Apov CA

8/17/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 514
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 537

Apo Fruits Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 164195. February 6, 2007.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC.,

petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Judgments; Res Judicata; Having been dismissed based on technicality

and not on the merits, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Res
Judicata applies only where judgment on the merits is finally rendered on
the first.—In this case, the third element of res judicata, i.e., that the former
judgment must be on the merits, is not present. It must be remembered that
the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 was based on technicality, that is,
for failure on the part of the DAR to state material dates required by the
rules. Having been dismissed based on a technicality and not on the merits,
the principle of res judicata does not apply. Res judicata applies only where
judgment on the merits is finally rendered on the first.
Pleadings and Practice; It is already an accepted rule of procedure for

us to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no
root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.—It is already an
accepted rule of procedure for us to strive to settle the entire controversy in
a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation. If, based on the records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the
dispute can be resolved by us, we will do so to serve the ends of justice
instead of remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
538
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Eminent Domain; While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent

powers of the state, there is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged
procedure, or that the payment of the private owner be protracted as far as
practicable.—While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016ca00f714f42cad5d7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/27
the state, there is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or

that the payment of the private owner be protracted as far as practicable.
Just Compensation; Words and Phrases; The concept of just

compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking.—The concept of just compensation
embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid
to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the property
owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word
“just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; Eminent domain is an inherent

power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended
for public use upon payment of just compensation to the land owner.—On
payment of just compensation, we have previously held: Eminent domain
is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate
where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the
purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by
the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept
the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of
eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the
539
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 539
State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield
to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored
justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people
is the supreme law. But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of
expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The
limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that “private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation” and in the
abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this
principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power
are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Same; Same; It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent

domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting
as Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot be lodged with administrative
agencies and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government.—The next question now crops up, who shall determine just
compensation? It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent
domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting
as Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot be lodged with administrative
agencies and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Donato T. Faylona and Ronald C. Aguado for petitioners Apo
Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc.
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, Danilo
Beramo and Jose M.A. Quimboy for respondent Land Bank of the
Philippines.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are
the registered owners of five parcels of agricultural lands located in
San Isidro, Tagum, Davao Province, to wit:
540

APO FRUITS CORPORATION
Transfer Certificate of Area (Ha.)

Title (TCT)1 No.
2
T-113359 115.2179

3
T-113366 525.1304
4
HIJO PLANTATION, INC.
TCT No. Area (Ha.)

T-10361 155.8408

T-10362 170.7980

5
T-10363 478.8920
On 12 October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily

6
offered to sell the
above parcels of land to the government. After the initial processing
at the Department
7
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Voluntary Offer
to Sell (VOS) application of
_______________
1 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, Annex “C,” p. 13; Both land
titles (TCTs No. 113359 and No. 113366) were previously covered by TCT No.
50976.
2 Id., at Annex “A,” p. 5.
3 Id., at p. 6.
4 Id., at p. 135.
5 Rollo, p. 259.
6 Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, effective 15 June 1988. (Records of
Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, Annex “B,” p. 9.)
7 Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) – A scheme wherein landowner/s voluntarily offer
their agricultural lands, including improvements thereon, if any, for coverage.
(Records, p. 592) DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998.
541
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 541

AFC and HPI, it was referred to the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) for initial valuation. On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI
received separately from the DAR’s Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) of Davao province a notice of land acquisition and
valuation, informing AFC that the value of the properties
8
has been
placed at P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47 per9 hectare while HPI’s
properties were valued at P164,478,178.14. Both AFC and HPI
considered the valuations unreasonably low and inadequate as just
compensation for the properties.
On 5 November 1996, AFC10rejected the valuation for both TCTs
No. T-113366 and No.113359. AFC applied for the shifting of the
11
mode of acquisition for TCT No. 113359
12
from VOS to Voluntary
Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme.
_______________
8 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 13.

9 Id., at p. 15.
10 Id., at p. 19.
11 Id., at p. 19.
12 Republic Act No. 6657, Sec. 20. Voluntary Land Transfer.—Landowners of
agricultural lands subject to acquisition under this Act may enter into a voluntary
arrangement for direct transfer of their lands to qualified beneficiaries subject to the
following guidelines:
(a) All notices for voluntary land transfer must be submitted to the DAR within
the first year of the implementation of the CARP. Negotiations between the
landowners and qualified beneficiaries covering any voluntary land transfer
which remain unresolved after one (1) year shall not be recognized and such
land shall instead be acquired by the government and transferred pursuant to
this Act.
(b) The terms and conditions of such transfer shall not be less favorable to the
transferee than those of the government’s standing offer to purchase from the
landowner and to resell to the beneficiaries, if such offers have been made
and are fully known to both parties.
(c) The voluntary agreement shall include sanctions for noncompliance by either
party and shall be duly recorded and its implementation monitored by the
DAR.
542

HPI also rejected the valuation of its three parcels of13 land covered
by TCTs No. T-10361, No. T-10362 and No. T-10363.
Owing to the rejection by both AFC and HPI of LBP’s valuation,
the DAR requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent to their
14
valuations in the names and for the accounts of AFC and HPI. AFC
thereafter withdrew the amount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI
withdrew the amount of P45,481,706.76, both in cash from LBP.
The DAR PARO then directed the Register of Deeds of Davao to
cancel the TCTs of AFC and HPI to the said properties and to issue a
new one in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
After the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Register of Deeds of Davao, upon
the request of the DAR, issued TCTs and Certificates of Land
Ownership Award to qualified farmerbeneficiaries.
On 14 February 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for
determination of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB). Despite the lapse of more than three years from
the filing of the complaints, the DARAB failed and refused to render15
a decision on the valuation of the land. Hence, two complaints for
determination and payment of just compensation were filed by AFC
and HPI before Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagum City (acting as a Special Agrarian Court), which were
subsequently consolidated. 16
Agrarian Case No. 54-2000 filed by AFC covers two parcels of
land in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao, with an aggregate
_______________

