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).

6 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.

7 Special Sixth Division.

8 Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Aurora Santiago-
Lagman concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.

9 Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.

10 An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical
Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending
for the Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

11 Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005, 454 SCRA 155.

12 Id.

13 K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).

14 Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name or nickname given to a person which may consist of one
or more names in addition to the middle names and last names. Thus, the term "first name" will be used here to refer
both to first name and nickname.

15 The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. – xxx xxx xxx

Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general, the petitioner may either appeal
the decision to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.

16 SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any person having direct and personal interest in the correction
of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file, in
person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to
be corrected or changed is kept.

In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be practical for such party, in
terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person before the local civil registrar keeping the
documents to be corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where
the interested party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then communicate
to facilitate the processing of the petition.

Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file their petition, in person,
with the nearest Philippine Consulates.

The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be processed in accordance with this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames may be availed of only once.
17 SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn
to before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish
the merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated.
The petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the change
sought to be made.

The petition shall be supported with the following documents:

(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing the entry or entries sought
to be corrected or changed;

(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the correction or change
shall be based; and

(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general may consider relevant
and necessary for the approval of the petition.

In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with the documents mentioned in
the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published at least once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification from the
appropriate law enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.

18 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 189.

19 Supra note 11.

20 Id.

21 In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).

22 Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).

23 Id.

24 Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 420.

25 Id.

26 Id.

27 Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).

28 Salonga, Jovito, Private International Law, 1995 Edition, Rex Bookstore, p. 238.

29 This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the Civil Code which authorizes the
recording of acts, events and judicial decrees or the correction or change of errors including those that occur after birth.
Nonetheless, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth are not be corrected or changed. The decision of the
court granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil register in the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil Register of Manila, supra note 24)

30 The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes "male" or "female" but the genitals of the child are that of
the opposite sex.

31 Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all man-made. The body that he inhabits is a male body in all aspects other
than what the physicians have supplied.

32 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.

33 Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.

34 In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221 (No. 2002-T-0149, slip op., Not Reported in N.E.2d,
2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist., December 31, 2003), citing Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1999).

35 Id.

36 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619.

37 Article 1, Family Code.

38 Article 2(1), Id.

39 These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include nightwork prohibition, facilities for women, prohibition
on discrimination and stipulation against marriage, among others.

40 These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on qualified seduction, simple seduction and acts of
lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party and Articles 342 and 343 on forcible and consented abduction,
among others.

41 Section 3(jj)(4).
2nd Case

Authority of the Solemnizing Officer

Read: Administrative Order No. 125-2007

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has
submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga,
despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the
Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his
actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-
MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16,
"Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on
the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife
have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing
the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states
that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and
that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for
a resolution of the case. 2

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they
will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively
assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status
is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in
evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as
claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew
Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she
has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already
dead.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's
presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of
the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling
under Article 41."

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles
7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases
of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where
both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage between
Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a
marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of
death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement
to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place.
Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario. 4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under
Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage
may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8,
which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority
of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within
the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions
therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the
cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to
apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply,
more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to
expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in
an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages
in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent
judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to
cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6)
months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

3rd Case
Valid Marriage License

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner’s appeal and affirming the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000,
dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8
December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.4 They got married on
the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing
a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a
sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local
civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage
void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract5 and its entry on file.6

Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains
that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. Contrary to petitioner’s representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14
October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with
whom he has three children.8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of
merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) per month as support for their
two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and

3. To pay the costs.11

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. His Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.12

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had
not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties’ marriage contract being a public
document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal
and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the
solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133
despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license
number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this
Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules
to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.14

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage
license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for
them.15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro
who solemnized the marriage belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of
the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita
Almario"17 but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19

Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.21

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the
court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability
to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that
the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage
license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S.
Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the
deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony
took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license,
the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this
case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to
this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario,
further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued
in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may
serve.26

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official business.27 The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to
an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these,
petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.29

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner
and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of
the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.30 An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states
that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not
impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals
the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It
therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the
parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,32 petitioner cannot pretend that he was
not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage
license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person.
He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise,
knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited
to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage
betrays his bad faith.34

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same
marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a
gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.lavvphi1

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the
marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in
petitioner’s testimony as follows—

WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.

COURT

What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.

WITNESS

I don’t remember your honor.

COURT

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?

WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don’t know if it is good enough
for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage Contract?

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which
Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS

Yes your honor.35

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time.
Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect
attended the civil wedding.36

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and who
facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be
presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed
from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
fulfilled the requirements of law.38

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.39 Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption
with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February
2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice
4th Case

Valid Marriage License

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas.1 As ground therefor, Castro
claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial
proceeded in his absence.

The controlling facts are undisputed:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo
M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no.
3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents.
Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together.
However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971,
Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status
before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of
her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior
to the celebration of their marriage.

As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:

February 20, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay
City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license 
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the
municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Senior Civil Registry Officer

Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license.
Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in
Pasay City.

The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-
issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of
the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."

Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the
local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.

As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between
the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification
issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such
license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated
testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner
thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow
the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.

Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court
disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he
attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization
of the subject marriage.

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to
the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.

We affirm the impugned Decision.

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil
Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio. 5

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the
effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.

We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:

Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his
deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data. 6

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied
by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search
and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting
parties.

The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to
deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of
a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase
but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either
or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown
to the parents of the former.

Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband,
Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he
chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted
for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show
that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.

It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is
null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting
to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.

In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Filed on February 19, 1987 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50117.

2 Decision dated June 30, 1987, issued by Presiding Judge Antonio P. Solano, Quezon City RTC, Branch LXXXVI; Rollo, pp.
46-48.

3 Sixteenth Division, penned by Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, with Mr. Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, concurring; Decision dated November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 38-42.

4 Articles 53 (4) and 58, New Civil Code.

5 Article 80 (3), New Civil Code.

5th Case

Valid Marriage License

Read: Sec. 15 RA 10354

SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416
dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No.
94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.

In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through
machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired
Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they
were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father
of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to
Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any
marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May
1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both
marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from
invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.

The trial court made the following findings:

In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before
a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage
Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father
accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although marriage
license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same
was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued
by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said
office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh.
"F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding
and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in
his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support
him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship
turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living
apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time
when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against
defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.

Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and
after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of
San Juan where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994
(Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of
San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and
September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry,
the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F")
and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony,
having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San
Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."

Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994,
March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office
failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).

Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after they met and were
introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty
pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff,
she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff
proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents
were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of everything,
and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him
in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a
minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home
separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since
defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further
stated that there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally
had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was
undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug
habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless
pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex,"
while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff
exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A
compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like
amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or
downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit
to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during
all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an English
teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically
and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela
Garcia in 1991 in the United States.

Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff;
that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and
his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's
expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all
the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the
couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil
with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.

As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in
order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce
decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact
authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff
identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the
marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus
appears to be fictitious.6

In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following
justifications:

Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the
marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of
the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that
no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on
the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x
x x.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized
by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under
religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite
marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local
Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.

Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the
Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information.7

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed
with the trial court and held:

In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,
unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."

In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already
retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage
contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of
the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed
to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available
for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.

xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his
union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately
was not substantiated with facts on record.8

Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6
April 2005.

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration
of the marriages in question;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts,
particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts in question which
show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila,
and

3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the
admitted "fact of marriage."9

At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued,
are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles
53,10 5811 and 80.12

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage
between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.

At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground
of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this
Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:

[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In
Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of
a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome.
It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage
license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner
conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence,
the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line
with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist
in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be
sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by
his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.

We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with
Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.

The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number
2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License
Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage
License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA
CARDENAS-SEVILLA.

This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore,
appear to be fictitious.

This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve.

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our
full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to
its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was
issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said
logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear
on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured.
This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things the register of
application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal,
from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?

A No, sir.

Q Why not?

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office maintains as required by
the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?

COURT

May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.

xxxx

COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by their office while with
respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued.
Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could
not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued or not?

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook
where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official
function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.

According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is among the disputable presumptions.

In one case, it was held:

A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is
no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One
such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform
a duty.22

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in
the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can
also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of
diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence
or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of the marriage.25

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two
offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity.
Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the
nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28

Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based
on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State
can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.29

"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is
that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure
is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.'
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.31

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said
in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20
December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

Footnotes

1 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A.
Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-31.

2 Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.

3 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-4.

4 Id. at 5.

5 Id. at 232.

6 Rollo, pp. 47-50.

7 Id. at 50-52.

8 Id. at 29-31.

9 Id. at 80-81.

10 ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

11 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article
75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides.

12 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional charater.

13 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133-134.

14 G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.

15 Records, Vol. I, p. 103.

16 Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before the trial court that in his letter requesting for the issuance
of a certification, addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, he mistakenly read the Marriage License No. as
2880792 instead of 2770792. (Records, Vol. II, pp. 725-726.)

17 Id. at 228.

18 Records, Vol. II, p. 888.

19 Id. at 735-737.

20 Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

xxxx

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted
and overcome by other evidence;

xxxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

21 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, 9 February 1994, 229 SCRA 795, 798-799.

22 Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224 (2003).

23 Article 220 Civil Code, Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 655 (2000).

24 Ricardo J. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed., 1999), p. 77.

25 Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 735, 740.

26 Records, Vol. II, p. 413, TSN, 11 April 1996.

27 Id. at p. 414.

28 Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 663 (2000).

29 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180-181 (1996) cited in Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, 4 March 2004,
424 SCRA 725, 740.

30 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 709 (1999).

31 Id.

32 G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 439.

6th Case

Marriage Ceremony

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch
4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate court, dated
September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of
Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained
constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which
was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran
City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court
of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
[City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied
upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of
Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and
void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not
a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void
even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted
by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the second
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact
that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of
Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by
Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been
dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a
bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be
accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public
policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual
by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for
good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However, the denial was by a split
vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined
in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly
declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE
FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense
of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court.
He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy
would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in
the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and
hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference
between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that
his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient
but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can
be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is
of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in
good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020,
seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all
the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of
Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into
by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED.21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of
the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was
no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words,
for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date
of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show
that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become
final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle
of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract
of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was
not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We
held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One
who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle
applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before
a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and
weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances
of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on
the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED
from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon
and Edgardo P. Cruz.

2 Records, pp. 114-119.

3 Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Marina L. Buzon,
concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis, dissenting.

4 Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh. "B," the copy of their marriage contract.
Records, p. 10.

5 The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1, reads:

"That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23,
1990 and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the amount to
be proved during trial.

"Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code."

6 Rollo, pp. 38-40.

7 Records, p. 119.

8 G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.

9 42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).

10 58 Phil. 817 (1933).

11 Rollo, p. 43.

12 ART. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

13 Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

14 Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of
the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

15 G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.

16 Rollo, p. 51.
17 Id. at 20-21.

18 G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.

19 Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

20 Supra.

21 CA Rollo, p. 38.

22 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.

23 Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated
in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

24 Rollo, p. 54.

25 G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.

26 Id. at 124.
7th Case

Marriage Ceremony

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
(RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March
29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to
secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding
gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also
known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the
latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in
the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited
guests.4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil
sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the
aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the
petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had
lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they take each
other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the
couple.9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount
to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00
fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage
ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further
ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352
of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of
the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of
the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment
of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these
laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00.12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in
"blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC,
however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite
for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.14 According
to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a
requirement in a marriage ceremony.15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent
on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it
covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and
does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally
constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the
verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The
petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared that
they take each other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State
cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral
guidance to the couple.20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude
the filing of the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44
of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its
"illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from
Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial
amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage
ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form
of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the
minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by
witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven,
through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband
and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge
may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness
and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions
he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars
it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances
of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take
each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome
these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph
and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the State from
qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been
duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting
its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and
that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State
is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation
of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum
requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of
the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage
certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he
conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s
knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present
case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in
the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall
be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections
39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized by
the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in
force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any
bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or
publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate
solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in
violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine
of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the regulations
to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable
in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the
MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It
is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point,
Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation
of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted
after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No.
31028.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 3-26.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Ramon M.
Bato, Jr.; id. at 28-55.
3 From the testimonies of Joseph Yere, id. at 89-90; Mary Anne Yere, id. at 182-183; the petitioner, id. at 118-123, 129
and 133-136; Joey Umadac, id. at 145-153; and Dominador Umadac, id. at 166-167.

4 Id. at 30.

5 Id. at 29.

6 Id. at 35.

7 Id. at 36-37.

8 Id. at 85-86 (TSN dated August 5, 2004 of Florida Umadac, p. 14).

9 Id. at 31.

10 Id. at 49-50.

11 Id. at 60-61.

12 Id. at 62-63.

13 Id. at 68.

14 Id. at 46.

15 Id. at 51.

16 Ibid.

17 Id. at 12-14.

18 Id. at 15.

19 Id. at 15-16.

20 Id. at 18.

21 Ibid.

22 Id. at 19.

23 Art. 55. No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties with legal capacity to contract
marriage must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that
they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by
signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage.

24 Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties with legal capacity to
contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age,
that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by
signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage.

25 Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary,
however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained
in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the
solemnizing officer.

26 This provision was taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which was, in turn, a reproduction of Section 3 of the
Marriage Law.
27

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.

