TITONG VS CA

ALLEGED ACTS OF PHYSICAL INTRUSION INTO ONE'S PURPORTED PROPERTY MAY BE CONSIDERED AS GROUND
FOR AN ACTION OF FORCIBLE ENTRY BUT DEFINITELY NOTE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.

The Supreme Court stated that in an action for quieting of title, a claimant must show that there is an instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the
owner’s title to or interest in real property.

The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be “an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding.” Under the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive
so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.

Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no other course of action under
the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an “instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding” beclouded the plaintiff’s title over the property involved

Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein), together with their hired laborers and without
legal justification, forcibly entered the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same.

When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have become apparent to the
court that the case was a boundary dispute.

Such would not constitute the instrument, etc. enumerated by the civil code.
 LEONERO VS BARBA
THE ISSUE ON WHETHER A TITLE WAS PROCURED BY FALSIFICATION OR FRAUD OR THE ISSUE ON THE
VALIDITY OF A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE SHOULD BE RAISED IN AN ACTION EXPRESSLY INSTITUTED FOR THAT
PURPOSE (THAT IS, ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE/CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE)
AND NOT IN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.
Instances where there is cloud of title on real property exists:
1. An absolute fictitious contract of sale or a sale with simulated consideration.
2. A sale by an agent without written authority or after expiration of his authority
3. A voidable contract where consent was given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence
or fraud (art. 1330), or by one without capacity (art. 1326)
Under art. 476, the only issue in an action to quiet title is whether there is a cloud on the title to real
property because of any instrument, etc. that has a prima facie appearance of validity. the purpose of
the action is to remove the could on the plaintiff's title.
 CALACALA VS REPUBLIC
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two requisites must concur:
1. The plaintiff or complainant has a legal, or at least, an equitable title to or interest in, the real
property subject of the action; and
2. The defendant claims an interest therein adverse to the plaintiff, arising from an instrument, etc.
the deed, claim or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in
fact, invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The action may be brought in an independent civil action or it can co-exist with an action for unlawful
detainer.
 PINGOL VS CA
The Supreme Court ruled that the one who filed the suit need not have an absolute title in order to have
the personality to bring an action to quiet title. an equitable title is sufficient to clothe him (example, the
vendee in an oral contract of sale of land who had made part payment and entered possession).
In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot in Caloocan City, executed a DEED OFABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF
AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF PARCEL OF LAND in favor of Donasco, payable in 6 years.
In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment, leaving abalance of
P10,161. The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to settle the balance with
Pingol.
However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded a larger amount. Thus, the heirs of Donasco
filed an action for specific performance because Pingol was encroaching upon Donasco’s lot. Pingol
averred that the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full payment of Donasco.
With Donasco’s breach of the contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and the
heirs’ continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by Pingol.
 continuation of PINGOL VS CA
Although the complaint filed was an action for specific performance, it was actually an action to quiet
title. A cloud has been cast on the title.
Despite the fact that the title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the
delivery of the object of the contract, the petitioners adamantly refused to accept the tender of payment
by the private respondents and steadfastly insisted that their obligation to transfer title had been
rendered ineffective.
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the land
and had made valuable improvements thereon, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor
who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee has an absolute title, an
equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.
 TAN VS VALDENUEZA
THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE COMPLAINANT NEED NOT BE IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY.
The action to quiet title applies to real property only and not to personal property.
With respect to real property, it may refer only to legal or equitable title or only on interest therein, such
as a usufruct, lease record, and real mortgage, and the plaintiff need not be in possession of the property.
 GALLAR VS HUSSAIN
THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE BROUGHT BY A PERSON WHO IS IN
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.
If the person claiming to be owner of the property is in actual possession of the same, the right to seek
reconveyance does not prescribe.
If the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, the action prescribes after thirty years. an action for
quieting of title to real property is indubitably a real action.
Under art. 1141 of the civil code plainly provides that real action over immovables prescribes after thirty
years. hence an action to quiet title is a real action over immovables, which prescribed after 30 years.
But art. 1141 clearly states that the 30-year prescriptive period is without prejudice to what is established
for acquisitive prescription periods of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
Thus, the acquisitive prescriptions of ownership of real rights must also be looked into as acquisitive
prescription of dominion and real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
 continuation of GALLAR VS HUSSAIN
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.
He must invoke his remedy within the proper prescriptive period of ten years or thirty years, depending
on ordinary or extraordinary prescription.
In addition to the action to quiet title, the plaintiff who is not in possession of the property may also bring
an action for ejectment, or to recover the better right of possession, or to recover ownership which must
be brought within the proper statutory periods of limitation governing such actions.
