1975 1981 Political Law Review QandA by 1973 Group

POLITICAL LAW AND
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:

(1975-1981) Bar Examinations
IV-A
ATTY. JOHN RAY LIBIRAN

Professor
SEPTEMBER, 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preamble (1978)……………………………………………………………
ART. I NATIONAL TERRITORY

Archipelagic doctrine (1975)……………………………………………...
Jurisdiction (1981)………………………………………………………………
ART. II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Republican form of government (1977)………………………………………
General Principles And State Policies (1977)………………………………
(1975-1981) BAR EXAMINATIONS|POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Prepared by: 1973 Group
Doctrine Of Incorporation (1980) …………………………………………….

General Welfare Clause (1976) ……………………………………………….
Social responsibility (1978) …………………………………………………..
Separation Of Church And State (1979) ………………………………………
Separation Of Church And State (1979) ……………………………………
Separation Of Church And State (1980) ………………………………………
ART. III: BILL OF RIGHTS

Requirements Of Due Process Of Judicial Proceedings (1977) ………………
Due Process Clause (1978) …………………..…………………..
Due Process Clause (1980) …………………..…………………..…………
Due Process(1981) …………………..…………………..…………………..
Rights Right To Privacy (1980) …………………..…………………..………
Requisites for a valid warrant (1979) …………………..…………………..
Freedom Of Speech Or Of The Press; Three Test (1977) …………………..
Freedom Of Speech (1975) …………………..…………………..………………
Clear And Present Danger (1975) …………………..……………….…………
Eminent Domain (1979) …………………..………………….…………………..
Non-Impairment Of Obligation Of Contract (1980) …………………..……
Custodial investigation (1978) …………………..…………………..…………
Custodial investigation (1980) …………………..…………………..………
Writ of habeas corpus; (1979) …………………..…………………..……………
Witness Against Himself (1981) …………………..…………………..……………
Double Jeopardy (1981) …………………..…………………..…………………..
Ex Post Facto Law (1977) …………………..…………………..……………..
Ex Post Facto Law (1979) …………………..…………………..………..
Bill Of Attainder. (1977) …………………………..…………………..
ART. IV CITIZENSHIP
Citizens (1977)………………………………………………….……
Natural-Born (1980)…………………………………………………
Modes of Acquiring Citizenship (1975)…………………………….
Loss and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship (1979)…………….
ART. V SUFFRAGE
Constitutional Provision (1977) …………………………………………
ART. VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Legislative Power (1976)…………………………………………………..
Budgetary Power (1978) …………………………………………….
Party-list system; turncoatism (1980) …………………………………...
Legislative, one bill, one subject (1979) ………………………………..
Limitations on revenue, appropriations, and tariff measures (1975)…
Limitations on revenue, appropriations, and tariff measures (1976 )…
Limitations on revenue, appropriations, and tariff measures (1978) …
Record Keeping (1981) ……………………………………………………..
Taxing Power (1975)………………………………………………………..
Taxing Power (1978) ……………………………………………………….
Taxing Power (1981)………………………………………………………
Non-Appropriation (1981)…………………………………………………
ART. VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Executive and administrative powers in general (1975)…………………
Power of appointment (1975) ………………………….……………………
Power of appointment (1979) ………………………….…………………
Power Of Supervision (1981) ……………………………………………………..
Pardoning Power (1976) ………………………….………………………….
Reprieve (1981) …………………………..……………………………………….
Veto Power (1981) ………………………………..…..…………………………
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ART. VIII JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Appointments to the Judiciary (1979) …………………………………………..
Judicial Review (1975) ………………………………………………….…..
Judicial Review (1975) ………………………………………………………..
Judicial Power And Judicial Review (1977) …………………………………
Judicial Review (1980) ……………………………………………….……..
Judicial review (1981) ……………………………………………….………..
Operative Fact Doctrine (1975) …………………………………………..
Power of removal (1979) ………………………………………….……………..
Powers Of Supreme Court (1979) ………………………………………………..
Powers of Supreme Court (1980) ……………………..………………………..
Powers of Supreme Court (1980) ………………….……………………………..
Powers of Supreme Court (1981) ……………………………...…………………..
Powers of Supreme Court (1981) ………………………………………………….
ART. IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Civil Service
Removal; Just cause (1980)…………………………………………………….
COMELEC
Powers (1981) ………………………………………………………………………..
Features (1978) ……………………………………………………………………..
ART XII NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Use of Property (1981)…………………………………………………………….
Hereditary Succession (1981) ----------------------------------------------
ART XIV EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
Academic Freedom (1979) …………………………………………………………
ART XV THE FAMILY

Marriage (1980)……………………………………………………………………..
ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS

State immunity (1976) ………………………………………………………
State immunity (1976) ………………………………………………………
State Immunity (1978) ………………………………………………………
State Immunity (1978) ………………………………………………………
State Immunity (1979) …………………………………………………
ART XVII AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Amendments (1976) …………………………………………………….

Amendment (1978) …………………………………………………….
Amendments (1978) …………………………………………………….
Amendments (1979) …………………………………………………….
Amendments (1979) …………………………………………………….
Ratification (1975) …………………………………………………….
Ratification (1977) …………………………………………………….
Referendum (1977) …………………………………………………….
Referendum-plebiscite (1977) …………………………………………
Referendum (1977) …………………………………………………….
Citizens Assemblies (1977) ………………………………………………
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ART. XVII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS (1981)…………………………………..
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

General principles (1975) ………………………………………………..
General principles (1979) ………………………………………………..
De facto officers (1976) …………………………………………………..
De facto officers (1978)……………………………………………………..
Term (1978) ………………………………………………………………
sandiganbayan and tanodbayan (1978) …………………………………..
Termination of official relation (1977) ……………………………………
Liable In Personal Capacity(1981)…………………………………………..
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Exhaustion of administrative remedies(1976)……………………….
Exhaustion of administrative remedy (1977)……………………….
Exhaustion of administrative remedies (1978) …………………….
Doctrine Of Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies (1978)…….
Doctrine of finality of administrative action (1976) ………………….
finality of administrative decisions (1977) …………………………
ELECTION LAW
Jurisdiction of the COMELEC(1975) …………………………
Powers of COMELEC 1979)………………….…………..
Election protest (1976)………………………………..……….
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Powers of local government units
Police power (1975)………………………………………………
Police power (1975)……………………………………………..
Taxing power (1975)…………………………………………….
Liability of LGU (1976)………………………………………………………….
Recall ( 1976)……………………………………………………………………
Referendum ( 1976) ……………………………………………………………..
Municipal corporations (1979) …………………………………………………..
Local Autonomy (1978) ………………………………………………………….
Public International Law

State
Right of asylum (1975) ……………………………………………
Archipelagic doctrine (1977)………………………………………..
Archipelagic doctrine (1979) ………………………………………
Stateless (1978) …………………………………………………..
Right of Equality (1979) ………………………………………
State immunity (1979) ………………………………………….
Extradition (1976) …………………………………………………….

Extradition (1977) ………………………………………………………..
International organizations
Principle of Postliminium (1979) ………………………………..
Right of extraterritoriality (1979) …………………………………
Uti possidetis (1979) ………………………………………………
Most favored nation treatment (1979) …………………………….
Doctrine of Act of state (1979) …………………………………….
International Court of Justice (1978) ………………………………….
Page 4 of 115
PREAMBLE
QUESTION: (1978)
The Preamble of the 1935 Constitution began simply with: The Filipino people x x x.” On the
other hand, the preamble of the 1973 Constitution started off, thus: “We, the sovereign
Filipino people x x x.” The 1935 Constitution Preamble spoke of the “blessings of the
independence” under a regime of “justice, liberty and democracy” while the 1973 Preamble
referred to “blessings of democracy” under a regime not only of justice and liberty but also
of peace and equality. What significance, if any, would you attach to each of these changes?
ANSWER:
By adopting the first person approach, the Preamble of the new Constitution emphasizes a
more direct and personal sense of participation, involvement and commitment of the
Filipino people in adopting the new charter. “Sovereign” describes the present political state
of the Filipino people which could not have been said when the 1935 Constitution was
adopted. Then the immediate goal of our people was political independence; now that it has
been realized it is only proper that the Filipino people seek the “blessings of independence.”
A state may be politically independent and sovereign, yet it is not democratic; its society
may be unjust, its people not free. True justice and liberty however, may not thrive where
society is riven with crime, violence and lawlessness and fractured with social and
economic inequalities. Hence, in adopting the new Constitution, we implore that the Divine
Providence bestow upon us “the blessings of democracy under a regime of justice, liberty,
peace and equality”.
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NATIONAL TERRITORY
QUESTION: (Archipelagic doctrine ) (1975)

What is meant by the archipelagic doctrine advocated by the Philippines in the
international conferences on the law of the seas? Applying it to the Philippines, what would
be considered as our territorial waters?
ANSWER:
The archipelago doctrine stresses the integration of a group of islands to the sea and their
oneness, so that together they constitute one unit, one country, and one state. A single base
line is drawn around the islands by joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of
the baselines are internal waters. As the Constitution provides, “the waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, irrespective of breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines”. On the others hand the
waters extending seaward within define limits constitute our territorial waters.
QUESTION: Jurisdiction(1981)
A Filipino-owned construction company with principal offices in Manila lead an aircraft
registered in England to ferry construction workers to the Middle East. While on a flight to
Saudi Arabia with a Filipino crew provided by the lessee, the aircraft was hijacked by drug
traffickers. The hijackers were captured in Damascus and sent to the Philippines for trial.
Do Courts in Manila have jurisdiction over the case? Reasons.
ANSWER:
Yes, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try the case. Hijacking is actually piracy, defined
in People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 (1922) as robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas
without lawful authority and done animo furandi and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind.
Accordingly, it may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all
other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so any it be punished by all. Nor
does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a
foreign state, “for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.” (U.S. v.
Furlong (1820)), 5 Wheat., 184)
Page 6 of 115
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
QUESTION: A Republican form of government (1977)

What are the manifestations or attributes of a Republican form of government?
ANSWER:
The manifestations of a republican state are:

(1) The existence of a bill of rights (Art. IV);
(2) The observance of the rule of the majority (supra) ;
(3) The observance of the principle that ours is a ' government of laws and' not of men
(supra) ;
(4) The presence of elections through popular will (Art. VI) .
(5) The Observance of the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances (See Art.VIII,Sec.1);
(6) The observance of the principle that the legislature cannot pass .irrepealable laws (see
Ibid.);
(7) The observance of the law on public officers (Art. XIII); and
(8) The observance of the principle that the state cannot be Sued Without its consent (Art.
XV,,. Sec. 16)
QUESTION: -b
State the requirements of due process of judicial proceedings.
ANSWER:
Procedural due process judicial proceedings. -Procedural due process in juudicial
proceedings requires:
(a) An impartial court clothed by law with power to hear and determine the matter before it
;
(b) Jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the .person of the defendant or property which is the
subject matter of the proceeding;
(c) Opportunity to be heard given the defendant; and
(6) Judgment to be rendered after lawful hearing.
QUESTION: c freedom of speech or of the press
What are the three tests to be considered by the courts in determining whether or not a law
violates the freedom of speech or of the press? Explain each,
ANSWER:
The three tests are:
(a) The dangerous tendency rule.--The rule which states that the State has the power to
prescribe and punish speech which “creates a dangerous tendency” Which the State has a
right to prevent.
(b) The clear and present danger test.-The question in every case is whether the words are
used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a Clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive laws that Congress has a right to present.
Page 7 of 115
(c) The balancing of interest test. -It requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interest observable in a given situation or type of situation.
QUESTION: -a-1 (1977)
Who are citizens of the Philippines under the New Constitution?
ANSWER:
The following are citizens of the Philippines.
1.) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
2.) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizen of the Philippines.
3.) Those who elect Philippine Citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
4.) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
QUESTION:-b-2 (1977)
What ate the duties and obligations of citizens under the New Constitution?
ANSWER:
The following are duties and obligations of citizens under the New Constitution:
1. It shall be the duty of the citizen to be loyal to the Republic and to honor the Philippine flag,
to defend State and contribute to its development and welfare, to uphold the constitution
and obey the laws, and to cooperate with the duly constituted authorities in the attainment
and preservation of a just and orderly society.
2. The rights of the individual impose upon him the correlative duty to exercise them
responsibly and with due regard for the rights of others.
3. It shall be the duty of every citizen to engage in gainful work to assure himself and his
family a life worthy of human dignity.
QUESTION:-a-3 (1977)
Who is a natural born citizen?
ANSWER:
A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippine from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
QUESTION:-a-4 (1977)
In what ways may Philippine citizenship be lost?
ANSWER:
A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the following ways and/or events; 1.) By
naturalization in a foreign country, 2.) By express renunciation of citizenship; 3.) By subscribing
to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining
twenty-one years of age or more ;Provided how-ever , That a Filipino may not divest himself of
Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any
country;4.) By rendering service to or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the republic
of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present :a)The Republic
of the Philippines has a defensive and/or b.) The said foreign country maintains armed forces
on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines;5.) By cancellation of
the certificate of naturalization; 6.)By having been declared by competent authority a deserter
of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty
has been granted , and 7.) in case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner and by her act
or omission she is deemed under the law to have renounced her citizenship.
Page 8 of 115
QUESTION: I-b General Principles And State Policies

Art II of the New Constitution embodies the Declaration of Principles and State Policies.
State them.
ANSWER:
Art II- Declaration of Principles and state Policies.
Section II.-The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
Section 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government and the people, and in
the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or
civil service.
Section 3. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Section 4. The state shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution. The natural right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth or civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the aid and support of the Government.
Section 5. The state recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being.
Section 6. The state shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security
of all the people. Towards this end, the state shall regulate the acquisition ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and
profits.
Section 7. The state shall establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in the field
of education, health, housing employment, welfare, and social security to guarantee the
enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living.
Section 8.Civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military.
Section 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, and equality
in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex , race, or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. The state shall assure the rights of workers and
employers. The state shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The state may provide
for compulsory arbitration.
Section 10. The state shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units,
especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant community.
QUESTION: Doctrine Of Incorporation (1980)
(a) The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under Presidential Decree No. 207, recommended the enactment of
local legislation for the installation of safety signs and devices.
Acting on that recommendation, Letter of Instruction No. 229 was issued requiring the
procurement by all motor vehicle owners of reflectorized triangular early warning devices
as a means of preventing nighttime vehicular accidents.
Page 9 of 115
Discuss briefly the validity or invalidity of said LOI from the standpoint of (1) international
Law; (2) police power; and (3) due process.
(b) “J”, a foreign nation, is an official of a specialized agency of the United Nations assigned to
the Philippines. Almost a year after his arrival in Manila (where his office is located), 20 big
crates all consigned to him arrived in port of Manila and were immediately stored in a
bonded warehouse. The Constabulary Anti-Smuggling unit, acting on a reliable tip that the
crates contained an assortment of highly dutiable goods and also prohibited importations,
apply to you, as a Judge of the Court of First Instance, to use a search warrant. The
application, under oath, describes particularly the goods to be searched as well as the place
where they are located.
Would you, assuming you were a CFI Judge, issue the search warrant? Why?
c. Assuming that you decide to issue the search warrant, and the solicitor General moves
to quash the same because the owner of the goods to be searched is entitled to
diplomatic privileges including immunity from search warrants, what will you do,
convinced as you are that the crates in question contain highly dutiable goods and even
prohibited items of importation?
ANSWER:
(a) The LOI was issued in fulfilment of the obligation assumed by the Philippines under the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals, for the installation of road safety signs
and devices. The Philippine Constitution declares the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. The Vienna Convention is such a law which
must be carried out by the Philippines under the principles of pacta sunt servanda.
LOI 229 is a police power measure intended to promote public safety. The heavy burden of
providing its invalidity is on anyone challenging its constitutionality. In issuing the decree the
President had statistical data showing the high incidence of accidents caused by stalled vehicles
on the roads without proper lighting. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.
Nor is the requirement oppressive. The adoption of universal signal can considerably reduce
the possibility of error of motorists at night. They will not have to figure out what any other sign
might indicate, whether the stalled vehicle might be a police car or an ambulance. (Agustin v.
Edu, 888 SCRA 195 [1979].)
(b) No. As held in World Health Organization v. Aquino, 49 SCRA 242 [1972]), “diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to go beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government it is. . . the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer
acting under his direction.”
c. I will lift the search warrant because the UN official is entitled to diplomatic immunity. At
the same time since I believe he is guilty of abuse of diplomatic privilege, I will make my
recommendation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that it can take up the matter the UN
office concerned to insure that in the future no repetition of the incident will recur. This is
the proper action to take under the convention on the privileges and immunities of
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. (WHO v. Aquino, supra)
Page 10 of 115
QUESTION: General Welfare Clause (1976)
A. Distinguish police power, taxation, and eminent domain.

B. Because of the construction of the Cubao overpass-underpass complex, traffic, both
pedestrian and vehicular, was blocked off around the affected intersection. As a result, the
business in a merchandising establishment of X fronting the site of the construction ground
stopped and X sustained losses in the form of unearned profits. May X successfully demand
compensation from the government for the losses aforesaid upon the theory that there was
virtual taking of his property for use under the circumstances?
C. Pursuant to the power vested in the Rice and Corn Board by law, Resolution 10 was
promulgated providing that no person who is not a citizen of the Phils shall be employed in
any capacity in any Filipino-owned establishment engaged in any of the lines whose
employment may be authorized by the President upon the recommendation of the Rice and
Corn Board. X, an alien employee of the Universal Corn Product filed a petition challenging
the constitutionality of the resolution pursuant to which he was dismissed from the service.
Decide with reasons.
Suggested answers:
A.
Their similarities:
1. They all underlie the constitution and rest upon necessity because there can be no effective
government without them.
2. They exist independently of the constitution as a necessary attribute of sovereignty. They
are rights inherent in the state as a sovereign. While they may be regulated and limited by
the constitution, they exist independent of it.
3. They are as enduring and indestructible as the state itself. The state cannot surrender them,
because it cannot surrender a sovereign power. It cannot be a state without them.
4. They constitute the 3 methods by which the state interferes with private rights.
5. Each presupposes an equivalent compensation.
6. They are all legislative in nature and character.
Their dissimilarities:
1. In the nature of compensation – in police power, the compensation of the individual is not
immediate, possible or apparent and in the application of certain laws or regulations
enacted pursuant thereto, annoyance and financial loss may even be caused the citizens,
leaving the reward of the individual to be reaped thru his altruistic recognition that the just
restraint is for public good. In taxation, the compensation of the individual is immediate and
apparent in the form of protection and benefits received from the government. In eminent
domain, the individual receives just compensation for his property taken by the government
for public use.
2. In the nature of the property taken – in police power, the property taken is noxious or
harmful either as to its inherent nature or the use to which it is devoted. In taxation, the
taxes come in the form of money paid by the taxpayer as his proportionate share in the
support of the government. In eminent domain, the property taken is not noxious either in
its nature or the use to which it is applied.
3. As to transfer of ownership - in police power, there is no transfer of ownership to the
government. The taking of the property consists either in its destruction or the regulation of
its use. In taxation, the taxes paid become part of the public funds. In eminent domain, the
ownership is transferred to the government.
Page 11 of 115
4. In relation to the impairment clause – police power and power of eminent domain are
superior to the impairment clause of the constitution, the power of taxation is subordinate
to it.
5. As to who may exercise them – police power and taxation may be exercised only by the
government while the power of eminent domain may be vested by law in public service
companies.
B. No. the loss in revenue suffered by X in this case is part of incidental damages resulting from a
proper governmental activity, the construction of an overpass-underpass complex, in the
exercise of the police power of the state. Hence it is not compensable
C. Resolution no. 10 is constitutional. It was issued pursuant to the power vested in the Rice and
Corn Board by law. The law violates neither the due process nor the equal protection clauses of
the constitution. Nationalization of employment in nationalized activities does not run counter
to the constitution. The nationalization of an economic measure when founded on grounds of
public policy cannot be branded as unjust, arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the
constitution because its aim is merely to further the material progress and welfare of the
citizens of a country. Indeed, nationalization of the rice and corn industry may be defeated, its
aims and purposes circumvented and thwarted, if employment is not nationalized. So the
purpose of the law is not to deprive alien of its employment but to enhance and to protect those
rights already accorded to the citizens in certain businesses or activities which affect the
national economy and security. And if indeed, there is a classification under the law based upon
citizenship or alienage, the classification is reasonable as the same is based upon substantial
distinctions which make real differences, germane to the purposes of the law, not limited to
existing conditions only and the law applies equally to all persons belonging to the same class.
QUESTION: A: Separation of powers (1978)
With the adoption of the parliamentary system of government under the 1973 Constitution, do
the principle of separation of powers cease to be one of the principles underlying our
constitutional government? Explain your answer.
ANSWER:
No. There are actually three separately distributive clauses in the New Constitution: Sec. 1 of
Art. VIII which provide that “the legislative power shall be vested in a National Assembly”; Sec.
1 of Art. IX which states that “the executive power shall be exercised by the Prime Minister with
the assistance of his cabinet”; and Sec. 1 of Art. X which provides that “the judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.”
Moreover, there are specific grants to the power of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister,
and the judiciary, as the case may be. No other department or organ of the government may
encroach upon the exercise of such powers. There is still, therefore, separation of powers,
although the separation of powers under the presidential system has been modified.
QUESTION: B: Social responsibility (1978)
Social responsibility in private ownership and in business has now been infused into our
constitutional system. So also an international economic order is a new concept developing in
International Law. What provisions in the New Constitution lend support to these ideas?
Explain.
ANSWER:
Page 12 of 115
(1) “The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the
people. Towards the end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and
disposition, of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.” (Sec. 5, Art.
II, New Constitution).
(2) “The State shall establish, maintain, and ensure adequate social services in the field of
education, health, housing, and employment, welfare, and social security to guarantee the
enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living.” (Sec. 7, Art. II, N.C.).
(3) “The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and human conditions of work.
The State may provide for compulsory arbitration.” (Sec. 9, Art. II, N.C.).
D. (4) “The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at
emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this
constitution.” (Sec. 12, Art. II, N.C.).
E. (5) The National Assembly may authorize upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at the cost to
deserving citizens.” (Sec. 13, Art. II, New Constitution)
QUESTION Separation Of Church And State (1979)
(a) What is the reason behind the principle of separation of Church and State?
(b) The Manila Synod, a gathering of religious and lay leaders, met with a mission related to the
religious and spiritual life of the residents of the Archdiocese. It discussed and passed a
Resolution urging the President to lift Martial Law, the Resolution becoming official with the
approval of the Archbishop of Manila. Is the Resolution justifiable notwithstanding the
principle of separation of Church and State?
ANSWER:
(a) The principle of separation of Church and State is based on the adage that “strong fences
make good neighbors” and is intended, through a delineation of their respective
jurisdiction, to prevent encroachment by one upon the other. It seeks as well to prevent a
conspiracy between the two or the purpose of imposing upon the religious freedom of the
people. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, it is likewise aimed against sponsorship and
financial support of and participation by the State and religious affairs.
(b) Two possible answers:
1. The resolution is valid because the participants in the Manila Synod consisting of priest
and lay leaders are citizen entitled to discuss public affairs in the exercise of their
freedom of expression. Ecclesiastics are not barred from this freedom because of their
calling. Indeed, even the Church itself as an institution may validly make suggestions to
the state in connection with public issues, including those affecting the welfare of the
people, such as the lifting of martial law.
2. The resolution is an unlawful interference by the Church in purely secular matters and,
therefore, violates the Establishment Clause. This is not a mere decision of citizens but
requires the imprimatur of the Archbishop of Manila in his capacity as an official of the
Catholic Church.
QUESTION: Separation Of Church And State (1979)
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(a) An Aglipayan priest, “A” was overwhelmingly elected Mayor of the predominantly Catholic
town of “X”, despite the issue raised against him of his disqualification, for being allegedly
an ecclesiastic. As such priest, he has no fixed station, but is active in community work
unrelated to religion, and undertaken mostly by Catholic residents. In running for the
Mayoralty, his certificate of candidacy was not sworn to. He belongs to no political party.
Would he be legally entitled to assume the position of Mayor?
(b) An ordinance requires all aliens to secure an employment permit from the Mayor upon the
payment of certain fee before being employed in any kind of position or engage in any
business, with penalty for violation thereof. The ordinance is assailed on Constitutional
grounds. Decide.
ANSWER:
(a) In the case of Pamil vs. Teleron, the Supreme Court upheld Section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code although supported only by 5 justices, as against the other 7 who
opposed it, for lack of the needed vote to declare it unconstitutional.
The fact that the certificate of candidacy was not sworn to could have been a valid
ground for its annulment before but not after the election, in deference to the verdict of the
voters.
(b) A similar ordinance was annulled in the case of Villegas v. Hui Chiong on the grounds that if
offended due process in so far as it impaired the alien’s right to earn a livelihood, violated
the equal protection clause for failure to distinguish among the aliens, who were required to
pay a uniform fee regardless of the nature of their employment or the amount of their
compensation, and also for lack of a sufficient standard to delimit the discretion of the
mayor in granting or withholding the permit. Justice Teehankee in his concurring opinion,
added that the ordinance contravenes public policy as expressed in national laws limiting
the ban on the employment of aliens to certain fields.
QUESTION: Separation Of Church And State (1980)

(a) Is the separation of Church and State a Constitutional myth or a reality? Reason out your
answer.
(b) A provision in the Election Code states as follows:
“Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be
qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in
any partisan political activity therein, provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of
the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and that filing of
charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.”
Discuss the validity or invalidity of the above provision in so far as it affects a person
who seeks to run for an elective office provided for in the Election Code but who is
charged with subversion and rebellion before a military tribunal, after a preliminary
investigation.
C) Would your answer be the same if the person involved had been convicted by a
civil court of rebellion but the judgment of conviction is on appeal to the Supreme
Court?
ANSWER:
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(a) Separation of Church and State in the Philippines is a reality:

1. Hiring policies with respect to private employment do not discriminate on the basis of
creed, pursuant to Art. II, Sec 9 of the Constitution.
2. Employment in the government is not based on any religious test. (Art. IV, Sec 8)
3. No public property or money is used for religious purposes, except to pay the salaries of
religious dignitaries assigned to the armed forces or employed in any penal institution or in
government orphanage or leprosarium. (Art. VIII, Sec 18 [2])
4. Buildings, lands and improvements owned by religious organizations and actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious purposes are exempt from taxation. (Art. VIII, Sec
17 [3])
*Examinees may also answer that separation of Church and State is a myth in the
following cases:
1. The use of public buildings (and therefore of public property) for the enthronement
of the Sacred Heart Image and the holding of other religious ceremonies violates Art.
VIII, Sec 18 (2) of the Constitution.
2. The use of public funds to subsidize religious pilgrimages to Mecca likewise violates
the same constitutional provision.
3. Active involvement and participation of religious sects qua religious sects in elections
contravenes the Constitution. (Cf. Art. XII, C, Sec 8)
(b) The presumption of disloyalty arising from the filing in a court or military tribunal of
charges after preliminary investigation contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from public office solely on the ground that
charges have been filed against him. Such person is virtually placed in the same category
as a person already convicted of a crime punishable by arresto, which carries with it the
accessory penalty of suspension to hold public office. Although the presumption is
rebuttable, time constraints may prevent one from offering contrary proof. Above all, it
is best that evidence of disloyalty be passed upon by the courts rather than by an
administrative body like the COMELEC. (Dumlao v. COM
(c) The answer would be the same even if the candidate had been convicted but his
conviction is still pending appeal. Only a final judgment of conviction would suffice to
disqualify him. The opposite position is, however, arguable. After conviction the burden
is now on the defendant appellant to show that his conviction is erroneous. As in
applications for bail, bail cannot be granted as of right after conviction, even if the
judgment of conviction is not yet final but is pending appeal. In Dumlao v. COMELEC, L-
52245, Jan. 22, 1980 this question was raised but the Supreme Court avoided passing
upon it on the ground that there was no necessity to do so, neither petitioner having
shown that he was injured by the operation of law.
Page 15 of 115
BILL OF RIGHTS
QUESTION:-a 1977
What are the manifestations or attributes of a Republican form of government?
ANSWER :
The manifestations of a republican state are:
(1) The existence of a bill of rights (Art. IV);
(2) The observance of the rule of the majority (supra) ;
(3) The observance of the principle that ours is a ' government of laws and' not of men
(supra) ;
(4) The presence of elections through popular will (Art. VI) .
(5) The Observance of the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances (See Art.VIII,Sec.1);
(6) The observance of the principle that the legislature cannot pass .irrepealable laws (see
Ibid.);
(7) The observance of the law on public officers (Art. XIII); and
(8) The observance of the principle that the state cannot be Sued Without its consent (Art.
XV,,. Sec. 16)
QUESTION:-b Requirements Of Due Process Of Judicial Proceedings (1977)
State the requirements of due process of judicial proceedings.
ANSWER:
Procedural due process judicial proceedings. -Procedural due process in juudicial
proceedings requires:
(a) An impartial court clothed by law with power to hear and determine the matter before it ;
(b) Jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the .person of the defendant or property which is the subject
matter of the proceeding;
(c) Opportunity to be heard given the defendant; and
(6) Judgment to be rendered after lawful hearing.
QUESTION:.-c Freedom Of Speech Or Of The Press; Three Test (1977)
What are the three tests to be considered by the courts in determining whether or not a law
violates the freedom of speech or of the press? Explain each,
ANSWER:
The three tests are:
(a) The dangerous tendency rule.--The rule which states that the State has the power to prescribe
and punish speech which “creates a dangerous tendency” Which the State has a right to prevent.
(b) The clear and present danger test.-The question in every case is whether the words are used in
such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a Clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive laws that Congress has a right to present.
(c) The balancing of interest test. -It requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interest observable in a given situation or type of situation.
Page 16 of 115
QUESTION:. A Due Process Clause (1978)

The validity of nationalization of the rice and corn industry embodied in a statute prohibiting an
alien from being employed in any capacity in any establishment in any industry except as a member
of the technical personnel and only upon authority of the President of the Philippines was assailed
on grounds of lack of due process and equal protection. How would you rule on such objection? May
such nationalistic policy be applied in certain areas of investments? Reason out your answer, citing
constitutional provisions.
ANSWER:
1. The law nationalizing the rice and corn industry is itself not violative of the equal protection
of the laws. The purpose of the law is not to discriminate against aliens but merely to reserve to
citizens of the Philippines the rice and corn industry, industries which directly affect not only the
national economy but also national security. The classification made by the law into citizens and
aliens is reasonable and proper. Substantial distinction exist between them; such classification is
germane to the purpose of the law and is not limited to existing conditions only and applies equally
to all citizens and aliens, as the case may be. If the rice and corn industry itself is nationalized,
necessarily, employment therein must also be nationalized by prohibiting alien employment
therein, otherwise the purpose of the law may be circumvented. Again, for purposes of
employment, substantial distinctions exist between citizens and aliens in the exercise and conduct
of the industry regulated.
2. The law does not violate the due process clause. Its purpose is legitimate: to prevent aliens
control and dominance of the rice and corn industry, an industry which affects national economy
and security. The means employed by the law is reasonable, alien employment in a nationalized
industry may open the door to the use of dummies, thereby circumventing the law. Moreover, alien
employment is not absolutely barred. They may still be employed in technical positions but as an
added safeguard, such employment must be with the approval of the President.
3. Yes. Under Section 3 of Article XIV, “the National Assembly shall, upon the recommendation
of the National Economic Development Authority, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations wholly owned by such citizens, certain traditional areas of investments
when the national interest so dictates.”
QUESTION:.B (1978)
Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the CFI seeking payment for their parcel of land from the national
government, alleging from 1947, it took possession of their private property for the purpose of
widening a national road. The defense of the government was the absence of its consent to be sued.
This was upheld by the lower court which dismissed the case. Plaintiffs appealed to the SC. How
would you decide the case? Reasons.
Answer:
Decisions of the lower court should be reversed. The doctrine of immunity of the state from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to citizens. When the government takes
any private property for public use without instituting proper condemnation proceedings, it makes
manifest that it submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked in action brought by the
property owner against the government for the payment of just compensation.
Page 17 of 115
QUESTION: Due Process Clause (1980)

(a) “I” operates a beerhouse. Before opening the establishment, he obtained from the
appropriate authorities the necessary license to operate which means that he complied with
the requirements of the applicable City Ordinances and paid the license fee. The license is
renewable annually.
Even before the lapse of one year from the date of issuance of the license, the City Mayor
moved to cancel the license in view of police reports that the subject beer house is frequent
place of intoxication of students from a number of schools which are not really distant from
the beer house.
“I”, the beer house operator, files a petition in Court seeking, in substance, to stop the City
Mayor from cancelling his license to operate the beer house.
If you were the Judge hearing the case, how would you decide it?
(b) Municipality “Z”, in preparation for the town fiesta contracted the services of “BB”
Construction Co. to erect a stage for the town fiesta program. During the town fiesta, the
stage collapsed when people climbed the stage to get a closer look at movie stars who were
special guests of the affair. A performing movie star died as a result of the collapse of the
stage.
It was later found that the stage was defectively constructed. The heirs of the deceased
movie star fatality now seek to recover damages against Municipality “Z”, which disowns
liability because the defective stage was erected not by the Municipality but by “BB”
Construction Co.
Is Municipality “Z” liable for damages to the heirs of the deceased movie star, or can it
successfully invoke as its defense the stage’s immunity from suit?
What is the liability, if any, of “BB” Construction Co?

