256

#257- Jurisdiction NLRC - (Where an employer appeals and a monetary award is

involved) the employer posts an appeal bond or submits a
Soliman Security Service vs CA surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company.
G.R. No. 143215
Records before the court shows that an appeal bond was posted
Facts: with the NLRC at the same time that the appeal memorandum of
Eduardo Valenzuela, a security guard, was a regular employee of Suliman was filed on Oct. 16,1998. The NLRC, in fact, ordered
Soliman assigned at BPI-Pasay. He received a memo relieving him suliman to confirm that its appeal bond was genuine and would be
from his post at the bank and requiring him to report to the security in force and effect until the final disposition of the case. The
agency for reassignment. The following month, he filed a complaint commission’s declaration that the appeal was accompanied by
for illegal dismissal. surety bond indicated that there had been compliance with Art. 223
of the Labor Code.
The LA ruled that he was constructively dismissed and ordered for
his reinstatement. Soliman filed an appeal to NLRC. NLRC issued an
order directing Soliman to submit an affidavit that their appeal bond
was genuine and would be in force until the final decision of the
case (Nov.11,1998). On Nov. 28 sought the appeal to be declared
not having been validly perfected for failure to deposit the required
bond for the appeal. On January 19, 1999 Soliman submitted the
required affidavit and manifestation(beyond the ten-day period for
perfecting an appeal. NLRC ruled in favor of Suliman

Valenzuela brought the matter to the CA alleging that NLRC

committed grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the
appeal despite the failure of suliman to post the appeal bond. The
CA ruled in favor of Valenzuela

Soliman filed a petition before the Supreme Court

Held:
An appeal to the NLRC is perfected once an appellant:
- Files the memorandum of appeal
- Pays the required appeal fee
258. Navarro, Bocabal and Guzman vs NLRC, Cornejo and Breton
Facts:
Petitioners were jeepney drivers of private respondent Cornejo on boundary
system.
Later on, petitioners were surprised to find somebody else were assigned to
their respective jeepneys. Breton told petitioners to look for work
elsewhere.
Petitioners then filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch a complaint
for illegal dismissal.
The LA rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.
On April 3, 1992, private respondents were served a copy of the
decision of the LA
On April 13, 1992 they filed with the NLRC a memorandum on Appeal
On April 30, 1992 private respondents filed the appeal bond
The said appeal bond was later discovered to be spurious because the person
who signed it was no longer connected with the insurance company for
more than 10 year.
On July 20, 1993 private respondents posted a substitute bond issued
by another company
The NLRC reversed the LA’s decision. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: WON the NLRC erred in entertaining the appeal for failure of the
private respondent to file a supersedeas bond within the reglementary period
Ruling: Yes. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and
in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with
such legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment
final and executory. Such requirement cannot be trifled with.
Art. 223- Decisions award or orders of the LA are final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within 10
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. xxx
In case of a judgment involving monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed form.
In case where the judgment involves monetary award, as in this case the
appeal may be perfected only upon posting of a cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable bonding company accredited by the NLRC.
Here, while private respondents filed their memorandum of appeal on time,
they posted surety bond beyond the 10-day reglementary period. Worse, the
bond was bogus having been issued by an officer no longer connected for a
long time with the bonding company. This irregularity was not sufficiently
explained by private respondents. They cannot avoid responsibility by
disavowing any knowledge of its fictitiousness for they were required to
secure bond only from reputable companies. Corollary, they should have
ensured that the bond is genuine, otherwise the purpose of requiring the
posting of bond, that is, to guarantee the payment of valid and legal claims
against the employer, would not be served.
We are mindful of the fact that this Court, in a number of cases, has relaxed
this rule requirement on the grounds of substantial justice. However, we
find no cogent reason to apply this same liberal interpretation herein when
the bond posted was not genuine. There is really no bond posted since a
fake bond is in legal contemplation merely a scrap of paper. The intention
of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the
perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that
an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of cash
or surety bond. The word “only” makes it clear that the lawmakers intended
the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be exclusive means
by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected.
259 Star Angel Handcraft v. NLRC and Sps. Fribaldos(Juris NLRC) In dismissing the appeal, the NLRC said: "The posting of bond is
likewise first required before the reduction thereof is allowed." In
Private respondents filed a complaint against the Star Angel
other words, the NLRC would not act on a motion for the reduction
Handicraft owned by Ildefonso and Estella Nuique, with the
of the bond unless petitioner first files the bond, the amount of
Regional Arbitration Branch, Region IV, of the NLRC, for illegal
which he is precisely contesting. This posture of the NLRC needs
dismissal and for payment of certain benefits.
rethinking.
By agreement of the parties, private respondents were
Neither the Labor Code nor its implementing rules specifically
allowed to report back for work, leaving only the money claims for
provide for a situation where the appellant moves for a reduction of
the determination of the Labor Arbiter.
the appeal bond.
In the decision, the money claims were resolved in favor of
Inasmuch as in practice the NLRC allows the reduction of the appeal
private respondents with Helen Fribaldos receiving an award of P45,
bond upon motion of appellant and on meritorious grounds, it
347.00 and Jolito Fribaldos an award of P48,125.00, or a total sum
follows that a motion to that effect may be filed within the
of P93,472.00.
reglementary period for appealing. Such motion may be filed in lieu
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the decision of of a bond which amount is being contested. In the meantime, the
the Labor Arbiter (Rollo, p. 42). After the denial of the motion for appeal is not deemed perfected and the Labor Arbiter retains
reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the NLRC with an Urgent jurisdiction over the case until the NLRC has acted on the motion
Motion to Reduce Bond, alleging as grounds grave abuse of and appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC.
discretion committed by the Labor Arbiter in computing the award
We have, heretofore, relaxed the requirement of the posting of an
of the claims based on an erroneous applicable, daily-minimum
appeal bond as a condition for perfecting an appeal under Article
wage for the handicraft establishment.
223 of the Labor Code.
Without resolving the Urgent Motion to Reduce Bond, the
NLRC (Third Division) dismissed the appeal of petitioner for
appellant's failure to put up a bond.

ISSUE: whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion when
it refused to act on the motion to reduce the appeal bond and when
it dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioner to post the appeal
bond.

HELD:

260
VIRGILIO M. CAÑETE, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION) and
VICENTE TING/V.T. MARKETING, respondents.
Labor Law; Labor Code; Technical rules may be relaxed to prevent
miscarriage of justice.—Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that
technical rules of evidence in courts of law shall not be controlling in
any of the proceedings before the Commission or the Labor Arbiters.
Further, the Commission is required to use every reasonable means
to ascertain the facts without regard to technicalities or procedure.
Technical rules may be relaxed to prevent miscarriage of justice.
They must not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights of obligations of the parties.
FACTS
Petitioner’s version:
Petitioner worked as a helper- utility man for the business of the
private respondent. He alleged that they were made to work from
7:30 am until past 6:00 pm but made to appear in their time cards
that they worked the regular eight hours (8:00 AM – 5:00 PM). Thus,
they only received compensation for 8 hours of work and were
underpaid.
July 22, 1992, petitioner arrived at the workplace where he saw his
co-employees were already working and he casually remarked “Why
are we working so early when we were supposed to start (at) 7:30
a.m.? In fact, we (have) already been deprived of half an hour(‘s pay)
because our payrolls indicate that we start (work) at 8:00 a.m.” his
remark reached the management and on the same day he was
summoned by the respondent’s manager, where he was told that he
will not report for work the next day, and that he will be given
separation pay of Php 6K. petitioner refused and about a month later,
he filed a case of illegal dismissal, under payment and non-payment
of 13th month pay and damages with the department of labor.
Private respondent’s version:
Private respondent presented another issue where it said that the
employee was not illegally dismissed but the employee was guilty of
abandonment. The employee allegedly did not report for work after
being reprimanded of his repeated and habitual absences.
Furthermore, the private respondent said that they furnished the
petitioner a copy of notice of termination, mailed to the employees’
last known address. Private respondent also submitted to the NLRC,
petitioner’s time records which revealed petitioner’s number of
absences.
The LA: ruled in favor of the petitioner, saying that the petitioner
was illegally dismissed from service. Petitioner was awarded
backwages, separation pay and attorney’s fees. He was also given
wage differentials due to a finding of underpayment of wages.
As per the return of service, Atty. Enrique Chua, private
respondent’s counsel, received a copy of the Decision of the labor
arbiter on March 15, 1993. However, private respondent’s appeal to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was filed only on
March 26, 1993, or a day after the lapse of the ten-day period
prescribed by law. Initially, the NLRC dismissed his appeal.
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of
his appeal. He explained that the copy of the labor arbiter’s Decision
sent through registered mail was not received by him but of a certain
Nenette Vasquez who is in no way connected to his law office.
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration.9 He alleged that
service of the copy of the labor arbiter’s Decision to Vasquez on
March 15, 1993 should be deemed as proper service to respondent’s
counsel.
the NLRC reversed the Decision of the labor arbiter. It ruled that
petitioner was not illegally dismissed but abandoned his work.
Nonetheless, in view of the willingness of the employer to pay
separation pay, the NLRC awarded to petitioner the amount of Nine
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifteen Pesos and Eighty Centavos
(P9,715.80) as separation pay. Petitioner’s claims for underpayment
of wages and damages were found unmeritorious and were likewise
dismissed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.11
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
WON the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in: (a)
declaring private respondent’s appeal to have been seasonably filed;
(b) holding that petitioner was not dismissed but abandoned his
employment; and, (c) admitting and considering evidence which had
been presented by private respondent for the first time on appeal.
HELD
a. NO. We have ruled that where a copy of the decision is
served on a person who is neither a clerk nor one in charge
of the attorney’s office, such service is invalid.12 In the case
at bar, it is undisputed that Nenette Vasquez, the person who
received a copy of the labor arbiter’s Decision, was neither a
clerk of Atty. Chua, respondent’s counsel, nor a person in
charge of Atty. Chua’s office. Hence, her receipt of said
Decision on March 15, 1993 cannot be considered as notice
to Atty. Chua. Since a copy of the Decision was actually
delivered by Vasquez to Atty. Chua’s clerk only on March
16, 1993, it was only on this date that the ten-day period for
the filing of respondent’s appeal commenced to run. Thus,
respondent’s March 26, 1993 appeal to the NLRC was
seasonably filed.
b. YES. petitioner did not abandon his work but was illegally
dismissed from service. We find it incongruous for petitioner
to give up his job after receiving a mere reprimand from his
employer. What is more telling is that on August 19, 1992 or
less than a month from the time he was dismissed from
service, petitioner immediately filed a complaint against his
employer for illegal dismissal with a prayer for
reinstatement. Petitioner’s acts negate any inference that he
abandoned his work. Abandonment is a matter of intention
and cannot be lightly inferred or legally presumed from
certain equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment, there
must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to
discontinue the employment.15 The burden of proving
abandonment of work as a just cause for dismissal is on the
employer. Private respondent failed to discharge this burden.
c. NO. Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that technical
rules of evidence in courts of law shall not be controlling in
any of the proceedings before the Commission or the Labor
Arbiters. Further, the Commission is required to use every
reasonable means to ascertain the facts without regard to
technicalities or procedure. Technical rules may be relaxed
to prevent miscarriage of justice. They must not be allowed
to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the
rights of obligations of the parties.
In the case at bar, petitioner had the opportunity to rebut the
truth of these additional documents. Respondent NLRC
correctly accorded weight to these documents considering
their nature and character. These were daily time records,
certifications from the postmaster, etc., whose
trustworthiness can be relied upon. Consequently, we find no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
considering on appeal petitioner’s daily time records and
payrolls for the period August 1989, December 1989 and
April 1990 to rebut the charge of underpayment of wages.
On the basis of these documents, it was sufficiently proved
that petitioner received the minimum daily wage for said
period. Perforce, the NLRC correctly dismissed petitioner’s
charge for underpayment of wages.
261) Diamonon v. DOLE
Doctrines:
Administrative Law; Appeals; Pleadings and
Practice; Assignment of Errors; The rule that an appellate court may
only pass upon errors assigned, as well as its exceptions, is also
applicable to administrative bodies.—An appellate court may only
pass upon errors assigned. However, this rule is not without
exceptions. In the following instances, the Supreme Court ruled that
an appellate court is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive
the lack of assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned: (a)
Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter; (b) Matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation
of law; (c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration
of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of a justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) Matters not specifically assigned as
errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record
having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed
to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) Matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; (f) Matters
not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of
a question properly assigned, is dependent. There is no reason why
this rule should not apply to administrative bodies as well, like the
case before us, for the instant controversy falls squarely under the
exceptions to the general rule.
Facts:
Petitioner served as the National Executive Vice President of
the National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the
Philippines (NACUSIP) and Vice President for Luzon of the
Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union
(PACIWU).
In a letter dated March 23, 1991, petitioner learned5 of his
removal from the positions he held in both unions in a resolution
approved during a meeting of the National Executive Boards of both
unions.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the resolution on his
removal. At the same time, he initiated a complaint (hereafter
referred to as FIRST) before the DOLE against the National
President of NACUSIP and PACIWU, private respondent Atty. Zoilo
V. de la Cruz, Jr., and the members of the National Executive Boards
of NACUSIP and PACIWU questioning the validity of his removal
from the positions he held in the two unions.
While the FIRST case was pending with the Med- Arbiter,
petitioner filed on May 16, 1991 a second complaint (hereafter
referred to as SECOND) against private respondent Atty. Zoilo V. de
la Cruz, Jr., and the National Treasurer of NACUSIP and PACIWU,
Sofia P. Mana-ay. He accused them of three (3) offenses, namely: (a)
wanton violation of the Constitution and By-Laws of both
organizations,
On August 2, 1991, an Order11 was issued in the FIRST
case declaring that petitioner’s removal from the positions he held is
null and void. Private respondents appealed12this decision to the
public respondent DOLE.
In view of the pendency of their appeal in the FIRST case,
private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss13 dated October 21,
1991 in the SECOND case.
In an Order14 dated November 5, 1991, the Med- Arbiter
dismissed the SECOND case on the ground of lack of personality of
petitioner to file the complaint in view of his removal from the
offices he held.
On December 27, 1991, public respondent Laguesma, acting
as the then Undersecretary of DOLE, decided on the FIRST case on
appeal and issued a Resolution15 which affirmed the assailed Order
dated August 2, 1991 declaring as null and void petitioner’s removal
from the positions he held.
In view of the adverse Order dated November 5, 1991
dismissing the SECOND case, petitioner appealed16 to the public
respondent DOLE. Public respondent Laguesma, issued the assailed
Order dated December 29, 1992, holding that petitioner’s failure to
show in his complaint that the administrative remedies provided for
in the constitution and by-laws of both unions, have been exhausted
or such remedies are not available, was fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Resultantly, he affirmed19 the dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Order dated
December 29, 1992. However, public respondent in his Order dated
January 25, 1993 denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing complaint.
Whether or not the Court may pass upon errors assigned
Held:
No. Generally, an appellate court may only pass upon errors
assigned. However, this rule is not without exceptions. In the
following instances, the Supreme Court ruled that an appellate court
is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of
assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned:
1. (a)Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter;
2. (b)Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are
evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;
3. (c)Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of a justice or
to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
4. (d)Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal
but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some
bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or
which the lower court ignored;
5. (e)Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned;
6. (f)Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which
the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.
There is no reason why this rule should not apply to
administrative bodies as well, like the case before us, for the instant
controversy falls squarely under the exceptions to the general rule.
In the instant case, not only did petitioner fail to comply with
Section 2, Rule VIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code as amended but also the record
reveals that neither did he exhaust the remedies set forth by the
Constitution and by-laws of both unions.
In the National Convention of PACIWU and NACUSIP held
on August 10 and 11, 1991, respectively, nothing was heard of
petitioner’s complaint against private respondents on the latter’s
alleged unauthorized and illegal disbursement of union funds. In fact,
what the National Convention resolved was to approve and adopt the
resolution of the National Executive Board removing petitioner from
the positions he held. His failure to seek recourse before the National
Convention on his complaint against private respondents taints his
action with prematurity.
When the Constitution and by-laws of both unions dictated
the remedy for intra-union dispute, such as petitioner’s complaint
against private respondents for unauthorized or illegal disbursement
of unions funds, this should be resorted to before recourse can be
made to the appropriate administrative or judicial body, not only to
give the grievance machinery or appeals’ body of the union the
opportunity to decide the matter by itself, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to administrative or judicial bodies.
Thus, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate
the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also
pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention. This rule clearly applies to the instant case. The
underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body,
or grievance machinery, as in this case, is afforded a chance to pass
upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly. Petitioner’s
premature invocation of public respondent’s intervention is fatal to
his cause of action.
 Evidently, when petitioner brought before the DOLE his
complaint charging private respondents with unauthorized and illegal
disbursement of union funds, he overlooked or deliberately ignored
the fact that the same is clearly dismissible for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Thus, public respondent Bienvenido E.
Laguesma, in dismissing petitioner’s complaint, committed no grave
abuse of discretion.
Notes.—Non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not jurisdictional—it only renders the
action premature, i.e., the claimed cause of action is
not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason
a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court.
(Carale vs. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 132 [1997])
Only judicial review of decisions of administrative
agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial
function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.
(Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs.
Philippine Coconut Authority, 286 SCRA 109 [1998])
The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies rests on the presumption
that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete
chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly.
262. De Ocampo v NLRC
FACTS:
Petitioners are employees of the Baliwag Mahogany Corporation. They are
either officers or members of the Baliwag Mahogany Corporation Union-
CFW, the existing collective bargaining agent of the rank and file
employeees. The company and the union entered into a CBA containing,
among other things, provisions on conversion into cash of unused vacation
and sick leaves.
The union made several requests from the company. The company ruled to
allow payment of unused vacation and sick leaves for the period of 1987-
1988 but disallowed cash conversion of the 1988-1989 unused leaves.The
company suspended 20 employees for a period of 3 days because of failure
to render overtime work. On the same day, the union filed a notice of
strike on the grounds of ULP particularly the violation of the CBA on non-
payment of unused leaves and illegal dismissal of 7 employees.
The company issued a notice of termination to 3 employees including Cecile
de Ocampo allegedly to effect cost reduction and redundancy. The
members of the union conducted a picket at the main gate of the company.
On the same day, the company filed a petition to declare the strike illegal.
During the election of union officers, Cecile de Ocampo was elected as
president.
Conciliation meeting held at NCMB, the issue pertaining to the legality of
the termination of 3 union members. But both parties agreed to discuss it
separately. Union requested for the presence of a NCMB representative
during a strike vote held by the union. Strike vote resulted in favor of the
strike. The union staged a strike.
Company filed a petition to assume jurisdiction with the DOLE. The
company also filed an amended petition, praying, that the strike staged by
the union be declared illegal, there being no genuine strikable issue
The Secretary an order, certified the entire labor dispute to the respondent
Commission for compulsory arbitration and directed all striking workers
including the dismissed employees to return to work and the management
to accept them back.
The sheriff, with the assistance of the policemen removed the barricades
and opened the main gate of the company. Criminal complaints for illegal
assembly, grave threats, and grave coercion were filed against the
petitioners.
The respondent Commission rendered a decision declaring the strikes
staged illegal and reinstatement of the petitioners, but later modified
through MR of the Company, declaring the lost of employment status of the
petitioners.
ISSUE: WON there is a legal basis for declaring the loss of employment
status by petitioners on account of the strike in respondent Company.
HELD:
Yes. The Solicitor General claims that it is undisputed that the union
resorted to illegal acts during the strike arguing that private respondent’s
personnel manager specifically identified the union officers and members
who committed the prohibited acts and actively participated therein.
Article 264. (a) Prohibited activities. (a) ––
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute
to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of
an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages.
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status…
The clear mandate of the aforequoted article was stressed in the case of
Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc. Where it was held that
a strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor
of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and
thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor
Code as Amended and the Union officers and members, as a result, are
deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly
participated in an illegal act.
The Solicitor General maintains that the illegality of the strike likewise
stems from the failure of the petitioners to honor the certification order and
heed the return-to-work order issued by the Secretary of Labor.
Unrebutted evidence shows that the individual petitioners defied the
return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor. Hence, the termination of
the services of the individual petitioners is justified on this ground alone.
263. ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES VS. NATIONAL Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND BIENVENIDO Secretary of Labor, whose decisions are then appealable to
ARCAYOS the Office of the President. However, the new rules do not
G.R. NO. 130866 anymore provide provisions regarding appellate review for
decisions rendered by the NLRC.
SEPTEMBER 16, 1998