28 People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68, 115 (2000).

29 Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
8th Case

Effect of Defect in the Essential Requisites of Marriage

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as
void from the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case
for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being
duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee
Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using
the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains
the wife of respondent.
xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of
Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she
did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained
that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite
of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter
into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose
was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of
$2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR
THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire
American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a
marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of
immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the
sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a
particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited
purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of
their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom
did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of
the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus,
shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration
laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made
no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had
agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned
Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage,
there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no
matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not
in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage
at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put
an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must
assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or
cover, to deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage
entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided
"merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The
problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United
States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to
achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other
than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In
its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared
void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of
$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build
a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family
Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest.
A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into
the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to
be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages
in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There
is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable
intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage
can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family
life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only
be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that
a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages
in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not,
and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law,
may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot
declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the
purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only
the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a
sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage
for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore,
under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there
is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared
void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the
parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it
to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414
is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITER J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
9th Case

Effect of Defect in the Formal Requisites of Marriage

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of
the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

PER CURIAM, J.:

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I,
Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge
and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-
issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring
payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers
of Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C.
Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was
however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself
for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled
from the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license.
Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco
Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater
and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts
(Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent
judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that
he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days
after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant
Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage
licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said
marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were
already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against
her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register
which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage
contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage
contracts in preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of
the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to
follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed
to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls
under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict
instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same
with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently
formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which
was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were
not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the
date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo;
that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato
Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he
refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina
Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid
embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains
unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages solemnized and the number
of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July,
1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise
made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will
show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that
respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00
therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by respondent
judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only
one who should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely based
on the payments made as solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers
that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for
whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered
to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00
charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150
goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by complainant
Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was intentionally
placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on solemnization
fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that
there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official
receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted
payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by
complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore,
respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he
merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the
Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were
surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out
that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to
respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when
she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air
conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in
his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to the
Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the
appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of
court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended
as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara
was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of
P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has
been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it
has not been shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned over
to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited
with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper
procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver
the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash
bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom
was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while
Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to
conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners and that he
has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had been pending for more
than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding
receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she
deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was
on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued
a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead,
was instructed to deposit the same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her
account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other
P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted
to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative matter. We have
perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive
presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his
industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply substantiated by the
evidence and supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material
portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with
having solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano
Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma
Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show the number of the
marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting
parties and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the
marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate
as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said
marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil
Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a
marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of
Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-
3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they
were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage was solemnized and bring
with them their marriage license. In the meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife
believing that the formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties
allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there
was no date stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage
certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge
Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of
the contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage
as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited and
the place of the parties where the reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from
the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign the marriage
certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not
furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage.
His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among
others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their
marriage license and whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificate in
front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization
of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all
those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed
as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged
reasons given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument
of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did
not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized
their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not
required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband
and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano
was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together
as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit,
Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and
this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage
as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint
affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and
Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he
solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage
he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did
not follow his instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he solemnized
the marriage and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a
marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was
only made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and
Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage
under exceptional character where a marriage license was not required, why did he already require the parties
to have a marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as
the marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized and that the contracting
parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those
grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning.
Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs.
H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his
personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his
duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita
Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon
did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents
that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On
cross-examination, however, both admitted that they did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were
just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the
Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed
by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the
other aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992
and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was
no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she
was asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the
marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of
Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she did not
even know that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D).
The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee,
but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge
Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony
(Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the contracting parties and
their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to
whom he assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses
sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others.
His purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four
(4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal, because the
contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take each
other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before
they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and procedure before
solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte
(Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge
Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after
Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4)
marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only
twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His
monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the
whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and
marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued
by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify
in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is
not charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he
solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report of cases submitted
to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of documents notarized and
issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar
as the monthly report of cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the
respondents, show that for said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his
capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because
there were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not,
however, present evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns
were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents notarized should not
be based on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number of documents
placed or recorded in the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore the correctness of the
monthly reports because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to
have checked and verified the records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already signed by
respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have close supervision in the
preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is
personally responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr.,
102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the
inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly report of cases on
complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the
preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her own
admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet according to her
she never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the number of documents notarized
in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was
denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the data given to him by her,
still it is her duty to verify and check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage contracts, notarized
documents and notarial register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as clerk of court she
was supposed to be in custody, control and supervision of all court records including documents and other
properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from January, 1992 she
was already in full control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification, however, also shows that
respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those documents
notarized during the month of July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently
show that she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer;
and that she only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although
the documents notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial
register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though
the notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each
document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared
that what was actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme
Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial
fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50.
This should be fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed
by her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by
Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages were not solemnized
due to lack of marriage license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting
parties made a demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when
solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the notarial fees. This is
difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference of
the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the
personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection
of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents
notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo to
turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on
this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of
the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the
amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office and for this cash
bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the
Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case
where the cash bond was deposited informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this administrative case
was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an
account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was
the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of this
case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or order from the court. It was
only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash
bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash
bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash
bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy
just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or
(with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that
they would settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when Judge
Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary
receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and collections she received. She further admitted that
some of these temporary receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that receipt
marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the official
receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was already filed, when she only
started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge
Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this charge, show that on August
24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos
(Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was
brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box
when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on
installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the
respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both
respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a time when she was
applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in October, 1991.
From the time she bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge
Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt
dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily prepared. The
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is
between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at
least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this charge that
Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit,
however, has no probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the
hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in his house and one of
them escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact, the case against said accused
was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge, show
that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano
and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur
(Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from
the municipal jail where said accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon
is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have presented records from
the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was
under detention and said accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears
to be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that the
warrant of arrest (was) issued against the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for the
warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however, show that in fact
there was a return of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe
were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to
one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted because the two other accused,
Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who
allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did
not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was because he heard from the
police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the
police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should have been required to explain in writing why Alano was
not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his
arrest. It is only later on when he could not be arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The
order archiving this case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which
gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants
could not present records or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection cases filed by the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws
and that the filing fees received was deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The
evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for
collection against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees.
The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the
payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac
as it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her
part Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that respondent
Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not
pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really exempt from the
payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its
cases be submitted to the court in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made
on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on
March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently show that
respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty
in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of cases being submitted to the
Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it has been proven that the
reports for said two (2) months were falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is
respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning
that the same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages he
solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they
were solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil
Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing
alone a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the
irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code
of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of closely supervising his
clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly
report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of cases
only when his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her,
to check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not contain false
statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court
personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the
months of July and September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for having failed to
account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the
solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned;
for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the
cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued
only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26,
1993, or after one year and five months in her possession and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing
said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or authority and
redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from
Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an
unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal
Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay
filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00)
Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully
recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to
the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn
except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127,
Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official
receipt upon receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with the
municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order
of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court
Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary
character including rental deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt
thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any
of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even
intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and
responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her
duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of
Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9,
1993, it was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by
him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer.
Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's
failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her
misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty
and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and (the Court) ordered her immediate
dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized
by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example
of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It
applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being
standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it
declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab
initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we
are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law."9 This is of course, within the province of the
prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge should,
therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear
that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and
the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as
hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the
performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with
a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt
with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.
Bidin, J., is on leave.
10th Case

Effect of Absence of Certificate of Legal Capacity

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on
evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and
the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12,
1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties."3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued
by the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single"
and "Filipino."8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground
of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending
– respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down."13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.14
The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence
of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized
in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the
marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree
obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify
or annual.

Hence, this Petition.18

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto
terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the
applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained
by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the
divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition
in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged
divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the
presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place
where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad
by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.27

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for
such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

xxx xxx xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased
spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a written official act of
an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry
of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37 Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the
divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound
by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting
an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice
of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of
the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations
in their answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden
of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry
her in 1994.

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends
it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in
effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which
was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only
after proof of good behavior.47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits
the offence of bigamy."48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of
the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to
remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence
as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together
with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal
capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned.
The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of
legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of
the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for
petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-
Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate
of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment
between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act
1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo
erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring
him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.
After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the
divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may
declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the
other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the
purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that,
of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura; rollo, pp. 7-9.

2 Rollo, p. 10.

3 Ibid, p. 9.

4 Rollo, p. 37.

5 Ibid., p. 47.

6 Id., p. 44.

7 Id., p. 36.

8 Annex "I"; temporary rollo, p. 9.

9 The couple secured an Australian "Statutory Declaration" of their legal separation and division of conjugal assets. See
Annexes "3" and "4" of Respondent's Comment; rollo, p. 48.

10 Id., pp. 33-35.

11 Id., p. 39.

12 Amended Answer, p. 2; rollo, p. 39.

13 Id., pp. 77-78.

14 Id., p. 43.

15 Rollo, pp. 48-51.

16 TSN, December 16, 1998, pp. 1-8; records, pp. 172-179.

17 RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.

18 The case was deemed submitted for decision on January 11, 2000, upon this Court's receipt of the Memorandum for
petitioner, signed by Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba. The Memorandum for respondent, signed by Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of
Gomez and Associates, had been filed on December 10, 1999.
19 Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 242-243.

20 43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922.

21 Ruben F. Balane, "Family Courts and Significant Jurisprudence in Family Law," Journal of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, 1st & 2nd Quarters, 2001, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 25.

22 "ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."

23 "ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of
the country in which they are executed.

xxx xxx xxx

"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."

25 Tenchaves v. Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29, 1965; Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67, 71-72, March
7, 1933.

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a).

"Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law." (As amended by EO 227, prom. July 27, 1987).

26 Cf. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143-144, October 8, 1985; and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, 663,
June 30, 1989.1âwphi1.nêt

27 Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., supra.

28 Ibid., p. 143.

29 For a detailed discussion of Van Dorn, see Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 ed. pp. 295-300. See also Jose C.
Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 16;

30 "SEC. 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.

"Public documents are:

"(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.

xxx xxx x x x."

31 Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p. 3511; §3, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence provides that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself."

32 "SEC. 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.

Public documents are:

"(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.

xxx xxx x x x."

33 "Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose
of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court."

34 "Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office."

See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 550-551, September 25, 1998; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133-134, May 6, 1988.

35 The transcript of stenographic notes states that the original copies of the divorce decrees were presented in court (TSN,
December 16, 1998, p. 5; records, p. 176), but only photocopies of the same documents were attached to the records
(Records, Index of Exhibit, p. 1.).

36 TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.

37 TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.

38 People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945, November 28, 1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1, 3, November 10, 1908; People v.
Diaz, 271 SCRA 504, 516, April 18, 1997; De la Torre v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196, 203-204, August 14, 1998, Maunlad
Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 114942, November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9.

39 Art. 15, Civil Code.

40 Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 566.

41 Ricardo J. Francisco, Evidence: Rules of Court in the Philippines, second edition, p. 382.

42 Ibid., p. 384.

43 Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119602, October 56, 2000, p. 7.

44 Francisco, p. 29, citing De los Angeles v. Cabahug, 106 839, December 29, 1959.

45 274 CJS, 15-17, §1.

46 Ibid., p. 611-613, §161.

47 27A CJS, 625, §162.

48 Rollo, p. 36.

49 "SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

"In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."

50 In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal
requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity
of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-
126); Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 197 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code
of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.).

51 Records, pp. 1-3.

52 Ibid., p. 4.

53 Id., p. 5.

54 Id., p. 180.

55 Id., pp. 170-171.

26 Id., pp. 84-89.

57 Id., pp. 181-182.

58 Id., pp. 40-41.

59 Id., pp. 183.

60 Id., pp. 184-187.

11th Case

Proof of Marriage (in relation to Article 22 of the Family Code)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case
No. 26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now
deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized
on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact
of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon,
Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30
March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H.
Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known.
In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name
of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her
children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal
surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on
30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the
properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged
prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar,
Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the
early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September
1942;12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War issued by the Office of the
Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth
of Climaco Avenido;13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3
March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her
knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth
documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:

1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he contracted marriage with the
petitioner although he had a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely:
Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria,
Surigao del Norte;19 and

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del
Norte.20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of
the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s
fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s counter-claim. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby
DISMISSED.22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence
of her marriage to Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while
pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void.
The CA ruled:

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO
who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30
September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition
sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court
has disregarded.24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity
of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25 dated 5 June
2008, raises the following legal issues:

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a subsequent
marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of the execution or
existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;

and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the existence of a valid
marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the witness stand.26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the
marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present
her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944.
The same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court
observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B")
stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945.
What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which
starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the
records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon,
Bohol.27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses
as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not
even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as
they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary
evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially
that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial
court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has
been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua
non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded.
They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez
v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred.
The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven
by secondary evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the
document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as
foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

xxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of
parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at
all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document,
when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of
such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.
But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who
saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss,
or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument
[has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony
and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial
evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a
living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These
are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were
clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove
the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the
parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO
who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30
September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition
sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court
has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and
Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is
AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
12th Case

Presumption of Marriage

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No.
61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo
Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he
begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by
her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died
and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who
was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children, namely:
Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco
Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).

At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried (Brief for
respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the
Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).

On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto,
Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed
Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the
Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the
adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus,
on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners
caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were
issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).

On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower
court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their
common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the
third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10).
Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling
defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the
plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record
on Appeal, p. 4).

The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the
complaint was one for recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial
court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:

It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by counsel for the defendants are
of erroneous application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).

However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court, in its
decision stating thus:

The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous enjoyment and
possession of status of children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either premise, and it is clear that
this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)

The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court committed an error ". . . in not
finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding
(that) they (appellants) are not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . "
(Rollo, pp. 14-15).

On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo
Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in
the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually
acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall
reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a
project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and
outstanding legal obligations.