14 Id., at p. 464.
15 Agrarian Case No. 54-2000 entitled, Apo Fruits Corporation v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, and Agrarian Case No. 55-2000
entitled, Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the
Philippines.
16 Records of Agrarian Case No. 54-2000, Book I, pp. 1-5.
543
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 543

area of 640.3483 hectares previously assessed by LBP with a

valuation of P86,900,925.88. 17
On the other hand, Agrarian Case No. 55-2000 filed by HPI
relates to the other three parcels of land in Tagum City, with a total
area of 814.5308 hectares, likewise, previously assessed by LBP
with a valuation of P164,478,178.14.
Summons was served on 23 May 2000 to defendants 18
DAR and
LBP. The trial court appointed as Commissioners persons it
considered competent, qualified and disinterested to determine the
proper valuation of the properties. 19
LBP submitted its Answer on 26 July 2000, while the DAR
Secretary,
20
represented by PARO Pedro P. Gumabao, filed its
Answer on 18 August 2000.
The pre-trial order issued by the trial court reads:
“This Court will determine the all-embracing concept of Just Compensation,

and whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages, and also whether the value
of the land and improvements as determined by the Land Valuation of Land
Bank for the determination of just compensation, and whether the plaintiff
21
has violated Section 13 of DARAB new rules and procedure.”
_______________
17 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, pp. 1-5.

18 Id., at p. 71. Appointed were: Atty. Cesar V. Arañas, Retired Provincial Assessor
of Davao Province; Retired City Assessor of Davao City; and Retired Director –
Finance, Region XI, Davao City, to act as the Chairman of the Panel of
Commissioners;
Mr. Alfredo H. Silawan, incumbent City Assessor of Tagum City, Davao del
Norte, to act as Member.
Mr. Wilfredo G. dela Cerna, incumbent City Treasurer of Tagum City, Davao del
Norte, to act as Member.
19 Id., at p. 93.
20 Id., at p. 95.
21 Id., at p. 188.
544

The commissioners, together with all the representatives of22 the

parties, conducted an ocular inspection
23
first on 25 August 2000 and
again on 16 December 2000.
On 21 May 2001,24the court-appointed commissioners submitted
their appraisal report.
On 14 September 2001, the case was considered submitted for
25
decision.
_______________
22 Id., at p. 129.
23 Id., at p. 181.
24 Id., at p. 328. This Commission therefore recommends:
a) The amount of ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE MILLION SIX

HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,131,600,000.00) under the current value of the
Philippine Peso, computed as the JUST COMPENSATION for the properties covered
by these cases, to be paid jointly and severally by the Department of Agrarian Reform
and/or the Land Bank of the Philippines and deposited in an authorized bank;
b) Interest on the abovementioned amount equivalent to the market interest rates aligned
with 91-day treasury bills, from the date of taking in 1996, until fully paid, to be paid
jointly and severally by the Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the Land Bank of
the Philippines and deposited in an authorized bank;
c) Defendants DAR/LBP jointly and severally pay all the fees payable to the
Commissioners herein named, taxed, as part of all the costs per Section 12, Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully submits this Appraisal Report to this Honorable
Special Agrarian Court, with a firm belief that the amount arrived at is JUST.
The Panel of Commissioners pray for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under
the premises.
At Davao City and Tagum City, for the City of Tagum, this 17th day of May 2001.
(Sgd.) CESAR V. ARAÑAS (Sgd.) ALFREDO M. SILAWAN

Chairman Member
545
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 545

26
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25
September 2001, the fallo thereof reads:
“WHEREFORE, consistent with all the foregoing premises, judgment is

hereby rendered by this Special Agrarian Court where it has determined
judiciously and now hereby fixed the just compensation for the 1,388.6027
hectares of lands and its improvements owned by the plaintiffs: APO
FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., as follows:
First—Hereby ordering after having determined and fixed the fair, reasonable and
just compensation of the 1,338.6027 hectares of land and standing crops owned by
plaintiffs – APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., based
at only P103.33 per sq. meter, ONE BILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,383,179,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the current value of the Philippine
Peso, to be paid jointly and severally to the herein PLAINTIFFS by the Defendants-
Department of Agrarian Reform and its financial intermediary and codefendant Land
Bank of the Philippines, thru its Land Valuation Office;
Second—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation
Office, to pay plaintiffs-APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION,
INC., interests on the above-fixed amount of fair, reasonable and just compensation
equivalent to the market interest rates aligned with 91-day Treasury Bills, from the
date of the taking in December 9, 1996, until fully paid, deducting the amount of the
previous payment which plaintiffs received as/and from the initial valuation;
Third—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
Office, to pay jointly and severally the Commissioners’ fees herein taxed as part of
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 747-795. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Erasto D. Salcedo.
546