ANSWER:
(a) I would grant the petition of “I”. The operation of the beerhouse is properly protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The cancellation of the license without a hearing and
solely on the basis of police reports is arbitrary. The Mayor’s office should have conducted
an investigation to determine the veracity of the report and only on proof could it cancel the
license granted to “I”.
(b) Municipality “Z” is liable. The rule is that if injury is caused in the curse of the performance
by a municipal corporation of its governmental function, no recovery can be had. The
reason is that the municipality is acting as agent of the State and, therefore, like the state,
the municipality is immune from suit. But when the municipality performs proprietary
function, it is liable to theird persons for its negligent acts. The holding of a town fiesta is a
proprietary function, because it is only for the special benefit of the community rather than
for the general welfare, performed in pursuance of a policy of the State. The mere fact that
the celebration was not held for profit or gain but only to provide entertainment for the
people is decisive. The establishment of a park does not provide income to a town, but
nevertheless, it is a private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public
schools, jails and the like, which are public. The municipality “Z” is responsible for the acts
of its agents under the doctrine of respondent superior. (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599
[1978]).
Page 18 of 115
“BB” Construction Co. is liable to the Municipality of “Z” under its contract, but has no
liability to third persons such as the family of the movie star who was killed in the accident.
QUESTION: Due Process(1981)

The collector of the Port of Cebu, acting on a trip, ordered the inspection of a truck about to
leave the customs zone. The customs police discovered untaxed goods being brought out as
personal effects. The Collector ordered seizure proceedings o be filed by customs
prosecutors assigned to his office. The owner of the seized articles questioned the
proceedings on the ground that the collector was the complainant, witness, prosecutor and
judge at the same time.
Does such a procedure deprive the owner of due process?
Reason out your answer.
ANSWER:
The question here is whether the owner of the goods is deprived of a fair and impartial
proceeding. The port collector may have initiated the seizure proceedings, but he really
does not act as prosecutor and judge. The prosecution is undertaken by others, although
assigned to his office. The procedure no more deprives the owner of due process than it
does an offender who commits an offense in the presence of a judge acting as such whom
the judge may order arrested and thereupon prosecuted as if he had been brought before
him on a warrant of arrest under Rule 113, sec. 5 of the Rules of Court. The proceedings in
the Bureau of Customs is more administrative than judicial. It is similar to the proceedings
in the Court of Industrial Relations where prosecutors assigned to the CIR handled unfair
labor practice cases.
QUESTION. Requisites for a valid warrant (1979)
After having been investigated by the military authorities, “X”, a civilian, was charged with
kidnapping with murder in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the crime having been committed in
Cainta where the complaint was first filed in the Municipal Court. The case was taken over by the
military authorities which conducted the preliminary investigation, on the suspicion that the killing
was related to rebellion, and “X” was a member of the New People’s Army (NPA) but was not found
to be so. Upon the filing of the information therein, the Court of First Instance issued the warrant of
arrest, by virtue of which “X” was detained without bail as none was recommended by the Fiscal
who filed the information without further investigation, in view of the crime being a capital offense.
Forthwith, “X” filed a petition in the Supreme Court for habeas corpus, alleging that the warrant of
arrest was not validly issued, and he was illegally denied bail. The Government opposed the petition
alleging: (1) That the proper remedy is to ask first the Court of First Instance to quash the warrant
of arrest to give the said Court a chance to correct its error, if any, and (2) that the warrant was in
all respects valid and legal.
Decide the two issues raised, stating on what ground the warrant of arrest may be assailed as
illegal, and your opinion whether the warrant is valid or not. Should the petition be granted?
Answer:
The warrant may be assailed on the ground that the preliminary investigation was not made
by the fiscal himself, but may be sustained under Sausi v. Querubin because the crime charged was
the same offense investigated by the military.
Page 19 of 115
The validity of the detention without bail would have to depend on whether evidence of
guilt of the capital offense is strong, this to be proved by the prosecution.
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy as the motion to quash will not afford the speedy relief
required to restore individual liberty.
QUESTION: Rights Right To Privacy (1980)

(a) Would a law be constitutionally valid in providing that, before a marriage license may be
issued by the appropriate official of a city or municipality, the parties to the prospective
marriage should first submit to him a certification from a Family Planning Center that they
have undergone at least a week of instruction and/or information on family planning?
(b) “F,” a newspaperman, began the production of a movie portraying the life of an
unmarried mayoralty candidate who was killed during an election campaign. “F” was basing
the film on a book on the candidate’s life, the rights to which he had purchased. Although
the emphasis of the movie was on the candidate’s public life, it portrayed portions dealing
with his private and family life including scenes depicting his mother and his girl friend. The
family objected to the production as an invasion upon their privacy. “F” contended,
however, that since the candidate was a public figure, the movie production was but in
exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of speech of the press.
c. Between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to freedom of expression on the
other, which would you sustain?
Answer:
(a) Yes, the law is valid. The Constitution makes it the responsibility of the state to achieve
and maintain population levels conductive to the national welfare. (Art XV, Sec 10) In
fulfillment of this duty, the government may by law require prospective couples to undergo
instruction in family planning.
(b) The right of privacy should prevail. As held in Lagunzad v. Soto Vda. De Gonzales, L-
32066, August 6, 1979 92 SCRA 476, “Being a public figure does not automatically destroy
in toto a person’s right to privacy. The right to invade a person’s privacy to disseminated
public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no
matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that
petitioner exerted efforts to present the true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner
admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab
story of torture and brutality. Freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position
in the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not, however, without limitations. In the particular
circumstances presented and considering the obligation assumed by petitioner under the
agreement, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the
limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
private concern.”
QUESTION: Freedom Of Speech And Peaceable Assembly (1975)

Petitioners, members of Jehovah’s Witnesses, applied for a permit to use the kiosk at the public
plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. The kiosk is very near the Roman Catholic church. The mayor denied
the permit to use the kiosk but offered to grant the use of a part of the plaza. The petitioners
contended that the denial of the permit is an abridgement of the right to freedom of speech and
peaceable assembly. Is the contention meritorious? Why?
Page 20 of 115
Answer
No. Freedom of speech and assembly is subject to regulation to promote public order and
public safety. In this case, there was reasonable ground to believe that because of the proximity of
the Roman Catholic Church to the kiosk the use of the kiosk by religious sects could lead to a
disturbance of peace and order. Especially is this so in the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses whose
tenents are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church. The offer of another place for the
meeting negated the claim of denial of the constitutional right of speech and assembly. (Ignacio v.
Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956) )
QUESTION: Clear And Present Danger (1975)

Can a person be punished for criticizing the decision of a court while the case is still
pending? Why?
ANSWER:
Yes. Criticism of a decision which tends or which creates a clear and present danger of
impending, obstructing, embarrassing or influencing the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt and may be punished. (People v. Alarcon,
69 Phil 265 (1930); People v. Castelo, L-11816, April 23, 1962, 4 SCRA 947) This is so because
freedom of speech and the press must, in this instance, yield in the interest of preserving the
independence of the judiciary and promoting the sound administration of justice. (Cabansag v.
Fernandez. GR. No. L-8974, October 18, 1957)
QUESTION: Eminent Domain (1979)
“X” is the owner of a piece of land with an area of 5,000 square meters, located near a
factory. The land is so swampy it has been breeding place for mosquitoes and wallowing
place for carabaos. The Government wants to expropriate the land for a low-cost housing
project for the factory workers and laborers. “X” opposed the expropriation on the ground
that the housing project is not for “public use” within the meaning of the power of eminent
domain.
(a) May the expropriation prosper?
(b) If not, may not the Government take the property just the same in the exercise of police
power for the protection of the health of all residents near the land, as by abatement of
nuisance?
ANSWER:
(d) The expropriation will prosper under the expanded concept of “public use” which now
includes even indirect public benefit or advantage. The only possible flaw would be in
the area of the land, which is not enough to make it a landed estate under Art. XIV, Sec.
13.
(e) The property, being noxious, may be regulated under the police power for the purpose
of improving it in the interest of public health.
QUESTION: Non-Impairment Of Obligation Of Contract (1980)

“D,” is a resident of Davao, borrowed P9,666.00 from “E” his employer, a resident of Manila, to
defray the hospitalization expenses of “D’s” wife in Davao. “D” agreed in writing that he would
work as a helper in the house of “E”; that this account would be paid back by him to “E” at the
rate of P400.00 a month starting on a particular month, without interest, covering a two (2)
Page 21 of 115
year period, the agreement further providing that in case “D” fails to pay in cash, he would
continue to render service, as a domestic help in “E’s” household with a salary of P400.00 a
month to be applied, however, to his indebtedness until fully paid. Since “D” could not pay in
cash on the third month of payment, he remained in “E’s” employ in accordance with the
agreement. On the sixth month, he requested to be allowed to be allowed to leave “E’s” service
because he had a better opportunity in Davao, salary-wise. “E” refused to release “D” from his
service and insisted on “D’s” compliance with his agreement even as “D” promised to continue
remitting from Davao the monthly amounts due until his debt was fully paid.
Evaluate the rights of the parties based on the Constitution. Which of the conflicting rights
should prevail?
ANSWER:
“E,” the employer, has a right under the contract to the services of “D” in satisfaction of his
credit. It is a right arising from contract. The Constitution provides that the obligation of
contracts shall not be impaired. However, “D” has a right not to be kept in involuntary
servitude under Art. IV, Sec 14 of the Constitution which provides that no involuntary
servitude shall exist in any form except as punishment for a crime whereof, the party shall
have been duly convicted. As held in Caunca v. Salazar, L-2690, Jan. 1, 1949, an employment
agency, regardless of the amount it may have advanced to a prospective employee, has
absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. If “D” is kept in “E’s” house
whether by physical force or by external moral compulsion, habeas corpus would lie to free
her from her employer.
No. the constitutional right of “D” should, therefore, prevail.
QUESTION: A: Custodial investigation (1978)

Pablo Cruz kills his brother-in-law with a gun while the latter was unarmed. When the
police arrived at the scene of the crime, Pablo Cruz surrendered his gun to the police,
saying, “I killed him because I was fed up with him.” During the trial of the case for murder
his defense counsel objected to any question propounded to the policeman which would try
to elicit the statement the accused made while surrendering his gun on the ground that at
that time he was already in police custody and, therefore, as he had then the right to
counsel, his statement, without assistance of counsel, would be inadmissible is accordance
with the constitution. How would you rule on the objection? Reason.
ANSWER:
The objection is not well-taken. The statements of Pablo Cruz are spontaneous declarations
constituting part of the res gestae, and therefore, admissible in evidence. The constitutional
prohibition invoked (Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the New Constitution) does not apply because the
statements of Pablo Cruz were voluntarily given by him in a precustodial proceeding. He
was not yet being investigated by the police for the commission of an offense. This is not the
custodial interrogation contemplated by the Constitution.
QUESTION:. B (1978)
In Sanidad v. COMELEC, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the President, in the
absence of the Interim National Assembly, could propose amendments to the Constitution.
Petitioner argued that the exercise of legislative powers by the President under Martial Law did not
Page 22 of 115
convert him into a constituent assembly for constitutional amendments. What is the majority
opinion? The dissenting? Discuss briefly.
ANSWER:
The majority opinion holds that in a crisis government such as which existed during the first phase
of the transition period, there is concentration of powers in the President. Although an interim
National Assembly legally exist, it has not yet been convened and therefore not in a position to
exercise and discharge its powers. The President, during the said period, could exercise the
legislative power not only because of the absence of an interim National Assembly but as the
administrator of martial law. There is no reason why he could not also exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments which is but an adjunct to legislative power. Otherwise, there will
be a vacuum in the Constitution. The President and the judiciary are the only existing constitutional
organs and since the judiciary cannot propose amendments to the constitution, only the President
can exercise that power to prevent that vacuum.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The dissenting opinion, in turn, holds that the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution is a constituent power. It is separate from and not a part of nor an adjunct to
legislative power. The Constitution specifically vests the power in the interim National
Assembly during the transition period; (Sec. 15, Art. XII, N.C) by no other organ or official
can that power be exercised. The Constitution is not only a grant but a limitation of power.
To avoid the so-called vacuum, it is incumbent upon the incumbent President to convene
the interim National Assembly for the specific purpose of proposing amendments to the
Constitution and not use his refusal; to convene it to justify his assumption of its power. The
true will of the sovereign people is embodied in the amendatory procedure provided in the
Constitution; hence, to propose amendments in any other way is a derogation to that will.
QUESTION: Custodial investigation (1980)

(a) Section 20, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution granted for the first time to a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense the right to counsel and to be informed of such
right.
If, prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, a confession had been obtained from a
person under investigation who was not informed of such right, would it be admissible in
evidence against him?
(b) Five (5) persons were apprehended by the city police authorities in connection with a
robbery with homicide committed within the city limits. During the customary police
investigation, one of the suspects “A,” pointed to “B” and “C” as his companions in the
commission of the offense. When pointed to, “B” and “C” did not admit nor deny participation in
the offense. They merely remained silent.
c. During the trial of the criminal case against “A,” “B,” and “C,” such silence of “B” and “C” during
the custodial investigation conducted by the police (in the face of an accusation implicating
them) was used by the prosecution against “B” and “C” on the basis of the legal principle that
when accused, “one’s silence is admission.”
Is this position of the prosecution tenable?
ANSWER:
Page 23 of 115
(a) Yes, the confession is admissible in evidence. In Magtoto v. Manguerra, 63 SCRA 4 (1975), it
was held that Art. IV, Sec 20 does not have a retroactive application. The result is that
confessions obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution without informing the
person in custody of his right to counsel were held admissible even if presented in court after
Jan. 17, 1973. The Court held that the validity of confessions must be determined as of their
taking. Before the 1973 Constitution, there was no requirement that the person in custody be
informed of the right to counsel. Moreover, to give retroactive effect of the provision might lead
to the acquittal of guilty individuals in many cases where confessions were obtained before the
effectivity of 1973 Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force.
(b) Pursuant to Art. IV, Sec 20, any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense has the right to remain silent and to counsel and may be informed of such right.
Therefore, the silence of “B” and “C” during the custodial investigation conducted by the
police even in the face of an accusation by “A,” can not be used against them and introduced
in evidence against them at the trial of the criminal case. (People v. Alegre, L-30423, Nov. 7,
1979, 94 SCRA 109). Rule 130, Sec. 23 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “any act or
declaration made in the presence and within the observation of a party who does or says
nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not
true, may be given in evidence against him,” does not apply to situations involving custodial
investigation. The latter (custodial investigation) is governed by Art. IV, Sec 20 of the
Constitution which guarantees every person under investigation the right to remain silent.
Consequently, evidence of “B” and “C” silence’s in that investigation cannot be introduced
without violating their aforesaid constitutional right.
QUESTION: Writ of habeas corpus; (1979)

(a) When the Bill of Right says that “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, etc.,” the Constitution clearly established a restriction upon the State. During
Martial Law when the suspension of the writ is vested exclusively on the President as
Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces, is the exercise of such power by the
President subject to judicial inquiry? If so, to what extent. If not, why?
(b) What do you understand by “constitutional authoritarianism” as the President as the
President describes our present Government under the regime of Martial Law?
(c) Can you cite provisions of the Constitution reflective of this character of our
Government?
ANSWER:
(a) Two possible answers:
1. Even in normal times, the President has the exclusive power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, on the grounds authorized by the Constitution. However, such
suspension is subject to review by the Supreme Court under the doctrine laid down in
Lansang vs. Garcia, even under Martial law according to one faction of the Supreme
Court in Aquino vs. Enrile, where t was also held that the imposition of martial law
automatically suspended the privilege of habeas corpus.
Martial law itself, according to this group, is also subject to the Lansang test and may be
annulled if not based upon the grounds prescribed, viz., invasion, insurrection, rebellion,
or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, as determined by the
Supreme Court after conducting its own factual investigation
2. According to another faction of the Supreme Court in the same case, the question is
political in nature and therefore cannot be decided by the judiciary.
Page 24 of 115
(b) By “constitutional authoritarianism” is meant the ascendancy of state authority over

individual rights under certain emergency circumstances, within the framework of the
Constitution.
(c) Illustrative of this concept are the provisions of the 1976 constitutional amendments in
general, particularly those concerning the extraordinary powers of the incumbent
President, including his power to legislate concurrently with, independently of, or even
against the legislature.
Another example is found in Art. XV, Sec. 7, which allows the State in times of national
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operations of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.
QUESTION. Witness Against Himself (1981)

A branch of a Bank was robbed. When the police arrived, they closed the branch and asked
all the persons inside to stay for interrogation and to inform the police investigators what
they saw, more particularly, the identity of the robbers.
When “X”, a teller, was being asked about the holdup, he gave a statement that tended to
implicate him. Prosecuted as an accomplice, he questioned at his trial the admissibility of
his statement given to the police investigator, claiming that he was denied his constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel.
is X’s contention correct? Explain briefly.
ANSWER:
X’s contention is untenable. His statement, which tended to incriminate himself, was part of
the res gestae and is admissible in evidence. The right to remain silent and to counsel,
guaranteed in Art. IV, sec 20, applies only to the custodial stage of interrogation during
which the police interrogation focuses on the guilt of a particular suspect who is deprived of
freedom in a significant way. here the investigation is only what is known as the stage of
general exploratory investigation, during which statements made without the warnings of
the right to remain silent and to counsel are admissible in evidence.
In similar case (People v. Tampus, 96 SCRA 624 (1980)) the accused, who were inmates at
the Bilibid Prison, after killing another inmate inside a toilet, upon coming out surrendered
to the prison guard, saying “Surrender po kami. Gumanti lang po kami.” it was held that
their statement was part of the res gestae and at the same time a voluntary confession of
guilt.
QUESTION: Double Jeopardy (1981)

“X” was accused of Liber before the First Instance in 1975. After the arraignment, no further
proceedings were had because of the unavailability of prosecution witnesses. Finally, at the
trial on January 10, 1981, the complaining witness testified on direct examination. However,
on February 15, 1981, the day set for his cross-examination, the complainant failed to
appear. The Court sustained the defense’s objection to the postponement, dismissed the
case, but qualified the dismissal as “provisional”.
The next day, the Fiscal moved for reconsideration of the Order of dismissal on the ground
that the complainant was not able to attend the trail because he was delayed by the traffic.
The Court reconsidered Order and reset the case for trial.
Page 25 of 115
Is the Order reinstating the case valid? Reasons.

ANSWER:
The order reinstating the case is valid. In the first place, the reinstatement of the case would
not place the accuse in double jeopardy because the dismissal of the case was only
provisional. In the second place, the failure of the prosecution to proceed with the hearing
on February 15, 1981 was excusable, the complainant, who was testifying, having been held
up by traffic. In People v. Surtida, 43 SCRA 29 (1972) the failure of the prosecution to
proceed with the hearing of a case because the fiscal and the witnesses had to come from
Angeles City, while trial was held in San Fernando, Pampanga, and the traffic was heavy,
was held by the Supreme Court to be excusable. For this reason it ordered the reinstatement
of the criminal case on the ground that the prosecution was entitled to due process as much
as the defense. It does not appear, however, that the time it has taken to try the case was
due to the failure of the prosecution. Nor does it appear that the accuse objected to the
delay if it was due to requests for postponement by the prosecution. The only time he
objected was to the motion for postponement on February 5, 1981 which, as already stated,
is due to an excusable reason.
An alternative answer is that provisional dismissal is a final disposition of the case and that
the reinstatement of the case would place the accused in double jeopardy. (Esmesa v. Pogoy,
L-54110, February 20, 1981)
QUESTION: a-I (1977)
Explain and give an example of parens partriae.
ANSWER”
Parens Patriae means guardian of the private rights of the people. This prerogative of
parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every state. It is a most beneficient function, and
its exercise is often necessary in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of the injury to
those who cannot protect themselves.
In one case, where the money donated to the victims of an earthquake in the Philippines failed to
reach them, the Supreme Court held that the Government of the Philippines Islands, as parens
patriae, was the proper party to bring the suit against a bank to recover the money which was
deposited therein for distribution to the intended victims. As parens patriae, the government has
the right to enforce all charities of a public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority
over the public interests, where no other person is enrusted with it. (Gov’t. of P.I.v. Monte de
Piedad, 35 Phi. 728).
QUESTION: a-2 Ex Post Facto Law (1977)

Explain and give an example of ex post facto law.
Answer
An ex post facto law is “one which (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the
law and which was innocent when done and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes
greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizers conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
of penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a
person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” An enactment which
gives a criminal character to conduct which when performed was not criminal, is an ex post facto
law.
QUESTION: a-3 Bill Of Attainder. (1977)
Page 26 of 115
Explain and give an example of bill of attainder.
Answer
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Historically,
bills of attainder were used to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities. A statute which
convicts an individual or punishes him for a crime without a judicial trial is a bill of attainder.
Law (1979)
“A”, a public official, is charged with violation of Anti-Graft law committed before the
creation by a presidential decree of the Sandigan Bayan which the Constitution requires
to be created by the National Assembly, the Constitution giving it the power to hear and
decide criminal cases against public officials. As constituted, the Sandigan is composed
three justices, whose decision is appealable direct and only to the Supreme Court. “A”
challenges the jurisdiction and authority of the Sandigan over him. He contends that if
applied to him, the presidential decree creating the Sandigan, providing for its
composition, and defining its powers and jurisdiction in accordance with Constitution,
would be in the nature of an ex post facto law, the crime having been committed before
the Sandigan was created but after the 1973 Constitution took effect. Accordingly, he
contends that his case should be tried in Court of First Instance which had jurisdiction
of the crime at the time of its commission, and whose decision may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals, and if necessary, to the Supreme Court, thereby giving him more
remedies and greater protection to his advantage. Decide on the question raised.
Answer
It is generally held that a procedural rule cannot be considered an ex post facto law,
which refers only to penal matters. This was the view affirmed rather inconclusively in
the case of People v. Vilo. However, in the earlier case of U.S. vs. Gomez Coronel, an
amendment of a procedural law allowing the fiscal to file an information for adultery
which before could be initiated only by the offended spouse was held to be ex post facto.
Page 27 of 115
CITIZENSHIP
QUESTION No. I-a-1 Filipino citizens (1977)
Who are citizens of the Philippines under the New Constitution?
Answer
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
5.) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
6.) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizen of the Philippines.
7.) Those who elect Philippine Citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
8.) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
QUESTION No.I-b-2 The Duties And Obligations Of Citizens

What ate the duties and obligations of citizens under the New Constitution?
Answer
The following are duties and obligations of citizens under the New Constitution:
4. It shall be the duty of the citizen to be loyal to the Republic and to honor the Philippine flag,
to defend State and contribute to its development and welfare, to uphold the constitution
and obey the laws, and to cooperate with the duly constituted authorities in the attainment
and preservation of a just and orderly society.
5. The rights of the individual impose upon him the correlative duty to exercise them
responsibly and with due regard for the rights of others.
6. It shall be the duty of every citizen to engage in gainful work to assure himself and his
family a life worthy of human dignity.
QUESTION No. 1-a-3 Natural-Born Citizen

Who is a natural born citizen?
ANSWER:
A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippine from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
QUESTION No. I-a-4 Loss and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
In what ways may Philippine citizenship be lost?
ANSWER:
A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the following ways and/or events; 1.) By
naturalization in a foreign country, 2.) By express renunciation of citizenship; 3.) By
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country
upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more ;Provided how-ever , That a Filipino may
not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the
Philippines is at war with any country;4.) By rendering service to or accepting commission
in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident
thereto, with the consent of the republic of his Philippine citizenship if either of the
following circumstances is present :a)The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive
and/or b.) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines;5.) By cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization; 6.)By having been declared by competent authority a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty
has been granted , and 7.) in case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner and by her
act or omission she is deemed under the law to have renounced her citizenship.
Page 28 of 115
QUESTION No. I-b

Art II of the New Constitution embodies the Declaration of Principles and State Policies.
State them.
ANSWER:
Art II- Declaration of Principles and state Policies.
Section II.-The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
Section 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government and the people, and in
the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or
civil service.
Section 3. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Section 4. The state shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution. The natural right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth or civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the aid and support of the Government.
Section 5. The state recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being.
Section 6. The state shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security
of all the people. Towards this end, the state shall regulate the acquisition ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and
profits.
Section 7. The state shall establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in the field
of education, health, housing employment, welfare, and social security to guarantee the
enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living.
Section 8.Civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military.
Section 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, and equality
in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex , race, or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. The state shall assure the rights of workers and
employers. The state shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The state may provide
for compulsory arbitration.
Section 10. The state shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units,
especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant community.
QUESTION Natural-Born (1980)
(a) “H” was employed as assistant cashier in a government-owned corporation. Because

of irregularities in the performance of his duties, he was charged administratively
with gross negligence and misconduct prejudicial to the interests of his employer.
During the hearings in the administrative case “H” was suspended from office. At the
conclusion of the hearings, a decision was reached to dismiss him from the service.
He was, in fact, dismissed.
Page 29 of 115
While the hearings in the administrative case were on-going, he was also charged in
Court for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents in relation to the same
conduct then under investigation administratively. After his dismissal case
acquitting him of the offense charged based on reasonable doubt.
“H” then filed a ase in Court against his former employer for reinstatement alleging
as a basis thereof his acquittal in the criminal case.
Will his complaint for reinstatement prosper?
(b) Would a law requiring that only natural-born Filipino citizens may be eligible for
membership in the Board of Directors of domestic commercial banks be
constitutionally valid?
ANSWER:
(a) “H’s” complaint for reinstatement cannot prosper. While the evidence against him
may not be sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt his guilt, it may be
adequate to prove his liability for purposes of the administrative case. It is
noteworthy that his acquittal in the criminal case is based not on a finding of
innocence but on reasonable doubt.
(b) The law is unconstitutional as a denial of the equal protection. As held in Chan Tek
Law v. Republic, 55 SCRA 1 (1974), “a naturalized citizen is entitled to similar
treatment as a native-born citizen ecept where the Charter itself provides
otherwise.” In Baumgartner v. United States, 322 US 66 (1944), Justice Frankfurter
wrote for the Court that “under the American constitution a naturalized citizen
stands on equal footing with a native citizen in all respects save that of eligibility to
the Presidency.” In that case of the Philippines Constitution, natural born citizenship
is required only for members of the National Assembly (and therefore the President
and prime Minister since they are elected from among the members of the
Assembly), the members of the judiciary, and those of the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. Consequently, no law
may require natural born citizenship with respect to other positions, much less with
respect to private offices or business.
However, examinees may also answer that there is no basis for the classification in
the law between natural born and naturalized citizen for purposes of directorship in
domestic commercial banks. Such a classification is violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.
QUESTION: Modes of Acquiring Citizenship (1975)