The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence,
this petition which was given due course by the court on December 7, 1981.

The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right
to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly
filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues
hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private
respondents.

The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . .
and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as
his children and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their
relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled
to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared
as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the
decedent (Ibid, p. 10).

A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally one of partition. The
allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the
estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action filed
in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158
SCRA 282 [1988]).

It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the law, it does not
characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts
alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1
Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).

With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of
Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the
declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able
to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The
spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage
certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere
fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present
(People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume
that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things
have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule
131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978];
Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason
is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of

law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA
230 [1985]).

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor
contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).

The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However, considering the
effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set
of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children —
legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro
vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth
referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the
lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence
any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in
the same manner as their brother Jacinto.

While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as to certain dates and
names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable
length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death
in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of
Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang
mga kapatid ko sa

ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs
of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is
inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the
action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing
Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation
of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore,
an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]).
On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).

Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the extrajudicial partition excluding
the private respondents and registered the properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid
repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the
subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private respondents
filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).

In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except the unwilling defendants
in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record
on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully
refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents
who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about
their (respondents) share in the property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del
Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a
house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.

Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.
In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-
ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership;
(2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
property for the period required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that
the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent
to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed
to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots
involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is
Affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

13th Case

Article 26 of the Family Code

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question,
presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce
decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized
alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition
for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one
later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties
are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family
Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into
law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it
now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to
apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later
on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry,
and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines
(CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These
spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose
that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according
to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must
be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case,
not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other
hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must
also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended
by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent
is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Chairman

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 20-22.

2 Id. at 27-29.

3 Id. at 21-22.

4 Id. at 105.

5 Id. at 106-110.

6 Id. at 110.

7 Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.

8 Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281, 286, citing Galarosa v. Valencia,
G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.

9 Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.

10 No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

11 G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.

12 Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855.

13 Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.

14 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.

15 Id. at 451.
14th Case

Article 26 of the Family Code

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated
via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on
November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4
Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court
of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took
effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law;
to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant
to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her
desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8
in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he,
thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido
by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries
his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right
it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C.
Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO)
227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s
holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the
alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and
still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree
of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would
be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however,
can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and
legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words,
only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in
favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation,
we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at
this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the
Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution
must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized,
shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not
obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must
be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which
they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree
by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of
the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular
No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final
order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil
registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the
foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree
does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order."
The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by
which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation
or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed
with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must
be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil
Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per
Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.

1 Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.

2 Id. at 3-20.

3 Id. at 27.

4 Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.

5 Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.

6 Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:

It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of Annulment of Marriages in Manila,
unless and until final order of execution of such foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.

7 Supra note 1.

8 Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.

9 Rollo, p. 31.

10 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.

11 Id. at 121.

12 Gerbert’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an order dated February
17, 2009; rollo, p. 32.

13 Supra note 2.

14 Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.

15 The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article 52 of
the Family Code.

16 The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code.

17 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.

18 Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with the
Family Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.

19 Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.

20 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

21 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

22 Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.

23 Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.

24 The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree capacitated
the alien spouse to do so.

25 See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

xxxx

Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

26 Parenthetically, we add that an alien’s legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her
respective diplomatic and consular officials, which he or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family
Code). The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial action for a declaration of authority
to remarry.

27 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.

28 Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.

29 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.

30 Rollo, pp. 38-41.

31 The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the Canadian
court. The full text of the court’s judgment was not included.

32 Literally means "a thing adjudged," Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule that a final judgment
or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits, on points and matters determined in the former. Supra note 28 at 462.

33 See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110, where the
Court said:

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed
to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary
for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is
that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This
is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary.

34 On the face of the marriage certificate, the word "DIVORCED" was written in big, bold letters; rollo, p. 37.

35 Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114
(1964).

36 Rollo, pp. 47-50.

37 Id. at 51.

38 Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

39 Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

40 Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

41 When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is deemed
adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.
15th Case

Article 26 of the Family Code

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated
31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain
a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground
of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese
Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing
the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent
has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he
may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial
court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the
preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition
of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words,
the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife
and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in
bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband
in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous
marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable.
Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the
Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to
send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to
cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with
the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited
Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative
to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that
the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The
trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a)
and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the
husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x
x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court
cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited
by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x
x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry]
x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification
against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review.30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can
sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period
that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the
prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court)
is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially
Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s
legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen
and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108,
citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason
to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To
be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court
and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52
the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56
This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is
"to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case
on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable
on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition
by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court
of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts
can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a
marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section
3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this
Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of
a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of
an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting
the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife
of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus,
the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution
for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal
action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to
sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue
in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The
RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and
children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage
by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition
of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No.
8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under
the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to
adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage
between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists
in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this
Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare
the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies
because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—
the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation
where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference
between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case
was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question
of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding
public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that
the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry
in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the
contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.

2 In Pasay City, Metro Manila.

3 See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage between Maria Paz
Galela Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010. Translated by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s
Office (see rollo, p. 89).
4 Id.

5 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as amended):

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

xxxx

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.

6 Rollo, pp. 79-80.

7 The dispositive portion stated:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and WITHDRAWN from the active civil docket of this Court.
The RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to refund to the petitioner the amount of One Thousand Pesos (₱1,000) to be taken
from the Sheriff’s Trust Fund.

8 Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action.

(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime governing their property
relations, as well as the properties involved.

If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional
order for spousal support, custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration of community or
conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.

(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and certification must
be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by
the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent
in said country.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of
such service within the same period.

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.

9 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration).

10 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).

11 FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

xxxx

12 Rollo, p. 56.

13 FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

14 Rollo, p. 68.

15 Enacted 26 November 1930.

16 CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

17 Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil officers and priests or ministers authorized to solemnize
marriages shall send a copy of each marriage contract solemnized by them to the local civil registrar within the time limit
specified in the existing Marriage Law.

In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the successful petitioner for divorce or annulment
of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local civil registrar of the municipality where the dissolved
or annulled marriage was solemnized.

In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address of each of the contracting parties, their ages, the
place and date of the solemnization of the marriage, the names and addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address,
and relationship of the minor contracting party or parties or the person or persons who gave their consent to the marriage,
and the full name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the marriage.

In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the names of the parties divorced or whose
marriage was annulled, the date of the decree of the court, and such other details as the regulations to be issued may
require.

18 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name.

19 273 Phil. 1 (1991).

20 Id. at 7. See rollo, pp. 65 and 67.

21 Rollo, p. 47.

22 Id. at 46.

23 Id. at 48.

24 Id.

25 G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.

26 Id. at 641.

27 Id. at 643.

28 See rollo, p. 49.

29 Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:

Contents and form of petition. – x x x

xxxx

(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and certification must
be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by
the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent
in said country.

xxxx

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.

30 Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.

31 Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.

32 Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of the "Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Comment)" of the Solicitor
General stated:

In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with the requirements provided in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus, respectfully prayed that Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated
for further proceedings.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.

33 G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.

34 Id. at 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor General, pp. 8-9. See rollo, pp. 132-133.

35 Rollo, p. 133.

36 G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.

37 Id. at 287.

38 Rollo, p. 133.

39 G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162.

40 384 Phil. 661 (2000).

41 De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at 169.

42 Supra note 30.

43 See rollo, p. 120.

44 Id.

45 See rollo, p. 146.

46 Id.

47 Supra note 33.

48 Supra note 33 at 655.

49 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph
(a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof,
as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order, is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

50 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, supra note 36 at 282.

51 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.

52 Id., Sec. 6.

53 Id., Sec. 9.

54 Id., Sec. 11-15.

55 Id., Sec. 17-18.

56 Id., Sec. 19 and 22-23.

57 Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005) citing Eugene Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982).

58 Id.

59 Id. at 386.

60 Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x

xxxx

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

61 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 386. "Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party
expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task
of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord
Coke in the Ferrer’s Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: ‘rest and quietness.’" (Citations omitted)
62 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 382. "The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries." (Citations omitted)

63 43 Phil. 43 (1922).

64 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 280; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee, supra.

65 FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.

66 Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which
shall be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g)
adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of name.

Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name.

67 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.

68 FAMILY CODE, Art. 35-67.

69 FAMILY CODE, Art. 74-148.

70 FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.

71 See supra note 69.

72 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law x x
x."

73 FAMILY CODE, Art. 68-73.

74 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. x x x

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

75 Emphasis supplied.

76 Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
77 See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.

78 RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.

xxxx

79 Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

80 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.

81 Supra note 25.

82 Supra note 25.

83 See supra note 68.

84 FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of
their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children
and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate
visitation rights of the other parent.

Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.

85 FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall
also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.— (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

xxxx

86 FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession
of judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. — (1) Within one month after receipt of the court
order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating
whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file
their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report The court shall
set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of
the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

87 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.

88 509 Phil. 108 (2005).

89 Id. at 114.

90 223 Phil. 357 (1985).

91 Id. at 363.

92 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c).

93 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — x x x

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever
stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the
criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion
of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal
action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party
in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be
tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be
instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on
delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
16th Case

Article 26 of the Family Code

EN BANC
April 24, 2018
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the
September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076.
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City
set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week
for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked
the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues
of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed
questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action
should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which
captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by
their Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce decree
dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no longer living
together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled,
where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not
appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer
married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between the
petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already
dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be
allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among the
documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce;
and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in
Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not
afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos
or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights
and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
inclusing marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code)
is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained
makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec.
Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of
the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese
national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce
case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a
foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case
the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July
17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18
This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved
at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the where country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our
courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles
of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined
by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd
situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former
because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would
solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien
husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce
in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must
be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at
the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced
decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order
that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or
is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed
by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained
by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later
on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who
exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among
others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved
to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial
court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that
the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a
US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and
to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On
his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially
if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction .
In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his
own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given
legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from
Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void
on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of
an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
These property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that
the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be
proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled
that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the
reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody
and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary
consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together
and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which
prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as
she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not
only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court
is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words
in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely
and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words if a statute there should be departure."38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding
must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would
depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose
of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus,
applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an
absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of
the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or
her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in
like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are
severed by operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the City Code, is not
an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may
provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would
cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The deference
stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to
prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic
liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression,
press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling
state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin
to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy,
overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the
President which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as
well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse
has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is
null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance
with the national law of the foreigner.55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings
a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who
are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference
of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one
and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even
if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds,
the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be
governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not
lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now
existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been
better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as
well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners,
opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce
proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he intends to prove.
Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable
presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or
wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing
acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute
any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead
of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and
conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for
Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on the kind of life
that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and
would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages
in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not,
and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law,
may validly support a marriage.63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner
Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal
of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make this
a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the
social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my
personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an
absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of
Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman
of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710
and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one
year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as
to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated
and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69
From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined
by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute
divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were
filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute
Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House
Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57
against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during the marriage,
except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when
the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner; and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition
the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below
twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or personl having substitute
parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or
ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues or
appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening after the
marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is
filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity
was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another, the other
spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage beyond
repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on
absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family
as an institution and their nature of permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State
to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor
can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country.77 While
marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in
this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision.
Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State
cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign
divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless
victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if
not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No.
9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012")
and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person,
guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first
avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the
meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital"
affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant
to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication and
information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages
are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world,
the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not
found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and,
at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal
rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one of his
due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for
decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results
or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning
of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize
and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted
in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the
divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of
Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject
Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a a written act of
the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her
former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015
Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court
of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

On leave

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO*

Chief Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Acting Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Caguioa

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Caguioa

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

I concur, See Separate Opinion

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

No part

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA***

Associate Justice

See dissenting Opinion.

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

NOEL G. TIJAM

Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On leave

** Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.

*** No part

1 Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Nina G. Antonio-
Valenzuela concurring; rollo, pp. 23-21.

2 Rollo, pp. 32-33.

3 Id. at 30. (emphasis in the original)

4 Id. at 42-43.

5 Id. at 25, 37-38.

6 Id. at 40-41.

7 663 Phil. 546 (2011).

8 223 Phil. 357 (1985).

9 Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 575 (2007), citing Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 735-736 (2001).

10 Garcia v. Recio, supra, at 730 and Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 733, 739.

11 Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

12 Art 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippine laws
shall be observed in their execution.
Prohobited laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgements promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.(11a)

13 Techaves v. Escano, et al., 122 Phil. 752, 759-760 (1965), as cited in Cang v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 129, 162 (1998);
Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 342, 356 (2000); and Perez v. Court of Appeals, 516 Phil. 204, 211 (2006). See also
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 504 (2005); and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna,
739 Phil. 331, 341-342 (2014).

14 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730-731.

15 FAMILY CODE, Article 26, Paragraph 2. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730 and Medina v. Koike , supra Note
10.

16 Republic of the Phils. V. Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108, 112 (2005), as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, 543 Phil. 275, 291 (2007).

17 Id. at 112-113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, supra.

18 Id. at 113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, supra.

19 Sempio-Diy, Alicia V., HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1988, PP. 26-27.

20 Medina v. Koike, supra note 10 and Fujiki v. Marinay 712 Phil. 524, 555 (2013).

21 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra.

22 Id.

23 See Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, 681 Phil. 493, 498 (2012); Roehr v. Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608, 717-618 (2003); and
2003); and Llorenre v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13.

24 Supra note 19, at 27, See also Republic of the Phils. V. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 114, as cited in Fujiki v. Marinay,
supra note 20, at 555 and San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 292.

25 Supra note 19, at 27

26 Supra note 16.

27 Id. at 114-115 (Citations omitted).

28 625 Phil. 494 (2010).