the costs pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
equivalent to, and computed at Two and OneHalf (2 ½) percent of the determined
and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just compensation of plaintiffs’ land and
standing crops plus interest equivalent to the interest of the 91-Day Treasury Bills
from date of taking until full payment;
Fourth—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
Office, to pay jointly and severally the attorney’s fees to plaintiffs equivalent to, and
computed at ten (10%) Percent of the determined and fixed amount as the fair,
reasonable and just compensation of plaintiffs’ land and standing crops, plus interest
equivalent to the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date of taking until the full amount is
fully paid;
Fifth—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
Office to deduct from the total amount fixed as fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs’ properties the initial payment paid to the plaintiffs;
Sixth—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
Office, to pay the costs of the suit; and
Seventh—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
Office, to pay all the aforementioned amounts thru The Clerk of Court of this Court,
in order that said Court Officer could collect for payment any docket fee deficiency,
27
should there be any, from the plaintiffs.”
_______________
27 CA Rollo, pp. 131-133.
547
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 547

28
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 5 October 2001 mainly
on the ground that the trial court based its valuation on the value of
residential and industrial lands in the area forgetting that the lands
involved are agricultural. LBP also sought a reconsideration of the
award of attorney’s fees, the interest on the compensation over the
lands and the order of the trial court regarding the payment of
29
commissioners’ fees. In an Order dated 5 December 2001, the trial
court modified its decision as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the

following modifications as they are hereby made on the dispositive portion
of this Court’s consolidated decision be made and entered in the following
manner, to wit:
On the Second Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which now reads as
follows, as modified:
Second—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN

REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its Land
Valuation Office, to pay plaintiffs-APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO
PLANTATION, INC., interest at the rate of Twelve (12%) Percent per annum
on the above-fixed amount of fair, reasonable and just compensation computed
from the time the complaint was filed until the finality of this decision. After
this decision becomes final and executory, the rate of TWELVE (12%)
PERCENT per annum shall be additionally imposed on the total obligation until
payment thereof is satisfied, deducting the amounts of the previous payments by
Defendant-LBP received as initial valuation;
On the Third Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which Now Reads As

Follows, As Modified:
_______________
28 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 792; DAR also filed its
Motion for Reconsideration on the same date, i.e., 5 October 2001. (Records of
Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 799.)
29 CA Rollo, pp. 141-160.
548
Third—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN

Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally the Commissioners’ fees herein
taxed as part of the costs pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, equivalent to, and computed at Two and One-Half (2 1/2)
percent of the determined and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs’ land and standing crops and improvements;
On the Fourth Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which Now Reads As

follows, As Modified:
Fourth—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN

Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally the attorney’s fees to plaintiffs
equivalent to, and computed at ten (10%) Percent of the determined and fixed
amount as the fair, reasonable and just compensation of plaintiffs’ land and
standing crops and improvements.
Except for the above-stated modifications, the consolidated decision

stands and shall remain in full force and effect in all other respects
30
thereof.”
From 31this Order, LBP filed a Notice of Appeal dated 27 December

2001. The same was 32
given due course in the Order of the RTC
dated 15 May 2002. In the same Order, the RTC set aside its Order
dated 5 December 2001 granting execution pending appeal.
Subsequently, the trial court, citing this Court’s
33
ruling in the case
of “Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon,” that a petition for
review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper mode
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 158-160.

31 Id., at p. 161.
32 Id., at p. 166.
33 437 Phil. 347; 388 SCRA 537 (2002).
549
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 549

of appeal from a decision on the determination of just compensation

rendered by a special
34
agrarian court, issued an Order dated 4
November 2002 recalling its Order dated 15 May 2002 and
directed LBP to file a Petition for Review within the reglementary
35
period. LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the
case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon was not yet final at
that time; hence, it is not certain whether the decision in that case
would have a retroactive effect and that appeal is the appropriate
remedy. This was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 12
36
February 2003. 37
On 28 March 2003, LBP filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals assailing the 4 November 2002 and 12
February 2003 orders of the trial court.
The Court
38
of Appeals found the petition of LBP meritorious. In a
decision dated 12 February 2004, the Court of Appeals held:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders dated

November 4, 2002 and February 12, 2003 are NULLIFIED and,
39
accordingly, SET ASIDE.”
40
AFC and HPI filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration which 41
the
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 21 June 2004.
_______________
34 CA Rollo, pp. 47-48.

35 Id., at p. 168.
36 Id., at pp. 49-54.
37 Id., at pp. 2-46. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76222.
38 Id., at pp. 579-588. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador
with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring.
39 Id., at p. 588.
40 Id., at p. 599.
41 Id., at p. 686.
550

Earlier, on 23 January 2003, DAR filed its own separate petition 42

before the 43Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Review. In a
Resolution dated 2 April 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition of the44DAR for failure to state the material dates under Rule
42, Section 2, of the Rules of Court. The appellate court held:
“The importance of stating the material dates cannot be overemphasized. It

is only through a statement thereof in the petition can it be determined
whether or not the petition was filed on time. For its failure to state the
material dates, the petition can and should be outrightly dismissed.
xxx
The petition is also defective in that it failed to attach material portions
of the record as would support the allegations in the petition. More
specifically, copies of the alleged motion for reconsideration filed by the
DAR, the order denying it, and the notice of appeal were not attached to the
petition.
For all the foregoing, the court has no alternative but to dismiss the
petition.
45
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.”
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by the

DAR in CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 became final and executory and
entry 46of judgment was issued by the appellate court on 7 May
2003.
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 289-306. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74879.