How may an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen acquire citizenship?
ANSWER:
She must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging,
among other things, that she is not disqualified from acquiring citizenship pursuant to Sec. 4
of the Revised Naturalization Law. The petition must be accompanied by the joint affidavit
of the petitioner and her husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to the
group of disqualified persons, and must be filed with the Bureau of Immigration. (Moi Ya
Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-21289, Oct. 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 292)
SEC 3
QUESTION: Loss and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship (1979)
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(a) “B”, a natural born citizen lost his Filipino citizenship when he enlisted with the Russian
Navy. He reacquired it by administrative naturalization proceedings. May he be elected
to the National Assembly?
(b) “A”, Justice of the Court of Appeals, requested and was allowed by the President to take
an oath of office under the new Constitution but without the need of a new appointment,
just to strengthen his sense of security in office. A new President comes to office, may he
appoint another in place of “A” under the provision of the Constitution that an
incumbent judge or justice may continue in office until his successor is appointed by the
President?
(c) If the President does not exercise his power under this provision within 3 years, may he
not be deemed to have voluntarily renounced said power in the interest of the
independence of the judiciary?
Answer
(a) He may not be elected to the National Assembly where natural born citizenship is
required. As defined in Art. II, Sec. 4, of the Constitution, a natural-born is one who is a
citizen of the Philippines at birth without having to perform any to acquire or perfect his
citizenship. In this case, he had to perform an affirmative act to become a Filipino again.
One view is that the citizenship acquired is the old natural-born status. It is submitted,
however, that he is now a citizen not by virtue of his birth but as a result of a positive act
of repatriation.
(b) Two possible answers:

1. No, because the new President is not the “incumbent President” referred to in
Art. XVII of the Constitution. As held in Aquino vs. COMELEC, the phrase refers
exclusively to Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was the incumbent President of the
Philippines when the Constitution became effective in January 17, 1973.
2. No, because the new President will not assume the powers of the President-
Prime Minister and will only exercise the functions enumerated in Art. VII, Sec. 6,
of the Constitution.
3. No, because non-user will not result in forfeiture of the power nor does the
Constitution prescribe a time for its exercise. He may choose not to exercise his
power but may not renounce it.
Page 31 of 115
SUFFRAGE
QUESTION 1-a Suffrage (1977)
What are the constitutional provisions on suffrage?
ANSWER:
Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six month preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage. The National Assembly shall provide a system for the purpose of
securing the secrecy of the vote.
QUESTION 1-b
What are the constitutional provisions on powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections? Give five (5).
ANSWER:
The Commission on Elections shall have the following powers and functions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
2. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
Members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
3. Decided, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections,
including the determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment
of election officials and inspectors, and the registration of voters.
4. Deputize, with the consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, and honest elections.
5. Register and accredit political parties subject to the provisions of Section eight of Article XII
(c) of the constitution.
QUESTION II-b
What compose the citizens assemblies and the purpose of their creation?
ANSWER:
The Citizens Assemblies are composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio,
district ward for at least six month, fifteen years of the age or over, citizens of the
Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizens Assembly members kept by the
barrio district or ward secretary.
The citizens assemblies shall constitute the base for citizen participation in government
affairs and their collective views shall be considered in the formulation of national policies
of programs and, whenever practicable, shall be translated into concrete and specific
decision.
They shall consider vital national issues confronting the country.
QUESTION II-c
The people have approved the October 1976 amendment to the constitutional. Cite five (5)
of them.
ANSWER:
The following amendments to the Constitutional were approved by the people:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa.
Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless
otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines,
Page 32 of 115
representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less
than eighteen years of the age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the
incumbent President from the Members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be
apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration, while the sectors shall be
determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the
manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim
National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof. However, it
shall not exercise the powers provided in Article VII, Section 14(1) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and
selection of the Members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its
sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the
Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even
after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions, and
likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the 1935
Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this
Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and function,
and discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his cabinet,
and shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may
prescribe. The President (Prime Minister), if he so desires, may appoint a Deputy Prime
Minister or as many Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Minister as he may
deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law
shall have been lifted.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
QUESTION: Legislative Power (1976)
A. Distinguish:
1.Constituent power from legislative power
2Political question from justiciable question
B. The President proposes amendments to the Constitution providing in substance, for the
reversion from the Parliamentary to the Presidential system of government and calls a
referendum, appropriating funds therefor, in which to submit said proposals to the people
for ratification. X, a citizen and a taxpayer, challenges before the Supreme Court the
presidential acts aforesaid claiming that the propsed amendments will only resurrect the
evils of the Old Society and that a referendum plebiscite is not the proper method for
ratification. In turn, the SolGen contends that X has not standing to bring the action, that the
issue is political and not justiciable, and that the President does not have any power to
prepare amendment to the Constitution. Decide with reasons.
C.What is meant by constitutional authoritarianism? Is it compatible with the

constitutionally declared principle that the Phils is a Republican State?
ANSWER:
A. 1. Constituent power is the power to make or amend the Fundamental Law. Legislative
power, on the other hand, is essentially lawmaking power. It is the power to make laws
and to alter and to repeal them. A general grant of legislative power to the legislature
under the Constitution does not include the grant of constituent power.
2.The term political question connotes a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislature or executive branch of the government. Hence, political questions are beyond
judicial cognizance. Judicial authority over a case involving political question extends no
further than to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. A justiciable question, on the other
hand, refers to one which calls for the full exercise of judicial power. Courts decide such
questions on the merits. The question of validity or legality of the assumption and
exercise of powers, as well as the allocation of power, that calls for the application or
interpretation and construction of the provisions of the constitution is a legal or
justiciable question.
B.
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a. X has locus standi to bring this action. The action question the validity of a
decree which appropriate funds. Its purpose is to prohibit the disbursement of
such funds. If the decree is unconditional there will a misapplication of funds. A
taxpayer like X has therefore a substantial interest in prohibiting an illegal
expenditure of public funds.
b. The issue raised is legal and justiciable. Since the constitution provides how it
may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, can
declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed in proposing
amendment thereto is valid or not.
C. constitutional authoritarianism is a form of government wherein all the political powers

of the government are by constitution vested in and to be exercised by a single official
or ruler. Since a republican state is one where sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanate from them and since it is the people themselves – in
adopting their constitution – who provided for a constitutional authoritarian
government therein, there is then no incompatibility between constitutional
authoritarianism and the principle of republicanism.
QUESTION: Budgetary Power (1978)

In the past, members of our old Congress, used to allocate to themselves so-called
congressional allowances which met with popular disfavor due to their scandalous
proportions. What precautionary measures are now provided for in the New Constitution in
order to prevent such pernicious practice? Explain.
ANSWER:
Although the New Constitution (Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII), unlike the 1935 Constitution, does not
prohibit the grant of allowances, per diems and travelling expenses to its members, the
following provisions are made to safeguard against abuses in the grant therefore:
1. The records and books of accounts of the National Assembly shall be open to the public in
accordance with law;
2. Such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually the
itemied expenditures for each member. ( Sec. 8 (2), Art. VIII).
Moreover, under Sec. 16(3) of the Art VIII, the procedure in approving appropriations for
the National Assembly shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for
other departments and agencies. A discussion on the floor of appropriations for such
allowances is itself a safeguard against abuse in the grant thereof.
One who has intruded upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either the
lawful title ( like a de jure officer ) or the color or right to it ( like a de facto officer) is an
intruder or usurper. His acts are void unlike
QUESTION: Party-list system; turncoatism(1980)

(a) It has been said that the “virus of turncoatism” was remedied in the 1973 Constitution. Cite
and explain the novel and innovative provision in that Constitution by which this was effected.
(b) Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, in calling for the election of provincial officials in each province
classified the chartered cities based on the annual regular income of each city, and provided
that the “registered voter of a component city may be entitled to vote in the election of the
officials of the province of which tat city is a component, if its charter provides,” but that
Page 35 of 115
“voters registered in a highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the election of
the officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located.”
Taxpayers and voters of a “highly urbanized” city assailed the constitutionality of such
provision for being a denial of the equal protection clause, and an infringement on the right
of suffrage.
Is their contention tenable?
ANSWER:
(a) Art. XII, C, Sec 10 provides that “No elective public officer may change his political party
affiliation during the term of office, and no candidate for any elective public office may change
his political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election.”
The 1973 Constitution thus puts a stop to the rather common practice of candidates of changing
parties for political convenience or advantage and seeks to preserve the two-party system.
(b) The classification of cities is based on substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would
show whether it is capable of independent existence. Cities with smaller incomes need the
continued support of the provincial government. It is true that there are cities which are
classified as component cities whose charters do not allow their voters to participate in
provincial elections, while other component cities have charters which allow their voters to do
so, but this difference in treatment is a matter of legislative discretion. Highly urbanized cities
are independent of the province in the administration of their affairs. Such being the case, it is
just and proper to limit the selection and election of provincial officials to the voters of the
province whose interest are affected and exclude the voters of highly urbanized cities.
As for the contention that the classification in the statute is an infringement on the right of
suffrage, it has been held that the prohibition against the imposition of burden on the right of
suffrage refers to such irrelevant requirements as the poll tax or the requirement that one must
be a parent to be eligible to vote in a school district election. It has no application to a case like
this where the disfranchisement of voters is the result of the incorporation of their municipality
into a city. (Ceniza v. COMELEC, No. 52304, Jan. 30, 1980, 95 SCRA 763).
QUESTION One Bill, One Subject (1979)

By law passed by the Batasang Pambansa, the Courts are directed to fix as the just
compensation for property expropriated by the Government either the assessed value of the
land by the owner, or the market value whichever is the lesser amount. The law is entitled:
“Assessment Law of 1979”. “A”, owner of a property expropriated by the Government
contests the legality of the provision referred to, alleging that the same is not expressed in
the title of the law, nor is it germane to the subject matter thereof. He contends further that
fixing just compensation is a matter of judicial power, not legislative. Decide on the merit of
the contentions.
(b) Spouses “A” and “B” donated a piece of land to a Government bureau with a condition
attached to the deed of donation that said bureau “shall install lighting and water facilities
and construct a building and parking lot therein”. The bureau having failed to comply with
the condition, the spouses filed a suit for revocation. The court dismissed the suit because
the State cannot be sued without its consent. This decision of the Court was appealed to the
Supreme Court. Decide.
ANSWER:
Page 36 of 115
(a) Yes, under Art. VIII, Sec 19, par. 1, of the Constitution since the title of the bill is not
supposed to be a catalogue or index of all the contents of the measure. The title in the
problem is not enough to alert the people to the possible scope thereof, which could
reasonably include rues on the proper valuation of expropriated lands.
This measure is valid insofar as it prevents the owner from disowning his own sworn
declaration or allow actual value of the property to be determined by the court on the basis
of relevant factors, conformably to the formula devised by the legislature.
(b) This is the case of Santiago vs. Republic of the Philippines, where it was held that violation of
the conditional donation imported a presumed waiver of the immunity of the State from
suit. Moreover, the claim could have been filed with Commission on Audit under C.A. No.
327 as it was not a money claim.
QUESTION Limitations on revenue, appropriations, and tariff measures (1975)

The Social Security Act specifically covers religious organizations. Such inclusion is
assailed on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against
appropriation of public funds for the benefit of priest who may be employed by the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, since such priest or their beneficiaries will be the
recipients of retirement, disability, or death benefit from the system. Is the argument
meritorious? Why?
ANSWER:
No. The funds contributed to the Social Security System are not public funds but are funds
belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. Even
assuming such funds are impressed with a public character, nevertheless, their payment by
the way of retirement, death or disability benefits would not violate the constitutional
prohibition against the use of public funds for the benefit of priest employed by religious
organizations because their payment would be made to the priests not as such but as any
other employees . (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission, L-
15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10)
QUESTION Limitations on revenue, appropriations, and tariff measures (1976 )
A. Does the declaration of martial law necessarily suspend the constitutional right of a person
to bail?
B. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides: In no case shall there be
elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons
receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for
public works of the municipality. On the other hand, both the 1973 and 1935 provides: no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights. Is the above quoted provision of the Revised
Administrative Code inconsistent with the above quoted provisions of the 1935 and 1973
constitution? If so, how will you reconcile the provisions?
ANSWER:
A. Yes. Martial law includes the right to detain persons even without charges for act related to
the situation which justifies proclamation of the martial law. Moreover, implicit in a state of
martial law is the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to
persons arrested. The individual rights must yield to the more paramount right of the state
to defend and preserve itself.
Page 37 of 115
B. No. neither the establishment of religion nor the free exercise clause of the constitution
forbid the legislature from prescribing general and prospectively operative standards for
qualifications and eligibility for basis. Therefore, the law implements separation of church
and state, which by constitutional mandate, must be inviolable.
QUESTION: A Limitations on revenue, appropriations, and tariff measures (1978)

In the past, members of our old Congress, used to allocate to themselves so-called
congressional allowances which met with popular disfavor due to their scandalous
proportions. What precautionary measures are now provided for in the New Constitution in
order to prevent such pernicious practice? Explain.
ANSWER:
Although the New Constitution (Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII), unlike the 1935 Constitution, does not
prohibit the grant of allowances, per diems and travelling expenses to its members, the
following provisions are made to safeguard against abuses in the grant therefore:
1. The records and books of accounts of the National Assembly shall be open to the public in
accordance with law;
2. Such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually the
itemied expenditures for each member. ( Sec. 8 (2), Art. VIII).
Moreover, under Sec. 16(3) of the Art VIII, the procedure in approving appropriations for
the National Assembly shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for
other departments and agencies. A discussion on the floor of appropriations for such
allowances is itself a safeguard against abuse in the grant thereof.
QUESTION: B (1978)
Is a public office the property of the incumbent thereof? Explain briefly.
What is a usurper in public office as distinguished from a de facto officer and de jure officer?
ANSWER:
A public office is not property of the incumbent within the meaning of the due process
clause. It exists only for the good of the public. If public interests is no longer served by a
public office, it is not only the right but the duty of the legislature to abolish it, otherwise its
continued existence is a waste of public funds. In such case the office holder cannot claim
deprivation of property without due process of law. But where there is a controversy as to
which of two persons is entitled thereto, a public office may be considered property within
the protection of the due process clause in that before one may be deprived of his right to
the said office the same should be properly litigated before the court.
One who has intruded upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either
the lawful title ( like a de jure officer ) or the color or right to it ( like a de facto officer) is an
intruder or usurper. His acts are void unlike
Page 38 of 115
QUESTION: Record Keeping(1981)

A bill was presented to the Batasang Pambansa providing for a uniform franchise
tax of 3% of the gross earnings of electric and telephone utilities. The journal
showed that the Batasang Pambansa approved a tax of 5% of gross earnings, but the
bill authenticated by the Speaker and signed by the President showed that the tax
was only 3%. The stenographic notes of the proceedings indicated that the motion
increase the tax to 5% was voted down.
As the Bureau of Internal Revenue was collecting a tax at 5%, the franchise holders
questioned the assessment. The Speaker and the President declined to comment and issued
statements that they were leaving the matter to the Courts.
Decide the case giving reasons.
ANSWER:
The franchise holders cannot be made to pay more than 3% of their gross earning as
provided by law, and as shown by the enrolled copy of the bill which the President signed
into law. The enrolled copy of the bill imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
In Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 117 Phil 363 (1963), the statute fixed a uniform
margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions except with respect to the importation
of urea formaldehyde. But a resolution of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank granted
exemption from the payment of the fee in case of separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde. The auditor general refused to approve the exemptions pursuant to this
resolution, prompting the petitioner to raise the question to the Supreme Court.Petitioner
contended that the bill approved in Congress granted exemption to “urea and
formaldehyde” as separate elements. It argued that the intention of congress was to exempt
these essential elements, rather than the finished product. The Supreme Court that the
enrolled copy of the bill, which used the term “urea formaldehyde” was conclusive. If there
was a mistake in the printing, it was pointed out, the remedy was by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
It is true that in Astoraga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974), the journal was relied upon in
determining whether the bill which the President had signed into law was approved by
Congress, and as the journal showed that the bill did not embody did not embody the
amendments of the Senate, the Court held the statute never to have become a law. It is to be
noted, however, that in that case, the President of the Senate, upon discovering that the
enrolled copy of the bill did not contain the Senate amendments, invalidated his signature
and, when the Presidnet of the Philippines was informed, he in turn withdrew his signature.
There was, therefore, no enrolled bill to consider in that case. Thus, the question in the
Astoraga case is different, namely whether the bill became a law. On the other hand, the
question here is which of the two conflicting versions is correct. Necessarily, the one
certified by the presiding officer of the Batasang Pambansa must control.
However, credit may be given to an answer that the journal entries should prevail over the
enrolled copy of the bill on the basis of the statement in Astoraga v. Villegas that the journal
is a document required by the Constitution to be kept by the legislature.
QUESTION: a) Taxing Power (1975)
Some years ago, the B.I.R. has started to disallow the benefits of tax deduction enjoyed by the head
of the family, beginning with a fourth dependent and up, in line with the government’s family
Page 39 of 115
planning program. Furthermore, contraceptives for the prevention of birth are being encouraged by
the government and distributed for free by public hospitals and clinics. Catholic families strongly
protest against this state policy and practice on the grounds that it is not only discriminatory but
also offensive to religious beliefs and violative of the natural law which prohibit birth control of the
human specie. How would you resolve this controversy? Reason out you answer.
Answer
Such disallowance of a tax deduction by the B.I.R. to a head of family beginning with a fourth
dependent and up is invalid. There is nothing in the problem which says that the B.I.R. has acted
pursuant to law. On the contrary, the existing law (The Income Law Tax) allows such deduction. If
indeed it is in line with the government’s family planning program, such must be embodied in a
statute and the B.I.R. cannot, without any authority of law or in derogation of it, disallow such
deduction as a means to carry out that program.
Alternative Answer
On the assumption that there is such a law, the said statute is valid not only as a reasonable
measure to control population explosion which, in turn, may bring about serious economic and
social problems under the police power of the state and more specifically in compliance with
Section 10 of Article XV of the New Constitution which provides: “It shall be the responsibility of the
State to achieve and maintain population levels most conducive to national welfare.” The right to
religious freedom and of beliefs is not absolute. Its exercise is subject to the dominant police power
of the State.
QUESTION: b
Under Section 10 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is mandated that “the state
shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio to
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.” Under the 1976 amendments,
however, which were proposed by President Marcos, the barangays and sanggunians were given
constitutional recognition. Does this amendment have the effect of abolishing the barrio,
considering that the barangay now exercise political and public functions originally exercised by
barrio units? Reason out your answers.
Answer
No. The concept of barrios remain as one the political and territorial subdivisions into which the
Philippines is divided (Sec. 10, Art. II; Sec. 1, Art. XI, New Constitution). What happened is that
under Presidential Decree No. 557 issued on September 21, 1974 “all existing barrios or barrios
that may be created were (are hereby) declared as barangays and all references to the barrio in any
existing laws shall henceforth be understood as referring to the barangay.” In short, only the name
has been changed from barrio to barangay. But the entity remains the same
QUESTION : Taxing Power (1978)

An American citizen, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation
providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines, was
assessed by the BIR and had to pay the income tax due for the proceeds of the sale of
his automobile to a member of the U.S Marine Corp., the transaction having taken
place in Clark Airbase in Pampanga. It was his claim both with the CTA and
thereafter, the Supreme Court, that he was not liable for the tax as in legal
contemplation, the sale was made out of the Philippine territory. How would you
decide the case.
Page 40 of 115
ANSWER:
He is liable to pay income tax due from the proceeds of the sale of his automobile made
inside Clark Airbase in Pampanga. The Clark Airbase is not a foreign soil or territory for
purposes of income tax legislation. It is an integral part of the Philippine territory and
subject to its sovereignty and jurisdiction. True, under the military Bases Agreement, the
Philippines has consented that the United States exercise certain rights necessary for the
use, operation and defense of the bases. But the Philippines jurisdictional rights therein,
certainly not excluding the power to tax have been preserved. The “exemption clause”
under the Military Bases Agreement does not apply in this case because the income from
the sale of the car is clearly derived in the Philippines.
QUESTION: Taxing Power (1981)

A law prohibiting the making and use of fake internal revenue stamps imposes as penalty a “fine of
not less than P10,000.00 or imprisonment of not less than one year” for violation thereof.
“A” who was accused of violating the law, questioned the constitutionality thereof, claiming that it
imposes an excessive penalty. He contended that under said law, a Court can impose a fine of as
much as P1 Million pesos or imprisonment of twenty years because there is no maximum penalty.
Decide the case, giving reasons.
ANSWER:
The statute is unconstitutional not because the penalty it imposes is excessive but because it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The prohibition against excessive fines must
take into account the nature of the offense. Here the making and use of fake internal revenue
stamps deprives the government of substantial revenue from taxation, and thus affects vital public
functions. On the other hand the ban on cruel or unusual punishment does not have reference to the
severity of the punishment but to its form. Even in those cases where the prohibition is held to
apply to the severity of the punishment, it has been held that the disparity between the offense and
the penalty must be such as to shock the moral sense of reasonable men before the penalty may be
considered cruel or unusual (People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906 (1953)). An imprisonment of one
year certainly cannot be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. Since a court may
impose the minimum penalty of fine of P10,000 or imprisonment of one year, the statute cannot be
said to impose an excessive penalty.
However, to the extent that the statute does not fix the maximum penalty for its violation there is
undue delegation of legislative power to the courts. In People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), it was held
that “it is clearly within the province of the legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime,
and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment. . . . The legislative power to set
punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general discretion may
confer on trial judges, if it see fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to
beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or
conditional.” a statute that does not fic the maximum penalty would, therefore, give unfettered
discretion to the judges and would constitute an abdication of the legislative power to prescribe the
penalty.
QUESTION:. Non-Appropriation (1981)

A Barangay Counsil in Tawi- Tawi raised funds through donations for the construction of a
chapel and the purchase of religious paraphernalia. The exclusive use of the chapel was given to a
Page 41 of 115
Catholic priest who said mass therein for the benefit of residents, most of whom are dependents of
military personnel assigned to a military camp in the barrio.
A Muslim questioned the expenditure as violative of the Constitution. Decide the case, giving
your reasons.
Answer
In Grace v. Estenzo, G.R No. 53487, May 25, 1981, the Supreme Court held that the purchase
of a religious image by the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City with the use of funds, raised by
means of solicitations and cash donations, did not violate either art. VIII, sec. 18 (2) which prohibits
the use of public money for the use, benefit or support of any church, nor art. IV, sec. 8 which
prohibits the enactment of a law respecting an establishment of religion. The court held that the
image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. It further held that if there is nothing
unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint cannot be illegal.
However, the construction of a chapel, even if the money used was raised not by taxation
but only solicitation, is a religious activity which cannot be undertaken by the barangay council. It
has been held that the Non- Establishment Clause prohibits “sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity” and that any statute (including a barangay
counsil resolution), to be valid, must pass three tests: (1) it must have a secular legislative purpose;
(2) Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion and (3)
the statute must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. (Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S 602 (1971)).
Tested by these criteria, the barangay council resolution constitutes a law respecting an
establishment of religion. By means of it the barangay council of Tawi-Tawi sponsors a religious
activity contrary to art. IV, sec. 8 and the principle of separation of church and state as expressed in
art. XV, sec. 15
Page 42 of 115
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
QUESTION: Executive and administrative powers in general (1975)

Has the President (now Prime Minister) the authority to suspend the operation of any
statue or law? Why?
ANSWER:
No, because it is his duty to execute the law. However, he may be authorized by the
Legislature upon the occurrence of certain contingencies to suspend the operation of the law.
Moreover, in a martial law situation, the President exercises not only the executive power but
also legislative power and therefore may also suspend the operation of statutes.
QUESTION: Power of appointment (1975)

In 1958 Villaluz was appointed by the President of the Philippines as administrator of the
Motor Vehicles Office. In 1960 administrative charges were filed against him for
mismanagement, gross inefficiency, and negligence of the performance of his duties. After
an investigation and hearing, the President removed Villaluz and appointed Ponyo to take
his place. Villaluz filed an original petition in the Supreme Court seeking reinstatement of
the ground that Civil Service Commisioner and not the President of the Philippines has
jurisdiction to investigate and remove him. Is the contention meritorious? Why?
ANSWER:
No. Petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed
from office after due hearing by the President, under the principle that “The power to
remove is inherent to the power to appoint” as can be clearly implied from Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 2260. The Civil Service Commissioner is without jurisdiction to hear and
decide the administrative charges against petitioner because the authority of the
commissioner to pass upon question of suspension, separation, or removal can only be
exercise with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified service.
(Villaluz v. Saldivar, L-22754, Dec. 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 710)
QUESTION: Power of appointment (1979)
(d) “B”, a natural born citizen lost his Filipino citizenship when he enlisted with the Russian
Navy. He reacquired it by administrative naturalization proceedings. May he be elected
to the National Assembly?
(e) “A”, Justice of the Court of Appeals, requested and was allowed by the President to take
an oath of office under the new Constitution but without the need of a new appointment,
just to strengthen his sense of security in office. A new President comes to office, may he
appoint another in place of “A” under the provision of the Constitution that an
incumbent judge or justice may continue in office until his successor is appointed by the
President?
(f) If the President does not exercise his power under this provision within 3 years, may he
not be deemed to have voluntarily renounced said power in the interest of the
independence of the judiciary?
ANSWER
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(c) He may not be elected to the National Assembly where natural born citizenship is
required. As defined in Art. II, Sec. 4, of the Constitution, a natural-born is one who is a
citizen of the Philippines at birth without having to perform any to acquire or perfect his
citizenship. In this case, he had to perform an affirmative act to become a Filipino again.
One view is that the citizenship acquired is the old natural-born status. It is submitted,
however, that he is now a citizen not by virtue of his birth but as a result of a positive act
of repatriation.
(d) Two possible answers:
4. No, because the new President is not the “incumbent President” referred to in
Art. XVII of the Constitution. As held in Aquino vs. COMELEC, the phrase refers
exclusively to Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was the incumbent President of the
Philippines when the Constitution became effective in January 17, 1973.
5. No, because the new President will not assume the powers of the President-
Prime Minister and will only exercise the functions enumerated in Art. VII, Sec. 6,
of the Constitution.
6. No, because non-user will not result in forfeiture of the power nor does the
Constitution prescribe a time for its exercise. He may choose not to exercise his
power but may not renounce it.
QUESTION: Power Of Supervision (1981)

The Minister of Natural Resources affirmed the decision of the Director of Mines in a case
for specific performance of a mining contract filed by “A” against “B”. Instead of appealing to the
President, “B” the losing party, appealed to the Prime Minister, who reversed the decision of the
Minister of Natural Resources. Is the Prime Minister authorized under the 1981 amendments to the
Constitution to review the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources? Explain your answer.
ANSWER
The Prime Minister has no authority under the constitution to reverse a decision of a head
of a cabinet, his authority being limited to supervision. (Const., art IX, sec. 10). There is a distinction
between supervision and control. Supervision means overseeing or to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter, (Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143
(1995)). Since a review of the decision of the Minister of natural Resources may call for the
substitution of his judgment, it is clear that such review can be exercised only by the President who
under article VII, sec. 8 is vested with the control of ministries.
Page 44 of 115
QUESTION: Pardoning Power (1976)
A. In furtherance of the government’s policy of attraction to win over rebels in Mindanao, the
President extended executive clemency to several rebels being tried for violation of the anti-
subversion act and thereafter authorized their induction in the armed forces to help in the
pacification drive. Is this grant of clemency justifiable either as a pardon or an amnesty?
B. X, a practicing lawyer in the Phils received from his client the amount of 500 of a judgment of
ejectment against said client. X failed to deposit the amount in court. As a result the judgment
was executed and the client evicted from the apartment he was renting. The client prosecuted X
for estafa for failure to return the amount of 500 in spite of several demands and was convicted.
Later, the client filed disbarment proceedings against X based on his criminal conviction of
estafa. X asks for the dismissal of the disbarment proceedings against him on the ground that he
has already been pardoned by the Pres from the crime committed against the client. Is X’s
contention tenable?
C. X, Y, and Z were among those who participated in the raids against the authorities in the South.
In their raids, the rebels attacked even civilians along the way, burned their houses and other
valuable properties in order to restore normalcy in the area. Subsequently, the Pres granted
absolute amnesty to the rebels, among them X, Y, Z. May these civilians who suffered losses
because of the acts of the rebels go to court and sue those rebels responsible for the loss and
destruction of their property for damages?
ANSWER
A. This act of executive clemency may be justified as an amnesty because it was granted to a group
of offenders, for political offenses and before final conviction. As to the requirement of
concurrence of the national assembly, it may be stated that at this stage of the transition period
the President exercises not only executive and administrative powers but legislative power as
well. In fine, the power of the interim Batasang Pambansa to concur in the grant of amnesty by
the Pres must be deemed vested in the latter in this stage when the interim Batasang Pambansa
has not yet been convened and is not yet functioning.
B. It depends on the kind of a pardon extended to him. If the pardon is absolute X’s contention is
tenable. An absolute pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the
guilt of the offender, releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the
eyes of the law the offender is an innocent as if he had never committed the offense. An absolute
pardon wipes out the conviction, hence the ground for which his disbarment is sought ceases to
exist. On the other hand, if the pardon is conditional, only the punishment and the resultant
disabilities are affected subject to the conditions of the pardon. The conviction remains. Since
the ground for disbarment is his conviction, X’s contention will not be tenable.
C. Yes. Amnesty does not extinguish the right of the offended party to enforce the civil liability of
the person benefited by the amnesty. The idea that amnesty wipes out the crime cannot be
carried to the extent of saying, for the purpose of depriving a person of a legal civil right to
which he was entitled that the criminal act never existed. The state, through a grant of amnesty,
cannot condone civil liability legally due to a private individual. It cannot give away what does
not legally belong to it.
QUESTION: Reprieve (1981)

The Court of First Instance of Rizal found “X” guilty of murder and imposed upon him the
death penalty. The sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Upon the remand of the case for
execution on June 10, the trial court set the execution on June 10, 1980. On June 9, 1980, the
President granted a reprieve ending on July 10, 1980.
Page 45 of 115
On July 8, 1980, the trial court granted another reprieve of three months from July 10, 1980
in order to give the accused the opportunity to present evidence that the real murdered had
confessed and that his conviction was a case of mistaken identity.
Is the order of the trial court valid? Why?
ANSWER:
It is submitted that the order granting reprieve is void. In People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 65
(1937)the court distinguished between reprieve and suspension of sentence. Reprieve is the
postponement of the execution of sentence to a day certain, while suspension is for an indefinite
time. The power to grant reprieve is conferred by the Constitution on the President (Art. VII, sec
11). It, therefore, cannot be exercised by the courts. What the latter may be authorized by statute to
exercise would be the power to suspend sentence by probation or otherwise. Furthermore, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal cannot suspend the sentence here since decision has become final
and executory and, therefore, it is beyond the power of the court to reopen the case.
QUESTION: Veto Power (1981)