29 Supra note 8.

30 Dacasin v. Dacasin, supra, at 507. (Citations omitted; underscoring ours)

31 Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr. supra note 8, at 361-363 (Citations omitted).

32 Supra note 20.

33 Supra note 10.

34 Fujiki v. Marinay et al. supra note 20, at 549-550. (Citations omitted).

35 642 Phil. 420 (2010).

36 Supra note 9.

37 Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star Ferry, Inc. 298 Phil. 79, 86 (1993).
38 Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 649, 660 (1992), as cited in Victoria v. Commission on Elections,
299 Phil. 263, 268 (1994); Enjay Inc. v. NLRC, 315 Phil. 648, 656 (1995); and Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, 345 Phil.
1057, 1073 (1997). See also National Food Authority v. Masada Security Agency, Inc. 493 Phil. 241, 251 (2005); Rural Bank
of the San Miguel, Inc. v. Monetary Board, 545 Phil. 62, 72 (2007); Rep. of the Phils. v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 100 (2007); and
Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. (PAGCOR) v. Phil. Gaming Jurisdiction Inc. (PEJI), et al., 604 Phil. 547, 553 (2009).

39 Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 259, 268 (1995).

40 Id.

41 623 Phil. 531, 564-565 (2009)

42 Fujiki v. Marinay supra note 20, at 555.

43 See Barreto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 72 (1933), as cited in Techavez v. Escaño, et al. supra note 13, at 762.

44 See Assn. of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform , 256 Phil. 777, 808 (1989) and
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 740 Phil. 403, 436 (2014).

45 Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 597 (2004) as cited in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc. 601 Phil. 245, 436 (2009). See also Puno C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
v. COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32, 100 (2010); Brion J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission of 2010, 651. 374, 550
(2010); and Leonardo-De Castro, Jr., Concurring Opinion, Garcia v. Judge Drillon, et al., 712 Phil 44, 125 (2013).

46 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra.

47 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. et al. 601 Phil. 245, 282 (2009) and Mosqueda Pilipino Banana Growers &
Exporters Association , Inc. G.R. Nos, 189185 & 189305, August 16, 2016, 800 SCRA 313, 360. See also Brion, J., Separate
Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra Velasco, Jr., J. Concurring Opinion, International Service
for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc., v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Phils.) , et al., 774 Phil. 508, 706 (2015);
and Jardeleza, J., March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1, 904.

48 Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippines Truith Commission of 2010, supra note 45, at 553.

49 See Morales, J., Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Senral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 697-
698 (2004) as cited by Brion, J. Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 45, at 533,
and Leonen, J., Separate Opinion, Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442 August 8,
2017.

50 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. , et al., 601 Phil. 245, 298 (2009).

51 Id.

52 Brion J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Sps. Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr., et al., 732 Phil. 1, 326-327 (2014).

53 To be valid, the classification must conform to the following requirements:

1.) It must rest on substantial distinctions.

2.) It must be germane to the purpose of the law.

3.) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4.) It must apply to all members of the same class. (See PAGCOR v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 660 Phil. 636, 648 [2011];
Maj. Gen. Garcia v. The Executive Secretary et. al. 692 Phil. 114, 141-142 [2012]; Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 405
[2014]; Ferrer, Jr. v. Mayor Bautista, 762 Phil. 233, 277 (2015); Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. National
Council on Disability Affairs, G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 25, 22; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos.
225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016; and Mindanao Shopping Destination Corp. v.
Duterte, G.R. No. 211093, June 6, 2017).

54 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

55 Tenchavez v. Escano, et al., supra note 13, as cited in Cang v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13;; Llorente v. Court of
Appeals supra note 13; and Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730; Republic
v. Iyoy, supra, note 13; and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, supra note 13. FAMILY CODE, Article 26 Pragraph 2. See
also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730 and Medina v. Koike, supra note 10.

56 Art. 35 The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted
with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the leagl authority to do so;

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except covered by preceding Chapter;

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriage not falling under article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

(6) those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after solemnization. (As amended by E.O. 227)

Art 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relationship between
the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;

(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between the adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse or his her own
spouse. (82)
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has well founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, and he delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons.(n)

Art. 53 Either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with the requirements of the immediately preceding
Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.

57 REL 131, Section 3(a).

58 Id., Section 3(c).

59 Id., Section 3(d).

60 Id., Section 3(x)..

61 Id., Section 3(aa).

62 Id., Section 3(ff).

63 Rep. of the Phils. v. Albios, 719 Phil. 622, 636 (2013).

64 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2. This echoed the Family Code provision, which provides:

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

65 Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS, 1995 Edition , pp. 1132 citing V. RECORD
41.

66 Reconrd of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates, Volume V September 24, 1986, p. 41.

67 See Garcia Valdez v. Soteraña Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 944 (1920); Francisco v. Tayao, 50 Phil. 42 (1927); People v. Bitdu,
58 Phil. 817 (1933); Sikat v. Cason, 67 Phil. 207 (1939); and Arca, et al. v. Javier, 95. Phil. 579 (1954)

68 See Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461 (1946); Luz v. Court of First Instance of Tacloban, 77 Phil. 679 (1946); Antonio v.
Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006).

69 Baptista v. Castañeda supra at 463.

70 Tenchavez v. Escano, et. al., supra note 13; and Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra
note 9, at 730; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 13; and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, 739 Phil, 331, 341-342 (2014).

71 Entitled "Instituting Absolute Divorce in the Philippines, Amending for the Purpose,' with Representative Edcel C.
Lagman as Principal Author.
72 Entitled "An Act Amending Title I, Chapter 3 of Executive No. 209, Otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, Prescribing Additional Ground for Annulment," with Representative Robert Ace Barbers as Principal Author.

73 Entitled "An Act Introducing Divorce in the Philippines, Amending foe the Purpose Articles 26, 55 to 66 and Repealing
Article 36 Under Title II of Executive Order No. 209, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Family Code of the Philippines,
and For Other Purposes," with Gabriela Women's Party Representatives Emmi A. De Jesus and Arlene D. Brosas as principal
authors.

74 Entitled "An Act Providing for Grounds for the Dissolution of Marriage," with Representatives Teddy B. Baguilat, Jr.
Rodel M. Batocabe, Arlene D. Brosas, Ariel B. Casilao, France L. Castro, Nancy A. Catamco, Pia S. Cayetano, Emmi A. De
Jesus, Sarah Jane I. Elago, Gwedolyn F. Garcia, Ana Cristina Siquian Go. Edcel C. Lagman, Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Antonio L.
Tinio, and Carlos Isagani T. Zarate as Principal Authors.

75 See Leone, J. dissenting in Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No 203284, November 14, 2016.

76 Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC (Resolution), March 7, 2017.

77 See Sps. Imbong , et al. v. Hon. Ochoa , Jr. et al., 732 Phil. 1, 167 (2014).

78 Tilar v. Tilar G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017.

79 Article XV, Section 1.

80 Article XV, Section 3(2).

81 Article II, Sectioons 11, 12 and 14. See also Republic Act Nos. 7192 ("Women in Development and Nation Building Act")
and 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women").

82 Bernas, Joaquin G. S.J., THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS, 1995 Edition, pp. 1132, citing V. RECORD
40, 44.

83 See Paras v. Paras, 555 Phil.786, 804 (2007)

84 San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 292-293.

85 Supra note 16.

86 San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 293-294.

87 Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 115.

88 Id.

89 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited in Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 23, at 501.

90 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 544 and Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 23, at 499.

91 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited in Medina v. Koike, supra note 10 and Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido
III, supra note 16, at 116. See also Bayot v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. 591 Phil. 45, 470 (2008).

92 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 732-733. (Citations omitted). See also Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 23,
at 499 and 501-502 and San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 294.

93 Rollo, pp. 29-30.

94 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 733-734.

95 See Bayot v. Hoen Coutrt of Appeals, et al., supra note 75, at 470-471; and Roehr v. Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 617.
96 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9 at 735. (Citations omitted). See also Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 23, at 500-
501; San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 295; Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido, III, supra note 16, at 116; Llorente v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 13, 354.
17th Case

Retroactive Application of Article 26 (2)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor
of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding
Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William
Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100
San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as
legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties,
both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence
prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the
petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he
regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to
prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the
Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding
Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent,
as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile,
the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was
substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion
for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts
and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to
Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of
venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and
Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that
the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not
bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.
28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders
dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus,
the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract
a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines
in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason
to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the
law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce
having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry
under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as
"a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return.
They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during
the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of
Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished
from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because
they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42
However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence
in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved
that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted
in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the
period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa."
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala
Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address,
and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional
Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first
resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly
Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs.
Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to
the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against
his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses
from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be
denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating
the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise
cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family
Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into
law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it
now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according
to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as
Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should
not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal
rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature
and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots
to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his
due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia
v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies
of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of
the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo
by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under
the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-
owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would
be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired
by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the
case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the
strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article
148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994
Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Associate Justices
Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios.

2 Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

3 Id. at 391-393.

4 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Associate Justices
Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios.

5 Records, p. 125.

6 Id. at 137.

7 Id. at 116.

8 Id. at 1-5.

9 Id. at 10-24.

10 Id. at 30-35.

11 Id. at 38.

12 Id. at 39-138.

13 When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.

14 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

15 See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.

16 This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

17 Records, p. 259.

18 Id. at 260.

19 Id. at 262-267.

20 Id. at 270-272.

21 Id. at 288.
22 Id. at 301.

23 Id. at 302-303.

24 Id. at 306-311.

25 Id. at 318-320.

26 Id. at 339-349.

27 Id. at 350-354.

28 Id. at 391-393.

29 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.

30 Supra note 14.

31 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

32 Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken finding of fact because the records
clearly show that the divorce was obtained on December 14, 1973 (not December 14, 1992) and that the marriage of Gov.
San Luis with respondent was celebrated on June 20, 1974. These events both occurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988.

33 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.

34 See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.

35 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.

36 Id. at 75.

37 52 Phil. 645 (1928).

38 G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.

39 SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, x x x. (Underscoring
supplied)

40 G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.

41 Id. at 199-200.

42 Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at 415.

43 See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795,
January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.

44 Records, pp. 76-78.

45 Id. at 60-75.

46 Id. at 79.

47 Id. at 80.

48 Id. at 81-83.
49 Id. at 84.

50 The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over this case because the value of Gov. San
Luis’ estate exceeded ₱200,000.00 as provided for under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).

51 SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the Executive Order issued by the President of
the Philippines on January 17, 1983, declaring the reorganization of the Judiciary, the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region are hereby defined as follows:

xxxx

5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati – over the municipalities of Las Pinas, Makati, Muntinlupa and
Parañaque. x x x

52 Supra note 14.

53 Id. at 139, 143-144.

54 Id. at 144.

55 Supra note 31.

56 Id. at 664.

57 G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.

58 Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 121.

59 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 263.

60 G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.

61 Id. at 447.

62 Supra note 58.

63 Id. at 119-121.

64 Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).

65 ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

66 Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

67 Supra note 14 at 144.

68 G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.

69 Id. at 264-265, 268.

70 Supra note 60.

71 Id. at 448-449.

72 Records, pp. 118-124.

73 Supra note 60 at 451.

74 SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If x x x a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x
x x.

75 Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).

76 Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

77 Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).

78 Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 494, 506.

79 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.

80 Id. at 686.

81 Id. at 679, 686-687.

18th Case

Article 34
Rationale

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December
11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding
that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage
of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father
Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to
their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded
on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true
and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is
the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12
and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure
and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their
privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."
16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of
the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime
during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order
to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge
of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local
civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall
note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages
by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law
sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence
of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of
a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage
void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages
are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning
the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its
effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article
51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage
void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for
the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by
the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far
as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death
of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same
cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Footnotes

1 The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court
(RTC) — Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby
granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).

2 Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.

3 Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.

4 Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.

5 Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).

6 Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all the requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;

(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

7 Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.

xxx xxx xxx

8 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 75,
no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides.

9 Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).

10 Sec. 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999; See also Tuason v. CA, 256
SCRA 158 (1996).

11 Sec. 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.

12 Art. 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life. . . .

13 Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).

14 Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.

15 Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

16 Rollo, p. 29.

17 Art. 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.

18 Art. 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years. . . .

Art. 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years. . ."

19 Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.

20 Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated
herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent,
within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the
minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or
by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at anytime before the death of either party, or by
the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force,
intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;

For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.

21 Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement Board, 272 III. App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil
Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.

22 In re Conza's Estate, 176 III. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p.
271.

23 Art. 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.

24 Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986); People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845
(1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.

25 35 Am. Jur. 219-220.

26 18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.

27 Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939
(1995).

28 Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).

29 Art. 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February
23, 1998.
19th Case

Article 34
Requisites for Application

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the
bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta,
Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law
in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966
in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that marriage.2 On 22
March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3
When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano
and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together
as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4
According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit
and for being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside
his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano and of
Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their
families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the
basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed
on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated
the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano
was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial.
Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from
each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the
marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they
had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a
long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that
judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary,
the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the
amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Annex "A" of Complaint.

2 Annexes "B" to "E" of Complaint.

3 Annex "F" of Complaint.

4 Attached to the Marriage Contract (Annex "F" of Complaint).

5 Annexes "B" and "C" of Respondent Judge’s Manifestation.

6 DISIDERIO P. JURADO, CIVIL LAW REVIEWER 63 (1989).

7 Article 41, Family Code.

8 Espiritu v. Jovellanos, 280 SCRA 579, 589 [1997]; Vercide v. Hernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265, 6 April 2000.

