A.

LEGISLATIVE POWER
I. IN GENERAL SENSE

DAVID vs. ARROYO

FACTS:
7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP No.
1017 and GO No. 5, GMA committed grave abuse of discretion. It tramples upon the
very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution thus, such issuances
are void for being unconstitutional. GMA as the President and Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon her by
ARTICLE 7, SECTION 18 (The President whenever it becomes necessary may call
out the armed forces to prevent or suppress rebellion) and in her capacity as the
Commander-in-Chief (do hereby command the AFP to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by her personally or upon her
direction) and as provided in ARTICLE 12, SECTION 17 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency. Main reason for PP 1017 – plot to
unseat or assassinate GMA. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
GO 5 implements PP 1017. After 1 week, PP No. 1021 lifted PP 1017. The
petitioners contend that PP 1017 and GO 5 are unconstitutional for having violated
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, speech, assembly, expression
when those tasked to enforce PP 1017 committed these against the petitioners:
• Revoked rally permits
• Warrantless arrest
• Facility take over
• Restraining media
Also, it is unconstitutional because it grants the President the power to promulgate
decrees when the proclamation stated "enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally".

ISSUES:
WHETHER PP 1017 AND GO 5 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

RULING:
PROVISIONS OF PP 1017 (discussed):
First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Article VII do
hereby command the AFP, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion.
• THIS AN EXERCISE OF PRESIDENT'S CALLING-OUT POWER.
• In exercising her calling-out power, the President relied on SECTION 17,
ARTICLE XII.
• PP 1017 IS NOT A DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW. IT IS MERELY AN
EXERCISE OF PRESIDENT ARROYO’S CALLING – OUT POWER FOR THE
ARMED FORCES TO ASSIST HER IN PREVENTING OR SUPPRESSING
LAWLESS VIOLENCE.
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
• Petitioners argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon GMA
the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI. It
was lifted from Marcos’ PP No. 1081.
• She cannot use decrees similar to those issued by Marcos under PP 1081.
PDs are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes
because they were issued by the President in exercise of his legislative power
during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
• THE COURT RULES THAT THE ASSAILED PP 1017 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
INSOFAR AS IT GRANTS GMA THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE DECREES
when the proclamation stated "enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally".
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
• A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare a
“state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. The first,
Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power so no constitutional
objection can be raised. But the second, Section 17, Article XII, constitutional
issue arise.
• THE CONSTITUTION DID NOT INTEND THAT CONGRESS SHOULD FIRST
AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT BEFORE HE CAN DECLARE A “STATE OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY”. SO, PRESIDENT ARROYO COULD VALIDLY DECLARE
THE EXISTENCE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A
CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT. BUT THE EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY POWERS
SUCH AS THE TAKING OVER OF PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC UTILITY OR
BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST, IS A DIFFERENT MATTER.
THIS REQUIRES DELEGATION FROM CONGRESS.
The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
• The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a
call by GMA on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
 • However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not
related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President,
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
• In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such
declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately – owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
• GO 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and
the PNP should implement PP 1017. Considering that “acts of terrorism” have
not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
GO 5 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
• The violence against petitioners are UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA

Dispositive Portion:
Respondent Executive Secretary Rufino G. Hechanova had and has no power to
authorize the importation of foreign rice. He exceeded his jurisdiction in granting
said authority. The said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its
provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for
must be and is, accordingly DENIED.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:

Petitioner is a rice planter with a substantial proportion of rice land, taxpayer and
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed a petition seeking
to restrain the allegedly unlawful disbursement of public funds to import rice from
abroad. Petitioner argues that in making or attempting to make the importation of
rice, the respondents “are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,”
because RA 3452, allegedly repealing or amending RA 2207 explicitly prohibits the
importation of rice and corn. The petitioner prayed the petition be given due course,
and that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, restraining respondents from
implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary to import the foreign rice
from private sources, and that judgement be rendered making the injunction
permanent.

Respondent Executive Secretary has authorized the importation of 67 000 tons of

foreign rice to be purchased from private sources and created a procurement
committee, composed of the other respondents, for the implementation of the rice
importation.

Proposed rice importation is illegal because the respondent, Executive Secretary

Rufino G Hechanova and his procurement committee did not comply with the
conditions of RA 2207 and RA 3452. RA 3452 and RA 2207 prohibit the importation
of rice and corn by government itself and the government agency(ies).

Respondents argued that the there is no rice shortage and that the proposed
importation is not intended for public consumption, and is not governed by RA 3252
and RA 2207, rather it was authorized by the President in exercising his authority
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Commonwealth Act
1, Sect 2, “for military stock pile purposes”.

Respondents further argued that the Philippine government has entered and
constituted an agreement with the Republic of Viet Nam and Government of Burma
which is valid under the International Law.

ISSUE:
Whether the proposed importation is legally feasible
Whether or not an international agreement may be invalidated by the PH courts

HELD:
Constitutionally, the international agreement with the two foreign countries is
inconsistent with the local statue, RA 3452 and RA 2207. The President, by the
American constitutional system may enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority; but by executive agreement, the President may not
enter into a transaction prohibited by statutes enacted.

The Constitution provides that the Executive enforces laws enacted by the Congress
and cannot interfere with the legislative except when exercising the Executive veto
power. The Executive may not defeat the legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of law by directly repealing through an executive agreement providing
for the performance of the very act prohibited by the law.

Sect 2 Art 8 of the 1987 RPH Constitution, the judicial review is vested upon the
SC. Thus the alleged consummation of the contracts with the Republic of Viet Nam
and the Government of Burma does not render this case academic. RA 2207 enjoins
the PH government NOT FROM entering into contracts for the purchase of rice BUT
from importing rice, except under the conditions prescribed in the said Act.

A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel the
PH government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have
contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact the
obligations may be complied without importing the said commodity into the PH, the
proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the
Ras.

