Institutional Analysis for State and Local Government

Author(s): Lawrence M. Mead

Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1979), pp. 26-30
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration
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26 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

Bibliography Luis Sanchez, "Theory and Implementationof Cost

and Benefit Analysis of TransportationSystems",
Benefit-Costand Policy Analysis, (Chicago: Adline (NECTP Report #225, December 1969. NTIS
PublishingCo., 1970,1971,1972,1973,1974). PB190-945.
Selma Mushkin,Implementing PPB in State,Cityand Lyn Squire and Herman G. Van Der Tak, Economic
County,State-LocalFinancesProjectof theGeorge Analysis of Projects,(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins Uni-
Washington University(Washington:1969). versityPress, 1975).
WallaceOates,FiscalFederalism,(NewYork:Harcourt, Martin Wohl, Transportation Investment Planning,
Brace,Jovanovich,1972). (Lexington,MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1972).

INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS FOR STATE

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Lawrence
M. Mead,Republican
NationalCommittee

Institutional analysisis a way to studyadministrative of systematic analysis.WhenCongressor a statelegisla-

and politicalfactorswhichaffecttheimplementation of tureenactsor reforms a program, politicians andadminis-
government programs. This kindof researchcouldcon- trators haveto devisea bureaucratic structure to runthe
tributeto thepolicyanalysispublicofficials needto make program and a politicalstrategy to sustainsupportforit
decisionsaboutprograms. Theneedforinstitutional anal- during implementation. Theyhaveusuallymadethesede-
ysishas increased as theissuesfacedbygovernment at all cisionsad hoc,on thebasisof personalexperience or the
levelstendmoreand moreto deal withadministrative existingproceduresof the agencyinvolved.2 The staff
structures.The needmaybe greatest at thestateandlocal work,ifany,is usuallycloserto politicalintelligence than
level,wherefiscalconstraints haveleftbureaucratic reor- realanalysis.Implementation hurdles areconceived as im-
ganizationas perhapsthebesthope forimproving pro- mediatecircumstances and personalities to be overcome,
gramperformance. notas subjectsforsystematic studyandtheoretical under-
Thispaperdiscussestheneedforinstitutional analysis, standing.3Maximsaboutstructure areconfined togeneral-
one possibleapproachto it, and thecontribution it can ities,suchas theneedforbetter"coordination", whose
maketopolicyanalysisforstateandlocalgovernment.l applicabilityto theprogram in questionis notrigorously
tested.4
The Need For Institutional Analysis Onereasonforthelackofanalysisis that,to date,most
policyanalysts havebeenmoreinterested intheinitialleg-
Institutional issueshaverecently becomeprominent in islationofa program orinitsultimate "impact"on recipi-
American government. One reasonis widespread disillu- entsthanin theproblemsof carrying it out. Typically,
sionment withgovernment's abilityto designeffectiveand economists have helped policy makers design socialpro-
efficient
socialpolicies;muchoftheskepticism stemsfrom gramsinitially and estimatetheircosts.Evaluatorshave
thelimitedsuccessand highcostof manyGreatSociety assessedtheeffect of theservices on recipients oncedeliv-
programs. Anotherreasonis fiscalscarcity. The sluggish ered.Neither grouphasgivenprimary attention to thead-
economy of recentyearsno longerguarantees steadilyris- ministrativeand politicallinkagesthat lie between theleg-
ingrealrevenues. Implementation problems canno longer islationofa program andservicedelivery.5 Analysts often
beovercome simply bymorespending ornewprograms. knowaboutthesefactors anddiscussthem,buttheyrarely
Accordingly, publicpolicyis gradually shiftingitsfocus studyor analyzethemsystematically. Institutional think-
towardwhatmightbe calledinstitutional development. ingis the"missinglink" in policyanalysisas it is now
Thereis an increasing effort to improve government per- practiced.6
formance without morespending, through thereform of Policymakerswillneedmoreanalysisaimedat struc-
administrative and politicalstructures. Governmental re- turalissuesin theyearsahead.Thisworkshouldforecast
structuringis nowgoingonat all levelsofgovernment. Bu-
reaucraticreorganization is underway in Washington and Lawrence M. Meadis DeputyDirector ofResearch fortheRepub-
inmanystates,andrevenue sharing measures haveimpor- licanNationalCommittee. he wasa research
Formerly, associate
tantlychanged intergovernmental relations. at TheUrbanInstitute,a non-profit
researchfirm inWashington,
Up to now,however, publicofficials usuallyhavemade D.C. He received hisPh.D. inpolitical
sciencefromHarvardUni-
decisionsaboutinstitutional arrangements without benefit versityin1973.

