CARLOS VS.

SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 179922. December 16, 2008.
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS
II, respondents.

TOPICS AS PER OUTLINE

V. Marriage and Personal Relations between Spouses > G. Void Marriages > 2. Who Can Invoke
Nullity
V. Marriage and Personal Relations between Spouses > G. Void Marriages > 4. Procedure in Actions
for Declaration of Nullity > d. > A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003

GENERAL FAQs
1. What is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC?
Also known as the "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages”, it is, as the title suggests, a new Rule of the Supreme Court which shall govern
petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rule which was dated on March 04, 2003 took effect on
March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7,
2003.

2. Who can invoke nullity?

Under the new Rule, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

IMPORTANT CONCEPTS
Confession of judgment—a legal term that refers to a type of contract (or a clause with such a provision)
in which a party agrees to let the other party enter a judgment against him or her.
Summary judgment—a procedural device used during civil litigation to promptly and expeditiously
dispose of a case without a trial. It is used when there is no dispute as to the material facts of the case
and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Judgment on the pleadings—a judgment rendered by the court prior to a verdict because no material
issue of fact exists and one party or the other is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law 1.

1 Matter of law—That which is determined or ascertained through the use of statutes, rules, court decisions, and interpretations of legal
principles
 FACTS
The First Division of the Six Parcels of Land

 Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their two
sons, Teofilo Carlos and Juan De Dios Carlos (petitioner of this case).
 The first three parcels of land (Parcel Nos. 1, 2, and 3) were transferred to the name Teofilo while
his dad was still alive to avoid inheritance taxes.
 Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of Juan de Dios Carlos.
 When Teofilo died intestate in May 13, 1992, Lots 5 and 6 were immediately registered in the name
of Teofilo’s wife, Felicidad and his son, Teofilo II (respondents of this case).

The Second Division of the Six Parcels of Land

 Sometime in 1994, Juan de Dios Carlos sued the Felicidad and Teofilo II (for reasons not stated in
the case).
 On August 17, 1994, however, the parties signed an approval of a compromise agreement
acknowledging their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel
of land.
 On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the rest of the
first parcel of land.
 The second parcel of land was also divided in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on
August 17, 1994.
 Two more contracts were signed dividing the third and fourth parcels of land.
 The fifth and sixth parcels were never divided after Juan de Dios Carlo commenced a civil action
against Felicidad and Teofilo II.

Juan de Dios Carlos’ Civil Action Against Felicidad and Teofilo II

 On August 1995, Juan de Dios Carlos commenced a civil action against Felicidad and Teofilo II
asserting that:
(a.) that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view
of the absence of the required marriage license (nullity of marriage).
(b.) that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II (status of a child).
 He also sought:
(a.) the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the
subject real properties (recovery of property).
(b.) the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the
properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as
proceeds, should be reconveyed to him (reconveyance).
(c.) indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit (sum of money and damages)

The Answer of Felicidad and Teofilo II

 On October 16, 1995, Felicidad and Teofilo II submitted their answer. They denied the material
averments of Juan de Dios Carlos' complaint. Felicidad and Teofilo II contended that the dearth of
details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo.
 Respondents also declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos
with another woman.
 On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents also prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.

The Summary Judgment

 However, before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II
moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace
who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were
designated as parents.
 On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own
motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
 Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent
Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5
 Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report
and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.

The RTC Ruling

 The Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. Juan de Dios Carlos’ Counter-Motion for Summary
Judgment was granted and the summary judgment is rendered in favor of Juan de Dios Carlos in
saying, inter alia, that:
(a.) the marriage between Felicidad and Teofilo is null and void
(b.) Teofilo II is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E.
Carlos.
 Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the
trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the
marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of
Teofilo, Sr.

The CA Ruling
 On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing that the summary
judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered
REMANDING2 the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
 On November 22, 2006, Juan de Dios Carlos moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions. Thus, a petition
before the SC was filed.

2When an appellate court sends an appealed case back to the trial court for further action, the case is said to be
remanded.
ISSUES
1. WON a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a
summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial.
2. WON a person who is not a spouse could bring the action for nullity of marriage.