CHAVEZ VS. JBC

FACTS:
From the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the
Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative
branches of the government. Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of
appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan
activities,1 5 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the
President. Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the
judicial appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council(JBC).
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

in 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the
JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the
House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2)
of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in
this petition. Respondents argued that the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It
is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of
either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that
both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated
duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each
from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

ISSUE:
-Is the JBC’s practice of having 2 representatives from the senate is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
- What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

HELD:
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined and by
which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe
and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. Congress, in relation to the
executive and judicial branches of government, is constitutionally treated as
another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other
hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and the
House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of
Congress' role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in
fact, necessitates the separateness of the two Houses of Congress as they relate
inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other
two co-equal branches of government.

Since the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional, however, that as a

general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. Under
the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds
that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

Respondents' contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be
accepted, simply because it was only questioned for the first time through the
present action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done
in violation of the Constitution no matter how frequent, usual or notorious cannot
develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once
an act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the very
beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.

(BICAMERALISM ISSUE: )
Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to its deliberate intent
which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. the
Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it. The Court cannot accede to
the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional construction-
Section 8, Article VIII. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the
singular letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people
through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the
JBC. The Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, in reverence to it as a
major branch of government not as constituent.

The 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as
to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII,
the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding
adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by
its two Houses.

IMBONG VS. OCHOA

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 10354, “The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act
of 2012” (RH Law), was enacted by the Congress on December 21, 2012. On March
15, 2013, the RH-IRR took effect.

a) Various sectors challenged the constitutionality of the said law, with 14

petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention. On March 19, 2013, the Court
issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO).

b) The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power
to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).

c) The petitioners claim that RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to
Local Government Units (LGU) under Section 17 of Local Government Code

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the delegation by Congress to FDA (Food & Drug Assoc. Phil)
of the power to determine whether a supply or product is to be included in
the Essential Drugs List (EDL) is valid.

2. Whether or not the RH Law infringes upon the vested powers upon Local
Government Units (LGU) and ARMM.

HELD:

1. Yes, the delegation of power is valid.

Section 4 of RA No. 3720 as amended by RA 9711 provides that:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an
office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department
of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the
Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules
and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health

products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the

implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of

health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity,
safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve

as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for
compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers,
exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments
and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to

the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity,
and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters,

wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health
products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said
product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint
for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That
for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty
(30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process
has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any
health product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury
to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe,
dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement
 the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the
appropriate authorization;

The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services.

The functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to
carry out mandates of the law. Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that
ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was
equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective.

Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to

the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines
that are safe includes “services” and “methods”. From the declared policy of RH
Law, it is clear that Congress intended the public be given only those medicines that
are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance
with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.

2. No, the RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of LGU and ARMM.

Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving

nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local
government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it
has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of
these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an
undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by
LGUs.

Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM
merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government.
These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare.

The petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. R.A. No. 10354 is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
2) Section 23 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24
7) Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by
its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A.
No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

xxxx

Additional discussion:

Philosophy behind permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray vs Secretary of

Justice:
“x x x Legislature may not have the competence, interest and time to provide
the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions.”
Given these shortcomings, the Congress may then create an administrative body
and empower it to promulgate the needed rules and regulations, subject only to
certain limitations or broad policies pre-determined by the legislature itself.

The 5 Permissible delegations (TEPLA) are: 1.) delegate Tariff powers to Pres, 2.)
delegate Emergency powers to Pres, 3.) delegate to People at Large, 4.) delegate to
Local government and 5.) delegate to Administrative Bodies.

Administrative agencies are entrusted with “power of subordinate legislation” by

Congress. Under power of subordinate legislation: 1.) supplementary regulations
and 2.) contingent regulations.

Other Issues:

I. PROCEDURAL:
1) Power of Judicial Review
2) Actual Case or Controversy
3) Facial Challenge
4) Locus Standi
5) Declaratory Relief
6) One Subject/One Title Rule
- In a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law, both
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the population
growth. Thus, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress had
the intention to deceive the public regarding the contents of the said law.

II. SUBSTANTIVE:

1) right to life
- petitioners claim that it violates the right to life of the unborn (Consti Art 2
Sec 2) by:
1. allowing contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and before
implantation. Respondent contends that life begins at implantation.
 2. allowing contraceptives that induces abortion. RH-IRR defined abortifacient
as drug that PRIMARILY induces abortion.

- When does life begin? Life begins at conception. What is conception?

Life begins at fertilization (of the female ovum by the male sperm), and not
on implantation

Verba legis non est recedendum – From the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
- One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that
where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.

- Court ruled to remove the word “primarily” in the RH-IRR.

2) right to health
- petitioners claim that RH law increases risk of cancer in women who use
oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them, and other
health risks.
- the Court finds that the attack on RH Law on this ground is premature, as
not a single contraceptive has been submitted to FDA. It behooves the Court
to await which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe.

3) freedom of religion and right to free speech

-Sections 7, 23 and 24 of RH Law mandate that a hospital or medical
practitioner to refer a person seeking health care and services under the law
to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
- The Court is of the view that the obligation to reger imposed by RH Law
violates religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Section 7,
Section 23(a), 23(b) and related IRRs are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

4) the family
Spousal Consent – decision making involving a reproductive health procedure
is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. The RH
Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision making.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) which allows a married individual, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, to undergo health procedures without the consent of
spouse is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Parental Consent – debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor,

who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. The State cannot, without a compelling state of interest, take
over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or
 not the latter is already a parent or has had miscarriage. Section 7 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

5) freedom of expression and academic freedom

- petitioners claim that Section 14 of RH Law effectively force educational
institutions to teach RH education even if thy believe that the same is not
suitable to be taught to their students.
- the Court finds that the attack on RH Law on this ground is premature
because the DECS (Dept. of Education, Culture and Sports) has yet to
formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate RH education.

6) due process
- petitioners claim that RH law suffers from vagueness relating to: a)
definition of “private health service provider” and confusion with “private
health care institution”, b) whether hospitals operated by religious groups are
also exempt from giving RH information and c) definition of “incorrect
information”
- the court ruled that: a) private health care service provider is clearly
defined in Section 4(n), and it is used synonymously with private health care
institution b) Hospitals operated by religious groups are thus also exempt
from giving RH information, as “service” and “methods” are broad enough to
include the providing of information, and c) the word “incorrect” is construed
in its plain meaning as inaccurate, faulty, etc.