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POLICY ANALYSIS IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 27

theadministrativeand politicalconsequences of choosing been definedas output,or thedelivery of theintended

variousoptions,justas traditionalpolicyanalysisalready serviceto theclient,whether or not theclientactually
otherkindsofconsequences.
forecasts "Institutional
anal- benefits.Evaluators haveusuallygonefurther anddefined
ysis"willbe usedheretomeanbothpolicyanalysisproper performance as outcomeor "impact,"meaning theactual
and researchon existing institutionalstructures.The re- benefitor changethe servicecauses in theclient.Out-
search,whichaddresseshowprograms alreadyfunction, come does determine whethera programis ultimately
providestheempiricalandtheoretical basisforpolicyanal- worthwhile. However,evaluation studieshaveshownout-
ysisonhowtoimprove structures. cometobe heavily influenced bytheclient'seconomic and
Institutional
analysisis similarto traditional
publicad- socialcircumstances, overwhichtheprogram usuallyhas
ministration
inmanyrespects. Thedifferences maybe that no control.Simpleoutputof services is a moreusefulper-
institutional
analysisis relatively
moreattuned tothepolit- formance measureforourpurposes, sinceitis morelikely
on program,
icalinfluences moretheoretic, moreprescrip- tovarywithhowwelltheprogram is organized andrun.
tive,and moreoriented to policyalternativesthanpublic Anotherperformance criterion forprograms is simply
administrationhascometobe.7Thesearedifferences more To implement
efficiency. a program cannotmeanto carry
ofdegreethanofkind. it out at any cost. Successfulimplementation means
efficient
as wellas effective delivery ofservices. Sometimes
outputand efficiency maybe in tension.Of course,what
... public officials usually have made thesecriteria
meanprecisely andwhatthetrade-off should
decisionsabout institutionalarrangements behastobe defined foreachprogram studied.
withoutbenefitof systematicanalysis.... Second,theeffort is madeto explaina program's per-
formance by reference to its institutional characteristics.
The staffwork,if any, is usually closer to This means makingconnectionsbetweenthe way a
political intelligencethanreal analysis. programperforms and its administrative and political
structure.It also meansinterpreting theseassociations
usingelementsof economic,organization, and political
AnApproachtoInstitutional
Analysis theory.Economictheory helpsexplaintheincentive struc-
turesand thecharacteristics of provider institutions that
mayencourage or inhibit implementation. II Organization
Fora number ofreasons,thereis,as yet,no established
waytostudyinstitutional questions. Implementation proc- theoryexplicatessomeof thebasic weaknesses of large
esseshavecomplexcauses-economicand socialas well bureaucracies,suchas theircommunication andcoordina-
as administrative and political-anyof whichmightbe tionproblems. 2 Politicaltheory, especially interestgroup
studied.Whatmethodology to use is also uncertain.It is theory,helpsexplainsuchphenomena as theabilityof
unclearwhichanalytical constructsfromsocialscienceare providergroupsto "capture"theimplementation of pro-
mostuseful8 andtowhatextent quantitative studyis possi- grams.3 Institutional analysiswiththis analyticfocus
ble. The subjectof implementation is a newinterest of contrastswithotherapproaches thattreatimplementation
politicalscientists,andthestudiesdonetodatevarywidely problems primarily indescriptive terms. 14

