Q+MEANINGS DIFFERENT FOR EACH OF THE PARTICIPANTS

If we assume that the bodily co-presence of actors and

spectators is constitutive of performance, and that performance is
transient, the
notion of a fxed meaning becomes unsustainable. Both bodily co-
presence
and transience suggest that a performance does not convey a stable
and
preexisting meaning. Instead, meanings only emerge over the
course of the
performance and are diferent for each of the participants. It is
impossible to
know in advance which meanings individual participants will
generate. The
interaction between actors and spectators can always take an
unexpected turn
and disturb the planned program.

PHENOMENAL BODIES – PERCEPTUAL ORDER OF PRESENCE

POJAVNO TELO

In addition, the spectators can be distracted

by the presence of phenomenal bodies and atmospheres that
counteract any
purely semiotic interpretation of the performance. Perceiving bodies
and objects on stage in their specifc presence does not
necessarily mean perceiving them as meaningless. Rather, it means
perceiving all of these phenomena as something. They are not
simply stimuli or sensory
data, but rather the perception of something as something. In the
perception of
the spectator things appear in a performance in their particular
phenomenality;
their appearance is their meaning This sort of self-referentiality
neither transmits
nor strips the object of a pre-existing meaning. Instead, this self-
referentiality is
in itself a way of creating meaning. In other words, the process of
perception
is also a process of creating meaning, since these objects “mean”
what they
appear as. One does not frst perceive something and then—in an
act of
interpretation—give it meaning. Rather, the perception of something
as
something simultaneously constitutes meaning as part of a process
that manifests
its specifc phenomenal being.
CONSTITUTION OF MEANING – PERCEPTUAL ORDER OF
REPRESENTATION SEMIOTICKO TELO
Furthermore, the appearance of a phenomenon is the prerequisite
for
another mode of perception and a diferent way of constituting
meaning. In
the moment that spectators cease to focus their attention on the
phenomenal
being of the perceived, they begin to perceive it as a signifer; that
is, as a signbearer
that is linked with associations—fantasies, memories, feelings,
thoughts—to what it signifes, i.e. possible meanings. The iron oven
may
recall memories of a spectator’s own childhood or a vacation house,
just as the
hand-less clock may remind a spectator of the old professor’s dream
in Ingmar
Bergman’s flm Wild Strawberries.These few examples sufce to
show that perception and the constitution of meaning are largely
dependent on subjective factors connected to individual
spectators. The associations conjured by an object, a gesture, a
sound, or a
light cue depend on their individual experiences, their knowledge,
and their
specifc sensitivities. This includes factors such as age, gender,
class, and cultural
background, which impact how people perceive and understand
performances.
It would be naïve to believe that perception and the constitution of
meaning depend only on what is presented and how it is presented.
Instead,
both are founded in the specifc conditions that each participating
subject
brings to the performance. Both perception and the chain of
associations
produced by it difer for everyone. It is also doubtful that these sorts
of associations
follow specifc rules and are predictable for every individual. Instead,
they arise spontaneously, as in the famous frst scene of Marcel
Proust’s novel
In Search of Lost Time. The narrator takes a bite from a madeleine
and its taste
conjures up a wave of involuntary memories and associations that
overpower
him. We can compare Proust’s narrator to the spectator of a
performance: the
immediate sensation and perception of phenomena in the
performance can stir
a wide range of associations that are often not conscioously created.
Instead,
they occur without being called upon or searched for.
PRESENCE VS REPRESENTATION. POJAVNO VS SEMIOTICKO
TELO
We can call the oscillation of perception between concentration on
phenomena
in their self-referentiality and on the associations that they give rise
to
the perceptual order of presence as opposed to the perceptual order
of representation.
Both the body of the actor as bodily being-in-the-world and objects
in their
phenomenal being create the foundation of the order of presence.
Perceiving
a body or object as a sign—as a dramatic character and the
character’s
environment—is the foundation of the perceptual order of
representation.
The order of representation demands that everything that is
perceived is perceived
in relation to a dramatic character, the character’s fctive world, or
another
symbolic order. While the frst order of perception (i.e. presence)
focuses on
meaning as tied to phenomenal being, the second order of
perception (i.e.
representation) creates meaning that comprehensively constitutes
the character
and fctive world.
SEMIOTICKO: These two perceptual orders generate meaning
according to diferent
principles. When one of these two orders becomes the dominant
order of
perception, it afects how spectators perceive a performance. In the
order of
representation, the process of perception has the goal of allowing a
dramatic
character, fctive world, or symbolic order to come into existence.
Only elements
of the performance with relevance to the fctive world are perceived;
all
else the spectator preemptively shuts out of the process of
perception. The
dramatic framework of the performance afects the process of
perception and
allows for the perception of only those elements that make sense
within the
framework. Ultimately, this process of perception is goal-oriented,
even
though it often follows the principle of trial and error. Although the
order of representation is goal-oriented, it does not follow
that each spectator will generate the same meaning about dramatic
characters
and their fctive world. Personal experiences, knowledge, beliefs,
values, convictions,
a person’s whole habitus—i.e. factors that are informed by cultural
and social milieu—create the preconditions for perception and the
constitution
of meaning. Part of this knowledge and experience is a person’s
previous
experiences with theatre. Whether the spectator goes to the theatre
frequently
or rarely, whether the spectator knows the piece that is being
performed, and
whether the spectator has already seen the actors perform in
diferent roles
impacts the spectator’s process of perception. Even when the
perceptual process
and constitution of meaning follow the order of representation, the
outcome
will vary among spectators depending on the conditions each brings
to
the performance and it is likely that spectators will not all agree on
the
meanings created (Carlson 2001). We can assume that theatre
performances that involve a realistic-psychological
style of acting invite the spectators to privilege the perceptual order
of
representation, while experimental theatre and performance art
draw the
spectator toward the perceptual order of presence. Nevertheless it is
almost
impossible to imagine a performance that an audience would
perceive exclusively
through one of these orders. Even in a psychologically realistic
staging, spectators sense the presence of an actor or a specifc
atmosphere without
asking themselves what it is supposed to mean. Likewise, spectators
of a performance
art event will give specifc meanings to the actions of the performer
and objects in the room.