The President of the Philippines went on a state visit to Malaysia. while there, he was
informed that five bills passed by the Batasang Pambansa had to be acted upon by him as they had
been submitted to him 29 days before. So, on the 30th day, he went to the Philippine Embassy in
Kuala Lumpur and vetoed one of the bills and approved three of the bills. The fifth bill was neither
vetoed nor signed into law.
(a) Was the veto by the President valid?
(b) Was the approval of the three bills valid?
(c) Did the fifth bill become a law?
Reason out each of your answer.
ANSWER:
(a) The veto is valid and effective. While art VIII, sec 20 (1) requires that the vetoed bill
should be returned to the Batasang Pambansa together with the President’s objections, so that if
the legislature wishes, it may reconsider the bill and repass it over the President’s veto by the vote
of two-thirds of all its members, this requirement may be complied with later, outside the thirty day
period provided in the Constitution.
(b) The approval of the three bills is valid. The Philippine Embassy in Malaysia is an
extension of Philippne Territory and certainly the President can sign the bills passed by the
Batasang Pambansa in that office.
(c) Yes, the fifth bill became a law pursuant to art VIII, sec. 20 (1) which provides that if the
President does not act on a bill passed by the Batasang Pambansa within thirty days after it is
presented to him, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
Page 46 of 115
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
QUESTION: Appointments to the Judiciary (1979)
“A” was already a Justice of the Court of Appeals when the 1973 Constitution took effect.
Thereafter, he was appointed Presiding Justice. When he reached the age of 65 years, he
continued in the same office exercising the functions and prerogatives thereof. The validity
of his decision was raised by a defeated litigant in the Supreme Court, majority of whose
members are similarly situated as “A”.
(a) May all the members of the Supreme Court sit to pass on the question raised?
(b) May “A” continue in office until he reaches the age of 70 years?
(c) If not, may he be considered de facto officer when he rendered the questioned decision/
ANSWER:
(a) It is submitted that the validity of the decision cannot be questioned collaterally and
that A’ title should be raised in a direct proceeding in quo warranto. In any case, the
question of disqualification is addressed to the discretion only of the Justices involved.
(b) There is yet no settled rule on this matter. One view is that the judge appointed under
the new Constitution should retire at the age of 65 years even if he might originally have
been covered by Art. XVII, Sec. 10.
Another view is that he does not forfeit the benefits of this rule, since all it requires is
that he was incumbent in the Judiciary and not in any particular judgeship on January
17, 1973.
The cases of Chief Justice Makalintal and Justices Martin and Palma, originally covered
by the said provision, who retired voluntarily upon reaching the age of 65, have only
one persuasive value
(c) Yes, as there was an office de jure, color of title derived from his reputation as a judge,
and actual possession of the office.
QUESTION: Judicial Review (1975)

What do you understand by power of judicial review? When may it be exercised? What are
the guides or standards for its exercise?
ANSWER:
In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) the Court, through Justice Laurel,
defined the power of judicial review as the power of courts “to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy
the right which that instrument secures and guarantees to them”.
It may be exercised if the following conditions are present:
(a) an appropriate case;
(b) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question;
(c) invocation of the power at the earliest opportunity;
(d) necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon to decide the case.
(People v. Vera, 64 Phil. 56 (1937))
Page 47 of 115
S is the registered lessee of a 393 sq. meter lot forming a part of the Tambsoong Estate,
paying the rentals thereof to the Roman Catholic church, then the owner thereof. S
subleased to L, B, and K portions of the said lot on which they built their houses, paying
rentals to S. In 1947, the government acquired this estate pursuant to Commonwealth Act
539 for resale to bonafide tenants or occupants therein. S applied to purchase the entire lot
leased to him, while L, B, and K also applied to buy the portions thereof respectively
subleased to them. The bureau of Lands approved the application of S and denied those of
the sublessees. However, the Land Tenure Administration set aside the decision of the
Bureau of Lands and gave due course to the application of the sublessees, which action was
affirmed by the Executive Secretary, S went to court on certiorari. The lower court as well as
the Court of Appeals upheld him. In the appeal, the following issues were raised:
(a) Are the sublessees “tenants” or “occupants” under the law who may be allowed to
purchase the respective portions of the lot of S leased to them?
(b) Can the court review the administrative action of the Bureau of lands?
Please decide.
ANSWER:
(a) Commonwealth Act No. 539, Section 1 provided that lands acquired under it should be
subdivided and resold at reasonable prices to “their bona fide tenants or occupants or
private individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire
and own lands in the Philippines.” Thus, the order of preference is, first, bona fide tenants,
second, occupants, and third, private individuals.
In Leongson v. Court of Appeals, L3255, January 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 212, the Court
considered the sublessees, L, B, and K, to be bona fide tenants with respect to the portion of
the lands occupied by them. The Court held that “justice and equity command that [they] be
given preferencial right to purchase in order to carry out the avowed policy of the law to
give land to the landless” and that “if the claim of a sublease actually in possession would be
ignored or disregarded, the result would be to heighten social tension and aggravate further
the unrest that has its roots in so many of our countrymen being denied the opportunity of
owning even a small piece of land on which their houses are built and wherein they reside.”
(b) Yes, because the question involved is a question of law. As held in the same case of
Leongson v. Court of Appeals, “the moment a question of law arises, . . . it is inescapable on
the judiciary to pass upon and decide the issue.” A decision of the Director of Lands on a
question of law is in no sense conclusive upon the courts, but is subject to review.
QUESTION: -a-I (1977)

ANSWER:
parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every state. It is a most beneficent
function, and its exercise is often necessary in the interest of humanity, and for the
prevention of the injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
In one case, where the money donated to the victims of an earthquake in the Philippines
failed to reach them, the Supreme Court held that the Government of the Philippines
Islands, as parens patriae, was the proper party to bring the suit against a bank to recover
the money which was deposited therein for distribution to the intended victims. As parens
patriae, the government has the right to enforce all charities of a public nature, by virtue of
its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is
enrusted with it. (Gov’t. of P.I.v. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phi. 728).
Page 48 of 115
QUESTION: a-2 (1977)

ANSWER:
law and which was innocent when done and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or
makes greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal
rules of evidence, and authorizers conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights
and remedies only, in effect imposes of penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” An enactment which gives a criminal character to
conduct which when performed was not criminal, is an ex post facto law.

ANSWER:
bills of attainder were used to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities. A statute
which convicts an individual or punishes him for a crime without a judicial trial is a bill of
attainder.

Explain and give an example of posse commitatus.
ANSWER:
This is an ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and
good order of his community. Under this power, those persons in the state, county, or town who
were charged with the maintenance of peace and good order were bound, ex oficio, to pursue and
to take all persons who had violated the law. For that purpose they might command all male
inhabitants of a certain age to assist them. Act No.1309 is a statutory recognition of such common-
law right. Said Act attempts simply to designate the cases and the method when and by which the
people of the town may be called upon to render assistance for the protection of the public and the
preservation of peace and good order.

Explain and give an example of eminent domain.
ANSWER:
Eminent domain is the right or power of the state or of those to whom the power has been
lawfully delegated to take (or expropriate) private property for public use upon paying to
the owner a just composition to be ascertained according to the law. The taking of private
land by the government to be used as a public street is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
QUESTION: b (1977)
Define and distinguish term of office and tenure of office.
ANSWER:
The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as offright,
and fixed the interval after which the several represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office.
Page 49 of 115
QUESTION: b-2 (1977)

Define and sandiganbayan and tanodbayan.
ANSWER:
The sandiganbayan is a special court which shall have special jurisdiction over civil and
criminal cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office as may be determine by law.
The Tanodbayan shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate
recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the
corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the proper court or body.

Defined the distinguish political rights, civil rights, social and economic rights, rights of the
accused.
ANSWER:
Political rights are such rights of the citizens which give them the power to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the government. Among
these rights are the right of citizenship and the right of suffrage.
Civil rights are those rights which the law will enforce at the instance of private individuals
for the purpose of securing to them the enjoyment of their means of happiness. They
include the right against involuntary servitude (Section 14) and imprisonment for
nonpayment of debt or a poll tax (Section 15), the constitutional rights of the accused
(Section 17-20); the social and economic rights (infra.); liberty of an abode and of travel
(Sections 5); etc. Freedom of speech and of the press, the right of assembly and petition, and
the right to form associations (Sections 7,9) are likewise civil rights. However, they partake
of the nature of political rights when they are utilized as a means to participate in the
government.
Social and economic rights include those rights which are intended to insure the well-being
and economic security of the individual. The right to property (Section 1) and the right to
just compensation for private property taken for public use (Section 2) belong more
appropriately under this third category of rights. They are also provided in the provisions
dealing with the promotion of social justice (Article II, Section 6), the protection to labor
and the rights of workers (Ibid., Section 9), the conversation and utilization of natural
resources (Article XIII, Section 8,9), and the promotion of education (Article XV, Section 8).
Rights of the accused are the rights intended for the protection of a person accused of any
crime, like the right to presumption of innocence, the right to a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, and the right against cruel and unusual punishment. The provisions (Section 17 to 22)
particularly and directly dealing with these rights are discussed subsequently.
QUESTION: b-4 Judicial Power And Judicial Review (1977)
Defined and distinguish judicial power and judicial review.
ANSWER:
Judicial power is the power to apply the laws to contests or disputes concerning legally
recognized rights or duties between the State and private persons, or between individual
litigants in cases properly brought before the judicial tribunals.
Page 50 of 115
Judicial review is the power of the courts, ultimately of the Supreme Court, to interpret the
constitution and declare any legislative or executive act invalid because it is in conflict with
the fundamental law. This authority is derived by clear implication from the provision of
sections 2(2) and 5 (2a) Article X of the Constitution. Through such power, the Supreme
Court particularly, enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution.
QUESTION: b-5
Defined and distinguish presidential decree, general orders, letters instruction, and
implementation.
ANSWER:
Presidential decrees are laws promulgated by the incumbent President under his martial
law powers. They are presumed to be valid and constitutional in the same way that existing
laws passed by the defunct Congress are presumed to be valid and constitutional until
declared otherwise in appropriate judicial proceedings.
General orders are orders issued by the incumbent President defining specific policies that
shall govern or regulate certain activities.
Letters of instruction are orders issued by incumbent President to specific government

officials directing or authorizing the doing of certain things, or laying guidelines to be
complied with for the effective implementation of a law.
Letters of implementations are those that put into effect the reorganization of the
government as provided in Presidential Decree No.1.

(a) To what extent is the Constitution a grant of, and yet a limitation on, power?
(b) What, if any, is the difference in the power of review of the Supreme Court over
decisions, rulings and orders of the Commission on Elections under the 1935 Constitution
and 1973 Constitution?
ANSWER:
(a) A Constitution is an organic instrument under which governmental powers are both
conferred and circumscribed. “The office and purpose of the Constitution is to shape and fix
the limits of governmental activity (Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines 21 [2d ed.
1977]). When the Constitution allocates powers to the different branches of the
government, the effect is to confer, and at the same time place, limitations on power.
(b) Under the 1935 Constitution the decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission on
Elections “shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court.” (Art. X, Sec. 2). This means a
review of questions of law. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat
differently that the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission “may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.” (Art. XII, C, Sec. 11), even as it ordains that the Commission
shall be “the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections returns and qualifications of
all the members of the National Assembly and elective provincial officials.” (Art. XII, C, sec. 2
[2]). It is evident from the change in the Constitutional language and the limited scope of
certiorari compared to review that the intent is to limit judicial review to questions of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. This construction is consistent with the
decision of the Constitutional Convention to strengthen the independence of the
Commission. (Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, L-49705-02, Feb. 8, 1978, 88 SCRA 251).
Page 51 of 115
QUESTION: Judicial review (1981)

What is your understanding of this sentence that the function of Judicial review has both a
positive and a negative aspect, and that its exercise is an awesome and delicate power?
ANSWER:
Judicial review has both a positive and negative aspect because it can be used as a means of
validating governmental action against constitutional doubts, as well as to nullify legislative or
executive acts. The first is known as the legitimating work of judicial review, while the second is
known as the checking work. (Black, The People and the Court 87 (1960):ana v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
56350, April 2, 1981).
The power of judicial review is a delicate one because, as Justice Frankfurt has pointed out,
the authority of the Supreme Court, which is possessed neither of the purse nor the sword,
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be
nourished at the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political
entanglements and by absentation from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political
settlements. (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S 186 (1962) (dissent); see also Fernando, The Supremacy of the
Constitution: Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 113 (1981)). The power is at the same time an
awesome one because, as Professor alexander M. Biclkel has well observed, judicial review can be a
counter majoritarian force in a democratic system. ( The Least Dangerous Branch 16 (1962)). It is a
veto on the act of the people's representatives in the legislature.
QUESTION: Operative Fact Doctrine (1975)

When an assailed legislative or executive act is found by the courts to be contrary to the
Constitution, it is null and void. Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that administrative or
executives acts, orders, and regulations shall be valid only when they are contrary to the laws or the
constitution. What is the nature of acts done under such our constitutional or invalid law, order or
regulation before the court has declared the same null and void? Why?
ANSWER:
Strictly speaking, acts done under an unconstitutional statute or executive act are null and
void since such law or executive act confers no rights, imposes no duty and affords no
protection. This is especially so where the statue or executive act is void on its face.
However, this rule is subject to qualifications. It has been held that the actual existence of a
statute or executive act prior to a determination that it is unconstitutional is an operative
fact and many have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The effect of a
subsequent ruling of invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects - with respect
to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determination deemed
to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of
the statute or act and of its previous application, demand examination. A principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot thus be justified. Municipality of Malabang v.
Benito, L28113, March 28, 1969; Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, L-23127,
April 29, 1971
QUESTION: Power of removal (1979)

(a) The President writes a member of his cabinet that his registration has been accepted
although the latter has not filed his resignation. Is this a valid termination of official
relation?
(b) What do you understand by the principle that a “public office is a public trust”?
Page 52 of 115
(c) When is it considered as property?
ANSWER:
(a) In Article IX, Sec 4, the members of the Cabinet may be removed by the Prime Minister at his
discretion. Strictly speaking, however, Cabinet members serve at the pleasure of the Prime
Minister, their term continuing as long as they enjoy his confidence. The moment such
confidence is lost, they cease to be entitled to their position, not by virtue of a removal but
of a different method of terminating official relations, to wit, expiration of the term. No
resignation is even necessary to separate them from the cabinet.
(b) It means that public office is held by the functionary not for purposes of self-
aggrandizement (overstatement) but as a steward who must discharge the duties thereof
for the benefit of the people.
(c) Generally, public office is not considered property. However, in Segovia vs. Noel, it was held
that it could come under the protection of due process of law in the sense that one cannot
be deprived thereof except upon a clear showing of the legislative intention.
QUESTION: Powers of Supreme Court (1979)

(a) “X” appealed an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. After the
submission of brief by appellant “X” and appellee “Y”, the case was submitted for
decision after oral argument on May 5, 1975. No decision having been rendered, “Y”
filed on January 1, 1977 a motion for certification that the appealed decision is deemed
affirmed by operation of the Constitution. Seven (7) of the 12 actual members of the
Supreme Court vote to grant the motion, five (5), to deny. With this voting, should the
certification prayed for be issued? With whom would you vote?
(b) Under the provision of the Constitution, may nine (9) votes be sufficient to impose the
penalty of death, or to declare a treaty unconstitutional where there are only twelve
(12) members of the Supreme Court, the remaining positions being vacant? If so, why?
(c) If not, is there any procedure that should be taken to obtain the constitutionally
required votes to reach a decision?
ANSWER:
(a) Under Art. X, Sec. 11, par. 2, the decision appealed from is deemed affirmed following
the lapse of 18 months, the necessary vote not having been obtained unless the case is
one requiring a qualified majority vote or involves a judgment of conviction.
However, this provision has been held to be merely directory.
The certification of this fact is not subject to votation but it is to be made by the
presiding justice alone.
Even if it were subject to votation, the needed vote is 8, not 7, as the question was to be
heard and decided en banc.
(b) Art. X, Sec. 2, par. 2, of the Constitution provides that the vote of at least ten justices is
necessary for a declaration of unconstitutionality, regardless of the actual membership
to the Court. All other cases which under the rules of the Supreme Court are to be heard
and decide en banc are to be resolved by a vote of eight justices. By resolution of the
Supreme Court, however, the affirmative of a death sentence requires the vote of ten
justices.
Page 53 of 115
(c) Possibly, a motion for reconsideration. Better still, the vacancies should be filed.

(a) “G”, a Filipino citizen resident of and property owner in Davao City, believing that the
President of the Philippines may not propose amendments to the Constitution – since
this is a legislative function under the Constitution to be performed only by the regular
National Assembly or by a Constitutional Convention called by it or by the interim
National Assembly – files a suit to stop the Commission on Elections and the National
Treasurer, the first from conducting a plebiscite and the second, from releasing public
funds to finance the same plebiscite where the people were called upon to ratify (or
reject) a specific proposal of the President to amend the constitution.
Des “G” have a standing in Court vis-à-vis the action he has filed? The respondents
contend that “G” has no interest, direct or remote, to protect in the suit since he stands
to suffer no injury or damage from the holding of the plebiscite in question.
What will be your position on this issue?
(b) Before the 1973 Constitution, administrative supervision over inferior courts was
vested in the Department of Justice. The 1973 Constitution transferred said supervision
to the Supreme Court. Of late, the view has been advanced that administrative
supervision over inferior courts should be returned to the Ministry of Justice.
Would you endorse this view? Give the constitutional basis for your answer
ANSWER:
(a) “G” has standing to bring the action to stop the expenditure of funds which he believes
is for an unconstitutional purpose. For if the President of the Philippines as no power to
propose amendments to the Constitution, the expenditure of funds for the holding of a
plebiscite for the ratification of such proposed amendments would constitute a
misapplication of public funds. As citizen and taxpayer “G” has an interest in theproper
expenditure of public funds. (Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333[1976])
(b) The supervision of the inferior courts was vested the Supreme Court to secure the
independence of the judiciary. While a distinction can be drawn between the
performance of judicial functions and administration, the supervision of inferior courts
by the Ministry of Justice may trench upon the discretion of the judges which should be
exercised by them according to their influence which the Minister of Justice has over
Judges. It is unavoidable that judges will court his goodwill, as their promotion may at
times depend on it. (Garcia v. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 [1971] [Fernando, J., concurring]).
The examinee may, however, answer as follows: I am endorsing this proposal. The
Constitution should be amended so as to transfer the supervision of the lower courts to
the Ministry of Justice. Administrative supervision unnecessarily burden the Supreme
Page 54 of 115
Court and detracts from the time and attention that it needs to give to its essential
function of developing the law in its most profound aspects.
Section 291 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides:
“No court shall have authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any
internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by this Code.”
Is this provision unconstitutional for being an undue encroachment by the legislative
branch on judicial powers and prerogatives? Explain briefly.
ANSWER:
The power to enjoin the collection of taxes is not given to the courts; therefore the statute in
this case cannot be said to be an impairment of the powers and prerogatives of courts. No
government could exist that permitted its collection to be delayed by a very litigous man or
very embarassed man, to whom delay was more important than the payment of costs.
(Sarasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252 (1919)). Where a taxpayer is permitted to pay the
amount demanded under protest and then maintain an action at law to recover the amount
paid or so much of it as was illegally exacted, this is ordinarily regarded as adequate
remedy. In Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580 (1915), it was therefore held that a law
denying the power to enjoin the collection of taxes was valid (a) because jurisdiction was
never conferred on courts to enjoin the colection of taxes and (b) because the taxpayer has
an adequate remedy under the law. (See also David v. Ramos 90 Phil. 351 (1951)).
(c) “G”, a Filipino citizen resident of and property owner in Davao City, believing that the
President of the Philippines may not propose amendments to the Constitution – since
this is a legislative function under the Constitution to be performed only by the regular
National Assembly or by a Constitutional Convention called by it or by the interim
National Assembly – files a suit to stop the Commission on Elections and the National
Treasurer, the first from conducting a plebiscite and the second, from releasing public
funds to finance the same plebiscite where the people were called upon to ratify (or
reject) a specific proposal of the President to amend the constitution.
Des “G” have a standing in Court vis-à-vis the action he has filed? The respondents
contend that “G” has no interest, direct or remote, to protect in the suit since he stands
to suffer no injury or damage from the holding of the plebiscite in question.
What will be your position on this issue?
(d) Before the 1973 Constitution, administrative supervision over inferior courts was
vested in the Department of Justice. The 1973 Constitution transferred said supervision
to the Supreme Court. Of late, the view has been advanced that administrative
supervision over inferior courts should be returned to the Ministry of Justice.
Would you endorse this view? Give the constitutional basis for your answer
ANSWER:
(a) “G” has standing to bring the action to stop the expenditure of funds which he believes
is for an unconstitutional purpose. For if the President of the Philippines as no power to
propose amendments to the Constitution, the expenditure of funds for the holding of a
Page 55 of 115
plebiscite for the ratification of such proposed amendments would constitute a

misapplication of public funds. As citizen and taxpayer “G” has an interest in theproper
expenditure of public funds. (Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333[1976])
(b) The supervision of the inferior courts was vested the Supreme Court to secure the
independence of the judiciary. While a distinction can be drawn between the
performance of judicial functions and administration, the supervision of inferior courts
by the Ministry of Justice may trench upon the discretion of the judges which should be
exercised by them according to their influence which the Minister of Justice has over
Judges. It is unavoidable that judges will court his goodwill, as their promotion may at
times depend on it. (Garcia v. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 [1971] [Fernando, J., concurring]).
The examinee may, however, answer as follows: I am endorsing this proposal. The
Constitution should be amended so as to transfer the supervision of the lower courts to
the Ministry of Justice. Administrative supervision unnecessarily burden the Supreme
Court and detracts from the time and attention that it needs to give to its essential
function of developing the law in its most profound aspects.
“X”, a civilian, was tried before and convicted by a military commission of the crime of
kidnapping. He was sentenced to die by firing squad. The President affirmed the decision.
Is the death sentence subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court? Explain your
answer.
ANSWER:
In Gumawa v. Espino, 96 SCRA 402 (1980), Chief Justice Fernando said in a concurring and
dissenting opinion: “ Thus for me the question of whether or not this court is empowered to
pass on a death sentence by military tribunals where as in this case petitioner Gumaua is a
civilian, calls for determinantion. More specifically, the crucial issue to me is whether the
procedure for automatic review of a death sentence must be followed. My answer is in the
affirmative. So I would conclude in the light of what my opinion is the plain and explicit
command of the constitution. I must admit that Ruffy v. Chief of Staff yields a different
conclusion. Thus, Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the
authorities “ for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the
constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of
legislation.” (Winthrops's Military Law and Precedents, 2nd Edition, p.49). Unlike courts of
law, they are not portion of the judiciary.”...Not belonging to the Judicial branch of
Government, it follows that the courts-martial must pertain to the executive department;
and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress
for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and
navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his
authorized military representatives.” Such a ruling continues with unabated force where an
accused belongs to the armed forces. I cannot subscribe to the view that it calls for the
application where a civilian is involved. After the holding of this court in the third Aquino
decision, referred to earlier, that military tribunals have jurisdiction over civilians in certain
specified offenses, it would follow, to my way of thinking, that thereby judicial rather that
executive power is being exercised and, therefore, the law on automatic review calls respect
and deference.”
Page 56 of 115
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
QUESTION: Removal; just cause(1980)

(c) “H” was employed as assistant cashier in a government-owned corporation. Because
of irregularities in the performance of his duties, he was charged administratively
with gross negligence and misconduct prejudicial to the interests of his employer.
During the hearings in the administrative case “H” was suspended from office. At the
conclusion of the hearings, a decision was reached to dismiss him from the service.
He was, in fact, dismissed.
While the hearings in the administrative case were on-going, he was also charged in
Court for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents in relation to the same
conduct then under investigation administratively. After his dismissal case
acquitting him of the offense charged based on reasonable doubt.
“H” then filed a ase in Court against his former employer for reinstatement alleging
as a basis thereof his acquittal in the criminal case.
Will his complaint for reinstatement prosper?
(d) Would a law requiring that only natural-born Filipino citizens may be eligible for
membership in the Board of Directors of domestic commercial banks be
constitutionally valid?
ANSWER:
(c) “H’s” complaint for reinstatement cannot prosper. While the evidence against him
may not be sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt his guilt, it may be
adequate to prove his liability for purposes of the administrative case. It is
noteworthy that his acquittal in the criminal case is based not on a finding of
innocence but on reasonable doubt.
(d) The law is unconstitutional as a denial of the equal protection. As held in Chan Tek
Law v. Republic, 55 SCRA 1 (1974), “a naturalized citizen is entitled to similar
treatment as a native-born citizen ecept where the Charter itself provides
otherwise.” In Baumgartner v. United States, 322 US 66 (1944), Justice Frankfurter
wrote for the Court that “under the American constitution a naturalized citizen
stands on equal footing with a native citizen in all respects save that of eligibility to
the Presidency.” In that case of the Philippines Constitution, natural born citizenship
is required only for members of the National Assembly (and therefore the President
and prime Minister since they are elected from among the members of the
Assembly), the members of the judiciary, and those of the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. Consequently, no law
may require natural born citizenship with respect to other positions, much less with
respect to private offices or business.
However, examinees may also answer that there is no basis for the classification in
the law between natural born and naturalized citizen for purposes of directorship in
domestic commercial banks. Such a classification is violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.
QUESTION: Powers (1981)

In an election protest filed before the Court of First Instance, the protestees were
dissatisfied with an order that said court had issued. To assail it, the protestees filed with
Page 57 of 115
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction seeking to restrain the trial Court from enforcing said order. Acting
on the petition, the COMELEC issued a Resolution requiring the protestants to file an
Answer within ten days from notice, and in the meantime, restrained the Court of First
Instance from enforcing its questioned order.
Does the COMELEC, which now exercises judicial functions, have jurisdiction to take
cognizance of petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus involving election cases
cognizable by courts of First Instance and appealable to said Commission? Explain your
answer briefly.
ANSWER:
No. While the COMELEC, uhder Article 196 in relation to Art. 190 of the 1978 Election Code,
is given an appellate jurisdiction over decisions of courts of first instance in election
contests involving municipal and municipal district officers it has no original jurisdiction to
issue writ of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under the constitution or the election
laws.
It is basic that jurisdiction can only be conferred by law. The conferment of appellate
jurisdiction in the COMELEC does not include a grant of original jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writs even if it be in aid of the appellate jurisdiction granted. The only
original jurisdiction conferred on the COMELEC is that over contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all “Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials,” of which it is made the “sole judge” (Const., art. XII, C, sec. 2 (2);
1978 Election Code, art. 188)
QUESTION A: (1978)
An American citizen, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing
technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines, was assessed by the
BIR and had to pay the income tax due for the proceeds of the sale of his automobile to a
member of the U.S Marine Corp., the transaction having taken place in Clark Airbase in
Pampanga. It was his claim both with the CTA and thereafter, the Supreme Court, that he
was not liable for the tax as in legal contemplation, the sale was made out of the Philippine
territory. How would you decide the case.
ANSWER:
He is liable to pay income tax due from the proceeds of the sale of his automobile made
inside Clark Airbase in Pampanga. The Clark Airbase is not a foreign soil or territory for
purposes of income tax legislation. It is an integral part of the Philippine territory and
subject to its sovereignty and jurisdiction. True, under the military Bases Agreement, the
Philippines has consented that the United States exercise certain rights necessary for the
use, operation and defense of the bases. But the Philippines jurisdictional rights therein,
certainly not excluding the power to tax have been preserved. The “exemption clause”
under the Military Bases Agreement does not apply in this case because the income from
the sale of the car is clearly derived in the Philippines.
QUESTION: B Features (1978)
Is the COMELEC, under the New Constitution, a more independent and effective vehicle for
clean, orderly and honest elections than its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution? In what
respects is this true or false, as the case may be?
ANSWER:
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The COMELEC, under the New Constitution, is a more independent and effective vehicle for
clean, orderly and honest elections than its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution because of
its broader powers, such as:
1. It shall appoint its officials and employees in accordance with the Civil
Service Law (Sec. 4, Art. XII-A, New Constitution);
2. It has the power to fix in special cases the election period (Sec. 6, Art. XII-B,
New Constitution);
3. It has the power to register and accredit political parties (Sec.8, Art. XII-B,
New Constitution);
4. It shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the National Assembly and elective provincial or city officials.
(Sec. 2(2), Art. XII-C, New Constitution)
5. It has the duty to recommend to the National Assembly effective measures to
minimize election expenses and prohibit all forms of election frauds and malpractices,
political opportunism, guest or nuisance candidacy, or other similar acts (Sec. 2(6), Art. XII-
C, New Constitution);
6. It may regulate or supervise the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media, or
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, inlcuding any
government owned or controlled corporation during the election period for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections (Sec 5, Art. XII-C, N.C.);
7. It may recommend to the Prime Minister the removal of, or any other
disciplinary action against any officer or employee it has deputized, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its decision, order or directive (Sec 4, Art. XII-C, N.C.);
8. It can decide administrative questions affecting elections, including the
registration of voters ( Sec 2 (3), Art. XII, N.C.)
On the other hand, under Sec 2 of Art X of the 1935 Constitution the Commission may
deputize all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the government for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections without the consent of the President.
Now, it needs the consent of the Prime Minister for that purpose (Sec. 2 (4), Art. XIII-C, N.C.).
The latter provision has weakened the position of the Commission on this particular matter.
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NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
QUESTION: Use of Property(1981)

The Municipality of Pasig , Metro Manila, received a donation of a two-hectare lot which it
converted into a public park. The cost of construction of the park was partially met through
public contribution. As the Municipality could not pay the balance of the construction cost,
the contractors sued and secured a judgment against the Municipality.
Can the contractor have the park attached as security for the satisfaction of the judgement?
Explain.
ANSWER:
The public park cannot be attached. In Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of iloilo, 49
Phil. 52 (1962), It was held that “the movable and immovable property of a municipality,
necessary for government purposes, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a
judgment against the municipality. The Supreme reason for this rule is the character of the
public use to which such kind of property is devoted. The necessity for government service
justifies that the property of public use of the municipality be exempt certain property of
private individuals in accordance with section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
QUESTION: Hereditary Succession (1981)