inbothsubjects coveredandapproach.9
Theapproachdiscussed herehasbeendeveloped at The Third,theanalysisis prescriptive to someextent.The
UrbanInstitute since1975.To date,it has beenusedfor goalis notsimply to understand program processes butto
studiesof foursocialprograms witha federal-state struc- improve performance. Thispurposeis, perhaps,essential
ture-Medicaid,the EmploymentService,the Work in anyformof analysismeantto servepolicy.makers. It
Incentive program (WIN),andtheSpecialCrisisInterven- setsthisapproachapartfromother,moreacademicones
tionProgram (SCIP), an energy assistance program runby whichtreatimplementation problemsas inevitableand
theCommunity ServicesAdministration.'0 Thisapproach playdownthepossibility ofsignificant reforms. I5
defineswhatis tobe studied as administrative andpolitical is
Prescriptionimplicit in theanalytic approachjustde-
influences on theimplementation ofindividual socialpro- scribed.Thefactthatprogram institutionsarediscussed in
grams.The goal is to findassociations between program termsof theirinfluence on performance directsanalysis
performance, on theonehand,andtheadministrative and towardidentifying improvements. Theuseoforganization
politicalstructure of programs, on theother.The meth- theory thatspeaksofconstraints on organizational behav-
odologyis based on (1) an operationaldefinition of iorimplicitlysuggests thattheyshouldbe overcome. Dis-
programperformance and (2) an analysisof structural cussionsofinterest groupinfluence inevitablyaskwhether
factorsaffecting performance. Thereis also (3) thepre- it shouldbe minimized.Institutional analysismay be
intention
scriptive toimprove programs and(4) thegoalof approached fromtheperspective thatprograms shouldbe
operationalizing and quantifying the analysisso far as carriedout accordingto law and changesdue to admin-
possible.Thesefoursubjectsare takenup briefly below. istrative orpolitical
influencesareundesirable. I6
The discussion is general;detailsvarywiththeindividual Thedegreeofprescription, however, willvarywithhow
study. severeimplementation problems are feltto be. At oneex-
First,theeffort is madeto defineprogram performance treme, witha successfulprogram, thestudymightsimply
in termsof variablesover whichthe institutions have describe the program'sadministrative and political
control.In thestudiesto date,program performance has processesto findout howtheywork,and notto suggest

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1979

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28 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

majorchanges.At theotherextreme, witha program in anceis a goodestimator of strictly programperformance