However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon

themselves to review such decisions from the NLRC by virtue
Facts: Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St.
of their role under the check and balance system and the
Martin Funeral Homes for misappropriating funds worth Php
perceived intention of the legislative body who enacted the
38,000 which was supposed to be taxes paid to the Bureau of
new rules.
Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal was illegal,
respondent filed a case against St. Martin Funeral Homes in
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). “It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to
scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute;
Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the
that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative
respondent is not an employee due to the lack of an employer-
agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights
employee contract. In addition, respondent is not listed on St.
of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and
Martin’s monthly payroll.
balances which restricts the separation of powers and
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”
indeed, there was no employer-employee relationship between
the two and hence, there could be no illegal dismissal in such
a situation. The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the appeal or certiorari should have been filed initially to the
Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle of hierarchy
The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set
of courts. As such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
aside the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter.
the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by
the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court –
alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for

certiorari was properly filed in the Supreme Court.

Held: No.
264
Veloso VS. China Airlines
Doctrines:
 The precipitate filing of petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 without first moving for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution warrants the outright dismissal of
the case. A motion for reconsideration is indispensible,
for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors
or mistakes it might have committed before resorts to
the courts can be held.
 Certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law against acts of the public respondent. –
In the case at bar, the plain and adequate remedy
expressly provided by law is a motion for
reconsideration of the impugned resolution, to be
made under oath and filed within 10 days from
receipt of the questioned resolution of the NLRC, a
procedure which is jurisdictional.
 Without a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed
within 10 day reglementary period, an order, decision
or resolution of the NLRC becomes final and executory
after 10 days from receipt thereof.
 Thus, before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner
must have filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order or act complained of to enable the tribunal,
board or office concerned to pass upon and correct its
mistakes, if any without the intervention of the higher
court.
Facts:
Petitioner, Rebecca Veloso was employed as supervisor of the
ticketing section of respondent China Airlines Ltd.
(CAL). Private respondent K.Y. Chang, then district manager of
the Manila branch office of CAL, informed petitioner that
management had decided to temporarily close its ticketing
section in order to prevent further losses. CAL decided to
permanently close said ticketing section. Thus, petitioner and
her staff members were informed that their recent lay-off
from employment will be considered permanent, effective
one month from receipt of such notice. A notice of said
retrenchment was filed with the labor department.
Petitioner filed with the Arbitration Branch of NLRC a
complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages
and attorney's fees. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of
petitioner. Private respondents appealed to the NLRC.
Petitioner received copy of the aforesaid resolution of public
respondent. However, instead of filing the required motion for
reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the filing petition for certiorari under Rule 65n warrants
the outright dismissal of this case.
HELD: The filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65
without first moving for reconsideration of the assailed
resolution warrants the outright dismissal of this case. As we
have consistently held in numerous cases,a motion for
reconsideration is indispensable, for it affords the NLRC an
opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have
committed before resort to the courts can be had.
It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law against acts of public respondent. In this case,
the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law is a
motion for reconsideration of the impugned resolution, to be
made under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of
the questioned resolution of the NLRC, a procedure which
is jurisdictional. Hence, the filing of the petition forcertiorari in
this case is patently violative of prevailing jurisprudence and
will not prosper without undue damage to the fundamental
doctrine that undergirds the grant of this prerogative writ.
 Case no. 265
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (3rd Division) and MARCELITO PESCANTE, respondents.
Labor Law; Certiorari; When the findings of the NLRC contradict those
of the labor arbiter, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, must of necessity review the records of the case to
determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to
the evidentiary facts.—To begin with, we reiterate the rule that in
certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, this Court does not assess and
weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor arbiter and
public respondent NLRC based their decisions. Our query is limited to
the determination of whether or not public respondent acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering
the assailed decisions. But when the findings of the NLRC contradict
those of the labor arbiter, this Court, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, must of necessity review the records of the case to
determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to
the evidentiary facts, as in this case.
FACTS:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the Decision of
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on June 20,
1996, in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-04118-94, and its Resolution dated
September 12, 1996, which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
1. Private respondent Marcelito Pescante and another PAL employee,
Edgar Vicente, were assigned to handle petitioner’s flight PR 841 bound
for Cebu as load controller and check-in clerk, respectively.
As load controller, private respondent’s main task is to manifest the
baggage of passengers with reference to their respective weights and to
determine the proper load balance of the aircraft. As check-in clerk,
Vicente’s duty is to check-in the passengers and place the
corresponding tags on their luggage. The checkin clerk takes down the
weight of the passenger’s baggage, then reflects the same on the
tickets that are eventually passed on to the load controller who uses
the same as the basis in determining the load of the aircraft. As a policy,
load controllers are prohibited from assisting in the checking-in of
passengers to prevent collusion with the check-in clerks.
2. A passenger named Myla Cominero checked in for the flight. She was
escorted by Sgt. Jose Tompong, the police assistance officer assigned at
the domestic airport.
3. According to Sgt. Tompong, the passenger asked him to hand over Ed
Vicente 1000Php as payment for her over baggage and when Sgt
Tompong asked what the money was for the passenger said it was for
the “excess baggage” allegedly fixed by Ed Vicente.
4. It appears that Vicente reflected a lighter weight of baggage on
Cominero’s ticket to make it appear that the same was within the
allowable level. Cominero’s excess baggage was pooled with other
passengers with lesser baggage weight or no baggage at all. After
checking-in, Cominero left.
5. When the anomaly was discovered, Vicente hastily went to the
cashier, Loreto Condez, to pay the excess baggage fee.
6. PAL filed an administrative case against private respondent and
Vicente with “fraud against the company” as defined under petitioner’s
Code of Discipline.
Accordingly, private respondent and Vicente submitted their respective
affidavits in answer to the charge. After several hearings, both were
found guilty as charged and were meted the penalty of dismissal from
the service. Private respondent elevated his case to petitioner’s Step III
Grievance, but the same was denied.
7. Private respondent filed before the labor arbiter, a complaint for
illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of
backwages, damages and attorney’s fees.
Labor arbiter ruled that private respondent had direct involvement in
the illegal pooling of baggage, which is a scheme to obtain secret
profits, for himself and that such act of attempting to defraud
petitioner of its revenues warranted the termination of private
respondent from the service. Thus DISMISSED from service.
8. Dissatisfied with the decision, private respondent appealed to the
NLRC, which in its assailed decision dated June 20, 1996, reversed the
labor arbiter’s decision.
Justification of NLRC: the NLRC declared that the alleged defrauding of
petitioner’s excess baggage revenue was not the handiwork of private
respondent. The labor tribunal further held that petitioner failed to
show that it suffered losses in revenues as a consequence of private Condez averred that Vicente paid the excess baggage fee of Cominero
respondent’s questioned act. It then disposed of the case as follows: long after the aircraft had departed, after which, private respondent
ordered Vicente to photocopy the excess baggage receipt and send a
ISSUE: W/N NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the copy to Cebu via flight PR 839.
decision of the Labor Arbiter
In the case at bar, there is substantial evidence showing that private
HELD: Yes! respondent had direct involvement in the illegal pooling of baggage.
First, private respondent urged Pelayo to check-in Cominero by proxy.
1. To begin with, we reiterate the rule that in certiorari proceedings
Failing to convince Pelayo, he chided the latter by saying “Pare ang laki
under Rule 65, this Court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of
naman yata ng daga mo sa dibdib.” and then called Vicente who in turn
evidence upon which the labor arbiter and public respondent NLRC
willingly cooperated in checking-in Cominero. Second, when the
based their decisions. Court’s query is limited to the determination of
anomaly was uncovered, private respondent approached Sgt. Tompong
whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of
and said, “Sarge, pakibalik mo na lang ang pera dahil mayroon itong
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed
problema.” Third, private respondent handed the money amounting to
decisions. But when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the
P1,000.00 to Vicente, which the latter used to pay the excess baggage
labor arbiter, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, must
fee. Fourth, private respondent instructed Vicente to call a fellow load
of necessity review the records of the case to determine which
controller in Mactan airport to intercept Cominero and fix the matter.
findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary
Fifth, private respondent did not report the matter to his supervisors
facts, as in this case.
although it is the practice whenever one is confronted with situation of
2. Court held that it was erroneous to discredit the statement of the same nature.
Vicente just because he appears guilty too. Rather, Vicente’s
Surely, had the irregularity not been accidentally discovered, private
declaration must be weighed side by side the testimonies of other
respondent would have enriched himself at the expense of petitioner.
witnesses regarding the incident.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of NLRC is
As to Pelayo’s statement, it should not be considered biased in the
hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is
absence of proof showing that the declarant was actuated by ill motive.
REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in that the award therein of
Save for his bare denials, private respondent did not give any plausible
P5,000.00 financial assistance is deleted for lack of factual and legal
reason, much less presented evidence, to show that his coworkers were
basis
moved by ill will in testifying against him. Verily, the testimonies of
persons not shown to be harboring any motive to depose falsely against
an employee must be given due credence, particularly where no
rational motive is shown why the employer would single out private
respondent for dismissal unless the latter were truly guilty of serious
offense.

