James Ient and Maharlika Schulze vs Tullet
Prebon Philippines
G.R. No. 189158
Jan. 11, 2017
Facts: Tullet Prebon and the company of Ient and
Schulze Tradition Philippines are competitors in the
deal breaking business. At some point in time
several Tullet deal brokers resigned and went to
work with Tradition Philippines. Tullet file a
complaint against Tradition for sabotaging their
business by taking their employees.
Tullet wanted Tradition to be criminally liable under
Sections 31, 34, and 144 of the Corporation Code.
Issue: Are Ient and Schulze criminally liable?
Ruling: No, Ient and Schulze could not be criminally
liable because the Corporation Code is not a penal
statute. The penalties suggested in the code are
only administrative.
In a Resolution... dated February 17, 2009, State
Prosecutor Cresencio F. Delos Trinos, Jr.
(Prosecutor Delos Trinos), Acting City Prosecutor
of Makati City, dismissed the criminal complaints.
On the issue of conspiracy, Prosecutor Delos
Trinos found that since Villalon and Chuidian did
not commit any acts in violation of Sections 31 and
34 of the Corporation Code, the charge of
conspiracy against Schulze and Ient had no basis.
Dated April 23, 2009, then Secretary of Justice
Raul M. Gonzalez reversed and set aside
Prosecutor Delos Trinos's resolution and directed
the latter to file the information for violation of
Sections 31 and 34 in relation to Section 144 of the
Corporation Code against Villalon, Chuidian,
Harvey, Schulze, and Ient before the proper court.
Minucher V Scalzo
G.R No. 142396 Feb. 11, 2003
Facts
Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was
filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic
agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said
to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted
by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-
up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur
Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the
discharge of his official duties as being merely an
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the
United States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that, being a special agent
of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note
of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of
the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul
Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true
and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to
diplomatic immunity.
RULLING
YES.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be
cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of
the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine
government to the activities of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be
gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.
  The official exchanges of communication
between agencies of the government of the two
countries
 Certifications from officials of both the
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and
the United States Embassy
 Participation of members of the Philippine
Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation”
conducted at the residence of Minucher at the
behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic
status” of the latter but they give enough indication
that the Philippine government has given its
imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within
Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to
conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers
and, after having ascertained the target, to inform
local law enforcers who would then be expected to
make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher,
later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in
the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the
scope of his official function or duties.
FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. 125865 - January 28, 2000
JEFFREY LIANG
(HUEFENG), Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow
ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral
defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue
of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing
petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge,
the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an "office of protocol" from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter
Agreement) in the country. Based on the said
protocol communication that petitioner is immune
from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The
latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied,
the prosecution filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the
MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After
the motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal cases were filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its
face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's
determination that a certain person is covered by
immunity is only preliminary which has no binding
effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's
advice and in motu propio dismissing the two
criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the
latter's right to due process was violated. It should
be noted that due process is a right of the accused
as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed
inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the
time of the alleged utterances requires for its
resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be
presented at the proper time.1 At any rate, it has
been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity
clause does not ipso factoresult in the dropping of
the charges.2
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which
provides:
Officers and staff of the Bank including for the
purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the
following privileges and immunities:
a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts
performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity.
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the acts was done in
"official capacity." It is therefore necessary to
determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit
of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have
been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol
and it must be accorded the opportunity to present
its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be
covered by the immunity agreement because our
laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such
as defamation, in the name of official duty.3 The
imputation of theft is ultra viresand cannot be part
of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith
or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.4 It appears that even the government's
chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not
support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the
DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner
is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction
of the receiving state except in the case of an
action relating to any professional or commercial
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving state outside his official functions.5 As
already mentioned above, the commission of a
crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no
preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say
that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right
in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one
at bar.6 Being purely a statutory right, preliminary
investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law.7 The rule on the criminal procedure
is clear that no preliminary investigation is required
in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.8Besides the absence of preliminary
investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction
nor does it impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective.9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Liang V People
G.R No. 125865 March 26, 2001
FACTS:
· 2 criminal informations for for grave oral
defamation were filed against Jeffrey Liang, a
Chinese national who was employed as an
Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB),
by Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of
ADB
· MTC: dismissed the complaint stating that Liang
enjoyed immunity from legal processes
· RTC: Upon a petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed by the People of the Philippines
annulled and set aside the order of MTC
· SC: Denied petition for review on the ground that
the immunity granted to officers and staff of the
ADB is not absolute and is limited on the official
capacity and immunity CANNOT cover the
commission of a crime such as slander or oral
defamation in the name of official duty
· A motion of reconsideration is filed
ISSUE: W/N the crime of oral deflamation enjoys
immunity
HELD: NO
· slander, in general, cannot be considered as an
act performed in an official capacity
· issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances
constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court
to determine
PUNO, J., concurring:
· the nature and degree of immunities vary
depending on who the recipient is
· Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all
acts, whether private or official, and hence he
cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for
any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic
immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of
international organizations enjoy "functional"
immunities, that is, only those necessary for the
exercise of the functions of the organization and the
fulfillment of its purposes.
o officials and employees of the ADB are subject to
the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private
acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of
immunity
People vs Tulin
G.R. No. 111709
August 30, 2001
Facts: On March 2, 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo
vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation, was seized by a group of seven
heavily-armed men led by Emilio Changco, with
Cecilio Tulin, Loyola, and Infante. After the seizure
of the vessel and the employment of violence and
intimidation to the crew, they directed the vessel to
go to Singapore, were the cargo was disposed of
and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April
10, 1991, in violation of PD no. 532(Piracy in
Philippine Waters).
Issue: WON the Philippine courts have jurisdiction
over the crime committed
Held: The Court ruled that the crime committed can
be tried in the Philippine courts. PD No. 532
provides that the seizure and attack of vessels and
its cargo should be committed within the Philippine
Waters, however, the disposition of the vessel and
its cargo, which is still deemed part of the crime
need not to happen inside the Philippine waters.
According to the facts of this case, the actual
seizure and attack happened within the Philippine
Territory and this is sufficient enough for the
court to have jurisdiction over the said crime,
despite the disposal of its cargo on a different
territory.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL
LAW
1. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION Art. 3,Sec 1, Consti
White Light Corp V City of Manila
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law
Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance prohibiting short
time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses,
pension houses and similar establishments in the
City of Manila”. White Light Corp is an operator of
mini hotels and motels who sought to have the
Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance
infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The
RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the
Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City
maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid
exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City
is empowered to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports. The CA
ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null
and void as it indeed infringes upon individual
liberty. It also violates the due process clause
which serves as a guaranty for protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance
invades private rights. Note that not all who goes
into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really
there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists
who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up.
Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the
said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a
limited group of people. The SC reiterates that
individual rights may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.
Garcia V Drilon
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a
petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband,
Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic
violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody
of her children and of financial support and also a
victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to
faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The
trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the
same when petitioner failed to comment on why the
TPO should not be modified. After the given time
allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would be an
“axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for
being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the
TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to
raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings
before the trial court and the petition for prohibition
to annul protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the
petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to
conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not
finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does
violence to the policy of the state to protect the
family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262
as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an
undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy.
Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC
has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family
Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it
may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the
trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled
that all that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; not
limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally
to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is
based on a valid classification and did not violate
the equal protection clause by favoring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO
exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right
to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator
is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of
the State to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution cannot be
sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled
that the court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is
not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to
Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is
the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of
BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty
executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for
lack of merit.
 2. Freedom of Expression. Art. 3 Sec. ,
Consti
US vs Bustos
Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to
the Executive Secretary regarding charges against
Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of
Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included
bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all
the charges were proved. But, the judge still found
him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the
victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary
justice, instigated the charges against him for
personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor
General but it wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents
by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty
and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire
the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court
denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants
appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement
was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond
reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous
statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to
the introduction in evidence by the accused of
the affidavits upon which the petition forming the
basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire
the objection in advertently interposed by their
counsel to the admission in evidence of the
expediente administrativo out of which the
accusation in this case arose.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are
guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace in Pampanga.
Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.
Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country
before 1900. There were small efforts at reform
made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos
Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed
freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself
laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine
Liberty when he wrote, “that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of
the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were
references to “public opinion should be the constant
source of liberty and democracy.” It also said “the
guaranties of a free speech and a free press include
the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced
is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a
judge the same as any other public officer, public
opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the
judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.”
“It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the
State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of
any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts
to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into
and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly
means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling and
petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for
the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public
opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result
of this. Privilged communications may in some
instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public
policy is the “unfettered administration of justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified
privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of
malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good
faith against a public official’s conduct having a duty
in the matter. Even if the statements were found to
be false, the protection of privilege may cover the
individual given that it was in good faith. There must
be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-
matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contained
criminatory matter which without this privilege would
be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from
defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies
on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the
defendant the existence of malice as the true motive
of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of
probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the
information, if said of a private person, might well be
considered libelous per se. The charges might also
under certain conceivable conditions convict one of
a libel of a government official. As a general rule
words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace
dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct
touching him in his office are actionable. But as
suggested in the beginning we do not have present
a simple case of direct and vicious accusations
published in the press, but of charges predicated
on affidavits made to the proper official and thus
qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been
proved by the prosecution. Further, although
the charges are probably not true as to the justice of
the peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action.
Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance
or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The
ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure
the removal from office of a person thought to be
venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse
the privilege. These respectable citizens did not
eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances
which not only seemed to them of a grave character,
but which were sufficient in an investigation by a
judge of first instance to convince him of their
seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the
petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct
of the justice of the peace was proper.
Guingguing v People
Facts:
CA affirmed with modification the decision rendered
by the RTC finding Guingguing and Lim guilty of the
crime of libel. This is a petition filed by
Guingguing alone. This case originated from
the case filed by Torralba. . Complainant was a
broadcast journalist who handled two programs
for radio stations DYLA and DYFX. Lim
caused the publicat ion of r ecor ds of
cr im inal cases f iled ag ainst complainant
as well as photographs of the latter being
arrested. These were published by means of a
one-page advertisement paid for by Lim in the
Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited and
published by petitioner. The lower court concluded
that the publication complained of was indeed
libelous. The CA modified the penalty imposed but
it affirmed the RTCs finding of guilt.