 MAMADSUAL VS MOSON
IT WAS RULED THAT ONE WHO IS IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF A PIECE OF LAND CLAIMING TO BE THE
OWNER THEREOF MAY WAIT UNTIL HIS POSSESSION IS DISTURBED OR HIS TITLE ATTACKED BEFORE
TAKING STEPS TO VINDICATE HIS RIGHT.
Mamadsual allege that recently private respondents have disturbed their possession of the property by
surreptitiously constructing dikes. the rule is that the petitioners may wait until their possession is
disturbed or their title is attacked before they may take steps to vindicate their right.
The reason for the rule being that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid
of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE PERSON SEEKING TO QUIET HIS TITLE IS THE REGISTERED OWNER OF THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION.
 MAESTRADO VS CA
IT WAS RULED THAT TITLE HERE DOES NOT NECESSARILY DENOTE A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ISSUED IN
FAVOR OF THE PERSON FILING THE SUIT
The trial court considered Lot No. 5872 as still a common property and therefore must be divided into
six parts, there being six heirs. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which sustained the decision
of the trial court.
The Supreme Court ruled that Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the deceased
spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners’ ownership over said lot was acquired by reason of the
oral partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses’ heirs sometime before 1956. That oral agreement
was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by the said heirs on August 16, 1977 and September
8, 1977. There was indeed an oral agreement of partition entered into by the heirs/parties.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant
establishes a better right. In the instant case it is the petitioners, being the possessors of Lot No. 5872,
who have established a superior right thereto by virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed by
the notarized quitclaims of the heirs. Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held
in common among those to whom it may belong. It may be effected extra-judicially by the heirs
themselves through a public instrument filed before the register of deeds.
 continuation of MAESTRADO VS CA
However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an inherent element of
a contract of partition. Since registration serves as constructive notice to third persons, an oral partition
by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected.
Moreover, even the requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply
to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is
not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation
of that part which belongs to each heir.
A LEGAL TITLE MAY CONSIST IN FULL OWNERSHIP OR IN NAKED OWNERSHIP WHICH IS REGISTERED IN
THE NAME OF THE PLAINTIFF.
 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS ALEJO
A proceeding to nullify an existing transfer certificate of title in the name of the mortgagor, without
notice to the mortgagee bank who is an indispensable party.
Title is the claim, right or interest in property. it is different from a “certificate of title” which is the
document of ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued by the register of deeds.
The supreme court ruled that filing an action for quieting of title is not an appropriate remedy as it will
not remedy what the mortgagee perceived as a disregard of due process.
The subject judgment cannot be considered as a cloud on the mortgagee's title or interest over the
property covered by TCT No. V-41319, which does not even have a semblance of being a title.
It could not be proper to consider the judgment as a cloud that would warrant the filing of an action for
quieting of title because to do so would require the court hearing the action to modify or interfere with
the judgment or order of another co-equal court.
 TANDOG VS MACAPAGAL
The Supreme Court ruled that as a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is
not created by mere verbal or parole assertion of ownership of an interest in property.
Where there is a written or factual basis for the asserted right, the same will be sufficient. Thus a claim
of right based on acquisitive prescription or adverse possession may be held to constitute a removal
cloud on title.
 LANZAR VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS
The CFI of Iloilo ruled in favor of Lanzar’s application for the titling of a parcel of land. the cfi held that
the property in question has been possessed by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest publicly,
continuously and adversely for more than 30 years.
The CFI also reasoned that there was no proof offered that the said land is necessary for public utility or
the establishment of special industries.
The director of lands, who had opposed the application stated that the land is foreshore land which forms
part of the public domain and is needed by Iloilo city as a road right of way, appealed the case.
The Director of Lands also alleged that the applicant had not possessed the property in such manner as
to warrant an implied grant entitling him to confirmation of title.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the CFI and held that the land in question, being an
accretion formed by the action of the sea, is property of the public domain and is not susceptible of
private appropriation.
The Supreme Court ruled that lands formed by the action of the sea belong to the public domain.
 Continuation of LANZAR VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS
The shores of the lands reclaimed from the sea remain a part of the public domain.
Until they are converted into patrimonial property of the state, such lands are not susceptible of
prescription, in as much as, being dedicated to public use, they are not subject to commerce among men.
The occupation or material possession of land formed upon the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits
caused by the sea, where the occupant is a private person and holds it without previous permission of
authorization from the government, is illegal possession on his part.
The petitioner could not acquire the land in question by prescription.
The petition was dismissed and the decision of the CA was affirmed.
