Philippine Constitution Association v.

Enriquez
G.R. No. 113105
19 August 1994

FACTS:

RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled
“An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines
from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was approved by the
President and vetoed some of the provisions.

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it
violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before
the Supreme Court.

PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16
on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special
provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.

16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management
and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of
the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services.

Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of:
1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and
DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGU’s, DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of
acts of the Executive.
HELD:

The Court held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to question the
validity of acts of the Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of
Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by members of Congress. In the
absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or
impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal
standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.

Petition dismissed. Congress can not include in the general appropriations matters that
should be enacted in a separate legislation and if it does so, the inappropriate provision
must be treated as an item and can be vetoed by the President.

The provision in GAA authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension and gratuity fund violates Section 25 (paragraph 5) and Section 29 (paragraph
1) of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Only the President is authorized to augment
items from savings in the general appropriation to the executive branch. Also pursuant
to Section 29 – no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.

Further Explanation for Petitioner’s legal standing:

When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising
the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case (Luz Farms v.
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990]; Dumlao v.
Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).

While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No.
113105, he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political
(i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal
standing to bring the suits.

The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v.

Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire
membership of the Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential
veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was authorized by Senate
Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which reads as follows:
 "Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the
Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines
contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General
Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No.
19186) and For Other Purposes.”

In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been
recognized (United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384, 391 [1976];
Notes: Congressional Access To The Federal Courts, 90 Harvard Law Review 1632
[1977]).

While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the
Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not
authorized by the Senate itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888
were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.

Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases
becomes a preliminary issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of the
presidential veto and the conditions for the implementation of some items in the
GAA of 1994.

We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that
matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a
condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.

Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority
vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of
the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional Standing
To Challenge Executive Action, 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1366
[1974]).

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a

derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a case,
any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted;

"This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual
Senators as such having substantial interest in the question at issue. It could
likewise be said that there was requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would
then be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the domain
appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the situation were
reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that could allege a transgression, its officials
could likewise file the corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator
has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office" (Memorandum, p. 14).

It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI,
Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is
based on policy or political considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra
vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where
the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 159139
13 JANUARY 1995

FACTS:

On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to
conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the
poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization

program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases
of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I — Voter Registration and Validation
System; Phase II — Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III —
Electronic Transmission.

On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order

No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004
elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional
P500 million.

On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility
and to Bid".

On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president,
Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman
Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC
"due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been
conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and
procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition),
they sought a re-bidding.

A Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) to declare null and void
Resolution No. 6074 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), which awarded "Phase
II of the Modernization Project of the Commission to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC);"
(2) to enjoin the implementation of any further contract that may have been entered into
by Comelec "either with Mega Pacific Consortium and/or Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.
(MPEI);" and (3) to compel Comelec to conduct a rebidding of the project.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has standing.

HELD:

Petitioner has legal standing suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered

voters and concerned citizens and the Court has held that taxpayers are allowed
to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," or if public
money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; or when petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID
Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega
Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the subject Contract executed
between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further
ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement entered into
with regard to this project.

Further Explanation for Petitioner’s legal standing:

Respondents chorus that petitioners do not possess locus standi, inasmuch as

they are not challenging the validity or constitutionality of RA 8436. Moreover,
petitioners supposedly admitted during the Oral Argument that no law had been
violated by the award of the Contract. Furthermore, they allegedly have no actual and
material interest in the Contract and, hence, do not stand to be injured or prejudiced on
account of the award.

On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered

voters and concerned citizens — respond that the issues central to this case are
"of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's
flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity
would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus,
any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people
would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government.
Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract for automation involves
disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires
that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

We agree with petitioners. Our nation's political and economic future virtually hangs in
the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no
serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is "a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest"; in other words, it is of "paramount public interest" and
"transcendental importance." This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal
standing, following the liberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves "an issue of
overarching significance to our society." Petitioners' legal standing should therefore be
recognized and upheld.
Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a
claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," or if public money is being
"deflected to any improper purpose"; or when petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law." In the instant case, individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers,
assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used.
In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a
qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation.
Accordingly, they seek to restrain respondents from implementing the Contract and,
necessarily, from making any unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuant thereto.
Thus, we hold that petitioners possess locus standi.
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
G.R. NO. 171101
22 NOVEMBER 2011

FACTS:

The SC en banc voted 11-0 dismissing the petition filed by HLI Affirm with
modifications the resolutions of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC for
brevity) revoking Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI for brevity) Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and
placing the subject land in HL under compulsory coverage of the CARP of the
government.