9 Macasasa v. Imbing, 312 SCRA 385, 395 [1999].

10 Madredijo v. Loyao, 316 SCRA 544, 568 [1999]; Agunday v. Tresvalles, 319 SCRA 134, 146 [1999]; Villanueva v. Almazan,
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221, 16 March 2000.
20th Case

Falsity of Affidavit of Cohabitation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging
the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the
marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated
24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony
was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was
introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his
landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could
claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from
Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers
so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him
that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered
that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala
of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When
he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that
they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that
she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded
that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31
August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative
complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.7

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so
holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24
November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper.
[Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package
for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect
suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother
would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces
of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived
by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]

[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his
wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988,
one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company
I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the
only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame
excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his
sister.

When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a
witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the
signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the
marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if
indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all
the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil
Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years
after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity,
the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the
marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August
2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it
ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage,
the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation
must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the
time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he
had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7,
1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional
character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of
the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The
appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was
a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s
church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern
the parties’ marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of
the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the
woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended
Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the
marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of
their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5)
years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should
be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of
the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered
by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a
marriage license.21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated
10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review
before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be
reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting.
Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court
rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS
OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar
from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not
obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a
criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises
that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we
shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists
between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points
to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the falsity of
the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were
complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally
obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated
statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits
that the parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further
fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay
Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in
said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a
marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to
the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage,
(5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.36

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof,
they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37
One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where
the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio
for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite
of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but
reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions,
the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a
sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried,
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly
written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum
period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76
is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For
a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law
not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76
also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their
sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June
1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony
that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced
to live in her house.45

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in
nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under
Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to
this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings
are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect
the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant
merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite
of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the
case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49
Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent
marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered
into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of
marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage
of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements
of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of
the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which
was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure
of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated
by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that
the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference
to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It
must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent
that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before
he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void
marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson

RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno designating Associate Justice
Dante O. Tinga to replace Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave under the Court’s Wellness
Program and assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez as Acting Chairperson.

** Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura per Raffle dated 12 September 2007.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Santiago Javier Ranada,
concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 65-70; rollo, (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.

2 Records, p. 170.
3 Id.

4 Id. at 1-8.

5 The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration of the parties’ marriage, Jose was 27 years old, while
Felisa was 37.

6 The Administrative complaint before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman was
docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp. 252-258.

7 Id. at 257.

8 Id. at 313-323.

9 Id. at 323.

10 Id. at 321-322.

11 ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the periods as follows:

(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent,
within four years after attaining the age of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the parent or guardian or
person having legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age of twenty or eighteen years;

(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by
either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;

(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or
by any relative or guardian of the party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;

(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four years after the discovery of the fraud;

(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased;

(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight years after the marriage.

12 Records, p. 322.

13 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.

14 ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty
imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband;

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.

16 ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

17 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;

(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;

(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;

(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;

(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;

(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in
Article 92; and

(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-consuls in special cases provided in Articles
74 and 75.

18 ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;

(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him by his church or
religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or
religious sect;

(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article 31;

(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military
operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; or

(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.

19 CA rollo, p. 279.

20 384 Phil. 661 (2000).

21 CA rollo, pp. 278-279.

22 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.

23 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.

24 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.

25 Erroneously cited as Niño v. Bayadog; rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 18.

26 377 Phil. 919 (1999).

27 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article
75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides.

28 ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of
the Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the
celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.
29 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.

30 People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082.

31 The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the following essential requisites: (1) legal capacity of
the contracting parties; and (2) their mutual consent.

32 Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.

33 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75,
no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides.

34 Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984 Eleventh Ed.), pp. 302-310.

35 In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court articulated the spirit behind Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:

"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure
and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their
privacy and exempt them from that requirement."

36 The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years desire to marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons
from legalizing their status," Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

37 Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as an "Affidavit on (sic) Marriage Between Man and
Woman Who Haved (sic) Lived Together as Husband and Wife for at Least Five Years."

38 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001).

39 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137 (1999).

40 Id.

41 Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.

42 The first part of Article 76 states, "No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other x x x."

43 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.

44 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-4143), 15 April 1999.

45 Id. at 159.
46 First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 166616, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.

47 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605.

48 Id.

49 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999).

50 Id.

51 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or fact
leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community
of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of
the family in case of unlawful aggression.

52 People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at 4083.

53 Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).

54 Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil.
96, 108 (2000).

55 Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote
that "If the parties falsify their affidavit in order to have an instant marriage, although the truth is that they have not been
cohabiting for five years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage license, and they will also be criminally liable."
Article 76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code, which reads:

ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

56 Niñal v. Bayadog, supra note 20 at 134.

57 Id. at 130-131.

58 Id.
21st Case

Falsity of Affidavit of Cohabitation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.

THE FACTS

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced
an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked
petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice
of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without
responsibility." 7

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because
she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued
that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution.1âwphi1
She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced
herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and
September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang.
Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March
and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage.
It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need for a
marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos
long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the
indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been
celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of
a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and
wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered
their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without a valid
marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage
to accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The best support to her argument would have been the submission of
a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void
in these proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She
attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.

Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony
of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put
the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12

THE ISSUES

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not aware of
Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second
marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage license.
She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because
they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant
in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-
year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that the instant
Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent marriage. As regards
petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence
supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she should
have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the knowledge of the
second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission
of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the previous
marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances,
as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse
had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-
accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts
consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when
Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more
credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the R TC, less so in the
present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and
demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with
bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which
the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as
maximum.

Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of
bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law,
writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound
in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for
an accomplice to the crime.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision
mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that
of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a
duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty
shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two months of
imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months
imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must
have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do
it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case,
petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28

Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the
validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage
license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their
union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.31

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and that after six months
of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that
Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with
her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On
cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an
agent who sold her piglets.36

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four years.
Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show
that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of
them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before
they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which
the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized
under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that
they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks
to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing
that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her
marriage contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape
criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the
permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had
the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals
"to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath,
adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily
become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex
turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a
result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage
with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves
perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement
based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their
marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full well that they
had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it
will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second
marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his
second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19
August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court
acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second marriage.
In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly
illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot
regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Additional Cases
1st Case

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 166676

Present:

Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,

Carpio Morales,
Tinga,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of
the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of
entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2)
gender from "female" to "male."

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate2
before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures
had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer
to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in
conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that
respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes
male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified
that this condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and
that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the
change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has
adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven
that petitioner’s body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He
has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections
in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records
are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE,
WHILE RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."4

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and
her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries
under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not implead the local
civil registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent
is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such
filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow
change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make
her a male.7

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a
party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the
Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the
requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103

CHANGE OF NAME

Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the
province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].

Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name
changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the
purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days
prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.

Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the
proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.

Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published
as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for
changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil
registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the
civil register.

Rule 108

CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction;
(m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.

Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation
or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.

Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because respondent’s petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in
the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all
possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too
short of the requirements of the rules.13 The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar
and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.14 Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to
promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought
before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition
to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.
In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as
clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.18

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization;
(11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.20

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics.
A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX
chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous
genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as
the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening
of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the
term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female.
An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes."

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been
expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble
either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to
mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the
sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25] The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate
entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent
to be other than female, then a change in the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system
naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the
phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what
he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone
treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but
he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal more
fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as
one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in
order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path
of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal
judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what
nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary
state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but
of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The
trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine
name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find
merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate
from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

1 Rollo, pp. 29-32. Penned by Judge Florenio P. Bueser.

2 Id. at 33-37.

3 Id. at 31-32.

4 Id. at 97.

5 Id. at 99.

6 Id. at 103.

7 Id. at 104.

8 Id. at 136.

9 Id. at 127.

10 Id. at 134.

11 Id. at 136.

12 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 99, 106.
13 Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 134, 147.

14 Republic v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 146963, March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA 488, 492.

15 SEC. 6. Construction.- These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

16 Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

17 An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical
Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order,
Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Approved, March 22, 2001.

18 Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 388.

19 Id. at 389.

20 Id. at 389.

21 (1) 5-alpha reductase deficiency; (2) androgen insensitivity syndrome; (3) aphallia; (4) clitoromegaly; (5) congenital
adrenal hyperplasia; (6) gonadal dysgenesis (partial & complete); (7) hypospadias; (8) Kallmann syndrome; (9) Klinefelter
syndrome; (10) micropenis; (11) mosaicism involving sex chromosomes; (12) MRKH (mullerian agenesis; vaginal agenesis;
congenital absence of vagina); (13) ovo-testes (formerly called "true hermaphroditism"); (14) partial androgen insensitivity
syndrome; (15) progestin induced virilization; (16) Swyer syndrome; (17) Turner syndrome. [Intersexuality
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).]

22 Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).

23 Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008), citing Gagnon and Simon 1973.

24 Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).

25 M.T. v. J.T. 140 N.J. Super 77 355 A. 2d 204.

26 The goal of treatment is to return hormone levels to normal. This is done by taking a form of cortisol (dexamethasone),
fludrocortisone, or hydrocortisone) every day. Additional doses of medicine are needed during times of stress, such as
severe illness or surgery.

xxxx

Parents of children with congenital adrenal hyperplasia should be aware of the side effects of steroid therapy. They should
report signs of infection and stress to their health care provider because increases in medication may be required. In
additional, steroid medications cannot be stopped suddenly, or adrenal insufficiency will result.

xxxx

The outcome is usually associated with good health, but short stature may result even with treatment. Males have normal
fertility. Females may have a smaller opening of the vagina and lower fertility. Medication to treat this disorder must be
continued for life. (Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia <http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/encyclopedia.html>.)

27 The word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers,
prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit
and exploitation. (See Sec. 2 of Rule 92 of the Rules of Court)

28 Yu v. Republic of the Philippines, 123 Phil. 1106, 1110 (1966).

Additional Cases
2nd Case

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016
RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision
reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case
No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private
respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the RTC of
Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:

xxxx

3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now deceased,
then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers
were required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight
of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;

4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at
around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which
is just situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00
o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;

5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much
less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage license;

6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told to obtain the
pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the
moment the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been
validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most essential
requisite;

7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was solemnized sans the required
marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting
the requirement of such marriage license;

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due notice and hearing,
judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar,
null and void ab initio and of no legal effect;
xxxx

Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a
marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action because there
is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license
and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured
a marriage license which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.

Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the said Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho and
Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the
Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for proper registration of
this decree of nullity of marriage.

SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite marriage license when the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and
80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision,
disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and
Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents and purposes.

SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a presumption that a
marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled
that the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the
formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 14, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO
PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT
DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE
WITH RESPONDENT;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S
OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD
TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and

4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S
JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE
REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due credence to
petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner and
respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not on the basis of law
and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well as on the
perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.

The Court finds for the petitioner.

At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural question by arguing that the
issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into
these issues in a petition for review on certiorari.

The Court does not agree.

The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and prevailing jurisprudence.
However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which is a question
of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This
rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a marriage license obtained
by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.12
Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract, to wit:

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional
character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification
of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed
marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license
is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
the marriage contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is
the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.16 Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.17

In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which they presented
to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.

The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and that any doubt
should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional
policy which protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.

On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled
with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.

The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.

Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.18 There, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar,
that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.19 It was
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden
of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had
been secured.20

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in
favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1,
1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has
been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such
validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In addition, the
Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license.
Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives and Records Section, where
information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she
also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the
statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony
was conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and respondent.
Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed
to present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and mere allegation is not evidence.23

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the
only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA,
it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect
the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued
and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.

As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla v.
Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage
license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent search.

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification issued by the Local
Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the
absence of a categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their records despite diligent search." The Court,
citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record
or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification,
the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,27 this Court considered the marriage of
the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no record
of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the
deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan,
Jr.28

Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v. CA30 that, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued
by the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear
in their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the
officer involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
does not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence
was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus
the presumption must stand. x x x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject marriage license
which rendered the marriage void.

From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.32

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code
clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional
character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives are less than
pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may,
the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under
the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated
March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Brion,*J., on leave.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Additional Cases
3rd Case

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 226013, July 02, 2018
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO, Petitioner, v. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
Respondents.
DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 (RTC), through a petition
for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated July 18, 2016 of the RTC in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which denied
petitioner Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono's (Luzviminda) petition before it.

The Facts

Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on December 8, 2009.3 Thereafter,
they lived together in Japan for one (1) year and three (3) months but were not blessed with a child. During their married
life, they would constantly quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he was much older
than Luzviminda.4 As such, she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya
City, Japan, which was eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and duly recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya
City, Japan on July 1, 2012.5 In view of the foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree
obtained by her and Ryoji6 before the RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her former husband in her passport
and for her to be able to marry again.7

After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for hearing. Since nobody appeared to oppose
her petition except the government, Luzviminda was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. After the presentation
and absent any objection from the Public Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was admitted as proof of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, and as part of the testimony of the witnesses.8

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision9 dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that while a divorce obtained abroad by
an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines – provided that such decree is valid according to the national law of
the alien – the same does not find application when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the same.
Invoking the nationality principle provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code, the RTC opined that since petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws do not allow divorce, the foreign divorce
decree she herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the Philippines;10 hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly denied Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree she procured with Ryoji.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for
absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the Civil
Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad;
third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws; and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.13

The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated in Article 26 (2) of the Family Code
which reads:

Article 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise. have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.