 AGUSTIN VS IAC
On the western side of the Cagayan river is the town of Solana. on the eastern part is the town of
Tuguegarao. Among those occupying the land on the western side of the river were Pablo Binayug and
Maria Melad. Binayug’s homestead patent to the land was approved in 1959, though he bagan
possession of the land in 1947.
Melad was issued an OCT on 1956. Through the years, the Cagayan river eroded the eastern bank,
including the land of Agustin. the accretions were deposited on the land of Binayug on the western bank.
In 1968, there was a big flood and the Cagayan river changed its course and in the process, cut across the
land of Melad and Binayug. their lands were transferred to the Tuguegarao side of the river. Agustin
claimed the land as his own and drove away Binayug and Melad, who both filed a case to recover their
land.
Agustin also filed a case to recover his land. In its decision, the lower court directed Agustin to vacate the
lots and restore ownership to Melad and Binayug.
On appeal, the IAC affirmed the decision of the lower court. When elevated to the supreme court, it ruled
that accretion benefits the riparian owner. the action of the Cagayan river from 1919 to 1968 caused
the lands of Melad and Binayug to increase.
 continuation of AGUSTIN VS IAC
But the increase is imperceptible in nature. only after a resurvey years later was it found that the lands
of Melad (an additional 6.6 hectares) and Binayug (an additional 50 hectares) had increased.
These accretions belong to the riparian owner. It is only just that the risks to which lands bordering
streams and are exposed to floods should also be compensated by the right of accretion.
Their ownership over said properties were not lost due to the sudden change of the course of the
Cagayan river which caused a portion of the said lands to be separated due to the current. they retained
ownership of the portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.
The petition of Agustin was denied. the decision of the IAC was affirmed.
 NEW REGENT RESOURCES VS TANJUATCO
Cuevas, the president of new regent was authorized to apply for the acquisition of two parcels of land
through accretion. But said president applied for the lots in his name. pending approval of the
application with the bureau of lands, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco, to whom TCTs were later
issued.
New regent filed a case for rescission, and declaration of nullity of contract and reconveyance against
Tanjuatco. Tanjuatco alleged that regent had no cause of action against him as it was Cuevas who
defrauded the corporation. The RTC dismissed the case against Tanjuatco, holding that he was an
innocent purchaser for value.
On the issue of whether or not regent is correct that the lands subject of this case were accretion, the
supreme court held that it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion.
One who claims the right of accretion must show that he has met all the conditions provided by law in
art. 457 of the civil code. regent failed to offer evidence to prove that it had satisfied the requirements
laid down in art. 457.
 JAGUALING VS CA
The property in dispute in this case is an island in a non-navigable river. Janita Eduave claims that she
inherited the land from her father. And she has been in possession of the property since the time of the
death of her father. In 1964, the typhoon washed away the river control, resulting in the creation of the
island, which is now the subject matter of this case.
The Jagualings started occupying the island in 1969, paid taxes and was issued a Tax Declaration. In an
action to quiet title filed by Eduave, the RTC dismissed the case for failure of Eduave to prove their claim
of ownership over the land in litigation. The RTC also ruled that the land belongs to the state and is
outside the commerce of man.
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC, basing its ruling on art. 463 and 465 of the civil code.
The SC held that the CA properly applied art. 463 which allows ownership over a portion of land
separated or isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior to such separation.
 continuation of JAGUALING VS CA
The land in question is part of an island that formed in non-navigable river. the ca is correct when it
applied art. 465 that the island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin is sole owner
thereof. Lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner, who are in the best position to cultivate
the said land. In fact, no specific act of possession over the accretion is required.
It may, however, be acquired by third parties through prescription. But the Jagualing has been in
possession of the property for more than 15 years hence it may be adjudicated in their favor.
Lastly, this action for quieting of title being one which is quasi in rem, or an action in personam over real
property, the judgment is conclusive only between the parties and does not bind the state or the other
riparian owners who may have an interest over the island involved herein.
 OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE VS EBIO
Mario Ebio claims to be the absolute owner of a parcel of land located at Brgy. Vitalez, Paranaque city.
Said parcel of land is an accretion from the cut-cut creek. the in-laws of Mario, who are his predecessors
in interest have been paying taxes over the property since 1966.
In 2005, because of continuous threat from the City government that they will be evicted, Ebio filed a
petition for injunction to stop the city government from pushing them out of the land but the petition
was denied by the RTC.
Elevated to the ca, it found that the accreted property has been in possession of the predecessor-in-
interest for since 1930. Guaranteed homes was the riparian owner. Guaranteed homes should be the
owner of the accreted portion but they failed to act on the registration of the property. on the other
hand, the petitioner has proven their right over the property in question.