That the statements of Vicente and Pelayo are credible is shown by the
fact that these are replete with essential details, which interlock with
the declarations of other witnesses. Thus, Sgt. Tompong declared that
at around 5 p.m. private respondent retrieved from him the money
earlier given by Vicente because a problem cropped up. Next, another
PAL employee, Irene Cancio in her sworn statement, asserted that
private respondent ordered the alterations in the flight coupons so as
to reflect the true charges on excess baggage of Cominero. Then,
266
#267- Jurisdiction- Supreme Court

Tancinco vs GSIS
G.R. No. 132916

Facts:
SPO1 Eddie Tancinco was shot dead by five unidentified armed men
while he was repairing a service vehicle in front of his house. He was
assigned as part of the close-in security detail of then Vice-President
Joseph E. Estrada, however, he was off-duty at the time of his death
as Estrada was in the US for medical treatment. His wife filed a claim
for benefits before the GSIS which was denied due to the lack of
proof that SPO1 Tancinco’s death was work-related. Mrs. Tancinco
filed a petition before the EEC but was denied. She then filed the
petition before the CA but was again denied.

Held:
The instant petition before the SC was not timely filed. Under
Section 1 Rule 45 of the former revised rules of court which was
then still in effect, an appeal from a decision rendered by the CA
must be made within 15 days from the notice of judgement or the
denial of a motion for reconsideration filed in due time.

In the case at bar, petitioner filed her motion 231 days late thereby
rendering the said resolution final and executory. The period of
appeal is not only mandatory, but more importantly, it is
jurisdictional.

268. ABALOS vs. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 140374 November 27, 2002
DOCTRINES:
Remedial Law; Judgments; Rule that once a judgment attains
finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable admits of
exceptions.—A basic tenet in our rules of procedure is that an
award that is final and executory cannot be amended or modified
anymore. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment
attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
court of the land. However, this rule is subject to exceptions as
stated in the case of David vs. CA, 316 SCRA 710 (1999), cited by
respondent: One exception is that where facts and/or events
transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts and/or
events present a supervening cause or reason which renders the
final and executory decision no longer enforceable. Under the law,
the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same has
become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration
transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.
Fact that the decision has become final does not preclude a
modification or an alteration thereof because even with the
finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or
unjust, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same with
justice and the facts
Labor Law; Dismissals; Reinstatement; Doctrine of “strained
relations” is inapplicable to a situation where the employee has no
say in the operation of the employer’s business
Appeals; Factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have
acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction
are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind
the Court when supported by substantial evidence.—Regrettably,
petitioners now raise questions the determination of which would
require the Court to look into the evidence adduced by the parties.
This cannot be done in a petition for review on certiorari. It is
outside its purview under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
Factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally
accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when
supported by substantial evidence. It is not our function to assess
and evaluate the evidence all over again, particularly where the
findings of both the arbitrator and the Court of Appeals coincide.
Thus, in this case, absent a showing of an error of law committed by
the court below, or of whimsical or capricious exercise of its
judgment, or a demonstrable lack of basis for its conclusions, we
may not disturb its factual findings, much less reverse its judgment
outright.
FACTS:
A manpower audit conducted by respondent Philex revealed that
241 of its employees were redundant. Thus, Philex undertook a
retrenchment program that resulted in the termination of
petitioners’ employment. Consequently, petitioners filed a case for
illegal dismissal against respondent. The case was submitted for
arbitration through the NCMB.
The Voluntary Arbitrator ordered the reinstatement the
Complainants and Intervenors to their former positions with back
wages without loss of seniority and privileges.
On appeal, the CA ruled that while there was indeed a valid reason
for retrenchment, the means employed were disadvantageous, thus
inequitable, to the affected workers.
Philex filed a manifestation and motion for leave to offer separation
pay to petitioners, in lieu of reinstatement, alleging that petitioners’
positions no longer existed and that there arose strained relations
between the parties that effectively barred reinstatement. The
motion was granted by the Arbitrator.
Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
on the ground that Arbitrator Juan Valdez acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order directing their reinstatement became final
and executory, hence Arbitrator Valdez no longer had jurisdiction to
modify the same.
RULING:
A basic tenet in our rules of procedure is that an award that is final
and executory cannot be amended or modified anymore. Nothing is
more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by
the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.
However, this rule is subject to exceptions as stated in the case of
David vs. CA, 316 SCRA 710 (1999), cited by respondent:
One exception is that where facts and/or events transpire after a
decision has become executory, which facts and/or events present a
supervening cause or reason which renders the final and executory
decision no longer enforceable. Under the law, the court may
modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become
executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances
justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired
after the judgment has become final and executory.
In Deltaventures Resources Inc. vs. Cabato, 327 SCRA 521 (2000), we
held that “jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of
the parties but continues until the case is terminated.” The power of
a voluntary arbitrator to issue a writ of execution carries with it the
power to inquire into the correctness of its execution and to
consider whatever supervening events transpire during execution.
Therefore, we are in agreement with the appellate court that a
voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction to amend the mode of
executing an award if and when the case merits such amendment.
However, we find respondent’s reliance on the doctrine of “strained
relations” misplaced. In Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Quijano, we
stated that said doctrine is inapplicable to a situation where the
employee has no say in the operation of the employer’s business.
Petitioners herein are part of the rank-and-file workforce; they are
cooks, miners, helpers and mechanics of the respondent.

As held also in the Mercury Drug case:

To protect labor’s security of tenure, we emphasize that the

doctrine of strained relations should be strictly applied so as not to
deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his right to
reinstatement. Every labor dispute almost always results in strained
relations and the phrase cannot be given an overarching
interpretation, otherwise an unjustly dismissed employee can never
be reinstated.

Despite our sympathy for the workers’ plight, however, we find no

legal support for their opposition to the conclusion and findings of
the voluntary arbitrator and the Court of Appeals.