7) equal protection
-petitioners contend that the RH Law discriminates against the poor because:
1) it makes them the primary target of the gov’t program that promotes
contraceptive use. They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive
health, the RH Law is aimed to reduce the number of the poor. 2) exclusion
of private educational institutions from mandatory RH education program
- equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.
- The court ruled that: 1) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in
the government’s RH care program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause, rather it recognized the distinct necessity to address the needs of
underprivileged. 2) there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions with respect to religious instruction and to
consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of RH education.

8) involuntary servitude
- petitioners aver that RH Law violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude under Section 17 requiring private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro-bono RH services,
because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.
 - The OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the
government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being
a privilege and not a right. Further, the rendering of pro-bono service is
only encouraged. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty
is imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays"). Its primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial
law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating
the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on
October 16, 1976. The questions ask, to wit: 1) Do you want martial law to be
continued? (2) WON you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the
following amendments to the Constitution?

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and
son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree
Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to
the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments
to the new Constitution.

ISSUE/S:
During the present stage of the transition period, and under the environmental
circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose
amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?

HELD:
YES. In the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President
(Sec. 15 of the Transitory Provisions).

The power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly

during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a
matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the
exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer the convening of that body
in utter recognition of the people's preference - the people had already rejected the
calling of the interim National Assembly in the referendums of January 1973 and
February 1975.

In the instant case, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly
and proceeded with the assumption of that body’s legislative power which is within
the bounds of the Constitution and the law. The President has been legitimately
discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, and it is within his
power to discharge the function of the interim Assembly to propose amendments to
the Constitution.

With the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the
Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative
upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution – the latter being in no capacity to propose
amendments to the Constitution.

LA SUERTE CIGAR VS. CA

FACTS:

• Under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (1997 NIRC) stemmed
leaf tobacco is subject to an excise tax of P0.75 for each kilogram thereof.2

• The 1997 NIRC further provides that stemmed leaf tobacco - "leaf tobacco
which has had the stem or midrib removed"3 - "may be sold in bulk as raw
material by one manufacturer directly to another without payment of the tax,
under such conditions as may be prescribed in the rules and regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Finance."

• La Suerte sought to appeal17 the decision18 of the Court of Appeals holding it

liable for deficiency specific tax on its local and imported purchases of
stemmed leaf tobacco and those it sold for the period from June 21, 1989 to
November 20, 1990.

• Sometime in June, 1989, a team of examiners from the Bureau of Internal

Revenue, led by Crisanto G. Luna, Revenue Officer III of the Field Operation
Division of the Excise Tax Service, conducted an examination of the books of
La Suerte by virtue of a letter of authority issued by then Commissioner Jose
U. Ong

• On January 3, 1990, La Suerte received a letter from then Commissioner

Jose U. Ong demanding the payment of 34,934,827.67 as deficiency excise
tax on La Suerte’s entire importation and local purchase of stemmed leaf
tobacco for the period covering January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989.
• On January 12, 1990, La Suerte . . . protest[ed] the excise tax deficiency
assessment . . . stressing that the BIR assessment was based solely on
Section 141(b) of the Tax Code without, however, applying Section 137
thereof, the more specific provision, which expressly allows the sale of
stemmed leaf tobacco as raw material by one manufacturer directly to
 another without payment of the excise tax. However, in a letter, dated August
31, 1990, Commissioner Jose U. Ong denied La Suerte’s protest, insisting
that stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to excise tax "unless there is an express
grant of exemption from [the] payment of tax."
• On December 6, 1990, La Suerte filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a
Petition for Review seeking for the annulment of the assessments.

• The Tax Court found that the assessment of alleged deficiency specific tax in
the amount of ₱34,904,247.00 issued by the Respondent is hereby
CANCELLED for lack of merit

• The Commissioner appealed the Court of Tax Appeals’ decision before the
Court of Appeals. On December 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals Sixth Division
ruled against La Suerteand found that RR No. V-39 limits the tax exemption
on transfers of stemmed leaf tobacco to transfers between two L-7
permittees.58 The Court of Appeals reversed the decision

ISSUES:

I. Whether stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to excise (specific) tax under

Section 141 of the 1986 Tax Code;
II. Whether Section 137 of the 1986 Tax Code exempting from the payment
of specific tax the sale of stemmed leaf tobacco by one manufacturer to
another is not subject to any qualification and, therefore, exempts an L-7
manufacturer from paying said tax on its purchase of stemmed leaf tobacco
from other manufacturers who are not classified as L-7 permittees;
III. Whether stemmed leaf tobacco imported by La Suerte, Fortune, and
Sterling is exempt from specific tax under Section 137 of the 1986 Tax Code;
IV. Whether Section 20(a) of RR No. V-39, in relation to RR No. 17-67, which
limits the exemption from payment of specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco
to sales transactions between manufacturers classified as L-7 permittees is a
valid exercise by the Department of Finance ofits rule-making power under
Section 338118 of the 1939 Tax Code;
V. Whether the imposition of excise tax on stemmed leaf tobacco under
Section 141 of the 1986 Tax Code constitutes double taxation.

HELD:

1. Yes, It is evident that when tobacco is harvested and processed either by

hand or by machine, all its products become subject to specific tax. Section
 141 reveals the legislative policy to tax all forms of manufactured tobacco —
in contrast to raw tobacco leaves — including tobacco refuse or all other
tobacco which has been cut, split, twisted, or pressed and is capable of being
smoked without further industrial processing.

2. No, the manufacturer must be classified as an L-7 permittee. The conditions

under which stemmed leaf tobacco may be transferred from one factory to
another without prepayment of specific tax are as follows: (a) The transfer
shall be under an official L-7 invoice on which shall be entered the exact
weight of the tobacco at the time of its removal; (b) Entry shall be made in
the L-7 register in the place provided on the page for removals; and (c)
Corresponding debit entry shall be made in the L-7 register book of the
factory receiving the tobacco under the heading, "Refuse, etc.,received from
the other factory," showing the date of receipt, assessment and invoice
numbers, name and address of the consignor, form in which received, and
the weight of the tobacco.

