G.R. No.

146206 August 1, 2011

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,
vs.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS and EXEMPT UNION, Respondent

I. Facts: In G.R. No. 110399, entitled San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union v.
Laguesma,1 the Court held that even if they handle confidential data regarding technical and
internal business operations, supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of
petitioner San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI) are not to be considered confidential employees,
because the same do not pertain to labor relations, particularly, negotiation and settlement of
grievances. Consequently, they were allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. The Court also declared that the employees belonging to the
three different plants of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao,
San Fernando, and Otis, having "community or mutuality of interests," constitute a single
bargaining unit.
With that, a pre-election conferences was conducted, however, there was a discrepancy in the
list of eligible voters, i.e., petitioner submitted a list of 23 employees for the San Fernando plant
and 33 for the Cabuyao plant, while respondent listed 60 and 82, respectively.
On the date of the election, September 30, 1998, petitioner filed the Omnibus Objections and
Challenge to Voters, questioning the eligibility to vote by some of its employees on the grounds
that some employees do not belong to the bargaining unit which respondent seeks to represent
or that there is no existence of employer-employee relationship with petitioner.
In a decision of the Court of Appeals, it stated that only those holding the positions of Human
Resource Assistant and Personnel Assistant are excluded from the bargaining unit.

II. Issue: Whether or not the CA err in expanding the scope of the bargaining unit so as to include
employees who do not belong to or who are not based in its Cabuyao or San Fernando plants.

III. Ruling:
No. In G.R. No. 110399, the Court explained that the employees of San Miguel Corporation
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis constitute a single
bargaining unit, which is not contrary to the one-company, one-union policy. An appropriate
bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less
than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights
and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interest. Certain factors, such as specific line
of work, working conditions, location of work, mode of compensation, and other relevant
conditions do not affect or impede their commonality of interest. Although they seem separate
and distinct from each other, the specific tasks of each division are actually interrelated and there
exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a single bargaining unit.
Moreover, the CA was correct in ruling that positions of Human Resource Assistant and Personnel
Assistant belong to the category of confidential employees and, hence, are excluded from the
bargaining unit, considering their respective positions and job descriptions. Their discharge of
their functions, both gain access to vital labor relations information which outrightly disqualifies
them from union membership.
 HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL, PETITIONER, VS. HON.
PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, AND PINAG-ISANG TINIG AT LAKAS NG
ANAKPAWIS – HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
AND EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS),
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 179146, 23 July 2013

FACTS

On May 31, 2002, a petition for certification election (PCE) was filed by private respondent
Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis – Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and
Employees Labor Union (HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS).

In its Comment and Position Paper, petitioner HCCS consistently noted that it is a parochial
school with a total of 156 employees as of June 28, 2002, broken down as follows: ninety-eight
(98) teaching personnel, twenty-five (25) nonteaching academic employees, and thirty-three (33)
non-teaching non-academic workers. It assailed the PCE on the ground that the bargaining unit is
inappropriate for want of community or mutuality of interest.

On August 10, 2002, Med-Arbiter Agatha Ann L. Daquigan denied the petition for certification
election on the ground that the unit which private respondent sought to represent is inappropriate.

Private respondent appealed before the SOLE, who, on December 27, 2002, ruled against the
dismissal of the petition and directed the conduct of two separate certification elections for the
teaching and the non-teaching personnel.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the SOLE did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing the petition for certification election, since it directed the conduct of two separate
certification elections.

ISSUE

Whether or not the bargaining unit that the union seeks to represent is appropriate

RULING

Yes, the bargaining unit is appropriate.

The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to,
the concept of a bargaining unit: Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as
"any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of
collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of
employment."

On the other hand, a bargaining unit has been defined as a "group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective
interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be best suited
to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of
the law.

We stressed that the test of the grouping is community or mutuality of interest, because “the
basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights.

As the SOLE correctly observed, petitioner failed to comprehend the full import of Our ruling in
U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja. We quote the disposition of the SOLE:

XXXX
In the same manner, the teaching and non-teaching personnel of [petitioner]
school must form separate bargaining units. Thus, the order for the conduct of
two separate certification elections, one involving teaching personnel and the
other involving non-teaching personnel. It should be stressed that in the
subject petition, [private respondent] union sought the conduct of a
certification election among all the rank-and-file personnel of [petitioner]
school. Since the decision of the Supreme Court in the U.P. case prohibits us
from commingling teaching and non-teaching personnel in one bargaining
unit, they have to be separated into two separate bargaining units with two
separate certification elections to determine whether the employees in the
respective bargaining units desired to be represented by [private respondent].
In the U.P. case, only one certification election among the non-academic
personnel was ordered, because ONAPUP sought to represent that bargaining
unit only.

XXXX
Erson Lee Doing Business as Super Lamination v SMSLS-NAFLUKMU, Nov 21, 2016

Facts:
Erson Ang Lee through Super Lamination, is a duly registered entity principally engaged in the
business of providing lamination services to the general public.
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa ng Super Lamination Services (Union A) is a legitimate labor
organization, a local chapter affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions - Kilusang Mayo
Uno.
Union A filed a Petition for Certification Election and on the same date, Express Lamination
Workers' Union (Union B) also filed a Petition for Certification Election
Also on the same date, the Samahan ng mga Manggagawa ng Express Coat Enterprises, Inc.
(Union C) filed a Petition for Certification Election
Super Lamination, Express Lamination, and Express Coat, all represented by one counsel,
separately claimed in their Comments and Motions to Dismiss that the petitions must be
dismissed on the same ground — lack of employer-employee relationship between these
establishments and the bargaining units that Unions A, B, and C seek to represent as well as
these unions' respective members.
All three Petitions for Certification Election of the Unions were denied, on the ground that there
was no existing employer-employee relationship between the members of the unions and the
companies concerned.
DOLE found that Super Lamination, Express Lamination, and Express Coat were sister
companies that had a common human resource department responsible for hiring and disciplining
the employees of the three companies.
To DOLE, these circumstances showed that the companies were engaged in a work-pooling
scheme, in light of which they might be considered as one and the same entity for the purpose of
determining the appropriate bargaining unit in a certification election.
DOLE applied the concept of multi-employer bargaining under Sections 5 and 6 of DOLE
Department Order 40-03, Series of 2003. Under that concept, the creation of a single bargaining
unit for the rank-and-file employees of all three companies was not implausible and was justified
under the given circumstances.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted an appeal before the CA, which denied his Petition and affirmed
the Decision of DOLE. It sided with DOLE in finding that Super Lamination, Express Lamination,
and Express Coat were sister companies that had adopted a work-pooling scheme. Therefore, it
held that DOLE had correctly applied the concept of multi-employer bargaining in finding that

the three companies could be considered as the same entity, and their rank-and-file employees
as comprising one bargaining unit.
Issues:
Whether the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is warranted.
Ruling:
Petitioner argues that separate corporations cannot be treated as a single bargaining unit even if
their businesses are related, as these companies are indubitably distinct entities with separate
juridical personalities.
Hence, the employees of one corporation cannot be allowed to vote in the certification election of
another corporation, lest the abovementioned rule be violated.
A settled formulation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is that when two business
enterprises are owned, conducted, and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will,
when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that these two
entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as one and the same.
This formulation has been applied by this Court to cases in which the laborer has been put in a
disadvantageous position as a result of the separate juridical personalities of the employers
involved. Pursuant to veil-piercing, we have held two corporations jointly and severally liable for
an employee's back wages. We also considered a corporation and its separately incorporated
branches as one and the same for purposes of finding the corporation guilty of illegal dismissal.
These rulings were made pursuant to the fundamental doctrine that the corporate fiction should
not be used as a subterfuge to commit injustice and circumvent labor laws.
The following established facts show that Super Lamination, Express Lamination, and Express
Coat are under the control and management of the same party — petitioner Ang Lee. In effect,
the employees of these three companies have petitioner as their common employer
Further, we discern from the synchronized movements of petitioner and the two other companies
an attempt to frustrate or defeat the workers' right to collectively bargain through the shield of the
corporations' separate juridical personalities. We make this finding on the basis of the motions to
dismiss filed by the three companies. While similarly alleging the absence of an employer-
employee relationship, they alternately referred to one another as the employer of the members
of the bargaining units sought to be represented respectively by the unions.
We hold that if we allow petitioner and the two other companies to continue obstructing the holding
of the election in this manner, their employees and their respective unions will never have a
chance to choose their bargaining representative. We take note that all three establishments were
unorganized. That is, no union therein was ever duly recognized or certified as a bargaining
representative. Therefore, it is only proper that, in order to

safeguard the right of the workers and Unions A, B, and C to engage in collective bargaining, the
corporate veil of Express Lamination and Express Coat must be pierced. The separate existence
of Super Lamination, Express Lamination, and Express Coat must be disregarded. In effect, we
affirm the lower tribunals in ruling that these companies must be treated as one and the same unit
for purposes of holding a certification election.
The foregoing considered, we find no error in the CA's affirmance of the DOLE directive. We affirm
DOLE's application by analogy of the concept of multi-employer bargaining to justify its Decision
to treat the three companies as one. While the multi-employer bargaining mechanism is relatively
new and purely optional under Department Order No. 40-03, it illustrates the State's policy to
promote the primacy of free and responsible exercise of the right to collective bargaining. The
existence of this mechanism in our labor laws affirm DOLE's conclusion that its treatment of the
employees of the three companies herein as a single bargaining unit is neither impossible nor
prohibited. It is justified under the circumstances discussed above.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by DOLE vs. KAWASHIMA TEXTILE MFG.,
PHILIPPINES, INC.
(G.R. No. 160352, July 23, 2008)