43 Id., at pp. 631-636. Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili with
Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria-Tirona and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
44 SEC. 2. Form and contents.—The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible
copies x x x; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on
time; x x x.
45 CA Rollo, pp. 633-636.
46 Id., at p. 638.
551
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 551

On the other hand, from the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
Petition filed by LBP in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, AFC and HPI filed
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND

RESOLUTION ARE IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT?
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT LBP IS BOUND BY THE

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 74879 AND IS
THEREFORE PRECLUDED FROM FILING CA-G.R. SP NO. 76222?
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING BY RESPONDENT LBP OF

CAG.R. SP NO. 76222 IS ALREADY BARRED BY RES JUDICATA?
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN

THE ARLENE DE LEON CASE, GIVING ONLY PROSPECTIVE
EFFECT TO ITS EARLIER RESOLUTION AS TO THE PROPER MODE
OF APPEAL FROM DECISIONS OF SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS IS
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE?
V.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT LBP WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE

PROCESS AND/OR OF ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL?
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT PETITION (CA-G.R. SP NO.

76222) WAS MERELY INTERPOSED TO DELAY THE EXECUTION OF
SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT’S “DECISION” WHICH IS BASED ON
47
EVIDENCE DULY PRESENTED AND PROVED?
_______________
47 Rollo, p. 262.
552

AFC and HPI pray that the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222 be reversed and set aside and
that the Decision of the RTC dated 25 September 2001 in Agrarian
Cases No.48 54-2000 and No. 55-2000 be declared as final and
executory.
In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, decided
on 10 September 2002, respondents are the registered owners of a
parcel of land. They voluntarily offered the subject property for sale
to the government pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657. Unable to
agree on the valuation of the property offered by the DAR,
respondents filed a petition with the RTC (acting as a Special
Agrarian Court) to fix the just compensation of the property. In due
time, the RTC rendered judgment fixing the compensation of the
property. Before the Court of Appeals, the DAR and LBP filed
separate petitions. The DAR filed a Petition for Review of the
decision of the RTC which was assigned to the Special 3rd Division
of the appellate court. LBP, on the other hand, raised the case on
appeal to the Court of Appeals by way of ordinary appeal. The same
was assigned to the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals. The
petition of the DAR was given due course. On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals dismissed LBP’s ordinary appeal on the ground
that the same was erroneous. LBP filed a petition for review before
this Court. In Land Bank, we explained:
“A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in

effecting an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as
Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the determination of just
compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly
and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted.
There is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and
49
categorical, there is no room for construction, but only application.”
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 287-288.
49 Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, supra note 33 at p. 356; p. 543.
553
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 553

LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution of this

Court dated 20 March 2003, this Court emphasized the prospective
application of the Decision dated 10 September 2002.
“WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002 and
the supplement to the motion for reconsideration dated November 11, 2002
are PARTIALLY GRANTED. While we clarify that the Decision of this
Court dated September 10, 2002 stands, our ruling therein that a petition for
review is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts shall apply only to cases appealed after the finality of this
50
Resolution.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Essentially therefore, the rule is that a decision of the RTC acting as

a Special Agrarian Court should be brought to the Court of Appeals
via a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals will no longer
entertain ordinary appeals thereon. However, this rule applies only
after the finality of the Resolution of this Court in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. De Leon dated 20 March 2003.
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled when it gave
due course to the appeal of LBP. LBP’s Notice of Appeal was filed
on 27 December 2001. This was given due course by the RTC in an
Order dated 15 May 2002. LBP’s appeal was, thus, perfected before
this Court’s Resolution in the aforementioned Land Bank of the
Philippines v. De Leon case. Hence, the Court of Appeals could give
due course to LBP’s petition.
Next we proceed to determine the issue of whether or not the
petition of LBP before the Court of Appeals is barred by the
disposition of the Petition for Review filed by the DAR in CA-G.R.
SP No. 74879 on the ground of res judicata.
The following are the elements of res judicata:
_______________
50 Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495, 505; 399 SCRA 376,
385 (2003).
554

“(a) The former judgment must be final;
(b) The court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction

over the parties and the subject matter;
(c) It must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) There must be between the first and second actions identity
51
of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.”
In this case, the third element of res judicata, i.e., that the former
judgment must be on the merits, is not present. It must be
remembered that the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 was based
on technicality, that is, for failure on the part of the DAR to state
material dates required by the rules. Having been dismissed based
on a technicality and not on the merits, the principle of res judicata
does not apply. Res judicata applies52 only where judgment on the
merits is finally rendered on the first.
Having disposed of the procedural issues involved herein, we
shall now proceed to resolve the substantive questions in this case.
This Court is aware that in the instant case, since LBP’s appeal
before the Court of Appeals is to be given due course, the normal
procedure is for us to remand the case to the appellate court for
further proceedings. However, when there is enough basis on which
a proper evaluation of the merits of petitioner’s case may be had, the
Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure in 53
order to
prevent further delays in the disposition of the case. Indeed,
remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of
evidence is not conducive to the speedy administration of justice and
it becomes
_______________
51 TF Ventures, Inc. v. Matsuura, G.R. No. 154177, 9 June 2004, 431 SCRA 526,
532-533.
52 David v. Navarro, G.R. No. 145284, 11 February 2004, 422 SCRA 499, 511.
53 Somoso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78050, 23 October 1989, 178 SCRA 654,
663; Bach v. Ongkiko Kalaw, Manhit & Acorda Law Offices, G.R. No. 160334, 11
September 2006, 501 SCRA 419.
555
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 555

unnecessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute

based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and expeditious administration of justice, has
resolved action on the merits, instead of remanding them for further
proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by
54
the remand of the case or where55the trial court had already received
all the evidence of the parties. Briefly stated, a remand of the
instant case to the Court of Appeals would serve no purpose save to
further delay its disposition contrary to the spirit of fair play.
It is already an accepted rule of procedure for us to strive to settle