Issue:
Whether or not the publication subject matter of the
instant case is indeed libelous.
Held:
Yes. Criminal libel is defined as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead. Two major
propositions in the prosecution of defamatory
remarks were established: first, that libel
against a public person is a greater offense
than one directed against an ordinary man, and
second, that it is immaterial that the libel be true.
This Court has accepted the proposition that the
actual malice standard governs the prosecution of
criminal libel cases concerning public figures. As it
has been established that complainant was a
public figure, it was incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove actual malice on the part of
Lim and petitioner when the latter published the
article subject matter of the complaint. It should
thus proceed that if the statements made against
the public figure are essentially true, then no
conviction for libel can be had. From the
foregoing, it is clear that there was nothing
untruthful about what was published in the
Sunday Post. The criminal cases listed in the
advertisement as pending against the complainant
had indeed been filed. To this end, the publication
of the subject advertisement by petitioner and
Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have
been done with actual malice. Aside from the
fact that the information contained in said
publication was true, the intention to let the public
know the character of their radio commentator can
at best be subsumed under the mantle of having
been done with good motives and for justifiable
ends.
Wherefore, petition is GRANTED. Decision of
the RTC and CA is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.
 3. Freedom of Religion. Art. 3, Sec 5, Consti
Estrada vs Escritor
FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in
the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more
than twenty five yearsand had a son with him as
well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she
entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said
RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement
is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible
Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple
to legalize their union.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize
respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING: No. The State could not penalize
respondent for she is exercising her right tofreedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically
articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s
interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely
abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the
case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete
interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the
State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic
preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and
secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution
adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious
exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is
not infringed any more than necessary to achieve
the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right
to freedom of religion.
4. No excessive fines, nor cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment. Art. 3, Sec. 19,
CONSTI
People vs Echegaray
People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leo
Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant Appellant
Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is
acting collectively & anonymously.
Facts:
 The SC rendered a decision in the instant
case affirming the conviction of the accused-
appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old
daughter.
 The crime having been committed
sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as
the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect,
accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the
supreme penalty of death.
 The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister
motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated
the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape
against the accused. The motion was dismissed as
the SC found no substantial arguments on the said
motion that can disturb the verdict.
 On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant
discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R.
Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death
Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance
Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
 A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-
appellant aiming for the reversal of the death
sentence.
 In sum, the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1)
mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial
proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence
of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3)
purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659)
is unconstitutional
Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration &
supplemental motion for reconsideration are
denied for lack of merit.
Ratio:
 Accused-appellant first claims that the death
penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state,
however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman,
categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading
and inaccurate.
 The issue in Furman was not so
much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death
penalty was imposed on the accused by the
sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in
Furman centered not so much on the nature of the
death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the
discrimination against the black accused who is
meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is
given the unconditional discretion to determine
whether or not to impose the death penalty.
 Furman, thus, did not outlaw the
death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per
se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all
discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it
did so because the discretion which these statutes
vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was
uncontrolled and without any parameters,
guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not
altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal
biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the
part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
 accused-appellant asseverates that the
death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment for the crime of rape mainly because
the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking
of life.
 In support of his contention,
accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is
without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but
in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the
person and to the public, it does not compare with
murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of
human life. Although it may be accompanied by
another crime, rape by definition does not include
the death of or even the serious injury to another
person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly
so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is
not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction
that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its
severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive
penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take
human life"
 The U.S. Supreme Court based its
foregoing ruling on two grounds:
 first, that the public has
manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a
proper punishment for the crime of rape through the
willful omission by the state legislatures to include
rape in their new death penalty statutes in the
aftermath of Furman;
 Phil. SC: Anent the
first ground, we fail to see how this could have
any bearing on the Philippine experience and in
the context of our own culture.
 second, that rape, while
concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a
woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and
psychological balance, does not involve the taking
of life.
 Phil. SC: we
disagree with the court's predicate that the
gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the
death penalty or not, is the attendance of the
circumstance of death on the part of the
victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling
of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".
 The Revised Penal Code, as it was
originally promulgated, provided for the death
penalty in specified crimes under specific
circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital
punishment had entered our legal system through
the old Penal Code, which was a modified version
of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
 Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the
penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence
with the enemy during times of war, qualified
piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping,
rape with homicide or with the use of deadly
weapon or by two or more persons resulting in
insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting
in death.
 The opposition to the death penalty
uniformly took the form of a constitutional question
of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment
 Harden v. Director of Prison- "The
penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436,
the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or
a lingering death, but the punishment of death is
not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life.
 People v. Limaco- "x x x there are
quite a number of people who honestly believe that
the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or
unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that
penalty remains in the statute books, and as long
as our criminal law provides for its imposition in
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions,"
 Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution simply states that congress, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may
re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said
provision imposes a requirement that for a death
penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in
the form of a higher incidence of crime should first
be perceived and statistically proven following the
suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the
said provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
society
 what R.A. No. 7659 states is that
"the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order
and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes,
finds compelling reasons to impose the death
penalty for said crimes.
 Heinous crime is an act or series of
acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in
which the same was committed or by the reason of
its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard
and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or
public morals. It is an offense whose essential and
inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant
and outrageous to a civilized society and hence,
shock the moral self of a people.
 The right of a person is not only to live but
to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of
society is obligated to respect his or her individual
personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or
her own physical body, and the value he or she
puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological,
material and social preferences and needs.
 Seen in this light, the capital crimes
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the
victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving minors or
resulting in the death of the victim in the case of
other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention
where the victim is detained for more than three
days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on
the victim or threats to kill him were made or the
victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or
intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very nature.
 SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous
crimes because:
 the perpetrators thereof have
committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so
deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with
severely destructive effects on the national efforts
to lift the masses from abject poverty through
organized governmental strategies based on a
disciplined and honest citizenry
 they have so caused irreparable and
substantial injury to both their victim and the society
and a repetition of their acts would pose actual
threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government, they must be permanently prevented
from doing so
 People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible
violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It
does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply
wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and
moral integrity to which every person has a right. It
causes grave damage that can mark the victim for
life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an
outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not
only the victim but the society itself.
5. Non-imprisonment for debt or non-
payment of poll tax. Art. 3, Sec 19,
CONSTI
6. Bill of Attainder. Art. 3, Sec 22, CONSTI
People vs Ferrer
FACTS:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation
of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against the respondent Feliciano Co, as he became
an officer of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization
aimed to overthrow the government.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-
Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 29170, another criminal
complaint was filed with before Nilo Tayag and fiver
others with subversion, as they were tagged as
officers of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a
subversive organization instigating and inciting the
people to organize and unite for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Tayag also moved to quash the complaint on the
grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is
vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not
expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him
the equal protection of the laws.
ISSUE: Whether RA 1700 otherwise known as
Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
RULING: No, the Supreme Court said it is only
when a statute applies either to named individuals
or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without
a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
In this case, when the act is viewed in its actual
operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the member
thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does
is simple to declare the party to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
the purposes of the prohibition.
The term "Communist Part of the Philippines"
issues solely for definitional purposes. In fact the
act applies not only to the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also to "any organisation having the
same purpose and their successors." Its focus is
not on individuals but on conduct.
7. Ex-post facto laws. Art. 3, Sec 22,
CONSTI
US vs Diaz Conde
Facts:
On December 30, 1915, complainants Bartolome
Oliveros and Engracia Lianco entered into a
contract with the defendants concerning a debt of
P300. Oliveros and co. were obligated to pay five
percent interest per month within the first ten days
of every month. On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz
Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde were charged
with violating the Usury Law in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. They were found
guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of P120 and in case
of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with the provisions of law. They took it
to SC to plead.
Issues:
WoN the Usury Law has a retroactive effect in this
case
WoN the law impaired the contract
Held and Ratio:
No. The Usury Law, a penal law, cannot become
retroactive unless it is favorable to the person
accused. (Art. 21 and 22 Penal Code)
Yes. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot
be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation.
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
2. Spanish text prevails over the English text
People V Abilong
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-appellant.
Carlos Perfecto for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr.,
and Solicitor Manuel Tomacruz for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Manila with evasion of service of
sentence under the following information:
That on or about the 17th day of
September, 1947, in the City of Manila,
 Philippines, the said accused, being then a
convict sentenced and ordered to serve two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of destierro during which he should not
enter any place within the radius of 100
kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue
of final judgment rendered by the municipal
court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No.
B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
evade the service of said sentence by going
beyond the limits made against him and
commit vagrancy.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, with the
accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.
He is appealing from that decision with the
following assignment of error:
1. The lower court erred in imposing a
penalty on the accused under article 157 of
the Revised Penal Code, which does not
cover evasion of service of "destierro."
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person
like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is
not criminally liable under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the
said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers
only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal
institution and completely deprived of their liberty.
He bases his contention on the word
"imprisonment" used in the English text of said
article which in part reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any convict who shall evade service of
his sentence by escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment.
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the
original text of the Revised Penal Code been in the
English language, then the theory of the appellant
could be uphold. However, it is the Spanish text
that is controlling in case of doubt. The Spanish text
of article 157 in part reads thus:
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia.
— Sera castigado con prision correccional
en sus grados medio y maximo el
sentenciado que quebrantare su condena,
fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo
privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; . .
..
We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch
as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved
and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs
(People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is clear
that the word "imprisonment" used in the English
text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the
phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the
Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the
Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not
constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of
liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the
present case, the appellant by his sentence
of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the
City of Manila. This view has been adopted in the
case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26,
1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court held, as
quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is
clear that a person under sentence of destierro is
suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from
the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the
prohibited area." Said ruling in that case was
ratified by this Court, though, indirectly in the case
of People vs. Jose de Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to
No. 9, p. 370)1, where it was held that one evades
the service of his sentence of destierro when he
enters the prohibited area specified in the judgment
of conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides
that its provisions do not apply to those who shall
have escaped from confinement or evaded
sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is
guilty of evasion of service of sentence under
article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish
text), in that during the period of his sentence
of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he
was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he
entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and
Tuason, JJ., concur.
3. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION WHEN
FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED
Hernan vs Sandiganbayan
OPHELIA HERNAN v. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 217874 December 5, 2017
TOPIC: Reopening of case, malversation of public
funds
PONENTE: Peralta
FACTS:
Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal
Clerk at DOTC-CAR in Baguio City. By virtue of his
position, she was designated as cashier,
disbursement and collection officer.
As such, petitioner received cash and other
collections from customers and clients for the
payment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and
special message fees. The collections she received
were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio
City Branch.
On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of
accounts handled by Hernan was conducted. It was
found out that the deposit slips dated September 19,
1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing
the amounts of P11,300.00 and P81,348.20,
respectively, did not bear a stamp receipt by LBP nor
was it machine validated. Petitioner was then
informed that the two aforesaid remittances were not
acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found
that petitioner duly accounted for the P81,348.20
remittance but not for the P11,300.00.
Accused-petitioner was charged with malversation
of public funds with the amount of P11,300.00. RTC
found the accused guilty. Petitioner appealed to CA
which affirmed her conviction but modified the
penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set
aside its decision on the finding that it has
no appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbayan
which affirmed RTC’s decision but modified the
penalty imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution
dated August 31, 2010. On June 26, 2013, the
Resolution denying petitioner’s MR became final and
executory.
On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to
Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with
Prayer to Stay the Execution. Sandiganbayan
denied the same and directed the execution of the
judgment of conviction.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of
Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of
Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which
was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of malversation of public funds.
2. Whether or not the case may be reopened for further
reception of evidence.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES.
The Court affirmed the finding of guilt of
accused for the crime of malversation of public
funds.
The elements of malversation of public funds under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1)
that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had
the custody or control of funds or property by reason
of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or
property were public funds or property for which he
was accountable; and (4) that he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take them. This article establishes a
presumption that when a public officer fails to have
duly forthcoming any public funds with which he
is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he has
put such missing funds to personal uses.
As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s defense that she,
together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to
the LBP and handed the subject P11,300.00 deposit
to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as
to where the money went failed to overcome the
presumption of law.
 For one, Paraiso was never presented to
corroborate her version. For another, when
questioned about the subject deposit, not only did
petitioner fail to make the same readily available,
she also could not satisfactorily explain its
whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of malversation,
all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof
that the accountable officer had received public
funds, that she did not have them in her possession
when demand therefor was made, and that she
could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do
so. Thus, even if it is assumed that it was
somebody else who misappropriated the said
amount, petitioner may still be held liable for
malversation.
SECOND ISSUE: NO, but the instant case was
nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify the penalty
imposed in view of the enactment of an amendatory
law favorable to the accused.
The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling that
the absence of the first requisite that the reopening
must be before the finality of a judgment of
conviction already cripples the Motion to Reopen the
Case. The records of the case clearly reveal that the
August 31, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration had
already become final and executory and, in fact, was
already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on
June 26, 2013.
Requirements for reopening of the case (Section
24, Rule 119 of Rules of Court)
1. The reopening must be before the finality of a
judgment of conviction;
2. The order is issued by the judge on his own initiative
or upon motion;
3. The order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
4. The order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice;
and
5. The presentation of additional and/or further
evidence should be terminated within thirty days
from the issuance of the order
However, the Court held that it is still necessary
to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of
Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the
Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of
evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in
order to modify the penalty imposed by said
court.
The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made
by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
of the land. When, however, circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit
en banc and give due regard to such
exceptional circumstancewarranting the relaxation
of the doctrine of immutability.
To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10951 which accordingly reduced the
penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an
example of such exceptional circumstance.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, we
have here a novel situation wherein the judgment
convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has
already become final and executory and yet the
penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue
of the passage of said law. Because of this, not only
must petitioner’s sentence be modified respecting
the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws,
the sentencing being favorable to the accused, she
may even apply for probation, as long as she does
not possess any ground for disqualification, in view
of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707.
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that
petitioner may suffer as well as a possible multiplicity
of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper
to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of
Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the
Sandiganbayan, which imposed the penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one
(21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead,
since the amount involved herein is P11,300.00,
which does not exceed P40,000.00, the new penalty
that should be imposed is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, which has a prison
term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1)
day, to six (6) years.
The Court also held that when exceptional
circumstances exist, such as the passage of the
instant amendatory law imposing penalties more
lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court
shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a
final and immutable judgment, the objective of
which is to correct not so much the findings of
guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
4.PRESCRIBED BUT UNDESERVED
PENALTIES. ART. 5, RPC
People V Formigones
PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES
87 Phil. 658
Facts: In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo was
living on his farm in Camarines Sur w/ his wife, Julia
Agricola & their 5 children. From there they
transferred in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias
Formigones in the same municipality to find
employment as harvesters of palay. After a month,
Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house
when Abelardo, w/o previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house
& stabbed his wife Julia, in the back, the blade
penetrating the right lung & causing a severe
hemorrhage resulting in her death. Abelardo then
took his dead wife & laid her on the floor of the living
room & then lay down beside her. In this position, he
was found by the people who came in response to
the shouts made by his eldest daughter, Irene
Formigones.
The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because
according to his statement, he used to have quarrels
with his wife for reason that he often saw her in the
company of his brother, Zacarias; that he suspected
the 2 were maintaining illicit relations because he
noticed that his wife had become indifferent to him.
During the preliminary investigation, the accused
pleaded guilty. At the case in the CFI, he also
pleaded guilty but didn’t testify. His counsel
presented the testimony of 2 guards of the provincial
jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that
his conduct was rather strange & that he behaved
like an insane person, at times he would remain
silent, walk around stark naked, refuse to take a bath
& wash his clothes etc… The appeal is based merely
on the theory that the appellant is an IMBECILE &
therefore exempt from criminal liability under RPC
A12.
Issue: WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the time of
the commission of the crime, thus exempted from
criminal liability
Held: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr.
Francisco Gomes, although he was feebleminded,
he is not an imbecile as he could still distinguish
between right & wrong & even feel remorse. In order
that a person could be regarded as an imbecile w/in
the meaning of RPC A12 so as to be exempt from
criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment & freedom of will at the time
of committing the crime. (Note that definition is same
as insanity)
As to the strange behavior of the accused during his
confinement, assuming it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his
being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having
killed his wife. A man who could feel the pangs of
jealousy & take violent measures to the extent of
killing his wife who he suspected of being unfaithful
to him, in the belief that in doing so, he was
vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as
an imbecile. WON the suspicions were justified, is of
little or no importance. The fact is that he believed
her faithless. Furthermore, in his written statement,
he readily admitted that he killed his wife, & at the
trial he made no effort to deny of repudiate said
written statements, thus saving the government all
the trouble & expense of catching him & securing his
conviction.
But 2 mitigating circumstances are present: passion
or obfuscation (having killed his wife in a jealous
rage) & feeblemindedness.
Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found guilty of
parricide & the lower court’s judgment is hereby
affirmed w/ the modification that appellant will be
credited with half of any preventive imprisonment he
has undergone (because of the 2 mitigating
circumstances)
5 Suppletory application of RPC to Special
Penal Laws
Ladonga vs People
FACTS:
Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and spouse,
conspiring and knowing fully well that they did not
have sufficient funds deposited with the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), drew and issue
UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in
the amount of P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo
Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter
that they did not have sufficient funds deposited
with the bank to cover up the amount of the check,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the
said check to Alfredo by way of rediscounting of the
aforementioned checks; however, upon
presentation of the check to the drawee bank for
encashment, the same was dishonored for the
reason that the account of the accused had already
been closed, to the damage and prejudice of
Alfredo.
The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the
Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for
probation which was granted. On the other hand,
petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally
liable for conspiring with her husband as the
principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg.
22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a
signatory of the checks and had no participation in
the issuance thereof.
ISSUE:
a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in violations of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by invoking art. 10 of
RPC?
b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the CA in
affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner as
conspirator applying the suppletory character of the
RPC to special laws like BP 22 is applicable?
RULING:
A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, especially with the addition of the second
sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special
laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide
any prohibition regarding the applicability in a
suppletory character of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART.
10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first
provides that offenses which in the future are made
punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes
the RPC supplementary to such laws
B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the
suppletory application of the provisions of the
RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision
in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC
which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable,
may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent
case of Yu vs. People the Court applied suppletorily
the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under
Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of
conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under
Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is
shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary,
since all the conspirators are principals. BUT In the
present case, the prosecution failed to prove that
petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of
the alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must be
established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Thus, Petitioner Evangeline
Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her
under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No
pronouncement as to costs.
People vs Simon
FACTS:
Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation
of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags
of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags,
weighing a total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to
laboratory examination, were found positive for
marijuana.
Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming
that on the day of question, he was picked up by
the police at their house while watching TV. He was
told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight
from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When
they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to
sign some papers and, when he refused, he was
boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt.
Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his
signature and fingerprints on the documents
presented to him. He denied knowledge of the
marked money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana
leaves, and insisted that the marked money came
from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason
why he vomited blood was because of the blows he
suffered at the hands of Pejoro.
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of
Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that
she treated appellant for three days due to
abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that
the cause for this ailment was appellant’s peptic
ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious
external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.
Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand
pesos and to pay the costs.
Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement
ISSUE:
Was the conviction of Simon correct?
RULING:
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs,
the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. To sell means to give, whether for
money or any other material consideration. It must,
therefore, be established beyond doubt that
appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags
of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted
as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-
peso bills.
After careful review, the Court held that there were
2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold and there
were 2 other tea bags of marijuana confiscated.
Thus, Simon should be charged of selling for the 2
tea bags of marijuana only.
However, there is an overlapping error in the
provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by
reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the
maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is
less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of
the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750
grams or more. The same error has been
committed with respect to the other prohibited and
regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To
harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to
give effect to the whole law, the court hereby hold
that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity
of the drugs involved is less than the quantities
stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and
not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with
the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts
should be construed in a manner favorable to the
accused.
The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the
Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence
with their technical signification and effects. In fact,
for purposes of determining the maximum of said
sentence, the court have applied the provisions of
the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive
at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to
impose the same in the medium period. Such
offense, although provided for in a special law, is
now in effect punished by and under the Revised
Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the
minimum, the court applied first part of the
aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in imposing
a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Codefor the offense.”
Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be
begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence
within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next
lower to prision correccional which is the maximum
range have fixed through the application of Articles
61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with
fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum
sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6
months and 1 day of prision correccional.
B. Elements of Criminal Liability
1. Physical Element
a. Act
b. Omission
People vs Sylvestre and AtienzaFacts:
 Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo
Joaquin by his second marriage
 Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin
Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong,
Bulacan
 On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the
justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a
sworn complaint for adultery
 After being arrested and released on bail,
the two defendants begged the municipal president
of Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge
him to withdraw the complaint
 The two accused bound themselves to
discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live
again in Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)
 On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a
motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the
justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case
 The accused left Masocol and wen to live in
Santo Niño, in Paombong
 About November 20, 1930: Romana met
her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz,
in Santo Niño and followed him home to Masocol
(under the pretext of asking him for some nipa
leaves)
 Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit
with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of
Nicolas
 On the night of November 25, 1930, while
Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were
gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and
Antonia to take their furniture out of the house
because he was going to set fire to it
 He said that that was the only way
he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol
who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery
against him and Romana
 Martin was armed with a pistol so no
one dared say anything to him
 Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but
were too late
 The fire destroyed about 48 houses
 Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving
the house on fire
 The Court of First Instance of Bulacan
convicted Martin and Romana of arson
 Martin was convicted as principal by
direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day
of cadena temporal)
 Romana was convicted as
accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)
 The court-appointed counsel for the
accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the
CFI decision with regard to Martin, but assigns
errors with reference to Romana:
 The lower court erred in convicting
Romana as acoomplice
 The court erred in not acquitting
Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or at
least, of reasonable doubt
Issue:
 Whether or not Romana can be convicted
as accomplice
Holding:
 No.
Ratio:
 Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection
with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who
does not take a direct part in the commission of the
act, who does not force or induce other to commit
it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by
another act without which it would not have been
accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of
the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
 In the case of Romana: there is no evidence
of moral or material cooperation and none of an
agreement to commit the crime in question. Her
mere presence and silence while they are
simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation,
for it does not appear that they encouraged or
nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson;
and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a
subsequent act it does not make her liable as an
accomplice.
 Mere passive presence at the scene of
another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or
conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation
required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity
in the commission of the crime witnessed passively,
or with regard to which one has kept silent
Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin
Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana
Silvestre, who is acquitted.
People vs Talingdan
People V Talingdan
84 SCRA 19
Facts: Bernardo Bagabag was murdered in his own house
in Abra on June 24, 1967 by Talingdan, Tobias, Berras,
Bides and Teresa Domogma, his alleged wife. The
murder was witnessed by Corazon, the eldest child of
Bernardo and Teresa whom she testified to the crime
committed by the accused-appellants. Bernardo and Teresa
have had several conflicts in their married life and the latter
was suspected of having an illicit affair with
Talingdan, a policeman who lives nearby. After
Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation
with the accused. These subsequent acts of her constitute
concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal
in the crime which makes her liable as an accessory
to the crime
Issue: Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to
the crime committed of murder to his husband Bernardo
Bagabag
Ruling: The court affirmed the decision held by the
trial court that the accused are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and the wife of the
victim Teresa Domogma is guilty as accessory to the
same murder.
Not showing the actual cooperation on her part with her co-
appellants in their culpable acts does not mean she is entirely
free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally
convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to
the offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside the
room when her husband was shot. As she came out
after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she
was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When
Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras
and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin
her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone,
she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I
will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the
peace officers who repaired to their house to
investigate what happened, instead of helping them
with the information given to her by Corazon, she
claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other
words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her
husband, she was more or less passive in
her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy,
known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was
killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These
subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or
assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime"
which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact
under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code.
2 Mental Element (Mens Rea)
a. Deliberate Intent (Dolo)
Manuel vs People
Laws Applicable: Art. 3 par 2 RPC, Art. 349 RPC,
Art. 41 FC
FACTS:
July 28, 1975: Eduardo married Rubylus Gaña
before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati
o Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and
thereafter imprisoned
o Eduardo only visited 3 times and never saw her
again
January 1996: Eduardo met Tina B. Gandalera,
21 year old computer secretarial student, in
Dagupan City while she looked for a friend during
her 2 days stay
Later, Eduardo visited Tina, they went to a
motel together and he proposed marriage and
introduced her to his parents who assures that he is
single
April 22, 1996: Eduardo married Tina before
Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of
the RTC of Baguio City and they were able to build
a home after
1999: Eduardo only visited their home twice or
thrice a year and whenever jobless Tina would ask
for money, he would slap her
January 2001: Eduardo packed his things and
left and stopped giving financial support
August 2001: Tina through inquiries from the
National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila and was
embarrassed and humiliated to learn that Eduardo
was previously married
Eduardo claimed that he did NOT know that he
had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his
first marriage before marrying Tina
RTC: Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from 6 years and 10 months, as
minimum, to 10 years, as maximum and
P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs
of suit
o Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been
dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year
absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from
liability for bigamy
Eduardo appealed to the CA contending that he
did so in good faith and without any malicious intent
whereas under Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally
liable for a felony
CA: affirming the decision of the RTC stating
that Article 41 of the Family Code should apply that
there should have been a judicial declaration of
Gaña’s presumptive death as the absent spouse
and modified minimum to 2 years and four months
ISSUE: W/N Eduardo is guilty of Bigamy, a felony
by dolo (deceit).
HELD: YES. petition is DENIED. CA affirmed
 Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
o The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to
preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.
o Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made
the dissolution of marriage dependent not only
upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain
objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive
death of the absent spouse
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the
prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
o (a) he/she has been legally married; and
o (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without
the former marriage having been lawfully
dissolved.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is deceit when the act is
performed with deliberate intent
o Malice -a mental state or condition prompting the
doing of an overt act WITHOUT legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury
o When the act or omission defined by law as a
felony is proved to have been done or committed
by the accused, the law presumes it to have been
intentional
o For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo,
there must be a confluence of both an evil act and
an evil intent.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
GR: mistake of fact or good faith of the accused
is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by
dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal
intent.
EX: ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law.
o Ignorantia legis neminem excusat
burden of the petitioner to prove his defense
that when he married he was of the well-grounded
belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had
not heard from her for more than 20 years since
1975
o failed to discharge his burden since no judicial
declaration as proof
Article 41 of the Family Code amended the
rules on presumptive death on Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code which states that before the
spouse present may contract a subsequent
marriage, he or she must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive
death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to
the effect of the reappearance of the absentee
spouse.
moral damages may be awarded under Article
2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code for being against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social
institution, good morals and the interest and
general welfare of society
i. Elements of Dolo
ii. GENERAL AND SPECIFIC
INTENT
People vs Puno
Facts:
 January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm:
the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then
away in Davao purportedly on account of local
election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's
bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC
 He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver
Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so
Isabelo will temporarily take his place
 When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go
home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her
husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving
 After the car turned right on a corner of
Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused
Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
 Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as
Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from
her
 Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag
which she handed to the accused
 But the accused said that they wanted
P100,000 more
 The car sped off north towards the North
superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento
to issue a check for P100,000
 Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two
P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
 Isabelo then turned the car around towards
Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga
 According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped
out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish
vendor's van, her dress had blood because
according to her, she fell down on the ground and
was injured when she jumped out of the car
 The defense does not dispute the above
narrative of the complainant except that according
to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion
and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the
car
 He said he even slowed the car
down as he drove away, until he saw that his
employer had gotten a ride
 He claimed that she fell down when
she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway
Issue:
1. Whether or not the accused can be
convicted of kidnapping for ransom as
charged
2. Whether or not the said robbery can
be classified as "highway robbery" under
PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
1. No.
2. No.
Ratio:
1. There is no showing whatsoever
that appellants had any motive, nurtured
prior to or at the time they committed the
wrongful acts against complainant, other
than the extortion of money from
her under the compulsion of threats or
intimidation.
 For this crime to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactors was to deprive the offended
party of her liberty
 In the case, the restraint of her
freedom of action was merely an incident in
the commission of another offense primarily
intended by the offenders
 This does not constitute kidnapping
or serious illegal detention
2. Jurisprudence reveals that during
the early part of the American occupation of
our country, roving bands were organized
for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate
to cope with such moving bands of outlaws,
the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the
origin of the law on highway robbery)
 PD No. 532 punishes as highway
robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by
outlaws indiscriminately against any person
or persons on Philippine highways and not
acts of robbery committed against only a
predetermined or particular victim
 The mere fact that the robbery
was committed inside a car which was
casually operating on a highway does
not make PD No 532 applicable to the
case
 This is not justified by the
accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery
(indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of
prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento
P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral
damages.)
People vs Delim
Facts
 January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm:
the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then
away in Davao purportedly on account of local
election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's
bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC
 He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver
Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so
Isabelo will temporarily take his place
 When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go
home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her
husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving
 After the car turned right on a corner of
Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused
Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
 Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as
Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from
her
 Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag
which she handed to the accused
 But the accused said that they wanted
P100,000 more
 The car sped off north towards the North
superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento
to issue a check for P100,000
 Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two
P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
 Isabelo then turned the car around towards
Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga
 According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped
out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish
vendor's van, her dress had blood because
according to her, she fell down on the ground and
was injured when she jumped out of the car
 The defense does not dispute the above
narrative of the complainant except that according
to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion
and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the
car
 He said he even slowed the car
down as he drove away, until he saw that his
employer had gotten a ride
 He claimed that she fell down when
she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway
Issue:
1. Whether or not the accused can be
convicted of kidnapping for ransom as
charged
2. Whether or not the said robbery can
be classified as "highway robbery" under
PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
1. No.
2. No.
Ratio:
1. There is no showing whatsoever
that appellants had any motive, nurtured
prior to or at the time they committed the
wrongful acts against complainant, other
than the extortion of money from
her under the compulsion of threats or
intimidation.