City of Paranaque brought the case to the SC. The supreme court ruled that the subject land was formed
form the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of the cut-cut creek.
The law that will govern is the Spanish law of waters of 1866 which remains in effect, in relation to Art.
457 of the Civil Code.
Art. 84 of the Spanish law of waters provide that accretion upon lands contiguous to a creek belong to
the owners of such lands.
 continuation of OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE VS EBIO
Art. 457 provides that the owners of the land adjoining the banks of rivers own the accretion.
Accretion along banks of creeks do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added.
But he must register the same under the Torrens system, otherwise the alluvial property may be subject
to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
For more than 30 years, neither guaranteed homes nor the local government unit sought to register the
accreted portion.
Ebio have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. They can assert said right
even if they have yet to register title over the property. a decree of registration merely confirms, but
does not confer ownership.
Their application for sale patent should not be used to prejudice what may be deemed as their vested
right over the subject property. ownership of the land is already vested upon them by virtue of
acquisitive prescription. Besides, the property is no longer public land.
 AGNE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS
The land subject matter of this case forms part of the river bed of the Agno-Chico river which was
abandoned due to a flood in 1920. Agne is the riparian owner of the area in question and are in
possession of the same.
A free patent was issued in the name of Agpoon covering the area in question and the same is now
covered by a TCT in favor of the heirs of Agpoon. Agpoon then filed an action to recover possession of
the land. The RTC ruled in their favor. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Brought to the SC, it found that based on the old civil code, which was the law then in force, “the river
beds which remained abandoned because of the course of the water has naturally changed belong to
the owner of the riparian land.
Under this law, acquisition of ownership by the riparian owner is automatic. there need be no act on the
part of the riparian owner as it is his ipso facto, the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident,
without need of any formal act of acquisition.
Such abandoned river bed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of the riparian land even
without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupation thereof will be considered as a
trespasser.
 continuation of AGNE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS
The failure of Agne to register the accretion in their names and to declare it for taxation purposes did
not divest it of its character as a private property.
While an accretion does not cause automatic registration, and therefor is not entitled to the protection
of imprescriptibility, in the present case, the title claimed by Agpoon is not based on acquisitive
prescription but on the public grant from the government, presupposing that it was initially a public land.
But the director of lands has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be public land
and has passed on to private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void.
The nullity arises not from fraud but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the bureau
of lands, which is limited only to public land and does not cover lands privately owned.
 VIAJAR VS CA
Lot no. 7340, located in Brgy. Guiboangan, Pototan, Iloilo, consisted of 20,089 square meters. This is the
land titled in the name of the Viajars.
Lot 7511, located in Brgy. Cawayan, Pototan, Iloilo, covered an area of 154,267 square meters and was
registered in the name of Lobrido. Lot no. 7511 and Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague river.
It is alleged by the Viajars that 11,819 square meters of what was once lot 7340 has been in the
possession of the Lobridos, together with 14,036, which was formerly the river bed. In 1974 Viajar
instituted an action for the recovery of possession against Lobrido.
The RTC ruled against Viajar. CA affirmed the RTC decision. It found that the evidence presented by Viajar
that the change in the course of the Suague river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not
clear and convincing.
The Lobridos, on the other hand, showed that for many years after 1926 a gradual accretion on their lot
took place by the action of the current of the Suague river, such that in 1979, an alluvial deposit of 20,912
square meters had been added to lot 7511.
The accretion was possessed by Lobrido, who tenants planted the same to tobacco.
 continuation of VIAJAR VS CA
Art. 457 provides that the owner of the property adjoining the banks which gradually receive accretion
becomes the owner of said property.
Therefore, the accretion to lot 7511 consisting of lot and b belong to the Lobridos.
In sec. 45 and 46 of act 496, it is provided that the land shall always remain registered and that no title
to registered land shall be acquired by prescription ot adverse possession.
As such, Viajar contends that the accretion under art. 457 must be limited to unregistered land and
should not extend to registered land.
The land in question having remained the lot of the Viajars, the Lobridos cannot acquire title thereto by
accretion for that will defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
But the supreme court held that registration under the Torrens system does not protect the riparian
owner against the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes.
The petition was dismissed.
 REYNANTE VS CA
Reynante was the tenant of a private fishpond in Bulacan. He took care of nipa palms planted on Lots 1
and 2. It is between the fishpond and the Liputan river. After the death of his father-in-law, Reynante
was paid P200,000.00 by his in-laws for him to turn over the fishpond and all rights therein.
The fishpond was leased to Dela Cruz and his in-laws demanded that he vacate the nipa hut contending
that he had been indemnified for the surrender of his rights as tenant. Reynante refused so a case for
forcible entry was filed against him for staying in Lots 1 and 2. The lower court dismissed the case. The
RTC reversed the lower court. CA affirmed the RTC.
