Colgate – Palmolive Philippines Inc. vs.

Gimenez
G.R. No. L-14787, January 28, 1961

Facts: The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation engaged in manufacture

of toilet preparations and household remedies. Some of its materials needs to be imported to be
used as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation, the
petitioner pays the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign
exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to
Republic Act 601, the Exchange Tax Law.

The petitioner appealed to the Auditor General to seek refund of the 17% special excise tax based
on Section 2 of RA 601, which provides in part:
“Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other
charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of … stabilizer and flavors
… shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore.”
However, the Auditor General refused to grant the refund that petitioner seeks.

Issue: Whether or not the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from
the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law.

Ruling: Yes. The decision under review was reversed. The ruling of the Auditor General that the
term “stabilizer and flavors” as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the
preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of
statutory construction that “general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result
that the general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute’s
object and purpose.” The rule, however, is applicable only to cases where, except for one general
term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar,
it is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is preceded by a number of articles that may be
classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately
following it do not belong to the same classification.

Thus, it cannot validly be maintained that the term “stabilizer and flavors” as used in the above-
quoted provision of RA 601 refers only to those used in the manufacture of food and food
products. In applying the statutory maxim of “where the law does not distinguish, neither do we
distinguish”, the Court ruled that we must not distinguish “stabilizers and flavors” used in food
manufacturing from toothpaste or dental cream manufacturing and must construe the words in
its general sense. The rule of construction when general terms are read with specific
enumerations in connection with them, it is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the
intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.

Wherefore, the respondents were ordered to audit the refund applications filed by the
petitioner.
 Victorias Milling Co. Inc. vs. Social Security Commission
114 Phil. 555, 1962

Facts: On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission (SSC) issued its Circular No. 22
requiring all employers to include in the Employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay,
as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof,
petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the SSC in effect protesting
against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly
excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and
employees' respective monthly premium contributions.

Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the SSC
to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official
Gazette. However, the SSC ruled that Circular No. 22 is merely an administrative interpretation
of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be
construed and will not need further presidential approval and publication for its effectivity.

Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is an example of administrative rule or regulation or it is

an administrative opinion.

Ruling: It is an administrative opinion. The Court ruled that an administrative rule or regulation
creates a new law, while administrative opinion merely interprets a pre-existing law.
Administrative rules or regulations are product of delegated power to fill in the details of the law
in order to carry out its intention, which has the force and effect of law.

Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what,
in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be
based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the
Official Gazette for its effectivity.
 Marcos vs. Chief of Staff, AFP
89 Phil. 239, 1951

Facts: The petitioners Ferdinand Marcos and Manuel Concordia filed civil actions of mandamus
against the respondents General Court-Martials composed each of different members or officers
of the Philippine Army, in which it is alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals excluded
unlawfully the petitioners from their right to appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted
before said tribunals, on the ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by Section 17, Article
17 of the 1935 Constitution to appear as counsel for said defendants, to wit:

“SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly

or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Congress during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel
before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case wherein the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein an offer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. . .”

Issue: Whether or not the prohibition contained in the above-quoted provision of the 1935
Constitution is applicable to the petitioners.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 17, Art. 17 of the 1935 Constitution is applicable
to the petitioners because the words "any court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-
martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our
Constitution. The phrase “any court”, used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as
counsel “in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office,” refers not only to civil, but also to military courts.
The Supreme Court further emphasized that in construing the Constitution, general meaning
must prevail over restricted meaning unless the nature of the subject matter clearly indicates
that limited sense is intended.

Furthermore, under the applicable Constitutional provision, it is obvious that the reason for
prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and the House of Representatives as
counsel for the accused in court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts,
because the independence of civil court's judges is guaranteed by our Constitution. Ubi eadem
ibi eadem lex. Hence, it is undisputable that the court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by same
authority that any other exists by, and the military law is a branch of law as valid as the others.

Wherefore, the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel before the court-martial and the
respondents did not unlawfully denied their rights. Hence, petitions for mandamus are denied.
 Velazco vs Blas
G.R. No. L-30456, July 30, 1982

Facts: The Municipal Council of Silang, Cavite authorized Emilia S. Blas to operate a cinema
through Resolution No. 3, series of 1968. The resolution expressly prohibited the installation any
device that would make it a nuisance to the community because the cinema would be near the
medical clinic of Dr. Virgilio S. Velazco. Any violation of the prohibition or other conditions
imposed for the operation of the cinema would constitute sufficient ground for the revocation
of the permit. After securing the necessary permits, Blas started construction of the cinema, but
later on, the Provincial Board of Cavite approved Resolution No. 68 which declared Resolution
No. 3 aforementioned null and void on the ground that it was contrary to the provisions of R.A.
No. 1224.

Blas still continued with the construction of the cinema despite the unfavorable actions of the
Provincial Board. Thereafter, the Board passed Resolution No. 80 advising the Mayor of Silang to
stop the construction but Blas still ignored such resolution. Hence, Dr. Velazco filed an action in
the trial court to declare the operation of the cinema illegal and to stop its construction because
(1) the noise produced by the construction was harmful to the patients of the clinic and (2) the
operation of the cinema contravenes the provisions of R.A. No. 1224.The lower court then ruled
that the noise from the construction was not a nuisance and dismissed the complaint.

Issue: Whether or not a movie theater is a place of amusement similar to those enumerated in
R.A. No. 1224 and is consequently a nuisance.

Ruling: No, the prohibition in R.A. 1224 does not apply in the case. The Supreme Court discussed
Section 1 of R.A. 1224 which provides in part:

“Sec. 1. The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city and the
municipal council of each municipality and municipal district shall have the power
to regulate or prohibit by ordinance the establishment, maintenance or operation
of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling
alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial
jurisdiction; Provided, however, that no such places of amusement mentioned
herein shall be established, maintained and/or operated within a radius of two
hundred lineal meters in the case of night clubs, cabarets, pavilions, or other similar
places, and fifty lineal meters in the case of dancing schools, bars, saloons, billiard
pools, bowling alleys, or other similar places, ... from any public building, schools,
hospitals and churches ...”

The Court agreed with the ruling of the trial court that the cinema in question is not included
within the scope of the above-quoted statute. It was said that the reason of the law in regulating
such places may be founded on the very nature of activities taking place therein. Definitely, they
detract from the quiet and sober atmosphere which is expected to prevail around public
buildings, schools, hospitals and churches. The contention of the petitioner is untenable because
a movie-house would certainly not produce the same level of noise like the amusement places
mentioned. To include this form of entertainment by analogy would constitute an unreasonable
extension of the context and intent of the law. Movies have been one of the most, if not the
most, popular forms of public entertainment in this country. It is safe to assume therefore that if
the legislators intended to include them among the regulated forms, they would have done so
expressly.

Wherefore, the Court dismissed the petition of Dr. Velazco for lack of merit.