Facts:
KFWU filed with DOLE Regional Office No. IV, a Petition for Certification Election to be conducted
in the bargaining unit composed of 145 rank-and-file employees of respondent. Attached to its
petition are a Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter issued on January 19, 2000 by DOLE
Regional Office No. IV, stating that it [KFWU] submitted to said office a Charter Certificate issued
to it by the national federation Phil. Transport & General Workers Organization (PTGWO), and a
Report of Creation of Local/Chapter.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground that KFWU did not acquire any
legal personality because its membership of mixed rank-and-file and supervisory employees
violated Article 245 of the Labor Code, and its failure to submit its books of account contravened
the ruling of the Court in Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of
Labor and Employment.

Med-Arbiter Bactin found KFWU’s legal personality defective and dismissed its petition for
certification election on the ground that at least 2 members of KFWU are supervisory employees,
thus prohibited to join the union of rank and file employees. (Dany I. Fernandez and Jesus R.
Quinto, Jr., Chief Engineers of the Maintenance and Manufacturing Department, respectively)

It held that since petitioner’s members are mixture of rank and file and supervisory employees,
petitioner union, at this point in time, has not attained the status of a legitimate labor
organization. Petitioner should first exclude the supervisory employees from it membership
before it can attain the status of a legitimate labor organization.

KFWU appealed to the DOLE which reversed and set aside the order of the Med-Arbiter. It
granted the application for certification election.

CA reversed and set aside the decision of DOLE.

Issue:
Whether a mixed membership of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in a union is a ground
for the dismissal of a petition for certification election.
Whether the legitimacy of a duly registered labor organization can be collaterally attacked in a
petition for a certification election through a motion to dismiss filed by an employer.
Ruling:

1. No, mixed membership of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in a union is not a ground
for the dismissal of a petition for certification election.

Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory
employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-
and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.

While Article 245 declares supervisory employees ineligible for membership in a labor
organization for rank-and-file employees, the provision did not state the effect of such prohibited
membership on the legitimacy of the labor organization and its right to file for certification
election. Neither was such mixed membership a ground for cancellation of its registration.

As enunciated in Tagaytay Highlands Int’l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-
PGTWO, after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and
privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for
cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.

2. No, the legitimacy of a duly registered labor organization cannot be collaterally attacked in a
petition for a certification election through a motion to dismiss filed by an employer.

Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any

petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative,
for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their
collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the exclusive
concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot
interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it;
not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification
election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the
certification election. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed
thereof.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The decision of DOLE granting the certification election is
reinstated
 ST. JAMES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY vs. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA ST.
JAMES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY
(G.R. NO. 144492, December 18, 2008)

Facts:

The Samahang Manggagawa sa St. James School of Quezon City filed a petition for
certification election to determine the collective bargaining representative of the motor pool,
construction and transportation employees of St. James School of Quezon City.

A certification election was held wherein 84 out of 149 eligible voters cast their votes.

St. James filed a certification election protest challenging the 84 votes. St. James alleged
that it had 179 rank
and file employees, none of whom voted in the certification election. St. James argued that those
who voted were not its regular employees but construction workers of an independent contractor,
Architect Conrado Bacoy

Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin ruled that the certification election for the rank and file
employees was a failure; and null and void ab initio. He ruled that the 84 voters were no longer
working at St. James. Med-Arbiter Falconitin supported his ruling using the roster of rank and file
employees submitted by St. James, which did not include the names of the 84 voters. Med-Arbiter
Falconitin also ruled that since the construction projects have ceased, some of the workers were
no longer entitled to vote in the certification election. Finally, Med-Arbiter Falconitin ruled that
even if the 84 workers were to be included in the 179 rank and file employees of St. James, the
total number of voters would be 263. Thus, the 84 votes cast would not be sufficient to constitute
a majority of all eligible voters to have a valid certification election.

The DOLE reversed the ruling of Med-Arbiter Falconitin. The DOLE ruled that Samahang
Manggagawa seeks to represent the non-academic personnel or the rank and file employees from
the motor pool, construction and transportation departments, and not all the rank and file
employees of St. James. According to the DOLE, Med-Arbiter Falconitin erred in including all the
rank and file employees of St. James, whether teaching or non-teaching personnel, in the
computation of the total number of employees. The DOLE ruled that the list submitted by St. James
contained only the administrative, teaching and office personnel of the school.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari of St. James and ruled that the
DOLE did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the ruling of Med-Arbiter Falconitin.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the labor union is valid

2. Whether or not the certification election is valid

Held:

1. Yes, the labor union is valid.

St. James argues that majority of the members of Samahang Manggagawa are not
its employees but employees of Architect Bacoy, an independent contractor.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the construction workers are actually St. James’
regular employees in its motor pool, construction and transportation departments. The
Court of Appeals also ruled that Architect Bacoy is a labor-only contractor and thus an
agent of St. James, which is the real employer.

2. Yes, the certification election is valid.

Section 13, Rule XII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
("Omnibus Rules") provides:

Section 13. Proclamation and certification of results by election officer; when proper. –
Upon completion of the canvass there being a valid election, the election officer shall
proclaim and certify as winner the union which obtained a majority of the valid votes cast
under any of the following conditions:

a) No protest had been filed or, even if one was filed, the same was not perfected within
the five-day period for perfection of the protest;
b) No challenge of eligibility issue was raised or even if one was raised, the resolution of
the same will not materially change the result.

For this purpose, the election officer shall immediately issue the corresponding
certification, copy furnished all parties, which shall form part of the records of the case.
The winning union shall have the rights, privileges and obligations of a duly certified
collective bargaining representative from the time the certification is issued. The
proclamation and certification so issued shall not be appealable.

According to St. James, the certification election was conducted without quorum.
St. James alleges that it has 179 rank and file employees in its Quezon City Campus. When
the certification election was held, none of these qualified rank and file employees cast
their votes because they were all on duty in the school premises. The 84 voters who cast
their votes are employees of Architect Bacoy. St. James also alleges that it has 570 rank
and file employees in all its campuses. Even if the 84 voters are its employees, the votes
do not constitute a majority vote of its rank and file employees because the quorum should
be based on its 570 rank and file employees.

We cannot sustain the argument.

St. James has five campuses – the Philamlife and Scout Alcaraz, Quezon City
campuses which are pre-schools; the Parañaque City and Calamba, Laguna campuses
which offer elementary, secondary and college education; and the Tandang Sora, Quezon
City campus which offers elementary and secondary education.

The members of Samahang Manggagawa are employees in the Tandang Sora

campus. Under its constitution and by-laws, Samahang Manggagawa seeks to represent the
motor pool, construction and transportation employees of the Tandang Sora campus. Thus,
the computation of the quorum should be based on the rank and file motor pool,
construction and transportation employees of the Tandang Sora campus and not on all the
employees in St. James’ five campuses.

Section 2, Rule XII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules provides:

Section 2. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion proceedings. – All employees who

are members of the appropriate bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioner
at the time of the certification or consent election shall be qualified to vote. A dismissed
employee whose dismissal is being contested in a pending case shall be allowed to vote in
the election.

In case of disagreement over the voters’ list or over the eligibility of voters, all contested
voters shall be allowed to vote. However, their votes shall be segregated and sealed in
individual envelopes in accordance with Section 9 of these Rules.

The motor pool, construction and transportation employees of the Tandang Sora
campus had 149 qualified voters at the time of the certification election. Hence, the 149
qualified voters should be used to determine the existence of a quorum. Since a majority
or 84 out of the 149 qualified voters cast their votes, a quorum existed in the certification
election.