56
the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. If, based on the records,
the pleadings, and other evidence, the dispute can be resolved by us,
we will do so to serve the ends of justice instead of remanding the
57
case to the lower court for further proceedings.
The complete records of this case have already been elevated to
this Court. The pleadings on record will fully support this
adjudication. We have painstakingly gone over all of LBP’s
representations and arguments, and we found that the material and
decisive facts are hardly disputable. From another perspective, due
consideration should also be given to
_______________
54 Real v. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, 26 January 2007, 513 SCRA 111; Golangco v.
Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771, 778; 283 SCRA 493, 501 (1997); Heirs of Crisanta
Y. Gabriel-Almoradie v. Court Appeals, G.R. No. 91385, 4 January 1994, 229 SCRA
15, 29; Republic v. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 134 Phil. 631; 25 SCRA 641
(1968).
55 Samal v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 230, 233 (1956).
56 Bunao v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 159606, 13 December 2005, 477
SCRA 564, 571.
57 Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156413, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 658,
668; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 598, 605; 365 SCRA 279, 286 (2001);
Chua v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 262, 273; 271 SCRA 546, 555 (1997); Golangco
v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771, 778; 283 SCRA 493, 501 (1997).
556

AFC and HPI for having voluntarily offered to sell their properties, a
clear indication of AFC and HPI’s willingness to participate in the
agrarian reform program of the government. In turn, they must be
given compensation that is just and timely. Records indicate that the
case has been dragging on for more than ten years now without the
landowners having been fully compensated. We cannot countenance
such a glaring indifference to AFC and HPI’s rights as land owners
—they should be afforded all that is just and due them. To be sure,
they deserve nothing less than full compensation to give effect to
their substantive rights.
While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the
state, there is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged
procedure, or that the payment of the private owner be protracted as
58
far as practicable.
It is not controverted that this case started way back on 12
October 1995, when AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the
properties to the DAR. In view of the failure of the parties to agree
on the valuation of the properties, the Complaint for Determination
of Just Compensation was filed before the DARAB on 14 February

1997. Despite the lapse of more than three years from the filing of
the complaint, the DARAB failed to render a decision on the
valuation of the land. Meantime, the titles over the properties of
AFC and HPI had already been cancelled and in their place a new
certificate of title was issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, even as far back as 9 December 1996. A period of
almost 10 years has lapsed. For this reason, there is no dispute that
this case has truly languished for a long period of time, the delay
59
being mainly attributable to both official inaction and indecision,
particularly on the determination of the amount of just com-
_______________
58 Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, 19 December 2005, 478 SCRA 474,
532.
59 Rocamora v. Regional Trial Court-Cebu (Branch VIII), G.R. No. L-65037, 23
November 1988, 167 SCRA 615, 624.
557
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 557

pensation, to the detriment of AFC and HPI, which to date, have yet
to be fully compensated for the properties which are already in the
hands of farmer-beneficiaries, who, due to the lapse of time, may
have already converted or sold the land awarded to them.
Verily, these two cases could have been disposed with dispatch
were it not for LBP’s counsel causing unnecessary delay. At the
inception of this case, DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was
commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the
cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed
the cases before the RTC. We underscore the pronouncement of the
RTC that “the delay by DARAB in the determination of just
compensation could only mean the reluctance of the Department of
Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines 60
to pay the
claim of just compensation by corporate landowners.”
To allow the taking of landowners’ properties, and to leave them
empty-handed while government withholds compensation is
61
undoubtedly oppressive.
It is in light of the foregoing that this Court will now undertake
the final resolution of the present controversy which, as already
elucidated, is within the power of this Court to do.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of
the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the property owner is
being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or

more before actually receiving the amount nec-
_______________
60 RTC Decision, p. 40; CA Rollo, p. 124.

61 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1047, 1055; 258
SCRA 404, 409-410 (1996).
558

62
essary to cope with his loss. Just compensation is defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
63
expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the
64
measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word
“just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation”
to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered65for the property
to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
The two main issues, thus, for determination of this Court are the
date of the taking of the property and the amount of just
66
compensation.
First, it is settled that the property was taken on 9 December
1996, when a Certificate of Title was issued in favor of the Republic
of the Philippines, and the Certificates of Title of AFC and HPI were
cancelled. The farmer-beneficiaries themselves took possession of
67
the subject properties on 2 January 1997.
Second, on payment of just compensation, we have previously
held:
“Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to

forcibly acquire private lands intended for pub
_______________
62 Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone, G.R. No.