The disputed land involved in this case is not included in the titled property of the fishpond. the ca ruled
that the lots were created by alluvial formation and hence the property of private respondent pursuant
to art. 457.
But such accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another
person through prescription. accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the
lot which receives it is covered by a TCT.
 continuation of REYNANTE VS CA
Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposits by accretion, their failure to register
said accretion for a period of fifty years subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by
third persons.
It is undisputed that Reynante has been in possession of the lots for more than 50 years. and unless the
other party can show better title over the subject lots, Reynante’s possession over the property must be
respected.
 REPUBLIC VS SANTOS
For having been in possession of the property for more than 10 years, Santos applied for the registration
of lot 4998-b, located in Brgy. San Dionisio, Paranaque city. Application is based on their allegation that
the property was formed by way of accretion.
Paranaque opposed the same, saying it was going to use the land for their flood control program.
Elevated to the Supreme Court ruled that the CA erred in applying art. 457. Santos is the owner of the
land adjoining the alleged accretion.
The Republic, however, showed that the evidence does not establish accretion, but instead, the drying
up of the Paranaque river. Santos, as the applicants, carried the burden of proving that the property was
an accretion to their land. Santos was not able to show that the deposit of soil on their property was
gradual and imperceptible.
Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried up river bed of the Paranaque river.
The effects of the current of the river are not the only cause for the formation of an island along a river
bank. One such cause is the drying up of rivers. The TCT of Santos also shows that his property was
bounded on the southwest, along lines 5-11 by dried river bed. In accretion, the water level did not
recede and was more or less maintained.
 continuation of REPUBLIC VS SANTOS
Acquisitive prescription is not applicable to Santos since the land was not formed through accretion.
Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank did not translate to possession that would
ripen to acquisitive prescription in the absence of proof that the land was already declared alienable and
disposable by the government.
Absent that, the land still belonged to the state as part of its public domain. But Santos insists that the
land was already classified as alienable and disposable because of a notation on the survey plan.
Was the notation sufficient?
To prove the same, there has to be conclusive proof from the applicant of the existence of a positive act
of the government, such as a Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order, Administrative Action,
Investigation Report of the Bureau of Lands, or a Legislative Act or Statute.
Notation on survey plan does not constitute positive government act validly changing the classification
of the land. A mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The application of Santos is thus dismissed, the lot applied for is declared as belonging to the state.
 GALANG VS REYES
Reyes owns two properties, separated by the Marigman creek, which dried up in 1980, when it changed
its course. Reyes alleges that Galang was able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried up creek
through fraud.
Reyes came to know of it through their caretaker, who previously applied for the titling of said property
as he has been occupying the same since 1968. The caretaker requested Reyes to continue the
application. As owners of the land where the new course of river passed, they are entitled to ownership
of the property to compensate for the loss of their land now being occupied by the new creek.
Galang denied allegation of Reyes and said they applied for free patent for the land now titled in their
name. Assuming that the creek changes its course and passed through Ponderosa, the Reyes had already
claimed for themselves the dried up creek which adjoined their property.
RTC decision - the complaint of Reyes for annulment of the title of Galang was dismissed for lack of cause
of action. CA reversed the RTC finding that the creek was a portion of the creek bed that was abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the water.
 continuation of GALANG VS REYES
Reyes were owners ipso facto. It was no longer private so no patent could be issued by the government.
The Supreme Court defined the issues as follows:
Can Reyes file an action for annulment of free patent?
The Galang contend that Reyes did not have the personality and authority to institute an action for
annulment of title because such authority is vested in the republic.
Galangs are wrong. The Reyes want to transfer to their names the property registered in the Galangs. it
was not an action for reversion which requires the state to initiate.
But while the Reyes have the right to file the action for reconveyance, they failed to adduce substantial
evidence to establish their allegation that the Galangs used fraud.
Art. 461 provides that if a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and passed
through the property of the claimant, the ownership of the old bed left dry by the change of course was
automatically acquired by the claimant.
 continuation of GALANG VS REYES
Before such conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be
shown. It must be proven that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made
intervention.
In this regard, Reyes was unable to adduce evidence to prove an old course, its natural abandonment,
and a new course.
The conflicting claims between the Galangs, who have a valid title, and the Reyes, based on
unsubstantiated testimony, that give the land in question is the former bed of a dried up creek, the Court
is inclined to believe the Galangs.
Fraud and misrepresentation as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence. Here, fraud was never proven.
CA decision reversed and set aside; complaint of Reyes is dismissed for lack of merit.