St. James further alleges that the names of the 84 voters are not on the list of its
rank and file employees. On this score, we sustain the factual finding of the DOLE that the
list submitted by St. James consists of its administrative, teaching and office personnel.
These administrative, teaching and office personnel are not members of Samahang
Manggagawa. They do not belong to the bargaining unit that Samahang Manggagawa seeks
to represent. Hence, the list submitted by St. James may not be used as basis to determine
the members of Samahang Manggagawa.
 DHL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION UNITED RANK AND FILE ASSOCIATION-FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS (DHL-URFA-FFW) vs. BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG DHL PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 152094 July 22, 2004
Facts: A certification election was conducted among the regular rank and file employees in DHL
Philippines Corporation. The contending choices were petitioner and "no union."On the basis of
the results of the certification election, with petitioner receiving 546 votes and "no union"
garnering 348 votes, the election officer certified the former as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank and file employees of the corporation.

On December 19, 1997, Respondent (BUKLOD) filed with the Industrial Relations Division of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Petition for the nullification of the certification
election. The officers of petitioner were charged with committing fraud and deceit in the election
proceedings, particularly by misrepresenting to the voter-employees that it was an independent
union, when it was in fact an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW).The latter union,
BUKLOD, was issued a Certificate of Registration by DOLE on December 23, 1997.

On May 18, 1998, Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin nullified the certification election and ordered
the holding of another one with the following contending choices: petitioner, respondent, and
"no choice." Setting aside the Decision of Med-Arbiter Falconitin, DOLE Undersecretary Rosalinda
Dimapilis-Baldoz held on appeal that the issue of representation had already been settled with
finality in favor of petitioner, and that no petitions for certification election would be entertained
within one year from the time the election officer had issued the Certification Order. CA affirmed
the decision of the Med-Arbiter, setting aside the decision of the Dole Undersecretary.
Issue: Whether a new certification election should be conducted among the employees of DHL
Philippines Corporation.
Ruling:
Yes. The making of false statements or misrepresentations that interfere with the free choice of
the employees is a valid ground for protest. A certification election may be set aside for
misstatements made during the campaign, where 1) a material fact has been misrepresented in
the campaign; 2) an opportunity for reply has been lacking; and 3) the misrepresentation has had
an impact on the free choice of the employees participating in the election. A misrepresentation
is likely to have an impact on their free choice, if it comes from a party who has special knowledge
or is in an authoritative position to know the true facts.
The Court sustains the ruling of the CA that the withdrawal of a great majority of the members
of petitioner -- 704 out of 894 of them -- provided a compelling reason to conduct a certification
election anew in order to determine, once and for all, which union reflected their choice.
 The fact that the officers of petitioner especially its president, misrepresented it to the voting
employees as an independent union constituted a substantial misrepresentation of material facts
of vital concern to those employees. The materiality of such misrepresentation is self-evident.
The employees wanted an independent union to represent them in collective bargaining, free
from outside interference. Thus, upon knowing that petitioner was in fact an affiliate of the FFW,
the members disaffiliated from petitioner and organized themselves into an independent union.
Although petitioner won in the election, it is now clear that it does not represent the majority of
the bargaining employees, owing to the affiliation of its members with respondent.
The purpose of a certification election is precisely to ascertain the majority of the employees’
choice of an appropriate bargaining unit -- to be or not to be represented by a labor organization
and, in the affirmative case, by which one.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
 STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, versus HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT and STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION WORKERS ASSOCIATION
(CLUP LOCAL CHAPTER), Respondents.

The Facts

After their petition for certification election was dismissed by Med-Arbiter Bactin for inappropriateness,
Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, CLUP-SLECC and its
Affiliates Workers Union reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation Workers Association (CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-and-file
employees of SLECC. On the same date, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition. It alleged that SLECC
employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of employees belonging to the rank-and-file
category are its members. [CLUP-SLECCWA] claimed that no certification election has been held among
them within the last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition, and while there is another union
registered with DOLE-Regional Office covering the same employees, namely, Samahang Manggagawa sa
Sta. Lucia East Commercial [SMSLEC], it has not been recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of
[SLECC's] employees.

SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that it has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on as
the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective bargaining
negotiations already commenced between them. SLECC argued that the petition should be dismissed for
violating the one year and negotiation bar rules under pars. (c) and (d), Section 11, Rule XI, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

A CBA between [SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered with
DOLE-Regional Office.

[CLUP-SLECCWA] contended that Chief LEO Raymundo Agravante, DOLE Regional should have not
approved and recorded the voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC] by [SLECC] because it violated one of the
major requirements for voluntary recognition, i.e., non-existence of another labor organization in the
same bargaining unit. It pointed out that the time of the voluntary its registration as [CLUP-SLECC and
its Affiliates Workers Union], which covers the same group of employees covered, was existing and has
neither been cancelled or abandoned

The Med-Arbiter's Ruling

dismissed CLUP-SLECCWA's petition for direct certification on the ground of contract bar rule. The prior
voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA between SLECC and SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-
SLECCWA's petition for direct certification.

CLUP-SLECCWA appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment which held that the subsequent
negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could not bar CLUP-SLECCWA's
petition. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization at the
time of SLECC's voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and ordered for the immediate conduct of a
certification election.
SLECC filed a motion for reconsideration which the Secretary denied for lack of merit. SLECC then filed a
petition for certiorari before the appellate court. The Appellate court affirmed the ruling of the
Secretary.

The Issue

whether the SLECC's voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was done while a legitimate labor organization
was in existence in the bargaining unit.

The Ruling

Yes. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union's initial problem was that they constituted a
legitimate labor organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. However, CLUP-SLECC
and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its members to
the rank-and-file of SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union was a
legitimate labor organization at the time of SLECC's voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. SLECC and
SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
represented an appropriate bargaining unit.

The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are:

(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);

(2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule);

(3) prior collective bargaining history;

(4) similarity of employment status.

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court has categorically ruled that the existence of a prior
collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes
an appropriate bargaining unit.

The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized
establishments. SLECC was not an unorganized establishment when it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as
its exclusive bargaining representative on 20 July 2001. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
filed a petition for certification election on 27 February 2001 and this petition remained pending as of
20 July 2001. Thus, SLECC's voluntary recognition of SMSLEC on 20 July 2001, the subsequent
negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA executed by SLECC and SMSLEC are void and cannot bar
CLUP-SLECCWA's present petition for certification election.
 SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG
KAPATIRANG HALIGI NG ALYANSA (SAMMA-LIKHA), Petitioner, v. SAMMA
CORPORATION, Respondent.

Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma' Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi

ng Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) filed a petition for certification election on July 24, 2001 in the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), claiming that: (1) it was a local chapter of the
LIKHA Federation, a legitimate labor organization registered with the DOLE; (2) it sought to
represent all the rank-and-file employees of respondent Samma Corporation; (3) there was no
other legitimate labor organization representing these rank-and-file employees; (4) respondent
was not a party to any collective bargaining agreement and (5) no certification or consent
election had been conducted within the employer unit for the last 12 months prior to the filing
of the petition.

Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition arguing that (1) LIKHA Federation failed to
establish its legal personality; (2) petitioner failed to prove its existence as a local chapter; (3)
it failed to attach the certificate of non-forum shopping and (4) it had a prohibited
mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.

MedArbiter then dismissed the petition on certification election on the following grounds: (1)
lack of legal personality for failure to attach the certificate of registration purporting to show its
legal personality; (2) prohibited mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees and (3)
failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration and case was forwarded to the Secretary of Labor.
Respondent filed a petition for cancellation of petitioner's union registration.

Acting Secretary Imson rendered a decision reversing the order of the med-arbiter. He ruled
that the legal personality of a union cannot be collaterally attacked but may only be questioned
in an independent petition for cancellation of registration. Respondent filed its comment on the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner, asserting that the order of the med-arbiter could only
be reviewed by way of appeal and not by a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Department
Order (D.O.) No. 9, series of 1997.

On April 14, 2003, Crispin D. Dannug, Jr., Officer-in-Charge/Regional Director of DOLE Regional
Office IV, issued a resolution revoking the charter certificate of petitioner as local chapter of
LIKHA Federation on the ground of prohibited mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file
employees and non-compliance with the attestation clause under paragraph 2 of Article 235 of
the Labor Code.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the resolution of the Secretary of
Labor. CA ruled in favor of the respondent. It held that Administrative Circular No. 04-94
which required the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping applied to petitions
for certification election. It also ruled that the Secretary of Labor erred in granting the
appeal despite the lack of proof of service on respondent. Lastly, it found that petitioner had no
legal standing to file the petition for certification election because its members were a mixture
of supervisory and rank-and-file employees. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE

(1) whether a certificate for non-forum shopping is required in a petition for certification
election

(2) whether petitioner had the legal personality to file the petition for certification election.