Petition is DENIED.
269) SGS Far East v. NLRC
Doctrines:
Labor Law; Appeals; Executions; Public respondent gravely abused
its discretion in refusing to assume jurisdiction over the appeal of the
petitioners.—The public respondent gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to assume jurisdiction over the appeal of the petitioners. Its
refusal is based on the general rule that “after a decision has become
final, the prevailing party becomes entitled as a matter of right to its
execution, that it becomes merely the ministerial duty of the court to
issue the execution.” The general rule, however, cannot be applied
where the writ of execution is assailed as having varied the decision.
Same; Same; Same; National Labor Relations
Commission is vested with authority to look into the correctness of
the execution of the decision and to consider supervening events that
may affect such execution.—In Bliss Development Corporation v.
NLRC, we held that “the NLRC is vested with authority to look into
the correctness of the execution of the decision and to consider
supervening events that may affect such execution.” We explained
the rational for the remedy in Matuiguina Integrated Wood Products
v. CA, viz.: “. . . where the execution is not in harmony with the
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no
validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional
provision against depriving a person of his property without due
process of law.”
Facts:
It appears that on February 2, 1982, a complaint for
underpayment of wages and violation of labor standard laws,
docketed as NLRC Case No. NCR-2- 2095-82, was filed by private
respondent Philippine Social Security Labor Union Federation
(PSSLU) and thirteen (13) of its members. On August 4, 1982, the
case was amicably settled when the parties executed a compromise
agreement
Thus, NLRC Case No. NCR-2-2095-82 was dismissed in an
order issued by Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela dated August
24, 1982.4 The Deed of Release and Quitclaim was executed and
signed by the complainants. Three (3) years later or on August 16,
1985, private respondents Crisanto Ortiz, Mauricio
Forbes, Jr., Tony Lim and Arturo Gallardo filed a
Manifestation and Motion before the Office of Labor Arbiter
Emerson Tumanon alleging that: (1) they were not allowed to work
by SGS;5 (2) SGS has not complied with Presidential Decrees and
Wage Orders; (3) they were not given priority in employment; and (4)
SGS violated the August 4, 1982 Compromise Agreement. Petitioner
SGS filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that Labor Arbiter Tumanon
had no jurisdiction to decide private respondents’ Motion and
Manifestation which raised a cause of action not covered by the
Compromise Agreement. It also alleged compliance with the
compromise agreement and labor laws governing wages.
On February 6, 1989, Labor Arbiter Tumanon denied the
Motion to dismiss.
SGS appealed to the NLRC. On August 8, 1991, the NLRC
reversed Labor Arbiter Tumanon and ruled that the latter had no
jurisdiction to decide private respondents’ Motion and Manifestation.
It held that private respondents should file a new case.7 Private
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied on September 3,
1991. They then filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court
which was docketed as G.R. No. 101698. On March 23, 1994, the
First Division of this Court set aside the ruling of the NLRC and
resolved that Labor Arbiter Tumanon had jurisdiction to decide the
claims of private respondents.
After entry of judgment, the case was referred to a different
labor arbiter, Valentin C. Reyes, for execution. Labor Arbiter Reyes
required the parties to submit their respective computations of the
monetary award given in the decision of Labor Arbiter Tumanon.
 Private respondents’ computation reached P4,806,052.41.
The computation of petitioners merely totalled P298,552.48.10

Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter Reyes erred in ordering

the payment of P4,806,052.41 to complainants,
as the award is unreasonable, excessive and
varied the tenor of the judgment.

Held:
The public respondent gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to assume jurisdiction over the appeal of the petitioners. Its
refusal is based on the general rule that “after a decision has become
final, the prevailing party becomes entitled as a matter of right to its
execution, that it becomes merely the ministerial duty of the court to
issue the execution.” The general rule, however, cannot be applied
where the writ of execution is assailed as having varied the decision.
In the case at bar, petitioners have vigorously assailed the correctness
of the computation of arbiter Reyes. They also alleged it has
materially altered the decision of arbiter Tumanon. Among others,
petitioners contend that: (1) the salary rate for the computation of the
three (3) years backwages should be the last salary rate received; and
(2) the award of 200% monthly basic pay for every year of service is
not within the purview of the judgment sought to be executed. If
petitioners are correct, they are entitled to the remedy of appeal to
the NLRC.18 In Bliss Development Corporation v.
NLRC, we held that “the NLRC is vested with authority to look into
the correctness of the execution of the decision and to consider
supervening events that may affect such execution.” We explained
the rational for the remedy in Matuiguina Integrated Wood Products
v. CA,20 viz.: “. . . where the execution is not in harmony with the
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no
validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional
provision against depriving a person of his property without due
process of law.”
270. Maternity Children’s Hospital v. Secretary of Labor
FACTS: The case concerns 10 employees of the petitioner, employed
in different capacities, filed a complaint before the Office of
Regional Director of Labor and Employment for underpayment of
salaries and ECOLA. The Regional Director directed his two Labor
Standard and Welfare Officers to inspect the records of the
petitioner to ascertain the truths of the complaints. When they
submitted the report confirming the underpayment of wages and
ECOLA of all employees of the hospital, the Regional Director
ordered the payment of the wages and ECOLA to all the petitioner’s
employees.
to him under labor standards law need not litigate. The Regional
Director, by virtue of his enforcement power, assured “expeditious
deliver to him of his rights and benefits free of charge” provided of
course, he was still in the employ of the firm.
In this case, the Court found, in upholding the jurisdiction and
exercise of the powers of the Regional Director, the petitioner
admitted the Charge of underpayment of wages to workers still in
its employ; in fact, it pleaded for time to raise funds to satisfy its
obligation. Therefore, there was no contest against the findings of
the labor inspectors.

Petitioner appealed to the Minister of Labor and Employment who

affirmed the decision of the Regional Director but modified the
decision that the computation should be only from 23 May 1983 to
23 May 1986. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Minister of Labor and Employment.

ISSUE: Whether the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: The Court held that the Regional Director has jurisdiction over
the case under the Labor Code and the Rules governing its
implementation.

The Court provides that under the Labor Code and the rules, a
Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power
over labor standard cases, and is therefor empowered to adjudicate
money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee
relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested
by the employer concerned.

The Court explained that under Policy Instruction No. 7, a

complaining employee who was denied his rights and benefits due
271 SSK Parts v. Camas (Juris Reg. Dir.)

There are 3 consolidated cases filed against SSK Parts: (1) by

Teodorico Camas for illegal deductions; (2) for underpayment of
wages, non-payment of legal holiday pay and service incentive leave
filed by the union in behalf of its members; and (3) for non-payment
of employees' service incentive leave, underpayment of allowance,
overtime pay, premium pay, and non-payment of two (2) regular
holidays in December which were discovered upon routine
inspection conducted by the labor regulation officers.

The regional director ruled in favor the complainant

employee. Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor but it was
dismissed. In petitioner’s petition for certiorari it alleges that the
Regional Director has no Jurisdiction over its employees’ claims.

ISSUE: WON the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the

complaints filed.

HELD: YES.

The petition is devoid of merit. The jurisdiction of the Regional

Director over claims for violation of labor standards is conferred by
Article 128-B of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No.
111 of March 26,1987 which provides that:
(b) The Provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary
notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of employer-
employee still exists, the Minister of Labor and Employment or his
duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and
administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor
standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based
on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety
engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of
execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their 272
orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of
the labor regulation officer and raises issues which cannot be
resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not
verifiable in the normal course of inspections.

Under the exception clause in Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, the
Regional Director may not be divested of his jurisdiction over these
claims, unless three (3) elements concur, namely:

(a) That the petitioner (employer) contests the findings of the labor
regulation officer and raises issues thereon;

(b) That in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine

evidentiary matters; and

(c) That such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of
inspection.

In this case, although the petitioner contested the Regional

Director's finding of violations of labor standards committed by the
petitioner, that issue was resolved by an examination of evidentiary
matters which were verifiable in the ordinary course of inspection.
Hence, there was no need to indorse the case to the appropriate
arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for adjudication.
273
TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-
FFW and individual union members DANILO G. MADARA and
ROMEO L. MANAYAO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, as Secretary of
Labor and Employment, and TEMIC TELEFUNKEN
MICROELECTRONICS, (PHILS.), INC., respondents.

FACTS
A labor dispute started when the company and the union reached
deadlock in their negotiations for a new CBA. Union filed a Notice
of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB).

The Acting SOLE intervened and assumed jurisdiction over the

dispute An Order was issued by the said Acting Secretary of Labor
enjoining any strike or lockout, whether actual or intended, between
the parties. His Notice of the Assumption Order was personally
served on the representatives of the Company and twice to the Union
President. Despite the assumption Order, the Union struck, Two (2)
days later, the Acting Secretary of Labor issued an Order directing
the striking workers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours
and for the Company to admit them back to work under the terms
and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.
Notice of the Return-to-Work Order was sent to the striking Union
members but still some of them refused to heed the order and
continued with their picket. Violence erupted in the picket lines. The
service bus ferrying non-striking workers was stoned, causing
injuries to its passengers. Thereafter, complaints for threats,
defamation, illegal detention and physical injuries were filed against
the strikers.
The Company issued letters of termination for cause to the workers
who did not report back to work despite the Notice of Assumption
and Return-to-Work Orders issued by the Acting Secretary of DOLE.
The Acting Secretary of Labor issued another Order directing the
Company to reinstate all striking workers “except the Union
Officers, shop stewards, and those with pending criminal charges”
while the resolution of the legality of the strike was pending.
Union filed with the SC a petition for certiorari questioning the
exclusions of the said Order. While the said petition was pending,
then Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing, issued a Writ of
Execution for the physical reinstatement of the remaining striking
workers who were not reinstated.
The Company filed a Motion to Quash, Recall or Suspend the Writ
of Execution issued by Secretary Quisumbing. This motion was
denied by the DOLE for lack of merit and, in the same Order, the
DOLE directed the issuance of an Alias Writ to enforce the actual
and physical reinstatement of the workers, or in case the same was
not feasible, to effect payroll reinstatement.
The Company filed with the SC a petition for certiorari, questioning
the denial of its motion for reconsideration and the Alias Writ issued
by the DOLE to enforce the actual and physical reinstatement or the
payroll reinstatement of the workers. The SC rendered a decision
after consolidating the petitions for certiorari of the company and the
Union. The company’s petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit
while the Union’s petition was GRANTED. In this decision, the SC
ordered the reinstatement of all striking workers without exception,
also the SC ordered the SOLE to determine the legality of the strike
and the liabilities of individual strikers, if any.
ISSUE
WON the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WON defiance to the assumption and return-to-work orders of the
Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground
for loss of the employment status of any striking union officer or
member.
HELD
NO.
The SC see no cogent basis to hold that the Secretary of Labor has
abused his discretion.
Under Art 263 of the Labor Code
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. x x x x x x x
x x (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same
to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption per
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order. If one had already taken place at
the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may
seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the
compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may
issue to enforce the same.
It is clear from the foregoing legal provision that the moment the
Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an
industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall
have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue
another order directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of
an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries
with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work
is not expressly stated in the assumption order.40 However,
petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of
Labor on September 8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of
another order expressly directing the striking workers to cease and
desist from their actual strike, and to immediately return to work but
which directive the herein petitionersopted to ignore.
The rationale of this prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the
labor dispute has been properly acquired by the competent authority,
that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of
the coercive processes of a strike. It is well settled that defiance to
the assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor
after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the
employment status of any striking union officer or member.
The assumption and return-to-work Orders issued by the Secretary of
Labor in the case at bar are not the kind of orders contemplated in the
immediately cited rule of the NLRC because such Orders of the
Secretary of Labor did not yet finally dispose of the labor dispute. As
pointed out by the Secretary of Labor in his Decision, petitioners
cannot now feign ignorance of his official intervention.