 For this crime to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactors was to deprive the offended
party of her liberty
 In the case, the restraint of her
freedom of action was merely an incident in
the commission of another offense primarily
intended by the offenders
 This does not constitute kidnapping
or serious illegal detention
2. Jurisprudence reveals that during
the early part of the American occupation of
our country, roving bands were organized
for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate
to cope with such moving bands of outlaws,
the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the
origin of the law on highway robbery)
 PD No. 532 punishes as highway
robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by
outlaws indiscriminately against any person
or persons on Philippine highways and not
acts of robbery committed against only a
predetermined or particular victim
 The mere fact that the robbery
was committed inside a car which was
casually operating on a highway does
not make PD No 532 applicable to the
case
 This is not justified by the
accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery
(indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of
prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento
P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral
damages.)
iii. Intent distinguished from
motive
iv. Mistake of fact
US vs Ah Chong
FACTS: A cook at the Officers’ Quarters at Fort
McKinley
• August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a
cook was suddenly awakened by some trying to
force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed
and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no
answer and was convinced by the noise at the door
that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. The defendant,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief,
leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck
just above the knee by the edge of the chair
(thought to be an unlawful aggression) which had
been placed against the door. Seizing a common
kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the
defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual
who is a house boy or muchacho who in the spirit
of mischief was playing a trick on him
• Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to
his employers and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
• There had been several robberies not long prior
to the date of the incident, one of which took place
in a house where he was employed as cook so he
kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.
• trial court held it as simple homicide
ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute
the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
had known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act.
HELD: trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime
NO.
• GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must
be committed with malice or with criminal intent in
order that the actor may be held criminally liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability
under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code
• Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and
ommissions punished by law.
o A person voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from
that which he had intended to commit.
o voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and
intentional act
o "malice" signifying the intent
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the act
itself does not make man guilty unless his intention
were so
o “ Actus me incito factus non est meus actus” -
an act done by me against my will is not my act
• GR: courts have recognized the power of the
legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission
criminal WITHOUT regard to the intent of the doer
• EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without regard
to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed
• ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
• defendant at the time, he acted in good faith,
without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that
he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts
been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he can not be said to
have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or
even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to
the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge.
People vs Oanis
FACTS:
Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed
to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped convict,
Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him
dead or alive. They went to the suspected house
then proceeded to the room where they saw the
supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back
towards the door. Oanis and Galanta
simultaneously or successively fired at him which
resulted to the victim’s death. The supposedly
Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson, an
innocent man.
ISSUE:
1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to
innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance
of their official duties.
2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal
liability in the performance of their duty.
HELD:
1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to
the case at bar. “Ignorance facti excusat” applies
only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect
was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have
checked whether it is the real Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A
person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in
the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office. There are 2 requisites to justify this:
(1) the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) that
the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty
or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this
case, only the first requisite is present.
v. Malum prohibitum as exception to the
requirement of mens rea
Padilla v Dizon
Facts:
 Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in
his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai,
saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to
violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo
Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under
Central Bank Circular No. 960.
 Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs
guard at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign
exchange instruments out of the country.
 An information was filed against Lo
Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central
Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction
provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
 Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular
No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or
transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign
exchange in any form out of the Philippines without
an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and
non-resident visitors may take out or send out from
the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not
exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange
brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident
temporary visitors bringing with them more than
US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the
form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of
entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
 Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883
provides that any person who shall engage in the
trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in
violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of
the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of
blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion temporal (minimum of 12
years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a
fine of no less than P50,000.00.
 At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to
establish that he was a businessman from
Hongkong, that he had come to the Philippines 9 to
10 times to invest in business in the country with his
business associates, and that he and his business
associates declared all the money they brought in
and all declarations were handed to and kept by him.
 Because of the revolution taking
place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was
urged by his business associates to come to Manila
to bring the money out of the Philippines.
 Commissioner of Customs, Alexander
Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R.
Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
Issue:
 Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon
is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance
of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
prosecution must establish that the accused had the
criminal intent to violate the law.
Held:
 Yes.
Ratio:
 Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the
foreign currency and foreign currency instruments
found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was
apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such
foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign
currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the
trial, and that these currency declarations were
declarations belonging to other people.
 In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank
Circular No. 960 to justify the release of
US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again
diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance
of law. There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular
which could be taken as authority for the trial court
to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi
Fai.
Magno vs CA
Facts:
 Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring
complete set of equipment to make his car repair
shop operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice
President of Mancor Industries.
 VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and
Management Corporation, advising its Vice
President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to
supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS
Finance could accommodate Magno and and
provide him credit facilities.
 The arrangement went on requiring Magno to
pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so
he requested VP Gomez to look for third party who
could lend him that amount.
 Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was
the one who provided that amount.
 As payment to the equipment, Magno issued
six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest
had no sufficient fund.
 Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno
failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the
equipment.
 Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2
(The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.
Issue:
 Whether or not Magno should be punished
for the issuance of the checks in question.
Held:
 No
Ratio:
 To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty
deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his
own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is
to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did
not receive the amount in question. All the while,
said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company which is managed by the officials and
employees of LS Finance.
Garcia vs CA
FACTS: On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing
period of 1995 senatiorial elections, Aquilino
Pimintel, Jr., was informed that Arsenia Garcia
(Arsenia), along with her co-conspirators, willfully
and unlawfully decreased the number of votes of
the candidate from 6,998 to 1921 votes.
Pimintel filed a complaint against Asenia and her
co-conspirators. All the accused was acquited due
to lack of evidence except for Arsenia who was
found guilty of the crime defined under Republic Act
6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of
Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in
relation to BP Blg. 881.
Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the
judgment of CA is erroneous and there was no
motive on her part to reduce the votes of private
complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good
faith is not a defense in the violation of an election
law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a violation of Section
27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in
se.
(2) Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal
intent be valid defenses?
HELD: (1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No.
6646 provides: Any member of the board of
election inspectors or board of canvassers who
tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election or any
member of the board who refuses, after proper
verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes
or deduct such tampered votes.
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b)
are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and
mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue
would be punishable.
(2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary
diligence should be exercised by the members of
the board of canvassers in canvassing the results
of the elections. Any error on their part would result
in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and
its supporting statements of votes prepared by the
municipal board of canvassers are sensitive
election documents whose entries must be
thoroughly scrutinized.
The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum
penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six
months is AFFIRMED.
B. CONSTRUCTIVE INTENT (CULPA) ART. 3 AND
365
I. ELEMENTS
II. IMPRUDENCE OR LACK OF SKILL
III. NEGLIGENCE OR LACK OF FORESIGHT
PEOPLE VS PUGAY
FACTS
The accused, Pugay, Fernando and Samson,
Benjamin were charged with the crime of Murder for
killing Miranda, Bayaani, a retardate. Upon being
arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. After trial, the RTC of Cavite
rendered decision finding both of them guilty on the
crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused
Pugay the mitigating circumstances of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong. Sentencing
Pugay 12 years of Prision Mayor as minimum and
20 years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and
Samson to suffer Reclusion Perpetua with the
accessories of the law for both of them.
Miranda (deceased) and the Pugay are friends. The
deceased used to run errands for the accused and
they used to sleep together. On the evening of May
19, 1982 a town feast was held in the plaza of
Rosario, Cavite. Sometime after midnight of the
same date, Eduardo Gabon (eye witness) was sitting
in the Ferris wheel and reading comics when he
noticed the group of Pugay appeared to be drunk
making fun of Miranda by tickling the latter with a
piece of wood. Pugay suddenly took a can of
gasoline and poured it to Miranda. Gabion told
Pugay not to do so while the latter is in the process
of pouring the fuel. Then, another accused, Samson
set Miranda on fire.
ISSUE(S)
Is conspiracy present in this case to make murder a
crime? If not, what are the responsibilities of the
accused?
HELD
There is nothing on the records showing that there
was a conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention between the two accused immediately
before the commission of the crime.
There is no animosity between the deceased and the
accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the
scene was accidental and also clear that Pugay and
his group merely wanted to make fun of Miranda.
Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of
Pugay and Samson arising from different acts
directed against Miranda is individual not collective
and each of them is liable only for the act that was
committed by him.
The criminal responsibilities of Pugay is having
taken the can from under the machine of Ferris
wheel and holding it before pouring its contents to
Miranda’s body, the accused knew that can really
contained gasoline. The stinging smell this liquid fuel
could not escape his notice even before pouring the
same. Clearly, he FAILED to exercise his diligence
necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence
arising from any act that may committed by his
companions against the deceased. Thus, the
accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence defined in Art 365 of RPC making the
penalty range of Pugay from four months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of
prision correctional, as maximum. As for Samson’s,
he must suffer for an indeterminate sentence from
eight years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen years of reclusion temporal, as maximum
for the reason of Samson was no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed.
Ivler vs San Pedro
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August
2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City
(MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded
guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted
out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information for the second delict for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
of reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity
of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition
for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the
suspension of proceedings in criminal case,
including the arraignment his arraignment as a
prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the
MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because
of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until
after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but
as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to
seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the
MTC ordered his arrest following his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for
injuries sustained by respondent; and
2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband.
RULING:
The accused negative constitutional right not
to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense" protects him from, among others,
post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as
the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising
from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall
not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-
offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
species of crime, separately defined and penalized
under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing
new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused
facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or,
as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress
can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes
the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the
most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized
as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still
keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under
Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung
of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
Petition granted.
C. transferred intent. Art. 4 par. 1
i. Aberratio ictus
People vs Guillen
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of
appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby
Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged
in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty
of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon
Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay
the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of
not guilty to the charges contained in the
information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of
the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over
by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after
the submission of the evidence of the prosecution
and the defense, rendered judgment as above
stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the
beginning of the trial and before arraignment,
counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the
mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court,
notwithstanding that it had found out from the
answers of the accused to questions propounded to
him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that
he was not suffering from any mental derangement,
ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital,
there to be examined by medical experts who
should report their findings accordingly. This was
done, and, according to the report of the board of
medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of
the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen
was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the
heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13
and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant
observation since admission. There was not
a single moment during his whole 24 hours
daily, that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the
crime is stated above. The veracity of this
motivation was determined in the
Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis
was successful was checked up the day
after the test. The narco-synthesis proved
not only reveal any conflict or complex that
may explain a delusional or hallucinatory
motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to
elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr.
Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be
intelligent, always able to differentiate right
from wrong, fully aware of the nature of the
crime he committed and is equally decided
to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the
crime, his conduct and conversation relative
thereto, the motives, temptations and
provocations that preceded the act, were all
those of an individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong
will and conviction and once arriving at a
decision he executes, irrespective of
consequences and as in this case, the
commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality
of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of
some overt acts. This is seen not only in the
present instance, but sometime when an
employee in la Clementina Cigar Factory he
engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a
Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar
makers, and felt it his duty to defend them.