RULING:

1. Requirement of Certificate Of Non-Forum Shopping Is Not Required in a Petition

For Certification Election

The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-claims,

cross-claims, petitions or applications where contending parties litigate their respective positions
regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A certification
proceeding, even though initiated by a "petition," is not a litigation but an investigation of a
non-adversarial and fact-finding character.

Such proceedings are not predicated upon an allegation of misconduct requiring relief,
but, rather, are merely of an inquisitorial nature. The Board's functions are not judicial in
nature, but are merely of an investigative character.

The rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the
Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation.
Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to
degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds
to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. Furthermore, the rule
proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and
their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration
of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the
courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies
rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.

Considering the nature of a petition for certification election and the rules governing it, the
court ruled that the requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping is inapplicable to such a
petition.

2.) Legal Personality of Petitioner

LIKHA was granted legal personality as a federation under certificate of registration no. 92-
1015-032-11638-FED-LC. Subsequently, petitioner as its local chapter was issued its charter
certificate no. 2-01. With certificates of registration issued in their favor, they are clothed with
legal personality as legitimate labor organizations:

Section 5. Effect of registration. - The labor organization or workers' association shall be

deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of
registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules. 30

-0-

Section 3. Acquisition of legal personality by local chapter. - A local/chapter constituted in

accordance with Section 1 of this Rule shall acquire legal personality from the date of filing of
the complete documents enumerated therein. Upon compliance with all the documentary
requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor Relations shall issue in favor of the
local/chapter a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations.

Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned
only in an independent petition for cancellation of certificate of registration. Unless petitioner's
union registration is cancelled in independent proceedings, it shall continue to have all the
rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to petition for certification election.

Furthermore, the grounds for dismissal of a petition for certification election based on the lack
of legal personality of a labor organization are the following: (a) petitioner is not listed by the
Regional Office or the Bureau of Labor Relations in its registry of legitimate labor organizations
or (b) its legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality in accordance with the
rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

 CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON.
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS AND CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS
UNION-PTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER NO. 832

[G.R. No. 167426, January 12, 2009]

FACTS:

1. Chris Garments Corporation is engaged in the manufacture and export of quality garments
and apparel.
2. Chris Garments Workers Union-PTGWO filed a petition for certification election with the
Med-Arbiter. The union sought to represent company's rank-and-file employees not
covered by its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the SMCGC-SUPER, the
certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. The union alleged that it is a
legitimate labor organization with a certification from the BLR.
3. The company moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it has still an existing CBA
with the SMCGC-SUPER which bars any petition for certification election prior to the 60-
day freedom period. It also contended that the union members are not its regular employees
since they are direct employees of qualified and independent contractors.
4. The union countered that its members are regular employees of petitioner since:
(1) they are engaged in activities necessary and desirable to its main business
although they are called agency employees;
(2) their length of service have spanned an average of four years;
(3) petitioner controlled their work attitude and performance; and
(4) petitioner paid their salaries

5. The union added that while there is an existing CBA, there are other rank-and-file
employees not covered by the CBA who seek representation for collective bargaining
purposes. It also contended that the contract bar rule does not apply.
6. Med-Arbiter: dismissed the PCE on the ground that there was no employer-employee
relationship because the union admitted that they were agency employees and even if they
were considered direct employees, the PCE will still fail due to the contract-bar rule.
Hence, a petition could only be filed during the 60-day freedom period of the CBA. The
employees could still avail of the CBA benefits by paying agency fees to the certified
bargaining agent.
7. SOLE: affirmed MA. The union members may be considered part of the bargaining unit of
petitioner's rank-and-file employees because the company failed to prove that the union
members are employees of qualified and independent contractors with substantial capital
or investment and added that the company had the right to control the performance of the
work of such employees.
8. The union filed for a 2nd and 3rd PCE but it was dismissed on the ground that it was barred
by a prior judgment.
9. The SOLE, however, granted the 3rd PCE.
10. The company received a copy of the decision on January 25, 2005 and filed a petition for
certiorari on February 4, 2005.
 11. A certification election was conducted among petitioner's rank- and-file employees where
SMCGC-SUPER emerged as the winning union. The Med-Arbiter certified SMCGC-
SUPER as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees of
the company.

ISSUE/S: (1) Is a motion for reconsideration necessary before a party can file a petition for certiorari from
the decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment? (2) Is the case barred by res judicata or
conclusiveness of judgment? and (3) Is there an employer- employee relationship between petitioner and
the union members?

HELD:

1. No. The general rule is that a MR is a prerequisite to the filing of a special civil action for
certiorari. Under Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, the decision of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment shall be final and executory after ten days from receipt thereof
by the parties and that it shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration. However, this
case falls under one of the exceptions, that is, when a MR would be useless under the
circumstances. The company availed of the proper remedy since Department Order No.
40-03 explicitly prohibits the filing of a MR with the SOLE.
2. No. Elements of Res Judicata:
1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final
2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties
3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits
4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action

In the instant case, there is no dispute as to the presence of the first 3 elements of res
judicata. The Resolution of SOLE on the 1st PCE became final and executory. BUT the
4th element is not present.

The SOLE dismissed the 1st PCE as it was filed outside the 60-day freedom period. At that
time, the union has no cause of action since they are not yet legally allowed to challenge
openly and formally the status of SMCGC-SUPER as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the bargaining unit.

Such dismissal however, has no bearing in the instant case since the 3rd PCE was filed
well within the 60-day freedom period. In other words, a cause of action already exists for
the union as they are now legally allowed to challenge the status of SMCGC-SUPER as
exclusive bargaining representative.
3. Yes. The company failed to appeal this factual finding with the SOLE. Thus, the matter of
ER-EE relationship has been resolved with finality by the SOLE.
 NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES –
MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER VS SECRETARY OF LABOR
GR No. 181531 July 31, 2009

FACTS: A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of
respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel) with the following results:

Employees in voter’s list: 353

Total Votes Cast: 346
NUWHRAIN-MPHC:151
HIMPHLU: 169
No Union: 1
Spoiled: 3
Segregated: 22

In view of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions, NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and
Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter to decide
which among those votes would be opened and tallied. 11 votes were initially segregated because they
were cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the Court
of Appeals. Six other votes were segregated because the employees who cast them were already
occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still five other votes were segregated on the
ground that they were cast by probationary employees and, pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote. It bears noting early on, however, that the vote of one
Jose Gatbonton, a probationary employee, was counted.
Med-Arbiter ruled for the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes, specially those cast by the 11
dismissed employees and those cast by the six supposedly supervisory employees of the Hotel.
Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE), arguing
that the votes of the probationary employees should have been opened considering that probationary
employee Gatbonton’s vote was tallied. And petitioner averred that respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered
169 votes, should not be immediately certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17 segregated
ballots would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which
HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of the majority which would then become 169.
Secretary affirmed the decision of the med-arbiter. In fine, the SOLE concluded that the certification of
HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent was proper.

ISSUES:
(1) whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections should be allowed
to vote
(2) whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent.

HELD:
1. YES
The inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary
employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The votes of the six other probationary
employees should thus also have been counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja holds:
In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether
probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code
which states that the “labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes
of collective bargaining.” Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the
resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence,
all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection
of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as
basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to “all” the
employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to
the “bargaining unit.” For purposes of this section (Rule II, Sec. 2 of Department Order No. 40-03,
series of 2003), any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the
first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization.
All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the self-employed, rural workers and
those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection and
other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining. (Emphasis supplied)

The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override the
Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon.

A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

2. NO
It is well-settled that under the so-called “double majority rule,” for there to be a valid certification
election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have
garnered majority of the valid votes cast. Prescinding from the Court’s ruling that all the probationary
employees’ votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory employees should be
excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase – from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of
the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit.
This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a
majority vote. The position of both the SOLE and the appellate court that the opening of the 17 segregated
ballots will not materially affect the outcome of the certification election as for, so they contend, even if such
member were all in favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win, is thus untenable.
It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve
as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections. The
opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material.
To be sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate
bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining representative, if the
employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the determination of who between two
or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the members of the
bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented and which union they want to represent them.
Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required
majority, it follows that a run-off election must be held to determine which between HIMPHLU and
petitioner should represent the rank-and-file employees. PETITION GRANTED.
 EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EAGLE RIDGE EMPLOYEES UNION (EREU), Respondents.