“A”, a Filipino citizen, bought a farm of ten hectares in Tanay, Rizal, in 1937. In 1950, he
emigrated to Canada with his wife and his only child “B”. In 1973, “A”, his wife and son
became naturalized as Canadian citizens. :A” and his wife died in a vehicular accident in
1980.
Who is entitled to own the farm left by “A”, the Philippine Government, or “B'? Reasons.
ANSWER:
The farm passed to B by hereditary succession upon the death of A. The fact that A and his
family, including B, became Canadian citizens and under Commonwealth Act No. 63, sec. 1
(1) they lost their Philippine citizenship is of no moment. Article XIV, sec 14 of the
Constitution provides that save in cases of hereditary succession no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
ARTICLE XIV
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
QUESTION: Academic Freedom (1979)
(a) What do you understand by “academic freedom”, and what is the limitation of its exercise”?
(b) The constitution provides that the “ownership and management of the mass media shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines or corporation wholly owned and managed by such
citizen.” Is this not repugnant to the press freedom and freedom of speech provision of the
Constitution? If so, which provision would prevail?
ANSWER:
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(a) Academic freedom is the freedom of the teacher or researcher to investigate and discuss the
problems of his science and to publish his conclusions thereon without interference from
the political or ecclesiastical authorities. As applied to institution of learning, according to
Garcia v. Faculty of Admissions, it includes the right to determine what to teach, how to
teach it, when to teach it, and to whom to teach it.
(b) Art. XV, Sec. 7, par 1, does not militate against freedom of speech, which is subject to the
police power. The purpose of the rule is to prevent aliens from dominating the mass media,
whose pervasive and strong influence in the crystallization of public opinion may be used
by these foreigners for their ulterior purposes to the prejudice of the national interest.
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THE FAMILY
QUESTION: (1980)
(a) Would a law be constitutionally valid in providing that, before a marriage license may be
issued by the appropriate official of a city or municipality, the parties to the prospective
marriage should first submit to him a certification from a Family Planning Center that they
have undergone at least a week of instruction and/or information on family planning?
(b) “F,” a newspaperman, began the production of a movie portraying the life of an
unmarried mayoralty candidate who was killed during an election campaign. “F” was basing
the film on a book on the candidate’s life, the rights to which he had purchased. Although
the emphasis of the movie was on the candidate’s public life, it portrayed portions dealing
with his private and family life including scenes depicting his mother and his girl friend. The
family objected to the production as an invasion upon their privacy. “F” contended,
however, that since the candidate was a public figure, the movie production was but in
exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of speech of the press.
Between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to freedom of expression on the
other, which would you sustain?
ANSWER:
(a) Yes, the law is valid. The Constitution makes it the responsibility of the state to achieve
and maintain population levels conductive to the national welfare. (Art XV, Sec 10) In
fulfillment of this duty, the government may by law require prospective couples to undergo
instruction in family planning.
(b) The right of privacy should prevail. As held in Lagunzad v. Soto Vda. De Gonzales, L-
32066, August 6, 1979 92 SCRA 476, “Being a public figure does not automatically destroy
in toto a person’s right to privacy. The right to invade a person’s privacy to disseminated
public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no
matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that
petitioner exerted efforts to present the true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner
admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab
story of torture and brutality. Freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position
in the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not, however, without limitations. In the particular
circumstances presented and considering the obligation assumed by petitioner under the
agreement, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the
limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
private concern.”
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GENERAL PROVISIONS
QUESTION: State immunity (1976)
A. Upon what is based the principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent?
B. May an office, agency or instrumentality of the republic which is unincorporated and
possessing no juridical personality be sued without the consent of the government?
C. X was the owner of a parcel of land evidenced by a certificate of title issued to her in 1924.
No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appeared
at the back of the title. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used
a portion of X’s land for the construction of 2 avenues. X asked for payment of the use of the
land but the then auditor general disallowed the claim of X fronting the site of the
construction ground stopped the republic for the recovery of the land with damages. The
CFI before which the complaint was filed dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction on the
ground that the complaint is actually a suit against the state without its consent. Was the
action taken by the court tenable?
ANSWER:
A. The principle rests upon a two-fold basis: first, upon grounds of public policy, and second,
upon sovereignty. Public policy because public service will be hindered and the public
safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of
every citizen and controlled in the use and disposition of means required for the proper
administration of government. Sovereignty because there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends. Some authorities add another
basis: the theory of social contract. Under this theory, the people had agreed to surrender
some of their rights in favor of the higher rights of the state. One of such rights surrendered
is the right to sue the government without its consent.
B. It depends on the nature of its functions. If it exercises sovereign or governmental function,
it may not be sued without the consent of the government. Contrariwise, if it exercises
business or proprietary function, it may be sued. However, if the business function is merely
accidental to the governmental function of the office, then it may not be sued without the
government’s consent.
C. No. the doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice to a citizen. When the government takes a private property for public use without
instituting proper condemnation proceedings, it makes manifest that it submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit
could still be appropriately invoked in an action brought by the property owner against the
government for the payment of just compensation
QUESTION State immunity (1976)

A. On November 1, 1976, A,B,C and D, self-styled Moro rebels long wanted by the
authorities for the fatal ambuscade of a bus-load of innocent civilians, hijacked a PAL
plane on its Manila-Davao flight which they forcibly diverted to, and landed in Djarkarta,
Indonesia. In that country , A, B, C and D sought political asylum, invoking the United
Nations Declaration on Human Rights. Reacting, the Philippines Government, thru
proper diplomatic channels, sought after their extradition. May Indonesia grant Asylum
or should it extradite A, B, C and D to the Philippines? Reason.
B. While about to leave his place of work inside U.S Naval Base in Subic, E, a Filipino
civilian employee therein, was unceremoniously stopped and undignifiedly search by
U.S. Marines, acting upon orders of the Base Provost Marshall on suspicion of pilfering
navy property, but only to be released after several hours of detention when nothing
was found in his person. Charging excess of jurisdiction and abuse of authority, E filed a
suit before the CFI of Olongapo City against the Provost Marshall and other base officers
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for damages for violation of his Constitutional rights under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
Moving the dismiss, defendant Base officials contend: (1) that the civil code does not
apply inside the U.S. Naval Base; and (2) that having acted in their official capacities, the
suit which has not given its consent thereto. Decide with reasons.
C. R and S are both U. S. military servicemen subject to the military law of the United States
and regularly assigned to the Philippines. While in Clark Air Force Base, R sladered a 19-
year old daughter of S by calling her a professional “call girl”. Assume that slander is also
punishable under U. S. laws and an appropriate prosecution is initiated against R. Under
the US-PI Military Bases Agreement, which country would have primary jurisdiction to
try the case? Reason.
ANSWER:
A. Inasmuch as the offenders are merely “self-styled” Moro rebels, I take it that they are
not actual rebels and there is no political color to their acts. Indonesia must therefore
extradite them to the Philippines in view of our recently concluded treaty of extradition
with Indonesia relative to such crimes as murder or homicide obviously committed in
the “fatal ambuscade”. It additionally extradite is requested for the hijacking , the same
should likewise be granted.
B. The motion to Dismiss should be DENIED firstly, because Philippines laws such as the
Civil Code operate even inside the Bases, our Government not having relinquished
territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty over the Bases and secondly, while they may
have acted in their official capacities, certainly the Provost Marshall and other base
officers are not supposed to exercise unlawful and illegal acts, which are prohibited
even under United States Law. Obedience to lawful orders may exempt but
obedience to unlawful commands cannot exempt. Said act therefore cannot be
presumed to have been done by a foreign government as an Act of State. Verily
therefore, this is not a suit against the United States. Or the position of the Base officials
that the Civil Code does not apply inside the U. S. Naval Base is not meritorious. The U.S.
Naval Base in Subic is part of Philippines territory, and Philippine law apply therein as
in other parts of the Philippines. However, the second contention is well taken. Having
acted in their official capacities and in obedience to the direct orders of their superiors,
the Base officers may not be held personally liable for damages in the absence of proof
showing that the United States consented to be sued before the Philippine courts. This is
one of the limitations on Philippine jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss should be
granted on this ground.
C. Under the US-PI Military Bases Agreement, the general rule( if the act is punishable both by
Philippines and US laws) is that the Philippines has primary jurisdiction and it will not matter
whether the Crime is an exception, and this occurs when the accused is a person subject to US
Military Law and the Crime he committed is one of the following:
1. Against the property or security of the U.S.
2. Against the property or person of:
a) a member of the U.S. Armed Forces; or
b) a member of the Civilian Component; or
c) a dependent of either.
3. In connection with official duty.
In the present problem, the accused is a Member of the U.S. Armed Forces, AND the crime has been
committed against the person of the dependent member of the U.S. Armed Forces. Thus, the
U.S. has primary jurisdiction.
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Be it noted that the Agreement speaks of a crime against "property" or "person", and the crime in
the problem is one of "slander" ( one that under the Revised Penal Code is not a crime against
"property" or "person"), NONETHELESS there is no indication in the Agreement that the offense
against "property" or "person" are those referred to as such in the Philippine Revised Penal Code,
whose classification of crimes may not tally with that under U.S. laws.
QUESTION:. A. State Immunity (1978)

The validity of nationalization of the rice and corn industry embodied in a statute prohibiting an
alien from being employed in any capacity in any establishment in any industry except as a member
of the technical personnel and only upon authority of the President of the Philippines was assailed
on grounds of lack of due process and equal protection. How would you rule on such objection? May
such nationalistic policy be applied in certain areas of investments? Reason out your answer, citing
constitutional provisions.
ANSWER:
1. The law nationalizing the rice and corn industry is itself not violative of the equal protection
of the laws. The purpose of the law is not to discriminate against aliens but merely to reserve to
citizens of the Philippines the rice and corn industry, industries which directly affect not only the
national economy but also national security. The classification made by the law into citizens and
aliens is reasonable and proper. Substantial distinction exist between them; such classification is
germane to the purpose of the law and is not limited to existing conditions only and applies equally
to all citizens and aliens, as the case may be. If the rice and corn industry itself is nationalized,
necessarily, employment therein must also be nationalized by prohibiting alien employment
therein, otherwise the purpose of the law may be circumvented. Again, for purposes of
employment, substantial distinctions exist between citizens and aliens in the exercise and conduct
of the industry regulated.
2. The law does not violate the due process clause. Its purpose is legitimate (lawful purpose):
to prevent aliens control and dominance of the rice and corn industry, an industry which affects
national economy and security. The means employed by the law is reasonable, alien employment in
a nationalized industry may open the door to the use of dummies, thereby circumventing the law.
Moreover, alien employment is not absolutely barred. They may still be employed in technical
positions but as an added safeguard, such employment must be with the approval of the President.
3. Yes. Under Section 3 of Article XIV, “the National Assembly shall, upon the recommendation
of the National Economic Development Authority, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations wholly owned by such citizens, certain traditional areas of
investments when the national interest so dictates.”
QUESTION: B State Immunity (1978)

Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the CFI seeking payment for their parcel of land from the
national government, alleging from 1947, it took possession of their private property for the
purpose of widening a national road. The defense of the government was the absence of its
consent to be sued. This was upheld by the lower court which dismissed the case. Plaintiffs
appealed to the SC. How would you decide the case? Reasons.
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ANSWER:
Decisions of the lower court should be reversed. The doctrine of immunity of the state from
suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to citizens. When the
government takes any private property for public use without instituting proper
condemnation proceedings, it makes manifest that it submits itself to the jurisdiction of the
court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be
appropriately invoked in action brought by the property owner against the government for
the payment of just compensation.
QUESTION: State Immunity (1979)

By law passed by the Batasang Pambansa, the Courts are directed to fix as the just
compensation for property expropriated by the Government either the assessed value of the
land by the owner, or the market value whichever is the lesser amount. The law is entitled:
“Assessment Law of 1979”. “A”, owner of a property expropriated by the Government
contests the legality of the provision referred to, alleging that the same is not expressed in
the title of the law, nor is it germane to the subject matter thereof. He contends further that
fixing just compensation is a matter of judicial power, not legislative. Decide on the merit of
the contentions.
(b) Spouses “A” and “B” donated a piece of land to a Government bureau with a condition
attached to the deed of donation that said bureau “shall install lighting and water facilities
and construct a building and parking lot therein”. The bureau having failed to comply with
the condition, the spouses filed a suit for revocation. The court dismissed the suit because
the State cannot be sued without its consent. This decision of the Court was appealed to the
Supreme Court. Decide.
ANSWER:
(a) Yes, under Art. VIII, Sec 19, par. 1, of the Constitution since the title of the bill is not
supposed to be a catalogue or index of all the contents of the measure. The title in the
problem is not enough to alert the people to the possible scope thereof, which could
reasonably include rules on the proper valuation of expropriated lands.
This measure is valid insofar as it prevents the owner from disowning his own sworn
declaration or allow actual value of the property to be determined by the court on the basis
of relevant factors, conformably to the formula devised by the legislature.
(b) This is the case of Santiago vs. Republic of the Philippines, where it was held that violation of
the conditional donation imported a presumed waiver of the immunity of the State
from suit. Moreover, the claim could have been filed with Commission on Audit under C.A.
No. 327 as it was not a money claim.
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AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
QUESTION: Amendments (1976)

A. Distinguish:
1. Constituent power from legislative power
2. Political question from justiciable question
B. The President proposes amendments to the Constitution providing in substance, for the
reversion from the Parliamentary to the Presidential system of government and calls a
referendum, appropriating funds therefor, in which to submit said proposals to the people
for ratification. X, a citizen and a taxpayer, challenges before the Supreme Court the
presidential acts aforesaid claiming that the proposed amendments will only resurrect the
evils of the Old Society and that a referendum plebiscite is not the proper method for
ratification. In turn, the Solicitor General contends that X has not standing to bring the
action, that the issue is political and not justiciable, and that the President does not have any
power to prepare amendment to the Constitution. Decide with reasons.
C. What is meant by constitutional authoritarianism? Is it compatible with the constitutionally

declared principle that the Philippines is a Republican State?
ANSWER:
A.
1. Constituent power is the power to make or amend the Fundamental Law. Legislative
power, on the other hand, is essentially lawmaking power. It is the power to make laws and
to alter and to repeal them. A general grant of legislative power to the legislature under the
Constitution does not include the grant of constituent power.
2. The term political question connotes a question of policy. It refers to those questions which,
under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or
executive branch of the government. Hence, political questions are beyond judicial
cognizance. Judicial authority over a case involving political question extends no further
than to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.
A justiciable question, on the other hand, refers to one which calls for the full exercise of
judicial power. Courts decide such questions on the merits. The question of validity or
legality of the assumption and exercise of powers, as well as the allocation of power,
that calls for the application or interpretation and construction of the provisions of the
constitution is a legal or justiciable question.
B.
a. X has locus standi to bring this action. The action question the validity of a decree which
appropriate funds. Its purpose is to prohibit the disbursement of such funds. If the
decree is unconditional there will a misapplication of funds. A taxpayer like X has
therefore a substantial interest in prohibiting an illegal expenditure of public funds.
b. The issue raised is legal and justiciable. Since the constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, can declare whether the
procedure followed or the authority assumed in proposing amendment thereto is
valid or not.
C. Constitutional authoritarianism is a form of government wherein all the political powers of

the government are by constitution vested in and to be exercised by a single official or ruler.
Since a republican state is one where sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them and since it is the people themselves – in adopting their
constitution – who provided for a constitutional authoritarian government therein, there is
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then no incompatibility between constitutional authoritarianism and the principle of

republicanism.
QUESTION: A (1978)
Some years ago, the B.I.R. has started to disallow the benefits of tax deduction enjoyed by
the head of the family, beginning with a fourth dependent and up, in line with the
government’s family planning program. Furthermore, contraceptives for the prevention of
birth are being encouraged by the government and distributed for free by public hospitals
and clinics. Catholic families strongly protest against this state policy and practice on the
grounds that it is not only discriminatory but also offensive to religious beliefs and violative
of the natural law which prohibit birth control of the human specie. How would you resolve
this controversy? Reason out you answer.
ANSWER:
dependent and up is invalid. There is nothing in the problem which says that the B.I.R. has
acted pursuant to law. On the contrary, the existing law (The Income Law Tax) allows such
deduction. If indeed it is in line with the government’s family planning program, such must
be embodied in a statute and the B.I.R. cannot, without any authority of law or in derogation
of it, disallow such deduction as a means to carry out that program.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
measure to control population explosion which, in turn, may bring about serious economic
and social problems under the police power of the state and more specifically in compliance
with Section 10 of Article XV of the New Constitution which provides: “It shall be the
responsibility of the State to achieve and maintain population levels most conducive to
national welfare.” The right to religious freedom and of beliefs is not absolute. Its exercise is
subject to the dominant police power of the State.
QUESTION: B Amendment (1978)
Under Section 10 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is mandated that “the
state shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the
barrio to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.” Under the 1976
amendments, however, which were proposed by President Marcos, the barangays and
sanggunians were given constitutional recognition. Does this amendment have the effect of
abolishing the barrio, considering that the barangay now exercise political and public
functions originally exercised by barrio units? Reason out your answers.
ANSWER:
No. The concept of barrios remain as one the political and territorial subdivisions into
which the Philippines is divided (Sec. 10, Art. II; Sec. 1, Art. XI, New Constitution). What
happened is that under Presidential Decree No. 557 issued on September 21, 1974 “all
existing barrios or barrios that may be created were (are hereby) declared as barangays
and all references to the barrio in any existing laws shall henceforth be understood as
referring to the barangay.” In short, only the name has been changed from barrio to
barangay. But the entity remains the same.
QUESTION: A (1978)
Pablo Cruz kills his brother-in-law with a gun while the latter was unarmed. When the
police arrived at the scene of the crime, Pablo Cruz surrendered his gun to the police,
saying, “I killed him because I was fed up with him.” During the trial of the case for murder
Page 68 of 115
his defense counsel objected to any question propounded to the policeman which would try
to elicit the statement the accused made while surrendering his gun on the ground that at
that time he was already in police custody and, therefore, as he had then the right to
counsel, his statement, without assistance of counsel, would be inadmissible is accordance
with the constitution. How would you rule on the objection? Reason.
ANSWER:
The objection is not well-taken. The statements of Pablo Cruz are spontaneous declarations
constituting part of the res gestae, and therefore, admissible in evidence. The constitutional
prohibition invoked (Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the New Constitution) does not apply because the
statements of Pablo Cruz were voluntarily given by him in a precustodial proceeding. He
was not yet being investigated by the police for the commission of an offense. This is not the
custodial interrogation contemplated by the Constitution.
QUESTION: B. Amendments to the Constitution (1978)
In Sanidad v. COMELEC, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the President,
in the absence of the Interim National Assembly, could propose amendments to the
Constitution. Petitioner argued that the exercise of legislative powers by the President
under Martial Law did not convert him into a constituent assembly for constitutional
amendments. What is the majority opinion? The dissenting? Discuss briefly.
ANSWER:
The majority opinion holds that in a crisis government such as which existed during the
first phase of the transition period, there is concentration of powers in the President.
Although an interim National Assembly legally exist, it has not yet been convened and
therefore not in a position to exercise and discharge its powers. The President, during the
said period, could exercise the legislative power not only because of the absence of an
interim National Assembly but as the administrator of martial law. There is no reason
why he could not also exercise the constituent power to propose amendments which is but
an adjunct to legislative power. Otherwise, there will be a vacuum in the Constitution.
The President and the judiciary are the only existing constitutional organs and since the
judiciary cannot propose amendments to the constitution, only the President can exercise
that power to prevent that vacuum.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The dissenting opinion, in turn, holds that the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution is a constituent power. It is separate from and not a part of nor an adjunct to
legislative power. The Constitution specifically vests the power in the interim National
Assembly during the transition period; (Sec. 15, Art. XII, N.C) by no other organ or official
can that power be exercised. The Constitution is not only a grant but a limitation of power.
To avoid the so-called vacuum, it is incumbent upon the incumbent President to convene
the interim National Assembly for the specific purpose of proposing amendments to the
Constitution and not use his refusal; to convene it to justify his assumption of its power. The
true will of the sovereign people is embodied in the amendatory procedure provided in the
Constitution; hence, to propose amendments in any other way is a derogation to that will.
QUESTION: Amendments 1979
The President wants the Constitution amended on its judiciary provisions, to restore the
retirement age of judges and justices to 70 years, and to return the supervision of courts to the
Ministry of Justice from the Supreme Court.
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(a) May the President propose the amendment himself and call a plebiscite to ratify them as
he did with the last October, 1976 amendments to the 1973 Constitution, an act
sustained as a valid procedure by the Supreme Court in the referendum-plebiscite
cases?
(b) May the Interim National Assembly or Batasang Pambansa (IBP) propose the
constitutional amendments without being called by the President/ Prime Minister as a
constituent body?
(c) Is an amendment to the Constitution valid even without a proclamation of the
President/Prime Minister to the effect that the votes required to ratify the amendment
has been met?
ANSWER:
(a) The President may no longer propose amendments to the Constitution because the IBP
(Batasang Pambansa) is now functioning. Sanidad v. Commisssion on Elections was
decided principally on the basis of the non-convening of the interim National Assembly
and the resultant vacuum that had to be filled, logically by the President, who was then
already exercising legislative authority. The Supreme Court said that the power to
propose constitutional amendments was an adjunct of the legislative power.
(b) Under Art. XVII , Sec. 15, of the Constitution, the IBP may propose constitutional
amendments by a majority vote of all its members only upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister.
(c) This was required only with respect to the 1976 constitutional amendments. Sec. 16
of Art. XVII provides that proposed amendments shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast at a plebiscite called for the purpose, subject presumably to
certification of the results thereof not by the President but by the Commission on
Elections.
QUESTION: Amendments (1979)
(a) Considering the specific and paramount purpose for which the Interim National
Assembly was created by the Constitution itself, may it propose an amendment thereto
to revert the form of government form parliamentary to the Presidential type as we had
under the 1935 Constitution?
(b) May the members of the National Assembly who are lawyers practice their profession?
(c) A member of the Interim National Assembly is served with a warrant of arrest while the
assembly is in session. May the warrant be enforced, and may the Interim National
Assembly be obliged to surrender the erring member?
ANSWER:
(a) Three possible answers:
1. Art. XVII, Sec. 5, of the Constitution provides that the IBP shall give preference to
the enactment of, among others, measures for the orderly transition from the
presidential to the parliamentary system of government. Hence, it cannot
propose a change of government.
2. Its power to propose amendments under Art. XVII, Sec. 15, which, incidentally, is
later in point of location, is plenary and, therefore, includes proposals to change
the form of government.
3. The problem speaks of the “Interim National Assembly” which has already been
abolished. Hence, it can no longer make any proposal or, for that matter,
function at all.
(b) Art. XVII, Sec. 10, of the Constitution provides that a member of the National Assembly
may not appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court of appellate jurisdiction,
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision, agency,
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or instrumentality thereof is an adverse party, or before any administrative body. If he

is also a member of the Cabinet, he may also not practice his profession or appear
before any judicial or administrative body under Art. IX, Sec. 8.
(c) Under Art. VIII, Sec. 9, of the Constitution, a member of the National Assembly is
immune from arrest while attending the legislative session, and while going to and
returning from the same, for any offense punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment.
To the provision also states that within 24 hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its
next regular session, the National Assembly should surrender the wanted member to the
authorities.
QUESTION: Ratification (1975)

When, how, and by whom was the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines ratified?
ANSWER:
By Proclamation No. 1102 the President certified and proclaimed that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was ratified by the
overwhelming majority of all the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens
Assemblies) throughout the Philippines and that it had thereby come into effect. While the
Supreme Court, by the vote of 6 Justices, held in Javellana v. Executive Secretary 69 O.G.
7975 (1973) that the proposed Constitution was not validly ratified in accordance with
Article XV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, nevertheless, the Court failed to rule “that the
new Constitution is not in force”. Accordingly the petitions challenging the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 and seeking to enjoin enforcement of the new Constitution by
executive officials were dismissed, with the consequence that “there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect”. The effect of this
ruling is to uphold the validity of Proclamation No. 1102. Its date, January 17, 1973, is
regarded as the date of effectivity of the new Constitution.
Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, especially in the Martial Law cases and the
Referendum cases, held that the effectivity of the new Constitution was laid to reset by the
acceptance or acquiescence of the Filipino people.
QUESTION: Ratification cases; Referendum-plebiscite 1977