3. No, The factories contemplated are those located operating only in the
Philippines. Contrary to La Suerte’s claim, Chapter V, Section 61 of RR No.
V-39195 is not applicable to justify the tax exemption of its importation of
stemmed leaf tobacco because from the title of Chapter V, the provision
particularly refers to specific taxes on imported cigars, cigarettes, smoking
and chewing tobacco.
4. Yes it is valid because the power of taxation is inherently legislative and may
be imposed or revoked only by the legislature.168 Moreover, this plenary
power of taxation cannot be delegated by Congress to any other branch of
government or private persons, unless its delegation is authorized by the
Constitution itself.169 Hence, the discretion to ascertain the following — (a)
basis, amount, or rate of tax; (b) person or property that is subject to tax;
(c) exemptions and exclusions from tax; and (d) manner of collecting the tax
— may not be delegated away by Congress. However, it is well-settled that
the power to fill in the details and manner as to the enforcement and
administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized
administrative agencies like the Secretary of Finance in this case

5. The contention that the cigarette manufacturers are doubly taxed because
they are paying the specific tax on the raw material and on the finished
product in which the raw material was a part is also devoid of merit. For
double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited sense to exist, "the same
property must be taxed twice, when it should be taxed but once."204 "[B]oth
taxes must be imposed on the same property or subject- matter, for the
same purpose, by the same. . . taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction
 or taxing district, during the same taxing period, and they must be the same
kind or character of tax. , There is no double taxation in the prohibited sense
because the specific tax is imposed by explicit provisions of the Tax Code on
two different articles or products: (1) on the stemmed leaf tobacco; and (2)
on cigar or cigarette

III. EXTENT AND LIMITATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

IN RE: CUNANAN

FACTS: 

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in
1952. Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a
candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent
in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."(Rule 127, sec. 14,
Rules of Court).

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and

passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against
(See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained
averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in
Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among
others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946.

The President requested the views of the court on the bill. Complying with that
request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written
comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress
did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371 which is an Act
to fix the passing marks for bar examinations from nineteen hundred and forty-six
up to and including nineteen Hundred and fifty-five, embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill.

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar
those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of
law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the
revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid
law as an additional ground for admission. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has
found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must
be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied
equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not.

ISSUE:

Whether the passage of RA 972 is a valid exercise or within the limitations of the
Legislative power.

HELD:

No. RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been
derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the
judicial and legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of
law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the
matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the

constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment
revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in
attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has
exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the
bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules
promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2
of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

BELGICA VS. OCHOA

FACTS: 

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that
“the government has been defrauded of some Php 10 Billion over the past 10 years
by syndicate using funds from the Pork Barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned
by sworn affidavits of six whistle blowers who declared that JLN Corporation- “JLN”
standing for Janet Lim Napoles- had swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for ghost projects using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire
decade. Thus, after the investigation of the Napoles controversy, criminal
complaints were filed against 5 lawmakers for plunder, and 3 other lawmakers for
Malversation, direct bribery and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.

Petitioners insist that the Pork barrel be declared unconstitutional and null and void
for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: 

WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c)
checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; (f) local autonomy.

HELD: 

(A) Separation of Powers

The separation of powers stems from the notion that the powers of the
government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one
branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its
power over the other branches or the citizenry. There is a violation of the separation
of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches the domain
of another. In other words, there is a violation of the separation of powers when
there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another
department’s functions. The enforcement of the GAA is a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive Department.
Legislators have been consistently accorded post enactment authority to
identify projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel
allocations. Post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Thus, legislators
have, in one way or another, authorized to participate in the various operational
aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities and the regulation and release of funds in violation of the
separation of powers principle. Court ruled in favour of the petitioners.
(B) Non-delegability of Legislative Power
In this case, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it
confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise
the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress.
The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from
Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution which states that: “No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law”. The
power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from
the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. In the PDAF Article, legislators are
given a lump sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from
such fund would go to (b) a specific project of beneficiary that THEY
THEMSELVES determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of
appropriation, and given that the PDAF Article authorizes legislators to do the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not allow. Keeping with the non-delegability of legislative power,
the Court declares the 2013 PDAF Article unconstitutional.


ABAKADA PARTYLIST VS. PURISIMA


(also applicable to Approval of Bills under Statutes and their Enactment)

FACTS:
• RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue capability and collection of BIR
and BOC. It’s a system of rewards and sanctions. It gives incentives to BIR
and BOC officials and employees if they exceed the target revenue. It can
also dismiss BIR and BOC officials and employees if their revenue collection
falls short of the target by 7.5%. It only covers employees/officials with at
least six months of service.
• The fund from where the incentive will come from the excess of their revenue
target from BIR and BOC.
• The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations
of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose.
• Petitioners contended the following:
o That by having a reward system for BIR & BOC employees/officials
would become a mercenaries and bounty hunter. The reward system
invites corruptions.
o It violates the clause of equal protection since BIR & BOC employees/
officials are the only person who will benefit from this.
 o The law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue target to the
President. Therefore, he can set an unrealistic target in order to
dismiss BIR & BOC employees/officials.
o There is no need to create a congressional oversight because this
committee permits the legislative participation in the implementation
and enforcement of the law. It is also because legislative function is
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and
approval of the law.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 9335 is constitutional

2. Whether or not it violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection

because of the scope of system of reward is limited only to BIR & BOC
official/employees

3. Whether or not the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue target to
the President

4. Whether or not the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine

of separation of powers

HELD:

1. YES. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of

constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. To
invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’ baseless supposition is an affront to
the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive
which approved it. Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public
officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance.
A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is
not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes
and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public
service of deserving government personnel.
2. NO. In United States v. Matthews, the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law
which awards to officers of the customs as well as other parties an amount
not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the
laws against smuggling. In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC
may by law be entitled to a reward when, because of their zeal in the
enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets.
 Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the
same conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among
equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be
accomplished. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, this Court
declared:
… All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. With respect to RA 9335, its
expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Both the BIR and the BOC
are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of
being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great
inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is
germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335
fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
3. NO. Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1)
the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented. RA 9335 adequately states
the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue
collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal
year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the
President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets
does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the
scrutiny of the DBCC.
4. YES. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created
for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it
approved the said IRR. From the moment the law becomes effective, any
 provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a
provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to
overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive
branch charged with the implementation of the law. Following this rationale,
Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. The next
question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of
Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other provisions of the law? Will it render the
entire law unconstitutional? NO.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid
by a competent court, the remainder of this Act or any provision not affected
by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and effect.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate
and detach any invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may
continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently of the
invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a
complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC
by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335

creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing
rules and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA
9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions
remain in force and effect.

LEAGUE OF CITIES VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the

12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress
ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the
13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the
Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. The 16 cityhood bills contained
a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills.

The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga,
Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law
(Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's
signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
municipality into a city.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
and the equal protection clause?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes
to local government units. The Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe
all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in
any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Furthermore, even if the exemption in
the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law.
There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to
stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of
a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write
such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their
cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities
with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into
cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA VS SENATE 


(also applicable to Formalities under Statues and their Enactment)

FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that
established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26,
2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

ISSUES:
 1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections
including the ARMM elections?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-
days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

HELD:
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of
RA No. 10153 in toto.

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned
from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments
to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on
the wording and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-
separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to
the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate
enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of
the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI,
Section 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i)
the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in
its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of
a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House
and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.

3. YES, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress
in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim
[in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections: (1) allow the incumbent
elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those
elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the 2013
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint
OICs, their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013
synchronized elections assume office.

3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of
office of the incumbent ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms.

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term
through a holdover.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated
by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the
occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term
and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever
way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we
have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply
where such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention
of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely
removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the
discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this
Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its
own, has no authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. No

elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice
President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by
another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may
have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in
the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional
elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of
its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This
Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative
decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power
to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having
been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow
ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant
the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in
the exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date
earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what
will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall
prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the
interim is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No.
10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during
the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the
only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint.
These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers
and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of
colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it
falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on
clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint
OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution
requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and
representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an
express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is
more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to
be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character
of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge
for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM
officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.
The legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153,
in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures
that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read –
in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from
its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding
to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

B. STATUTES AND ENACTMENT

I. TITLE OF BILLS

LIDASAN VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as
Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec
verba, reads:

Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,

Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan,
Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and
Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao
del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct
and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government
of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality
shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for
local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within
the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality
of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15,
1967, the pertinent portions of which are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for
other election purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA
 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the
barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung,
Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan,
Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality
of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated
in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios — in two municipalities in the
province of Cotabato — are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This
brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President,
through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation,
declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court."

ISSUE:
Whether Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in
Cotabato be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No
bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill"?

RULING:

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive.
Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law;
it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in
the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from
their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it
kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected
by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

SC declares Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent
Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.

PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ

FACTS:

The Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) contends the
constitutionality of Republic Act 3836 “insofar as the same allows retirement
gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress)”. The
PHILCONSA filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the
Auditor General of the PH and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress
from “passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning the checks or
treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuitys pursuant to RA 3836.

RA 3836: Retirement is allowed to a member, regardless of age, who rendered at

least 20 years of service. The gratuity is equivalent to one month’s salary for every
year of service, based on the highest rate received but not to exceed 24 months.
Provided, retiring officer or employee has been in service of the said employer or
office for at least 4 years immediately preceding his retirement. Retirement is also
allowed to a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives and to an
elective officer of either House of the Congress, regardless of age, provided that in
the case of a Senator or Member must served at least 12 years as a Senator or as a
member of House of Representatives. In the case of elective officer of either House,
he must served the government for at least 12 years. The gratuity payable must be
equivalent to one year’s salary for every four years of service in the government
and the same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever and shall be neither liable
for attachment or execution nor refundable in case of reinstatement of the retiree.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the title of Republic Act No 3836 is germane to the subject
matter expressed in the act

2. Whether or not the law in question violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution

3. Whether or not Republic Act No 3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in
Article VI,

Section 14 of the Constitution

HELD:

1. “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill” (Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution) RA 3836 amending the first paragraph of Section 12, subsection
of the Commonwealth Act 186, the retirement benefits are granted to the member
of the GSIS, who have rendered at least 20 years of service regardless of age is
related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No 186. HOWEVER, the
succeeding paragraph that refers to the members of the Congress and to elective
officers who are not members of GSIS, is not germane to the Commonwealth Act
NO 186. The constitutionality requirement with respect to the titles of statues as
sufficient to reflect their contents is satisfies if all parts of a law relate to the subject
expressed in its title. The title of said RA 3836 is void as it is not germane to the
subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned Paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution

2. The principle of the requirement of equal protection of law applies to all persons
similarly situated. The law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives who are elective officials, it doesn’t include other
elective officials such as the governors of provinces and the members of the
provincial boards and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.
All members of the Congress are given retirement benefits after serving 12 years
while most government officers and employees are given retirement benefits after
serving for 20 years. The law violates the equal protection clause.

3. Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution “Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall receive an annual compensation of 7,000, including per diems
and other emoluments or allowances. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
House of Representatives approving such increase”. Emoluments - the profit arising
from office or employment, that which is received as compensation for services or
which is annexed to the possession of an office as salary, fees, and perquisites. It
has been established that the retirement benefits is a form or another species of
emolument, because it is a part of compensation services of one possessing any
office. RA 3836 provides an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives. It counters the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14
of the Constitutional. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional. REPUBLIC ACT 3836
VIOLATES THREE CONSITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: 1) PROHIBITION THAT THE TITLE
OF A BILL SHALL NOT EMBRACE MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT; 2) THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE; 3) PROHIBITION REGARDING INCREASE IN THE SALARIES
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS. RA 3836 IS NULL AND VOID.