serioustrouble,theanalysiswouldbe explicitly reform- evenifthereis nodirect measure ofthelatter.
ist-aimedat overcoming grossinefficiencies and ineffec- To quantify theadministrative andpoliticalfactors that
tiveness. In betweenwouldbe studiesof programs which affect performance also presents difficulties. Thesefactors
arefunctioning reasonably wellbutneedto be fine-tuned. arecomplexandsubjectto varying interpretations bypro-
Heretheagendais notto rootoutscandal,butto findout gramparticipants. To reducethemto numbersmaybe
whatprogramstructures mightmakeperformance better arbitraryand artificial.Methodologiesdo exist for
thanitis. 17 measuring someaspectsof how organizations function,
Fourth,theeffort is madeto operationalize theresearch andTheUrbanInstitute hasbegunto usethesein itsown
as faras possible.Institutional analysisofa kindcouldbe work."9 Quantifying politicalinfluences is moredifficult
done using anecdotal or qualitativeevidenceabout andmoredistant. To date,ithasbeenpossibletoquantify
program performance andstructural features thataffect it. performance, butthedatagathered on structural factors is
Theanalysishas moreauthority, however, ifperformance still primarilyqualitative-interviews with program
is quantified in somemannerand quantitative indicators officialsabouthowtheirprogram functions.
arefoundfortheadministrative andpolitical determinants
of performance. Thenthestrength of association between Implementationhurdles are conceived as
performanceand structurecan be measuredmore
precisely, and the relativeimportance of the structural
immediatecircumstancesand personalities
influences can be specified.The concernto demonstrate to be overcome,not as subjectsfor systema-
implementation processes inactual,ongoing programs sets ticstudyand theoreticalunderstanding.
thisapproachapartfrommoreabstract treatments ofim-
plementation. 18 To estimate howperformance is affected byadministra-
To measureperformance is difficult for any public tiveandpoliticalfactors itis necessary toobservehowper-
program sincetheprofit ormarket criteria ofsuccessavail- formance changeswhentheinstitutional factorschange.
abletoprivate industry areusuallymissing. Ourdefinition Thiscanbe doneeitherbystudying theentireprogram as
of performance in termsof outputratherthanoutcome itsstructures anditsperformance changeovertime,or by
can simplify matters.It is only necessaryto measure examining simultaneously a number ofdifferent sub-units
whether, and howmany,services are delivered to clients, of theprogram, each witha different performance level
notthe"impact"of theseserviceson people.For some and structural set-up.The contrasts, eitherovertimeor
programs,simplecounts of servicesdeliveredwould across sub-units,suggest which administrative and
suffice.The otherimportant performance measure,for politicalfeatures tendto producehighand low perform-
efficiency,wouldbecostsperservice. ance.
Some programshave records,not on numbersof TheEmployment ServiceandWIN studieshaveusedthe
buton whathappensto clients-forexample,
services, the secondapproach.In eachstudy,a groupofhigh-perform-
number ofpeoplein manpower programs whogetjobs or inganda groupoflow-performing stateprograms (defined
the numberof healthcare recipients whosehealthim- throughthe regression analysismentioned above) were
proves.Thesestatistics arepartlymeasures of outcomeor selected.Agencyofficials in thesestatesweretheninter-
impact,sincewhathappenstoclients is due,notonlytothe viewedto see whichstructural features differentiated the
servicedelivered (output),buttoenvironmental conditions high-fromthelow-performers. In theEmployment Service
andthepriorcondition oftheclient. itwas found,amongotherthings, thatsuccessful agencies
usuallyhadrelatively smalllocaloffices, littleadministra-
Suchfigures, however, can oftenbe usedto producea tivehierarchy, and muchdelegationof responsibility to
good estimate of output.The procedure is to controlfor low levelsin theorganization; unsuccessful agencies had
thenon-program influences on performance byusingre- thereverse characteristics.20
In The Urban Institute's studies of the Drawing on findings like these,institutional analysis
gressionanalysis.
Serviceand WIN, forexample,itwas deter- can bringa new dimension to policy analysis. It can esti-
Employment
mined that officialperformance indicatorssuch as mate how structural changes in programs will actually
numbers ofjob placements bystateprograms wereheavily affect howwellsuchprograms deliver services.
influenced by labor market conditions and the demo-
graphiccharacteristics of clients.Usingdata fromall the UseByStateandLocal Governments
states,regression analysiscan predictthe "expected"
performance ofa givenstateprogram on thebasisofthese Institutionalanalysisshouldbe especially usefulto state
non-program factors alone.Then,forthestateinquestion, andlocalgovernment, foratleasttworeasons.
the difference between "expected" and actual First,thesegovernments have suffered morethanthe
performance will indicatethe influenceof program federalgovernment fromfiscalhardshipin recentyears.
factors,including institutional influences. A statewhich Traditionally, thesegovernments reliedevenmorethan
outperforms itsexpected levelis probably a highperformer Washington on higher spending toimprove services.From
in termsof outputand efficiency, whileone whichfalls the1950sto theearly1970s,stateand local government
belowtheexpectedis probablya low performer. Hence, expenditures increasedeven more rapidlythan federal
thedifference between"expected"and actualperform- spending. Correspondingly, thesegovernments nowsuffer