137285, 16 January 2001, 349 SCRA 240, 264; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, id., at p. 1054; p. 409, quoting Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 8989899, 1 October 1990, 190 SCRA 207, 213.
63 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286, 313 (1915).
64 Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467, 469 (1938); J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L21064, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 413,
432; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, G.R. Nos. L-55166-67, 21 May 1987,
150 SCRA 89.
65 City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208, 234 (1913).
66 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, pp. 332, 344.
67 Id., at p. 345.
559
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 559

lic use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously,

there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under
terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of
sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is
unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by
the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert
the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner.
Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public
interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power,
that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no
means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in
the constitutional injunction that “private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation” and in the abundant jurisprudence
that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and
68
(2) just compensation.” (Emphases supplied.)
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law) provides:
“SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction.—The Special Agrarian Courts shall have

original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under
their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case
for decision.”
To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Rule XIII,

Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, provides:
_______________
68 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 376.
560

“Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just

Compensation.—The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and
preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion
for reconsideration.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The next question now crops up, who shall determine just
compensation? It is now settled that the valuation of property in
eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested
with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot be
69
lodged with administrative agencies and may not be usurped by
70
any other branch or official of the government.
We now come to the issue of just compensation.
LBP argues that the trial court’s valuation of the subject
landholdings has incorporated irrelevant and/or immaterial factors
such as the schedule of market values given by the City Assessor of
Tagum, the comparative sales of adjacent lands and the
71
commissioners’ report.
_______________
69 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, 464 Phil. 83, 84; 419 SCRA 67, 75
(2004); Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, G.R. No. L-59603, 29 April
1987, 149 SCRA 305, 312; Belen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45390, 15 April
1988, 160 SCRA 291, 295, citing National Power Corporation v. Jocson, G.R. Nos.
94193-99, 25 February 1992, 206 SCRA 520, 540; Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Natividad, G.R. No. 127198, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 441, 451; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 331 Phil 1072; 263 SCRA 750 (1996), cited in Philippine Veterans Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 141, 147; 322 SCRA 139, 146 (2000).
70 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, supra note 68 at p. 380.
71 Rollo, p. 351.
561
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 561

Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant,

providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just
compensation, reads, as follows:
“Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just

compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property
as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
72
factors to determine its valuation.”
_______________
72 Otherwise stated, the determination of just compensation involves the
examination of the following factors specified in Section 17 of Republic Act No.
6657 as amended.
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;

2. the current value of like properties;
3. its nature, actual use and income;
4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
5. the assessment made by government assessors;
6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the government to the property; and
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any.
These factors as provided under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 have been
translated in a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the
DAR’s rulemaking power to carry out the object and purposes of Republic Act No.
6657, as amended.
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
562

The RTC provided the following elucidation in its assailed decision:
“The recommendation of the Commissioners’ Report for a value of P85.00

per sq.m. or P850,000.00 per hectare (sic) is founded on evidence. The
schedule of market values of the City of Tagum as per its 1993 and 1994
Revision of Assessment and Property Classification (Exhibits “J-6” and
“CC-6”) give the lowest value for residential land at P100/sq.m. for 4th
class residential land in 1993. In 1994, it gave the lowest value of
P80.00/sq.m. for barangay residential lot. It appears that certain portions of
the land in question have been classified as Medium Industrial District
(Exhibits “J-4” and “CC-4”). The lowest value as for industrial land, 3rd
class in a barangay is P130.00 sq.m. The average of these figures, using the
lowest values in Exhibits “6” and “CC-6” yields the figure of P103.33 which
is even higher by 22.2% than that recommended by the Commissioners. It is
even of judicial notice that assessments made by local governments are
much lower than real market value. Likewise, the value of the
improvements thereon, not even considered in the average of P103.33. If
considered, this will necessarily result in a higher average value.
In said Appraisal Report, mention has been made on “improvements,”
and our Supreme Court in Republic vs. Gonzales, 50 O.G. 2461, decreed the
rule, as follows:
_______________
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and
applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2 ((Land Bank of the Philippines v. Banal, G.R. No. 143276, 20 July
2004, 434 SCRA 543, 549-550.)
563
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 563

If such improvements are permanent in character, consisting of good paved road,

playgrounds, water system, sewerage and general leveling of the land suitable for
residential lots together with electric installations and buildings, the same are
important factors to consider in determining the value of the land. The original cost
of such improvements may be considered, with due regard to the corresponding
depreciation. (Davao vs. Dacudao, L-3741, May 8, 1952).
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent

improvements on plaintiffs’ lands have been introduced and found existing,
e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing
houses, among others, wherein substantial amount of capital funding have
been invested in putting them up.
This Court, however, notes that the comparative sales (Exhibits “A” to
“F”) referred to in the Appraisal Report are sales made after the taking of
the land in 1996. However, in the offer of evidence, the plaintiff offered
additional comparative sales of adjacent land from late 1995 to early 1997,
ranging from a high of P580.00/sq. meter in September 1996 (Exhibits “L-
4” for plaintiff Apo and “EE-4” for plaintiff Hijo) to a low of P146.02/sq.
meter in October 1997 (Exhibits “L-2” and “EE-2”). The other sales in 1996
were in January 1996 for P530.00/sq.meter (Exhs. “L-3” and “EE-3”) and in
December 1996 for P148.64/sq. meter (Exhs. “L-2” and “EE-1”). On the
other hand, the sale in December 1995 (Exhs. “L-5” and “EE-5”) was made
for P530.00/sq.meter.” The average selling price based on the foregoing
transaction is P386.93/sq. meter. The same is even higher by around 350%
than the recommended value of P85.00, as per the Commissioners’ Report.
The Cuervo Appraisal Report, on the other hand, gave a value of
P84.53/sq. meter based on the Capitalized Income Approach. The said
approach considered only the use of the land and the income generated from
such use.
The just compensation for the parcels of land under consideration, taking
into account the Schedule of Market Values given by the City Assessor of
Tagum (Exhs. “J-6” for Apo “CC-6” for Hijo), the comparative sales
covering adjacent lands at the time of taking of subject land, the Cuervo
Report, and the Appraisal Report is hereby fixed at P103.33/sq.meter.
The valuation given by Cuervo and the Appraisal Report of P84.53 and
P85.00, respectively, in this Court’s judgment, is the
564

