1. Petitioner questioned the validity of the MMDA's "Wet Flag Scheme" for crowd control, arguing it had no legal basis and violated rights.
2. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding the petitioner failed to demonstrate standing as a citizen or taxpayer and violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine by filing directly with the Supreme Court.
3. The Wet Flag Scheme was found to have a legal basis as most cities under MMDA jurisdiction had enacted valid traffic ordinances the scheme aimed to enforce.
1. Petitioner questioned the validity of the MMDA's "Wet Flag Scheme" for crowd control, arguing it had no legal basis and violated rights.
2. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding the petitioner failed to demonstrate standing as a citizen or taxpayer and violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine by filing directly with the Supreme Court.
3. The Wet Flag Scheme was found to have a legal basis as most cities under MMDA jurisdiction had enacted valid traffic ordinances the scheme aimed to enforce.
1. Petitioner questioned the validity of the MMDA's "Wet Flag Scheme" for crowd control, arguing it had no legal basis and violated rights.
2. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding the petitioner failed to demonstrate standing as a citizen or taxpayer and violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine by filing directly with the Supreme Court.
3. The Wet Flag Scheme was found to have a legal basis as most cities under MMDA jurisdiction had enacted valid traffic ordinances the scheme aimed to enforce.
Tests/Elements for valid exercise hierarchy of the courts.
His argument that the Flag Scheme has
Case 1: City of Batangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corp. is legally baseless is unmeritorious. Facts: Francisco v. Fernando A citizen can raise a constitutional question when: Petitioner in this case questions the “Wet Flag Scheme” of the MMDA. Respondent Bayani Fernando is the chairman of the 1. He has suffered actual or threatened injury MMDA. 2. The injury can be traced to governmental action 3. A favorable action will redress the injury 1. Ernesto Francisco, Jr in his capacity as member of the IBP and taxpayer filed a petition for Prohibition and A taxpayer, on the other hand, can raise a constitutional Mandamus directly to the Supreme Court questioning question when shows that he suffers injury due to the illegal use the validity of the “Wet Flag Scheme” of the MMDA of public funds. Francisco shows neither of these. 2. The Wet Flag Scheme of the MMDA involves mobile units The doctrine of hierarchy of the courts is a rule that can be of the MMDA patrolling around thoroughfares with a relaxed in exceptional and compelling circumstances. It does large wet flag on its right side meant for crowd control, not give a complainant unabated freedom of choice to file a to keep pedestrians along the sidewalks petition where he pleases. 3. Francisco complains that it: (1) has no legal basis because the MMC did not authorize it; (2) it violated the due The cities under the MMDA’s jurisdiction, except for Valenzuela process clause because of its summary punishment; (3) City, have already enacted valid traffic regulation ordinances. it disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, Such enactments serve as basis for the enforcement means degrading and inhuman punishment; (4) it violates being implemented by MMDA. pedestrian rights Doctrines: (1) Citizen and taxpayer standings 4. MMDA Chairman argues that the case should be dismissed because Francisco had no legal standing, that he violated the hierarchy of the courts, and that the Wet Flag Scheme is a valid preventive measure
Issue: Should Francisco’s petition for prohibition and
mandamus be granted?
Ruling: Petition dismissed.
Ratio: Francisco’s petition should be dismissed because of his
failure to show legal standing, for violating the doctrine of
Peter Wolff and Richard Shortt v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16, Selective Service Local Board No. 66, and Col. Paul Akst, Individually and as Director of the New York City Headquarters Selective Service System, 372 F.2d 817, 2d Cir. (1967)