In the following historic cases, discuss fully the principal issue raised by the petitioners and
petitioners and the ruling promulgated by the Supreme Court:
1. Martial law cases (Aquino vs. Enrile)
2. Ratification cases (Jovellana vs. Exec. Sec.)
3. Referendum cases (Aquino vs. COMELEC)
4. Referendum-plebiscite cases (Sanidad vs. COMELEC)
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ANSWER:
There were several principle issues presented in many of these case.
1. Martial law cases (Aquino vs. Enrile)
Petitioners were arrested of the Philippines, following the proclamation of martial law on
September 21, 1972. They applied to the Supreme Court for writs of habeas corpus, contending
that the declaration of martial law was unconstitutional. The writs were issued requiring
respondent Secretary of National Defense and military official to make a return contending that
the declaration of martial law was justified by a rebellion and the consequent danger to public
safety. It was claimed that petitioners were involved in a conspiracy to seize political and state
power and to take over the government by force.”
Shortly after, some of the petitioners withdrew their petitions and were subsequently released.
Others, without doing so, were likewise released with the result that only two of the petitioners
(Jose W. Diokno and Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.) remained in custody.
On August 11, 1973, petitioner Aquino was charged with murder, subversion and illegal
possession of firearms before a military commission. On December 28, of the same year, Diokno
filed a motion to withdraw the petition filed on his behalf on the ground that, because of the
decision on his behalf on the ground that, because of the decision in the ratification cases in the
decision of the members of the Court to take an oath of allegiance to the new Constitution he
could not “reasonably expect to get justice” in this case.
On September 11, 1974, Diokno was released from military custody on order of the President so
that only petitioner Aquino remained in detention. On September 17, the Supreme Court
dismissed the remaining petitions. The court in a resolution prepared by Chief Justice
MAKALINTAL, said (1) that seven Justices (Makalintal, C.J, Zaldivar, Ferndo, Teehankee,
Barredo, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ.) had voted to grant Diokno’s motion to withdraw, while
five (Castro, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra and Fernandez, JJ) had voted to deny it but that in
view of Diokno’s subsequent release from custody, all members of the Court, with the exception
of Castro, J., agreed to dismiss the petition on the ground of mootness; (2) that six Justices
(Barredo , Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Antonio, JJ.) held that whether the
proclamation of martial law was justified by the condition in the country at the time was
political question; while five (Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Muñoz
Palma,JJ.) held that the Court could determine the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation
of martial law under the test laid down in Lansang vs. Garcia, L-33964, December 11, 1971; (3)
that the power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to the situation which
justified the proclamation of martial law necessary implied the power to impose conditions or
restrictions which were germane to, or necessary to carry out the purposes of, the proclamation
of martial law. Fernando, J. dissented, contending that the restrictions placed on petitioner
Rodrigo’s right to travel should be removed; (4) that implicit in a state of martial law is the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
CASTRO,J. filed a separate opinion stating: (1) that Diokno’s motion to withdraw the petition in
his behalf should be denied; (2) that there was no doubt as to existence of rebellion; (3) that
while court could inquire into, or take judicial notice of the existence of conditions claimed to
justify the declaration of the martial law the determination of the necessity for the exercise of
such power was within the constitutional domain of the President and as long as the measures
taken were reasonably related to the occasion involved, interference by the courts would be
officious; (4) that given the validity of the proclamation of martial law the arrest and detention
of those believed to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it was beyond question; (5) that
the suspension of the writ was subsumed in a declaration of martial law.
FERNANDO, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, stating (1) that Aquino’s petition
should be dismissed solely on the ground that charges had been filed against him and therefore
the question of legality of his detention had become moot; that the conditions imposed on
petitioner Rodrigo’s release should be removed on the principle that freedom of travel should
be unrestricted; and that the petition filed in behalf of Diokno should be considered withdrawn;
(2) that the vadility of proclamation No. 1081 could no longer be questioned in view of the
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provision of Article XVII, Section 3(2) of New Constitution making all proclamations, orders and
decrees issued by the incumbent President to be valid and binding as part of the land; (3) that
independently of the New Constitution, Proclamation No. 1081 was valid, the President not
having been shown to have acted arbitrarily in issuing it; (4) that is was doubtful whether the
writ of habeas corpus and, therefore, it was desirable that if the intention was to suspend the
privilege of the wri, a specific to this effect should be issued: (5) that nevertheless, preventive
detention, where necessary to enable the state to defend itself, was allowable: (6) that wheter
an individual fell within the coverage of the proclamation was a judicial question.
TEEHANKEE, J., filed a separate opinion stating that ( 1) Diokno’s motion to withdraw petition
should be granted because a simple majority of seven to tweleve members of the Court is legally
sufficient to grant the motion, since it does not involve a decision on the merits: (2) That court
should not rule on constitutional issues except when necessary in an appropriate case, and as
urged by respondent” at the very least, this Court should postpone consideration ***until the
present emergency is over”;(3) a party’s subjective evaluation of the Court’s action is actually of
no moment, for it has always been recognized that this Court, possessed of neither the sword
nor the purse, must ultimately and objectively rest its authority on sustained public on
sustained public confidence in the truth, justice integrity and moral force of its judgements (4)
petitioner is in error in his assumption that this court is a “ new court functioning under a News
Constitution different from the Court and the Constitution under which (he) applied for (his)
release. “The same Supreme Court has continued saved that it now operates under Article X of
the 1973 Constitution: ( 5) during the period of ninety days that the Ratification cases were
pending before the days that the Ratification cases were pending before the Court until their
dismissal became final on April 17, 1973.the Executive Department was operating under the
1973 Constitution in accordance with the Proclamation No. 1102 ON January 17, 1973 while
this court as the only other governmental department continued to operate under the 1935
Constitution pending its final resolution on the said cases challenging the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 and enforcement of the New Constitution;(6) petitioner Aquino’s
petition should be dismissed on the ground that charges had been filed against him and had
filed another petition questioning his trial by a military commission which has superseded his
present petition and where the same constitutional issues may properly be resolved (see the
Military Tribunal case), and (7) Petitioner Rodrigo’s petition should be dismissed having been
rendered moot and academic by his release from physical confinement and detention.
BARREDO, J., concurred, stating (1) that the judicial power of the Supreme Court is complete
and plenary and covers all cases of whatever nature, including those traditionally termed as
political: and it’s up to the court in the light of the attendant circumstances and the
imperativeness and inadvisability of the intervention, as the national interest may dictate, to
take the cognizance of the same or not; that, in any event, G.O. No. 3 and G. O. No. 3-A Removing
from the jurisdiction of the courts cases involving the constitutionality of martial law
proclamations orders and decrees had become inoperative: (2) that the court should abstain
from determining the constitutional sufficiency of Proclamation No. 1081: (3) that the
Constitution definitely commits the Excutive the determination of the factual bases for the
proclamation of martial law; (4) that the judiciary was not powerless to check the abuse of the
power to proclaim martial law; (5) that under Constitution the President has authority to
determine when condition justified the restoration of the regular constitutional process;(6) that
the proclamation of martial law carried with it the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; (7) that under Article XVII, section 3 (2) of the Constitution the proclamations,
orders and decrees of the incumbent President , whether issued before or after the ratification
of the New Constitution, are valid and cannot be questioned in court; (8) that this interpretation
of Article XVII , Section 3 (2) is confirmed by the results of the referendum held in January and
July of 1973.
ANTONIO, J., joined by makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., filed a separate opinion stating
(1) that the 1935 Constitution expressly conferred the power to proclaim martial exclusively on
the President ; (2) that in times of emergency there was a need for prompt and unhesitating
obedience to the orders of the President as every delay or obstacle to its immediate
implementation may jeopardize the safety of the nation; (3) that there was danger to public
Page 73 of 115
safety arising from the Communist rebellion, justifying the proclamation of martial law;(4) that
the arrest and detention of petitioner were made pursuant to the proclamation of martial law;
(5) that the proclamation of martial law in effect suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
with respect to those involved in the rebellion and subversion; (6) that petitioner Aquino had
been charged with subversion and therefore his detention was related to the proclamation of
martial law; (7) that the restrictions on the freedom to travel of certain petitioners were
justified by the requirement of national security.
ESGUERRA,J,. filed a separate opinion stating (1) the Proclamation No. 1081; (2) that the
veracity or sufficiency of the factual bases of the Proclamation could not be inquired into by the
courts; (3) that the question presented by the petitions in these cases were political and not
justiciable.
FERNANDEZ, J., joined by Makasiar, Antonio, and Aquino, JJ., filed a separate opinion stating (1)
that Diokno’s motion to withdraw for the reasons given by him should be denied but in view of
his subsequent release, his motion should now be allowed, the petition for habeas corpus
having become moot and academic; (2) that the power to proclaim martial law is exclusively
vested in the President and the proclamation of martial law raises a political question; (3) that
even under the test of Lansang vs. Garcia, Proclamation No. 1081 could not be said to have been
issued in an arbitrary manner; (4) that the validity of Proclamation 1081 was confirmed in
Article XVII, Section 3(2) of the New Constitution; (5) that there was no longer any question
that the Constitution was in force and effect; (6) that the power to determine whether the
proclamation of martial law should be lifted is also vested in the President alone; (7) that the
proclamation of martial law automatically suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
MUŇOZ PALMA, J., filed a separate Opinion stating (I) that Diokno’s motion to withdraw should
be granted; (2) that petitioner. Aquino’s case should be dismissed; (3) that Court should inquire
into the sufhciency of the proclamation of martial law under the test of Lansang vs. Garcia, 11-
33964, December 11, 1971; (4) that the proclamation of ‘martial law was necessary and the
President’s action was neither capricious nor whimsical; (5) that the fact that courts were open
did not negate the need for the proclamation of martial law ; (6) that the proclamation of
martial law does not carry 'with it the automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, except possibly when there is a total collapse of civil authorities;. (7) that)
proclamations, orders and decrees issued by the incumbent President had the force of law but
not of a constitutional mandate “and, therefore, were subject to judicial review like statutes: (8)
that the arrest of those suspected of complicity in the rebellion .was valid; (S!) that the
conditions imposed on those who had been released was a reasonable precautionary measure
in the face of danger and was not arbitrary.
2. Ratification cases (Javellana vs. Exec. Sec.)
Following the decision in the Plebiscite cases, these actions were filed in the Supreme Court to
restrain respondent executive officials from enforcing the New Constitution on the ground that
it was not” validly ratified. In b36155 (Roms vs. Exec. Sec.) the additional allegation was made
that petitioner were duly elected members of Congress who were unlawfully prevented from
meeting by the authorities who had taken physical possession of the Legislative Building.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare Proclamation No. 1102 declaring the New Constitution in
force, to be null and void. Respondents controverted petitioners’ allegations and contended that
the questions raised were political in character; that there was, substantial compliance with the
1935 Constitution in the ratification of the New Constitution; that the New Constitution had
been ‘properly submitted to the people; and that Proclamation No. 1102 was conclusive on the
courts.
The Court dismissed the petition in a resolution stating that, (1) On the question whethei the
validity of Procla‘mation No 1102 was justiciable or political, six Justices (Concepcion, C. J.,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, ' ' .and Teehankee, JJ.) held that the issue was justiciable
and non-political. Barredo, J., qualified his vote and held that} ‘ the Court should determine
whether the New Constitution had actually been approved and, if so, the Court should keep its
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hands off out of respect to the people’s will, but, in the negative, the Court should determine
Whether Article XV of the 1935 Constitution had been complied with. Three Justices (Makasiar,
Antonio, and. Esguerra, JJ.) held that the'issue was‘political and “beyond the ambit of judicial
inquiry;’.’ (2) On the question of'validity of the ratification, six Justices (Concepcion, C.J.,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ.) held that the proposed Constitution
was not validily ratified in accordance With Article XV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution,
Which ' provided only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in
accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters;” Justice: '
Barredo held that, while the ratification of the 1973 Constitution fell short of the requirements
of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, as he had “no means of refusing to recognize as a judge
that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes Were for considering as
approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in
past ratifications,” in its political aspect, which was decisive, there had been substantial
compliance with Article XV 0f the 1935 Constitution and that the 1973 Constitution had been
constitutionally ratified. Two justices (Makasiar and Esgueri'a, JJ.) held that there had been
substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification. Justice
Antonio advanced the view that Article XV 0f the 1935 Constitution applied only to
amendments but not M a revision thereof. In the case of revision, where the existing
Constitution is to' be replaced by an entirely New Constitution, the procedure of adoption is
“reserved to the people.” In overwhelmingly approving the 1973 Constitution through the
Citizens’ Assembly, the people exercised such power reserved to them under the 1935 Charter.
(3) On the question of acquiescense by the people in the proposed Constitution, no majority
‘vote was reached by the Court. Four Justices (Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.)
held that the people had accepted the 1973 Constitution, two others (Concepcion C.J., and
Zaldivar, JJ.) held that under martial law the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines
could not express themselves freely on the proposed Constitution; four J ustices (Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ.). expressed lack of knowledge or competence to rule on
the question on the ground that they could not ascertain whether the people had accepted the
Constitution; (4) On the question of relief, six Justices (Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ.) voted to dismiss the petitions. Makalintal and 'Castro, JJ., explained
that “(T)hat effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate
question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore
beyond 'the competence of this Court are relevant and unavoidable.” Four J ustices (Concepcion,
C.J.,; Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ.) voted to give due course to the petitions; (5) On the
question whether the New Constitution was in force, four Justices (Barredo, Makasiar: Antonio,
and» Esguerra, JJ.) held that it was in force by virtue of popular acquiescence; four (Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ.) abstained on the ground that they could not ascertain
whether the people had accepted the Constitution; and two (Concepcion, C.J., and Zaldivar, J.)
voted that the proposed Constitution was not in force, with the result that there were enough
votes to declare that the New Constitution was not in force; (6) by virtue of the majority of six
votes of Makalintal Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.) with the four
dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ. the cases were
dismissed with the result that there was “no further judicial obstacle to the New Constitution
being considered in force and effect.”
3. Referendum Cases (Aquino vs. COMELE’C)
Petitioners brought his action for prohibition to stop the holding of a referendum on
February 27, 1975. They contended that President Marcos did not have law-making powers
and that at all events he was no longer President of the Philippines. In addition it was‘
contended that under martial law, there was no freedom of speech and that therefore there
could be no true expression of the Will of the people The Court through MAKASIAR, J., dis.
missed the petition
MAKASIAR, J. joined by Makalintal, C..,J and Aquino, . J ., in the result, held: ( 1) that
President Marcos was the “incumbent President”. Within the meaning of Article XVII Section
3(1-) of the Constitution and as such is authorized to “continue to exercise the powers and
prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers
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vested in.the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until he calls upon
the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister
who shall then exercise the legislative powers vested by this Constitution;” (2) that as
Commander-in-Chief and enforcer and administrator of martial law the President has
authority to issue such orders and decrees having the .force of law, as may be necessarily
for the security and preservation of the Republic, the defense of political and social liberties
of the People and the institution of reforms to prevent the re8urg-ence of rebellion or
insurrection ; and (3) that martial law is not incompatible with the holding of a referendum.
CASTRO, J., joined by Makalintal, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, and Fernandez, concurred on
the ground (1) that President Ferdinand E. Marcos was the constitutional and lawful
President of the Philippines; and (2) Article XVII, Section 3 of' the Constitution constitutes
an unmistakable constitutional warrant for the incumbent President, meaning President
Marcos, to legislate until at the Very earliest the interim National Assembly shall have been
convoked.
FERNANDO, J ., concurred stating ( 1) that the question raised was not political; (2) that
petitioners as tax payers had standing; (3) that to grant the petition would be to declare
illegal a procedure that under the present regime is the only viable one for ascertaining the
will of the people; (4) that petitioners’ objection to the decrees on referendum are not
weighty enough to warrant granting their petition; (5) that to make the referendum
meaningful, the people should be allowed freedom of expression and assembly, no
limitation being permissible unless otherwise required by a clear and present danger.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurred in the view that President Marcos is the incumbent President
referred in Article XVII of the Constitution but dissented on the grounds that (1) the powers
vested in the President by Article XVII, Section 3(1) are executive, not. legislative powers ;
(2) the legislative powers which the President has under martial law are limited to those
which are necessary for the preservation of the state and the operation of the government;
(3) the immediate convening of the interim National Assembly, in which legislative power is
vested, is clearly required by the Constitution where the single most important change is
the change from the presidential to the parliamentary system of government; (4) from the
very nature of the transitory provisions which created it, its existence must likewise be
interim, i.e. temporary, Provisional, of passing and temporary duration (as opposed to
permanent and the regular institutions provided for in the first 15 articles of the
Constitution) until after it shall have reapportioned the Assembly seats and called for the
election of the members of the regular National Assembly; (5) the concept of martial law
may not be expanded, as the main opinion does, to cover the lesser threats of “worldwide
recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations” in derogation
of the Constitution; (6) those legislative powers granted in the cited Section 3(2) known‘ as
the’ validating provision which validated the President’s acts and decrees after the
proclamation of martial law up to the ratification of the Constitution are limited to
modifying, revoking or superseding such validated acts and degrees done or issued prior to
the proclaimed ratification, since Section 7 of the Transitory Provisions expressly reserves
to the National Assembly the legislative power to amend, modify or repeal “all existing laws
not inconsistent with the. Constitution”; and (7) Referenda (where 15-year olds participate)
are admittedly consultative and cannot amend the Constitution or any provision or mandate
thereof.
BARREDO, J., joined by Makalintal, C.J., Antonio, Esguerra, and Fernandez, J.J., concurred
stating ( 1) that ' by virtue of ‘Article XVII, Section 3(1), President Marcos continued
exercising the powers of President under the 1935 Constitution and to exercise those of the
President and Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution; (2) that . by virtue of Article
XVII, Section .3(2)/ he was given the power to make laws not inconsistent With existing
laws -which pursuant to Section 7 may only be amended, modified, or repealed by the
regular National Assembly; (3) that while nothing is said in the Constitution regarding
referenda there is nothing in it that prohibits their holding; on the contrary, the holding of
referendums is the best assurance against fears of dictatorship; (4) whether in the
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referendum the people will be allowed freedom, of expression was a question that could not
be determined beforehand; (5) there was no evidence that the Commission on Elections
was not independent and impartial.
ANTONIO, J., concurred, stating (1) that the President under martial law has legislative
powers which are affirmed in Article XVII, Section 3(1) of the Constitution; (2) that the
convening Of the interim National Assembly was left to the President to determine in view
of the emergency for which martial law was proclaimed; (3) that the exercise of
authoritarian powers to realize the ethical purposes of society is not inconsistent with
profession of democracy, since such powers are expressly conferred by the Constitution; (4)
that the referendum was a means of ascertaining the wishes of the people; (5) that there
was no basis for petitioner’s fear that the people would not be able to express their will in
the referendum.
FERNANDEZ, J ., concurred, stating (1) that President Marcos had authority to exercise the
powers of the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and those of the
President and Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution; (2) that the convening of the
interim National Assembly was left to the judgment of the President; (3) that it would be
unthinkable for the Constitutional Convention to leave it to the President when to convene
the "interim National Assembly Without providing for the exercise of legislative powers in
the meantime; (4) that the power to declare martial law includes the power to make needful
rules and regulations with the force and effect of law tintil the termination of martial rule.
MUNOZ PALMA, J ., concurred stating: (1) that by virtue of Article XVII, Section 3(1) of the
1973 Constitution, President Marcos continued to exercise the powers of the President
under the 1935 Constitution during the transition period contemplated in said article, that
is, until the interim National Assembly shall have been called and the interim President and
interim Prime Minister shall have been elected after which the office of the incumbent
President ceases; (2) to fill up the vacuum during the transition period when the interim
National Assembly is not yet convened and functioning, the incumbent President
necessarily exercises legislative powers to carry out the. objectives of the proclamation of
Martial Law and for the orderly functioning of the government, and because this grant of
vast executive and legislative powers to the incumbent President Will result in a one-man
rule, it cannot be reasonably construed that the absence in the Constitution of a specific
period of time for the President to initially convene the interim assembly places the matter
at his sole pleasure and convenience otherwise, the incumbent President can keep the
interim National Assembly, which automatically came into existence upon the ratification of
the 1973 Constitution, in suspended animation as long as he pleases, hence, the President is
called upon to use his sound. discretion and judgment on the matter; (3): the holding bf a
referendum is nothing more than a device for consulting the people on national issues and
as such is not prohibited 'by the Constitution and is authorized as an exercise of 'executive
power; (.4) a referendum‘ held under a regime of Martial Law can be of no far reaching
significance because it is being accomplished under an atmosphere or climate of fear; (5)
under the Constitution, Article XI, Section 2, changes in the form of local governments can
only be effected by the National Assembly and approved by the people in a plebiscite.
4. Referendum Plebiscite cases (Sanidad vs. 7 COMELEC) ‘ ‘ '
Petitioners questioned the validity of Presidential Decree N0. 991 and 'No. 1033, dated
September. 2,. 1976 "and September 22, 1976 respectively, calling for the holding of a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16, 1976 and for mulating the questions and the
amendments to be submitted to the people for their consideration.
The petitioners raised their issues, namely:
(1) Is the question of the constitutionality of P1esidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033
political or justiciable?
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(2) During the present stage of the transition period, and under the environmental
circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to
the Constitution as 'well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for
the ratification of his proposals by the people?
(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame
allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
The Supreme Court, by a vote of 8 to 2, dismissed the petitions.
On the first question, the Court voted 7 to 3 that the issue xx as justiciable.
On the second question, 7 voted to sustain the President’s exercise of constituent powers, 2
voted in the negative. One (Justice Fernando) concurred in the result but dismissed in part.
On the third question, 6 stated there was a sufficient and proper submission while 2 voted
there was none. Two Justices Fernando and Antonio, joined Justice Makasiar who was also
one of the 6 were of the view that this .2 question is political.
Justice Martin, writing for the Court, held that the amending process, both as to proposal
and ratification raises a justiciable question and that under the peculiar circumstances
brought about by the refusal of the people to convene the interim National Assembly, the
President, of necessity, had authority to exercise constituent powers.
Chief Justice Castro, concurring, held that ‘(1) the issue of the validity of the Presidential
Decrees was a justiciable question; '(2) without going into whether or not the President is
vested with constituent power, under the present transition period of our political
development, no provision exists in the Constitution as to the agency or agent by whom and
the procedure by which amendments thereto may be proposed and ratified; consequently,
constituent power at present remains with the people to be exercised by them in the
manner or through the agency of their choice, and (3) there was proper submission of the
proposed amendments within the allowed time frame.
Justice Fernando concurring: in the result, held that (1) the issue presented is justiciable;
(2) he dissents from the majority opinion that there is a concentration of governmental
power in the Executive in times of crisis; and therefore, (3) he expresses serious doubts
rather than a dissent as to the President’s authority to exercise constituent powers.
Justice Teehankee, dissenting, held that (1) the issue was justifiable; (2) the President’s act
'of proposing amendments to the constitution had no constitutional and ' legal basis; and
(3) there was no proper submission considering the complex and -complicated proposed
amendments, their vagueness and ambiguity, and the limitations on free debate and
discussion under martial law.
Justice Barredo, concurring, held that (1) the issue was justiciable; (2). the President’s
exercise of constituent .power under the 'prevailing circumstances is not inconsistent with
constitutionalism but conforms admirably with the underlying, tenet of Government-the
sovereignty and plenary power of the people; and (3) while admitting that the majority may
be right in holding that the period given to the people is adequate, he) himself, prefers that
the referendum-plebiscite day be postponed; still the matter was for the President to
decide.
Justice Makasiar, concurring, held that the matter at hand is political and therefore outside
the scope of judicial inquiry, the ultimate decision, being with the people.
Justice Antonio, ,concurring‘, held that (1) the issue involved is political and (2) the power
to propose amendments or to amend the Constitution is part of the inherent power of the
people as the depository of sovereignty; ' absent an interim National Assembly upon whom,
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through the Constitution, the people have delegated authority to exercise constituent
powers, it follows from necessity that either the people should exercise that power
themselves through any,other instrumentality they may choose-in this case, the President.
Justice Munoz Palma while concurring fully in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee
wrote a separate dissenting opinion ‘stressing the need to strictly observe the processes
embodied in the Constitution itself.
Justice Aquino concurred in the opinion of J . Antonio.
Justice Concepcion, Jr. concurring, held that (1) the issue is justiciable involving as it does a
determination of conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and (2) the authority
to amend the Constitution was transferred from the interim National Assembly to the seat
of sovereignty itself when the people voted against the convening of the interim National
Assembly.
QUESTION: Case. No. l Referendum 1977
President Marcos has” issued Presidential Decree No. 1229 calling for a national
referendum on December 17, 1977 wherein the people will be asked this question: “Do you
vote that President Ferdinand E. Marcos continue in office as incumbent President and be
Prime Minister aftetthe organization of the interim Batas-ang Pambansa as provided for in
Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 amendments to the Constitution?”
The decree appropriated P10 million for implementing the provisions thereof and directed
the COMELEC to supervise the conduct of the referendum.
Assuming that Juan de la Cruz, a citizen of the Republic and a taxpayer, files in the Supreme
Court the proper petition against the COMELEC and the National Treasurer questioning the
legality of the referendum and the use and expenditure of public funds for said referendum,
contending that (1) the expenditure is unnecessary because the people had already voted
overwhelmingly in support of the leadership of President Marcos in previous referenda; (2)
that the so-called referendum is in reality a presidential election which is not legally feasible
under the present Constitution as amended; and (3) that the Muslim seccessionist problem
must first be solved before holding this political exercise. Will this petition prosper? Why?
ANSWER:
(1) As first held in the Emergency Powers Cases and recently affirmed in Samidad v.
Commission on Elections, an ordinary citizen and taxpayer may question the validity of an
appropriation measure. In any event, according to the Supreme Court, the question of proper
party is subject to its discretion. ,
(2) The issue of the necessity of the expenditure is political in nature, addressed to the exclusive
discretion of the lawmaking power. Not even the Supreme Court can review this question under
the doctrine of separation of powers. . ’
(3) The objection based on the Muslim problem is also political, involving as it does the matter
of legislative priorities and the wisdom of the challenged measure. It is also not subject to
judicial review for the reasons stated in (2).
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(4) An election, like a plebiscite, produces legal and binding effect. A referendum, according to
the Sanidad Case, is merely consultative or advisory and may be participated in by those not
qualified to vote, including ex-convicts and the feeble-minded, They may advise the
government. But a “yes” vote in-the projected referendum cannot by itself legally extend the
President’s term; on. the other hand, a “no"vote may be legally disregarded or rejected by him. .
QUESTION: Case No. 2
Former Senator X is, charged of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions,

subversions, and murder before a military tribunal. He files a petition for habeas corpus before
the Court claiming unlawful detention and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. He
contends that unlike in his case, Muslim rebels who have taken up arms against the government
and have inflicted how losses and casualties on men and material of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines are entitled to complete amnesty and release and are not prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms; subversion or rebellion; that civilian guards and bodyguards of
warloads from whom unlicensed firearms and ammunition had been confiscated were also
released and not prosecuted; and that the publicly announced policy of the government which
transfers authority to try civilians under indictment before military courts to civil courts in
thousands of detainees has not been equally applied to him. Petitioner claims he alone was
singled out, detained and prosecuted. Is the petitioner entitled to the writ prayed £01. 9 Decide
with reasons.
ANSWER:
In Yick Wo v. Hopkim, affirmed by our own Supreme Court in People v. Vera, it was held that
a law fair and impartial on its face would still violate the equal protection clause if it were
administered with an evil eye and an uneven hand. This guaranty calls for equal treatment
of those similarly situated, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. It has been
denied Senator X as there is no substantial distinction between him and the Muslim rebels
who are being coddled by the government,
Section 19 of Republic Act 5185 (Decentralization Act) provides that the positions of
provincial attorney and city legal officer may be created to enable the provincial and city
governments to avail themselves of the. full-time and trusted services of legal officers.
Under this law, Atty. Cruz was appointed City Legal Officer of San Fernando City by City
Mayor Santos in view of the fact that the Mayor had absolute confidence and trust in the
appointee, who, besides being profession/ally capable, is highly trained and specially
qualified. Upon the resignation Mayor Santos, the new Mayor replaced Atty. Cruz and in his
stead, appointed his loyal confident and supporter, Atty. Reyes. Atty. Cruz now questions his
removal and seeks reinstatement to his former position with back salariesin the proper
petition. If you were the Judge, decide the case with reason.
ANSWER:
This is not a case of removal, as erroneously suggested in the problem. Atty. Cruz was
separated from his office by expiration of his term.
As held in Salazar v. Mathay, a person holds a primarily confidential position for as long as
he enjoys the confidence of his superior. His term is co-existent with that confidence and
ends the moment such trust is lost.
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In Besa v. PNB, it was held that the position of the chief legal counsel of the PNB was
primarily a confidential position. That ruling may be applied by analogy to this problem.
Sergio Osmena III and Eugenio Lopez, Jr., both charged with attempted assassination of
President Marcos before the military tribunal, escaped from military custody, flew to
Hongkong and then to California, U.S.A. where they are reportedly seeking political asylum.
There is no extradition treaty, however, between the Philippines and the United States.
Assuming that the Philippine government desires the surrender of the above named
fugitives to the Philippines to face trial before military tribunal, how can this be legally done
under international law?
ANSWER:
The Philippines may only request and cannot demand the surrender of the two fugitives. As
territorial sovereign of the United States is not oblige to return them but may decide to do
so for reasons of comity. This is not likely however, beacause the escapees are sought for
political offences and can claim the right to asylum under the Universal declaration of
Human Rights.
QUESTION: . a-I 1977

What are the constitutional provisions on suffrage?
ANSWER:
Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six month preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage. The National Assembly shall provide a system for the purpose of
securing the secrecy of the vote.
QUESTION: a-2
What are the constitutional provisions on powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections? Give five (5).
ANSWER:
The Commission on Elections shall have the following powers and functions:
6. Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
7. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
Members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
8. Decided, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting
elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, the
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and the registration of voters.
9. Deputize, with the consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, and honest elections.
10. Register and accredit political parties subject to the provisions of Section eight of Article
XII (c) of the constitution.
QUESTION: b Citizens Assemblies (1977)

What compose the citizens assemblies and the purpose of their creation?
ANSWER:
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The Citizens Assemblies are composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio,
district ward for at least six month, fifteen years of the age or over, citizens of the
Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizens Assembly members kept by the
barrio district or ward secretary.
The citizens assemblies shall constitute the base for citizen participation in government
affairs and their collective views shall be considered in the formulation of national policies
of programs and, whenever practicable, shall be translated into concrete and specific
decision.
They shall consider vital national issues confronting the country.
QUESTION: c Amendment
The people have approved the October 1976 amendment to the constitutional. Cite five (5)
of them.
ANSWER:
The following amendments to the Constitutional were approved by the people:
6. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa.
Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless
otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines,
representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less
than eighteen years of the age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the
incumbent President from the Members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be
apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration, while the sectors shall be
determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the
manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
7. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim
National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof. However, it
shall not exercise the powers provided in Article VII, Section 14(1) of the Constitution.
8. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and
selection of the Members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its
sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the
Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even
after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions, and
likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the 1935
Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this
Constitution.
9. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and function,
and discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his cabinet,
and shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may
prescribe. The President (Prime Minister), if he so desires, may appoint a Deputy Prime
Minister or as many Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Minister as he may
deem necessary.
10. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law
shall have been lifted.
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TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
QUESTION: (1981)
How tenable is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not in force and effect and is not
the fundamental law of the land, but that, the 1935 Constitution was suspended by the
establishment of an authoritarian regime by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
after the proclamation of martial law and was once more operative with the lifting of
martial law on January 17, 1981?
Explain briefly.
ANSWER:
The assertion is untenable. In Occena v. COMELEC, G.R. 56350, April 2, 1981, the Supreme
COurt adverted to its decision in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 (1973), in
which, after dismissing the several petition to enjoin enforcement of the 1973 Constitution
on the ground that it had not been validly ratified it was held: “This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect”. Such a statement served a useful purpose to clear the atmosphere by
making it manifest that the Constitution came into force and effect on January 17, 1973.
Since then, there has been popular acquiescence and the Supreme Court itself has invariably
applied the present Constitution.
Nor is there any basis for the claim that the 1935 Constitution was suspended upon the
proclamation of martial law and, therefore, became once more effective upon the lifting of
martial law on January 17, 1981. As held in Mitra v COMELEC, G.R. No. L-56503, April 4
1981, even during the period of martial law the judiciary performed its functions and
discharged its responsibility. The court passed upon the transcendental issues arising from
the proclamation of martial law and in one case, Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980),
even nullified a portion of a statute making the filing of charges of subversion, insurrection
or rebellion before civil courts or military tribunals prima facie evidence of such facts. There
can be no justification then for the reckless assertion that upon the proclamation of martial
law and while it was in force, constitutionalism, in terms of the exercise of the power of
judicial review and respect for individual rights, no longer hel sway in the Philippines.
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
QUESTION: General principles (1975)

(a) Who are public officers, and what are their classifications?
(b) Can a public officer who has already resigned still withdraw his resignation?
ANSWER
(a) An individual holding a right authority, and duty created or conferred by law, whereby
for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the appointing
power he is invested with some sovereign functions of government to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public.
Public officers may be classified as follows:
(1) Executive, legislative, and judicial
(2) Constitutional and statutory
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(3) National, provincial, city, and municipal

(4) Military, naval, and civil
(5) Discretionary, ministerial, and administrative
(6) De jure and De facto
(7) Appointive and elective
(8) Special agents
(b) Yes, provided his resignation has not yet been accepted because then it is still
incomplete. Acceptance of resignation is necessary and any public officer who before
acceptance is given abandons his office to the detriment of public service is liable under
article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. And even after the acceptance of the resignation
he may still be allowed to make the withdrawal by the consent of the authority
accepting, so long as no new rights in favor of third parties have arisen. (Gonzales, op.
cit. citing Mechem, Public Officer and Offices 265)
QUESTION: General principles (1979)
(d) The President writes a member of his cabinet that his registration has been accepted
although the latter has not filed his resignation. Is this a valid termination of official
relation?
(e) What do you understand by the principle that a “public office is a public trust”?
(f) When is it considered as property?
Answer
(d) In Article IX, Sec 4, the members of the Cabinet may be removed by the Prime Minister at his
discretion. Strictly speaking, however, Cabinet members serve at the pleasure of the Prime
Minister, their term continuing as long as they enjoy his confidence. The moment such
confidence is lost, they cease to be entitled to their position, not by virtue of a removal but
of a different method of terminating official relations, to wit, expiration of the term. No
resignation is even necessary to separate them from the cabinet.
(e) It means that public office is held by the functionary not for purposes of self-
aggrandizement but as a steward who must discharge the duties thereof for the benefit of
the people.
(f) Generally, public office is not considered property. However, in Segovia vs. Noel, it was held
that it could come under the protection of due process of law in the sense that one cannot
be deprived thereof except upon a clear showing of the legislative intention.
QUESTION: Accountability of public officers, De facto officers (1976)

A. One of the salient characteristics of a public office is that it is a public trust and not a
property. Is there any instances when a public office may be considered a property of
the office-holder within the protection of the due process clause of the Constitution?
Explain your answer. How should a public officer or employee serve his office?
B. Distinguish the power of recall from the power of removal. Is the power of recall
authorized in the Philippines?
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C. A was appointed Director of a certain bureau. He took his oath of office, and assumed
the duties thereof. Few months later, the bureau to which he was appointed was
declared not legally existing because the law creating it is unconstitutional. What would
be the legal effect of the acts performed by A before the law creating the office was
declared unconstitutional? Reason.
ANSWER
A. In cases where the controversy relates to the question as to which of two persons is
entitled thereto, a public office may be considered property within the protection of the
due process clause, in that before any may be deprived of his title to the office, the same
should be properly litigated before the courts. A public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people. (Sec.1, Art.XIII, New
Constitution).
B. Removal is the ouster of a public officer exercised by the official who has been vested by
law of the power to remove; recall is removal of such officer by the people themselves,
through the process of a recall election. Section 2 of Article XI of the New Constitution
mandates the National Assembly to enact a local government code defining a more
responsive an accountable local government structure with “an effective system of
recall”. Recall is therefore authorized under the New Constitution.
C. Technically, A would be a plain usurper or intruder because the law creating his office
(bureau) is unconstitutional. Therefore, there is no de jure office and if there is no office
de jure there cannot be an officer de jure or de facto. ( The facts of the problem given
itself says that “ the bureau to which he was appointed was declared not legally existing
because the law creating it is unconstitutional). Accordingly, under the general rules, the
acts of A would be void. However, the harshness of this rule should not deprived the
law of its quality of fairness and justice especially insofar as the public and third
persons, acting without notice, who dealt with A thinking that A is the officer he
purports himself to be. The existence of the law creating the bureau to which A had been
appointed is an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored. Therefore, it is submitted
that insofar as the public and third parties are concerned, the facts of A must be
considered good and valid like those of a de jure officer.
QUESTION: De facto officers (1978)

Is a public office the property of the incumbent thereof? Explain briefly.
What is a usurper in public office as distinguished from a de facto officer and de jure officer?
ANSWER
A public office is not property of the incumbent within the meaning of the due process
clause. It exists only for the good of the public. If public interests is no longer served by a
public office, it is not only the right but the duty of the legislature to abolish it, otherwise its
continued existence is a waste of public funds. In such case the office holder cannot claim
deprivation of property without due process of law. But where there is a controversy as to
which of two persons is entitled thereto, a public office may be considered property within
the protection of the due process clause in that before one may be deprived of his right to
the said office the same should be properly litigated before the court.
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QUESTION: -a-I (1978)

ANSWER
parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every state. It is a most beneficient
function, and its exercise is often necessary in the interest of humanity, and for the
prevention of the injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
In one case, where the money donated to the victims of an earthquake in the Philippines
failed to reach them, the Supreme Court held that the Government of the Philippines
Islands, as parens patriae, was the proper party to bring the suit against a bank to recover
the money which was deposited therein for distribution to the intended victims. As parens
patriae, the government has the right to enforce all charities of a public nature, by virtue of
its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is
enrusted with it. (Gov’t. of P.I.v. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phi. 728).