LIMINALITY

This means that in every performance the perception of each

spectator
oscillates between diferent modes of perception. The more often
these oscillations
occur, the more spectators feel like wanderers between two worlds.
This creates a state of instability that the spectators experience as
an inbetween,
or liminal state. Spectators can and will constantly but
unsuccessfully
attempt to reset their perception—and become aware that the
oscillation
between the modes of perception is out of their control They can
and will
constantly but unsuccessfully attempt to reset their perception—
either on the
order of representation or the order of presence. It soon becomes
clear that
the oscillation undermines spectatorial intent: in efect, spectators
are caught
between the two orders. They experience their own perception as
emergent,
wrested from their control, inaccessible but also conscious. The
oscillation
draws the attention of spectators to the dynamic process of
perception itself.
The creation of meaning becomes less and less predictable and
dependent on
the course of a performance.

The Event-ness of Performance as Experienced by

the Spectator
AUTOPOETICNA POVRATNA SPREGA:
1. A performance can be seen as an event rather than an artwork
because it is
created through the interaction of actors and spectators (i.e. an
autopoietic
feedback loop). This autopoietic process is the process of the
performance.
When the autopoietic process ends, the performance is over and
irretrievably
lost. In other words, this autopoietic process and the performance
are not results or artifacts, but events
2. As an event, a performance—in contrast to a staging—is unique
and unrepeatable.
Any particular constellation of actors and spectators is singular.
The reactions of the spectators and their efect on the actors and
other
spectators will difer from performance to performance—even if the
actors
are performing a staging in which all of their actions are pre-
planned.

3.A performance is an event in so far as no individual

participant controls it
completely. This is true not only because of the bodily co-presence
of actors and spectators, but also because of the specifc mode of
presence
through which phenomena emerge and how meaning is constituted
from
these phenomena. The phenomena occur for those who perceive
them; we can say that their perception happens to a person. The
perceiving
subject is overcome by an oscillation between two diferent orders of
perception, and is placed in a state of liminality.
4) The event-ness of performance opens up a very specifc sort of
experience
for its participants, especially for the spectators. In performance,
participants
experience themselves as subjects who partially control, and are
partially controlled by, the conditions—neither fully autonomous nor
fully
determined. They experience performance as an aesthetic and a
social,
even political, process in which relationships are negotiated, power
struggles
fought out, and communities emerge and vanish. Concepts and
ideas
that we traditionally see as dichotomous pairs in our culture—such
as
autonomy and determinism, aesthetics and politics, and presence
and
representation—are experienced not in the form of either/or but as
not
only/but also. Oppositions collapse.