G.R. No. 178989 March 18, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner Eagle Ridge is a corporation engaged in the business of maintaining golf courses. It had,
at the end of Calendar Year 2005, around 112 rank-and-file employees. The instant case is an off-shot of
the desire of a number of these employees to organize themselves as a legitimate labor union and their
employer’s opposition to their aspiration.

On December 6, 2005, at least 20% of Eagle Ridge’s rank-and-file employees had a meeting where they
organized themselves into an independent labor union, named "Eagle Ridge Employees Union" (EREU),
elected a set of officers, and ratified their constitution and by-laws. EREU formally applied for registration
before the DOLE. DOLE granted the application and issued EREU Registration Certificate. EREU then filed
a petition for certification election.

Eagle Ridge opposed this petition followed by its filing of a petition for the cancellation of Reg. Cert. on
the grounds of misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the adoption of its
constitution and by-laws, the numerical composition of the Union, and the election of its officers. Eagle
Ridge alleged that the EREU declared in its application for registration having 30 members, when the
minutes of its December 6, 2005 organizational meeting showed it only had 26 members. That 25
members actually ratified the constitution and by-laws on December 6, 2005 and the fact that 26
members affixed their signatures on the documents, making one signature a forgery. Eagle Ridge
contended that five employees who attended the organizational meeting had manifested the desire to
withdraw from the union. The five executed individual affidavits or Sinumpaang Salaysay on February 15,
2006, attesting that they arrived late at said meeting which they claimed to be drinking spree, that they
did not know that the documents they signed on that occasion pertained to the organization of a union,
and that they now wanted to be excluded from the Union. The withdrawal of the five, Eagle Ridge
maintained, effectively reduced the union membership to 20 or 21, either of which is below the
mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reduction of union membership of EREU is a ground for cancellation of petition
for certification election.

RULING: No. The Union thereby complied with the mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement
under Art. 234(c) of note is the undisputed number of 112 rank-and-file employees in Eagle Ridge, as
shown in the Sworn Statement of the Union president and secretary and confirmed by Eagle Ridge in its
petition for cancellation. The Union has sufficiently explained the discrepancy between the number of
those who attended the organizational meeting showing 26 employees and the list of union members
showing 30. The difference is due to the additional four members admitted two days after the
organizational meeting as attested to by their duly accomplished Union Membership forms.
Consequently, the total number of union members, as of December 8, 2005, was 30, which was truthfully
indicated in its application for registration on December 19, 2005. The difference between the number
of 26 members, who ratified the Union’s constitution and by-laws, and the 25 members shown in the
certification of the Union secretary as having ratified it, is, as shown by the factual antecedents, a
typographical error.

We have in precedent cases said that the employees’ withdrawal from a labor union made before the
filing of the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of
such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same. Now then, if a withdrawal
from union membership done after a petition for certification election has been filed does not vitiate such
petition.

DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.

LAW: The then governing Art. 234 (on the requirements of registration of a labor union) and Art. 239
(on the grounds for cancellation of union registration) of the Labor Code respectively provided as follows:

ART. 234. REQUIREMENTS OF REGISTRATION. –– Any applicant labor organization, association or group
of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on
the following requirements:

(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;

(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes
of the organizational meetings and the list of workers who participated in such meetings;

(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;

(e) Four copies (4) of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or
ratification and the list of the members who participated in it.

ART. 239. GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION REGISTRATION. –– The following shall constitute
grounds for cancellation of union registration:

(a) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the adoption or

ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification.
(b)
(c) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes
of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the
list of the newly elected/appointed officers and their postal addresses within thirty (30) days from
election.
 PICOP vs TANECA

GR No. 160828, August 9, 2010

FACTS: On February 13, 2001, respondents Anacleto Tañeca, Loreto Uriarte, Joseph Balgoa, Jaime
Campos, Geremias Tato, Martiniano Magayon, Manuel Abucay and fourteen (14) others filed a
Complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioner PICOP
Resources, Incorporated (PRI), Wilfredo Fuentes (in his capacity as PRI's Vice President/Resident
Manager), Atty. Romero Boniel (in his capacity as PRI's Manager of Legal/Labor), Southern Philippines
Federation of Labor (SPFL), Atty. Wilbur T. Fuentes (in his capacity as Secretary General of SPFL),
Pascasio Trugillo (in his capacity as Local President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources, Inc.-
SPFL [NAMAPRI-SPFL]) and Atty. Proculo Fuentes, Jr.6 (in his capacity as National President of SPFL).
Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona fide members of Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa PRI Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL), which is the collective
bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of petitioner PRI.

PRI has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five (5) years and in
that CBA, all employees within the appropriate bargaining unit who are members of the UNION at the
time of the signing of this agreement shall, as a condition of continued employment by the company,
maintain their membership in the union in good standing during the effectivity of this agreement.
Should an employee fail to comply with the condition aforementioned, the company, upon the written
request of the union and after compliance with the requirements of the New Labor Code, shall give
notice of termination.

On May 16, 2000, Atty. Proculo P. Fuentes (Atty. Fuentes) sent a letter to the management of PRI
demanding the termination of employees who allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the
Petition for Certification Election of the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) during the effectivity of
the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of campaigning for and signing the petition for certification
election of FFW as an act of disloyalty to the union and a valid basis for termination. On October 16,
2000, PRI served notices of termination for causes to the 31 out of the 46 employees whom NAMAPRIL-
SPFL sought to be terminated on the ground of "acts of disloyalty". Respondent employees then accused
the petitioner for unfair labor practice

Respondents alleged that none of them ever withdrew their membership from NAMAPRI-SPFL or
submitted to PRI any union dues and check-off disauthorizations against NAMAPRI-SPFL. They claimed
that they continue to remain on record as bona fide members of NAMAPRI-SPFL. They pointed out that
a patent manifestation of one’s disloyalty would have been the explicit resignation or withdrawal of
membership from the Union accompanied by an advice to management to discontinue union dues and
check-off deductions. They insisted that mere affixation of signature on such authorization to file a
petition for certification election was not per se an act of disloyalty. They claimed that while it may be
true that they signed the said authorization before the start of the freedom period, the petition of FFW
was only filed with the DOLE on May 18, 2000, or 58 days after the start of the freedom period.
Respondents, likewise, argued that at the time NAMAPRI-SPFL demanded their termination, it was no
longer the bargaining representative of the rank-and-file workers of PRI, because the CBA had already
expired on May 22, 2000. Hence, there could be no justification in PRI’s act of dismissing respondents
due to acts of disloyalty. Lastly, Respondents asserted that the act of PRI, Wilfredo Fuentes and Atty.
Boniel in giving in to the wishes of the Union in discharging them on the ground of disloyalty to the
Union amounted to interference with, restraint or coercion of respondents’ exercise of their right to
self-organization.

Citing Article 253 of the Labor Code, PRI contends that as parties to the CBA, they are enjoined to keep
the status quo and continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing CBA during
the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.

The Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal of the respondents to be illegal and ordered the petitioner to
reinstate respondents. PRI and NAMAPRI-SPFL appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter declaring the dismissal to be legal. Hence the
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON there was just cause to terminate the employment of respondents.

RULING: NO. Union security is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop,"
"union shop," "maintenance of membership," or any other form of agreement which imposes upon
employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment.
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer
needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is
requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient
evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. These requisites
constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the CBA. The
Supreme Court held that the 3rd requisite is missing as there is no sufficient evidence to support the
decision of PRI to terminate the respondent’s employment.

PRI contends that the act of respondents are a violation of the Union Security Clause, as provided in
their Collective Bargaining Agreement. However, nothing in the records would show that respondents
failed to maintain their membership in good standing in the Union. Respondents did not resign or
withdraw their membership from the Union to which they belong. Respondents continued to pay their
union dues and never joined the FFW.

The SIGNING OF THE AUTHORIZATION LETTER to file a petition for election by the respondents was the
alleged reason why the latter were suspended. However, the Supreme Court ruled that an authorization
letter to file a petition for certification election is different from an actual Petition for Certification
Election. What was actually prohibited was the filing of petition for certification election outside the
60day freedom period. In the case, however, the petition for certification election was properly filed
within the freedom period, which started on March 21, 2000 and ended on May 21, 2000. The
authorization letter was merely a preparatory act to the filing of actual petition for certification election.