ANSWER
law and which was innocent when done and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or
makes greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal
rules of evidence, and authorizers conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights
and remedies only, in effect imposes of penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” An enactment which gives a criminal character to
conduct which when performed was not criminal, is an ex post facto law.

ANSWER
bills of attainder were used to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities. A statute
which convicts an individual or punishes him for a crime without a judicial trial is a bill of
attainder.

Explain and give an example of posse commitatus.
ANSWER
This is an ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and
good order of his community. Under this power, those persons in the state, county, or town
who were charged with the maintenance of peace and good order were bound, ex oficio, to
pursue and to take all persons who had violated the law. For that purpose they might
command all male inhabitants of a certain age to assist them. Act No.1309 is a statutory
recognition of such common-law right. Said Act attempts simply to designate the cases and
Page 86 of 115
the method when and by which the people of the town may be called upon to render
assistance for the protection of the public and the preservation of peace and good order.

Explain and give an example of eminent domain.
ANSWER
Eminent domain is the right or power of the state or of those to whom the power has been
lawfully delegated to take (or expropriate) private property for public use upon paying to
the owner a just composition to be ascertained according to the law. The taking of private
land by the government to be used as a public street is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
QUESTION: b-1 Term (1978)

Define and distinguish term of office and tenure of office.
ANSWER
The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as offright,
and fixed the interval after which the several represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office.
QUESTION: -b-2 Sandiganbayan And Tanodbayan (1978)

Define and sandiganbayan and tanodbayan.
ANSWER
The sandiganbayan is a special court which shall have special jurisdiction over civil and
criminal cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office as may be determine by law.
The Tanodbayan shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate
recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the
corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the proper court or body.

Defined the distinguish political rights, civil rights, social and economic rights, rights of the
accused.
ANSWER
Political rights are such rights of the citizens which give them the power to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the government. Among
these rights are the right of citizenship and the right of suffrage.
Civil rights are those rights which the law will enforce at the instance of private individuals
for the purpose of securing to them the enjoyment of their means of happiness. They
include the right against involuntary servitude (Section 14) and imprisonment for
nonpayment of debt or a poll tax (Section 15), the constitutional rights of the accused
(Section 17-20); the social and economic rights (infra.); liberty of an abode and of travel
(Sections 5); etc. Freedom of speech and of the press, the right of assembly and petition, and
the right to form associations (Sections 7,9) are likewise civil rights. However, they partake
of the nature of political rights when they are utilized as a means to participate in the
government.
Social and economic rights include those rights which are intended to insure the well-being
and economics security of the individual. The right to property (Section 1) and the right to
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just compensation for private property taken for public use (Section 2) belong more
appropriately under this third category of rights. They are also provided in the provisions
dealing with the promotion of social justice (Article II, Section 6), the protection to labor
and the rights of workers (Ibid., Section 9), the conversation and utilization of natural
resources (Article XIII, Section 8,9), and the promotion of education (Article XV, Section 8).
Rights of the accused are the rights intended for the protection of a person accused of any
crime, like the right to presumption of innocence, the right to a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, and the right against cruel and unusual punishment. The provisions (Section 17 to 22)
particularly and directly dealing with these rights are discussed subsequently.
Defined and distinguish judicial power and judicial review.
ANSWER
Judicial power is the power to apply the laws to contest or disputes concerning legally
recognized rights or duties between the State and private persons, or between individual
litigants in cases properly brought before the judicial tribunals.
Judicial review is the power of the courts, ultimately of the Supreme Court, to interpret the
constitution and declare any legislative or executive act invalid because it is in conflict with
the fundamental law. This authority is derived by clear implication from the provision of
sections 2(2) and 5 (2a) Article X of the Constitution. Through such power, the Supreme
Court particularly, enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution.

Defined and distinguish presidential decree, general orders, letters instruction, and
implementation.
ANSWER
Presidential decrees are laws promulgated by the incumbent President under his martial
law powers. They are presumed to be valid and constitutional in the same way that existing
laws passed by the defunct Congress are presumed to be valid and constitutional until
declared otherwise in appropriate judicial proceedings.
General orders are orders issued by the incumbent President defining specific policies that
shall govern or regulate certain activities.
Letters of instruction are orders issued by incumbent President to specific government

officials directing or authorizing the doing of certain things, or laying guidelines to be
complied with for the effective implementation of a law.
Letters of implementations are those that put into effect the reorganization of the government as
provided in Presidential Decree No.1.
QUESTION: Case. No. l (1977)
referendum on December 17, 1977 wherein the people will be asked this question: “Do you
vote that President Ferdinand E. Marcos continue in office as incumbent President and be
Prime Minister aftetthe organization of the interim Batas-ang Pambansa as provided for in
Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 amendments to the Constitution?”
Page 88 of 115
Court the proper petition against the COMELEC and the National Treasurer questioning the
legality of the referendum and the use and expenditure of public funds for said referendum,
contending that (1) the expenditure is unnecessary because the people had already voted
overwhelmingly in support of the leadership of President Marcos in previous referenda; (2)
that the so-called referendum is in reality a presidential election which is not legally feasible
under the present Constitution as amended; and (3) that the Muslim seccessionist problem
must first be solved before holding this political exercise. Will this petition prosper? Why?
ANSWER
(1) As first held in the Emergency Powers Cases and recently affirmed in Samidad v.
Commission on Elections, an ordinary citizen and taxpayer may question the validity of an
appropriation measure. In any event, according to the Supreme Court, the question of
proper party is subject to its discretion. ,
(2) The issue of the necessity of the expenditure is political in nature, addressed to the
exclusive discretion of the lawmaking power. Not even the Supreme Court can review this
question under the doctrine of separation of powers. . ’
(3) The objection based on the Muslim problem is also political, involving as it does the
matter of legislative priorities and the wisdom of the challenged measure. It is also not
subject to judicial review for the reasons stated in (2).
(4) An election, like a plebiscite, produces legal and binding effect. A referendum, according to
the Sanidad Case, is merely consultative or advisory and may be participated in by those not
qualified to vote, including ex-convicts and the feeble-minded, They may advise the
government. But a “yes” vote in-the projected referendum cannot by itself legally extend the
President’s term; on. the other hand, a “no"vote may be legally disregarded or rejected by him. .
QUESTION: Case No. 2 Termination of official relation (1977)

subversions, and murder before a military tribunal. He files a petition for habeas corpus before the
Court claiming unlawful detention and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. He contends that
unlike in his case, Muslim rebels who have taken up arms against the government and have inflicted
how losses and casualties on men and material of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are entitled
to complete amnesty and release and are not prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms;
subversion or rebellion; that civilian guards and bodyguards of warloads from whom unlicensed
firearms and ammunition had been confiscated were also released and not prosecuted; and that the
publicly announced policy of the government which transfers authority to try civilians under
indictment before military courts to civil courts in thousands of detainees has not been equally
applied to him. Petitioner claims he alone was singled out, detained and prosecuted. Is the
petitioner entitled to the writ prayed £01. 9 Decide with reasons.
ANSWER:
administered with an evil eye and an uneven hand. This guaranty calls for equal treatment
of those similarly situated, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. It has been
denied Senator X as there is no substantial distinction between him and the Muslim rebels
who are being coddled by the government,
Page 89 of 115

President Marcos before the military tribunal, escaped from military custody, flew to
Hongkong and then to California, U.S.A. where they are reportedly seeking political asylum.
There is no extradition treaty, however, between the Philippines and the United States.
fugitives to the Philippines to face trial before military tribunal, how can this be legally done
under international law?
ANSWER:
territorial sovereign of the United States is not oblige to return them but may decide to do
so for reasons of comity. This is not likely however, beacause the escapees are sought for
political offences and can claim the right to asylum under the Universal declaration of
Human Rights.
QUESTION: Liable In Personal Capacity(1981)

“D”, the Mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan, dismissed without cause, notice and hearing , “X”, a
municipal employee, in violation of the law on tenure of office. “X” sued “D” in his personal
capacity, praying for reinstatement and payment of back salary and damages. “D” put up the
defense that the action should be filed against the Municipality of Nirzagaray as the latter
would be the one to pay the back salaries.
Is the defense of the Mayor meritorious? State your reasons.
ANSWER:
So far as the payment of back salary and damages is concerned D cannot claim that the
municipality of Norzaragay is liable. It is evident that D acted in bad faith is dismissing X
without cause and without even giving the latter notice and affording him a hearing before
dismissing him. The principle is well established that public officers are personally liable in
their private capacity if they act maliciously and in bad faith and outside the scope of their
official capacity. (Mindanao Realty Corp. v. Kintanar, 6 SCRA 814 (1962); Abellera v. City of
Baguio, 19 SCRA 600 (1967).
Page 90 of 115
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
QUESTION: principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, Doctrine of finality of

administrative action (1976)
A. Discuss briefly the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, giving its basis,
its purpose and its exception.
B. A standing circular in the U.P provides that not more than one member of any student
organization may be appointed or elected for any particular term in the University
Student Council, Senior Council Women’s Club and other student organization. Some U.P
students filed their grievances with the U.P student organizations. But , the U.P
president refused. After their petition was denied, they went to court assailing the
validity of the circular. Can the court take action on their petition for prohibition and
mandamus? Reason.
C. In the homestead application case, the Director of Lands, after appropriate proceedings,
found in favour of the applicant and ordered the issuance of the corresponding patent in
his favour. Upon appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture, however the factual findings of
the Director of Lands were modified by the Secretary of Agriculture, who instead found
for the oppositor and ordered the issuance of a patent to him. Should an appeal be taken
to the court in a proper case, what would be the effect of the findings of fact of the
Secretary of Agriculture upon the court, if any? Reason.
ANSWER:
A. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that when an

administrative remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting this
remedy before the courts will act. No resource for judicial review can be had until all
such remedies have been exhausted. This is founded not only on practical
considerations but also on comity existing between the different departments of the
government, which comity requires that the courts stay their hands until the
administrative processes have been completed. Its purposes may be found in the
following:
If relief is first sought from a higher or superior administrative agency, resort to the
courts may prove unnecessary, saving the delay and expense of litigation and
preventing the courts from being swamped by resort to them in the first instance;
If a mistake is committed in the initial steps of administrative activity or by an

administrative agency, it should be given the chance to correct such error, and if such
mistake is not corrected therein relief may be obtained from higher administrative
authorities;
The principle of comity and convenience requires the courts to stay their hands until the
administrative processes have been completed.
Finally, since judicial review of administrative actions is usually had through special
civil actions, such proceedings cannot ordinarily lie if there is an appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinarily course of law.
Among the recognized exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies are:
Page 91 of 115
1. Where it plainly appears that the administrative remedy would be of no

value and fruitless, the party seeking judicial relief does not have to
complete administrative procedure before resorting to the courts.
2. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency claiming
the benefit of the doctrine.
3. When no administrative action is possible because the question involved
is purely a legal question.
4. When the administrative actions for which relief is sought is potenty
illegal amounting to a lack of jurisdiction.
5. Where there is unreasonable delay or official in action.
6. Where there is an irreparable damage or injury or threat thereof unless
resort to the court is immediately made.
7. When the doctrine of qualified political agency applies.
8. In extreme cases, where there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
9. In land cases, the doctrine applies only to lands of public domain in
pursuance of the Public Land Act. The rule is inapplicable when private
lands are involved even where they had been acquired by the
government by purchase for resale to individuals.
10. When there are special reasons or circumstances demanding immediate
court action.
(NOTE: however, a general and substantial answer should suffice considering the length of
the correct answer)
B. No. Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Considering that the

presidency of the University is subject to the direction of the Board of Regents and that
board has the power to annul or modify the circular in question, it was the legal
obligation of the petitioners to appeal to the board before resorting to the courts.
C. The findings of facts of the Secretary of Agriculture shall be conclusive upon the courts
unless there is fraud, imposition or mistake other than error of judgment in estimating
the value or effect of the evidence.
QUESTION: A exhaustion of administrative remedy (1977) NO ANSWER

Discuss the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedy is provided by law, relief must
be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. No recourse can be had until all such
remedies have been exhausted and special civil actions against administrative officers could grant
relief.
QUESTION: B finality of administrative decisions (1977)

What are the exceptions to the finality of administrative decisions?
ANSWER:
(1) Where it plainly appears that the administrative remedy would be of no value and
fruitless, the party seeking judicial relief does not have to complete administrative
procedures before resorting the courts.
(2) When there is estoppel on the part of administrative agency claiming the benefit of the
doctrine.
(3) When no administrative action is possible because the question involved is purely a
legal question.
Page 92 of 115
(4) When the administrative action for which relief is sought is patently illegal amounting
to a lack of jurisdiction.
(5) When there is unreasonable delay or official in- action.
(6) When there is an irreparable damage or injury or threat thereof unless resort to the
court immediately made.
(7) When the doctrine of qualified political agency applies.
(8) In extreme cases where there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the
ordinary courts of law.
QUESTION: doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies (1978)

An ordinance of a city in the South made it unlawful for any proprietor, lessee or operator of an
amusement place to admit two or more persons with only one admission ticket. This was assailed
by the theater owners for being ultra vires and for being contrary to the due process clause as this
was an unlawful deprivation of property because of a limitation on their right “to manage their
theaters in the manner they wish.” How would you decide the case? Reason out your answer.
ANSWER:
The ordinance is valid. Regulation of places of amusement is within the legal powers of the city. One
who operates an amusement place does so subject to reasonable regulations for the safety and
convenience of the public patronizing the same and the collection of revenue due to the city
government. Admitting two or more persons with only one admission ticket certainly may result in
inconvenience to the patrons due to overcrowding and loss of revenue to the city. His ownership
thereof and right to manage the same are not absolute.
QUESTION: Doctrine Of Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies (1978)
QUESTION: No. 1
The Preamble of the 1935 Constitution began simply with: The Filipino people x x x.” On the
other hand, the preamble of the 1973 Constitution started off, thus: “We, the sovereign
Filipino people x x x.” The 1935 Constitution Preamble spoke of the “blessings of the
independence” under a regime of “justice, liberty and democracy” while the 1973 Preamble
referred to “blessings of democracy” under a regime not only of justice and liberty but also
of peace and equality. What significance, if any, would you attach to each of these changes?
ANSWER:
By adopting the first person approach, the Preamble of the new Constitution emphasizes a
more direct and personal sense of participation, involvement and commitment of the
Filipino people in adopting the new charter. “Sovereign” describes the present political state
of the Filipino people which could not have been said when the 1935 Constitution was
adopted. Then the immediate goal of our people was political independence; now that it has
been realized it is only proper that the Filipino people seek the “blessings of independence.”
A state may be politically independent and sovereign, yet it is not democratic; its society
may be unjust, its people not free. True justice and liberty however, may not thrive where
society is riven with crime, violence and lawlessness and fractured with social and
economic inequalities. Hence, in adopting the new Constitution, we implore that the Divine
Providence bestow upon us “the blessings of democracy under a regime of justice, liberty,
peace and equality”.
Page 93 of 115
QUESTION: No. II-a

The validity of nationalization of the rice and corn industry embodied in a statute
prohibiting an alien from being employed in any capacity in any establishment in any
industry except as a member of the technical personnel and only upon authority of the
President of the Philippines was assailed on grounds of lack of due process and equal
protection. How would you rule on such objection? May such nationalistic policy be applied
in certain areas of investments? Reason out your answer, citing constitutional provisions.
ANSWER:
1. The law nationalizing the rice and corn industry is itself not violative of the equal
protection of the laws. The purpose of the law is not to discriminate against aliens but
merely to reserve to citizens of the Philippines the rice and corn industry, industries which
directly affect not only the national economy but also national security. The classification
made by the law into citizens and aliens is reasonable and proper. Substantial distinction
exist between them; such classification is germane to the purpose of the law and is not
limited to existing conditions only and applies equally to all citizens and aliens, as the case
may be. If the rice and corn industry itself is nationalized, necessarily, employment therein
must also be nationalized by prohibiting alien employment therein, otherwise the purpose
of the law may be circumvented. Again, for purposes of employment, substantial
distinctions exist between citizens and aliens in the exercise and conduct of the industry
regulated.
2. The law does not violate the due process clause. Its purpose is legitimate: to prevent
aliens control and dominance of the rice and corn industry, an industry which affects
national economy and security. The means employed by the law is reasonable, alien
employment in a nationalized industry may open the door to the use of dummies, thereby
circumventing the law. Moreover, alien employment is not absolutely barred. They may still
be employed in technical positions but as an added safeguard, such employment must be
with the approval of the President.
3. Yes. Under Section 3 of Article XIV, “the National Assembly shall, upon the
recommendation of the National Economic Development Authority, reserve to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations wholly owned by such citizens, certain
traditional areas of investments when the national interest so dictates.”
QUESTION: No. II-b

Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the CFI seeking payment for their parcel of land from the
national government, alleging from 1947, it took possession of their private property for the
purpose of widening a national road. The defense of the government was the absence of its
consent to be sued. This was upheld by the lower court which dismissed the case. Plaintiffs
appealed to the SC. How would you decide the case? Reasons.
ANSWER:
Decisions of the lower court should be reversed. The doctrine of immunity of the state from
suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to citizens. When the
government takes any private property for public use without instituting proper
condemnation proceedings, it makes manifest that it submits itself to the jurisdiction of the
court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be
Page 94 of 115
appropriately invoked in action brought by the property owner against the government for
the payment of just compensation.
QUESTION: No. III-a

An ordinance of a city in the South made it unlawful for any proprietor, lessee or operator of
an amusement place to admit two or more persons with only one admission ticket. This was
assailed by the theater owners for being ultra vires and for being contrary to the due
process clause as this was an unlawful deprivation of property because of a limitation on
their right “to manage their theaters in the manner they wish.” How would you decide the
case? Reason out your answer.
ANSWER:
The ordinance is valid. Regulation of places of amusement is within the legal powers of the
city. One who operates an amusement place does so subject to reasonable regulations for
the safety and convenience of the public patronizing the same and the collection of revenue
due to the city government. Admitting two or more persons with only one admission ticket
certainly may result in inconvenience to the patrons due to overcrowding and loss of
revenue to the city. His ownership thereof and right to manage the same are not absolute.
QUESTION: No. III-B Exception To The Application Of The Doctrine Of Exhaustion Of
Administrative Remedies.
The losing party in a case before the Board of Transportation operating air conditioned
auto-truck service in the City of Cebu filed certiorari proceedings in the SC during the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Private respondent alleged that the suit was
premature as the administrative agency had not ruled yet on his motion for reconsideration,
invoking the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies before resorting to action.
How would you decide the case? Reason out you answer.
ANSWER:
Considering that the auto-truck service is a public utility, an early disposition of the case
may warrant the filing of a petition for certiorari with the SC without waiting for the
resolution by the lower court of the motion for reconsideration. It is to the public interest
and convenience that a procedural technicality be overlooked. In this sense, this is an
exception to the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Alternative Answers
1. Considering that a petition for certiorari was filed. The issue that must have been raised is:
that the Board of Transportation Acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or
committed a grave abuse of discretion. The question raised being strictly a legal one, exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not necessary.
2. Petition for certiorari is premature and will be dismissed. There is still a plain, adequate and
speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. Comity and convenience require that the Board of
Transportation be given the opportunity to rule on the motion for reconsideration. It may grant the
relief prayed for and thereby render unnecessary resort to judicial review. There is nothing in the
problem which give factual circumstance showing any urgency dictated by public interest to
warrant disregard for the exhaustion doctrine. Neither is there any intimation in the problem that
the question raised is a jurisdictional one or a pure question law.
Page 95 of 115
Page 96 of 115
ELECTION LAW
QUESTION: Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over political parties (1975)
John Doe and Richard Roe were opposing candidates for municipal mayor. After Richard
Roe was proclaimed as the winning candidate, John Doe filed with the Commission on
Elections a petition to cancel the canvass of the election returns of a certain precinct.
Richard Roe contends that the Commission on Elections has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition. Is the contention meritorious? Why?
ANSWER:
The Commission on Elections has no authority to annul any canvass made after the
proclamation of a winning candidate. The remedy of the party aggrieved is to file an election
protest. However, where the proclamation is illegal it cannot serve as a bar to an action to
annul the canvass, otherwise the pernicious practice of “grabbing-the-proclamation-and –
prolonging- the protest” would be encouraged. (Aguam v. Commission on Elections, L-28995,
May 28, 1968. 23 SCRA 883)
QUESTION: Powers of COMELEC (1979)
(a) The registered voters of distant barrios of Municipality “A” complained against the
transfer of their voting places from their barrios to the poblacion as ordered by the
COMELEC because of the presence of terrorists in areas far from the poblacion. May
they file a petition to the Supreme Court to order the COMELEC to return their voting
places to their barrios for their convenience invoking the power of the Supreme Court
over acts, orders etc. of the COMELEC as granted by the Constitution?
(b) Compare the powers of the COMELEC as granted by the 1973 Constitution and those
granted by the 193 Constitution but only with references to changes introduced in the
New Constitution.
ANSWER:
(a) Under Art. VII, (B), Sec 11 of the new Constitution, the decisions, orders or rulings of the
Commission on Election may be brought to the Supreme Court only in a petition for
certiorari which according to Aratuc vs. COMELEC, is limited to question of law or grave
abuse of discretion.
On the merits, the action of the COMELEC can be upheld in the interest of the
constitutional ideal of “free, orderly and honest election”
(b) The COMELEC is now the “sole judge” of election contest involving members of the
National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials may register and accredit
political parties, decide administrative questions concerning the registration of voters,
and regulate or supervise the operation of entities over to government franchise, like
communication and transportation, companies during the election period. It can now
still deputize, but only with the consent or at the instance of Prime Minister.
QUESTION: Election protest (1976)

A. Distinguish referendum from plebiscite. Can referendum and plebiscite be held at
the same time? Reason.
Page 97 of 115
B. One of the objection to the 1976 National referendum-plebiscite, submitting to the

people for their ratification the proposed amendments to the 1976 Constitution,
was that the allowing of the 15-year olds to vote in the said referendum- plebiscite
would amount to an amendment of the 1973 Constitution, which confines the right
of suffrage to those citizen of the Philippines, 18 years of age and over. How would
you meet the objection?
C. X who obtained second highest number of votes in the election of November 8,

1971, field a protest against the election of Y as mayor of Pintungan, Southern Leyte,
on the ground of fraud, illegal counting of votes and massive vote buying. Y, the
protestee, moved to dismiss the protest on the ground that , after the proclamation
of martial law the position of mayor became of doubtful existence and, after the
ratification of the New Constitution , the mayoralty position became a newly-
created position and he (Y) is only a hold-over occupant , no longer subject to an
electoral protest. The trial judge sustained the motion and dismissed the protest.
Was the dismissal of the protest correct? Reason.
ANSWER:
A. A referendum, in the concept of referenda being held in the Philippines since the
imposition of martial law, is merely a form of consultation with the people. Its purpose
is to determine how the people feels about an issue or question of national importance
so that the government may act, or formulate policies in accordance with their wishes.
Under P.C. No.86-A constituting the barangays as the base of citizen participation in the
governmental affairs, it is provided that the collective views of the members of the
barangay as expressed in the referendum or other forms of constitutions with its
members are to be considered in the formulation of polices and whenever practicable
translated into concrete and specific actions and decisions. They only serve as basis for
governmental action.
On the other hand, a plebiscite refers to a vote of the enfranchised citizens on a question
submitted for their determination. The result of a plebiscite are legally efficacious and
binding, ex propio vigore without the need for further governmental action. There is
nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the simultaneous holding of a referendum
and plebiscite. For example, in a ratification plebiscite the constitution does not qualify,
qualification is not justified. It may perhaps be better if they are separately held but that
is a policy matter addressed to the political department which the courts cannot review.
On the other hand, the issue raised in the referendum and plebiscite may be
interrelated. Moreover, the need to economize in the expenditure of funds which will be
entailed in holding them separately cannot just be ignored.
B. Presidential Decree No. 229 which was extended by Presidential Decree No. 1031 in the
conduct of the referendum-plebiscite held on October 16-17, 1976 , provides that the
barangay referendum committees shall prepare two sets of referendum results, one of
those between the ages of 15-18 years and another 18 years and above. In short, there
will be separate returns for those authorized to exercise the right of suffrage under the
Constitution. With respect to the votes of the group of barangay voters from 15 to 18
years, it will only be a means of determining the feeling of a substantial segment of the
body politic on the vital questions of national importance.
C. No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides; “ All officials and
employees in the existing government of the Republic of the Philippines shall continue
in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President…”. Said
provision does not the existing offices. In fact, it recognizes the continued existence of
said offices and allows the office holders to continue in office until otherwise decreed by
the incumbent President. It does not even terminate their terms of office upon the
ratification of the New Constitution nor create a new term for them. Insofar as elective
Page 98 of 115
local officials ,they are serving the same term only that the duration thereof has been
changed from one which is definite ( four years and until their successors are duly
elected and qualified) to one which is uncertain an indefinite ( to last until otherwise
decreed by the incumbent President.) On the other hand, only the “duly” elected officials
are the ones given the privilege to continue in office. And an election contest has for its
purpose the determination of whether or not Y is a duly elected official.
Page 99 of 115
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
QUESTION: Police power (1975)

Petitioners built their houses without government authority inside a public street of Manila.
The City Engineer of Manila threatened to demolish the houses summarily. Petitioners
sought to enjoin the City Engineer on the ground that their houses cannot be demolished
without a court order. Is the contention meritorious? Why?
ANSWER:
No. Houses constructed without governmental authority, on public streets and waterways,
obstruct at all times the free use by the public of the streets and waterways, and,
accordingly, constitute nuisances per se, as well as public nuisances. As such, their summary
removal, without judicial process or proceeding may be authorized by statute or municipal
ordinance, despite the due process clause. Both the Civil Code (Arts. 694, 700 & 702) and
the Revised Ordinance of the City Manila (Sec. 1122) authorized summary proceedings for
the abatement of public nuisances. (Stichon v. Aquino, 98 PHIL. 458, (1956))
QUESTION: Police power (1975)
The accused are owners of lumber yards located within a residential zone of the
municipality. They were prosecuted for failure to remove their lumber yards from the
residential area upon being required to do so by the municipal authorities. They attacked
the validity of the municipal ordinance as an invasion of the property rights of lumber yard
owners without due process of law. Is their contention meritorious? Why?
ANSWER:
No. the power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into industrial,
commercial, and residential zones and to abate nuisances is recognized in almost all
jurisdictions in as much as it is derived from the police power and is exercised for the
benefit and protection of their inhabitants. On this ground, and ordinance of the then
municipality of Iloilo, prohibiting lumber stores and lumber yard in certain streets classified
as residential and commercial zones, was upheld. Taking into consideration the nature of
plaintiff’s business necessarily disturbed passers-by, the Supreme Court held that such
business was a nuisance per accidence or per se. The Court rejected the contention that the
ordinance in question was confiscatory and did not provide adequate compensation, for the
reason that the municipality did not take over the ownership of the business but simply
prohibited the conduct of the business. The ordinance was intended to safeguard the health,
safety and welfare of the inhabitants, in accordance with the maxim salus populi supreme
lex. (Tan Chat v. Municipality of Iloilo, 60 Phil. 465)
QUESTION:Taxing power (1975)

The municipal council of Roxas, Palawan enacted Ordinance No. 12 on October 15, 1960
imposing an inspection and verification fee of PHP0.10 per ton of silence sand excavated
with Roxas. Plaintiff filed an action to annul the said ordinance and to ask for refund of
whatever amount it has paid under the same. Plaintiff contended as a police measure
because it applies to a business which is not inherently subject to police regulation. Is the
contention meritorious? Why?
ANSWER:
No. the fee in question is in the nature of a license tax and is authorized under section 2 of
the Republic Act No. 2264 giving local governments the power to impose not only taxes but
also license taxes and service fees. The ordinance in question is justified by public interest,
which requires inspection by municipal authorities to insure that a party has a permit from
the Bureau of Mines and that the excavation does not encroach upon the claims of other
Page 100 of 115

parties. (Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas, Palawan, L-20125, July 20, 1965, 14
SCRA 660)
Page 101 of 115