BANAT VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner filed for prohibition for TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction against
COMELEC, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9369 [ AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED “AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998
NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL
ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS
AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 881, AS AMENDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTION
LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”] and enjoining
Comelec from the implementation of this statute.

On May 7, 2007, BANAT filed this case. COMELEC and OSG also filed their
comments, maintaining the constitutionality of the statute.

The Petitioner argues that the title of the statute is misleading because it speaks of
the poll automation but then contains provisions on manual canvassing of votes.
They also argue for the unconstitutionality of some provisions, namely, sections 37
and 38, 43 and 34, that speaks of the impairment of the powers given to the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET),
Prosecution and the presence of Poll Watchers, respectively.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON RA 9369 violates Art 6 section 26 (1) of the 1987 Constitution

2. WON Sec 37 and 38 violates Art 6 Sec 17; Art 7 Sec 4 (7) of the Constitution
3. WON Sec 43 violates Art 9-C Sec 2 (6)
4. WON Sec 34 violates Art 3 Sec 10

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for Lack of Merit

1. NO. it is not in violation of the said article because the title encompasses the
areas it covers. The constitutional requirement regarding the 1 subject rule
has always been given a practical rather than a technical approach to the
matter at hand. Furthermore, RA 9369 serves to amend RA no. 8436, BP 881
and RA 7166. As such, RAs which seek to amend previous statutes need not
be too exacting, as it only requires that it contains the specific code which it
seeks to amend and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be
further stated.

2. NO. According to COMELEC, Section 37-38 covers the adoption and

application of the procedures on the pre-proclamation controversies in case
of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of
canvas. It does not say that Congress and Comelec may entertain pre-
proclamation cases for national elective posts.
 In Pimentel III v. COMELEC, The Court ruled that pre-proclamation regarding
preparation, transition, receipt, custody, and appreciation of election returns or
certificates are still prohibited. In this current case, the court ruled that there is no
encroachment of jurisdiction of SET and PET because congress and Comelec powers
are exercised on different occasions.

3. NO. Section 43 does not violate the constitution. Following Art 9-C Section 9,
Comelec has the power to investigate and prosecute violation of election
laws, “where appropriate”. This “where appropriate” clause means that it is
up to Congress to decide what kind of offenses Comelec should handle.
Hence, Comelec is not given sole authority over ALL election complaints. If it
was the (constitution) framers intention, they should have put it explicitly in
the Constitution.

4. NO. There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. It is held that that

the non-impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate
from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or changing the intention
of the parties and Police Power is superior to the non-impairment clause.

In Beltran v. Secretary of health, The court ruled that the freedom to

contract is not absolute. All contracts and all rights are subject to the police power
of the state.

Section 34 is Constitutional because the law was enacted in the exercise of

the police power of the state.

GIRON VS. COMELEC

FACTS: 

The present petition seeks to prohibit the Commission on Elections from further
implementing the Sec. 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Sec. 14 (Repealing
clause) of the RA 9006 also known as the Fair Election Act on the ground that these
provisions would enable elective officials to gain campaign advantage and allow
them to disburse public funds from the time they file their certificates of candidacy
until after elections. On the other hand, the respondent opposes the petition and
argues inter alia that this court has already resolved the matter in Farinas v.
Executive Secretary.
ISSUE: 

Whether or not the inclusion of Sec. 12 and 14 in the fair election act violates Sec.
26 Article 6 of the 1987 constitution or the “one-subject-one title” rule.

HELD: 

No. It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor
of the constitutionality of legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a
valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who
asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail. After a
thorough review of the arguments raised, the Court found that petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that would
surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair
Election Act. They have not put forward any gripping justification to reverse the
ruling in Farinas, in which the Supreme Court have already ruled that the title and
the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to include subjects other than
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda.

II. FORMALITIES

TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE

FACTS: 

These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions
filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The matter was submitted
for resolution on June 27, 1995. The petition contends that R.A. No. 7716 did not
originate exclusively from the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec.
24 of the Constitution. Prior to becoming a law (R.A. No. 7716), House Bill No.
11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three reading and
was afterward sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the
Senate Ways and Means committee. The petitioner claims that the Senate did not
pass it on second and third readings and that the Senate passed its own version,
Senate Bill No. 1630, instead.

ISSUE: 

Did R.A. No. 7716 violate Art. VI, Sec. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution?

HELD:

1. No, R.A. No. 7716 did not violate Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution – The
enactment of Senate Bill No. 1630 was not the only instance wherein the Senate
proposed an amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of the
bill. During the Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills
in consolidation with House bills (R.A. No. 7369 and R.A. No. 7549). During the
Ninth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills in consolidation
with House bills as well (R.A. No. 7642, R.A. No. 7643, R.A. No. 7646, R.A. No.
7649, R.A. No. 7656, R.A. No. 7660, and R.A. No. 7717). The enactment of Senate
Bill No. 1630 (Now R.A. No. 7716) was done in the exercise of the Senate’s power
to propose amendments to bills required to originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives. Amendment by substitution is only a mere matter of form. Art.
VI, Sec. 24 of our Constitutions reads: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments. This means that after a revenue bill is passed
and sent to the Senate by the House of Representatives, the Senate can pass its
own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the coequality of the two
chambers of Congress. The power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments is without restriction. Petitioners erred in considering Senate Bill No.
1630 an independent and distinct bill from House Bill No. 11197. In fact, petitioner
attached in his petition a tabular comparison of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate
Bill No. 1630 which proves that the Senate bill was precisely intended to amend the
House bill.

2. No, R.A. No. 7716 did not violate Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution – On

June 1, 1993 the President certified Senate Bill No. 1630 as urgent. Therefore, the
requirement of distributing printed copies of the bill three days before its enactment
and of reading of the bill on separate days may be dispensed with. This exception is
based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on separate
days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed,
it would defeat the purpose of addressing the emergency or public calamity it was
meant to alleviate.