In this connection, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code clearly provides

that:

Article 264. Prohibited Activities.

(a) No strike or lock out shall be declared after the assumption of
jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or
submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or
during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout. x x x. Any union officer who knowingly
participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. Provided,
that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not
constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment even
if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike.
 Case no. 274

PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ACTING

SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES and PHIMCO INDUSTRIES
LABOR ASSOCIATION, respondents.

Labor Law; Jurisdiction; Secretary of Labor; A match factory, though of

value, can scarcely be considered as an industry “indispensable to the
national interest” as it cannot be in the same category as “generation
or distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks, hospitals, and
export-oriented industries.”—The private respondent did not even
make any effort to touch on the indispensability of the match factory to
the national interest. It must have been aware that a match factory,
though of value, can scarcely be considered as an industry
“indispensable to the national interest” as it cannot be in the same
category as “generation or distribution of energy, or those undertaken
by banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries.”

The Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction grounded on the alleged

“obtaining circumstances” and not on a determination that the
industry involved in the labor dispute is one indispensable to the
“national interest,” the standard set by the legislature, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction.—It is thus evident from the foregoing that the Secretary’s
assumption of jurisdiction grounded on the alleged “obtaining
circumstances” and not on a determination that the industry involved
in the labor dispute is one indispensable to the “national interest,” the
standard set by the legislature, constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. To uphold the action of
the public respondent under the premises would be stretching too far
the power of the Secretary of Labor as every case of a strike or lockout
where there are inconveniences in the community, or work disruptions
in an industry though not indispensable to the national interest, would
then come within the Secretary’s power. It would be practically
allowing the Secretary of Labor to intervene in any labor dispute at his
pleasure.
FACTS:
1. Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA), duly certified collective
bargaining representative of the daily paid workers of the petitioner,
Phimco Industries, Inc. (PHIMCO), filed a notice of strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board, NCR, against PHIMCO, a
corporation engaged in the production of matches, after a deadlock in
the collective bargaining and negotiation.
2. When the several conciliation conferences called by the contending
parties failed to resolve their differences PILA, staged a strike.
3. PILA presented a petition for the intervention of the Secretary of
Labor in the resolution of the labor dispute, to which petition PHIMCO
opposed. Pending resolution of the said petition PHIMCO sent notice of
termination to some 4workers including several union officers.
4. Then Acting Secretary of Labor Jose Brillantes assumed jurisdiction
over the labor dispute and issued his Order; ruling, thus:
“WHEREFORE, ABOVE PREMISES CONSIDERED, and pursuant to Article
263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, this office hereby assumes
jurisdiction over the dispute at Phimco Industries, Inc. Accordingly, all
the striking workers, except those who have been handed down
termination papers on June 26, 1995, are hereby directed to return to
work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and for
the Company to accept them back under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to the strike.
5. Two weeks after the filing of the Petition, the public respondent
issued another Order temporarily holding in abeyance the
implementation of the questioned Order for a period of thirty (30) days;
directing, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the implementation of our
Order dated 7 July 1995 is hereby temporarily held in abeyance for a
period of thirty (30) days effective from receipt thereof pending the
private negotiations of the parties for the settlement of their labor
dispute. Thereafter, both the Union and the Company are directed to
submit to this Office the result of their negotiations for our evaluation
and appropriate action.
ISSUE: W/N the Secretary of Labor acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in assuming jurisdiction over
subject labor dispute
HELD: YES!
1. Under the Labor Code, Article 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code,
provides:
“(g) When, in his opinion, there exist a labor dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration x x x.”
“The Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor the discretion to
determine what industries are indispensable to the national interest.
Accordingly, upon the determination by the Secretary of Labor that
such industry is indispensable to the national interest, he will assume
jurisdiction over the labor dispute in the said industry.”
Court held that this power, however, is not without any limitation. In
upholding the constitutionality of B.P. 130 insofar as it amends Article
264(g) of the Labor Code, it stressed in the case of Free Telephone
Workers Union vs. Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment, et al.,
the limitation set by the legislature on the power of the Secretary of
Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute, thus:
“Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be any clearer, the coverage being
limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest.”
2. In this case at bar, however, the very admission by the public
respondent draws the labor dispute in question out of the ambit of the
Secretary’s prerogative because as stated by the Secretary of Labor:
“While the case at bar appears on its face not to fall within the strict
categorization of cases imbued with “national interest,” this office
believes that the obtaining circumstances warrant the exercise of the
powers under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended.”