Furthermore, PRI based their decision on terminating the respondents employment on ART 253 of the
labor code which provides that it shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to
continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day
period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that
the argument holds no water. While it is incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period, they
could only do so when no petition for certification election was filed. The reason for this is that with a
pending petition for certification election, any agreement entered into by the management and a labor
organization is filled with the risk that such a labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective
bargaining representative. In the case at bar, four petition for certification election was already filed.
Thus, PRI's obligation to recognize NAMAPRI-SPFL as the incumbent bargaining agent does not hold true
when petitions for certification election were filed.

Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to the
economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA. An existing
CBA cannot constitute a bar to filing a petition for certification election. When there is a
representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a new
agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where the union members will be
forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause existing under the CBA and,
thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for certification election. If we apply it, there
will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the employees exercise their right to self-organization.
PETITION DENIED
 LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LIMITED (LEGEND)
Vs

KILUSANG MANGGAWA NG LEGEND (KML)

G.R. No. 169754, 2/23/2011

Syllabus:

1. Nature of Certificate Election - It is well-settled rule that 'a certification proceedings is

not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a
non-adversarial and fact finding character.' (Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-
Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]; Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. NLRC,
183 SCRA 451 [1990]. Thus, the technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to
grant it proceeds from an examination of the sufficiency of the petition as well as a careful
look into the arguments contained in the position papers and other documents

2. The effect of filing an independent action cancelling the union’s registration to the
Petition for certificate election- That there is a pending cancellation proceedings against the
respondent Union is not a bar to set in motion the mechanics of collective bargaining. If a
certification election may still be ordered despite the pendency of a petition to cancel the
union's registration certificate x x x more so should the collective bargaining process
continue despite its pendency.

3. Same: In Association of Court of Appeals Employees v. Ferrer-Calleja,43 this Court was

tasked to resolve the issue of whether "the certification proceedings should be suspended
pending [the petitioner's] petition for the cancellation of union registration of the
UCECA44."45 The Court resolved the issue in the negative holding that "an order to hold
a certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the
registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the
respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act
absent an order directing a cancellation."46 We reiterated this view in Samahan ng
Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Hon. Laguesma47 where we declared that "a certification
election can be conducted despite pendency of a petition to cancel the union registration
certificate. For the fact is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition for
certification, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing
its cancellation."48

Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is clear that a certification election may be

conducted during the pendency of the cancellation proceedings. This is because at the time
the petition for certification was filed, the petitioning union is presumed to possess the legal
personality to file the same. There is therefore no basis for LEGEND's assertion that the
cancellation of KML's certificate of registration should retroact to the time of its issuance
or that it effectively nullified all of KML's activities, including its filing of the petition for
certification election and its demand to collectively bargain.
4. The legitimacy of the legal personality of a union cannot be attacked collaterally –

Laguna Autoparts Manufacturing Corporation v. Office of the Secretary, Department of

Labor and Employment49 that "such legal personality may not be subject to a collateral
attack but only through a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of
assailing it.

"[T]he legal personality of a legitimate labor organization x x x cannot be subject to a

collateral attack. The law is very clear on this matter. x x x The Implementing Rules
stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested with legal
personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate of
registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a collateral
attack. In may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance
with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules.

DEL CASTILLO,J:

FACTS:

On 2001, KNL filed with the Med-Arbitration unit of DOLE, San Fernando, Pampanga, a
Petition for Certificate Election. LEGEND moved to dismiss the petition alleging that KML is
not a legitimate labor organization because its membership is a mixture of rank and file and
supervisory employees. LEGEND also claims misrepresentation and fraud in its registration.

The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition. Thereafter, KML appealed the decision to SOLE, where
it reversed the decision of the Med-Arbiter and it ordered the conduct of certificate election.
LEGEND filed a PetCert to the CA where the latter affirmed the decision of SOLE. The CA
denied the petition. LEGEND’s MR to CA was also denied. LEGEND then filed a PetRev on
Cert to the SC. One argument of LEGEND is that on 6/30/2005, the CA reversed the
March 2002 decision of the BLR upholding the validity of KML’s registration.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the 2005 decision of the CA retroacts to 2001 Petition for certificate election of KML
and its activities; and

2. Whether the registration of the KML can be attacked collaterally in a Petition for Certificate
Election.

RULING:

1. No, it is a well settled rule that an independent petition cancelling a union’s registration is
does not suspend the proceedings in the petition for certificate election. Moreover, it is also
settled that the collective bargaining process is not also affected by the independent petition. In
this case, the petition for certificate election of KML cannot be suspended by the petition for
cancellation of the union’s registration. In other words, the finality of the decision of the CA,
ordering the cancellation of KNL’s registration cannot retroact to the date of the filing of the
petition for certificate election as well as its activities including the collective bargaining process.
Therefore, the decision that cancel’s KML’s registration cannot retroact to the petition for
certificate election as well its activities.

2. NO, in many cases decided by the Supreme Court, it was held that the only way to impugn the
validity of a union’s registration is through an independent action to cancel the registration in the
proper forum. Therefore, KML’s registration cannot be attacked collaterally.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated September 18, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72848 insofar as it affirms
the May 22, 2002 Decision and August 20, 2002 Resolution of the Office of the Secretary of
Department of Labor and Employment is AFFIRMED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it declares that the March 26, 2002 Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations in Case
No. RO300-0108-CP-001 upholding that the legitimacy of KML as a labor organization has long
become final and executory for failure of LEGEND to appeal the same, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
 SMCC-SUPER v. CHARTER CHEMICAL
Topic: III-A. Bargaining Agent; Certification Election Proceedings

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE

PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS JERRY
VICTORIO - UNION PRESIDENT, PETITIONER, VS. CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
1. On February 19, 1999, SMCC-SUPER filed a petition for certification election among the
regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical with the DOLE-NCR. Charter Chemical
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor
organization because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law,
and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union.
2. MED-ARBITER: Dismissed the petition for certification election because SMCC-SUPER
is not a legitimate labor organization because the Charter Certificate, "Sama-samang Pahayag ng
Pagsapi at Authorization," and "Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-
ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas" were not executed under oath and certified by the union
secretary and attested to by the union president as required by Section 235 of the Labor Code .
The union registration was, thus, fatally defective.
The Med-Arbiter further held that there were 12 batchman, mill operator and leadman
who performed supervisory functions. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, said supervisory
employees are prohibited from joining petitioner union which seeks to represent the rank-and-
file employees of respondent company.
3. DOLE: Dismissed SMCC-SUPER’s petition for certification election because it was filed out
of time. It took judicial notice that another union, i.e., Pinag-isang Lakas Manggagawa sa Charter
Chemical and Coating Corporation, previously filed a petition for certification election which was
already granted.
4. DOLE-MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION: DOLE reversed its earlier ruling;
the DOLE found that the prior certification election filed by Pinag-isang Lakas
Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation was, likewise, denied by the Med-Arbiter
and, on appeal, was dismissed by the DOLE for being filed out of time. Hence, there was no
obstacle to the grant of petitioner union's petition for certification election.
5. CA: nullified the DOLE Order; CA gave credence to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that
petitioner union failed to comply with the documentation requirements under the Labor Code.
It, likewise, upheld the Med-Arbiter's finding that petitioner union consisted of both rank-
and-file and supervisory employees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged failure to certify under oath the local charter certificate issued by
its mother federation and list of the union membership attending the organizational meeting [is a
ground] for the cancellation of petitioner [union's] legal personality as a labor organization and for
the dismissal of the petition for certification election

Petitioner Union's Arguments

1. The lack of verification of its charter certificate is not a ground for the dismissal of a petition
for certification election. It contends that what is required to be certified under oath by the
local union's secretary or treasurer and attested to by the local union's president are limited to
 the union's constitution and by-laws, statement of the set of officers, and the books of
accounts.
Respondent Company's Arguments
1. Respondent company notes that Article 235 of the Labor Code and Section 1, Rule VI of the
Implementing Rules of Book V, as amended by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, expressly requires
that the charter certificate be certified under oath.