One time he ran after a policeman with a
knife in hand after being provoked to a fight
several times. He even challenged
Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime
before when Mr. Nueno was running for a
seat in the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his
apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality
characterized by a weakness of censorship
especially in relation to rationalization about
the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our
considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is
not insane but is an individual with a
personality defect which in Psychiatry is
termed, Constitutional Psychopathic
Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority,
without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical
board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of
one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to
give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that
Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was
tired, for the offenses he committed on the date in
question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs
submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor
General and their respective memoranda, we find
that there is no disagreement between the
prosecution and the defense, as to the essential
facts which caused the filing of the present criminal
case against this accused. Those facts may be
stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio
Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any
particular political group, has voted for the defeated
candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946.
Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate,
assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the
President of the Philippine Republic. According to
Guillen, he became disappointed in President
Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges
and fulfill the promises made by him during the
presidential election campaign; and his
disappointment was aggravated when, according to
him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the
interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned
for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure.
Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways
and means of assassinating President Roxas, the
opportunity presented itself on the night of March
10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the
Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila
attended by a big crowd, President Roxas,
accompanied by his wife and daughter and
surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen
prominent in government and politics, stood on a
platform erected for that purpose and delivered his
speech expounding and trying to convince his
thousand of listeners of the advantages to be
gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional
amendment granting American citizens the same
rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the
accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said
firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two
hand grenades which were given him by an
American soldier in the early days of the liberation
of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He
had likewise been weighing the chances of killing
President Roxas, either by going to Malacañan, or
following his intended victim in the latter's trips to
provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon)
where the President was scheduled to speak, but
having encountered many difficulties, he decided to
carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at
Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of
Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare
for him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with
their pervious understanding in the preceding
afternoon, when they met at the premises of the
Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-
parity" meeting held there. On account of its
materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote
hereunder the contents of said document. An
English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original
Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what
happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I
carried it out all by myself alone. It took me
many days and nights pondering over this
act, talking to my own conscience, to my
God, until I reached my conclusion. It was
my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on
life to spare. And had I expected to lives to
spare, I would not have hesitated either ton
sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which
was the welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more
have mourned the loss of their husbands, of
their sons, and there are millions now
suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their
hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God
that there was a man to be blamed for all
this: he had deceived the people, he had
astounded them with no other purpose than
to entice them; he even went to the extent
of risking the heritage of our future
generations. For these reasons he should
not continue any longer. His life would mean
nothing as compared with the welfare of
eighteen million souls. And why should I not
give up my life too if only the good of those
eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to
do what I did and I am willing to bear up the
consequences of my act. I t matters not if
others will curse me. Time and history will
show, I am sure, that I have only displayed
a high degree of patriotism in my
performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino
home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog
(Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his
nephew, was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock
in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which
reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because
he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de
Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was
carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper
bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one
of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot
located close to the platform, and when he decided
to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair
on which he had been sitting and, from a distance
of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at
the President when the latter had just closed his
speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador
Romulo and was about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw
the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing
his presence of mind, kicked it away from the
platform, along the stairway, and towards an open
space where the general thought the grenade was
likely to do the least harm; and, covering the
President with his body, shouted to the crowd that
everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the
ground and exploded in the middle of a group of
persons who were standing close to the platform.
Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a
panic. It was found that the fragments of the
grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or
Barrela ) — who died on the following day as the
result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of
the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva,
Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police
Department about two hours after the occurrence. It
appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one
spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who
was standing next to him hurled an object at the
platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards
a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de
Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of
the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and
had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen
offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and
managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some
detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal
and the author of the explosion, placed him under
arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and
some agents of the Manila Police Department were
investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles
volunteered the information that the person with
whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio
Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted
with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and
had seen each other in the plaza a few moments
previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and
Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours
after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724
Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police
headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the
same person who hurled towards the platform the
object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to
hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he
readily admitted his responsibility, although at the
same time he tried to justify his action in throwing
the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to
his captors the place where he had hidden his so
called last will quoted above and marked Exhibit B,
which was then unsigned by him and subsequently
signed at the police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to
the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the
other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the
presence of witnesses he signed a statement which
contained his answers to question propounded to
him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who
investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E).
From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are
satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations
and made by him on the witness stand during the
trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this
appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly
committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding
the appellant guilty of murder for the death of
Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant
guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1
of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in
determining the penalty to be imposed upon the
accused"; and fourth, "in considering the
concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in
the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the
brazen statements made by the accused, shows
beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen
attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand
grenades, to put into execution his preconceived
plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully
well that, by throwing one of those two hand
grenades in his possession at President Roxas,
and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the
persons who were around his main and intended
victim from being killed or at least injured, due to
the highly explosive nature of the bomb employed
by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to
questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of
transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that
he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose
was to kill the President, but that it did not make
any difference to him if there were some people
around the President when he hurled that bomb,
because the killing of those who surrounded the
President was tantamount to killing the President,
in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to
the President being loyal to the President, were
identified with the latter. In other word, although it
was not his main intention to kill the persons
surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in
killing them also in order to attain his main purpose
of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel
for appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide
through reckless imprudence in regard to the death
of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical
injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should
be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the
different felonies committed, the sum total of which
shall not exceed three times the penalty to be
imposed for the most serious crime in accordance
with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the
intention of killing him, the appellant acted with
malice. He is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act; for in
accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being simply the incident
of another act performed without malice. (People
vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in
order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it
is necessary that either malice nor intention to
cause injury should intervene; where such intention
exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has
produced even though it may not have been the
intention of the actor to cause an evil of such
gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on
the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held
by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful
act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil.,
232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot
be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs.
Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de
la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar
tabaco, y habiendose negado este a
darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar
entre ambos disputa alguna; pero;
trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el
estanquero despachando a C, se oye la
detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada
por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en
el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no
intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al
estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este
de homicidio y la de c de imprudencia
temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la
Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y
condeno al procesado a catorse anos de
reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de
prision correctional por la imprudencia.
Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero
debio calificarse de assesinato y no de
homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con
aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C,
suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria
el procesado, no pudo calificarse de
imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien
debio declararsele responsable de la
misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este
apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo
ambas muertes producidas por un solo
hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio
imponerse al reo la pena del delito de
asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo
dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la
pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente
que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de
otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la
Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo
del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo
declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18
junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I
Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as
follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. —
When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not
paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The
case before us is clearly governed by the first
clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a
throwing highly explosive hand grenade at
President Roxas, the accused committed two grave
felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon
Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted
murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva,
Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang
were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case
of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that
the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be
properly considered, even when the victim of the
attack was not the one whom the defendant
intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that
neither of the two persons could in any manner put
up defense against the attack, or become aware of
it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying
circumstance of premeditation may not be properly
taken into the account when the person whom the
defendant proposed to kill was different from the
one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused
attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a
hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him,
thereby commencing the commission of a felony by
over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating
him "by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance." For the
same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the
four other persons already named as merely
attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that ,
although there is abundant proof that , in violation
of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code, the accused Guillen has committed among
others the offense of assault upon a person in
authority, for in fact his efforts were directed
towards the execution of his main purpose of
eliminating President Roxas for his failure to
redeem his electoral campaign promises, by
throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief
Executive of the nation the hand grenade in
question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation
charging Guillen with the commission of said
offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that
effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple
attempted murder committed by the accused with
the single act of throwing a hand grenade at the
President, was attended by the various aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information, without
any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it
necessary to consider said aggravating
circumstances because in any event article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires
that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes
be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out
to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it
upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove
narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we
have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby
do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence
shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of
the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the
Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial
court may fix within 30 days from the date the
record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
ii. Error in personae
People vs Sabalones
Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Juanito M.
Gabiana Sr. filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, five amended
Informations charging Rolusape Sabalones,
Artemio Timoteo Beronga, Teodulo Alegarbes and
Eufemio Cabanero, with two counts of murder and
three counts of frustrated murder. The accused
were convicted after a shooting incident in Cebu in
1985 which led to the death of Glenn Tiempo and
Alfredo Nardo, and fatal injuries of Nelson Tiempo,
Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores.
In the trial, there was positive identification by
survivors who saw the accused when they peered
during lulls in gunfire. Alfonso Allere, a distant
relative of the accused, remembered
having received a call from Roling Sabalones, one
morning after the burial of the latter's brother,
asking for his advise because of the threats to his
life which he received thru telephone from the
group of Nabing Velez and the group of the military.
Also according to the wife of Sabalones, her
husband was implicated in the killing of Nabing
Velez because of the slapping incident involving
her father-in-law, Federico Sabalones, Sr. and
Nabing. From another witness, Jennifer
Binghoy, Rolusape Sabalones and his friends were
gathered at one table in the wake of Jun
Sabalone, conversing in whispers with each other,
that there were two rifles on top of the table, and
that they became panicky after hearing of the death
of Nabing Velez on the radio. Hence, the
observation of the trial court that "they went to
their grisly destination amidst the dark and
positioned themselves in defense of his turf against
the invasion of a revengeful gang of supporters of
the recently slain Nabing Velez.
The cases against Sabalones and Beronga were
jointly tried. Thereafter, the lower court found them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. Appellants filed a notice of appeal to the
Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the CA affirmed their
conviction but sentenced them to reclusion
perpetua for the murders they were found guilty of.
Sabalones and Beronga appealed
ISSUE
Whether or not the court erred in holding that the
instant case is "one of aberratio ictus”?
HELD
Yes, this case is not one of aberration ictus but of
error in personae. Part 1 of Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines states that “Criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing
a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from which he intended.”
The conclusion of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong
persons was based on the extrajudicial statement
of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer
Binghoy. These pieces of evidence sufficiently
show that appellants believed that they were
suspected of having killed the recently slain Nabing
Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate
against them. Hence, upon the arrival of the
victims' vehicles which they mistook to be
carrying the avenging men of Nabing Velez,
appellants opened fire.
