In Re: Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus Parong et al vs Enrile G.R.

No. L-61388 April 20, 1983.

Facts: Petitioners, 14 of them, were arrested without warrant allegedly while

they are holding a conference in Bayombong, NV. It was alleged that all
Petitioners are members of the CPP. At the time of their arrest, Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045 was in effect. PD 2045 states:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime Minister of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby revoke
Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a state of Martial Law in the Philippines) and
Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the Continuation of Martial Law) and proclaim the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines; Provided, that the call
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect; and
Provided that in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the
residents therein, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shag
continue; and in all other places the suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also
continue with respect to persons at present detained as well as others who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposals to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses
committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith. (Emphasis supplied)

ISSUE: WON the Petitioners’ detention is legal.

SC:

(1) At the time of the arrest of the nine of the 14 detainees, they were
having a conference. All of the 14 were identified as members of the
CPP engaged in subversive activities.

From the facts as above narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially
arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection
or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes
and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or
in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their
essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the
arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing
jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

(2) The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting
armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance
of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an
armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of
the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
 warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very
survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.
If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification
in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging
a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion,
merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
contingencies continues cannot be less justified. In the language of
Moyer vs. Peabody, 1 cited with approval in Aquino, et al. vs. Ponce
Enrile, 2 the President " shall make the ordinary use of the soldiers to
that end that he may kill persons who resist, and, of course, that he
may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he
considers to stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not
necessarily for punishment, but are by way of precaution, to prevent
the exercise of hostile power."

Thus characterized, the arrest and detention of persons ordered by the President
through the issuance of Presidential Commitment Order PCO is merely preventive.
"When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life,
the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the
moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial
process." 3 What should be underscored is that if the greater violation against life itself
such as killing, will not be the subject of judicial inquiry, as it cannot be raised as
transgressing against the due process clause that protects life, liberty and property,
lesser violations against liberty, such as arrest and detention, may not be insisted upon
as reviewable by the courts.

(3) Kadja

Transcendentally important, therefore, is the question of whether the issuance of a

Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided the legal basis of the detention of
herein detainees following their arrest for Proclamation No. 2045 covered offenses. This
question has to be set at rest promptly and decisively, if We are to break a seemingly
continuous flow of petitions for habeas corpus, as what had been seen lately of such
petitioners being filed in this Court one after the other.

The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a

person for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in
force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been
made initially without any warrant, its legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a
means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the suspension of
the privilege of the writ. The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege provides
the basis for continuing with perfect legality the detention as long as the invasion or
rebellion has not been repelled or quelled, and the need therefor in the interest of public
safety continues.
The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the President as
Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a
view to determining its legality in the light of the bill of rights guarantee to individual
freedom. This must be so because the suspension of the privilege is a military measure
the necessity of which the President alone may determine as an incident of his grave
responsibility as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, of protecting not only
public safety but the very life of the State, the government and duly constituted
authorities. This should be clear beyond doubt in the case of "invasion," along which
"rebellion" or "insurrection" is mentioned by the Constitution, which contingency does
not present a legal question on whether there is a violation of the right to personal
liberty when any member of the invading force is captured and detained.

The presidential responsibility is one attended with all urgency when so grave a peril to
the life of the Nation besets the country in times of the aforementioned contingencies. In
the discharge of this awesome and sacred responsibility, the President should be free
from interference. The existence of warlike conditions as are created by invasion,
rebellion or insurrection, the direst of all emergencies that can possibly confront a
nation, argues, beyond dispute, against subjecting his actions in this regard to judicial
inquiry or interference from whatever source. If freedom from judicial review is
conceded in the exercise of his peacetime powers as that of appointment and of
granting pardon, denominated as political powers of the President, it should
incontestably be more so with his wartime power, as it were, to adopt any measure in
dealing with situations calling for military action as in case of invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is one such measure. To
be effective, the occasion for its application on specific individuals should be left to the
exclusive and sound judgment of the President, at least while the exigencies of
invasion, rebellion or insurrection persist, and the public safety requires it, a matter,
likewise, which should be left for the sole determination of the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Nation's armed forces. The need for a unified command in
such contingencies is imperative-even axiomatic-as a basic military concept in the art of
warfare.

(4) From the clear language of the Lansang case, 4 "the function of Court
is merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain
merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act. " If, however, the constitutional right to bail is granted
to the herein petitioners by the court, through the procedure laid down
under Rule 114 of the Rules of court, what inevitably results is the
supplanting of the decision of the President to detain pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2045, of persons who come under its coverage.

The specific mention in the Constitution of rebellion and insurrection along with invasion
and imminent danger thereof, shows that the terms "rebellion and insurrection" are used
therein in the sense of a state or condition of the Nation, not in the concept of a
statutory offense. What, therefore, should determine the legality of imposing what is
commonly referred to as "preventive detention" resulting from the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus, is the necessity of its adoption as a measure to suppress or
quell the rebellion, or beat off an invasion. The necessity for such measure as a means
of defense for national survival quite clearly transcends in importance and urgency the
claim of those detained to the right to bail to obtain their freedom. To hold otherwise
would defeat the purpose of the constitutional grant of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the occasions expressly mentioned in the
charter. For what indeed could the purpose be of suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus other than to restrict, at least for the duration of the emergency of
invasion or rebellion, the right to personal liberty, dictated as it is, in the greater interest
of public safety and national security.

So it is that Proclamation No. 2045 mentions not only rebellion or insurrection as

coming within the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but also
other offenses, including subversion which is not mentioned in the Constitution,
committed by reason or on the occasion of the rebellion, or in connection therewith, or
in the furtherance thereof. There need be no alarm over what libertarian jurists fear as
violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty when the President decrees the
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. Only those who give cause for it will be
subject to restriction of their liberty, as the necessity therefor arises in the interest of
national defense and survival. The constitutional guarantee of individual freedom is
intact in all its plenitude and sanctity, save only as the Constitution has envisioned the
need for its limitation, and only to a few, in relation to the entire population, as the
Constitution itself permits in case of overwhelming and imperious necessity.

(5) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry
with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress
the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be
demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured
and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least
doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

Buscayno vs Military Commission, decided after PN 2045 : constitutional

right to bail is unavailing when the privilege of the WHC is suspended with
respect to certain crimes enumerated in the Proclamation.

(6)