de LeonvBrokerage

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 4 29/09/2019, 8)52 AM
VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962 517

De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-15247. February 28, 1962.
DE LEON BROKERAGE Co., INC., petitioner, vs. THE

COURT OF APPEALS and ANGELINE STEEN,
represented by her guardian ad litem LEOPOLDO STEEN,
respondents.
Prosecution of civil actions; Reservation to file civil action

includes action based on quasi-delicts.·There servation to file
separate civil action made in the criminal action does not preclude
a subsequent action based on a quasi-delict.
Same; Theory to be adopted when complaint presents two

apparent theories.·Where the complaint presents two apparent
theories, the theory which is clearly intended by the facts pleaded
should be adopted.
Same; Same; Quasi-delicts; Damages resulting from negligent

driving of vehicle.·A complaint which alleged that the complainant
suffered injuries as a result of the collision between the jeepney in
which she was riding and the petitioner's cargo truck recklessly
driven by its employee, and for which the latter had been
prosecuted and convicted, is not a suit for civil liability arising from
crime but one for damages resulting from a quasi-delict. Mention of
the criminal conviction merely tended to support the claim that the
driver had been recklessly negligent in driving the truck.
518
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016d7a7bb1e13c4a171a003600fb002c009e/p/AQB889/?username=Guest Page 1 of 11
Same; Same; Same; Same; Admission of judgment of conviction

without objection; Effect of.·Where the judgment of conviction had
been admitted without objection, its competency can no longer be
questioned on appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When owner of automobile not liable

for injuries resulting from negligent operation of vehicle by his
employee.·In order that an owner of a motor vehicle may be
relieved from liability for injuries or damages resulting' from the
negligent operation of his automobile while it is being used by his
employee for the latter's own personal business, the said employee
must have abandoned completely his master's business to engage in
some purpose wholly his own.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Owners who are solidarily liable

even if they are not riding in the vehicle at the time of mishap.·The
owners of an establishment or enterprise are solidarily liable with
their driver for any accident resulting from the latter's negligent
operation of the vehicle even if said owners are not riding therein at
the time of the mishap.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Abelardo P. Cecilio and H. Datuin, Jr. for petitioner.
Vergara & Dayut for respondents.
BENGZON, C.J.:
Review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the

decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila which
ordered petitioner and its employee, Augusto Luna, to pay
jointly and severally to respondent Angeline Steen
P12,183.70 as actual and moral damages, and attorney's
fees.
The awards were for injuries said respondent suffered as
a result of the collision between the passenger jeepney in
which she was riding, and petitioner's cargo truck
recklessly driven by its employee, Luna, and for which the
latter had been prosecuted and convicted of the crime of
homicide with physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.
In the criminal action against Luna (and the driver of the

passenger jeepney, who was, however, acquitted),
respondent had reserved her right to file a separate civil
action.
After a judgment of conviction had been rendered,
respondent filed in the court of first instance of Manila, an
519
VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962 519

action for recovery of damages against Luna and petitioner.

As proof of Luna's negligence, she presented during the
hearing the judgment of conviction in the criminal case,
Exh. B; and likewise established her claim o f or actu moral
and exemplary damages. Defendants, that is, Luna and
petitioner, sought to prove by means of the former's
testimony that he was not engaged in the performance of
his duties at the time of the accident.
Said court rendered judgment·which on appeal was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals·holding petitioner and
Luna solidarily liable to respondent for the sums of P1,-
183.70 for actual expenses; P3,000.00 for unpaid medical
fees; P7,000.00 as moral damages; and P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees; all amounts to earn legal interest from the
filing of the complaint, plus costs.
Seeking reversal of such affirmance by the Appellate
Court, De Leon Brokerage claims that: (1) the allegations
in respondent's complaint were so ambiguous that it was
not clear whether she was suing for damages resulting
from a quasi-delict or for civil liability arising from crime,
but since the averments therein are more characteristic of
an action of the latter nature, the same, as against
petitioner, is premature for failure to allege the insolvency
of its employee; (2) the judgment of conviction Exh. B, is
not admissible against it as evidence of a quasi-delict; (3)
the employee, Luna, was not in the discharge of his duties
at the time of the accident; and (4) it cannot be held
solidarily liable with Luna o f or damag
The court of origin and the appellate court correctly
considered respondent's complaint to be based on a
quasidelict She alleged that she suffered injuries because of

the carelessness and imprudence of petitioner's chauffeur
who was driving the cargo truck TH-776 belonging to
petitioner, which truck collided with the passenger jeepney
wherein she was riding. Since averment had been made of
the employer-employee relationship and of the damages
caused by the employee on occasion of his function, there is
a dear statement of a right of action under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. The complaint does not, and did not have to
allege that petitioner did not exercise due deligence in
520

choosing and supervising Luna, because this is a matter of

defense.
Contrary to petitioner's view, respondent is holding it
liabl e f or its own la ck of car e. Her all egati on acts of the
defendants above described constitute gross negligence and
recklessness", plainly refers to petitioner's act of employing
Luna as driver of its cargo truck. and to Luna's careless
manner of driving it.
Whatever doubts remain as to the nature of
respondent's action are resolved by her prayer that
petitioner and its employee be held solidarily liable.
According to petitioner, what causes confusion as to the
nature of respondent's action are the allegations of Luna's
conviction (a copy of the judgment of conviction was
attached to the complaint), and the express reservation by
respondent of her civil action·circumstances, petitioner
argues, which infallibly characterize an action for civil
indemnity under the criminal code.
But respondent clearly did not base her suit on the
criminal conviction. This fact, it is true, was alleged in a
paragraph separate from her allegation of Luna's
negligence as having been the cause of her injuries; but
mention of the criminal conviction merely tended to
support her claim that Luna had been recklessly negligent
in driving the truck. Being evidentiary, the allegation could
have been disregarded.
Respondent neither had to wait for the termination of

the criminal proceeding nor to reserve 1
in the same her
right to file a separate civil action. She waited for the
results of the criminal action because she wanted to be sure
which driver and respective employer she could rightly sue,
since both Luna and the driver of the passenger jeepney
were prosecuted. And she reserved because otherwise, the
court in the criminal proceeding would have awarded her
indemnity, since the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the 2
offense is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. In such event, she would
_______________
1 Art 33, Civil Code.

2 Par. (a), Sec. 1, Ru le 107, Rules of Court.
521
VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962 521

no longer be able to file the separate civil action

contemplated by the civil code, not because of failure to
reserve the same but because she 3
would have already
received indemnity for her injuries.
Plainly, the reservation made in the criminal action does
not preclude a subsequent action based on a quasi-delict. It
cannot be inferred therefrom that respondent had chosen to
file the very civil action she had reserved. The only
conclusion that can reasonably be drawn is that she did not
want the question of damages threshed out in the criminal
action, but preferred to have this issue decided in a
separate civil action.
At any rate, if respondent's complaint, which was clear
enough, had created confusion in petitioner's mind as to the
foundation of her cause of action, then it should have
moved for a more definite statement of the same before the
trial.
However, it seems that petitioner understood quite well
that it was being held liable under the civil code. In its
answer, it alleged as an affirmative defense that in the
selection and supervision of its employees and drivers, it

had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family·a
defense available only to an employer being sued for a
quasi-delict. Petitioner argues that, not knowing the nature
of respondent's action and deciding to play it safe, it put up
defenses both against a suit for quasi-delict and against an
action for civil liability arising from crime. Yet, it did not
aver that the complaint failed to allege that its employee
was insolvent·the defense consistent with an action
against an employer for subsidiary liability under the
criminal code. What it alleged was that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action as against it, which could
not be sustained since the complaint sufficiently alleges an
action based on quasi-delict and the court 4
could validly
have granted respondent's prayer for relief.
_______________
3 Art. 2177, Civil Code.

4 Thus, even if the allegations in a complaint are ambiguos or
indefinite, but a cause of action can be made therefrom, and recovery can
be based on the facts of combination of facts proven, then the motion to
dismiss should be denied. (Pangan
522

Considering that the judgment of conviction, Exh. B, had

been admitted without objection, 5
its competency can no
longer be questioned on appeal. It established the fact of
Luna's negligence, giving rise to the presumption that
petitioner had been negligent6
in the selection and
supervision of its employees. And petitioner failed to prove
that it had exercised such requisite care and diligence as
would relieve it from responsibility.
But, was Luna in the performance of his duties at the
time of the collision? He testified that on the day of the
accident he had been instructed to go to Pampanga, from
there to proceed to Nueva Ecija, but that after unloading
his cargo in Pampanga, he at once returned to Manila.
However, his reason for immediately returning to Manila is

not clear. He could have returned for purposes of repair. It
does not appear that he was on an errand of his own. In the
absence of determinative proof that the deviation was so
complete as would constitute a cessation or 7
suspension of
his service, petitioner should be held liable,
_______________
v. Evening News Publishing Co., L-13308, Dec. 29, 1960, citing 71

Corpus Juris Secundum 932.)
Even granting petitioner's claim that the complaint can be understood
for either kind of action, the fact that the allegations for a cause of action
under the criminal code are insufficient (although as has been said, these
allegations are merely statements of evidentiary matter) does not render
the complaint defective inasmuch as the cause of action based on a quasi-
delict had been sufficiently alleged. (Sec. 7, Rule 15, Rules of Court.) x x x
"Whe r e a compl aint pre sen ts two a pparent the theory adopted should
be the one which is more clearly authorized or intended by the facts
pleaded." (71 Corpus Juris Secundum 230-231).
5 Hodges vs. Salas, 63 Phil 567.
6 Bahia v. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624; Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38
Phil. 768.
7 The American conce pt of "an emp loyer's lia bil driver's negligence,
while based on a different theory 9 7 th at "respondent superior"·
nevertheless illuminates the point.
While, as stated, the owner of an automobile is not liable for injuries
or damages caused by the negligent operations of his automobile while it
is being used by an employee for his own business or pleasure, the
servant must have abandoned and turned aside completely from the
master's business, to engage in same purpose wholly his own, before the
master ceases to be
523
VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962 523

In fact, the Court of Appeals disbelieved the alleged

violation of instructions.
Since both Luna and petitioner are 8
responsible for the
quasi-delict, their liability is solidary , although the latter
can recover9 from the former whatever sums it pays to

respondent.
Petitioner invites attention to Art. 2184, of the Civil
Code, and insists that it is only in the instance covered
thereby·when the owner of the motor vehicle is riding
therein at the time of the mishap·that the employer
becomes solidarily liable with the driver for any accident
resulting from the latter's negligence. That article refers to
owners of vehicles who are not included in the terms of Art.
2180 "as owners of an establishment or enterprise."
As alternative remedy, petitioner asks that the damages
awarded be reduced. The moral damages of P7,000.00 is
amply justified by the pain and disfigurement suffered by
respondent, a pretty girl of sixteen (at the time of the
accident), whose left arm had been scraped bare of flesh
from shoulder to elbow because of the accident. As a result,
she had to undergo seven operations which cost P3,000.00 9
7 a reasonab le eno ugh sum. Attor ney' s P1,000.00 is not
unconscionable considering that the case was appealed to
this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed with costs.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo. Labrador, Concepcion,

Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
Judgment affirmed.
_______________
liable for his act; it is not every deviation from the direct line of his
duties on the part of an employee that constitutes a turning aside from,
and an abandonment of his master's business. A slight deviation by the
servant in charge of a motor vehicle, for his own purposes, when he is in
business for his master, does not affect the liability of the master for an
injury resulting from the negligent operation of the automobile by the
servant. (5 Am. Jur. 714-715.)
524

De Leon Brokerage Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Notes.·The importance of determining the issue of

whether or not the plaintiff is seeking to enforce civil
liability arising from a crime or from a quasi-delict is due to
the fact that the exercise of due diligence on the part of the
employer on the selection of its employees and in exercising
supervision over them would be a good defense should the
action be based upon quasi-delict but not if predicated upon
a liability springing from a crime (M.D. Transit and Taxi
Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals. L-23882, Feb. 17, 1968, 22
SCRA 559).
In determining the nature of the action, the allegations
and subsequent prayer in the complaint should be
examined. Where the main characteristics of obligations
arising from quasi-delict such as solidarity (See articles
2180 and 2184 of the new Civil Code) and primary liability
of the employer for negligence of the employee are
particularly alleged in the complaint, the action is
undoubtedly one for enforcement of civil liability under the
Civil Code (M.D. Transit and Taxi Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, supra, citing De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, L-15247, Feb. 28, 1962).
Where the allegations of the complaint are not clear on
whether or not the damages sued for resulted from a crime
or from a quasi-delict, the circumstances surrounding the
actions should be considered. The circumstances that the
plaintiff reserved in the criminal action the right to seek
indemnity in a separate civil action and that the first piece
of evidence offered by the plaintiff in the civil action for
damages at the trial was the decision of conviction
rendered in the criminal case against the driveremployee
were considered clear indications of the intention of the
plaintiff to enforce liability from crime (M.D. Transit and
Taxi Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra).
The absence of allegations in the plaintiff's complaint
about the conviction of the driver-employee in the criminal
case and about his insolvency does not impair the right to
bring action based on crime because such allegations are
not indispensable. The law authorizing the commencement
of a civil action based upon a civil liability arising from a
crime even before the institution of the criminal action

necessarily implies that the rendition of a judg-
525
VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962 525

ment of conviction in the latter need not be alleged in the

civil complaint (M.D. Transit and Taxi Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, supra; Alba v. Acua, 53 Phil. 381).
An allegation of insolvency of the employee is not
essential to an action to enforce the subsidiary liability of
the employer particularly when both are sued in the same
action to exact the primary liability of the employee, and
the subsidiary liability of the employer. The secondary
nature of the employer's obligation necessarily connotes
that his properties may not be levied upon in pursuance of
a writ of execution of the judgment declaring the existence
of both liability, as long and so long as the employer can
point out properties of the employee which may be levied
upon in satisfaction of said judgment (M.D. Transi and
Taxi Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Quiambao
v. Mora, L-12690, May 25, 1960; Rotea v. Halili, L-12030,
Sept. 30, 1960). The employee's solvency is merely a matter
of defense which may be availed of by the employer. (Ibid.)
It is already settled that in the absence of collusion
between the defendant and the offended party the
judgment of conviction in the criminal case against an
employee is not only admissible in evidence in the civil case
against the employer but also conclusive upon his
subsidiary liability arising from the employee's criminal
liability not only with regard to his civil liability but also to
the amount of his liability (M.D. Transit and Taxi Co., Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, supra, quoting Miranda v. Malate
Garage a Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670, 675 and Martinez v.
Barredo, 81 Phil. 1, 2-3). These views were reiterated in
Nagrampa v. Mulvaney, 97 Phil. 724 and Orsal v. Alisbo, L-
13310, Nov. 28, 1959). See also Manalo v. Robles Trans. Co.,
Inc., 99 Phil. 428. The latest manifestation of approval of
the Martinez doctrine appears in Bantoto v. Bobis, L-18966,
Nov. 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 690, and Jocson v. Glorioso, L-
22686, Jan. 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 316.

The previous dismissal of an action based on culpa
aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability required by Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
(Joson v. Glorioso, supra, citing Diana v. Batangas Trans.
Co., 93 Phil. 391).
526
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

de LeonvBrokerage

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

de LeonvBrokerage

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 4 29/09/2019, 8)52 AM

VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962 517

No. L-15247. February 28, 1962.

DE LEON BROKERAGE Co., INC., petitioner, vs. THE

Prosecution of civil actions; Reservation to file civil action

Same; Theory to be adopted when complaint presents two

Same; Same; Quasi-delicts; Damages resulting from negligent

518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; Same; Admission of judgment of conviction

Same; Same; Same; Same; When owner of automobile not liable

Same; Same; Same; Same; Owners who are solidarily liable

PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the

In the criminal action against Luna (and the driver of the

VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962 519

action for recovery of damages against Luna and petitioner.

quasidelict She alleged that she suffered injuries because of

520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

choosing and supervising Luna, because this is a matter of

Respondent neither had to wait for the termination of

1 Art 33, Civil Code.

VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962 521

no longer be able to file the separate civil action

selection and supervision of its employees and drivers, it

3 Art. 2177, Civil Code.

522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Considering that the judgment of conviction, Exh. B, had

However, his reason for immediately returning to Manila is

v. Evening News Publishing Co., L-13308, Dec. 29, 1960, citing 71

VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962 523

In fact, the Court of Appeals disbelieved the alleged

can recover9 from the former whatever sums it pays to

Padilla, Bautista Angelo. Labrador, Concepcion,

524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Notes.·The importance of determining the issue of

crime even before the institution of the criminal action

VOL. 4, FEBRUARY 28, 1962 525

ment of conviction in the latter need not be alleged in the

22686, Jan. 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 316.

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

You might also like