Wherefore, the motions for reconsideration were denied by the Supreme Court with
finality.

PHILJA VS. PRADO

FACTS:

R.A. 7534, the law which creates the Philippine Postal Corporation was
implemented. Section 35 of the aforementioned law withdraws the franking
privilege of the Judiciary (Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, ...)

The petitioner, Philippine Judges Association (Philja), questions the constitutionality

of the said law on the following grounds:
 1. The title does not reflect the contents of Sec. 35 as well as the purpose of
the removal of privilege (Art. 26, Sec. 1)

2. The amendments were made upon the last reading and the failure to
distribute the printed copies of the bill in its final form, among the members
of the Congress (Art. 26, Sec. 2)

3. The law is discriminatory for it withdraws the franking privilege of the

Judiciary while retaining the same for the President, Vice President,
Congress, COMELEC, …

(Art. 3, Sec.1)

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 7534 is constitutional

HELD:

(1)YES. The contention of the petitioner is unreasonable. Section 35, a repealing

clause, doesn’t need to be expressly included in the title for it is not the main
subject of the law.

(2)YES. The bill enrolled was certified by the Senate President and House
Speaker and passed by the both Houses of the Congress. The court cannot
further inquire the authenticity of the enrolled bill for it would violate the
doctrine of separation of powers.

(3)NO. On the equal protection grounds, the removal of franking privilege of the
Judiciary while retaining the same for the other departments is
unconstitutional.

III. APPROVAL OF BILLS

BOLINAO ALECTRICS VS.VALENCIA

FACTS:

This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with

preliminary injunction filed by petitioners Bolinao Electronics Corporation,
Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat Broadcasting System,
Inc., owners and operators of radio and television stations enumerated
therein, against respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications
and Acting Chief of the Radio Control Division. Later the Republic of the
Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and
 was allowed to intervene in this case, said intervenor having been granted a
construction permit to install and operate a television station in Manila.
Petitioners’ applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied
because it should be filed two months before the expiration of the license.
Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act 584, on the
p o w e r s a n d d u t i e s o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f P u b l i c Wo r k s a n d
Communications(formerly Commerce And Communications), he may approve
or disapprove any application for renewal of station or operator license,
provided, however, That no application for renewal shall be disapproved
without giving the licensee a hearing. Thus, the notices of hearing were sent
by respondents to petitioners. Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to
find out whether there is ground to disapprove the applications for renewal.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection

with petitioners' applications for renewal of their station licenses, has any
legal basis;
(2) WON there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle
Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS; and
(3) WON Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate Channel 9 and is
entitled to damages, for CBN's refusal to give up operations thereof.

HELD:

1. The lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e.,
late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect,
ceased to exist and, hence, there is neither reason nor need for the present
investigation.

2. There was no express agreement that there was abandonment or

renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9 in
favor of PBS. The only basis of the contention of the respondents that there
was such renunciation is the statement "Channel 10 assigned in lieu of
Channel 9", appearing in the construction permit to transfer television station
DZXL-TV from Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to petitioner. This statement
alone, however, does not establish any agreement between the radio control
authority and the station operator, on the switch or change of operations of
CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10.
 It was made to understand that the assignment of Channel 10, in connection
with the planned transfer of its station to Baguio, was to be effective upon
the final transfer of the said station. In other words, Channel 10 would be
assigned to petitioner only when the Baguio station starts to operate. When
the plan to transfer DZXL-TV to Baguio had to be abandoned, it did not mean
abandonment by the station of its right to operate and broadcast on Channel
9 in Quezon City. The fact that CBN was allowed to continue and did continue
operating on Channel 9 even after the approval of its proposed transfer, is
proof that there was no renunciation or abandonment of that channel upon
the approval of its petition to transfer. Respondents committed error in
refusing to grant or approve petitioner's application for renewal of the license
for station DZXL-TV Channel 9.

3. As regard intervenor's claim for damages, it would have been sufficient to

state that it having failed to prove the alleged agreement between CBN and
said intervenor on the exchange of use of Channel 9 and 10, no right
belonging to said intervenor had been violated by petitioner's refusal to give
up its present operation of Channel 9. Based on the Appropriations Act, it
contained an item appropriating a certain sum for assistance to television
stations, subject to the condition that the amount would not be available in
places where there were commercial television stations in operation.
President Macapagal approved the appropriation but vetoed conditions no. 1
and no. 5 that both, having similar provisions, stating “no portion of this
appropriation shall be used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or
any part of the Philippines where there are television stations.” In the leading
case of State v. Holder, it was already declared that such action by the Chief
Executive was illegal. This ruling, that the executive's veto power does not
carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been
adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that
the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the
appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the
intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television station
in Manila, where there are already television stations in operation, would be
in violation of the express condition for the release of the appropriation and,
consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to see that even if it were able
to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervenor would not have
been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.

NOTES
Three methods by which a bill may become a law, to wit:
(1)When the President approves then signs it;
 (2)When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all
the members of each House; and
(3)When the President does not act upon the measure within thirty days
after it shall have been presented to him
a. His reason for not acting upon it is may be fear of antagonizing
certain elements interested in its passage or his belief that the final
judgment on its constitutionality rests not with him but with the
judiciary.

IV. EVIDENCE OF DUE ENACTMENT OF LAWS

A.ENROLLED BILL THEORY

MABANAG VS. LOPEZ

FACTS:
Three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been
elected senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The
three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first
session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in
their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to
sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the
same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their
suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that
resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the present
petition was filed.

The three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation
of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment
to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD:
Even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had
been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals
does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section
313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of
irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the
effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals
behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and
rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with
each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if
discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the
explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

CASCO PHIL. VS GIMENEZ

FACTS:
• The Petitioner, a synthetic resin glue manufacturer petitioned the Court for a
review of the decision of the Auditor General in denying a claim for refund.
• Accordingly, the former has purchased foreign exchange twice in relation to
its importation of urea and formaldehyde and has therefore paid for the 25%
margin fee required of it by Circular No. 95 of the Central Bank of the
Philippines in compliance to R.A. 2609 otherwise known as the Foreign
Market Exchange Margin Law.
• In cognizance of Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank of the Philippines, the petitioner has sought to be refunded of the
margin fees exacted upon it.
• Respondent denied the claim for refund on the ground that it was not in
accord with Section 2, Paragraph XVIII of R.A. 2609.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not, urea and formaldehyde being separate compounds are exempt
from the payment of the mentioned margin fee.