minimum value of the subject landholdings and definitely cannot in anyway

be the price at which plaintiffs APO and/or HIJO might be willing to sell,
considering that the parcels of land adjacent thereto were sold at much
higher prices, specifically from a low of P146.02/sq. meter to a high of
P580.00. The average of the lowest value under the 1993 and 1994 Revision
of Assessment and Property Classification (Exhibits “J-6” and “CC-6”) were
already at P103.33/sq. meter, even without considering the improvements
introduced on the subject landholdings.
Moreover, the Commission made the findings that “portions of the land
subject of th(e) report may x x x increase to P330.00/sq. meter, specifically
th(e) strips of land surrounding the provincial roads” and made the
conclusion that “(c)learly, the value recommended by th(e) Commission,
which is only about P85.00/sq.meter is way below the x x x assessed values,
which effectively was fixed (as early as) 1994 or earlier than the Voluntary
Offer to Sell of the above plaintiffs’ properties.” In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, the said assessed values are presumed to be
prevailing [in] December 1996, the time of taking of plaintiffs’
landholdings. The Commission further stated that the average of the said
“assessed values as submitted by the City Assessor of Tagum City (is)
P265.00/sq. meter.” This Court, therefore, finds it unfair that the just
compensation for the subject landholdings should only be fixed at
P85.00/sq.meter.
It is similarly true, however, that the determination of just compensation
cannot be made to the prejudice of defendants or the government for that
matter.
Thus, the selling price of P580.00/sq. meter nor the average selling price
of P386.93/sq. meter or the average assessed value of P265.00/sq. meter
cannot be said to be the value at which defendants might be willing to buy
the subject landholdings.
This Court, therefore, finds the price of P103.33/sq. meter for the subject
landholdings fair and reasonable for all the parties. Said value is even lower
than the lowest selling price of P148.64 for sale of adjacent land at the time
of the taking of the subject landholdings [in] December 1996. It
approximates, however, the average of the lowest values under the 1993 and
1994 Revision of Assessment and Property Clarification (Exhs. “J-6” and
“CC-6”) of P103.33. The said figure will further increase, if the Court will
further consider the improvements introduced by plaintiffs, which should be
the case. Moreover, the said value of P103.33/sq. meter is more realistic as
it
565
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 565

does not depart from the government recognized values as specified in the
1993 and 1994 Revised Assessment and Property Classification of Tagum
City. This Court finds the evidence of the plaintiffs sufficient and
73
preponderant to establish the value of P103.33/sq. meter.”
The trial court further rationalized its award thus:
“It may be admitted that plaintiffs’ properties are agricultural; however, it is

simply beyond dispute that in going about the task of appraising real
properties, as in the instant cases, “all the facts as to the condition of the
property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, may be
shown and considered in estimating its value.” (Manila Railroad Company
vs. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 287, 314). It is undeniable that plaintiffs’ agricultural
lands as borne out from the records hereof, and remaining unrebutted, shows
that all weather-roads network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing
houses, and among numerous other improvements are permanently in place
and not just a measly, but substantial amounts investments have been
infused. To exclude these permanent improvements in rendering its
valuation of said properties would certainly be less than fair. x x x.
xxxx
The plaintiffs’ agricultural properties are just a stone’s throw from the
residential and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact defendants-DAR
and LBP should never ignore. The market value of the property (plus the
consequential damages less consequential benefits) is determined by such
factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size,
shape and location as enunciated in B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. vs. Court of
Appeals, 216 SCRA 584 (1992). To follow Defendants-DAR and LBP logic,
therefore, would in effect restrict and delimit the broad judicial prerogatives
of this Court in determining and fixing just compensation of properties taken
by the State.
Proceedings before the Panel of Commissioners revealed that permanent
improvements as mentioned above exist inside the lands subject of this
complaints. It was also established during the trial proper upon reception of
the evidence of the plaintiffs which clearly
_______________
73 CA Rollo, pp. 125-128.
566

revealed the character, use and valuation of the lands surrounding the
properties involved in these cases, indicating the strategic location of the
properties subject of these cases. The findings being that surrounding

properties have been classified as residential, commercial or industrial. And
yet defendant-LBP refused to acknowledge the factual basis of the findings
of the Panel of Commissioners and insisted on its guideline in determining
74
just compensation. x x x.”
In arriving at its valuation of the subject properties, the RTC

conducted a thorough and meticulous examination of all determining
factors. It did not rely merely on the report of Commissioners nor on
the Cuervo appraiser’s report. It took into consideration the schedule
of market values of the City of Tagum per its 1993 and 1994
Revision of Assessment and Property Clasisification, value of the
permanent improvements thereon, as well as comparative sales of
adjacent lands from early 1995 to early 1997, among other factors.
Contrary to LBP’s claim, the above factors are neither irrelevant
nor immaterial. When the trial court arrived at the valuation of a
landowner’s property taking into account its nature as irrigated land,
location along the highway, market value, assessor’s value and the
volume and value of its produce, such valuation is considered in
75
accordance with Republic Act No. 6657.
Even the Commissioners’ report which the trial court took into
consideration may not be dismissed as irrelevant. In the first place
the trial court acting as a special agrarian court is authorized to
appoint commissioners to assist in the determination of just
76
compensation. In this case the Commissioners’ report was
submitted only after ocular inspections were con-
_______________
74 Id., at pp. 146-149.