RULING: No, it is not a ground for dismissal of the petition for certification election
1. the Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization and Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa
Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas are not among the
documents that need to be submitted to the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor Relations in
order to register a labor organization.
2. As to the charter certificate, the Labor indicates that it should be executed under oath.
However, the SC has already decided that it was not necessary for the charter certificate to
be certified and attested by the local/chapter officers. “Considering that the charter certificate
is prepared and issued by the national union and not the local/chapter, it does not make
sense to have the local/chapter's officers x x x certify or attest to a document which
they had no hand in the preparation of.”
3. In accordance with this ruling, petitioner union's charter certificate need not be executed under
oath. Consequently, it validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization upon
submission of (1) its charter certificate, (2) the names of its officers, their addresses, and its
principal office, and (3) its constitution and by-laws-- the last two requirements having been
executed under oath by the proper union officials as borne out by the records.
 THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA, ACTING THROUGH ITS OWNER, GRAND
PLAZA HOTEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT; MED-ARBITER TOMAS F. FALCONITIN; AND NATIONAL UNION
OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES–
HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA SUPERVISORS CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC),
G.R. No. 172132, July 23, 2014

Facts: On October 11, 1995, respondent National Union of Workers in Hotel Restaurant and
Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC) filed a
petition for certification election, seeking to represent all the supervisory employees of Heritage
Hotel Manila. The petitioner filed its opposition, but the opposition was deemed denied on
February 14, 1996 when Med-Arbiter Napoleon V. Fernando issued his order for the conduct of
the certification election.

The petitioner appealed the order of Med-Arbiter Fernando, but the appeal was also denied. A pre-
election conference was then scheduled. On February 20, 1998, however, the pre-election
conference was suspended until further notice because of the repeated non-appearance of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.4cralawlawlibrary

On January 29, 2000, NUWHRAIN-HHMSC moved for the conduct of the pre-election
conference. The petitioner primarily filed its comment on the list of employees submitted by
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC, and simultaneously sought the exclusion of some from the list of
employees for occupying either confidential or managerial positions. 5 The petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss on April 17, 2000,6 raising the prolonged lack of interest of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC to
pursue its petition for certification election.

On May 12, 2000, the petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s
registration as a labor union for failing to submit its annual financial reports and an updated list of
members as required by Article 238 and Article 239 of the Labor Code. It filed another motion
on June 1, 2000 to seek either the dismissal or the suspension of the proceedings on the basis of
its pending petition for the cancellation of union registration.8crala

The following day, however, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued a notice
scheduling the certification elections on June 23, 2000.9cralaw

Dissatisfied, the petitioner commenced in the CA on June 14, 2000 a special civil action
for certiorari,10 alleging that the DOLE gravely abused its discretion in not suspending the
certification election proceedings. On June 23, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.11crala

The certification election proceeded as scheduled, and NUWHRAIN-HHMSC obtained the

majority vote of the bargaining unit.12 The petitioner filed a protest (with motion to defer the
certification of the election results and the winner),13 insisting on the illegitimacy of NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC.
Issue: WON the petition for the cancellation of union registration based on mixed membership of
supervisors and managers in a labor union, and the non-submission of reportorial requirements to
the DOLE justify the suspension of the proceedings for the certification elections or even the denial
of the petition for the certification election?

Held: No. Basic in the realm of labor union rights is that the certification election is the sole
concern of the workers,29 and the employer is deemed an intruder as far as the certification election
is concerned.30 Thus, the petitioner lacked the legal personality to assail the proceedings for the
certification election,31 and should stand aside as a mere bystander who could not oppose the
petition, or even appeal the Med-Arbiter’s orders relative to the conduct of the certification
election. The petitioner’s meddling in the conduct of the certification election among its employees
unduly gave rise to the suspicion that it intended to establish a company union. 34 For that reason,
the challenges it posed against the certification election proceedings were rightly denied.

Under the long established rule, too, the filing of the petition for the cancellation of NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC’s registration should not bar the conduct of the certification election. 35 In that respect,
only a final order for the cancellation of the registration would have prevented NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC from continuing to enjoy all the rights conferred on it as a legitimate labor union,
including the right to the petition for the certification election.

Presently, then, the mixed membership does not result in the illegitimacy of the registered labor
union unless the same was done through misrepresentation, false statement or fraud according to
Article 239 of the Labor Code.

On the issue of non-submission of reportorial requirements to the DOLE, we cannot ascribe abuse
of discretion to the Regional Director and the DOLE Secretary in denying the petition for
cancellation of respondent's registration. The union members and, in fact, all the employees
belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit should not be deprived of a bargaining agent, merely
because of the negligence of the union officers who were responsible for the submission of the
documents to the BLR.
 GR No. 170091

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES - SEC DOLE

vs

NAMBOKU PEAK, INC

x-----------------x

PHIL-JAPAN WORKERS UNION, MED ARBITER,

and SECRETARY OF LABOR

vs

PHIL-JAPAN INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

FACTS

NAMBOKU

● Namboku is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing manpower services to

various clients, mainly airline companies.
● On April 28, 2013 - Philippine Aircraft Loaders and Cargo Employees Association Solidarity
Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (PALCEA-SUPER) filed a petition for
direct certification election before the Med-Arbiter seeking to represent the rank and file
employees of Namboku assigned at the Cargo and Loading Station of PAL in NAIA
● PALCEA-SUPER alleged that it is a local chapter affiliate of SUPER; its members are regular rank
and file employees; that out of 155 employees of Namboku, 128 or 78% are its members; and,
that Namboku is an unorganized establishment.
● NAMBOKU opposed the petition on the ground of inappropriateness. It claimed that the
members of PALCEA-SUPER are project employees which employment is for a fixed period of
time.
● Med-Arbiter issued an order granting the petition for the conduct of certification election of
PALCEA-SUPER.
● Namboku appealed to the SOLE and insisted that combination of project and regular employees
would render a bargaining unit inappropriate for lack of substantial-mutual interest.
● Namboku received summons setting the pre-election conference and stating that the order
granting the conduct of a certification election in an Unorganized establishment is not
appealable.Namboku filed a Motion seeking to suspend the conduct of certification election
contending that Sec. 17, Rule 8 of DO 40-03 prohibiting the filing of an appeal from an order
 granting the conduct of CE in Unorganized establishment is unconstitutional as it runs counter
to Art. 259 of the LC.
● SOLE denied the appeal and affirmed the Med-Arbiter's Order. Namboku filed before the CA a
Petition for Certiorari.

PHIL-JAPAN

● Phil-Japan is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing mufflers, chassis and other car
accessories
● The UNION - PJWU-SUPER filed before the Med-Arbiter a petition seeking to determine the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of rank and file employees in Phil-Japan. Total 100
employees, 69% are members of the Union; Unorganized Establisment
● Phil-Japan opposed the petition claiming that members of PJWU-SUPER are not its employees -
either they've resigned, end of contract or employees of its job contractors.
● Med-Arbiter ordered the conduct of CE. Phil-Japan appealed to the SOLE.
● Hearing officer, Lourdes Chings informed Phil-Japan that its appeal will noy be acted upon
pursuant to Sec. 17, Rule 8 of DO 40-03 and that CE will proceed accordingly.
● Phil-Japan filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari

CA RULING:

● Namboku's Petition granted, reversing MA and SOLE's decisions.

● Anent Phil-Japan, CA ruled in favor of Phil-Japan. CA is was convinced that most of the Union's
members were not employees of Phil-Japan.
● CA also nullified Sec. 17, Rule 8 of DO 40-03 for being in conflict with Art. 259 of LC, hence has
no legal force and effect.
● CA denied both motions of PJWU-SUPER and DOLE

SOLE filed separate Petitions Review of Certiorari for each case.

ISSUE

1. WON the SOLE can file a petition for review

2. WON Sec. 17, Rule 8 of DO 40-03 is unconstitutional

RULING

No. The Petitions are denied. The Secretary of Labor is not the real party-in interest vested with
personality to file the present petitions. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. As thus defined, the
real parties-in-interest in these cases would have been PALCEA-SUPER and PJWU-SUPER. It would have
been their duty to appear and defend the ruling of the Secretary of Labor for they are the ones who
were interested that the same be sustained. Of course, they had the option not to pursue the case
before a higher court, as what they did in these cases. As to the Secretary of Labor, she was impleaded
in the Petitions for Certiorari filed before the CA as a nominal party because one of the issues involved
therein was whether she committed an error of jurisdiction. But that does not make her a real party-in-
interest or vests her with authority to appeal the Decisions of the CA in case it reverses her ruling.

Under Section 1 of Rule 45, which governs appeals by certiorari, the right to file the appeal is restricted
to "a party," meaning that only the real parties-in interest who litigated the petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals are entitled to appeal the same under Rule 45.

Another reason that heavily militates against entertaining these Petitions is that the Secretary of Labor
should have remained impartial and detached from the cases she has decided even if the same are
appealed to a higher court for review.

It is a well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed
to a higher court for review. The raison d' etre for such doctrine is the fact that a judge is not an active
combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions
and the appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation. When a judge actively
participates in the appeal of his judgment, he, in a way, ceases to be judicial and has become adversarial
instead.

As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should "detach
himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review."