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1979

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POLICY ANALYSIS IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 29

more than Washington from economic stagnation. whichcontrolmostadministrative resources.Institutional

Anotherfiscalproblemis the end of rapid growthin fed- reform forthemthantheexpenditure
willbe moredifficult
eral and stategrantprograms.' Anotheris thatstateand strategywas,butit mayofferthemmoreautonomy and
local governments are frequentlybarredby theirconstitu- scopeforstatesmanship.
tions or politics fromrespondingto scarcityby running The "frontlines"ofthestruggle to improve implemen-
deficits,borrowingmoney,or increasingtaxes. tationareinstatesandlocalities.There,a tangledskeinof
Together,these constraintshave effectively struckthe programs
federal-state-local ineducation, health,welfare,
optionof increasedspendingfromthehandsof manystate housing,and manpowercriesout to be simplified and
and local officials.These jurisdictionsnow oftenhave no Through
rationalized. revenue sharing, govern-
thefederal
way to improveservicesotherthanto use theirexistingre- menthas increasingly passedthistaskto otherlevelsof
sources more effectivelyand efficiently.To do this government. Theirchallenge is to worktowardan admin-
requires better management,the reform of personnel system
istrative whichis moreeffective, and ac-
coherent,
systems,the reorganizationof agencies,and sometimesa countabletothepublicthanthepresent complexity.
centralizationor decentralizationof programresponsibil- To succeedwilltakebothpoliticalwilland expertise.
itieswithinthe state. Institutionalanalysis,evenat a rudi- The pointof institutionalanalysisis to provideleaders
mentarylevel,can providedecisionmakerswithbetterin- someoftheinformation theywillneed.
formationabout whetherand how to take thesestepsthan
theyoftenhave available now.

Notes
As longas improvedgovernment wassought
throughhigherspending,the initiativein
1. The workreported in thepaperis thecollective productof
domesticpolicy necessarilylay withthefed- Analysisprojectat The UrbanInstitute. I
theInstitutional
eral government,whoseeconomicresources wantto acknowledge thevitalcontribution to everything I
were dominant. Now that improvement say of MarkLincolnChadwinand JohnJ. Mitchell,my
mustappeal moretoinstitutionalstrategies, presentcolleagues atTheUrbanInstitute, andErwinC. Har-
grove,a former colleague.
the initiativepasses to statesand localities, 2. Harold Seidman,Politics,Position, and Power: The
which control most administrative re- Dynamicsof FederalOrganization, 2nd Ed. (New York:
sources. Oxford University Press,1975),pp. 140-2.
3. Jerome T. Murphy, StateEducationAgenciesand Discre-
tionaryFunds: Grease the Squeaky Wheel(Lexington,
Second, institutionalanalysisfocuseson improvingim- Mass.:D.C. HeathandCo., 1974),pp. 12-13,113-18.