Furthermore, the private respondent did not even make any effort to
touch on the indispensability of the match factory to the national
interest. It must have been aware that a match factory, though of value,
can scarcely be considered as an industry “indispensable to the national
interest” as it cannot be in the same category as “generation or
distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks, hospitals, and
export-oriented industries.” Yet, the public respondent assumed
jurisdiction his rationation as follows:
275 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL),
“For one, the prolonged work disruption has adversely affected not PETITIONER,
only the protagonists, i.e., the workers and the Company, but also those
directly and indirectly dependent upon the unhampered and continued VS.
operations of the Company for their means of livelihood and existence. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,
In addition, the entire community where the plant is situated has also UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
been placed in jeopardy. If the dispute at the Company remains
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AND ALLIANCE OF
unabated, possible loss of employment, not to mention consequent
social problems, might result thereby compounding the unemployment NATIONALIST GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION-
problem of the country.” KILUSANG MAYO UNO (ANGLO-KMU),
RESPONDENTS.
5. It is thus evident from the foregoing that the Secretary’s assumption
of jurisdiction grounded on the alleged “obtaining circumstances” and CASE NO. 149 G.R. NO. 123426
not on a determination that the industry involved in the labor dispute is MARCH 10, 1999
one indispensable to the “national interest,” the standard set by the
legislature, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS: On 27 December 1994, a petition for certification
6. To uphold the action of the public respondent under the premises election among the rank and file employees of Cebu Shipyard
would be stretching too far the power of the Secretary of Labor as
every case of a strike or lockout where there are inconveniences in the
and Engineering Work, Inc. was filed by the Alliance of
community, or work disruptions in an industry though not Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization (ANGLO-KMU).
indispensable to the national interest, would then come within the
Secretary’s power. It would be practically allowing the Secretary of
On 9 January 1995, forced-intervenor National Federation of
Labor to intervene in any labor dispute at his pleasure. This is precisely
why the law sets and defines the standard: even in the exercise of his Labor (NFL) moved for the dismissal of the petition on grounds
power of compulsory arbitration under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, that ANGLO-KMU failed to comply with the twenty-five percent
the Secretary must follow the law. (25%) consent requirement and to submit the aforesaid
requirements necessary for its acquisition of legal personality
within the freedom period. The NFL also alleged that the
documents submitted by ANGLO-KMU were procured through
misrepresentation.
On 13 March 1995, the Med-Arbiter issued the assailed
Resolution dismissing the petition, after finding that the
submission of the required documents evidencing the due
creation of a local was made after the lapse of the freedom
period. Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma set aside the
Med-Arbiter’s resolution and entered in lieu thereof a new
order “finding petitioner [ANGLO-KMU] as having complied
with the requirements of registration at the time of filing of the
petition and remanding the records of this case to the Regional
Office of origin”.
The National Federation of Labor thus filed this special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proper remedy to question the
decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: Yes. The remedy of an aggrieved party from the
decisions of the NLRC and those of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment is to timely file a motion for reconsideration
as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy and
then to seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. All such petitions
should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.
The propriety of Rule 65 as a remedy was highlighted in St.
Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, where the legislative history
of the pertinent statutes on judicial review of cases decided
under the Labor Code was traced, leading to and supporting
the thesis that “since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme
Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper
vehicle for judicial review of decision of the NLRC” and
consequently “all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P.
No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme
Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer
to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
276. Pepsi-Cola Sales and Advertising Union vs SOLE and Alisasis
Facts:
Alisasis was an employee of Pepsi-Cola and a member of petitioner union
(PSAU). As a member of the PSAU, he was also participating in the Mutual
Aid Plan set up by PSAU. During the entire period of his employment there
were regularly deducted from his wages the amounts corresponding to his
union dues and contributions to the fund of the Mutual Aid Plan.
Alisasis was later on dismissed by Pepsi cola. He filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal in which the NLRC eventually declared his dismissal to be
for a valid or lawful cause on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
It appears that both Alisasis and Pepsi-Cola accepted the NLRC’s verdict
and complied therewith: that, Pepsi-Cola gave Alisasis back wages for 1
year; and that, Alisasis issued the corresponding quitclaim and considered
himself separated from his employment
Alisasis thereafter asked PSAU to pay him monetary benefits in accordance
with the by-law of the Mutual Aid Plan. PSAU demurred.
Aliasis thereupon filed a omplaint against PSAU with the Med-Arbitration
Unit to compel PSAU to pay him his claimed benefits.
PSAU alleged among others that the Med-Arbiter had no jurisdiction over
the case since Aliasis’ claim for financial assistance was not among the
cases cognizable by the Med-Arbiters’ under the law “such as
representation cases, internal union and inter-union disputes... or a violation
of the union’s constitution and by-laws and the rights and conditions of
membership in a labor organization.
The Med arbiter promulgated that it had jurisdiction and ordered PSAU to
pay Aliasis his claim for financial assistance under the Mutual Aid Plan.
PSAU appealed to the SOLE which denied the appeal.
Hence, the instant Petition
Issue: Whether or not the Med-Arbiter of the BLR had original jurisdiction
over the case.
Ruling: Yes.
Art. 226 the BLR and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of
the DOLE shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own
initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and
intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievance or problems arising for or
affecting labor management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural
or non-agriculturalxxx
From the word intra-union, “intra-,” meaning within, inside of, and “inter-,”
denoting between and among. An intra-union conflict would therefore refer
to a conflict of within or inside a labor union, and an inter-union
controversy or dispute, one occurring or carried on between or among
unions.
Here, the controversy between Aliasis and his PSAU- respecting the
former’s rights under the latter’s “Mutual Aid Plan”- would be an intra-
union conflict under Article 226 of the Labor Code and hence, within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter of the BLRwhose
decision it may additionally be mentioned, is appealable to the SOLE
277. ABBOTT LABORATORIES PHILS. INC. vs ABBOTT LAB
EMPLOYEES UNION
FACTS
The respondent union (ALEUT) applied for union registration alleging that
it's members were 30 rank-and-file employees of the manufacturing unit;
and that there was no bargaining representative in the manufacturing unit,
which it wanted to represent.
The union was granted the application and became a legitimate labor
organization. The company petitioner opposed the registration stating that
the union did not obtain the signature of 20% of the 286 members of the
unit, and that the union failed to Submit copies of its books of account.
The regional director of BLR cancelled their registration, affirming the ruling
of the Med-arbiter that the union failed to prove that the manufacturing
employees had a different set of interests as those in the sales unit. The
union appealed to the Secretary, and the Secretary referred the case to the
BLR Director. The BLR Director reversed the regional director and gave the
following reasons: 1) Article 234 of the Labor Code does not require an
applicant union to show proof of the "desirability of more than one
Ibargaining unit within an employer unit," and the absence of such proof is
not a ground for the cancellation of a union's registration pursuant to
Article 239 of Book V, Rule II of the implementing rules of the Labor Code;
(2) the issue pertaining to the appropriateness of a bargaining unit cannot
be raised in a cancellation proceeding but may be threshed out in the
exclusion-inclusion process during a certification election; and (3) the
"one-bargaining unit, one-employer unit policy" must not be interpreted in
a manner that shall derogate the right of the employees to self-
organization and freedom of association as guaranteed by the Constitution.
The company appealed to the BLR, but was denied. The company raised an Relations rendered in the exercise of its appellate power to review the
appeal with the Secretary, but denied the appeal stating it had no decision of the Regional Director in a petition to cancel the union's
jurisdiction to review cases originating from the regional offices. The certificate of registration, said decisions being final and
petitioner appealed with the SC. inappealable.

ISSUE WON Secretary err in refusing to take cognizance of the petitioner's

In the instant case, upon the cancellation of respondent union's registration
appeal for cancellation of the labor organization's registration and instead
by the Regional Office, respondent union incorrectly appealed said decision
referring the matter to the BLR director?
to the Office of the Secretary. Nevertheless, this situation was immediately
rectified when the Office of the Secretary motu propio referred the appeal
HELD NO.
to the BLR. However, upon reversal by the BLR of the decision of the
Contrary to ABBOTT's contention, there has been no grave abuse of Regional Office cancelling registration, petitioner should have immediately
elevated the BLR decision to the Supreme Court in a special civil action
discretion on the part of the Secretary. Its refusal to take cognizance of
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ALEU's appeal from the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations is in
accordance with the provisions of Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code as amended by Department Order No. 09.
The rule governing petitions for cancellation of registration of any 278
legitimate labor organization or worker association, as it now stands,
provides:

SECTION 1. Venue of Action --……. limited to one region, the petition shall
be filed with the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place where
the respondent principally operates. Petitions filed against federations,
national or industry unions, trade union centers, or workers' associations
operating in more than one regional jurisdiction, shall be filed with the
Bureau.

Section 4. Action on the petition; appeals -- The Regional or Bureau

Director, as the case may be, shall have thirty (30) days from submission
of the case for resolution within which to resolve the petition. The decision
of the Regional or Bureau Director may be appealed to the Bureau or the
Secretary, as the case may be, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof by
the aggrieved party on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or any
violation of these Rules.

The Bureau or the Secretary shall have fifteen ( 15) days from receipt of
the records of the case within which to decide the appeal. The decision of
the Bureau or the Secretary shall be final and executory.

Clearly, the Secretary of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction to