The issue of whether Section 17, Rule VIII of Department Order No. 40-03 is unconstitutional is a matter
of great concern and deserves everyone’s attention. But this Court cannot pass upon and resolve the
same in these Petitions. Otherwise, it will countenance the objectionable actions of the Secretary of
Labor and run afoul of the above cited settled decisions. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 169745 and 170091
are DENIED.
 T&H SHOPFITTERS/GIN QUEEN CORP. ET AL. VS T&H SHOPFITTERS/GIN QUEEN
WORKERS UNION

FACTS: T&H Shopfitters Corporation/ Gin Queen Corporation workers union filed their Complaint
for ULP by way of union busting, and Illegal Lockout, with moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees, against T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen, before the Labor Arbiter. Respondents
treated T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen as a single entity and their sole employer. In their desire
to improve their working conditions, respondents and other employees of petitioners held their
first formal meeting to discuss the formation of a union. The following day 17 employees were
barred from entering petitioners’ factory premises located in Castillejos, Zambales, and ordered
to transfer to T&H Shopfitters’ warehouse at Subic Bay Freeport Zone purportedly because of its
expansion. Afterwards, the said 17 employees were repeatedly ordered to go on forced leave due
to the unavailability of work.

DOLE eventually issued a certificate of registration in favor of the THGQ Union. Respondents
contended that the affected employees were not given regular work assignments, while
subcontractors were continuously hired to perform their functions. With the assistance of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board, the parties came to an agreement. Petitioners agreed
to give priority to regular employees in the distribution of work assignments. Respondents
averred, however, that petitioners never complied with its commitment but instead hired
contractual workers.

When a certification election was finally scheduled, the president of Gin Queen through a
memorandum announced that it was relocating its office and workers in Cabangan, Zambales.
The area in Cabangan was a talahiban and the union officers and members were made to work
as grass cutters according to the respondents. When the workers did not report for work, the
officers were made to explain and the other employees were meted out with suspension. A day
before the election, the petitioners sponsored a field trip where the union officers and members
were not included. Allegedly, a sales officer campaigned against the union. Due to the heavy
pressure exerted by petitioners, the votes for "no union" prevailed. Respondents averred that the
following week after the certification elections were held, petitioners retrenched THG-GQ Union
officers and members assigned at the Zambales plant. Respondents claimed that the work weeks
of those employees in the SBFZ plant were drastically reduced to only three (3) days in a month.

In its defense, Gin Queen, claiming that it is a corporation separate and distinct from T&H
Shopfitters, stressed that respondents were all employees. Gin Queen claimed that due to the
decrease in orders from its customers, they had to resort to cost cutting measures to avoid
anticipated financial losses. Thus, it assigned work on a rotational basis. It was of the impression
that the employees, who opposed its economic measures, were merely motivated by spite in filing
the complaint for ULP against it. In addition, Gin Queen explained that its transfer from Castillejos,
Zambales to Cabangan, Zambales was a result of the expiration of its lease agreement with Myra
D. Lumibao (Myra), its lessor. Since the Cabangan site was bare and still required construction,
Gin Queen offered work, to employees who opted to stay, on rotation as well.

LA ruled against the union. The decision was appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision
of the LA and also ruled against the MR.
“Furthermore, it is noteworthy that, based on their Articles of Incorporation, T & H Corporation
and Gin Queen Corporation are engaged in the same line of business. It should also be noted
that respondents did not controvert the allegations to the effect that Myra D. Lumibao, the
supposed lessor of respondent corporations, is the wife of respondent Stennis Huang, and that
Gin Queen Corporation has been renamed ‘MDL’, but still carries on the same business in the
same premises using the same machines and facilities. These circumstances, together with the
supposed assignment of respondent Stennis Huang’s interest in Gin Queen Corporation to a third
party are badges of fraud that justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction. x x x Thus, based
on the foregoing, respondents T & H Shopfitters Corporation, Gin Queen Corporation (now known
as ‘MDL’) and Stennis Huang, as well as the presidents of the respondent corporations as of
November 2003 and the date of execution of this decision may be held liable for unfair labor
practice and the corresponding award of moral and exemplary damages.”

CA affirmed the NLRC decision. (THE DECISIONS MAY BE READ FROM THE ORIGINAL
CASE)

ISSUE: W/N ULP acts were committed by petitioners against respondents in the case at bench

HELD: YES. (BASICALLY THE SC AFFIRMS THE NLRC RULING ON THE PIERCING PART.
The rest of the decision is labor related na.) In support of their position, petitioners stress that
T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen are corporations separate and distinct from each other.
Consequently, T&H Shopfitters and Stinnes Huang, an officer of T&H Shopfitters, cannot be held
liable for ULP for the reason that there is no employeremployee relationship between the former
and respondents. Further, Gin Queen avers that its decision to implement an enforced rotation of
work assignments for respondents was a management prerogative permitted by law, justified by
the decrease in the orders it received from its customers. It explains that its failure to present
concrete proof of its decreasing orders was due to the impossibility of proving a negative
assertion. It also asserts that the transfer from Castillejos to Cabangan was made in good faith
and solely because of the expiration of its lease contract in Castillejos. The court disagrees and
affirms the NLRC ruling on this issue.

The questioned acts of petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to Zambales for its
employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the scheduled certification election; 2) the
active campaign by the sales officer of petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining
agent during the field trip; 3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center; 4) the
continuous hiring of subcontractors performing respondents’ functions; 5) assigning union
members to the Cabangan site to work as grass cutters; and 6) the enforcement of work on a
rotational basis for union members, all reek of interference on the part of petitioners.

Indubitably, the various acts of petitioners, taken together, reasonably support an inference that,
indeed, such were all orchestrated to restrict respondents’ free exercise of their right to self-
organization. The Court is of the considered view that petitioners’ undisputed actions prior and
immediately before the scheduled certification election, while seemingly innocuous, unduly
meddled in the affairs of its employees in selecting their exclusive bargaining representative.
More importantly, petitioners' bare denial of some of the complained acts and unacceptable
explanations, a mere afterhought at best, cannot prevail over respondents' detailed narration of
the events that transpired. At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that in labor cases, the quantum
of proof necessary is substantial evidence,18 or that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,
might conceivably opine otherwise.
 Coastal Subic Bay Terminal v DOLE
Quisimbing|Nov 20 2006

Facts:

Private respondents Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. Rank-and-File Union (CSBTI-RFU) and
Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. Supervisory Union (CSBTI-SU) filed separate petitions for
certification election before Med-Arbiter Eladio de Jesus of the Regional Office No. III. The rank-
and-file union insists that it is a legitimate labor organization having been issued a charter
certificate by the Associated Labor Union (ALU), and the supervisory union by the Associated
Professional, Supervisory, Office and Technical Employees Union (APSOTEU).

Petitioner’s Claims. The petitioner-company claims that the two unions are not legitimate
organizations. The opposition was acted on favorably by the Med Arbiter, who did not rule on
the legitimacy but dismissed the petitions of the respondents on the ground that the APSOTEU
and ALU are one and the same and thus the two unions were affiliated with one and the same
federation.

Secretary of Labor and Employment. The sec reversed the rulings of the med arbiter. He
declared that they separate and distinct labor unions having secured separate certifications of
registration from the DOLE. A certification election was ordered. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issues:

1.) WON the supervisory union and the rank-and-file union can file separate petitions for
certification election

See third issue

2.) WON the secretary’s decision based on stare decisis was correct in holding that the
Secretary’s ruling that APSOTEU is a legitimate labor organization and its personality
cannot be assailed unless in an independent action for cancellation of registration
certificate

Yes. Section 5, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules states:

Section 5. Effect of registration – The labor organization or workers’ association shall be

deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of
registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but maybe
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.

Thus, APSOTEU is a legitimate labor organization and has authority to issue charter to its
affiliates. It may issue a local charter certificate to CSBTI-SU and correspondingly, CSBTI-SU is
legitimate.

3. WON the private respondents were guilty of commingling

“Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are not eligible for
membership in a labor union of rank-and-file employees. The supervisory employees are
allowed to form their own union but they are not allowed to join the rank-and-file union because
of potential conflicts of interest. Further, to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge
with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors’ labor union would represent conflicting interests,
a local supervisors’ union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of unions
of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively participates in the union activity within
the company

Both unions share a common set of officers therefore possible conflicts of interests will
arise. So as long as they are respectively affiliated with APSOTEU and ALU, they do not meet
the criteria of legitimate labor organizations. This is in line with the idea that unions are
supposed to increase the collective bargaining power of employees, something that will be
compromised if supervisory employees commingled with the rank and file unions. They cannot
file separate petitions for certification election.

Held: Petition granted.