HELD
1. NO, a marriage may NOT be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a
summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial.
2. NO, a person who is not a spouse could NOT bring the action for nullity of marriage.

RULING
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment
on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest
to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and
in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of
action before it.

RATIO
1. On Ruling I
 With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of
summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of
marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule,
which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:
“SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the
case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to
matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.”
 Likewise instructive is SC’s pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, the
SC excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary
judgments:
"rescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of
marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation,
summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.”
 By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and
duty to intervene in the case
 Only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence
2. On Ruling II
 Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of
the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
-Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
 This rule should be read and contrasted with NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG where any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage after a spouses’ death.
 Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory
or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate (partial)
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application.
 The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code
is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any
person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
 True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were
married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can
file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interestand must be based on a cause
of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file
the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.

3. On Ruling III
 The Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or
nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss
the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence
that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner

4. On Ruling IV
 The SC agrees with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple
is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation.
 However, the SC is not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of
respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible.
For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not
be afforded credence. The CA is reminded of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the
Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child,
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
“WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and
filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between
respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the
late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of
marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET
ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case
priority in its calendar.”
Catalan vs CA
GR No. 167109, February 6, 2007
J. Ynares- Santiago (ponente)

FACTS:

Felicitas Amor- Catalan married Orlando Catalan on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter,
they migrated to the US and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereat. After 38 years of marriage,
Felicitas and Orlando divorced in 1988. Orlando then married respondent Merope in Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage of Orlando and Merope was bigamous since Merope had a
prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner has the personality to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of the
respondents on the ground of bigamy.

HELD:

A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. Petition for declaration
of nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the injured or offended spouse. In the case at bar, the
petitioner’s personality to file said petition cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the
divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence as to establish the validity of the divorce decree and to ascertain the
legal personality of the petitioner to file said annulment with damages.
 LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995

Facts:

Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage, the couple
when quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julia’s parents into their marital
affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States. Leouel was then unable
to communicate with her for a period of five years and she had then virtually abandoned their family.
Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial
Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

Issue:

Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be appreciated.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable. Mere abandonment cannot
therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.
ANTONIO VS REYES G.R. NO. 155800
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
FACTS:

Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on December 8, 1990. A
child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no longer take her constant lying,
insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from her in August 1991. He attempted reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Only after their marriage that
he learned about her child with another man.

He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage null and void.

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented was
insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997 Molina
case had not been satisfied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.

RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who
attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.

The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about
many material aspects as to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories
and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as
it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.

The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:

First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified that
was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her psychological
incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from
contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled
by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical
courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her behavior
remains unchanged.
SUAZO v. SUAZO

G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only. Without any means
to support themselves, they lived with Angelito’s parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito
refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this often
resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found
another woman with whom he has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical
beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both
her psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated.
However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage on
the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e.,
lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to
infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on
parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a
person lives for the next drink and the next drinks” but the CA reversed it and held that the
respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse,
but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was
clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was
suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not
the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from
the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply
to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the
failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that
he had been forced into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

HELD:
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in
setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The
psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she derived all
her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be
doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could
not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the
psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-
social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and
incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be
evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and
refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves,
show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform
marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted
in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal
or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, Aug. 18, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the UP Diliman, in 1972
when they were both 19 years old. Petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship which included dining out,
unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university student’s budget. At that time, respondent
held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was
not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking
marijuana.
On December 5, 1976, petitioner and respondent got married. They lived with Ramon’s parents and
they were supported by them. They had a child which made their financial difficulties worse. All the business
ventures of Ramon were unsuccessful and Socorro became the breadwinner of the family. To make things
worse, despite the fact that Socorro would undergo an operation for removal of a cyst, respondent remained
unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested
that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. They tried to attend counseling sessions
but nothing has changed. Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital
affair.
RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N Ramon is psychologically incapacitated

HELD:
Yes. Marriage is null and void. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or
any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors.
Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. In
the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support;
(2) extra-marital affairs;
(3) substance abuse;
(4) failed business attempts;
(5) unpaid money obligations;
(6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and
(7) criminal charges of estafa
 CHI MING TSOI, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 119190. January 16, 1997

Facts:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married as evidence by their marriage
contract. From May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact
between them. Gina made attempts for sexual activity to no avails. Medical examinations showed that
both Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were capaple of sexual conduct. Gina was still a virgin at the time of the
medical examination. Gina filed a motion for declaration of nullity and the Trial Court declared their
marriage as void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi
subsequently filed a motion to the Supreme Court citing that it was she and not he that had the problem
regarding sexual intimacy.