HELD:
The Court held that these compounds are not exempt from the payment of the
mentioned margin fee. With the view of the National Institute of Science and
Technology that “urea formaldehyde” is a clearly finished product and thus is
distinct from “urea” and “formaldehyde”. Furthermore, the Court has come to the
opinion that should there be any mistake as to the printing of the bill with regards
to the case at hand then the Court cannot meddle without coming against the
principle of separation of powers. This therefore establishes that should there be
any, then the remedy shall only be by amendment or curative legislation and not a
judicial decree.

MORALES VS. SUBIDO

FACTS: 

The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila
Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in
1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation
of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated
acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional
appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila.

On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo

Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for
"failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements
for the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified
for the post and called the attention of the mayor to section 4 of the
Decentralization Act of 1967 which requires the filling of a vacancy within 30 days
after its coming into existence. Earlier, on September 5, he announced in the
metropolitan newspapers that the position of chief of police of Manila was vacant
and listed the qualifications which applicants should possess.

The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a demand that the respondent
include him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from which the mayor might
appoint one as chief of police of the city. He contended that his service alone as
captain for more than three years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for
appointment. The demand was contained in a letter which he wrote to the
respondent on October 8, 1968. The mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but the
respondent refused to reconsider his stand. Hence this petition for mandamus to
compel the respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five next ranking eligible
and qualified persons."

As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant colonel in the MPD
since 1954, the petitioner's insistence is that he falls under the third class of
persons qualified for appointment as chief of a city police department.

The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish

between eligibility and qualification. For the statute may allow the compensation of
service for a person's lack of eligibility but not necessarily for his lack of educational
qualification. Second, section 9 governs the appointment of members of a police
agency only.

ISSUE:

Whether a person who has served as captain in the police department of a city for
at least three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for
appointment as chief of police. - The question calls for an interpretation of the
following provisions of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864)

HELD:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the petitioner is
neither qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief of police of the city of Manila.
Consequently, the respondent has no corresponding legal duty — and therefore
may not be compelled by mandamus to certify the petitioner as qualified and
eligible.

The petition for mandamus is denied.

ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA

FACTS:
An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced to the House
of Representatives involving taxations on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes. This was later passed accordingly and brought to the House of Senate.
Upon the interpellation on the second reading, herein petitioner moved for
adjournment for lack of quorum which is constitutionally needed to conduct
business. Petitioners motion was defeated and was railroaded. The bill was then
signed into law by President Fidel Ramos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the law was passed on violation on the constitutional mandate.

HELD:
There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by viva
voce or nominal voting. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only on the following
instances ± upon the last and the third readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of
the Members present and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. Second,
there is obviousness on the part of the petitioner to delay the business of the
House, thus eliminating the alleged skullduggery on part of the accused. Third, the
enrolled bill doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus
legally binding provided it is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the court
upheld principle of separation of powers, which herein, is applicable for the
legislative branch for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of discretion
resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

B. JOURNAL ENTRY RULE

US VS PONS
FACTS:

Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with the crime of illegal
importation of opium. Conspiring together, they willfully,unlawfully and fraudulently,
brought from Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and imported into the
city of Manila, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of
Php62,400.00. Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte
had not yet been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced accordingly, Juan Pons to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of
two years, to pay a fine of P1,000 to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs.
The same penalties were imposed upon Gabino Beliso, except that he was
sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed however, Beliso later withdrew his
appeal and the judgment as to him has become final. Pons appealed the sentence
arguing that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914
was the 28th of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if
found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of
that same year; and that, there, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is
not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session
was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that Pons is
charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381> the vital question is
the date of adjournment of the Legislature.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court can look to legislative journals as poof of when
adjournment of Legislature happened?

2. Whether or not the Court can go behind the legislative Journals to determine if
Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.

HELD:

(1) YES. Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of
the "official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United
States and of the Philippine Islands . . . shall be judicially recognized by the court
without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of
the subjects in this section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own
information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or
evidence." Section 313 of the same code provides that: Official documents may be
proved as follows…….

(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that
may be provided for the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order: Provided, That in
the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature when
there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of
said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due
enactment thereof. It is well settled in the United States that such journals may be
noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill became a
law or not. The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to
take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine
Legislature of 1914.

(2) On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for the ordinary and
special sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature, the following appears: The
Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine die of
the Commission as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight
having arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber
of the Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine die. The Act of Congress, approved July
1, 1902, provides, among other things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly
"shall keep in journal of its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In
obedience to this mandate, the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the
sessions of 1914 was duly published and it appears tthat the Assembly adjourned
sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914. The Supreme Court looked
into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but refused to go beyond the
recitals in the legislative Journals. From their very nature and object the records of
the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the
veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. The journals
say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these
journals.

ASTORGA VS. VILLEGAS

FACTS:
On March 30, 1964, House Bill No. 9266 was filed in the House of
Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments
on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its
concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and
Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas.
 When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on
May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 were introduced by
Senator Arturo Tolentino, which the Senate duly approved in toto.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on
May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification
of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and
not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the
Senate.
On July 31, 1964, a message was sent to the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances, the
President of the Philippines was officially withdrawing his signature on House
Bill No. 9266, adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to
convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of
Congress."
Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads
and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners,
operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard
the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief
of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been
assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
The then Vice-Mayor Herminio A. Astorga filed a petition on September 7,
1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of
Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the
Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the
municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the writ of Mandamus filed by the Vice-Mayor of Manila (Astorga) as
to compel the Mayor of Manila (Villegas) and other officials to comply with
the provisions of Republic Act 4065 was valid.
HELD:
The so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill
actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that
body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the
issue.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the
certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of
the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words,
it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers
that is essential.