entertain the appeal of ABBOTT. The appellate jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment is limited only to a review of cancellation
proceedings decided by the Bureau of labor Relations in the exercise of its
exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment has no jurisdiction over decisions of the Bureau of Labor
279. San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC
GR. NO. 99266 MARCH 2, 1999
DOCTRINE:
Grievance Procedure; A labor union, in abandoning the grievance
proceedings and stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies
under the CBA, violates the mandatory provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement.—As regards the alleged violation of the CBA,
we hold that such a violation is chargeable against the private
respondent union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and
stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA, private
respondent violated the mandatory provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement.
FACTS:
In July 1990, San Miguel Corporation, alleging the need to
streamline its operations due to financial losses, shut down some of
its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant, listed as follows:
seventeen (17) employees in the Business Logistics Division ("BLD"),
seventeen (17) in the Ayala Operations Center (AOC), and eighteen
(18) in the Magnolia-Manila Buying Station ("Magnolia-MBS").
Consequently, the private respondent union filed several grievance
cases for the said retrenched employees, praying for the
redeployment of the said employees to the other divisions of
the company.
Grievance proceedings were conducted. However, most
of the employees were redeployed, while others accepted early
retirement. As a result only 17 employees remained when the
parties proceeded to the third level (Step 3) of the grievance
procedure.
In a meeting on October 26, 1990, petitioner informed private
respondent union that if by October 30, 1990, the remaining 17
employees could not yet be redeployed; their services would be
terminated on November 2, 1990. The said meeting adjourned
when Mr. Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a representative of the union,
declared that there was nothing more to discuss in view of the
deadlock.
SMCEU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
notice of strike on the grounds of collective bargaining deadlock and
gross violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. SMC, on the
other hand, filed a complaint with the NLRC for the dismissal of the
notice of strike and to compel SMCEU to submit to grievance and
arbitration. NLRC, however, dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not San Miguel Corporation violated the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
HELD:
NO, alleged violation of the CBA, is chargeable against the private
respondent union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and
stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA, private
respondent violated the mandatory provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement. Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as
"the situation between the labor and the management of the
company where there is failure in the collective bargaining
negotiations resulting in a stalemate" This situation, is non-existent
in the present case since there is a Board assigned on the third level
(Step 3), of the grievance machinery to resolve the conflicting views
of the parties. Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed of
five representatives each from the company and the union, to decide
the conflict, private respondent union declared a deadlock, and
thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For failing to exhaust all the steps
in the grievance machinery and arbitration proceedings provided in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of strike should
have been dismissed by the NLRC and private respondent union
ordered to proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings.
In the case of Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. Can Co.,12 the court
declared as illegal the strike staged by the union for not complying
with the grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining
agreement, ruling that: “x x x the main purpose of the parties in
adopting a procedure in the settlement of their disputes is to
prevent a strike. This procedure must be followed in its entirety if it
is to achieve its objective. x x x strikes held in violation of the terms
contained in the collective bargaining agreement are illegal,
specially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These
agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends
have to be achieved. x x x”13 As regards the alleged violation of the
CBA, we hold that such a violation is chargeable against the private
respondent union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and
stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA, private
respondent violated the mandatory provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement.
280. Ludo & Luym Corporation vs. Saornido
Labor Law; Arbitration; Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; The jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the
cases enumerated in the Labor Code, Articles 217, 261 and 262, can
possibly include money claims in one form or another; Compulsory
arbitration has been defined both as “the process of settlement of labor
disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and
to make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of
arbitration where the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their
dispute through arbitration by a third party.”—In construing the above
provisions, we held in San Jose vs. NLRC, that the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the
cases enumerated in the Labor Code, Articles 217, 261 and 262, can
possibly include money claims in one form or another. Comparatively, in
Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC, compulsory arbitration has
been defined both as “the process of settlement of labor disputes by a
government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an
award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where
the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through
arbitration by a third party (emphasis supplied).” While a voluntary arbitrator
is not part of the governmental unit or labor department’s personnel, said
arbitrator renders arbitration services provided for under labor laws.
Same; Same; Same; Regularization; While the arbitrator is expected to
decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission
agreement, he can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final
settlement since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes;
Even if the submission agreement mentioned only the determination of the
date of regularization, law and jurisprudence give the voluntary arbitrator
enough leeway of authority as well as adequate prerogative to accomplish
the reason for which the law on voluntary arbitration was created—speedy
labor justice—and to settle, once and for all, the ultimate question of whether
the employees are entitled to higher benefits.—Generally, the arbitrator is
expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the
submission agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that he has
the necessary power to make a final settlement since arbitration is the final
resort for the adjudication of disputes. The succinct reasoning enunciated by
the CA in support of its holding, that the Voluntary Arbitrator in a labor
controversy has jurisdiction to render the questioned arbitral awards,
deserves our concurrence, thus: In general, the arbitrator is expected to
decide those questions expressly stated and limited in the submission
agreement. However, since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication
of disputes, the arbitrator can assume that he has the power to make a final
settlement. Thus, assuming that the submission empowers the arbitrator to
decide whether an employee was discharged for just cause, the arbitrator in
this instance can reasonably assume that his powers extended beyond
giving a yes-or-no answer and included the power to reinstate him with or
without back pay. x x x By the same token, the issue of regularization should
be viewed as two-tiered issue. While the submission agreement mentioned
only the determination of the date or regularization, law and jurisprudence
give the voluntary arbitrator enough leeway of authority as well as adequate
prerogative to accomplish the reason for which the law on voluntary
arbitration was created—speedy labor justice. It bears stressing that the
underlying reason why this case arose is to settle, once and for all, the
ultimate question of whether respondent employees are entitled to higher
benefits. To require them to file another action for payment of such benefits
would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the
constitutional mandate providing full protection to labor.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; basic is the rule that findings of
fact of administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality.—As regards
petitioner’s contention that the money claim in this case is barred by
prescription, we hold that this contention is without merit. So is petitioner’s
stance that the benefits claimed by the respondents, i.e., sick leave, vacation
leave and 13th month pay, had already prescribed, considering the three-
year period for the institution of monetary claims. Such determination is a
question of fact which must be ascertained based on the evidence, both oral
and documentary, presented by the parties before the Voluntary Arbitrator.
In this case, the Voluntary Arbitrator found that prescription has not as yet
set in to bar the respondents’ claims for the monetary benefits awarded to
them. Basic is the rule that findings of fact of administrative and quasi-
judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect
but even finality. Here, the Voluntary Arbitrator received the evidence of the
parties first-hand. No compelling reason has been shown for us to diverge
from the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, especially since the appellate
court affirmed his findings, that it took some time for respondent employees
to ventilate their claims because of the repeated assurances made by the
petitioner that it would review the company records and determine therefrom
the validity of the claims, without expressing a categorical denial of their
claims.
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing
coconut oil with a manufacturing plant in Cebu City. It engaged
in the arrastre services of Cresencio Lu Arrastre Services for
the loading and unloading of the finished products and several
workers were deployed by the latter. The workers were hired
on different dates as rank-and-file employees and later on
joined the respondent union.
The union entered into a CBA with the company with
varying benefits depending on the length of service of the
employee. The union requested that the petitioner include the
time of service of the arrastre workers when they were still
provided by the arrastre services in order to get higher benefits.
The petitioner failed to act on the request and the matter was
submitted to voluntary arbitration.
The sole issue submitted was the date of regularization
of the workers to be resolved by the voluntary arbitrator. The
voluntary arbitrator held that the employees were performing
activities necessary to the business of the petitioner and that
the contractor was a labor-only contractor. The court of
appeals affirmed the decision of the voluntary arbitrator.
Issue:
Whether or not the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction to
award benefits not claimed in the submission agreement
Held:
Yes.
Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators – the voluntary arbitrator or panel
of voluntary arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies referred to in the immediately preceding article.
Accordingly, violations of a CBA, except those which
are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as
unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as
grievances under the CBA. For purposes of this article,
gross violations of the CBA shall mean flagrant and/or
 malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions of such agreement.
Doctrines
Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes – the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators,
upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and
decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor
practices and bargaining deadlocks.
Generally, the arbitrator is expected to decide only
those questions expressly delineated by the submission
agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that he
has the necessary power to make a final settlement since
arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes.
While the submission agreement mentioned only the
determination of the date of regularization, law and
jurisprudence give the voluntary arbitrator enough leeway of
authority as well as adequate prerogative to accomplish the
reason for which the law on voluntary arbitration was created –
speedy labor justice. It bears stressing that the underlying
reason why this case arose is to settle, once and for all, the
ultimate question of whether respondent employees are
entitled to higher benefits. To require them to file another
action for payment of such benefits would certainly undermine
labor proceedings and contravene the constitutional mandate
of providing full protection to labor.
281
Vivero VS. Court of Appeals
 Absent an express stipulation in the CBA, the phrase
“all disputes” should be construed as limited to the
areas of conflict traditionally within the jurisdiction of
Voluntary arbitrators (ex. Disputes relating to
o contract - interpretation,
o contract - implementation,
o contract - interpretation or
o enforcement of company personnel policies
 Illegal termination disputes in the absence of an
express CBA provision, do not fall within any of these
categories above stated, and are within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters by express
provision of law.
 The phrase “all other disputes” may include
termination disputes provided that the agreement
between the Union and the company states “in
unequivocal language that the parties conform to the
submission of termination disputes and unfair labor
practice to voluntary arbitrator” - it is not sufficient to
merely say that parties to the CBA agree on the
principle that “all disputes” should first be submitted
to voluntary arbitrator. There is a need for an express
stipulation in the CBA that illegal termination disputes
should be resolved by a voluntary arbitrator, since the
same fall within a special class of disputes that are
 generally within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters by express provision of law.
 The use of the word “may” shows the intention of the
parties to reserve the right to submit the illegal
termination dispute to the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter, rather than to a Voluntary arbitrator –
Petitioner validly exercised his option to submit his
case to a Labor Arbiter when filed his complaint.
 When the parties have validly agreed on a procedure
for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to
voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be
strictly observed.
Facts
Petitioner Vivero, a licensed seaman, is a member of the
Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the
Philippines (AMOSUP).The Collective Bargaining Agreement
entered into by AMOSUP and private respondents provides,
among others :
- Any grievance, dispute or misunderstanding
concerning any ruling, practice, wages or working conditions
in the COMPANY, or any breach of the Employment Contract,
or any dispute arising from the meaning or the application of
the provision of this Agreement or a claim of violation thereof
or any complaint that any such crewmembers may have
against the COMPANY, as well as complaint which the
COMPANY may have against such crewmembers shall be
brought to the attention of the GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
before either party takes any action, legal or otherwise
On grounds of very poor performance and conduct, refusal to
perform his job, refusal to report to the Captain or the vessel’s
Engineers or cooperate with other ship officers about the
problem in cleaning the cargo holds or of the shipping pump
and his dismal relations with the Captain of the vessel,
complainant was repatriated.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal at AMOSUP of
which complainant was a member. Grievance proceedings
were conducted; however, parties failed to reach and settle
the dispute amicably, thus petitioner filed [a] complaint with
the POEA.Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case
considering petitioner Vivero's failure to refer it to a Voluntary
Arbitration Committee in accordance with the CBA between
the parties. Upon the enactment of RA 8042, the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the case was
transferred to the Adjudication Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission
ISSUE: WON the labor arbiter has jurisdiction?
HELD: YES. In San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission this Court held that: There is a need for an
express stipulation in the CBA that illegal termination disputes
should be resolved by a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators, since the same fall within a special class
of disputes that are generally within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters by express provision of law.
Absent such express stipulation, the phrase "all disputes"
should be construed as limited to the areas of conflict
traditionally within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators,
i.e., disputes relating to contract-interpretation, contract-
implementation, or interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies. Illegal termination disputes - not falling
within any of these categories - should then be considered as
a special area of interest governed by a specific provision of
law.
Under their CBA, both Union and respondent companies are
responsible for selecting an impartial arbitrator or for
convening an arbitration committee; yet, it is apparent that
neither made a move towards this end. Consequently,
petitioner should not be deprived of his legitimate recourse
because of the refusal of both Union and respondent
companies to follow the grievance procedure