Issue:

Whether or not non-desire of sexual consumation be an indicator of psychological incapacity?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court found the petition to be bereft of merit. Since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other
becomes immaterial. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Aligned with this is the
essential marital obligation, “the procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.

After ten months of marriage, the reluctance to perform the sexual act was indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity
to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in
1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and
a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his
parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986,
the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her
work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her
and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the
time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband
cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in
this case:

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage

such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code

decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected

court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the
state.
MARCOS V. MARCOS

Facts

Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging
that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse
and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The
RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA

Issues

Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a

requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

Held

Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established
by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although
this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family
and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects”
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of
respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to
give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness
was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no
evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Lolita and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan in October 1986. They later
lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half
of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child. They were married with MTC of Bacoor,
Cavite. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never
responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines
but he did not bother to see her and their child. Hence, she filed for a declaration of nullity of their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC declared their marriage null and void
because he failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. CA
affirmed RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:

W/N abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity

HELD:

Mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically
constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in
Molina.
 KALAW VS. HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 166357, [September 19, 2011]

FACTS:

Tyrone Kalaw and respondent Malyn Fernandez met in 1973 and eventually married in Hong Kong in
1976. They have 4 children. Tyron had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano, who gave birth to a son in 1983.
In 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her 4 children with Tyrone. Then Tyrone started living with
Jocelyn, who bore him 4more children. Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36. Tyrone presented a
psychologist, Dr. Gates, and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Healy, to testify on Malyn’s psychological
incapacity. Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior –
her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect
a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). Malyn’s NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as
a mother. Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad
Kalaw (Tyrone’s sister-in-law), and their son. Fr. Healy characterized Malyn’s psychological incapacity
as grave and incurable. He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well
as the report of Dr. Dayan, Malyn’s expert witness. He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness
of the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s “habits” because he believed it is the court’s duty to do so.

ISSUE:

Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malynsuffers from psychological incapacity

HELD:

NO.

RATIO:

The burden of proving psychological incapacity ison the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the
incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder
that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of
the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage,
and must be incurable.

Petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented
the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of
respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged
habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties
as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his
experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these
allegations of the petitioner. What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity,
which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their
children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that
voids a marriage.
 VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.

ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

Motion for Reconsideration.

PONENTE: Bersamin, J.

TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

FACTS:

In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to
her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion
of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed
psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.

Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this
case.

Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid,
such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of
nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less
specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations,
but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the
next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every
“trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity
of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable
demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.

Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered

We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accorded to a marriage that is null and void

ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally

examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.”

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that
a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert
opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence
on the causation.

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or

speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation.
The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their
exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional

temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in
the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The
position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.

The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely
generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and
competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36
of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were
largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC
itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for
by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should
be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she
made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have
known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them
to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term
effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly
on her very young children.

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not
only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture
of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and
mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as
NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.
TANI-DE LA FUENTE v. DE LA FUENTE
MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE,
JR.,respondent.
G.R. NO. 188400
March 08, 2017
Facts:
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in Mandaluyong City
after being in a relationship for five (5) years. They had two children.
While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was
prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. His jealousy became so severe
that he even poked a gun to his 15 year old cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave who made the
latter feel maltreated and molested. Sometime in 1986, the couple quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that
Maria Teresa was having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. She
left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and supported their children by herself.
On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. As support to her petitions, clinical
psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was presented as an expert witness. However, Rodolfo did not file any
responsive pleading. The trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present
evidence.
Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the
Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence. The Office of the Solicitor
General was also directed to submit its certification. The Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to
comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the certification and
comment from the Office of the Solicitor General. On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its decision
granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. The Office of
the Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification because it had no copies
of the transcripts of stenographic notes. It was also unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due
to the volume of cases it was handling On September 13 2002, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration..
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. It argued that the trial
court erred a) in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the Solicitor General, 58
and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr.
Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case.
Still, Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. In its resolution dated May 25, 2009, CA denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by Maria Teresa.
On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This time Rodolfo filed a
Comment 70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in
fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married."
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
Held:
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina
to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of
proof that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken when it chided
the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally
conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically
render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by
its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have
lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the
obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of their marriage.
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr.
Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder wouldrefuse to admit that there was
something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated
that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and
suggested couples counseling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking
professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends that the marriage
be annulled.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife
from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and
utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this
Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their
marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their
marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This
fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.

