Mia Jazttine M.

Ramirez Business 2
Bachelor of Science in Accountancy 10:30-12:00 TTH

ANTONIO LEJANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB ET. AL,
G.R. No. 176864. Dec. 14, 2010
Petitioner: ANTONIO LEJANO
Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx,
seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the
police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court
smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the
gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre. Four years later in 1995,
the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented
star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime.
She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong"
Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging"
Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong,
as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the
public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. The Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of
the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large. The prosecution presented
Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-
legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan
Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former
girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband. Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since
he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the
testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition,
the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible
nature of her testimony. But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events
surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations.
On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment,
finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison
term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded
damages to Lauro Vizconde. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision,
modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and
increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde. The appellate court did not agree that the
accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of
conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those
who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister. On April 20,
2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the
request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver,
which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the
request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the
prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to
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a correct decision in the case. Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it
no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The
trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the
prosecution offered in evidence in the case. This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an
urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence
has resulted in the denial of his right to due process. Controlling
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb,
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who
committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s
testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
3. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce
the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence
that would prove his innocence; and
4. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister.
HELD
The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that
he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the
State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the
semen specimen taken from Carmela. When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and
no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the
idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing
did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving
the specimen in the meantime. Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for
DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone
up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken
against him and the other accused. They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but
merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the
accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of
their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing
such test. Considering the accused ‘slack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot
be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at
some future time. Suspicious Details Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November
or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers
and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers
like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of
the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very
special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one
of the rooms at the NBI offices. When Alfaro seemed unproductive for some time, however, they
teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she
knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed
interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not
happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well assume the
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Bachelor of Science in Accountancy 10:30-12:00 TTH

role of her informant. Webb’s U.S. Alibi Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi
through (a) the travel preparations; (b) the two immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d)
the second immigration check; and (e) alibi versus positive identification; and (f) a documented
alibi. To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that
(a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as
well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that
it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he
supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to
the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the
lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours. Effect of Webb’s alibi to others Webb’s
documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also
with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court
accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony
will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence
against the others must necessarily fall.

The Chiong Murders (1997)

G.R. Nos. 138874-75 July 21, 2005
The Chiong murder case is one of the most controversial rape-slay cases in the
Philippines because of the amount of publicity it gained. Rumors surrounded the case,
including one that claims that the sisters were not murdered, but are actually still alive
and living in Canada. Another strange twist in the case is the seemingly solid alibi of the
lead suspect in the case.
Mia Jazttine M. Ramirez Business 2
Bachelor of Science in Accountancy 10:30-12:00 TTH

On July 17, 1997, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong went missing. According to the
prosecution, Jacqueline and Marijoy were waiting for a ride home when they were forced
into a car at about 10 p.m. on July 16, 1997 at the Ayala Center Cebu.

According to the Chiong family, Marijoy and Jacqueline were brought to a house in
Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu City, where they were raped. Then, they were transported to
Carcar, where they were again raped. Two days later, Marijoy's body, bruised and raped,
was found at the bottom of a ravine in Carcar. Jacqueline's remains are missing to this
day.
For some reason, the prosecution identified Francisco “Paco” Larrañaga, as the
mastermind of the crime. In 2004, Larrañaga, along with six other men, were convicted
of raping and murdering the Chiong sisters.
But Larrañaga had an ironclad alibi: he was not in Cebu but in Quezon City the whole
time, attending his classes in school. The school logs actually show his attendance, which
was corroborated by his classmates and teachers. He even answered an exam.
Give Up Tomorrow (2011) is an award-winning documentary that purports to show how
the trials, from the lower court to the Supreme Court, were mishandled, and how the state
witness for the prosecution was unreliable. Despite the seeming lack of evidence,
Larrañaga and six other men were placed on Death Row.
Larrañaga holds dual citizenship as a Spanish-Filipino. He was extradited to for Spain in
2009, and has since sought help from the entire European Union for his case. Spain’s
royal family appealed to the Philippines to admit a mistrial, while the Spanish government
and the European Union lobbied for the Philippines to declare Larrañaga and his co-
accused innocent.
Some people consider Paco Larrañaga lucky that he is a citizen of the powerful and
influential European Union, but for the six of his co-accused, they remain in prison to this
day.

The Silawan Rape Case (2019)

In March 2019 in Lapu-Lapu City in the Visayas, 16-year-old Christine Lee Silawan asked
permission from her mother if she could go to church that evening. She was a member of
the church ministry that collected donations from churchgoers. Her mother allowed her to
go, thinking that she would return home after an hour. She never did.
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The next day, a body of a girl about the same age as Silawan was found in a field, the
skin and muscles on her face carved clean right down to the bone, revealing the skull,
eyeballs still intact. She also had over 30 stab wounds on different parts of her body,
some of these were defense wounds. Photos of the gruesome scene quickly went viral
on social media. People learned that bone was really white.
Police had a hard time identifying the victim because of what was done to her face.
Eventually, they identified her as Christine based on DNA results. Her mother was
inconsolable.
Nearly a month later, police arrested 42-year-old Renato Payupan Llenes, who confessed
to the crime. According to Llenes, he posed as a different person on social media and
lured Silawan to meet with him. He became obsessed with Silawan, and when he learned
that she had relationships with other boys, he became jealous and enraged, so he killed
her.
“I used a dummy Facebook account to lure Christine. We chatted frequently until we
became a couple on Facebook,” said Llenes in a report by the Inquirer. “We agreed to
meet personally for the first time on March 10 at Sacred Heart Parish in Lapu-Lapu City.
We fought on our way (to Barangay Bangkal) and that’s when I killed her.”
Llenes also detailed how he was inspired by the Momo Challenge that urged children to
commit various crimes and self-harm.
When Llenes was asked where he learned to carve skin and muscle off the bone, he
answered that he learned it on social media sites such as YouTube and Facebook. Llenes
used scissors to remove skin and muscle off Silawan’s face, revealing her skull with her
eyeballs still intact.
Prior to Llenes’ confession, police had arrested a 17-year-old male suspect. According to
Llenes, he came forward because he was haunted by his conscience and that he couldn’t
bear the fact that another person would suffer the consequences of his crime.

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL LABOR

LEO T. MAULA, Petitioner, v. XIMEX DELIVERY EXPRESS, INC., Respondent

Mia Jazttine M. Ramirez Business 2
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GR No. 207838 January 25, 2017

TOPIC: serious misconduct, totality of infractions, preventive suspension
PONENTE: Peralta
FACTS:
Petitioner Maula was hired by respondent as Operation Staff. His duties include, but are
not limited to, documentation, checker, dispatcher or airfreight coordinator.
Petitioner’s employment was uneventful until came February 18, 2009 when the
respondent’s HRD required him and some other employees to sign a form sub-titled
“Personal Data for New Hires.” When he inquired about it he was told it was nothing but
merely for the twenty-peso increase which the company owner allegedly wanted to see.
He could not help but entertain doubts on the scheme as they were hurriedly made to
sign the same. It also appeared from the form that the designated salary/wage was daily
instead of on a monthly basis.
On February 25, 2009, petitioner, together with some other concerned employees,
requested for a meeting with their manager together with the manager of the HRD. They
questioned the document and aired their side voicing their apprehensions against the
designation “For New Hires” since they were long time regular employees earning
monthly salary/wages and not daily wage earners. The respondent company’s manager,
Amador Cabrera, retorted: “Ay wala yan walang kwenta yan.”
On March 25, 2009, in the evening, a supposed problem cropped up. A misroute of cargo
was reported and the company cast the whole blame on the petitioner. It was alleged that
he erroneously wrote the label on the box – the name and destination, and allegedly was
the one who checked the cargo. The imputation is quite absurd because it was the client
who actually wrote the name and destination, whereas, it was not the petitioner but his
co-employee who checked the cargo. The following day, he received a memorandum
charging him with “negligence in performing duties.”
On April 2, 2009 at 4:00 p.m., he received another memorandum of “reassignment”
wherein he was directed to report effective April 2, 2009 to Omalza and Marzan in another
department of the company. But then, at around 4:30 p.m. of the same day, he was
instructed by the HR manager to proceed to his former office for him to train his
replacement. He went inside the warehouse and at around 6:00 p.m. he began teaching
his replacement. At 8:00 p.m., his replacement went outside. He waited for sometime and
came to know later when he verified outside that the person already went straight home.

When he went back inside, his supervisor insisted to him to continue with his former work,
but due to the “reassignment paper” he had some reservations. Sensing he might again
be framed up and maliciously accused of such as what happened on March 25, 2009, he
thus refused. Around 10:30 p.m., he went home.
The following day, an attempt to serve another memorandum was made on him. This time
he was made to explain by the HR Manager why he did not perform his former work and
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not report to his reassignment. It only validated his apprehension of a set-up. For how
could he be at two places at the same time (his former work is situated in Sucat,
Parañaque, whereas, his new assignment is in FTI, Taguig City). It bears emphasizing
that the directive for him to continue discharging his former duties was merely verbal. At
this point, petitioner lost his composure. Exasperated, he refused to receive the
memorandum and thus retorted “Seguro na-abnormal na ang utak mo” as it dawned on
him that they were out looking for every means possible to pin him down.
Nonetheless, he reported to his reassignment in FTI Taguig on April 3, 2009. There he
was served with the memorandum suspending him from work for 30 days effective April
4, 2009 for alleged “Serious misconduct and willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work.”
On May 4, 2009, he reported to the office only to be refused entry. Instead, a dismissal
letter was handed to him.
Petitioner Maula filed a complaint against respondent Ximex and its officers for illegal
dismissal and other money claims. LA and NLRC found that petitioner was illegally
dismissed. CA reversed the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Maula’s inflammatory language constitutes serious misconduct which
warrants his dismissal.

HELD: NO
Petitioner’s outburst did not constitute serious misconduct
The Court held that respondent manifestly failed to prove that petitioner’s alleged act
constitutes serious misconduct.
Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it is the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct, to be serious within the
meaning of the Labor Code, must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not
merely trivial or unimportant. Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause
for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s
duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for
the employer.
While this Court held in past decisions that accusatory and inflammatory language used
by an employee to the employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or termination,
the circumstances peculiar to this case find the previous rulings inapplicable. The
admittedly insulting and unbecoming language uttered by petitioner to the HR Manager
on April 3, 2009 should be viewed with reasonable leniency in light of the fact that it was
committed under an emotionally charged state. We agree with the labor arbiter and the
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NLRC that the on-the-spur-of-the-moment outburst of petitioner, he having reached his

breaking point, was due to what he perceived as successive retaliatory and orchestrated
actions of respondent. Indeed, there was only lapse in judgment rather than a
premeditated defiance of authority.
Further, petitioner’s purported “thug-like” demeanor is not serious in nature. Despite the
“grave embarassment” supposedly caused on Gorospe, she did not even take any
separate action independent of the company. Likewise, respondent did not elaborate
exactly how and to what extent that its “nature of business” and “industrial peace” were
damaged by petitioner’s misconduct. It was not shown in detail that he has become unfit
to continue working for the company and that the continuance of his services is patently
inimical to respondent’s interest.
Doctrine of totality of infractions not applicable
Respondent contends that aside from petitioner’s disrespectful remark against Gorospe,
he also committed several prior intentional misconduct, to wit: erroneous packaging of a
cargo of respondent’s client, abandoning work after logging in, failing to teach the
rudiments of his job to the new employees assigned to his group despite orders from his
superior, and refusing to accept the management’s order on the transfer of assignment.
The Court held that respondent cannot invoke the principle of totality of infractions
considering that petitioner’s alleged previous acts of misconduct were not established in
accordance with the requirements of procedural due process. In fact, respondent
conceded that he “was not even censured for any infraction in the past.”
It admitted that “the March 25, 2009 incident that petitioner was referring to could not be
construed as laying the predicate for his dismissal, because he was not penalized for the
misrouting incident when he had adequately and satisfactorily explained his side. Neither
was he penalized for the other memoranda previously or subsequently issued to him.”
Penalty of dismissal too harsh
This Court likewise found the penalty of dismissal too harsh. Not every case of
insubordination or willful disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty
of dismissal because the penalty to be imposed on an erring employee must be
commensurate with the gravity of his or her offense. Petitioner’s termination from
employment is also inappropriate considering that he had been with respondent company
for seven (7) years and he had no previous derogatory record. It is settled that
notwithstanding the existence of a just cause, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is
too severe a penalty, if the employee had been employed for a considerable length of
time in the service of his or her employer, and such employment is untainted by any kind
of dishonesty and irregularity.
Petitioner was not accorded procedural due process
The Court held that the Memorandum dated April 3, 2009 does not contain the following:
a detailed narration of facts and circumstances for petitioner to intelligently prepare his
explanation and defenses, the specific company rule violated and the corresponding
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Bachelor of Science in Accountancy 10:30-12:00 TTH

penalty therefor, and a directive giving him at least five (5) calendar days to submit a
written explanation.
No ample opportunity to be heard was also accorded to petitioner. Instead of devising a
just way to get the side of petitioner through testimonial and/or documentary evidence,
respondent took advantage of his “refusal” to file a written explanation. This should not
be so. An employer is duty-bound to exert earnest efforts to arrive at a settlement of its
differences with the employee. While a full adversarial hearing or conference is not
required, there must be a fair and reasonable opportunity for the employee to explain the
controversy at hand.
Finally, the termination letter issued by respondent miserably failed to satisfy the requisite
contents of a valid notice of termination. Instead of discussing the facts and
circumstances to support the violation of the alleged company rule that imposed a penalty
of dismissal, the letter merely repeats the self-serving accusations stated in Memorandum
dated April 3, 2009.
Preventive suspension imposed was not justified
The Court held that preventive suspension is justified where the employee’s continued
employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer
or of the employee’s co-workers. Without this kind of threat, preventive suspension is not
proper.
Here, it cannot be said that petitioner posed a danger on the lives of the officers or
employees of respondent or their properties. Being one of the Operation Staff, which was
a rank and file position, he could not and would not be able to sabotage the operations of
respondent. The difficulty of finding a logical and reasonable connection between his
assigned tasks and the necessity of his preventive suspension is apparent from the fact
that even respondent was not able to present concrete evidence to support its general
allegation.

G.R. No. 192955, November 09, 2015

Petitioner: EDILBERTO P. ETOM, JR.
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Respondent: AROMA LODGING HOUSE THROUGH EDUARDO G. LEM,

PROPRIETOR AND GENERAL MANAGER,

PETITIONER Edilberto P. Etom, Jr., was employed as a roomboy by respondent Aroma

Lodging House. He claimed that in Feb. 4, 2008, respondent refused to allow him to report
for work without informing him of any violation that would warrant his dismissal.
In April 15, 2008, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and asked for salary differential,
holiday pay, 13th month pay, and overtime pay. The Labor Arbiter (LA) found petitioner
to have been legally dismissed but awarded him punitive damages amounting to P10,000
for non-compliance with the termination notice requirement, salary differential computed
at P199,482.80, holiday pay amounting to P3,107.50 and 13th month pay of P7,150. The
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the ruling of the LA but deleted
the award of punitive damages
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the decision of the NLRC. The CA
relied upon a notarized affidavit executed by petitioner stating that he received wages
above the required minimum salary. It also declared that there is no factual basis to
support the grant of 13th month pay and holiday pay in favor of petitioner. Did the CA err?
Ruling: Yes.
In addition, as a rule, once the employee has asserted with particularity in his position
paper that his employer failed to pay his benefits, it becomes incumbent upon the
employer to prove payment of the employee’s money claims. In fine, the burden is on the
employer to prove payment, rather than on the employee to establish non-payment.
Both the LA and the NLRC held that respondent did not pay petitioner the required
minimum wage, holiday pay and 13th month pay. The CA, however, overturned the
factual findings of these labor tribunals. Thus, we deem it necessary to review the facts
on record.
While a notarized document is presumed to be regular, such presumption is not absolute
and may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The fact that a
document is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents.
Here, petitioner is an unlettered employee who may not have understood the full import
of his statements in the affidavit. Notably, petitioner, along with a co-worker, did not state
the specific amount of what they referred as salary above the minimum required by law.
x x x.
As found by the LA, respondent did not present substantial evidence that it paid the
required minimum wage, 13th month pay and holiday pay in favor of petitioner.

Respondent’s mere reliance on the foregoing affidavit is misplaced because the

requirement of established jurisprudence is for the employer to prove payment, and not
merely deny the employee’s accusation of non-payment on the basis of the latter’s own
declaration.
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In conclusion, we find that the CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC in awarding salary differential, 13th month pay and holiday pay in favor of
petitioner. (Del Castillo, J., SC Second Division, Edilberto P. Etom, Jr. vs. Aroma Lodging
House Through Eduardo G. Lem, Proprietor and General Manager, G.R. No. 192955,
November 09, 2015).

GR No. 207613, Jan 31, 2018

REYMAN G. MINSOLA v. NEW CITY BUILDERS
FACTS:
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Bachelor of Science in Accountancy 10:30-12:00 TTH

Issues:
The instant legal conundrum rests on the following issues, to wit: (i) whether or not Minsola was a project
employee; (ii) whether or not Minsola was constructively dismissed by New City; and (iii) whether or not
Minsola is entitled to his monetary claims consisting of his salary differential, service incentive leave pay
differential, holiday pay and 10% attorney's fees.[33]

Minsola claims that he is a regular employee as his work as a laborer/mason was necessary and desirable
to New City's construction business. Added to this, Minsola points out that he worked for New City for
more than one year, more particularly, for 13 months, thereby automatically bestowing upon him regular
employment status. Although he was initially hired as a laborer, his employment in Avida 3 continued
when he was re-hired as a mason, without the execution of another contract fixing the term of his
employment. Minsola further asserts that New City's act of forcing him to sign an employment contract
is a scheme to preclude him from acquiring permanent employment status.

In addition, Minsola prays for the payment of his salary differentials, 13th month pay differential, service
incentive leave pay differential, holiday pay and attorney's fees. He asserts that he received a meager
daily wage of Php 260.00, which was far below the prevailing minimum wage rate of Php 382.00 per day.
As such, he is entitled to receive differentials for his salary, 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay. Moreover, Minsola claims that New City failed to present proof showing that he was given his holiday
pay. Lastly, Minsola asserts that he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees, as he was forced to litigate
and defend his rights against his illegal dismissal and the unlawful withholding of his wages.

On the other hand, New City counters that Minsola was hired as a project employee to work for the
structural phase, and thereafter, the architectural phase of the Avida 3. His work as a laborer was
completely different from his tasks as a mason.[34] In this regard, his subsequent re-hiring cannot be
construed as a continuation of his former employment. Furthermore, the simple fact that his employment
has gone beyond one year does not automatically convert his employment status. Finally, New City
maintains that Minsola failed to present any proof to substantiate his claim of illegal dismissal. It did not
dismiss Minsola, nor did it prevent the latter from reporting for work.[35]

Ruling:
The Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark in the evaluation of evidence adduced
before the lower tribunals. However, this rule allows for exceptions. One of these is when the findings of
fact of the quasi-judicial agencies concerned, are conflicting or contradictory with those of the CA. When
there is a variance in the factual findings, it is incumbent upon the Court to re-examine the facts once
again.