4. HerbertA. Simon,Administrative Behavior:A Studyof
plementation,and implementationis more a state and Organization,
Decision-Making ProcessesinAdministrative
thana federalone. The basic formatof
local responsibility 2ndEd. (NewYork:TheFreePress,1957),ch.2.
Americansocial administrationis the federal-stategrant 5. WalterWilliams,"Implementation Analysisand Assess-
program.The federalgovernmentdeliversfewservicesto ment,"WalterWilliams andRichardF. Elmore(eds.)Social
citizensdirectly.Instead, it fundsstateand local agencies ProgramImplementation (New York: AcademicPress,
to provide services, subject to regulatoryconditions. 1976),pp. 286-8,290-1.SeealsoGrahamT. Allison,Essence
Federal officials may worryabout implementation,but of Decision:Explaining theCubanMissileCrisis(Boston:
theyhave much less controlover it than state and local Little,Brown,1971),p. 267-one of theseminalstatements
officials. oftheimplementation problem inpolicyanalysis.
emphases 6. ErwinC. Hargrove, TheMissingLink: TheStudyof theIm-
The grantrelationshiphelps explaindiffering
plementation of Social Policy (Washington, D.C.: The
in federal and state policy analysis. Federal analysts
UrbanInstitute, 1975).
concentrateon basic policyand budgeting,in part,because 7. RichardR. Nelson,TheMoon and theGhetto(NewYork:
these are the aspects of programsover which theyhave W.W.Norton andCo., 1977),pp. 39-47.
greatestinfluence.State and local analysts concentrate 8. Forthedifferent analyticalperspectivesthatmaybe applied
much more on operational and administrative concerns, tothesameorganizational behavior,seeAllison,op. cit.;and
including cost control. Hence, institutionalanalysis JamesG. MarchandHerbert A. Simon,Organizations (New
actuallyfitsthetraditionalstateand local perspectivemost York:JohnWileyandSons,1958).
closely,althoughit has somethingto offerat all levels of 9. Someofthisliterature is discussedinnotesbelow.Forother
references,seeHargrove, op. cit.
government.
10. SeeLawrence M. Mead,Institutional Analysis:AnApproach
Institutionalanalysis could help states and localities Problemsin Medicaid (Washington,
to Implementation
survive the current fiscal emergency and seize the D.C.: The UrbanInstitute, 1977),a methodological study
opportunityit implies. As long as improvedgovernment confined to secondary sourcesabouttheprogram; andMark
was sought through higher spending, the initiativein LincolnChadwin, JohnJ.Mitchell, ErwinC. Hargrove, and
domestic policy necessarily lay with the federal LawrenceM. Mead, TheEmployment Service:An Institu-
government,whose economic resourceswere dominant. tionalAnalysis(Washington, D.C.: Departmept of Labor,
Now thatimprovement mustappeal more to institutional 1977),a studybasedon fieldresearch. The studyof WIN,
passes to statesand localities,
the initiative
strategies, also forthe Department of Labor, is in processat this