QUESTION Liability of LGU (1976)

A. X is the wife of the mayor of the municipality of Malabon. She wants to know if she can
legally lease a stall in the public market operated by the municipality. Can she do so?
reasons.
B. As a result of a fire that razed a row of private buildings along Recto Avenue, a burned-
out wall fronting said street remained standing. Despite the owner’s non-compliance
with an order for the demolition of said wall, the city Engineer inexcusably neglected to
enforce said order until, under its own weight , the aforesaid wall collapsed and crushed
onto a pedestrian who sustained serious injuries. Is the city of Manila liable in damages
to said pedestrian for the injuries he sustained? Reasons.
C. Under the so-called general welfare, the Municipal Council of Las Pinas, passed an
ordinance authorizing the establishment of a Red Light District within the limits of the
municipality. Is the ordinance valid? Reason.
ANSWER:
A. No. Section 2176 of the Revised Administrative Code makes it unlawful for any
municipal officer to possess a pecuniary interest, either direct or indirect , in any
municipal contract, contract work, or any other municipal business or to hold such
interest in any cockpit or other game licensed by municipal authority. Considering the
unity of interest of the mayor and his wife in their conjugal partnership, a lease of public
market will amount to a pecuniary interest of the mayor in a contract with the
municipality.
B. No. in the first place, under Section 24 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, the
city is not liable or held for damages or injuries to person or property arising from the
failure of any city official to enforce the provisions of the Charter, or any other law or
ordinance or from negligence of said officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce
said provisions. In the second place, a municipal corporation, like City of Manila, is not
liable in damages for the torts committed by its officers or employees in the
performance of public or governmental function, unless the law specifically makes it
liable.
C. No, Prostitution is a crime under the Revised Penal Coe and the regulation establishing
“Red Light District” seems to allow prostitution. In other words, the ordinance is
contrary to law and on that basis it may be invalidated. Moreover, it is not contrary to
law, but also lower morals and public policy. One of the mandatory powers of municipal
councils is to “prohibit and penalize prostitution”. Therefore, the Municipal ordinance of
Las Pinas establishing a “Red Light District” is invalid because it regulates prostitution.
It is therefore, ultra vires.
QUESTION: Recall( 1976)

A. One of the salient characteristics of a public office is that it is a public trust and not a
property. Is there any instances when a public office may be considered a property
of the office-holder within the protection of the due process clause of the
Constitution? Explain your answer. How should a public officer or employee serve
his office?
B. Distinguish the power of recall from the power of removal. Is the power of recall
authorized in the Philippines?
C. A was appointed Director of a certain bureau. He took his oath of office, and
assumed the duties thereof. Few months later, the bureau to which he was
appointed was declared not legally existing because the law creating it is
Page 102 of 115

unconstitutional. What would be the legal effect of the acts performed by A before
the law creating the office was declared unconstitutional? Reason.
ANSWER:
A. In cases where the controversy relates to the question as to which of two persons is
entitled thereto, a public office may be considered property within the protection of the
due process clause, in that before any may be deprived of his title to the office, the same
should be properly litigated before the courts. A public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people. (Sec.1, Art.XIII, New
Constitution).
B. Removal is the ouster of a public officer exercised by the official who has been vested by
law of the power to remove; recall is removal of such officer by the people themselves,
through the process of a recall election. Section 2 of Article XI of the New Constitution
mandates the National Assembly to enact a local government code defining a more
responsive an accountable local government structure with “an effective system of
recall”. Recall is therefore authorized under the New Constitution.
C. Technically, A would be a plain usurper or intruder because the law creating his office
(bureau) is unconstitutional. Therefore, there is no de jure office and if there is no office
de jure there cannot be an officer de jure or de facto. ( The facts of the problem given
itself says that “ the bureau to which he was appointed was declared not legally existing
because the law creating it is unconstitutional). Accordingly, under the general rules, the
acts of A would be void. However, the harshness of this rule should not deprived the
law of its quality of fairness and justice especially insofar as the public and third
persons, acting without notice, who dealt with A thinking that A is the officer he
purports himself to be. The existence of the law creating the bureau to which A had been
appointed is an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored. Therefore, it is submitted
that insofar as the public and third parties are concerned, the facts of A must be
considered good and valid like those of a de jure officer.
QUESTION : Referendum( 1976)

A.Distinguish referendum from plebiscite. Can referendum and plebiscite be held at the same time?
Reason.
A. One of the objection to the 1976 National referendum-plebiscite, submitting to the people
for their ratification the proposed amendments to the 1976 Constitution, was that the
allowing of the 15-year olds to vote in the said referendum- plebiscite would amount to an
amendment of the 1973 Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizen of
the Philippines, 18 years of age and over. How would you meet the objection?
B. X who obtained second highest number of votes in the election of November 8, 1971, field a
protest against the election of Y as mayor of Pintungan, Southern Leyte, on the ground of
fraud, illegal counting of votes and massive vote buying. Y, the protestee, moved to dismiss
the protest on the ground that , after the proclamation of martial law the position of mayor
became of doubtful existence and, after the ratification of the New Constitution , the
mayoralty position became a newly- created position and he (Y) is only a hold-over
occupant , no longer subject to an electoral protest. The trial judge sustained the motion and
dismissed the protest. Was the dismissal of the protest correct? Reason.
ANSWER:
Page 103 of 115

A. A referendum, in the concept of referenda being held in the Philippines since the imposition
of martial law, is merely a form of consultation with the people. Its purpose is to determine
how the people feels about an issue or question of national importance so that the
government may act, or formulate policies in accordance with their wishes. Under P.C.
No.86-A constituting the barangays as the base of citizen participation in the governmental
affairs, it is provided that the collective views of the members of the barangay as expressed
in the referendum or other forms of constitutions with its members are to be considered in
the formulation of polices and whenever practicable translated into concrete and specific
actions and decisions. They only serve as basis for governmental action.
On the other hand, a plebiscite refers to a vote of the enfranchised citizens on a question
submitted for their determination. The result of a plebiscite are legally efficacious and
binding, ex propio vigore without the need for further governmental action. There is
nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the simultaneous holding of a referendum
and plebiscite. For example, in a ratification plebiscite the constitution does not qualify,
qualification is not justified. It may perhaps be better if they are separately held but that
is a policy matter addressed to the political department which the courts cannot review.
On the other hand, the issue raised in the referendum and plebiscite may be
interrelated. Moreover, the need to economize in the expenditure of funds which will be
entailed in holding them separately cannot just be ignored.
B. Presidential Decree No. 229 which was extended by Presidential Decree No. 1031 in the
conduct of the referendum-plebiscite held on October 16-17, 1976 , provides that the
barangay referendum committees shall prepare two sets of referendum results, one of those
between the ages of 15-18 years and another 18 years and above. In short, there will be
separate returns for those authorized to exercise the right of suffrage under the
Constitution. With respect to the votes of the group of barangay voters from 15 to 18 years,
it will only be a means of determining the feeling of a substantial segment of the body politic
on the vital questions of national importance.
C. No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides; “ All officials and employees
in the existing government of the Republic of the Philippines shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President…”. Said provision does
not the existing offices. In fact, it recognizes the continued existence of said offices and
allows the office holders to continue in office until otherwise decreed by the incumbent
President. It does not even terminate their terms of office upon the ratification of the New
Constitution nor create a new term for them. Insofar as elective local officials ,they are
serving the same term only that the duration thereof has been changed from one which is
definite ( four years and until their successors are duly elected and qualified) to one which
is uncertain an indefinite ( to last until otherwise decreed by the incumbent President.) On
the other hand, only the “duly” elected officials are the ones given the privilege to continue
in office. And an election contest has for its purpose the determination of whether or not Y
is a duly elected official.
QUESTION Municipal corporations 1979
(a) Discuss the dual character of municipal corporation.

(b) Can a municipality impose a tax even if it is not authorized by a statute?
(c) The stage constructed during the town fiesta collapsed and caused the death of a person. If
sued for damages, may the Sanggunian Bayan members plead that they are not liable
because they constructed the stage in the exercise of a public function intended for the
general welfare, the town fiesta being for the enrichment and happiness of the whole
populace?
Page 104 of 115

ANSWER:
(a) Municipal corporations act in a public capacity as an agent of the State in the discharge of
governmental functions such as the collection of taxes, the protection of health, the
apprehension of criminals, and in a private capacity as an agent of their inhabitants for the
promotion of their interests, as where they engage in the operation of a market, cemetery,
or a ferry service.
(b) Municipalities can now impose taxes independently of statutory grant on the strength of a
self-executing constitutional authorization in Article XI, Sec 5, which provides that they can
create their own sources of revenue and levy taxes, subject only to limitations prescribed by
the Legislature.
(c) This is the case of Torrio vs. Fontanilla, where the Supreme Court described the celebration
of a town fiesta as a proprietary activity, which can be the basis of a tort action for damages
under the principle of respondeat superior.
QUESTION: A (1978)
Some years ago, the B.I.R. has started to disallow the benefits of tax deduction enjoyed by the head
of the family, beginning with a fourth dependent and up, in line with the government’s family
planning program. Furthermore, contraceptives for the prevention of birth are being encouraged by
the government and distributed for free by public hospitals and clinics. Catholic families strongly
protest against this state policy and practice on the grounds that it is not only discriminatory but
also offensive to religious beliefs and violative of the natural law which prohibit birth control of the
human specie. How would you resolve this controversy? Reason out you answer.
ANSWER:
dependent and up is invalid. There is nothing in the problem which says that the B.I.R. has acted
pursuant to law. On the contrary, the existing law (The Income Law Tax) allows such deduction. If
indeed it is in line with the government’s family planning program, such must be embodied in a
statute and the B.I.R. cannot, without any authority of law or in derogation of it, disallow such
deduction as a means to carry out that program.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
measure to control population explosion which, in turn, may bring about serious economic and
social problems under the police power of the state and more specifically in compliance with
Section 10 of Article XV of the New Constitution which provides: “It shall be the responsibility of the
State to achieve and maintain population levels most conducive to national welfare.” The right to
religious freedom and of beliefs is not absolute. Its exercise is subject to the dominant police power
of the State.
QUESTION: B Local Autonomy (1978)
Page 105 of 115

Under Section 10 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is mandated that “the state
shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio to
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.” Under the 1976 amendments,
however, which were proposed by President Marcos, the barangays and sanggunians were given
constitutional recognition. Does this amendment have the effect of abolishing the barrio,
considering that the barangay now exercise political and public functions originally exercised by
barrio units? Reason out your answers.
ANSWER:
No. The concept of barrios remain as one the political and territorial subdivisions into which the
Philippines is divided (Sec. 10, Art. II; Sec. 1, Art. XI, New Constitution). What happened is that
under Presidential Decree No. 557 issued on September 21, 1974 “all existing barrios or barrios
that may be created were (are hereby) declared as barangays and all references to the barrio in any
existing laws shall henceforth be understood as referring to the barangay.” In short, only the name
has been changed from barrio to barangay. But the entity remains the same.
Page 106 of 115

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
QUESTION Right of Asylum (1975)

(a) Distinguish recognition of state from recognition of government.
(b) Explain the right of asylum in international law.
ANSWER:
(1) Recognition of state carries with it the recognition of government since the former
implies that a state recognized has all the essential requisites of a state at the time the
recognition is extended.
(2) Once recognition of state is accorded, it is generally irrevocable. Recognition of
government, on the other hand, may be withheld from a succeeding government
brought about by violent or unconstitutional means.
(b) The right of asylum is the competence of every state inferred from its territorial
supremacy to allow a prosecuted alien to enter and to remain on its territory, under its
protection and thereby to grant asylum to him. (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law,
295 (3rd ed. 1966))
QUESTION Archipelagic doctrine (1977)
Explain the Philippine claim or position on the archipelagic concept presented to the United
Nations conferences on the Law of the Sea.
ANSWER:
The Philippine position was stated by Solicitor General Mendoza in an international
conference on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, thus: “All of (the
definitions of archipelago) uniformly suggest that integration of a group of islands to the sea
to a group of islands, and the oneness and existence of this group of islands and the sea
where they are found as one unit, one country, one state. 'The Philippines, known in history
as the Philippine Archipelago, or the Philippine Islands, one such state.”
The reason for such archipelago theory in $0 far as the Philippines is concerned is clearly
set forth, thus: “More than seven thousand islands comprise the Philippines, rules by one
unitary government, bound by a common heritage, beholden to the same traditions,
pursuing the same ideals, interdependent and united politically, economically and. socially
as one nation. To suggest that each island has its own territorial sea and the baselines must
be drawn around each island is to splinter into 7,000 pieces What is a single nation and a
united state.” There should be “single baseline around the islands that constitute it by
joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago with straight lines.” '
QUESTION Archipelagic doctrine (1979)

(a) What is the “archipelagic theory” as proposed by the Philippines in the U. N Conference
on “The Law of the Sea” and give its justification, legal or practical from the standpoint
of the Philippine Position?
(b) How can the observance of our law on national theory be enforced upon individuals,
and upon States?
(c) May the USA lay exclusive claim over the moon having explored it and having planted
her flag thereon to the exclusion of other States? Explain.
Page 107 of 115

ANSWER:
(a) Under the archipelago theory as constitutionalized in Article I, Sect., 1 of the new
charter the waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
irrespective of their breath and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
It is our position that the 7,100 islands comprising our terrestrial domain should be
considered one integrated whole instead of as a separate component to be each
provided with its own territorial sea, as this would make the intervening waters open
seas and, therefore, available to the uses of other states to the prejudice of our country.
(b) All persons within our national territory are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, with certain exceptions like heads and diplomatic agents of foreign states.
States are required under international law, specifically under Art. II, par. 4, of the U.N.
Charter, to respect the territorial integrity of other states. Any encroachment upon our
territory, for example by a foreign vessel, may be punished under our own laws, or by
sanctions allowed under the generally accepted principle of international law.
(c) The United States cannot lay exclusive claim to the moon because other space and all
celestial bodies found therein, including the moon, are not susceptible to national
appropriation but are legally regarded as res communes.
QUESTION: Stateless (1978)

Victor Korchnoi, a stateless resident of Switzerland, was the challenger to the world chess
title held by Russian Anatolyv Karpov. After 32 grueling games were played in Baguio City,
Karpov finally retained his title on a close 6 to 5 win. Korchnoi protested non-payment of
his prize money and alleged unfair treatment he received form the tournament organizers
in the Philippines, particularly in the 32nd crucial game which he attributes as the main
cause of his defeat. May he press for his right to the prize money against the Philippine
government through the Swiss government? Reason out your answer.
ANSWER:
No. Switzerland, even if she so decides, cannot espouse a diplomatic claim against the
Philippines in behalf of Viktor Korchnoi. Nationality is the basis of the right of a state to
espouse such claim. In this case Korchnoi is not a Swiss national, but a stateless person.
QUESTION Right of Equality (1979)

(a) A crime was committed in a private vessel registered in Japan by a Filipino against an
Englishman while the vessel is anchored in a port of a State “A”. where can he be tried?
If both are members of the crew, where will the trial be?
(b) The United States Ambassador to the Philippines and the American Consul General also
in the Philippines quarreled in the Manila Hotel and shot at each other. May the
Philippines Court take jurisdiction over them for trial and punishment for the crime
they may have committed?
ANSWER:
Page 108 of 115

(a) Under both the English and French rules, the crime will be triable by the local state “A”,
if serious enough as to compromise the peace of its port; otherwise, by the flag state,
Japan, if it involves only the members of the crew and is of such petty nature as not to
disturb the peace of the local state.
(b) The ambassador is immune from prosecution for all crimes committed by him, whether
officially or in a private capacity. The consul is immune from criminal prosecution only
for acts committed by him in connection with his official functions.
Page 109 of 115

QUESTION State immunity (1979)
(a) May the United Nations be sued for unpaid rentals of buildings used by it for its session in
the Philippines?
(b) It was after the 1973 Constitution has become effective that the Philippines had opened
diplomatic relations with Russia, China and other socialist countries. What provision in said
Constitution, not found in the 1935 Constitution, can you cite that may have paved the way
to the aforementioned diplomatic moves?
(c) What is the “ASEA”, and what are its primary objectives?
ANSWER:
(a) Two possible answers:

1. Article 105 of the U.N. Charter provides that the U.N shall enjoy in the territory of its
members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its
purposes. Hence, it cannot be sued for the rentals of premises used for its official
sessions in the Philippines.
2. Having entered into the contract of lease, the U.N is deemed to have waived its
immunities and may, therefore, be sued for unpaid rentals.
(b) Article II, Sec. 3, to the effect that the Philippine “adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.”
(c) The ASEAN is a regional organization composed of the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Singapore and Thailand, and organized to promote friendship , cooperation, peace and
prosperity in Southeast Asia.
QUESTION Extradition (1976)

A. On November 1, 1976, A,B,C and D, self-styled Moro rebels long wanted by the
authorities for the fatal ambuscade of a bus-load of innocent civilians, hijacked a
PAL plane on its Manila-Davao flight which they forcibly diverted to, and landed in
Djarkarta, Indonesia. In that country , A, B, C and D sought political asylum, invoking
the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. Reacting, the Philippines
Government, thru proper diplomatic channels, sought after their extradition. May
Indonesia grant Asylum or should it extradite A, B, C and D to the Philippines?
Reason.
B. While about to leave his place of work inside U.S Naval Base in Subic, E, a Filipino
civilian employee therein, was unceremoniously stopped and undignifiedly search
by U.S. Marines, acting upon orders of the Base Provost Marshall on suspicion of
pilfering navy property, but only to be released after several hours of detention
when nothing was found in his person. Charging excess of jurisdiction and abuse of
authority, E filed a suit before the CFI of Olongapo City against the Provost Marshall
and other base officers for damages for violation of his Constitutional rights under
Art. 32 of the Civil Code. Moving the dismiss, defendant Base officials contend: (1)
that the civil code does not apply inside the U.S. Naval Base; and (2) that having
acted in their official capacities, the suit which has not given its consent thereto.
C. R and S are both U. S. military servicemen subject to the military law of the United
States and regularly assigned to the Philippines. While in Clark Air Force Base, R
sladered a 19-year old daughter of S by calling her a professional “call girl”. Assume
that slander is also punishable under U. S. laws and an appropriate prosecution is
Page 110 of 115

initiated against R. Under the US-PI Military Bases Agreement, which country would
have primary jurisdiction to try the case? Reason.
ANSWER:
A. Inasmuch as the offenders are merely “self-styled” Moro rebels, I take it that they are
not actual rebels and there is no political color to their acts. Indonesia must therefore
extradite them to the Philippines in view of our recently concluded treaty of extradition
with Indonesia relative to such crimes as murder or homicide obviously committed in
the “fatal ambuscade”. It additionally extradite is requested for the hijacking , the same
should likewise be granted.
B. The motion to Dismiss should be DENIED firstly, because Philippines laws such as the
Civil Code operate even inside the Bases, our Government not having relinquished
territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty over the Bases and secondly, while they may
have acted in their official capacities, certainly the Provost Marshall and other base
officers are not supposed to exercise unlawful and illegal acts, which are prohibited
even under United States Law. Obedience to lawful orders may exempt but obedience to
unlawful commands cannot exempt. Said act therefore cannot be presumed to have
been done by a foreign government as an Act of State. Verily therefore, this is not a suit
against the United States. Or the position of the Base officials that the Civil Code does
not apply inside the U. S. Naval Base is not meritorious. The U.S. Naval Base in Subic is
part of Philippines territory, and Philippine law apply therein as in other parts of the
Philippines. However, the second contention is well taken. Having acted in their official
capacities and in obedience to the direct orders of their superiors, the Base officers may
not be held personally liable for damages in the absence of proof showing that the
United States consented to be sued before the Philippine courts. This is one of the
limitations on Philippine jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss should be granted on this
ground.
C. Under the US-PI Military Bases Agreement, the general rule( if the act is punishable both by
Philippines and US laws) is that the Philippines has primary jurisdiction and it will not matter
whether the Crime is an exception, and this occurs when the accused is a person subject to US
Military Law and the Crime he committed is one of the following:
1. Against the property or security of the U.S.
2. Against theproperty or person of:
a) a member of the U.S. Armed Forces; or
b) a member of the Civilian Component; or
c) a dependent of either.
3. In connection with official duty.
In the present problem, the accused is a Member of the U.S. Armed Forces, AND the crime has been
committed against the person of the dependent member of the U.S. Armed Forces. Thus, the U.S. has
primary jurisdiction. Be it noted that the Agreement speaks of a crime against "property" or
"person", and the crime in the problem is one of "slander" ( one that under the Revised Penal Code
is not a crime against "property" or "person"), NONETHELESS there is no indication in the
Agreement that the offense against "property" or "person" are those referred to as such in the
Philippine Revised Penal Code, whose classification of crimes may not tally with that under U.S.
laws.
QUESTION Case. No. l (1977)
Page 111 of 115

referendum on December 17, 1977 wherein the people will be asked this question: “Do you vote
that President Ferdinand E. Marcos continue in office as incumbent President and be Prime
Minister aftetthe organization of the interim Batas-ang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment
No. 3 of the 1976 amendments to the Constitution?”
Court the proper petition against the COMELEC and the National Treasurer questioning the legality
of the referendum and the use and expenditure of public funds for said referendum, contending that
(1) the expenditure is unnecessary because the people had already voted overwhelmingly in
support of the leadership of President Marcos in previous referenda; (2) that the so-called
referendum is in reality a presidential election which is not legally feasible under the present
Constitution as amended; and (3) that the Muslim seccessionist problem must first be solved before
holding this political exercise. Will this petition prosper? Why? Decide with reasons.
ANSWER:
(1) As first held in the Emergency Powers Cases and recently affirmed in Samidad v. Commission on
Elections, an ordinary citizen and taxpayer may question the validity of an appropriation measure.
In any event, according to the Supreme Court, the question of proper party is subject to its
discretion. ,
(2) The issue of the necessity of the expenditure is political in nature, addressed to the exclusive
discretion of the lawmaking power. Not even the Supreme Court can review this question under the
doctrine of separation of powers. . ’
(3) The objection based on the Muslim problem is also political, involving as it does the matter of
legislative priorities and the wisdom of the challenged measure. It is also not subject to judicial
review for the reasons stated in (2).
(4) An election, like a plebiscite, produces legal and binding effect. A referendum, according to the
Sanidad Case, is merely consultative or advisory and may be participated in by those not qualified
to vote, including ex-convicts and the feeble-minded, They may advise the government. But a “yes”
vote in-the projected referendum cannot by itself legally extend the President’s term; on. the other
hand, a “no"vote may be legally disregarded or rejected by him. .
QUESTION Case No. 2 (1977)

subversions, and murder before a military tribunal. He files a petition for habeas corpus before the
Court claiming unlawful detention and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. He contends that
unlike in his case, Muslim rebels who have taken up arms against the government and have inflicted
how losses and casualties on men and material of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are entitled
to complete amnesty and release and are not prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms;
subversion or rebellion; that civilian guards and bodyguards of warloads from whom unlicensed
firearms and ammunition had been confiscated were also released and not prosecuted; and that the
publicly announced policy of the government which transfers authority to try civilians under
indictment before military courts to civil courts in thousands of detainees has not been equally
applied to him. Petitioner claims he alone was singled out, detained and prosecuted. Is the
petitioner entitled to the writ prayed £01. 9 Decide with reasons.
ANSWER:
Page 112 of 115

administered with an evil eye and an uneven hand. This guaranty calls for equal treatment of those
similarly situated, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. It has been denied Senator X
as there is no substantial distinction between him and the Muslim rebels who are being coddled by
the government,
Section 19 of Republic Act 5185 (Decentralization Act) provides that the positions of
provincial attorney and city legal officer may be created to enable the provincial and city
governments to avail themselves of the. full-time and trusted services of legal officers.
Under this law, Atty. Cruz was appointed City Legal Officer of San Fernando City by City
Mayor Santos in view of the fact that the Mayor had absolute confidence and trust in the appointee,
who, besides being profession/ally capable, is highly trained and specially qualified. Upon the
resignation Mayor Santos, the new Mayor replaced Atty. Cruz and in his stead, appointed his loyal
confident and supporter, Atty. Reyes. Atty. Cruz now questions his removal and seeks reinstatement
to his former position with back salariesin the proper petition. If you were the Judge, decide the
case with reason.
ANSWER:
This is not a case of removal, as erroneously suggested in the problem. Atty. Cruz was
separated from his office by expiration of his term.
As held in Salazar v. Mathay, a person holds a primarily confidential position for as long as
he enjoys the confidence of his superior. His term is co-existent with that confidence and ends the
moment such trust is lost.
In Besa v. PNB, it was held that the position of the chief legal counsel of the PNB was
primarily a confidential position. That ruling may be applied by analogy to this problem.
QUESTION Case No. 3 Extradition (1977)
President Marcos before the military tribunal, escaped from military custody, flew to Hongkong and
then to California, U.S.A. where they are reportedly seeking political asylum. There is no extradition
treaty, however, between the Philippines and the United States.
fugitives to the Philippines to face trial before military tribunal, how can this be legally done under
international law?
ANSWER:
territorial sovereign of the United States is not oblige to return them but may decide to do so for
reasons of comity. This is not likely however, beacause the escapees are sought for political
offences and can claim the right to asylum under the Universal declaration of Human Rights.
QUESTION –a International organizations (1979)
(a) What event of great international significance took place recently in the United Nations
which enhanced the prestige and importance of the Philippines as a member of the
International community? Why?
Page 113 of 115

(b) May the United States be sued in our courts for the value of private properties requisitioned
by its Army during the last World War, as well as Japan for the “Mickey Mouse” money in
payment for private properties which have not been redeemed until now? May the suit be
brought to the International Court of Justice?
(c) When is the principle of Postliminium applied?
(d) ANSWER:
(a) The Philippines was recently elected one of the ten non-permanent members of the Security
Council, in the first balloting and after endorsement by the whole Asian bloc. This is
considered a recognition of our active role in the promotion of international peace.
(b) No, even foreign states are entitled to the doctrine of state immunity in the local state. The
suit may not be brought before the International Court of Justice without consent of the
United States as jurisdiction of this Court in contentious cases is based upon the consent of
the parties.
(c) Where the territory of one belligerent state is occupied by the enemy during war, the
legitimate government is ousted form authority. When the belligerent occupation ceases to
be effective, the authority of the legitimate government is automatically restored, together
with all its laws, by virtue of the jus postliminium.
QUESTION- b International organizations
What is the meaning or concept of:

1. Right of extraterritoriality
2. Uti possidetis
3. Most favored nation treatment
4. Act of state, doctrine
Answer No. VIII-b-1
The term “extraterritoriality” has been used to denote the status of a person or thing physically
present on a State’s territory, but wholly or partly withdrawn from the State’s jurisdiction by a rule
of international law
Answer No. VIII-b-2
The problem concerning ownership of property which have changed hands during the
course of the war are generally settled by the application of the rule of uti possidetis, by which each
belligerent is regarded as legally entitled to such property as are actually in its possession at the
time hostilities caused.
Answer No. III-b-3
The most-favored nation treatment is that granted by one country to another not less
favorable than that which has been or may be granted to the “most favored” among other countries.
Answer No. VIII-b-4
The act of state doctrine states that every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence off every other state and the courts Of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another, done within its territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves.
QUESTION: International Court of Justice (1978)
Page 114 of 115

A, a citizen of State X was arrested and detained for several years without charges or trial. He brings
his case to the courts of State X, but to no avail. He desires to seek redress from any international
forum. He goes to you as counsel to file his case to file his case with the International Court of
Justice. Will you action prosper? Reason out your answer.
ANSWER:
No. Only States may be parties in contentious cases before the International Court of Justice; in fact,
only States which are parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and other States on
conditions to be laid down by the Security Council may be such parties. Therefore, a private
individual like A, cannot bring an action before it.
Page 115 of 115

1975 1981 Political Law Review QandA by 1973 Group

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1975 1981 Political Law Review QandA by 1973 Group

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POLITICAL LAW AND

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:

ATTY. JOHN RAY LIBIRAN

ART. I NATIONAL TERRITORY

ART. II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Prepared by: 1973 Group

Doctrine Of Incorporation (1980) …………………………………………….

ART. III: BILL OF RIGHTS

ART. VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Prepared by: 1973 Group

ART. VIII JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

ART. IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

ART XII NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Academic Freedom (1979) …………………………………………………………

ART XV THE FAMILY

ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS

ART XVII AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Amendments (1976) …………………………………………………….

Prepared by: 1973 Group

ART. XVII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS (1981)…………………………………..

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Public International Law

Extradition (1976) …………………………………………………….

International Court of Justice (1978) ………………………………….

Prepared by: 1973 Group

Prepared by: 1973 Group

QUESTION: (Archipelagic doctrine ) (1975)

Prepared by: 1973 Group

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

QUESTION: A Republican form of government (1977)

The manifestations of a republican state are:

(c) Opportunity to be heard given the defendant; and

(6) Judgment to be rendered after lawful hearing.

QUESTION: c freedom of speech or of the press

Prepared by: 1973 Group

QUESTION: -a-1 (1977)

Who are citizens of the Philippines under the New Constitution?

Prepared by: 1973 Group

QUESTION: I-b General Principles And State Policies

Section 8.Civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military.

QUESTION: Doctrine Of Incorporation (1980)

Prepared by: 1973 Group

Prepared by: 1973 Group

QUESTION: General Welfare Clause (1976)

A. Distinguish police power, taxation, and eminent domain.

Prepared by: 1973 Group

QUESTION: A: Separation of powers (1978)

QUESTION: B: Social responsibility (1978)

Prepared by: 1973 Group

QUESTION Separation Of Church And State (1979)

QUESTION: Separation Of Church And State (1979)

Prepared by: 1973 Group

QUESTION: Separation Of Church And State (1980)

Prepared by: 1973 Group

(a) Separation of Church and State in the Philippines is a reality:

Prepared by: 1973 Group

QUESTION:-b Requirements Of Due Process Of Judicial Proceedings (1977)

State the requirements of due process of judicial proceedings.

(c) Opportunity to be heard given the defendant; and

(6) Judgment to be rendered after lawful hearing.

QUESTION:.-c Freedom Of Speech Or Of The Press; Three Test (1977)

Prepared by: 1973 Group

QUESTION:. A Due Process Clause (1978)