5. The collapse of these dichotomies draws the spectator’s attention

to the
threshold. The spectator experiences instability and the dissolution
of
boundaries as part of the event. This opens up the liminal space
between
poles such as presence and representation, and a feeling of in-
betweenness
dominates. Performances enable a threshold experience that can
transform
those who experience it. These threshold experiences might involve
specifc
physiological, afective, and energetic states as in Bob Flanagan’s
Visiting Hours or Christoph Schlingensief’s Art and Vegetables; the
shift
from spectator to actor roles as in Commune; or inversely, from
actor to
spectator roles as in the Batsheva Company’s Hora. Liminality is
bound up
with the event-ness of the performance. Richard Schechner’s
collaborator,
the anthropologist Victor Turner, developed the concept of
liminality with recourse to the work of Arnold van Gennep. Van
Gennep’s study, The Rites of Passage (1960), presented a wealth of
ethnographic
material that traced ritual’s connection to symbolically loaded
threshold experiences and rites of passage. According to van
Gennep, rites of passage across a variety of cultures can be
divided into three phases. First, in the separation phase, the
individual to be
transformed is separated from his or her everyday life and social
milieu. During
the subsequent threshold or transformation phase, the individual is
brought
into a state “between” all possible realms and has a completely
new, partly
unsettling, experience. In the fnal incorporation phase, the newly
transformed
individual reintegrates into the community, bearing a new status
and identity. Victor Turner built on van Gennep’s theory and called
the threshold phase a
“liminal state” (from the Latin limen). He defned this state more
precisely as
an unstable existence “betwixt and between the positions assigned
and arrayed
by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial” (Turner 1969: 95).
Turner elaborated
on how the threshold phase opens cultural space for experiments
and
innovations: “in liminality, new ways of acting, new combinations of
symbols,
are tried out, to be discarded or accepted” (Turner 1977: 40).
According to
Turner, the threshold phase usually leads to changes in the social
status and
identity of the individual who undergoes the rituals, and also
includes changes
to the society or community as a whole.
We will
focus on what happens when categories that structure our social
existence
collapse and how that afects participants in a performance.
Dichotomous
concepts regulate our actions and behavior. Destabilizing these
dichotomies
therefore results in a reevaluation of the rules and norms that guide
our behavior.
These conceptual pairs also allow us to categorize events: “this is
theatre”
or “this is a social or political situation.” Such categories imply
certain parameters
for suitable behavior in a given situation. When diferent or opposing
frames collide in performances such as Visiting Hours or Art and
Vegetables,
participants are confronted with potentially conficting models of
appropriate
behavior. In the case of Visiting Hours, the frames of the hospital
visit and gallery
visit collided; they occurred simultaneously and annulled each other.
Spectators/visitors entered a state “between” the rules, norms, and
orders that
would accompany each of these frames—they entered a liminal
situation.
The experience of a liminal situation destabilizes one’s sense of self
and
other, and of the world at large. Such an experience often implies
strong
feelings and changes in a person’s physiological, energetic, and
afective state.
The experience of liminality is articulated in both cognitive and
somatic ways.
A person experiences liminality frst and foremost as a bodily
transformation.
Liminality might be experienced primarily through the body, or it
might be a
state triggered by sudden physical changes in a person. Such is the
case if
intense emotions accompany the process of perception, especially
when confronting
a taboo, as was the case when encountering the ailing body of
Angela
Jansen in Art and Vegetables. Intense emotions elicit an impulse to
act and
might lead a spectator to interfere in the proceedings, thus
efectively turning
into an actor and challenging the normative relationships of a given
event
During such a performance, spectators enter a state of alienation
that is
potentially disorienting and can be enjoyable as well as agonizing.
Spectators
may experience a wide range of transformations. This is especially
true of
temporary transformations that last for part of or the duration of the
performance
alone. These include changes in the physiological, afective,
energetic,
and motor states of the body; shifts in status of actors and
spectators; or the
creation of a community of actors and spectators (or solely of
spectators. These changes take place over the course of the
performance, but often do
not extend beyond its end. It is only possible to say in
individual, welldocumented
cases whether the experience of the destabilization of self,
other,
and the world actually creates a permanent transformation,
as is the case with
rituals. Spectators might dismiss their temporary
destabilization as meaningless.
Alternately, spectators might remain in a state of
disorientation for an extended
period and only upon later refection come to a new
orientation or return
to their previous values and patterns of behavior.
Regardless of the outcome,
spectators experience their participation in the performance
as a liminal
experience. Any performance has the potential to create a
liminal experience, whether
it is a ritual, festival, theatre performance, political
demonstration, or athletic
competition. Threshold experiences difer depending on the
various kinds of
performance. A ritual involves a new identity and its
recognition by the
community; it is also irreversible. A youth who has gone
through an initiation
ritual to become a warrior will never be a youth again. In
this case, the
threshold experience is goal-oriented. In athletic
competitions, the goal is to
generate winners and losers, festivals create communities,
and political gatherings
legitimate power. In contrast, artistic performances involve
threshold
experiences that are ends in themselves. Such liminal
experiences can be
called aesthetic experiences. Aesthetic experiences focus on
the crossing of
boundaries and the process of transformation as such. Non-
aesthetic threshold
experiences are a passage to something, transformation into
something or
another.

In this chapter, we have explained the concept of performance

through its
four elements: mediality, materiality, semioticity, and aestheticity.
These elements
exist in all kinds of performance, even if they have been discussed
primarily with reference to theatre and performance art, genres that
have
traditionally been privileged in Theatre Studies. Theatre Studies is
the only
feld that studies all forms of performance. Its subject of study can
be any sort
of situation that would fall under the concept of performance as
developed
here.