1979
JANUARY/FEBRUARY

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30 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONREVIEW

writing.Thestudyof SCIP, also in process,is a jointeffort

withresearchers from twoothergroupsatTheInstitute.
11. Forexample,see JohnHolahan,Financing HealthCarefor

* PRAFOER
thePoor: TheMedicaidExperience (Lexington, Mass.:D.C.
HeathandCo., 1975);andMiltonI. RoemerandJayFried-
man,DoctorsinHospitals:MedicalStaffOrganization and
HospitalPerformance (Baltimore: TheJohns HopkinsPress,

SPEGAL
STUDES
1971).
12. See Marchand Simon,op. cit.,;Herbert A. Simon,op. cit.;
and Anthony Downs,InsideBureaucracy (Boston:Little,
Brown,1967).
13. MancurOlson, The Logic of CollectiveAction:Public
Goods and the Theoryof Groups(Cambridge,Mass.:
HarvardUniversity Press,1971),andTheodoreR. Marmor, REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH
ThePoliticsof Medicare(Chicago:AldinePublishing Co., THE FINANCIALSYSTEM
1973),chs.5-6. ofMoneyandCredit
The GrantsEconomics
14. Thedescriptive approachis bestseeninwhatmight be called Edited
byKENNETH E. BOULDINGand
THOMASFREDERICK WILSON
the"Berkeley"or "Wildavsky"schoolof implementation 336pp. 1978 LC 78-18017ISBN0-03-045341-0
$21.00
studies.See Jeffrey L. Pressmanand Aaron Wildavsky,
Implementation (Berkeley, Calif.:University of California
Press, 1973); and EugeneBardach,The Implementation
Game: What Happens Aftera Bill Becomes a Law STATEPOLICIES AND FEDERAL
(Cambridge, Mass.:TheMIT Press,1977).Thesecondwork PROGRAMS
is moreanalyticthanthefirst, buttheemphasisis stillon Priorities
andConstraints
"tellingthestory"ofimplementation problems. A Twentieth
CenturyFundReport
PETERPASSELL andLEONA ROSS
15. Pressman andWildavsky, op. cit.,andBardach,op. cit.,are 192pp. 1978 LC 77-27498ISBN0-03-042591-3
$16.95
conservativein thissense.To a lesserextent, thesamecould
besaidofMarthaDerthick, TheInfluence ofFederalGrants:
Public Assistancein Massachusetts (Cambridge,Mass.:
HarvardUniversity Press,1970),andNew Townsin Town: PROPERTY,POWER, AND
Whya FederalProgramFailed (Washington, D.C.: The PUBLIC CHOICE
UrbanInstitute, 1972). An Inquiry
intoLawandEconomics
A. ALLANSCHMID
16. See especiallytheworkof TheodoreJ. Lowi, TheEnd of 334pp. 1978 LC 78-5930ISBN0-0302956-0 $19.50
Liberalism:Ideology,Policy, and the Crisis of Public
Authority (NewYork:W.W.NortonandCo., 1%9)andThe
PoliticsofDisorder (NewYork:BasicBooks,1971).
17. Mead, op. cit., is an explicitly reformist study,while EMPLOYMENT
Chadwin,et al., op. cit.,aimsat theimprovement of per- DISCRIMINATION
formance. The ImpactofLegaland
18. DonaldS. Van Meterand CarlE. Van Horn,"The Policy Administrative
Remedies
Process: A ConceptualFramework,"
RAYMARSHALL,CHARLESB. KNAPP,
Implementation MALCOLMH. LIGGETTand
Administration andSociety, Vol. VI, No. 4 (February 1975); ROBERTW.GLOVER
MartinReinand FrancineRabinovitz, "Implementation: A 176pp. 1978 LC 78-17333ISBN0-03-045356-9
$20.00
TheoreticalPerspective," unpublished paper,May1974;and
SandraJ.Frawley, "Bureaucratic Implementation: Process,
Problems, Prospects forChange,"Unpublished paper,April OPEN HOUSING
1975. ofa SocialMovement
Dynamics
19. One method is Organizational Assessment, a method foras- JULIETSALTMAN
sociatingtheproductivity of administrative workunitswith 447pp. 1978 LC 78-19464ISBN0-03-022376-8
$22.95
theirinternalorganizationand management style.See
AndrewVan de Ven, "A Framework for Organization
Assessment," Academyof Management Review,Vol. I DECISIONS FOR SALE
(1976), and otherwritings. Anothermethodis Nominal andReform
Corruption in Land-Useand
GroupProcess,a structured discussion technique thatcanbe Regulation
Building
usedtoelicittheconsensus ofan organizational groupabout JOHNA. GARDINER and
theworkings andproblems oftheorganization. SeeAndreL. THEODORER. LYMAN
Delbecq,Andrew H. Vande Ven,andDavidH. Gustafson, 234pp. 1978 LC 78-19758ISBN0-0344691-0 $18.95
Group Techniques for ProgramPlanning:A Guide to
NominalGroupandDelphiProcesses(Glenview, Ill.: Scott,
Foresman andCo., 1975).Organization Assessment is being PRAEGERPUBLISHERS
usedexperimentally in our WIN study,and bothOA and Praeger SpecialStudies* A Divisionof
Hok,Rinehart andWinston/CBS
Nominal GroupProcessmaybeusedinfuture work. 383MadisonAvenue,N.Y.,N.Y.10017
20. SeeChadwin, et.al., op. cit.,ch.2. Pricesaresubjectto changewithoutnotice.
21. GeorgeE. Peterson,"Finance," WilliamGorhamand
NathanGlazer(eds.),TheUrbanPredicament (Washington,
D.C.: TheUrbanInstitute, 1976),pp. 35-71.

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1979

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