75 Belen v. Court of Appeals, supra note 69 at p. 295; Land Bank of Philippines v.
Natividad, supra note 69 at pp. 452-453.
76 Rule 67, Section 5, Revised Rules of Court.
567
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 567

ducted on the landholdings to give them a better idea of their real

77
value.
Conspicuously, the trial court did not merely rely solely on the
appraisal report submitted by the Commissioners. The trial court
conducted hearings for the purpose of receiving the parties’
evidence.
Clearly evident from the records of this case is that in the
proceedings before the Commission constituted by the RTC of
Tagum City, Branch 2, to fix the just compensation for the
properties, the LBP and the DAR were given all the opportunities to
justify their stances. Thus:
“[T]he Commission set another hearing on February 23, 2001 at 9:00 a.m. at
the Function Room, Marbella mansion, Rizal Street, Davao City, to give the
LBP the opportunity to present evidence. The LBP counsels, Attys.
Batingana and Sembrano, instead of presenting witnesses and other
evidence, manifested that they will submit a position paper within fifteen
(15) days from the date of the hearing. This was granted by the Chairman of
the Commission, who also gave the plaintiff the opportunity to submit
within five (5) days, if they so desire, their rejoinder.
Inspite of the lapse of the period, the LBP failed to file its position paper.
xxxx
The plaintiffs have presented evidence to establish the value of their
properties before the Court-appointed Commissioners, as well as before this
Court. The Commissioners who acted and performed their assigned tasks
under their Oaths of Office are deemed a surrogate or extension of the Court
itself. (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 32 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Defendant-DAR and Defendant-LBP failed to present evidence during the
hearings set by the Commissioners on February 5, 2001, and February 23,
2001, for the presentation of their evidence. This Court gave Defendant
Land Bank and Defendant DAR additional opportunities to present
evidence. Defendant Land Bank and DAR asked for extensions to submit
their evi
_______________
77 B.H Berkenkotter and Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89980, 14 December
1992, 216 SCRA 584, 589.
568

dence in its motion dated July 27, 2001, which was granted by the Court.
All exhibits and other documents offered in evidence were admitted, after
which this Court issued an order that these two cases were submitted for
78
resolution.”
Given the already exhaustive analysis made by the RTC, this Court
is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of
just compensation due to AFC and HPI.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. While the Decision, dated 12 February
2004, and Resolution, dated 21 June 2004, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, giving due course to LBP’s appeal, are
hereby AFFIRMED, this Court, nonetheless, RESOLVES, in
consideration of public interest, the speedy administration of justice,
and the peculiar circumstances of the case, to give DUE COURSE to
the present Petition and decide the same on its merits. Thus, the
Decision, dated 25 September 2001, as modified by the Decision,
dated 5 December 2001, of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum City,
Branch 2, in Agrarian Cases No. 54-2000 and No. 552000 is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez and

Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Petition partially granted, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—The nature and character of the land at the time of its

taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just
compensation should be given to the landowner. (National Power
Corporation vs. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation, 437 SCRA 60 [2004])
_______________
78 CA Rollo, pp. 112-121.
569
VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 569

Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
That just compensation should be determined in accordance with

Republic Act No. 6657 and not Presidential Decree No. 27 or
Executive Order No. 228 is especially imperative considering that
just compensation should be full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from the owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real
substantial, full and ample. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Natividad,458 SCRA 441 [2005])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Apov CA

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Apov CA

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

8/17/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 514

VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 537

APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC.,

Judgments; Res Judicata; Having been dismissed based on technicality

Pleadings and Practice; It is already an accepted rule of procedure for

538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Apo Fruits Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Eminent Domain; While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent

the state, there is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or

Just Compensation; Words and Phrases; The concept of just

Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; Eminent domain is an inherent

VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 539

Apo Fruits Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

APO FRUITS CORPORATION

Transfer Certiﬁcate of Area (Ha.)

TCT No. Area (Ha.)

On 12 October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily

VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 541

8 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 13.

542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

13 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 461.

VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 543

area of 640.3483 hectares previously assessed by LBP with a

“This Court will determine the all-embracing concept of Just Compensation,

17 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, pp. 1-5.

544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The commissioners, together with all the representatives of22 the

a) The amount of ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE MILLION SIX

(Sgd.) CESAR V. ARAÑAS (Sgd.) ALFREDO M. SILAWAN

25 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 707.

VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 545

“WHEREFORE, consistent with all the foregoing premises, judgment is

26 Id., at pp. 747-795. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Erasto D. Salcedo.

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

27 CA Rollo, pp. 131-133.

VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 547

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the

Second—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN

On the Third Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which Now Reads As

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Apo Fruits Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Third—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN

On the Fourth Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which Now Reads As

Fourth—Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN

Except for the above-stated modiﬁcations, the consolidated decision

From 31this Order, LBP ﬁled a Notice of Appeal dated 27 December

30 Id., at pp. 158-160.

VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 549

of appeal from a decision on the determination of just compensation

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders dated

34 CA Rollo, pp. 47-48.

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Earlier, on 23 January 2003, DAR ﬁled its own separate petition 42

“The importance of stating the material dates cannot be overemphasized. It

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition ﬁled by the

42 Id., at pp. 289-306. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74879.

VOL. 514, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 551

WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT LBP IS BOUND BY THE