This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care
and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. The rationale for
this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is
no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.14 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,15 the Court held:

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would
be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however,
can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and
legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

According to Republic v. Orbecido III,17 the following elements must concur in order for Article 26 (2) to apply, namely:
(a) that there is a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) that a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.18 In the same case, the Court also initially clarified
that Article 26 (2) applies not only to cases where a foreigner was the one who procured a divorce of his/her marriage to
a Filipino spouse, but also to instances where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and
obtained a favorable decree.19
However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),20 the Court En Banc extended the application of Article 26
(2) of the Family Code to further cover mixed marriages where it was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign
spouse. Pertinent portions of the ruling read:

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.

We rule in the affirmative.

xxxx

When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended
its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging
that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a
mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil
status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

xxxx

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words
in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding
must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would
depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose
of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes. x x x.

xxxx

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.

xxxx

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as
well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse
has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is
null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance
with the national law of the foreigner.

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings
and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine
and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

xxxx

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions.
Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development. It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. To our mind, the State cannot
effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. x x x.

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first
avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the
meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital"
affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant
to be tilted in favor of marriage and. against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication and
information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages
are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world,
the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not
found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages
and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.

Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. x x x.21 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen
may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of
course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen –
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.22

In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce
decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce
proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce
by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the
RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an examination of various factual matters, a
remand to the court a quo is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case is
REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings, as directed in this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., maintains dissent in RP vs. Manalo. See separate concurring opinion.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

I concur in the result.

I submit, as I did in the case of Republic v. Manalo1(Manalo), that Article 26(2) of the Family Code had been crafted to
serve as an exception to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code. Such exception is narrow, and
intended only to address the unfair situation that results when a foreign national obtains a divorce decree against a Filipino
citizen, leaving the latter stuck in a marriage without a spouse.

As stated in my Dissenting Opinion in Manalo:

x x x [R]ather than serving as bases for the blanket recognition of foreign divorce decrees in the Philippines, I believe that
the Court's rulings in [Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr.2], [Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III3] and [Dacasin v.
Dacasin4] merely clarify the parameters for the application of the nationality principle found in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
and the exception thereto found in Article 26(2) [of] the Family Code. These parameters may be summarized as follows:

1 Owing to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens are covered by the prohibition against absolute divorce. As a
consequence of such prohibition, a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen cannot be enforced in the
Philippines. To allow otherwise would be to permit a Filipino citizen to invoke foreign law to evade an express prohibition
under Philippine law.

3 Nevertheless, the effects of a divorce decree obtained by a foreign national may be extended to the Filipino spouse,
provided the latter is able to prove (i) the issuance of the divorce decree, and (ii) the personal law of the foreign spouse
allowing such divorce. This exception, found under Article 26(2) of the Family Code, respects the binding effect of the
divorce decree on the foreign national, and merely recognizes the residual effect of such decree on the Filipino spouse.5

Petitioner herein is a Filipino citizen, seeking recognition of a divorce decree obtained in accordance with Japanese law.

Unlike the divorce decree in question in Manalo, the divorce decree herein had been obtained not by petitioner alone,
but jointly, by petitioner and her then husband, who, in turn, is a Japanese national. Hence, the twin requisites for the
application of the exception under Article 26(2) are present — there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.6

Based on these premises, I vote to GRANT the Petition.

Additional Cases
4th Case

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No.
88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch
96.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines.
They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American citizenship. They then
begot two children, namely: Jerome T.

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged in courier
service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged
the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption
of the same.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002,Leticia executed
a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia,
sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia
claimed that David agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias
Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be
paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of
the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights
and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines.5 David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from
the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on
29 June 2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties
in the USA.7

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She
relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed
for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from
selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children;
4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment
of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.8

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also
include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be
charged against the conjugal partnership.9

The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital infidelity which can result
intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2) children.

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the
judicial separation prayed for.

3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras
will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property rights over their conjugal properties.

4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their
property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras,
including interests and charges.

5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against their conjugal
properties.

Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:

Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive legitimes.10

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded
to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the United States of America remaining in the sole ownership
of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The
titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom said
properties are awarded;

3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding paragraph are hereby given to
Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive
legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their share in the income from
these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the first half of January of each year, starting
January 2008;

4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana
in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their
presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their
share in the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first half
of January of each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A. Noveras shall give them
US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing, education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The
monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the children require and his
financial capacity can afford;

6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby
ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and ₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the
respondent may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler,
Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by their
representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period
of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the
custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court
only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and

7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by them individually.11

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and personalstatus are those
of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage
issued by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage
had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the
absolute community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children,
instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute community of
property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to
Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption,
Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit
any proof of their national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the
law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of
Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with
preponderant evidence.

The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for considering that she
already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the
Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that
under Article 89 of the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit
is void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s presumptive legitime, the appellate
court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006
of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are hereby divided equally
between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;

xxx

4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor children,
Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said
properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first
half of January, starting 2008;

xxx

6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the amount of₱520,000.00
to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of
the receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s
names. The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and
the corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period, withdrawable
only by the children or their attorney-in-fact.

A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:

8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount of ₱1,040,000.00
representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.

The last paragraph shall read as follows:

Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil
RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.

The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California Judgment which
awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the pleading presented and offered in
evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to
unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US properties by the California
court.

In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition
for judicial separation ofconjugal properties.

At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between the
parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must beproven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.14

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must comply with our
Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1)
an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication
or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has
the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may be, and
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence,
the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of
a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.

It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on certification where we held that
"[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office
where the divorce decree was obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did with respect to the property regime of
the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized
between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are
still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of marriage. An
exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved and refers only to the instances
provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18

Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135
of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:

(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;

(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;

(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;

(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family
as provided for in Article 101;

(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is
highly improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guiltyor absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).

The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of
properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:

Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is
deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information
as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.

In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora,
Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has
been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said
respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution
of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can
also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s
decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and
that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the
spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself
as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw
the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form.20 Third and more significantly, they
had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation
of absolute community of property should be granted.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the absolute community
regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).

Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the
following procedure should apply:

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said
assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements,
or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value
at the time of its dissolution.

(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In
case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. At the
risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by
the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of
David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes, which
the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property.1âwphi1 While both claimed
to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their contributions came
from, the same is presumed to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement
of half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute
community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may
be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14
of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal
case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share
equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.

xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists
of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children arc therefore entitled to half of the
share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each
pay them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*

Chief Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Second Division Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Additional Cases
5th Case

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
July 27, 2016
G.R. No. 215723
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner
vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents
DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated
November 28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying
petitioner's petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Article
26 of the Family Code.

The Facts

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese
national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.4 Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who
was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.5

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya
City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate7 and the same was
duly recorded in the Official Family Register ofMichiyuki Koike.8

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage9 on file with the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition10 for judicial recognition of ioreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code11 before the RTC, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. Q-13-72692.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.12 On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign
documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"13 and "Family Register of Michiyuki
Koike"14 both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the
Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate"
issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign
Affairs, as well as a Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce
certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their
corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code
of Japan 2009"17 were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.18

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign
divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully
proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her husband,
particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil
Code of Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24
and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and
its effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified expert witness nor was
shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and
divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section 46,22 Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented and considering further that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreignjudgments and law.23

Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a Resolution25 dated November 28, 2014; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce.1âwphi1

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and
a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by
an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.26

In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the occasion to rule that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.1âwphi1 Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect
of his claim or defense.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)

Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be
recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.31

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent
laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC,
the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for
review.
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower
courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions.32
In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.33

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to
the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred
to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not
issues of fact are involved shall be final.

This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when
there is error irr the choice or mode of appeal.34

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the CA, the
question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA
for further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration
of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to
help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its
prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts.35

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual
issues in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Chairperson

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 3-54.

2 Id. at 58-65. Penned by Judge Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale.

3 Id. at 66-70.

4 Id. at 80.

5 Id. at 59.

6 See Certificate of Receiving; id. at 109.

7 Id.at81.

8 See id.

9 Id. at 97.

10 Id.at71-79.

11 Executive Order No. 209, as amended, entitled "THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES," August 4, 1988.

12 Rollo, p. 58.

13 Id. at 109-110.

14 Id. at 101-107.

15 Id. at 83.

16 Id. at 111-115.

17 Id. at 116-119.

18 See id. at 62.

19 Id. at 58-65.

20 SECTION 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.

21 SECTION 25. What attestation of copy must state.- Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose
of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

22 SECTION 46. Learned treatises. -A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert
in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his
profession or calling as expert in the subject.

23 Rollo, pp. 63-64.

24 Id. at 169-193.

25 Id. at 66-70.

26 Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524, 555 (2013).

27 642 Phil. 420 (2010).

28 Id. at 432-433.

29 418 Phil. 723 (2001).

30 Id. at 725.

31 Id. at 735.

32 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Sarabia Manor Hotel Corporation, 715 Phil. 420, 433-435 (2013).

33 See Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 766-767 (2013).

34 CGP Transportation and Services Corporation v. PC! Leasing and Finance, Inc., 548 Phil. 242, 253-254 (2007).

35 Spouses Agbulos v. Gutierrez, 607 Phil. 288, 295 (2009).

Additional Cases
6th Case

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018
REDANTE SARTO Y MISALUCHA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 31 July 2012 Decision1 and the 6 March 2013
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 32635, which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400 finding petitioner Redante Sarto y
Misalucha (Redante) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy.

THE FACTS

On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly contracting two (2) marriages: the first,
with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria Socorro), and the second, without having the first one legally terminated, with
private complainant Fe R. Aguila (Fe). The charge stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by Fe against Redante on 4
June 2007. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about December 29, 1998, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with one Ma. Socorro G. Negrete, as
evidenced by hereto attached Certificate of Marriage mark as Annex "A," and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there, willfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with FE R. AGUILA-SARTO, herein
complaining witness, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During his arraignment on 3 December 2007, Redante entered a plea of "not guilty." Pre-trial ensued wherein Redante
admitted that he had contracted two marriages but interposed the defense that his first marriage had been legally
dissolved by divorce obtained in a foreign country.

On 22 May 2008, the defense filed a motion to allow the taking of Maria Socorro's deposition considering that she was
set to leave the country on the first week of June 2008.5 This was granted by the RTC in its Order,6 dated 26 May 2008.

Maria Socorro's deposition was taken on 28 May 2008. On 22 August 2008, the prosecution moved for a modified or
reverse trial on the basis of Redante's admissions.7 The RTC granted the motion in its Order,8 dated 27 August 2008,
wherein the defense was directed to present its case ahead of the prosecution.

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented Redante and Maria Socorro as witnesses. Their testimonies, taken together, tended to establish
the following:

Redante and Maria Socorro, both natives of Buhi, Camarines Sur, were married on 31 August 1984 in a ceremony held in
Angono, Rizal.9 Sometime thereafter, Maria Socorro left for Canada to work as a nurse. While in Canada, she applied for
Canadian citizenship. The application was eventually granted and Ma. Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship on 1 April
1988.10 Maria Socorro then filed for divorce in British Columbia, Canada, to sever her marital ties with Redante. The
divorce was eventually granted by the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 1 November 1988.11

Maria Socorro came back to Buhi, Camarines Sur, sometime in 1992 for a vacation. While there Redante's mother and
grandparents, who were against the divorce, convinced her and Redante to give their marriage a second chance to which
they acceded. Their attempts to rekindle their romance resulted in the birth of their daughter on 8 March 1993 in
Mandaluyong City. In spite of this, Redante and Maria Socorro's efforts to save their marriage were futile.12

Sometime in February 1998, Redante met Fe to whom he admitted that he was previously married to Maria Socorro who,
however, divorced him.13 Despite this admission, their romance blossomed and culminated in their marriage on 29
December 1998 at the Peñafrancia Basilica Minore in Naga City.14 They established a conjugal home in Pasay City and had
two children. Their relationship, however, turned sour when Ma. Socorro returned to the Philippines and met with
Redante to persuade him to allow their daughter to apply for Canadian citizenship. After learning of Redante and Maria
Socorro's meeting and believing that they had reconciled, Fe decided to leave their conjugal home on 31 May 2007.15 On
4 June 2007, Fe filed a complaint for bigamy against Redante.16

Meanwhile, Maria Socorro married a certain Douglas Alexander Campbell, on 5 August 2000, in Chilliwack, British
Columbia, Canada.17

The defense presented a Certificate of Divorce18 issued on 14 January 2008, to prove the fact of divorce.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution waived the presentation of testimonial evidence and presented instead, the Marriage Contract19
between Redante and Maria Socorro, to prove the solemnization of their marriage on 31 August 1984, in Angono, Rizal;
and the Marriage Contract20 of Redante and Fe to prove the solemnization of Redante's second marriage on 29 December
1998, in Naga City. The prosecution also adopted the Certificate of Divorce21 as its own exhibit for the purpose of proving
that the same was secured only on 14 January 2008.

The RTC Ruling

In its judgment, the RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. The trial court ratiocinated
that Redante's conviction is the only reasonable conclusion for the case because of his failure to present competent
evidence proving the alleged divorce decree; his failure to establish the naturalization of Maria Socorro; and his admission
that he did not seek judicial recognition of the alleged divorce decree. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Redante Sarto y Misalucha guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Bigamy
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court
hereby sentenced him an imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.22

Aggrieved, Redante appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's Judgment. The appellate court ratiocinated that assuming the
authenticity and due execution of the Certificate of Divorce, since the order of divorce or the divorce decree was not
presented, it could not ascertain whether said divorce capacitated Maria Socorro, and consequently Redante, to remarry.
It continued that Redante failed to present evidence that he had filed and had secured a judicial declaration that his first
marriage had been dissolved in accordance with Philippine laws prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant Redante Sarto y Misalucha of Bigamy in
Criminal Case No. 2007-0400, is AFFIRMED.23

Redante moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its 6 March 2013 resolution.