The petition is granted.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR. G.R. No. 189538;
February 10, 2014.

FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years.
Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not
know the alleged husband; She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the
Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.

During trial, She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she
revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while
she was working as a receptionist in Tadel's Pension House. She believed that her name was
used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. A document examiner testified that the
signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged. The RTC decided in favor of the
petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar.

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that:
(1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage
contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and
(2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity
was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be
feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is
not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: May the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage, be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding?

HELD:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects
the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary.

Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court has repeatedly
ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity
to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties
of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or
correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition,
if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is
after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of
the civil register.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry

cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente
lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient
of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela
Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office G.R.No. 196049, June 26, 2013.

While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak
of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of. DENIED
FACTS:
• 12/24/1981: Disbarment case filed by Dorothy B. Terre against Jordan Terre for "grossly immoral
conduct,"
• Jordan Terre alleged to have contracted a second marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsists
• 4/24/85: Three years, respondent still has not answered. SC decided to suspend respondent for evading
notice from court.
• 9/28/85: Respondent finally answered via Answer with Motion to Set Aside/Lift Suspension. Stated the
ff:
o Petitioner Dorothy Terre was married to Merito Bercenilla 1968
o Petitioner mockingly told him of her private meetings with Bercenilla and that child she was
carrying then was the son of Bercenilla
o That believing in good faith, Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem believing that his first
marriage is void ab initio.
• SC denied petition
• Petitioner testified. Petitioner and Respondent met highschool where petitioner was already married.
Both moved to Manila where eventually, respondent studied Law in Lyceum. Respondent continued courting
her even with the knowledge that she was married. Respondent said that her prior marriage was void ab initio
since Bercenilla is her first cousin.
• Despite her objections, respondent wrote “single” under her status in the marriage license stating that
her first marriage was void ab initio and requires no judicial declaration. Couple was thereby married.
• Respondent suddenly left petitioner 1981. Eventually, respondent found out that respondent married.
ISSUE/S:
WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage
RULING:
Respondent disbarred.
RATIO:
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first
place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith
of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had
inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void
ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second
marriage with the respondent.
Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran
counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential.
Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith,
the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to
complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem
must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
 LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES,
JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Facts:

Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes for Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda
De Castro, who are living together at a subdivision in Makati, which he purchased in 1987. One day, he
caught the respondent asleep in his bedroom. He asked the houseboy about him and the latter said that
the judge had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza did not bother to wake up the respondent instead
asked the houseboy to take care of his two children.

After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has alienated the affection
of his children. The Complainant also claims that the respondent is married to Zenaida Ongkiko.

The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was celebrated twice
without marriage license, therefore, his marriage to De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California
was because he believed in good faith and for all legal purposes, that his first marriage was solemnized
without marriage license.

He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in his case because his first
marriage in 1965 was governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd relationship was 1991 under the Family
Code. No retroactive Effect.

Issue:

Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous marriage justifi3es his act
to cohabit with De Castro

Held:

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice
of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already
a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage
license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the
flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure
a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40,
which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by
the application of Article 40 to his case.
Ty v. CA, G.R. No.127406, Nov. 27, 2000
FACTS:

Edgardo Reyes and Anna Villanueva were married twice, in civil rites and in church, in 1977. Both
weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even
before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes contracted marriage with Ofelia Ty in April 1979
and had their church wedding in Makati in April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January
1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. RTC
ruled that his marriage to Ofelia null and void ab initio. CA affirmed trial court‘s decision. CA ruled that a
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage with Villanueva must first be secured before a subsequent
marriage could be validly contracted.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the 1st marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can
be entered into validly

HELD: Both marriages governed by the Civil Code hence, no judicial declaration is necessary
 SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan
Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino with
whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under
the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of
P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the
marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without the
required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of
acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage
license.