Thereafter, the SC voting 6-5 averred that there are operative facts that occurred
in the premises. The SC thereat declared that the revocation of the SDP shall, by
application of the operative fact principle, give the 5296 qualified Farmworkers
Beneficiaries (FWBs for brevity) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI
stockholders or choose actual land distribution. Considering the premises, DAR
immediately scheduled a meeting regarding the effects of their choice and therefrom
proceeded to secret voting of their choice.

The parties, thereafter, filed their respective Motion for Reconsideration regarding
the SC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

HELD:

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and
that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been
rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition
under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling
in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there
was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the
issue of constitutionality.]

Further Explanation:

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very
lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the
constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. The
unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by which
judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is
favored. Garcia v. Executive Secretary explains why:

Lis Mota — the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will
undertake judicial review — means that the Court will not pass upon a question of
unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on
some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The
petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless
the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the
rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.

The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by
AMBALA (to which the FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory
Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to
support a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not
PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such
noncompliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends certain
constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be
resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover,
looking deeply into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said
section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the said
provision in the SDP that is flawed.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA
6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis-à-vis the stock distribution
component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: "[T]hat
after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell
and compulsory acquisition." Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock distribution
scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under existing law.
The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue.
League of Cities of the Philippines et. Al. vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. NO. 176951, 177499, 178056
24 AUGUST 2010

FACTS:

Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for violating
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished

or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents filed a petition for reconsideration which was denied by the Honorable
Court. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of November
2008, the judgement became final and executory.

The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly reversed its decision
upholding the constitutionally of the Cityhood Laws.

NOTE:
The League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) is a non-profit organization and is not a government
agency. It has a membership of 143 cities and was founded in 1988. The organization was formed
to help coordinate efforts to improve governance and local autonomy and to tackle issues such
as preserving the environment and improving public works.

Cityhood Laws - series of laws passed in 2007 that converted 16 municipalities nationwide into
cities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court can reverse the decision it already rendered.

HELD:

Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional

law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional,
but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be
left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine
affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law
itself.
 Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws
remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the “new cities”
or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and
effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only
the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a
matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed
validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their unconstitutionality.

Further Explanation for Doctrine of Operative Fact:

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but
the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be
left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the
operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.

However, the minority's novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the
enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new
cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to constitutionalize the
unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine
and sets a gravely dangerous precedent.

Under the minority's novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented

prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be
revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being
unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of
unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before
the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to
serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by
the Court.

The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an

exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It
can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. In Planters
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, the Court stated:

The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes
no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation,
inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the
levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code
principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the
Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation
or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the
contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as
a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose

an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied
to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in
double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a
law creating it. (Emphasis supplied)

The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an

unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law
remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In
short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.

Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws
remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws
prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and
supplies by the "new cities" or their issuance of licenses or execution of
contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the
Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the
implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed
validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court's declaration of their
unconstitutionality.
Chavez vs. Judicial & Bar Council
G.R. No. 202242
16 April 2013

FACTS:

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as
two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is
this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the
crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory
that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term
of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,”
it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.

ISSUE:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been met in this case?

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

HELD:

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when
these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an
act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to
sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true
that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say
that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and
question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the
JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land.
A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the
Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the
positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for
a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

“Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of
the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.”

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that
the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a
JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its
composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative
from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of
Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of
the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one
(1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words
of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
“Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House
of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into
half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause
disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is
reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise
mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to
expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume
that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
“Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded
because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended
a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually
adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in
the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes

no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable
when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration
of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.