Hence, the present petition.

On 26 June 2013, the Court issued a Resolution24 requiring the respondent Republic of the Philippines to file its comment.
The OSG's Manifestation

In compliance with this Court's resolution, the respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its
Manifestation (in lieu of Comment)25 advocating Redante's acquittal. The OSG argued that the RTC had convicted Redante
solely because of his failure to provide evidence concerning the date when Maria Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship.
It observed that Maria Socorro failed to provide the exact date when she acquired Canadian citizenship because of the
loss of her citizenship certificate at the time she took the witness stand. The OSG claimed, however, that Redante was
able to submit, although belatedly, a photocopy of Maria Socorro's Canadian citizenship certificate as an attachment to
his appellant's brief. The said certificate stated that Maria Socorro was already a Canadian citizen as early as 1 April 1988;
hence, the divorce decree which took effect on 1 November 1988 is valid. The OSG further averred that substantial rights
must prevail over the application of procedural rules.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY FOUND PETITIONER REDANTE SARTO y MISALUCHA
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF BIGAMY.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is bereft of merit.

Elements of bigamy; burden of proving the termination of the first marriage.

For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following elements must concur: (1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case of an absentee spouse, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the provisions of the Civil Code; (3) that the offender contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.26

Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however, put forth the defense of the termination of his
first marriage as a result of the divorce obtained abroad by his alien spouse.

It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.27 Since the divorce was a defense raised by Redante,
it is incumbent upon him to show that it was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro's country's national law.28
Stated differently, Redante has the burden of proving the termination of the first marriage prior to the celebration of the
second.29

Redante failed to prove his capacity to contract a subsequent marriage.

A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage. As in any
other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition
by Philippine courts may be required before the effects of a divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction.30
Recognition of the divorce decree, however, need not be obtained in a separate petition filed solely for that purpose.
Philippine courts may recognize the foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.31

Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Proving the foreign law under which the divorce was secured is mandatory
considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws.32 For the
purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence.
This is in consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only after it is
presented and admitted in evidence.33

In particular, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them must present copies thereof
and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.34 Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree
and foreign law may be proven through (1) an official publication or (2) or copies thereof attested to by the officer having
legal custody of said documents. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country, the copies of said documents must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.35

Applying the foregoing, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce as a fact or that it
was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe.

Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of evidence presented by the defense to prove
the divorce, is the certificate of divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 14
January 2008. Said certificate provides:

In the Supreme Court of British Columbia

Certificate of Divorce

This is to certify that Ma. Socorro Negrete SARTO and Redante M SARTO who were married at ANGONO, RIZAL,
PHILIPPINES on August 31, 1984 were divorced under the Divorce Act (Canada) by an order of this Court which took effect
and dissolved the marriage on November 1, 1988.

Given under my hand and the Seal of this Court January 14, 2008

(SGD.)

__________________

REGISTRAR

This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge against Redante. First, the certificate of
divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the divorce decree
required to prove the fact of divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere certification.
Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree, it was not accompanied by a
certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Canada, as required under Section
24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably
determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with Maria Socorro's national law.

Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce
supposedly secured by Maria Socorro - whether an absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce
which merely suspends it36 - and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be ascertained. As such,
Redante failed to prove his defense that he had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe.
His liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.

This Court is not unmindful of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Indeed, in Republic v. Orbecido,37 a
case invoked by Redante to support his cause, the Court recognized that the legislative intent behind the said provision is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse under the laws of his or her country. The Court is also not oblivious of the fact
that Maria Socorro had already remarried in Canada on 5 August 2000. These circumstances, however, can never justify
the reversal of Redante's conviction.

In Orbecido, as in Redante's case, the alien spouse divorced her Filipino spouse and remarried another. The Filipino spouse
then filed a petition for authority to remarry under paragraph 2 of Article 26. His petition was granted by the RTC.
However, this Court set aside said decision by the trial court after finding that the records were bereft of competent
evidence concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of the alien spouse. The Court reiterated therein the rules
regarding the recognition of the foreign divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it, as well as the necessity to show
that the divorce decree capacitated his former spouse to remarry.38

Finally, the Court notes that the OSG was miserably misguided when it claimed that the sole reason for the RTC's judgment
of conviction was Redante's failure to provide evidence, during trial, of the date Maria Socorro acquired Canadian
citizenship.

An examination of the 18 May 2009 judgment would reveal that the trial court rendered the said decision after finding
that there was lack of any competent evidence with regard to the divorce decree39 and the national law governing his
first wife,40 not merely because of the lack of evidence concerning the effectivity date of Maria Socorro's naturalization.
Thus, even if the Court were to indulge the OSG and consider Maria Socorro's citizenship certificate, which was a mere
photocopy and filed belatedly, it would not have any effect significant enough to produce a judgment of acquittal. The
fact that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce and that it was validly acquired prior to the celebration of
the second marriage still subsists.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision, dated 31 July 2012, of the Court of
Appeals in CA- G.R. CR No. 32635 which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga
City, in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Redante Sarto y Misalucha is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

April 23, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on February 28, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the
above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on April 23, 2018 at 1:30 p.m.

Very truly yours,

WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court

By:

(Sgd.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG III

Deputy Division Clerk of Court

Additional Cases
7th Case

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018
STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Amended Decision1 dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its
former Decision dated November 25, 2015, which in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
40, Daet, Camarines Norte, granting petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding
rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving their
marriage.2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition
and recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws.3 On November 25, 2015, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and set aside its
previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the following requisites under Article 26 of the Family
Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.5 This is because the divorce herein was
consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino
citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled
that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her cause.6

On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SECOND
REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT
BECAUSE THE PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT TO THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE HUSBAND.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE IS
NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE SUBMISSION OF AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL
CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.7

Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as Divorce by Agreement in Japan, as
opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more practical and common type of divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her great
disadvantage if said divorce is not recognized and instead, Judicial Divorce is required in order for her to avail of the benefit
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, since their divorce had already been granted abroad.8
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the mere fact that she consented to the divorce does not prevent the application of
Article 26 for said provision does not state that where the consent of the Filipino spouse was obtained in the divorce, the
same no longer finds application. In support of her contentions, petitioner cites the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v.
Orbecido III wherein the Court held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to remarry in the event that he or she is divorced by
a Filipino spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship.9 As to the issue of evidence presented, petitioner explains that
the reason why she was unable to present authenticated copies of the provisions of the Civil Code of Japan relative to
divorce is because she was unable to go to Japan due to the fact that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could
obtain a copy of the same for her. Instead, she went to the library of the Japanese Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code.
There, she was issued a document which states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas do not issue certified true
copies of Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of Japanese Law due to the potential problem in the legal
interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that this constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules on
Evidence.10

We grant the petition.

The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v. Manalo,11 the facts of which fall
squarely on point with the facts herein. In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino, was married to a Japanese
national named Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for divorce before a Japanese Court, which granted the same
and consequently issued a divorce decree dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized
in the Philippines and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro Manila, cancelled,
so that said entry shall not become a hindrance if and when she decides to remarry. The trial court, however, denied
Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in
the country or abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines
or in another country.

On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and affirmed, instead, the ruling of the CA. There,
the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code which states that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the
divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of the legislature and
would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically,
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject
provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same
place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.12

Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite the fact that petitioner
participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be
allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to
Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating
Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree
and the effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.13 This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.14 Since both the foreign
divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official
acts of a sovereign authority, Section 2415 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.16 Thus, what is required is proof,
either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.17

In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the
same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering that
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin
for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), J., I concur in result. See Separate Opinion.
Additional Cases
8th Case

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
July 27, 2016
G.R. No. 204494
JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners
vs.
LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent
DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated
August 6, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The
CA affirmed the Decision4 dated July 23, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No.
69611.

The Facts

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 docketed as Civil Case No. 69611 against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado
(Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston
Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6 dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002.7

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surv1vmg spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were
married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their
daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.8

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered
by the following Transfer Certificate of Title/s (TCT/s):

1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),

2. TCTNo. 60069/T-301(nowTCTNo. 11106-R),

3. TCTNo. 5109/T-26 (nowTCTNo. 11107),

4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),

5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and

6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R).9

According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties
pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral
Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-
Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died on September 21, 2002,11
Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002,
adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637
and 8003.12

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his
inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.13
In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,14 which the trial court considered as the Answer of her husband,
Gerard,15 Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however
that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a
Partition Agreement16 executed in November 1980. This was implemented through another Partition Agreement17
executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned to him by virtue of the said agreement
while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs covering
Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was described therein as single without reference to any
husband.18

Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their Answer,19 stating that Maria Luisa is
also not aware that Luis and Severina were married. She is cognizant of the fact that Luis and Severina lived together as
common-law husband and wife - a relationship which was terminated upon execution of a Partition Agreement. In the
Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina were described as single and they acknowledged that they were living together as
common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition of the properties they owned in common. Hence, Luis
already received his share in the properties20 and is estopped from denying the same.21 After the termination of their
cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA), married one Teresita Anson and had a son with her;
while Maria Luisa was left under the guardianship and custody of Severina.22 It was after the death of Severina that Maria
Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002.
The Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage23 (between Luis and Severina) from
the Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office.24

Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary evidence which included a certified
true copy of his marriage contract with Severina,25 the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective
Demurrers to Evidence.26 The Spouses Salgado disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack
of marriage license as borne out by the marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed on cross-
examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged marriage.27 Luis had also admitted the
existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement.28 The logical conclusion therefore is that the
properties disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties, which she
had all the right to dispose of, without the conformity of Luis.29

On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the sufficiency of evidence presented by Luis
is evidentiary in nature and may only be controverted by evidence to the contrary.30 The Spouses Salgado and Spouses
Maya filed their separate motions for reconsideration,31 which the trial court denied.32 Consequently, both the Spouses
Salgado and Spouses ·Maya filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the CA.33 Meanwhile, the Spouses Salgado
were deemed to have waived their presentation of evidence when they failed to attend the scheduled hearings before
the trial court.34

Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence filed by the Spouses Salgado, the CA Second Division
directed the trial court "to properly resolve with deliberate dispatch the demurrer to evidence in accordance with Section
3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by stating clearly and distinctly the reason therefor on the basis of [the
Spouses Salgado's] proffered evidence[,]"35 whereas the CA Ninth Division dismissed the petition of the Spouses Maya
and ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate dispatch.36

In an Order37 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA to resolve the demurrer to evidence in
more specific terms, denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack of merit and held that the totality of evidence
presented by Luis has sufficiently established his right to obtain the reliefs prayed for in his complaint.

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision38 in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage between Luis and Severina
was valid. It noted that the marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
execution and is conclusive as to the fact of marriage.39 The trial court also based its ruling in Geronimo v. CA40where
the validity of marriage was upheld despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract.41 The
trial court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which
cannot be disposed of by Severina without the consent of her husband, Luis.42

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Luis] and against [the Spouses Salgado]
ordering as follows:

1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of
Sale, all dated January 23, 2002 executed by [Severina] in favor of [Jo-Ann];

2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-
R, 11105-R and 11106-R covering the subject properties, all issued in the name of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for
San Juan, Metro Manila;

3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R (formerly TCT Nos. 5109, 20618 and
60069, respectively) to the conjugal community of properties between [Luis] and [Severina].

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.43

On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision44 which ordered the "ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE
and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De
Asis executed by [Maria Luisa] dated October 25, 2002 x x x."45 The RTC also ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued
by virtue of the said Deeds.46

The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective motions for reconsideration on September 11, 200747
and August 28, 2007,48 respectively, which the RTC denied in the Omnibus Order49 dated October 30, 2007 for lack of
merit. This prompted the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya to file their separate notices of appeal before the CA on
December 13, 200750 and April 24, 2009,51 respectively.

Ruling of the CA

The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise Agreement52 which was approved by the CA in its
Decision53 dated October 26, 2011. This resulted in the termination of the Spouses Maya's appeal.54

On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision,55 dismissing the appeal of the Spouses Salgado. The fallo reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 23, 2007 of the [RTC]
of Pasig is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.56

The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not present and formally offer
any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence presented by Luis.57 The CA further explained that
"the best evidence to establish the absence of a marriage license is a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the
parties to the Marriage Contract did not secure a marriage license or at the very least a certification from the said office
that despite diligent search, no record of application for or a marriage license was issued on or before December 28, 1966
in favor of Luis and Severina. Again, Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same by their failure to secure the said certification
and present evidence during the trial."58

The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for reconsideration59 which the CA denied through its Resolution60
dated November 26, 2012.
The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising the core issue of whether the CA committed reversible
error in affirming the RTC decision which declared the marriage between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as
conjugal properties.

Ruling of the Court

The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for want of marriage license
based on the Marriage Contract61 presented by Luis which has adequately established its absence.62

Luis, in his Comment,63 opposes the filing of the present petition on the ground that it raises a question of fact, which
cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. He also countered that the Spouses Salgado did not present any
evidence to support their theory.64 If the existence of the marriage license is in issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses
Salgado to show the lack of marriage license by clear and convincing evidence.65

Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition, the Court shall first tackle the procedural issue raised
by Luis which pertains to the propriety of the filing of this petition for review on certiorari.

Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law, mainly, whether the absence of a marriage
license may be proven on the basis of a marriage contract which states that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer on account of the marriage being of an exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is, as a general rule,
limited to reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions66 recognized by the Court, such as when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.67

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its celebration68 on December 28, 1966.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 5369 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for
marriages of exceptional character,70 renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3 ). It sets forth:

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)

"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4) ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage,
(6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages."71 To reiterate, in any of the aforementioned marriages
of exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed with.