Ruling:

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does not fall
within any of those exceptions and a marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it.
This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the
presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot
stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity
of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous;
under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals
is affirmed.
05 Republic of the Phils. Vs. Ludyson C. Catubag
G.R. NO. 210580; APRIL 18, 2018
PETITIONER/S: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT/S: Ludyson Catubag

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Private Respondent’s wife left the family home. After 6 years, Respondent filed a petition to have his
wife declared presumptively dead. The RTC granted it, but the Petitioner challenged it, filing a Petition under
Rule 65 with the CA, The CA dismissed it, ruling that the recourse was improper as the Petitioner should have
filed a MR with the RTC before elevating the case to the CA. The SC ruled that the recourse was proper, and
that there was no well-founded belief that the wife was dead due to the failure of Respondent to prove that he
exerted diligent efforts in searching for the absentee spouse.

DOCTRINE: In cases of summary proceedings, a decision of the trial court can be elevated to the CA via
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

FACTS:
• Private Respondent Ludyson and Shanaviv were cohabiting with each other as husband and
wife, and had 2 children together.
• Ludyson and Shanaviv eventually married in 2003. The marriage was solemnized by a
Municipal Judge in Rizal, Cagayan.
• Sometime in 2006, while Ludyson was working abroad, Shanaviv left their house and never
returned (Ludyson’s relatives took care of the children).
• Ludyson flew back home and proceeded to look for his wife. He inquired with close friends and
relatives and even travelled as far as Bicol, where he wife was born and raised, but to no avail.
He also searched various hospitals and funeral parlors, also to no avail.
• Ludyson subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo to broadcast the fact of his wife’s
disappearance.
• In 2012, Ludyson filed a petition with the RTC to have his wife declared presumptively dead.
• The RTC granted the petition.
• Petitioner, through the office of the SolGen, elevated the case to the CA via Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, contending that Ludyson failed to establish a well-founded belief that
his wife was already dead.
• The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that Petitioner should have filed a MR with the RTC. The
Petitioner filed a MR but the CA denied the same.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Petitioner’s resort to an appeal to the CA under Rule 65 is proper.
2. Whether the Private Respondent has complied with the requisites of a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Art. 41 of the Family Code.
 HELD:
1 YES. The nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate remedy or remedies
available. Under Art. 41 of the Family Code, a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a
summary proceeding. Art 253 of the same Code likewise characterizes proceedings under Art. 41
as summary proceedings.

As a consequence of this summary nature, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor

appeal decision in summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code because these
judgments are immediately final and executory by express mandate of law.

However, parties may challenge the decision in such proceedings through a petition for
certiorari to question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. As previously
held by the Court in Republic vs. Sareňogon, Jr., in a summary proceeding for the declaration
for presumptive death, if a party is aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, then a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 should be filed with the CA. any subsequent decision by the CA may be
elevated to the SC via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

2 NO. There are 4 requisites under Art. 41 that must be complied with for the declaration
of presumptive death to prosper:
1. The absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 if such spouse was in
danger of death when the disappearance occurred;
2. The present spouse wants to remarry;
3. The present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

In this case, Ludyson has complied with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th requisites, nut has not satisfied the 3rd
requisite as he has not established a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. Such belief must result from
diligent efforts to locate the absent spouse. Ludyson failed to establish his allegations. He did not present the
friends and family he claims to have made inquiries to. While he did have a certification from Bombo Radyo’s
manager, he did not seek help from government agencies like the police or NBI. Ludyson’s assertion,
uncorroborated by evidence, falls short of the diligence required to engender a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 23, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 and the Resolutions dated September 3, 2013 and December 6, 2013
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 131269 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the petition of private respondent Ludyson C. Catubag to have his wife, Shanaviv G. Alvarez
Catubag, declared presumptively dead is DENIED. SO ORDERED