Nonetheless, the fact that they were mistaken does
not diminish their culpability. The Court has held
that "mistake in the identity of the victim
carries the same gravity as when the accused
zeroes in on his intended.
iii. Praeter intentionem
People vs Albaquerque
FACTS
Gines Alburquerque, who has been suffering from
partial paralysis, was guilty of the crime of homicide
committed on the person of Manuel Osma. His
daughter Pilar became acquainted and had intimate
relations with Osma which culminated culminated in
Pilar's giving birth to a child. The appellant
wanted the Osma to legitimize his union with Pilar
by marrying her, or at least, to support her and his
child. Osma agreed but never complied with his
promise. One day the appellant went at the office
where the deceased worked to speak to Osma. He
proposed to the deceased to marry his daughter
and that, upon hearing that the latter refused to do
so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the
appellant's attitude, the deceased tried to
seize him by the neck whereupon the said
appellant stabbed him on the face with the said
penknife. Due to his lack of control of the
movement of his arm, the weapon landed on the
base of the neck of the deceased.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellant acted in legitimate
self-defense as he provoked and commenced the
aggression by whipping out and brandishing his
penknife?
HELD
No, the court held appellant did not act in legitimate
self-defense inasmuch as he provoked and
commenced the aggression by drawing his
penknife but that the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the
death of the deceased as well as those of his
having voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities, and acted under the influence of
passion and obfuscation, should be taken into
consideration in favor of the appellant. Part 1 of
Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines states that “Criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from which he intended.”
The defense likewise claims that, at all events,
article 49 of the Revised Penal
Code, which refers to cases where the crime
committed is different from that intended by the
accused, should be applied herein. The facts as
herein proven constitute the crime of homicide
defined and penalized in article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the
concurrence therein of three mitigating
circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree, that
is prision mayor, should be imposed.
3. Concurrence
4. Resulting harm
5. Causation
Bataclan vs Medina
Facts:
a. On September 13, 1952, bus no. 30 of the
Medina Transportation owned by the defendant,
Mariano Medina left the town of Amadeo, Cavite,
bound for Pasay City, driven by Conrado Saylon.
b. Among the 18 passengers was Juan Bataclan,
petitioner, and Felipe Lara, Natalia
Villanueva, and a certain Visayan.
c. At about 2’oclock that morning while running in
the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, the front tire bursts,
causing the bus to fall into a canal on the right side
of the road and turned turtle or upside down.
d. The passengers managed to escape, except
Bataclan, Lara, Villanueva, and the
Visayan.
e. Calls for help were heeded by town men bringing
a lighted bamboo torch. However, the fire from the
torch ignited the leaking gasoline from the bus,
setting the bus on fire and killing the four remaining
passengers.
f. Salud Villanueva, widow of Bataclan, and on
behalf of her five minor children, brought the
present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
g. The Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P
1,000 to plaintiffs, plus P 600 attorney’s fees, plus
P 100, for the value of merchandise being carried
by Bataclan to
Pasay City.
h. The widow of Bataclan appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed it to
the Supreme Court because of the value involved
in the claim in the complaint.
Issue:
1. Is the defendant, bus owner Mario Medina, liable
for the death of Bataclan considering that the death
was caused by the fire from the torch and not by
the overturning of the bus per se?
Ruling:
1. Yes, Mario Medina is liable for the death of
Bataclan, therefore the compensation to be
awarded is for death and not merely for physical
injuries.
The new Civil Code provides for the responsibility
of common carriers to its passengers and their
goods. The pertinent codal provisions are; Articles
1733, 1734,
1735 Nos. 5-7, and 1755 and 1756.
a. There was negligence on the part of the Medina
Transportation for
overspeeding, and failing to do the proper
maintenance of the bus.
b. Citing the Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American jurisprudence; that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have
occurred...' the SC ruled that the events after
the overturning of the bus are not unnatural or
extraordinary. It is ordinary that the gasoline would
have leaked out of an overturned bus. It also
natural that the men responding to the call for help
would be bringing in lit torches as source of light,
considering that it is a rural area where lamps and
flashlights are unavailable. The driver and
conductor are liable for not ensuring the safety of
the passengers by not warning the unknowing
rescuers of the leaking gasoline.
c. Therefore, the Supreme Court hereby modifies
the damages awarded by the trial court and are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS
TO SIX
THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS for the death of
Bataclan, and from SIX
HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800)
PESOS for the attorney's fees. The decision
appealed is affirmed, with costs.
People vs Iligan
At around 2:00 a.m. of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo
Quiñones, Jr., Zaldy Asis and Felix
Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto.
Domingo, Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending
a barrio fiesta dance. They met the accused
Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo Asis, and
Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them aside
thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. Fernando
Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall, drew from his
back a bolo and hacked Zaldy Asis but missed. The
trio ran pursued by the three accused. They ran for
about half an hour and stopped running when they
were no longer being chased.
Quiñones, Jr. invited the two to accompany him
back to his house and while they were walking, the
three accused suddenly emerged on the
roadside. Felix Lukban and Zaldy
Asis managed to fled while Quiñones, Jr. was
hacked by Fernando Iligan with his bolo hitting the
victim on the forehead and causing him to fall
down.
The incident happened on the national highway
where vehicles are expected to pass any moment.
One such vehicle passed seconds later when
Lukban and Zaldy Asis fled and Quiñones, Jr.,
weakened by the hacking blow, was run over by a
vehicle.
The postmortem examination report reveals
that Quiñones, Jr. died because of a vehicular
accident.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte,
Branch II convicted Fernando Iligan and Edmundo
Asis of the crime of murder and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in
the amounts of P30,000 for the latter’s death and
P256,960 representing the victim’s unrealized
income.
Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed an appeal
professing innocence of the crime for which they
were convicted and attributed Quiñones, Jr.’s death
to a vehicular accident.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused are liable for the
victim's death considering that it was caused
by a vehicular accident and not the hacking
Held:
Fernando Iligan was held liable for the death
of Quiñones, Jr. but proof beyond reasonable doubt
has not been established to hold Edmundo Asis
liable as Iligan’s co- conspirator. Meanwhile, Juan
Macandog was never apprehended
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
liability shall be incurred "by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he
intended." The essential requisites of Article 4
are: (a) that an intentional felony has been
committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the
offender. The intentional felony committed was the
hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by
Iligan. While Iligan's hacking of Quiñones,
Jr.'s head might not have been the direct
cause, it was the proximate cause of the
latter's death.
On the other hand, Edmundo Asis did not take any
active part in the infliction of the wound on the head
of Quiñones, Jr. There must be intentional
participation in the act with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and
purpose. His mere presence at the scene of the
crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a co-
principal or an accomplice to the assault
perpetrated by Iligan.
Therefore, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is
hereby convicted of the crime of homicide for which
he is imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and
he shall indemnify the heirs of
Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000). Appellant
Edmundo Asis is hereby acquitted of the crime
charged against him. Costs against appellant Iligan.
Urbano vs Intermediate Appellate
Doctrine: Proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
FACTS: Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a
canal by means of cutting grass which caused the
flooding of the storage area of the petitioner.
Petitioner got angry and demanded Javier to pay
for the soaked palay. Javier refused and a quarrel
between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo
and hacked Javier hitting him on the right hand and
left leg. Javier went to the hospital for the treatment
of the wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to
his farm and tended to his tobacco plants.
Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was
rushed to the hospital. Doctors findings showed
that he was suffering from tetanus infection. The
next day, Javier died.
RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide. Petitioner raised the
case to the SC arguing that the cause of the death
of Javier was due to his own negligence.
ISSUE: WON Urbano’s action was the proximate
cause of the death of Javier.
RULING: NO. Pursuant to this provision “an
accused is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom. The rule is that the death of the victim
must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by
the accused
The petitioner reiterates his position that the
proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was
due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses
found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got
infected with tetanus when after two weeks he
returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants
with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
elements like tetanus germs.
Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s
death, his wound could have been infected by
tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before
he died. The medical findings, however, lead us to
a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.
And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which
result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.
CA’s decision was SET ASIDE and petioner is
ACQUITED of the crime of homicide.
b. Impossible Crimes. Art. 4 Par. 2
Intod vs CA
FACTS
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod,
Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's
house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental and asked him to go with them to the
house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land
dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would
also be killed.
On the same day, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at
Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom.
Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however,
that Palangpangan was in another City and her
home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his
family. No one was in the room when the accused
fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun
fire.Petitioner and his companions were positively
identified by witnesses
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod
of attempted murder. The court
(RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding
that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder.
Hence , petitioner seeks a modification of the
judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime.
ISSUE
Whether or not the crime committed is an
impossible crime
HELD
Yes, it is an impossible crime. Article 4, paragraph
2 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines provides that “Criminal Responsibility
shall be incurred by any person performing an act
which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of
its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Legal impossibility would apply to those
circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the
law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical
act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting
from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs
when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. The case at
bar belongs to this category.
Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was
not present in said place and thus, the petitioner
failed to accomplish his end. In our jurisdiction,
impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility
of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a
defense, but an act penalized by itself.
People vs Saladino
In the case no 271-V of the Court of Industrial
Relations, the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. filed a
petition against the National Labor Union and San
Miguel Brewery Employees and Labores
Association, for the purpose of threshing out,
among other matters, demand No. 4 presented by
the respondents, to the effect that no dismissal,
suspension or transfer should be made except for
just cause, and that Julian Nocos, Hermogenes de
Guzman and Lazaro Tapiador and others who had
been dismissed or transferred without cause be
reinstated. On September 17, 1949, the Court of
Industrial Relations rendered a decision which, in
the portions pertinent to this case, reads as follows:
Both parties are agreed that there should be
no dismissal, suspension or transfer except
for just cause. Their only conflict regarding
this demand refers to the transfer of Nocos,
Guzman and Tapiador. The respondents
demand the reinstatement of these laborers
to their former positions in the syrup room of
the Coca-Cola Plant. They alleged that the
transfers were effected because these three
men were those responsible for the filing of
the petition against the rotation system
contemplated by the SMB.
The petitioner on the other hand, refuses to
consider the reinstatements asked for by
the respondents. In justification of its stand,
the SMB offered the following evidence: that
the Coca-Cola Plant was formerly operating
on 3 shifts with two bottling lines; that one
additional bottling line was installed and the
operation was reduced to two shifts with
three bottling lines; that as a consequence
of this change in operation, the personnel
working in one of the shifts were reassigned
to the additional bottling line with the
exemption of the crew of one of the shifts of
the syrup room which was composed of the
above mentioned personnel, because two
crews of syrup men were adequate to feed
all the three bottling lines; and that for thus
reason, the transfer of Nocos, De Guzman
and Tapiador among others was found to be
absolutely necessary.
On the basis of the records relative to this
particular demand, the Court finds that the
transfers of the three above named
employees were accomplished for no other
purpose than that stated in its evidence.
This purpose, the Court believes is valid
and justified.
IN VIEW OF THE FACTS ESTABLISHED
IN THE EVIDENCE AND THE
CONSIDERATIONS ABOVE MENTIONED,
the Court . . . partially denies and partially
grants Demands 4 and 7.
On April 15, 1950, the San Miguel Brewery, Inc.
dismissed Santos Ortiz allegedly for cause.
Whereupon, the National Labor Union and San
Miguel Brewery Employees and Laborers
Association filed in July, 1950, in case No. 271-V, a
motion praying (1) for the reinstatement of Santos
Ortiz, on the ground that he was dismissed without
any just cause and for his union activities in
violation of the decision of September 17, 1949,
and (2) for the punishment of contempt of a person
responsible for the dismissal of Santos Ortiz. The
San Miguel Brewery, Inc. questioned the authority
of the Atty. Eulogio R. Lerum to file said motion in
the name of the San Miguel Brewery Employees
and Laborers Association , on the allegation that
the latter had disauthorized Atty. Lerum and was at
the rate already dissolved. Before the matter could
be acted upon by the Court of Industrial Relations,
Atty. Lerum filed an amended motion on behalf
solely of the National Labor Union, reiterating the
same allegations in the first motion. This amended
motion was docketed as Case No. 478-V and
assigned to the Second Branch. The San Miguel
Brewery Inc. filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that
the case involved only one laborer and therefore
was not come within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations, there being no dispute which
involves more than 30 laborers as provided by the
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The court
denied this motion for dismissal. Failing to obtain
the reconsideration, the San Miguel Brewery, Inc.
appealed by way of the present petition
for certiorari.
The petitioner, San Miguel Brewery, Inc., contends
that the Court of Industrial Relations has no
jurisdiction to entertain the amended motion filed by
the National Labor Union, and docketed as case
No. 478-V, on the ground that it deals with the
dispute over the propriety of the dismissal of only
one laborer, Santos Ortiz. The Court of Industrial
Relations, in overruling the contention of the
petitioner, held as follows:
It is true that the case was docketed in
Court as Case No. 478-V apparently an
independent action relative to the
reinstatement of Santos Ortiz. A careful
study of the same records, nevertheless,
shows that the instant case is so closely
connected with case No. 271-V between the
same parties, that the Court must, of
necessity, acquire jurisdiction over it,
considering that the jurisdiction of the court
had already attached in Case No. 271-V.
the dissolution of "SAMBELA" is not
 pertinent to the issues involved in the
instant case, the amended motion having
been brought in the name of the National
Labor Union solely and singly, of which
Ortiz is an active member as shown by his
sworn statement on the amended motion. In
other words, the jurisdiction of the Court
over the amended motion is the same
jurisdiction over case No. 271-V.
In our opinion, the Court of Industrial Relations is
correct. The decision in case No. 271-V provided,
upon stipulation of the parties, that there should be
no dismissal, suspension or transfer except for just
cause, and this pronouncement of course included
all the laborers employed in the petitioner and then
presented by the National Labor Union and the San
Miguel Brewery Employees and Laborers
Association. One such laborer is Santos Ortiz. The
herein respondent National Labor Union, in its
amended motion merely seeks the reinstatement of
Santos Ortiz by virtue and as a consequence of the
decision of September 17, 1949 in case No. 271-V.
Said amended motion in essence can be said to be
a part of case No. 271-V, as the right sought to be
enforced springs from the decision in said case. At
any rate, the Court of Industrial Relations may
reopen any question involved at the decision at any
time during its effectiveness under section 17 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103. To adopt the theory of
the petitioner that the dismissal of Santos Ortiz
should be the subject-matter of an independent
case, (to be ventilated in an ordinary court of
justice), would be to frustrate in a way the purposes
of the law that created the Court of Industrial
Relations.
Furthermore, the court of Industrial Relations has
all inherent powers of the court of justice provided
in paragraph 5 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court,
among which is to compel obedience to its
judgments, orders and process, as well as the
power to punish direct and indirect contempts
provided in Rule 64 (Sec 6, Commonwealth Act No.
103). In addition to this, section 23 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 expressly specifies
that in case of none-compliance with any award,
order or decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
after it has become final, conclusive and executory,
the judgement maybe enforced by a writ of
execution or any other remedy provided by law with
respect to enforcement or execution of orders,
decisions, or judgments of the court of first
instance. It follows from this provisions that the
Court of Industrial Relations, in entertaining the
motion of the respondent Union as regards the
dismissal of Santos Ortiz, is merely called upon to
enforce its decision of September 17, 1949 in case
No. 271-V. The execution and enforcement of said
decision must necessarily and conveniently be
sought and disposed of in the same case.
With reference to the contention with the petitioner
assailing the authority of the National Labor Union
to represent Santos Ortiz, in view of the dissolution
of the San Miguel Brewery Employees and
Laborers Association (formerly affiliated by the
Union), suffice it to say that under section 17 of
Commonwealth Act. No. 103, the Court of Industrial
Relations may, on application of an interested
party, and after due hearing, alter, modify in whole
or in part, or set aside any decision, or reopen any
question involved therein. The National Labor
Union, and even Santos Ortiz for that matter, are
certainly interested parties within the meaning of
the law. Moreover, the dissolution of the San
Miguel Brewery Employees and Laborers
Association should not affect the jurisdiction
already acquired by the Court of Industrial
Relations. In the case of Mortera vs. The Court of
Industrial Relations,* 45 Off. Gaz. 1714, we made
the following pronouncement:
. . . When petitioners appeared for the first
time before the court of Industrial Relations
as members of the Bisig Ng Canlubang
(NLU), they appeared as workers of the
Canlubang Sugar Estate. When they
seceded from said union to form another,
they remained to be workers of the
Canlubang Sugar Estate. The order of
December 11, 1946, prohibiting the workers
from striking pending decision of the case
was addressed to the workers of the
Canlubang Estate. The splitting workers of
the Canlubang Workers' Union into two
unions cannot affect the jurisdiction of the
court. The members of the Canlubang
workers Union may even dissolved the
union completedly but that would not affect
the jurisdiction of the court. Otherwise,
approval will be given to the scheme by
which a workers' union, in case of an
adverse decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations, may always make a mockery of
orders and decision of said court. Such a
result is against the administration of justice
and is violative of the principles and the
purposes of which Commonwealth Act. No.
103 was enacted.
The other point raised by the petitioner is that, even
it be held that the motion is a mere incident to case
No. 271-V, the first Branch of the Court of Industrial
Relations should have jurisdiction over it, inasmuch
as case No. 271-V was originally assigned to a
disposed of by said Branch. The point is not well
taken. The assignment of the amended motion to
the Second Branch was made by the Presiding
Judge, in pursuance of section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 103, as amended, which provides that the
Judges shall act on such matters as the Presiding
Judge may designate, and each of them shall have
power to preside over the hearing of cases
assigned to him and to render decisions thereon. It
is already an established doctrine that a court,
though composed of several branches, is deemed
to be a totality. In the case of Mercado vs Ocampo,
72 Phil. 318, this Court had already upheld the act
of one branch regarding an order of another branch
of a court of First Instance:
. . . un juez que preside una sala de un
juzgado de primera instancia
puedemodificar o anular la orden que ha
dictado otrom juez del mismo juzgado, sin
que por ello se infrinja el principio de
coordinacion, y que la norma que de be
servir de guia debe ser la de si el juez que
dicto la primera ordentenia faculdad para
modificarla o dejarla sin efecto, en cuyo
caso el otro juez que la modifico o anulo
debe tener igualmente la misma faculdad, y
la razon de la doctrina asi sentada consiste
sencillamente en que ambos juecesactuan
en el mismo juzgado y es el mismo juzgado
el que ha modificado o anulado la orden.
Wherefore, the order of the Court of Industrial
Relations denying the motion to dismiss filed by the
petitioner and ordering that the amended motion
filed by the respondent Union be set for hearing,
and affirmed and it is so ordered with costs against
the petitioner.
JACINTO VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner, together with two other women, namely,
Anita Valencia and Jacqueline Capitle was charged
with the crime of Qualified Theft.
That in June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner,
Gemma Jacinto collector of Mega Foam, a
postdated checked worth P10,000 as payment for
Aquino’s purchases from Mega Foam
International, Inc. The said check was deposited to
the account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-
Generoso Capitle. Rowena Ricablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call
from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking
for Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check
deposited had been dishonored. Thereafter,
Joseph Dyhengco talked to Aquino to tell that the
BDO Check bounced. However, Aquino said that
she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in
August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored
check.
Dyhengco filed a complaint with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter,
petitioner and Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed
a criminal case for qualified theft against the two
and Jacqueline Capitle.
RTC rendered a decision that Gemma Jacinto,
Anita Valencia and Jacqueline Capitle are
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed petitioner’s
conviction, Anita Valencia’s sentenced was
reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium and
Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. A partial
Motion for Reconsideration was filed for petitioner
Gemma Jacinto but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition was filed by petitioner alone,
assailing the Decision and Resoulution of
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WON this can constitute as an impossible
crime and not as a qualified theft
RULING: Yes, since the crime of theft is not a
continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving the
cash replacement should not be considered as
continuation of the Theft.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated
check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently
dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether
the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
(1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property;
(2) that the act was done with evil intent; and
(3) that its accomplishment was inherently
impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped
receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she
thought was the cash replacement for the
dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held
in Valenzuela v. People that under the definition of
theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
there is only one operative act of execution by the
actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal
property of another.
The time that petitioner took a possession of the
check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed
all the acts to consummate that crime of theft had it
not been impossible of accomplishment in this
case. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught
receiving the marked money was merely
corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her
intent to gain.
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner
Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an
impossible crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6)
months of arresto mayor and pay courts.