The marriage is not of an

exceptional character

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license number was indicated
therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic
Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor. The pertinent portion of the marriage contract is quoted as
follows:
[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x x, 19 x x x in favor of, said parties, was exhibited
to me or no marriage license was exhibited to me, this marriage being of an exceptional character performed under Art.
77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x.72

The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public document, the
marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
This is pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.

Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract are prima facie proof that at the time of their
marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an
exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations,
rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of
Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.

The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was
solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to
conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage
license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non
that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil
marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil
ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage appearing on the records. This was also consistently
affirmed by Luis in open court:

Atty. Francisco:

Q- You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A certifying that you were married to the late
[Severina].

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Do you recall when this marriage took place?

A- As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my daughter get (sic) one (1) year old. That was 1966 December
something like 28, because she was born December 30, the death of Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So, before she
turned one (1) year old two (2) days before we got married here in San Juan.

Q- So, when was she born if you can recall?

A- Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.

Q- If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?

A- It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan.73

xxxx

[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination that you were married to [Severina]?

A: Yes sir.

Q: When do you say you marr[ied] her?

A: Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is December 28, 1966.74 (Emphasis ours)

Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and this was
not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this
marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the
provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied with.
There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is
required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.

Absence of marriage license

The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of the marriage license?

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does
not obtain in their case, it is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis relied
mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence
(marriage contract), which on its face has established that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
If there was a marriage license issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage contract was not explained at all.
Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No other witness also testified to prove its existence,
whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one, and is
uncertain about the documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall. As he revealed in his testimony:

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place between you and [Severina]?

A TTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor?

ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a wedding that took place, Your Honor.

COURT: Answer.

What preparations were done?

A- There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the Mayor during that time and the Mayor is a close friend
of ours.1âwphi1 So, when he knew that we are traveling, we are going to Thailand with the invitation of a friend to work
with him in Thailand, he told us you better get married first before you travel because your daughter will be illegitimate.75

xxxx

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?

A- We did not.

Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?

A- No.

CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS

[Q-] There was no marriage license?

A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license.

COURT:

Not necessarily.

A- But, I don't know whether there was an application for the license because it was at the house of the Mayor.

COURT:

But in this particular case before you went to the house of the Mayor for the solemnization of your marriage, did you
apply for a marriage license?

A- No. 76

x x xx

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF

[LUIS]:

Q- Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were asked by counsel as well as a question was raised by
the Honorable Court whether or not you applied for a marriage license when you got married on December 28, 1966
allegedly with [Severina]. Can you tell the Court what you meant by that?

COURT:

By what?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Whether he applied?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization of the marriage, you answered No.

WITNESS:

I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit or application before we went to the house of the
Mayor to get marry (sic) but that was about - - I cannot recall if that past (sic) a week or 2 days or 3 days ago.

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you used we, whom are you referring to?

A- [Severina].

Q- And, yourself?

A- Yes.
Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the solemnization of the marriage?

A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office of the [M]ayor or Office of the Chief
of Police.1awp++i1 I cannot recall. It is inside the Munisipyo of San Juan.

Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?

A- The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our marriage. They let us signed (sic) an application or
affidavit. I cannot recall what it is.77 (Emphasis ours)

In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to consider the glaring statements in the
marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer and that the marriage is of an
exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious. Both the RTC and CA upheld
the fact of marriage based on the marriage contract but simply glossed over the part stating that the marriage is of an
exceptional character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a case of mere non-recording of the marriage license
number on the marriage contract, as was in Geronimo.78

The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the case under review, hence, inapplicable. In Geronimo,
despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract presented by therein petitioner (brother of
the deceased), there was no statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also
testified that the deceased and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband of the deceased was
able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section where the marriage
license number appears.

"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties."79 Considering that the absence of the marriage
license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional
character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that the marriage
between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot,80the Court similarly declared that a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu of a marriage license, therein parties to the
marriage executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the notion
that all the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with. The Court held that to permit a false affidavit
to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. It was further explained:

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties' affidavit will not affect
the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant
merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite
of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

xxxx

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated
by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that
the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference
to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.81
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract because these refer to the absence of
a formal requisite of marriage. "The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement
and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception."82
"The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a
basic 'autonomous social institution."'83

Partition Agreement is Valid

Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation, Luis and Severina executed a notarized
Partition Agreement84 in November 1980, which divided their properties between them without court intervention. Luis
sought to annul such agreement on the ground that "the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of
the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes
effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is void."85

The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City,86the Court held that "[i]n a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article
148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code x x x."87 It
provides:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their .ioint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation
and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
of the cohabitation.88 (Emphasis ours)

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their cohabitation
and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil
Code,89 in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations.
Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license."90
"Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."'91

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties co-owned
by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division
and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its
value." As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the
agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the
execution of the Partition Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement.92 It also remains
uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no
reason to have the said agreement declared null and void or annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which renders
such contract invalid or at least, voidable.

All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of marriage license or certification of "due
search and inability to find" a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of
the license,93 such certification is not the only proof that could validate the absence of a marriage license.

In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to
the solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character under
Article 77 of the Civil Code, are circumstances which cannot be disregarded. Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis'
failure to assert his marriage to Severina during the latter's lifetime is suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981, and until
Severina' s death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled with her.94 All those years, he never presented himself to
be the husband of Severina. Not even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. During trial, he never presented
any other witness to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly
contracted a subsequent marriage abroad. Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence
he himself had presented.

"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well."95

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2012
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No.
69611 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Additional Cases
9th Case

SECOND DIVISION
January 13, 2016
G.R. No. 207406
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If
they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence
of the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated July 18, 2012 and
Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision4 of Branch 25 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.5 Norberto was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto with bigamy.7 The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then legally married to GINA
M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all
the legal requisites for its validity with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to and at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law.8

Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at the Manila Cathedral in
Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children.10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another woman[.]"11 She
eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as
evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal
Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in 1987.13 "After much
prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in 1994."14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake marriage"15 with his college
girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed
with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children.17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an affair with a married
man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone conversation with her paramour.18
Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair. The lawyer also
warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing her paramour.19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint for bigamy against
Norberto.20

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage with Gina, Branch 25
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated
September 1, 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the penalty imposed in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18,
2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 25, dated
September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced.
Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution dated June 3, 2013.24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, filed a Comment25 to which Norberto filed a Reply.26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.27 He presents as evidence a Certification28 from
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly
issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—
the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage.29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.
According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes bigamy mentions that
requirement.30 Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused[,]"31 Norberto prays for
his acquittal.32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage with Gina as evidenced by
the marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise proved that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina
was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice;
and that the second marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore,
should be convicted of bigamy.33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first
marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming
that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved
through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did
nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present
any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil registrar of the
municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to
Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on July 17, 1987. This
was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August 3,1988.35 Consequently, provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines36 govern the validity of his first marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which renders the marriage void
from the beginning:37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.38 The marriage license represents the state’s "involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested."39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties."40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and License Issuance available in
this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR.
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41
This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not
categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his
first wife, Gina.43 The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence
of petitioner’s first marriage.44This "should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the]
absence of any record of the marriage[.]"45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a marriage.47 As part
of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the marriage license "cannot be located as said
license . . . does not appear from [the local civil registrar’s] records."48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license."49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’ sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not
issue [a] marriage license . . . to the contracting parties."50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage
that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto
for him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the
cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence
presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be
found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found
is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses
may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit
is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.51 In Cariño, the marriage contract between Santiago
Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number.52 In addition, the local civil registrar certified
that it has no record of any marriage license issued to Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.53 This court declared Santiago
Cariño’s first marriage void for having been solemnized without a marriage license.54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely and voluntarily signed
and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing officer. The first marriage was celebrated on
July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4)
months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even
while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In other words,
petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar suspect. The
prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a second
or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to
discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus,
pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license cannot be
found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was issued.
The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.55 There is no evidence to show that
the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been issued from its source. There is no proof as to
whether the licenses issued before or after the document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There
is no evidence that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown whether
there was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the proper judicial
conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official functions to the civil
registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that there is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the context just discussed
can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage license in his office. This presumption does
not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly executed by petitioner
and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer
a conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a deprivation of liberty.
It is not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the case—that a well-connected accused will use all means,
fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within
the discretion of a government employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may be accurate
but which he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an accused. Much of
the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses. We can
defer to that discretion as much as to make our own judgment based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by
the trial court. Using both, we have no reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II

Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner
remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.56 The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in
this case.

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such
authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts
a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of the Family Code:59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of
Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage
and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally
void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first."60 Further, "[a] party may even enter into a marriage
aware of the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void."61
For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En Banc as petitioner
insists.62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently married Alice G.
Eduardo on December 4, 1994.63 As for the last element of bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice
without his first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void.64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime charged.1âwphi1

III

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. On the other
hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of
the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are
considered.65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that is prision correccional. Prision
correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years;67 hence, the minimum penalty can be any period
within this range.

As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period, there being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional
as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The ranges of the minimum and maximum
penalties are within the ranges as previously computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness[,]’"68
we lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner
is, thus, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 and
Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A.
Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Additional Cases
10th Case

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated
July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to
RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive
Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to
Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite
on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this
case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January
9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St.,
Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo
some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage
until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and
that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license
number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003
to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said
certification reads as follows:

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued
in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8,
1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had
gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license
on advice of his counsel.8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic
appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents
pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20,
1993.9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same
serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo
and May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and
that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license
the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the
solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the
marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother
of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple,
and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did
not know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the
marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer
and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present
at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez
at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male
person went to their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to
their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she
was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by
Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003,
pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26

As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the
wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify
all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures
as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one
of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin
returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.
Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura
during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the
RTC of Manila.30

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those
around them at the time were Chinese.31

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license
had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona,
Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the
marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was
acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel
from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-
Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.

SO ORDERED.34

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND
VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE
THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE
IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN
ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with
all the requisites laid down by law.37

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27
January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas
and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated July 24, 2008.41

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN
THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.42

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of
the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the
authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt
from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case,
thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage
license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as
well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued,
Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was
there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by
his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license, the Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of
public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where
they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued,
issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number
of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of
Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and
Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification
used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the
certification could not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular
case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the
same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence
was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus
the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains
to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to
not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance
in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from
that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there
was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The
case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To
quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been
validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to
marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein
gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several
pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held
after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who
was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to
have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against
him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready
to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to
profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that
he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling
the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and
Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.

2 Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling.

3 Rollo, p. 13.

4 Id. at 47.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 12.

7 Id. at 10.

8 Id. at 48.

9 Id. at 49, "January 19, 1993" in some parts of the records.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 49-50.

12 Id. at 50.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id. at 51.

17 Id.

18 Id.
19 Id.

20 Id. at 52.

21 Id.

22 Id. at 53.

23 Id. at 54.

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 Id.

27 Id. at 55.

28 Id.

29 Id. at 56.

30 Id. at 57.

31 Id.

32 Id. at 58.

33 Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the city or municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this
Title.

34 Rollo, pp. 58-59.

35 Id. at 122.

36 Id. at 128.

37 Id. at 129.

38 Id. at 130.

39 Id. at 131.

40 Id. at 135-146.

41 Id. at 173-174.

42 Id. at 31.

43 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.

44 Id. at 262.

45 Supra note 43.

46 Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446, 456.

47 403 Phil. 861, 869 (2001).

48 Supra note 43.

49 Supra note 47, at 870.

50 Rollo, pp. 129-130.

51 Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized
without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives.

Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.

Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed
before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed
in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no
means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took
the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment
to the marriage.

Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a legible copy of the marriage
contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was
performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.

Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or
by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.

Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize
marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces
or civilians.

Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly
without the necessity of marriage licenses, provided they arc solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or
practices.

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Additional Cases
11th Case

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances
handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify
the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support
pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the
CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside
certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face,
the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to
Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then
on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court
issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after
completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same
court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they
executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired
during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the
Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an American citizen;
that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and
entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256
of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support
pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their
daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of
her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal
complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on
the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting
Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in
Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount
of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration
of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente
lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving
legal support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA
on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be
ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001
and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the
posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on
May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but
the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition
for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No.
01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision
reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to
state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having
previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an American
citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to
contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree
was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that
her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the
Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status and
having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b)
when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18,
1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case
No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus
soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign
divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally
assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R.
No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of which
converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would have
entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED
IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS
BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT
ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL
COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the
petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a
Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a
Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in
this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting
of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was
a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and
second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an
American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle
of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she
was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American
citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3)
when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34
in which she stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778
and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized
as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon
the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau
Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and
partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935
Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995,
and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five
years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11,
1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995
when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this
patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice
Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001.
There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of
the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative
Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization
regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official
copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of
the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued
before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant
to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
(Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then
Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to
attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation
or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no
identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore,
the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on
June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later,
or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is
indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it
was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly,
the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex
"A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on
October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the
question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the
withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted
of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her
Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No.
RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to
motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she
was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At
the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil
Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the
existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42
years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who
personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave.,
Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x
x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L.
Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis
ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which
allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly
affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may,
the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And
neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground
of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds
true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section
50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to
actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence
of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly
represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation
by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify
or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at
the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing
the legal requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the
Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as
follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their
citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14,
1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consists only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila
registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce
decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between
the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by
reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision
of said agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang.48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of
action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based
on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint
are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court
can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following
elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and
Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be
dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their
daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support
given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the
majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She
would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is
best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be
proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes,
if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is,
Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her
petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA
veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the
petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and
June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice