Summary Procedure

2/18/2018 G.R. No.
156809
FIRST DIVISION
ESTATE OF FELOMINA G.R. No. 156809

G. MACADANGDANG,
represented by Court Appointed Present:
Administrator ATTY. OSWALDO
MACADANGDANG, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
Petitioner, CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
- versus - BRION,* JJ.
LUCIA GAVIOLA,
AGAPITO ROMERO,
CRISTINA QUIONES,
BOY LAURENTE,
AGUSTINA TUNA,
SOTERO TAPON,
BUENAVENTURA MURING, SR.,
ROGELIO PASAJE,
FE TUBORO, ESTANISLAO PEN,
PABLO NAVALES, and Promulgated:
JOSE DAGATAN,
Respondents. March 4, 2009
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DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
[1]
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 26 July 2002 Decision and the 10
[2]
December 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62002.
The Antecedent Facts
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2/18/2018 G.R. No. 156809
On 18 January 2000, Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang (Atty. Macadangdang), acting as

administrator of the Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang (petitioner), filed an action for
Unlawful Detainer with Damages against Lucia Gaviola, Agapito Romero, Cristina Quiones,
Boy Laurente, Agustina Tuna, Sotero Tapon, Buenaventura Muring, Sr., Rogelio Pasaje, Fe
Tuboro, Estanislao Pen, Pablo Navales, and Jose Dagatan (respondents). Respondents were
occupying, by mere tolerance, portions of four parcels of land in the name of the late Felomina
G. Macadangdang, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-6084, T-6085, T-6086, and T-
6087, all in the Registry of Deeds of Davao City.
[3]
In a Decision dated 27 June 2000, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,
Davao City, ruled in favor of petitioner, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all the persons claiming
rights under them to:
a) vacate their respective possession over the subject premises, and remove their structures built
therein at their expense;
b) pay plaintiff the sum of P500.00 a month, for each defendant, for the use and occupation of the
said premises commencing the date of this decision until they vacate the same;
c) pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00, each defendant, as attorneys fee; and
d) cost of suit.
Defendants counterclaims being compulsory are dismissed.

[4]
SO ORDERED.
Respondents appealed from the MTCCs Decision.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
[5]
In an Order dated 14 September 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City
dismissed the appeal for respondents failure to file an appeal memorandum.
On petitioners motion, the RTC remanded the case to the MTCC for execution of judgment in its
[6]
Order dated 22 September 2000.
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On 3 October 2000, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial.
[7]
In an Order dated 16 October 2000, the MTCC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution
after payment of the execution fee.
[8]
In an Order dated 30 October 2000, the RTC denied respondents motion for reconsideration.
The RTC ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction over the motion after the dismissal of
respondents appeal.
Respondents filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals assailing the RTCs 14
September 2000 Order.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision promulgated on 26 July 2002, the Court of Appeals set aside the 14 September
2000 Order and remanded the case to the RTC.
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a matter of policy, the dismissal of an appeal on purely
technical grounds is frowned upon. The Court of Appeals ruled that rules of procedure are
intended to promote and not defeat substantial justice and should not be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense. The Court of Appeals further ruled that litigants should be afforded every
opportunity to establish the merits of their cases without the constraints of technicalities.
The Court of Appeals ruled that a distinction should be made between failure to file a notice of
appeal within the reglementary period and failure to file the appeal memorandum within the
period granted by the appellate court. The Court of Appeals ruled that failure to file a notice of
appeal within the reglementary period would result to failure of the appellate court to obtain
jurisdiction over the appealed decision. Thus, the assailed decision would become final and
executory upon failure to move for reconsideration. On the other hand, failure to file the appeal
memorandum within the period granted by the appellate court would only result to abandonment
of appeal, which could lead to its dismissal upon failure to move for its reconsideration. Thus,
the RTC erred in denying respondents motion for reconsideration on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
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Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that while the negligence of counsel binds the client, the rule
is not without exceptions such as when its application would result to outright deprivation of the
clients liberty or property, or when a client would suffer due to the counsels gross or palpable
mistake or negligence.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
In its 10 December 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTCs dismissal
of respondents appeal for failure to file an appeal memorandum.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred when it allowed the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before the RTC. Petitioners allege that the case stemmed from an unlawful
detainer case where the Rules on Summary Procedure apply. Petitioners allege that under the
Rules on Summary Procedure, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners
also allege that due to the mandatory character of Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the RTC correctly dismissed the appeal. Petitioners also pointed out that
respondents Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial was neither verified nor accompanied by
affidavits of merit as required under Section 2, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Applicability of the Rules on Summary Procedure
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Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases falls on the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
[9]
Circuit Trial Courts. Since the case before the the MTCC was an unlawful detainer case, it
was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The purpose of the Rules on Summary
Procedure is to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of
[10] [11]
certain pleadings is prohibited, including the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
However, the motion for reconsideration that petitioners allege to be a prohibited pleading was
filed before the RTC acting as an appellate court. The appeal before the RTC is no longer
covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The Rules on Summary Procedure apply before
the appeal to the RTC. Hence, respondents motion for reconsideration filed with the RTC is not
a prohibited pleading.
Procedure on Appeal
Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. -
(a) Upon receipt of the complete records or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which
shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
appellants memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file
a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so,
the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case
on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
as are filed. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the RTC dismissed respondents appeal for their failure to file an appeal
memorandum in accordance with Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs dismissal of the appeal.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the negligence of counsel binds the client, the
circumstances in this case warrant a departure from this general rule. The Court of Appeals ruled
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 156809
that respondents counsel only realized his failure to submit the appeal memorandum when he
received a copy of the dismissal of the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that exceptions to the
general rule are recognized to accord relief to a client who suffered by reason of the counsels
gross or palpable mistake or negligence.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm
[12]
of procedural technique. There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the
[13]
general rule results in the outright deprivation of ones property through a technicality.
In this case, respondents counsel advanced this reason for his failure to submit the appeal
memorandum:
c. That there was a delay in the filing of defendants-appellants[] appeal memorandum due to the
heavy backlog of legal paperwork piled on the table of the undersigned counsel, and he realized
his failure to submit defendants[] appeal memorandum when he received a copy of the dismissal
of the case. This is to consider that he is the only lawyer in his law office doing a herculean task.
[14]
We find no reason to exempt respondents from the general rule. The cause of the delay in the
filing of the appeal memorandum, as explained by respondents counsel, was not due to gross
negligence. It could have been prevented by respondents counsel if he only acted with ordinary
diligence and prudence in handling the case. For a claim of gross negligence of counsel to
[15]
prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be shown. In one case,
the Court ruled that failure to file appellants brief can qualify as simple negligence but it does
[16]
not amount to gross neglience to justify the annulment of the proceedings below.
Finally, respondents were not deprived of due process of law. The right to appeal is not a natural
[17]
right or a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in
[18]
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The Court notes that in their
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[19]
memoranda, respondents admitted that they signed an agreement that they would vacate the
land they occupy not later than 28 February 1998. They refused to vacate the land only because
they were not relocated as promised by the owner. Respondents claimed that the land was later
declared alienable and disposable, and the decision was affirmed by this Court. Hence,
respondents alleged that petitioner no longer had the right to drive them out of the land.
However, respondents did not even indicate the case number and title, as well as the date of
promulgation of the alleged Supreme Court decision, in their memoranda.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 26 July 2002 Decision and the
10 December 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62002.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 156809
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated member per Special Order No. 570.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 33-38. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Mario L. Guaria III,
concurring.
[2]
Id. at 40.
[3]
Id. at 111-117. Penned by Presiding Judge George E. Omelio.
[4]
Id. at 116-117.
[5]
Id. at 118. Penned by Judge Augusto V. Breva.
[6]
Id. at 125-126.
[7]
Id. at 141.
[8]
Id. at 140.
[9]
Section 1(A), Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
[10]
Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 372 (2000).
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 156809
[11]
Section 18(c).
[12]
R Transport Corporation v. Philippine Hawk Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 155737, 19 October 2005, 473 SCRA 342.
[13]
Id.
[14]
Records, p. 144.
[15]
Que v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150739, 18 August 2005, 467 SCRA 358.
[16]
Redea v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146611, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 389.
[17]
Producers Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 812 (2002).
[18]
Id.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 312-321, 323-332.
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 194880
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 194880

and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, both represented Present:
by the PRIVATIZATION
MANAGEMENT OFFICE, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Petitioners, BRION,
PEREZ,
- versus - SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, Respondent. Promulgated:
June 20, 2012

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DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for unlawful detainer filed by
petitioners herein with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power Corporation (NPC)
are registered co-owners of several parcels of land located along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito
[1]
Cruz in Makati City, and covered by four Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs). The main
subject matter of the instant Petition is one of these four parcels of land covered by TCT No.
458365, with an area of approximately 22,294 square meters (hereinafter, the subject property).
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Eighty percent (80%) of the subject property is owned by petitioner Republic, while the remaining
[2]
twenty percent (20%) belongs to petitioner NPC. Petitioners are being represented in this case
by the Privatization Management Office (PMO), which is the agency tasked with the
[3]
administration and disposal of government assets. Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation (Sunvar) occupied the subject property by virtue of sublease
agreements, which had in the meantime expired.
[4]
The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26 December 1977,
petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the subject property, to the Technology
Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years beginning 01 January 1978
[5]
and ending on 31 December 2002. Under the Contract of Lease (the main lease contract),
[6]
petitioners granted TRCFI the right to sublease any portion of the four parcels of land.
Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject property to
[7]
respondent Sunvar through several sublease agreements (the sublease agreements). Although
these agreements commenced on different dates, all of them contained common provisions on the
terms of the sublease and were altogether set to expire on 31 December 2002, the expiration date
of TRCFIs main lease contract with petitioners, but subject to renewal at the option of respondent:
[8]
The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years and [variable]
months commencing on [variable], renewable for another twenty-five (25) years at SUNVARs
[9]
exclusive option.
According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar agreed to return
or surrender the subleased land, without any delay whatsoever upon the termination or expiration
[10]
of the sublease contract or any renewal or extension thereof.
During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful improvements,
[11]
consisting of several commercial buildings, and leased out the spaces therein. It also profitably
utilized the other open spaces on the subject property as parking areas for customers and guests.
[12]
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In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was dissolved. In its stead,
the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) was created, assuming the functions
[13]
previously performed by TRCFI.
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease contract and the
sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as successor of TRCFI. Respondent
expressed its desire to exercise the option to renew the sublease over the subject property and
[14]
proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of another 25 years. On even date, it
also wrote to the Office of the President, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and
petitioner NPC. The letters expressed the same desire to renew the lease over the subject property
[15]
under the new rental rate and renewal period.
On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of the lease had
[16]
already been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive a response. It further explained
that the proposal of respondent for the renewal of the sublease could not yet be acted upon, and
[17]
neither could the proposed rental payments be accepted. Respondent acknowledged receipt of
the letter and requested PDAF to apprise the former of any specific actions undertaken with
[18]
respect to the said lease arrangement over the subject property.
On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire, petitioner
NPC through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and General Counsel notified PDAF of the
[19]
formers decision not to renew the contract of lease. In turn, PDAF notified respondent of
[20]
NPCs decision.
On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary
Waldo Q. Flores likewise notified PDAF of the formers decision not to renew the lease contract.
[21]
The Republic reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten the corporate life of
PDAF and to transfer the latters assets to the former for the purpose of selling them to raise funds.
[22]
On 25 June 2002, PDAF duly informed respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republics decision
not to renew the lease and quoted the Memorandum of Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Flores.
[23]
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On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its sublease
agreements with respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners recovered from PDAF all the
rights over the subject property and the three other parcels of land. Thereafter, petitioner Republic
transferred the subject property to the PMO for disposition. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar
continued to occupy the property.
On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired, petitioner
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar to
[24]
completely vacate the subject property within thirty (30) days. The latter duly received the
[25]
Notice from the OSG through registered mail, but failed to vacate and remained on the
[26]
property.
On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final notice to
[27]
vacate within 15 days. When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the
property and continued to occupy it.
On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to determine the fair
rental value of the subject property and petitioners lost income a loss arising from the refusal of
respondent Sunvar to vacate the property after the expiration of the main lease contract and
[28]
sublease agreements. Using the market comparison approach, the PMO determined that the
fair rental value of the subject property was ₱10,364,000 per month, and that respondent Sunvar
[29]
owed petitioners a total of ₱630,123,700 from 01 January 2002 to 31 March 2009.
On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for unlawful detainer
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City. Petitioners prayed that respondent
Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay damages for the illegal use and lost
income owing to them:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after

proper proceedings, judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and all

persons, natural and juridical, claiming rights under it, to vacate the subject property and
peacefully surrender the same, with the useful improvements therein, to the plaintiffs or to their
authorized representative; and
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2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to pay

plaintiffs damages in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (₱630,123,700.00) for the illegal
and unauthorized use and occupation of the subject property from January 1, 2003 to March 31,
2009, and the amount of TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND
PESOS (₱10,364,000.00) per month from April 1, 2008 until the subject property, together with
its improvements, are completely vacated and peacefully surrendered to the plaintiffs or to their
[30]
authorized representative.
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the allegations of
petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful detainer, since no privity of
[31]
contract existed between them. In the alternative, it also argued that petitioners cause of action
was more properly an accion publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the
MeTC, considering that the petitioners supposed dispossession of the subject property by
respondent had already lasted for more than one year.
In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed
[32]
respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners Complaint. The lower court likewise denied
[33] [34]
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent. Respondent later on filed its
[35] [36]
Answer to the Complaint.
Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment, respondent
Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by
[37]
the MeTC of respondents Motion to Dismiss.
In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue the jurisdiction
of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibited the filing of a
[38]
petition for certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Hence, they prayed for the
outright dismissal of the certiorari Petition of respondent Sunvar.
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary circumstances called
[39]
for an exception to the general rule on summary proceedings. Petitioners filed a Motion for
[40] [41]
Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the RTC. Hence, the hearing on the
[42]
certiorari Petition of respondent proceeded, and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.
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In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits of the certiorari
Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for
[43]
unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for the
filing of an unlawful detainer case was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract and
the sublease agreements on 31 December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion
publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.
[44]
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.
I
Petitioners Resort to a Rule 45 Petition
Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are procedural issues
that merit preliminary attention.
Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners resort to a Rule 45 Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court is an improper mode of review of the assailed RTC Decision.
Allegedly, petitioners should have availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition instead, since the RTC
Decision was an order of dismissal of the Complaint, from which no appeal can be taken except by
a certiorari petition.
The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and holds that the resort
by petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly within the bounds of our procedural rules.
As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order of the RTC
[45]
dismissing an action without prejudice, but the aggrieved party may file a certiorari petition
[46]
under Rule 65. Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
[47]
Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter
situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise
only questions of law.
[48]
In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions
of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby
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judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of
Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is
brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third
[49]
mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law. (Emphasis
supplied.)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the
[50]
doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution
[51]
of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the jurisdiction of
the RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the interlocutory order of the MeTC in an
unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the present case is the correct application of the Rules on
Summary Procedure; or, more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took
cognizance and granted the certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC of the Motion to
Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a question of law that involves the proper
interpretation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition has
been properly lodged with this Court.
II
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings
Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that it was erroneous
for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of respondent Sunvar, since the
Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of
the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed RTC Decision is annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an
[52]
interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading. The
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[53]
prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage. The RTC
should have dismissed outright respondent Sunvars Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a
prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately
[54]
prayed for the dismissal of the certiorari Petition. Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss the
[55]
certiorari Petition, but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits.
[56] [57]
Respondent Sunvars reliance on Bayog v. Natino and Go v. Court of Appeals to
justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to extraordinary circumstances is misplaced. In both
cases, there were peculiar and specific circumstances that justified the filing of the mentioned
prohibited pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure conditions that are not
availing in the case of respondent Sunvar.
In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case against Alberto Magdato, an
agricultural tenant-lessee who had built a house over his property. When Magdato, an illiterate
farmer, received the Summons from the MCTC to file his answer within 10 days, he was stricken
with pulmonary tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer in San Jose, Antique only after the
reglementary period. Hence, when the Answer of Magdato was filed three days after the lapse of
the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take cognizance of his Answer and,
hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayogs land. When his house was demolished in January 1994,
Magdato filed a Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a duly
instituted tenant in the agricultural property, and that he was deprived of due process. Bayog, the
landowner, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC, since a petition for relief from judgment covering a summary proceeding was a prohibited
pleading. The RTC, however, denied his Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC
for proper disposal.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief from judgment
was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court nevertheless
allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave
injustice and irreparable injury:
We disagree with the RTCs holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case No.
2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca
ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief
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from judgment, or a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any

interlocutory order issued by the court, it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38
regarding petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari,
mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable by
Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65
of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief from
judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases
covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This
is but consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case, unless
some form of relief is made available to MAGDATO, the grave injustice and irreparable
injury that visited him through no fault or negligence on his part will only be perpetuated.
Thus, the petition for relief from judgment which he filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac
vice, either as an exception to the rule, or a regular appeal to the RTC, or even an action to
annul the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993. As an exception, the RTC
correctly held that the circumstances alleged therein and the justification pleaded worked in favor of
[58]
MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was without merit. xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with a procedural
void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the resort to a Rule 65 Petition in
the RTC. In that case, the preliminary conference in the subject ejectment suit was held in
abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the case for
specific performance involving the same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC. The
affected party appealed the suspension order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a summary proceeding
that was not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and subsequently
directed the MTCC to proceed with the hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by
the appellate court.
In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed the filing of a
petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order in an ejectment suit, considering that the
affected party was deprived of any recourse to the MTCCs erroneous suspension of a summary
proceeding. Retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained the procedural void
in this wise:
Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for it does not dispose of the
case but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case. It is axiomatic
that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that the proper
remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits incorporating in
said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 194880
orders would result in the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong
to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of
its interlocutory rulings. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous
and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may
allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But neither can it
file a petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, Section 19(g) of which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited pleadings:
xxxxxxxxx
Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught between Scylla and
Charybdis in the procedural void observed by the Court of Appeals and the RTC. Under these
extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a remedy consistent
with the objective of speedy resolution of cases.
As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, the purpose of the Rules on Summary
Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to
technical rules. (Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129) Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit
petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and
to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case, however, private respondent challenged the
MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the
Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding is suspended
indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because
of the extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit
and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the
[59]
disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the said Rules. (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in these two cases
are not comparable with respondents situation, and our rulings therein are inapplicable to its cause
of action in the present suit. As this Court explained in Bayog, the general rule is that no special
civil action for certiorari may be filed with a superior court from cases covered by the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Sunvar filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit
pending before the MeTC. Worse, the subject matter of the Petition was the denial of respondents
Motion to Dismiss, which was necessarily an interlocutory order, which is generally not the
subject of an appeal. No circumstances similar to the situation of the agricultural tenant-lessee in
Bayog are present to support the relaxation of the general rule in the instant case. Respondent
cannot claim to have been deprived of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary
judicial proceeding.
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of Appeals that would
justify respondents resort to a certiorari Petition before the RTC. When confronted with the
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 194880
MeTCs adverse denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case, the expeditious and proper
remedy for respondent should have been to proceed with the summary hearings and to file its
answer. Indeed, its resort to a certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a
summary ejectment proceeding was not only prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a
superfluity on account of respondents having already taken advantage of a speedy and available
remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary circumstances that

would constrain this Court to apply the exceptions obtaining in Bayog and Go. The Court hesitates
to liberally dispense the benefits of these two judicial precedents to litigants in summary
proceedings, lest these exceptions be regularly abused and freely availed of to defeat the very goal
of an expeditious and inexpensive determination of an unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to
relax the interpretation of the prohibition against the filing of certiorari petitions under the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with similar prayers from adversely
affected parties questioning every order of the lower court and completely dispensing with the goal
of summary proceedings in forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.
III
Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer Cases
We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition whether the Complaint
filed by petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer within the jurisdiction of the MeTC
or an accion publiciana lodged with the RTC. At the heart of the controversy is the reckoning
period of the one-year requirement for unlawful detainer suits.
Whether or not petitioners action for unlawful detainer was brought within one year after
the unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it was properly filed with the
MeTC. If, as petitioners argue, the one-year period should be counted from respondent Sunvars
receipt on 03 February 2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed
within the one-year period and appropriately taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the
reckoning period is pegged from the expiration of the main lease contract and/or sublease
agreement, then petitioners proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana to be filed with
the RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful
detainer and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
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Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may by virtue of any express or
implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful deprivation bring an action in the
municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of
[60]
possession with damages and costs. Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall
commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate
is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is served upon the person found
on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of land or 5
[61]
days in the case of buildings.
[62]
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes, the Court recently defined the nature and scope of an
unlawful detainer suit, as follows:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal
but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is
summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court.
The action must be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in
the case must be the right to physical possession. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the
following elements:
1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract

with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiffs notice to the
defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession.
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and

deprived the plaintiff of the latters enjoyment.
4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to
[63]
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for ejectment.
On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 194880
than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than
one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer,
[64]
but an accion publiciana.
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for an action
for unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to possess the subject property
from its sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF. However, with the expiration
of the lease agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent lost possessory rights over the subject
property. Nevertheless, it continued occupying the property for almost seven years thereafter. It
was only on 03 February 2009 that petitioners made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to
turn over the property. What is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer
suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the one-year
period should be counted from the final demand made on 03 February 2009.
[65]
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC, the one-year period to file an unlawful detainer
case is not counted from the expiration of the lease contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last
demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period for determining the one-year period in
an action for unlawful detainer. Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiffs
last demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period
[66]
does the possession become unlawful.
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the date of the last
[67] [68]
demand. In Leonin v. Court of Appeals, the Court, speaking through Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the unlawful detainer Complaint filed on 25
February 1997 from the latest demand letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier
demand letter dated 03 July 1995:
Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-square meter property
located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City whereon was constructed a two-storey house and a
three-door apartment identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 194880
Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy Apartment C
without paying any rentals.
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioners further contend that respondents remedy is accion publiciana because their
possession is not de facto, they having been authorized by the true and lawful owners of the
property; and that one year had elapsed from respondents demand given on July 3, 1995 when
the unlawful detainer complaint was filed.
The petition fails.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the allegations in the complaint make out a case for
unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that she is the registered owner of the
property and that petitioners, who are tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite
the notice to vacate sent to them.
Likewise, contrary to petitioners contention, the one-year period for filing a complaint for
unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in this case October 24, 1996, the
reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and
let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint on February
[69]
25, 1997 was well within the one year reglementary period. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01 January
2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the subject property. Absent any
express contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any separate lease contract, it illegally
occupied the land or, at best, was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners
petitioners herein. Thus, respondent Sunvars possession became unlawful upon service of the final
notice on 03 February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners, and without
any contract between them, respondent is necessarily bound by an implied promise that it will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
[70]
them. Upon service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated the
property and, consequently, petitioners had one year or until 02 February 2010 in which to resort
to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their Complaint was filed with the
MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the one-year period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22 February
2008, which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer suit.
Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have waived their right of action against respondent Sunvar
and continued to tolerate its occupation of the subject property. That they sent a final Notice to
Vacate almost a year later gave respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 194880
promise as occupants by mere tolerance. Consequently, the one-year period for filing a summary
action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must be reckoned from the latest demand to vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature of
reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to
commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the
[71]
original demand. If the subsequent demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the
original demand, the one-year period to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the
[72]
first demand. However, respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings below this
question of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is now too late in the
proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate was a mere reiteration or reminder of
the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any event, this factual determination is beyond the scope of the
present Rule 45 Petition, which is limited to resolving questions of law.
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject property since
the expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual issue of whether respondent has
paid rentals to petitioners from the expiration of the sublease to the present was never raised or
sufficiently argued before this Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Courts attention that
almost a decade has passed without any resolution of this controversy regarding respondents
possession of the subject property, contrary to the aim of expeditious proceedings under the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant Petition and the remand of the
case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court emphasizes the duty of the lower court to
speedily resolve this matter once and for all, especially since this case involves a prime property of
the government located in the countrys business district and the various opportunities for
petitioners to gain public revenues from the property.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14
February 2011, filed by petitioners Republic and National Power Corporation, which are
represented here by the Privatization Management Office. The assailed Decision dated 01
December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is DIRECTED to
proceed with the summary proceedings for the unlawful detainer case in Civil Case No. 98708.
SO ORDERED.
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 194880
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1]
TCT Nos. 458364, 458365, 458366 and 458367.
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 194880
[2]
Petitioner Republic owns approximately 17,574 square meters of the subject property, while petitioner NPC owns 5,350 square meters.
(NPC Resolution No. 2009-13 dated 09 March 2009; rollo, p. 73)
[3]
Executive Order No. 323 dated 06 December 2000, Art. III, Sec. 2.
[4]
Complaint dated 26 May 2009, pp. 3-4, para. 4; rollo, pp. 77-78.
[5]
Contract of Lease between petitioners Republic and NPC with TRCFI; rollo, pp. 492-502.
[6]
The LESSEE [TRCFI] shall have the right, upon notice to the LESSORS [petitioners Republic and NPC], to sublease the whole or part
of the leased land. (Contract of Lease, Sec. VI, p. 6; rollo, p. 497)
[7]
The entire subject property was subleased by TRCFI to respondent Sunvar in five agreements: (a) Agreement dated 18 August 1980
(rollo, pp. 503-519); (b) Sub-Lease Agreement dated 28 February 1982 (rollo, pp. 523-536); (c) 1983 Sub-Lease Agreement with illegible
exact date (rollo, pp. 537-545); (d) Sub Lease Agreement dated 28 August 1983 (rollo, pp. 546-554); and (e) the remaining portions were
also subleased by Sunvar, according to petitioners (Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 6, para. 9; rollo, p. 80)
[8]
Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 6, para. 10; rollo, p. 80.
[9]
(a) Agreement dated 18 August 1980, p. 9; rollo, p. 511 (22 years and 5 months from 31 July 1980); (b) Sub-Lease Agreement dated
28 February 1982, p. 3; rollo, p. 526 (20 years and 10 months from 28 February 1982); (c) 1983 Sub-Lease Agreement with illegible exact
date, p. 2; rollo, p. 538 (19 years and 9 months from March 1983); and (d) Sub Lease Agreement dated 28 August 1983, p. 2; rollo, p. 547
(19 years and 3 months from September 1984).
[10]
[11]
Among these commercial buildings are what are known today as Premier Cinema, Mile Long Arcade, Makati Creekside Building,
The Gallery Building and Sunvar Plaza. (Complaint dated 26 May 2009, pp. 6-7, para. 12; rollo, pp. 80-81)
[12]
Complaint dated 26 May 2009, pp. 6-7, para. 12; rollo, pp. 80-81.
[13]
[14]
Respondent Sunvars Letter dated 26 April 2002 to PDAF; rollo, pp. 714-715.
[15]
Respondent Sunvars Letter dated 26 April 2002 to the Office of the President, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and petitioner NPC; rollo, pp. 712-713.
[16]
PDAFs letter dated 10 May 2002; rollo, p. 716.
[17]
We wish to inform you that as of this date, our office has not received any response from the NG [petitioner Republic] nor the NPC.
Consequently, since the renewal of our Sublease Contract is dependent on our Foundations own renewal of our Contract of Lease with the
NG and the NPC, we cannot yet act on your letter or give favorable consideration on your desire to renew our Sublease Contract,
notwithstanding the provisions thereof.
In view hereof, we likewise cannot accept any proposed rental payments from your office for the renewal term until such time that we
already have an indication of the terms and conditions of any renewal acceptable to the NG and the NPC and, hence, our decision to return
the check you sent to us. (PDAFs letter dated 10 May 2002; rollo, p. 716)
[18]
Respondent Sunvars Letter dated 27 May 2002; rollo, p. 717.
[19]
We wish to inform you that in its last meeting on May 29, 2002, the NPC Board of Directors decided not to renew the contract of
lease which is set to expire on December 31, 2002 (NPC Letter dated 03 June 2010 [rollo, p. 555]; see also Complaint dated 26 May
2009, p. 7, para. 14 [rollo, p. 81])
[20]
PDAFs Letter dated 14 June 2002; rollo, p. 718.
[21]
You are hereby given by this Office notice that subject lease should no longer be renewed/extended.
The Lease should end by January 2003, so that Notice of Non Renewal/ Non Extension should be given to Lessor not less than 6 months
from said date given PDAF is now in the process of dissolution. (Memorandum dated 13 June 2002; rollo, p. 556)
[22]
[23]
PDAF Letter dated 25 June 2002; rollo, p. 557.
[24]
As you very well know, this property is owned by the National Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National
Power Corporation, both of which has not extended or renewed, either expressly or impliedly, any lease [contract] involving the same in
favor of any party, private or public. This being the case, your sublease agreement with the Philippine Development Alternative
Foundation (PDAF) which expired on December 31, 2002 could not possibly have been renewed or extended. We hereby advise you to
completely vacate said property within THIRTY (30) DAYS from receipt of this letter. (OSG Letter dated 22 February 2008; rollo, p. 558)
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 194880
[25]
Registry Receipt No. 2826; rollo, p. 559.
[26]
[27]
This is in reiteration of our first letter dated February 22, 2008 demanding that you vacate the property covered by your sublease
agreements with the Philippine Development Alternative Foundation (PDAF) which expired on December 31, 2002, or more specifically,
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. (458365) S-77242 located between De la Rosa and Arnaiz streets and parallel to Amorsolo street
in Legaspi Village, Makati City.
Once again, we demand that you completely vacate said property within FIFTEEN (15) days from receipt of this letter, or we will be
constrained to file the necessary legal action against you before the proper court. (OSG Final Notice to Vacate dated 26 January 2009;
rollo, p. 560)
[28]
Inspection and Appraisal Report dated 02 April 2009; rollo, pp. 563-566.
[29]
As per instruction, please see attached copy of Inspection and Appraisal Report dated April 2, 2009 indicating a Fair Rental Value of
Php 10,364,000 per month and an Income Loss of Php 630,123,700, respectively. (PMO letter dated 02 April 2009; rollo, p. 562)
[30]
Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 11; rollo, p. 85.
[31]
Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter) dated 07 August 2009; rollo, pp. 90-102.
[32]
MeTC Order dated 16 September 2009, docketed as Civil Case No. 98708; rollo, pp. 116-117.
[33]
Respondent Sunvars Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration (of the Order dated 16 September 2009); and (2) to Hold in Abeyance
the Period to File an Answer dated 02 October 2009; rollo, pp. 118-141.
[34]
MeTC Order dated 08 December 2009; rollo, pp. 162-163.
[35]
Respondent Sunvars Verified Answer ad Cautelam dated 18 December 2009; rollo, pp. 678-711.
[36]
Thereafter, MeTC Judge Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag voluntarily inhibited himself, and petitioners unlawful detainer suit was re-
raffled to Judge Roberto P. Buenaventura.
[37]
Petition for Certiorari dated 22 January 2010; rollo, pp. 164-208.
[38]
Petitioners Comment (In Compliance with the Honorable Courts Order Issued in Open Court on February 12, 2010) dated 18
February 2010; rollo, pp. 255-272.
[39]
Thus, in view of the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in the present petition, the Court resolves to relax the application of the
rules and to proceed with the hearing on the petitioners application for TRO/Injunction on March 12, 2010 at 2:00 in the afternoon. (RTC
Order dated 08 March 2010; rollo, pp. 273-275)
[40]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 16 March 2010; rollo, pp. 276-295.
[41]
RTC Order dated 29 April 2010; rollo, pp. 296-297.
[42]
Respondent Sunvars Memorandum dated 10 June 2010 (rollo, pp. 805-843); Petitioners Memorandum dated 11 June 2010 (rollo, pp.
844-868).
[43]
RTC Decision dated 01 December 2010; rollo, pp. 62-72.
[44]
Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 February 2011; rollo, pp. 25-61.
[45]
Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 1 (g).
[46]
In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65. (Rules
of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 1)
[47]
Appeal by Certiorari In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 2 [c]).
[48]
G.R. No. 169067, 06 October 2010, 632 SCRA 338.
[49]
Id. at 344-345.
[50]
Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco, G.R. No. 175291, 27 July 2011, 654 SCRA 643, citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila v. CA, 327 Phil. 810, 825-826 (1996), citing Arroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, 132 Phil. 9 (1968).
[51]
Five Star Marketing Co., Inc., v. Booc, G.R. No. 143331, 05 October 2007, 535 SCRA 28.
[52]
1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Sec. 19 (g).
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 194880
[53]
Muoz v. Yabut, Jr., G.R. No. 142676 & 146718, 06 June 2011, 650 SCRA 344.
[54]
Petitioners Comment (In Compliance with the Honorable Courts Order Issued in Open Court on February 12, 2010) dated 18
February 2010; rollo, pp. 255-272.
[55]
RTC Order dated 08 March 2010; rollo, pp. 273-275.
[56]
327 Phil. 1019 (1996).
[57]
358 Phil. 214 (1998).
[58]
327 Phil. 1019, 1040-1041 (1996).
[59]
358 Phil. 214, 223-225 (1998).
[60]
Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 1.
[61]
Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 2.
[62]
G.R. No. 178096, 23 March 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334, citing Valdez, Jr. v. CA, 523 Phil. 39, 46 (2006).
[63]
Macaslang v. Spouses Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, 30 May 2011, 649 SCRA 92, 104, citing Cabrera v. Getaruela, 586 SCRA 129,
136-137 (2009); see also Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, 18 January 2012 and Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odones, G.R. No.
178096, 23 March 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334-335, Iglesia Evangelica Metodista en Las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF), Inc. v. Juane, G.R.
No. 172447 & 179404, 18 September 2009, 600 SCRA 555, 562-563; Parsicha, v. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 136409, 14
March 2008, 548 SCRA 273, 288; Fernando v. Spouses Lim, G.R. No. 176282, 22 August 2008, 563 SCRA 147, 159-160.
[64]
Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, 25 September 2009, 601 SCRA 147, 157.
[65]
Hence, in the present petition, upon the expiration of the term of the sublease on December 31, 2002, the private respondents
(petitioners Republic and NPC) have one year to file an unlawful detainer case. The complaint having been filed beyond the prescribed
one year period it cannot properly qualify as an action for unlawful detainer over which the lower court can exercise jurisdiction as it is an
accion publiciana. (RTC Decision dated 01 December 2010, p. 10; rollo, p. 71)
[66]
Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, 07 April 2009, 584 SCRA 81, 90, citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,
320 Phil. 146, 154 (1995); Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 542; Varona v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 124148, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 577, 583-584.
[67]
Labastida v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 162 (1998), citing Sy Oh v. Garcia, 28 SCRA 735 (1969) and Calubayan v. Pascual, 128
Phil. 160 (1967).
[68]
G.R. No. 141418, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 423.
[69]
Id, at 424-428.
[70]
Spouses Beltran v. Nieves, G.R. No. 175561, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 242, 249, citing Calubayan v. Pascual, 128 Phil. 160, 163
(1967).
[71]
Racaza v. Gozum, 523 Phil. 694 (2006), citing Desbarats v. Laureano, 124 Phil. 704 (1966).
[72]
Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Torres, 374 Phil. 529 (1999), citing Pacis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102676, 03 February 1992, min.
res., cited in Summary of 1992 Supreme Court Rulings, Part III, by Atty. Daniel T. Martinez, p. 1847; Desbarats v. de Laureano, supra.
\11'0
l\epublic of tbe ~bilippines

~upreme QI:ourt
:manila
SECOND DIVISION
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT G.R. No. 217694

CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
MENDOZA, and
LEONEN,JJ.
Promulgated:
ARTURO LOO PO,
Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 seeking to reverse and set

aside the October 31, 2014 Decision2 and the March 6, 2015 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 134701 which affirmed the
September 16, 2013 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 67 (RTC) in SCA Case No. 3831. The RTC decision, in tum,
sustained the March 21, 2013 Decision 5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 72, Pasig City (MeTC), which dismissed the unlawful detainer case
filed by petitioner Fairland Knitcraft Corporation (Fairland) against
respondent Arturo Loo Po (Po) for failure to prove its case by
preponderance of evidence.
1
Rollo, pp. 3-14.
2
Id. at 16-21. Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao with Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybafiez
and Associate Justice Carmelita S. Manahan, concurring.
3
Id. at 23-24.
4
Id. at 62-63. Penned by Presiding Judge Amorfina Cerrado-Cezar.
5
Id. at 42-44. Penned by Presiding Judge Judge Joy N. Casihan-Dumlao.
'{\
DECISION 2 G.R. No. 217694
The Antecedents
In a complaint 6 for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No.

19429, filed before the MeTC, Fairland alleged that it was the owner of
Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street,
Pasig City. The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal agreement,
with a rental fee of P20,000.00 a month, to be paid by Po at the beginning of
each month. From March 2011, Po had continuously failed to pay rent. For
said reason, Fairland opted not to renew the lease agreement anymore.
On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal letter7 to Po demanding

that he pay the amount of P220,000.00, representing the rental arrears, and
that he vacate the leased premises within fifteen (15) days from the receipt
of the letter. Despite receipt of the demand letter and the lapse of the said
15-day period to comply, Po neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent
nor vacated the premises. Thus, on December 12, 2012, Fairland was
constrained to file the complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC. Po
had until January 7, 2013 to file his answer but he failed to do so. Hence, on
February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion to render judgment.8
In its February 21, 2013 Order,9 the MeTC considered the case
submitted for decision.
On March 1, 2013, Po’s counsel filed his Entry of Appearance with

Motion for Leave of Court to file Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render
Judgment.10 In the attached Comment/Opposition, Po denied the allegations
against him and commented that there was no supporting document that
would show that Fairland owned the property; that there was no lease
contract between them; that there were no documents attached to the
complaint which would show that previous demands had been made and
received by him; that the alleged unpaid rental was P220,000.00, but the
amount of damages being prayed for was P440,000.00; that the issue in the
case was one of ownership; and that it was the RTC which had jurisdiction
over the case.
The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po’s answer to the

complaint. Considering, however, that the case fell under the Rules of
6
Id. at 25-28.
7
Id. at 29.
8
Id. at 32-33.
9
Id. at 35.
10
Id. at 36.
Summary Procedure, the same was deemed filed out of time. Hence, the
motion was denied.11
The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
In its March 21, 2013 Decision, the MeTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit due to Fairland’s failure to prove its claim by
preponderance of evidence. The MeTC explained that although the
complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action, Fairland failed to prove that
it was entitled to the possession of the subject property. There was no
evidence presented to support its claim against Po either.
Aggrieved, Fairland seasonably filed its appeal before the RTC under
Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. Being an appealed case, the RTC required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In its memorandum,12 Fairland argued that an unlawful detainer case

was a special civil action governed by summary procedure. In cases where a
defendant failed to file his answer, there was no need for a declaration of
default. Fairland claimed that the Rules stated that in such cases, judgment
should be based on the “facts alleged in the complaint,”13 and that there was
no requirement that judgment must be based on facts proved by
preponderance of evidence. Considering that the presentation of evidence
was not required when a defendant in an ejectment case failed to appear in a
preliminary conference, the same should be applied when no answer had
been filed.
Fairland continued that the failure to file an answer in an ejectment

case was tantamount to an admission by the defendant of all the ultimate
facts alleged in the complaint. There was no more need for evidence in such
a situation as every allegation of ultimate facts in the complaint was deemed
established by the defendant’s acquiescence.
On July 18, 2013, Po filed his memorandum14 and countered that there
was no merit in Fairland’s insistence that evidence was unnecessary when no
answer had been filed. The facts stated in the complaint did not warrant a
rendition of judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. The court had the discretion to
rule on the pleadings based on its evaluation of the allegation of facts.
11
Id. at 39.
12
Id. at 47-52.
13
Section 6, Rules on Summary Procedure.
14
Id. at 53-61.
Further, all the statements in the complaint were mere allegations

which were not substantiated by any competent evidence. Po asserted that
there was no proof presented to show that the subject property was indeed
owned by Fairland; that there was no lease contract between the parties; that
he never received the demand letter, dated January 30, 2012; and that the
amount stated in the prayer of the complaint did not coincide with the
amount of unpaid rent. Po also reiterated that the case involved an issue of
ownership over the condominium unit he was occupying.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 16, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling and
agreed that Fairland failed to establish its case by preponderance of
evidence. There was nothing on record that would establish Fairland’s right
over the property subject of the complaint. Though it had been consistently
ruled that the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case was the physical
or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the party-litigants, the court may go beyond the
question of physical possession provisionally. The RTC concluded that even
assuming that Po was not the lawful owner, his actual physical possession of
the subject property created the presumption that he was entitled to its
possession thereof.
Fairland filed a motion for reconsideration15 attaching its condominium

certificate of title16 over the subject property, but it was denied by the RTC
in its Order,17 dated February 24, 2014.
Undaunted, Fairland filed a petition for review18 under Rule 42 of the

Rules of Court before the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In the assailed Decision, dated October 31, 2014, the CA dismissed

the petition and ruled that an action for unlawful detainer would not lie
against Po. Notwithstanding the abbreviated proceeding it ordained and the
limited pleadings it allowed, the Rules on Summary Procedure did not relax
the rules on evidence. In order for an action for recovery of possession to
prosper, it was indispensable that he who brought the action should prove
15
Id. at 64-66.
16
Id. at 67-70.
17
Id. at 78-80.
18
Id. at 81-91.
not only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed. The CA
concluded, however, that Fairland failed to discharge such bounden duty.
Fairland filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
CA in its assailed Resolution, dated March 6, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS
IN AN EJECTMENT CASE WHEREIN NO ANSWER WAS

SEASONABLY FILED, IT IS AN ERROR OF LAW TO BASE
JUDGMENT ON PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
II
HOLDING THAT EVIDENCE IN AN EJECTMENT CASE

SHOULD HAVE BEEN ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT IS AN
ERROR OF LAW.19
Fairland argues that in ejectment cases, presentation of evidence was

undertaken through the submission of position papers but the same was
dispensed with when the defendant failed to file an answer or when either
party failed to appear during the preliminary conference. In an ejectment
case, the scope of inquiry should be limited to the sufficiency of the cause of
action stated in the complaint when no seasonable answer was filed. The
attachment of documentary evidence to the Complaint was not a requirement
and was even proscribed by law.
In his Comment, 20 Po countered that the present petition raised a

question of fact. Although couched in different words, the issues raised here
were substantially the same as the issues raised before the CA. There was no
legal basis in Fairland’s assertion that evidence was dispensed with when no
answer to the complaint had been filed. Such argument would undermine the
inherent authority of the courts to resolve legal issues based on the facts of
the case and on the rules on evidence. Contrary to Fairland’s position, the
court decided the case on the basis of the complaint which was found
wanting in preponderance of evidence.
19
Id. at 6-9.
20
Id. at 141-158.
In its Reply, 21 Fairland posited that the petition did not raise mere
questions of fact but one of law as what was being sought for review was the
erroneous dismissal of the ejectment case for lack of preponderance of
evidence. Since no answer was filed and the complaint sufficiently alleged a
cause of action for unlawful detainer, it became the duty of the MeTC to
decide the case in its favor.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Complaint has a valid

cause of action for
Unlawful Detainer
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements

for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:
Section 1. – Who may institute proceedings, and when. –

Subject to the provision of the next succeeding section, a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
Stated differently, unlawful detainer is a summary action for the

recovery of possession of real property. This action may be filed by a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person from whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. The
possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract
between them. The defendant’s possession, however, became illegal when
the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and
21
Id. at 171.
the defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer
must be instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of possession.22
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful

detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of the property by
the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to
the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property, and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year
from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.23
There is no question that the complaint filed by Fairland adequately

alleged a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The pertinent portion of the
said complaint reads:
xxx
3. Plaintiff is the owner of, and had been leasing to the defendant,
the premises mentioned above as the residence of the latter;
4. There is no current written lease contract between plaintiff and

the defendant, but the latter agreed to pay the former the amount of
Php20,000.00 as rent at the beginning of each month. Thus, the
term of the lease agreement is renewable on a month-to-month
basis;
5. Since March 2011, defendant has not been paying the aforesaid
rent despite plaintiff’s repeated demands;
6. Due to defendant’s continuous failure to pay rent, plaintiff

reached a decision not to renew the lease agreement. It sent a
formal letter, x x x demanding defendant to pay the amount of
Php220,000.00, representing defendant’s twelve month rental
arrears beginning January 2011, and to vacate the leased premises,
both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said letter;
7. Despite receipt of the aforesaid demand letter and lapse of the

fifteen day period given to comply with plaintiff’s demand,
defendant neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent nor
vacated the leased premises. Worse, defendant has not been paying
rent up to now;
x x x24
22
Jose v. Alfuerto, 699 Phil. 307, 316 (2012).
23
Zacarias v. Anacay, G.R. No. 202354, September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 508, 516.
24
Rollo, pp. 25-26.
The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently alleged that

Fairland was the owner of the subject property being leased to Po by virtue
of an oral agreement. There was a demand by Fairland for Po to pay rent and
vacate before the complaint for unlawful detainer was instituted. The
complaint was seasonably filed within the one-year period prescribed by
law. With all the elements present, there was clearly a cause of action in the
complaint for unlawful detainer.
Under the Rules of Summary

Procedure, the weight of
evidence is not considered
when a judgment is rendered
based on the complaint
The question now is whether the MeTC correctly dismissed the case
for lack of preponderance of evidence. Fairland posits that judgment should
have been rendered in its favor on the basis of the complaint itself and not on
its failure to adduce proof of ownership over the subject property.
The Court agrees with Fairland’s position.
The summons, together with the complaint and its annexes, was
served upon Po on December 28, 2012. This presupposes that the MeTC
found no ground to dismiss the action for unlawful detainer.25 Nevertheless,
Po failed to file his answer on time and the MeTC had the option to render
judgment motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff. In relation thereto,
Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provide:
Sec. 5. Answer. – Within ten (10) days from service of summons,

the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a
copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not
pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory
counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered
barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed
and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which
they are pleaded.
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail to

answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court,
motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to
25
Section 4, Rules of Summary Procedure.
what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the
amount of damages and attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive
or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability
of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more
defendants.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer,
the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s
motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to
what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely file his answer
and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every
allegation stated in the complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be done in
this situation26 except to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint. 27
Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which

governs the rules for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if the defendant
fails to answer the complaint within the period provided, the court has no
authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead, the court, motu proprio
or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.28
This has been enunciated in the case of Don Tino Realty and
Development Corporation v. Florentino,29 citing Bayog v. Natino,30 where
the Court held that there was no provision for an entry of default under the
Rules of Summary Procedure if the defendant failed to file his answer.
In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite

proper service of summons. He also failed to provide a sufficient
justification to excuse his lapses. Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment
must be rendered by the court as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
the complaint.
26
Luceres, Bernardo M., Revised Rule of Summary Procedure, 1st Ed., p. 14 (2011).
27
Section 6, Resolution of the Court En Banc, dated October 15, 1991, providing for the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure for Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
28
Riano, Willard, Civil Procedure, The Bar Lecture Series, Volume II, p. 456-457 (2012).
29
372 Phil. 882 (1999).
30
327 Phil. 1019 (1996).
Failure to attach annexes is not

fatal if the complaint alleges a
sufficient cause of action;
evidence need not be attached
to the complaint
The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland

simply on the ground that it failed to establish by preponderance of evidence
its ownership over the subject property. As can be gleaned above, the rules
do not compel the plaintiff to attach his evidence to the complaint because,
at this inception stage, he only has to file his complaint to establish his cause
of action. Here, the court was only tasked to determine whether the
complaint of Fairland alleged a sufficient cause of action and to render
judgment thereon.
Also, there was no need to attach proof of ownership in the complaint

because the allegations therein constituted a sufficient cause of action for
unlawful detainer. Only when the allegations in the complaint are
insufficient to form a cause of action shall the attachment become material
in the determination thereof. Even under Section 4 of the Rules of Summary
Procedure,31 it is not mandatory to attach annexes to the complaint.
In the case of Lazaro v. Brewmaster32 (Lazaro), where judgment was

rendered based on the complaint due to the failure of the defendant to file an
answer under the Rules of Summary Procedure, it was written that:
xxx To determine whether the complaint states a cause of

action, all documents attached thereto may, in fact, be considered,
particularly when referred to in the complaint. We emphasize,
however, that the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the
material allegations in the complaint. Thus, consideration of the
annexed documents should only be taken in the context of
ascertaining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In Lazaro, the assailed invalid invoices attached to the complaint were

not considered because the complaint already alleged a sufficient cause of
action for collection of sum of money. Those assailed documents were not
31
Sec. 4. Duty of court. — After the court determines that the case falls under summary procedure, it may,
from an examination of the allegations therein and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the
case outright on any of the grounds apparent therefrom for the dismissal of a civil action. If no ground for
dismissal is found it shall forthwith issue summons which shall state that the summary procedure under this
Rule shall apply.
32
642 Phil. 710 (2010).
the bases of the plaintiff’s action for sum of money, but were only attached
to the complaint to provide evidentiary details on the alleged transactions.
Similarly, in the case at bench, there was no need for documentary

attachments to prove Fairland’s ownership over the subject property. First,
the present action is an action for unlawful detainer wherein only de facto or
material possession is required to be alleged. Evidently, the attachment of
any deed of ownership to the complaint is not indispensable because an
action for unlawful detainer does not entirely depend on ownership.
Second, Fairland sufficiently alleged ownership and superior right of

possession over the subject property. These allegations were evidently
manifest in the complaint as Fairland claimed to have orally agreed to lease
the property to Po. The Court is of the view that these allegations were clear
and unequivocal and did not need supporting attachments to be considered
as having sufficiently established its cause of action. Even the MeTC
conceded that the complaint of Fairland stated a valid cause of action for
unlawful detainer. 33 It must be stressed that inquiry into the attached
documents in the complaint is for the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material allegations in the complaint.
Third, considering that Po failed to file an answer within the

prescribed period, he was deemed to have admitted all the allegations in the
complaint including Fairland’s claim of ownership. To reiterate, the failure
of the defendant to timely file his answer and controvert the claim against
him constituted his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint.
In the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file

Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render Judgment, which was belatedly
filed and so was denied by the MeTC, Po merely denied the allegations
against him without even bothering to aver why he claimed to have a
superior right of possession of the subject property.34
Fourth, it is only at the later stage of the summary procedure when the
affidavits of witnesses and other evidence on factual issues shall be
presented before the court. Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure state:
33
Rollo, pp. 42.
34
Id. at 36-38. Though unnecessary and even not sanctioned by the Rule, Fairland, nevertheless, attached
the Condominium Certificate of Title (Rollo, p. 67) under its name to its motion for reconsideration with
the RTC to remove and doubt as to its ownership of the subject property. The said certificate was entered
into the books of the registry as early as October 13, 2005.
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. – Within five (5) days

after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall
issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, x x x
Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. – Within ten

(10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and
other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together
with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied
upon by them.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Again, it is worth stressing that these provisions are exactly Sections 9

and 10 under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, it is only at this part of the proceedings that the parties

will be required to present and offer their evidence before the court to
establish their causes and defenses. Before the issuance of the record of
preliminary conference, the parties are not yet required to present their
respective evidence.
These specific provisions under the Rules of Summary Procedure

which are also reflected in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, serve their purpose
to immediately settle ejectment proceedings. “Forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession
of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination
thereof. It is a ‘time procedure’ designed to remedy the situation.35 Thus, as
a consequence of the defendant’s failure to file an answer, the court is
simply tasked to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.
As the complaint contains a

valid cause of action, a
judgment can already be
rendered
In order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of

unlawful detainer cases, a remand of this case to the lower courts is no
longer necessary and the case can be determined on its merits by the Court.
35
Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation v. Florentino, 372 Phil. 882 (1999).
To recapitulate, as Po failed to file his answer on time, judgment shall

be rendered based only on the complaint of Fairland without the need to
consider the weight of evidence. As discussed above, the complaint of
Fairland had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Consequently, there is no more need to present evidence to establish

the allegation of Fairland of its ownership and superior right of possession
over the subject property. Po’s failure to file an answer constitutes an
admission of his illegal occupation due to his non-payment of rentals, and of
Fairland’s rightful claim of material possession. Thus, judgment must be
rendered finding that Fairland has the right to eject Po from the subject
property.
The Judicial Affidavit Rule
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss the relevance of

the Judicial Affidavit Rule or A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, where documentary or
object evidence are required to be attached. To begin with, the rule is not
applicable because such evidence are required to be attached to a judicial
affidavit, not to a complaint. Moreover, as the rule took effect only on
January 1, 2013, it cannot be required in this case because this was earlier
filed on December 12, 2012.
Granting that it can be applied retroactively, the rule being essentially

remedial, still it has no bearing on the ruling of this Court.
In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of documentary or

object evidence to the affidavits is required when there would be a pre-trial
or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing. As stated earlier,
where a defendant fails to file an answer, the court shall render judgment,
either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s motion, based solely on the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. Thus, where there
is no answer, there is no need for a pre-trial, preliminary conference or
hearing. Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule reads:
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in

lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the court
and serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier
service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary
conference or the scheduled hearing with respect to motions and
incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall

take the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies;
and
(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any,

which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and
marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of
the complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2,
3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the
defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original

document or object evidence in his possession, he may, after the
same has been identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated,
warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or reproduction
attached to such affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction of that
original. In addition, the party or witness shall bring the original
document or object evidence for comparison during the
preliminary conference with the attached copy, reproduction, or
pictures, failing which the latter shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary

evidence in place of the original when allowed by existing rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 31, 2014

Decision and the March 6, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 134701 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Arturo Loo Po is ORDERED TO VACATE Condominium Unit No. 205
located in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.
Respondent Po is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears,

as well as the rentals accruing in the interim until he vacates the property.
The unpaid rentals shall incur a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from January 30, 2012, when the demand to pay and to vacate was made, up
to the finality of this decision. Thereafter, an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum shall be imposed on the total amount due until full payment is made.
SO ORDERED.
JOSEC END OZA

WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Qr/Aft~
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
~
"' ~. . . ,,. ..,
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
~
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 160239
THIRD DIVISION
ANGELINA SORIENTE and ALL G.R. No. 160239

OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING
RIGHTS UNDER HER,
Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, J., Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE

ARSENIO E. CONCEPCION, Promulgated:
represented by NENITA S.
CONCEPCION, November 25, 2009
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
[1] [2]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order dated October 3, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, National Capital Judicial Region in Civil
Case No. MC-03-407-A, which affirmed the Decision dated April 8, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59 in Civil Case No. 17973, ordering petitioner to vacate the
property, subject matter of this unlawful detainer case, and surrender the possession thereof to
respondent.
[3]
The facts, as stated by the trial court, are as follows:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/november2009/160239.htm 1/13
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 160239
Respondent Nenita S. Concepcion established that she was the registered owner of the lot
occupied by petitioner Angelina Soriente at No. 637 Cavo F. Sanchez Street, Mandaluyong City,
Metro Manila. The lot, with an area of 295 square meters, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
[4]
(TCT) No. 12892 issued by the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District II.
During the lifetime of Arsenio E. Concepcion, who acquired the lot in 1978, he allowed and
tolerated the occupancy of the lot by petitioner, who was already staying on the property. Petitioner
was allowed to stay on the lot for free, but on a temporary basis until such time that Concepcion
and/or his family needed to develop the lot.
After Arsenio E. Concepcion died on December 27, 1989, his family initiated steps to develop
the lot, but petitioners occupancy of the lot prevented them from pursuing their plan.
Verbal demands to vacate the lot was made on petitioner. Petitioner pleaded for time to transfer
to another place, but she never left.
In June 2000, Elizabeth Concepcion-Dela Cruz, daughter of respondent, filed a complaint for
conciliation proceedings before the barangay at the instance of respondent. However, the parties did
[5]
not reach a settlement, which resulted in the issuance of a Certificate to File Action dated February
17, 2001 by the Barangay Captain of Barangay Hagdan Bato Itaas, Mandaluyong City.
Respondent sent petitioner a demand letter dated September 22, 2000 by registered mail,
demanding that she peacefully surrender the property and extending financial assistance for her
relocation. Despite receipt of the demand letter, petitioner did not vacate the premises.
[6]
On April 27, 2001, respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint for unlawful detainer
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59 (trial court). The Complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 17973. The Complaint alleged that respondent was the registered owner
of the subject property, while petitioner had no title to the property and her free occupancy thereof
was merely tolerated by respondent. Moreover, petitioner was occupying the premises together with
her family, and she had maintained boarders for a fee. Respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to
vacate the lot, surrender the possession thereof to respondent, pay monthly rent of P5,000.00 from
June 2000 until she vacates the premises, and pay actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
litigation expenses.
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It appears from the records of the case that petitioner Soriente, as a defendant in the lower
court, did not file a separate Answer, but affixed her signature to the Answer filed by defendant
Alfredo Caballero in another ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 17974, which was filed by
respondent against Caballero. Hence, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Render
[7]
Judgment under Section 7, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure for Sorientes
failure to file an Answer to the Complaint. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Render
[8]
Judgment.
[9]
In an Order dated December 5, 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Render Judgment.
It stated that the allegations of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 17973 and 17974 are similar, the only
substantial difference being the time when defendants occupied the subject property allegedly through
the tolerance of Arsenio Concepcion. The trial court believed that in signing the Answer filed in Civil
Case No. 17974, Soriente intended to adopt the same as her own, as both defendants Caballero and
Soriente had a common defense against plaintiffs (respondents) separate claim against them. The trial
court denied the Motion to Render Judgment in the interest of justice and considered that the two
cases, including Civil Case No. 17932 against Severina Sadol, had been consolidated.
Pursuant to Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the trial court set a
preliminary conference on October 9, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. The preliminary conference was reset to
November 15, 2001, and then to December 18, 2001 because the Motion to Render Judgment was
still pending resolution. On December 18, 2001, the preliminary conference was reset to January 24,
2002 as prayed for by defendants on the ground that their common counsel was absent despite proper
[10]
notice, and plaintiff (respondent) did not object to the resetting.
On January 24, 2002, the scheduled preliminary conference was again reset to March 5, 2002
because no notice was sent to defendants counsel, and plaintiff (respondent) and her counsel were
both absent despite proper notice.
On March 5, 2002, the trial court reset the preliminary conference to April 16, 2002 on the
ground that there was no notice sent to defendants counsel.
In the scheduled preliminary conference held on February 18, 2003, only plaintiffs
(respondents) counsel and defendants Severina Sadol and Alfredo Caballero were present. Plaintiffs
(respondents) counsel submitted a secretarys certificate attesting to the existence of a board resolution
authorizing him to enter into a compromise agreement. A representative of defendant (petitioner)
Angelina Soriente appeared, but failed to submit a Special Power of Attorney authorizing her to enter
into a compromise agreement. Counsel for defendants was not in court, and there was no proof of
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service on her for the hearing. However, defendants Sadol and Caballero informed the court that they
informed their counsel of the hearing scheduled that day. In view of the absence of defendant
Angelina Soriente or her authorized representative, plaintiffs (respondents) counsel moved that the
case be submitted for decision, and that he be given 15 days within which to submit his position
[11]
paper.
[12]
In its Order dated February 18, 2003, the trial court granted the motion of plaintiffs
(respondents) counsel and considered the case against defendant (petitioner) Angelina Soriente
[13]
submitted for decision in accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.
[14]
On April 8, 2003, the trial court rendered a Decision holding that respondent established by
preponderance of evidence that she was entitled to the relief prayed for. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Angelina Soriente and all other
persons claiming rights under her to:
1. Vacate the subject premises and surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff;
2. Pay the amount of PESOS: FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) per month as reasonable
compensation for use and occupation of the premises as of June 2000 until she
finally vacates the subject premises;
3. Pay the amount [of] PESOS: THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) as attorneys fees; and
[15]
4. Pay the litigation expenses and cost of suit.
Petitioner appealed the trial courts Decision to the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213,
raising the following issues:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the plaintiff was able to establish that she is the registered
owner of the lot occupied by the defendant-appellant instead of dismissing the complaint outright
for lack of legal capacity to sue.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the plaintiff was able to establish by preponderance of
evidence that she is entitled to the relief prayed for despite lack of jurisdiction.
3. The lower court erred in holding that this instant case subject of this appeal be decided in
[16]
accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.
[17]
In an Order dated October 3, 2003, the RTC affirmed the trial courts Decision, disposing
thus:
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PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered

AFFIRMING IN TOTO the decision dated April 8, 2003 rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
[18]
Branch 59, Mandaluyong City.
The RTC held:
Case records readily disclosed that the ownership of the subject lot belongs to the late Arsenio E.
Concepcion, married to herein Plaintiff-Appellee Nenita S. Concepcion, as evidenced by the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12892 (Annex A in the complaint for Unlawful Detainer). This Certificate of
Title shall be received as evidence in all courts of the Philippines and shall be conclusive as to all
matters contained therein principally, the identity of the owner of the land covered thereby except as
provided in the Land Registration Act. Said title can be attacked only for fraud within one year after the
date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or
diminished in a collateral proceeding such as this instant appeal from the decision rendered by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City in an ejectment case. As should be known by Appellant
Soriente through counsel, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered
owner Arsenio E. Concepcion but also against his hereditary successors because the latter merely steps
into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personalities
of their predecessors-in-interest (Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil 251; PD 1529, Sec. 47). x x x
xxxx
Noteworthy to mention in the case at bar is the ruling laid down in Calubayan v. Pascual, 21
SCRA 146, where the Supreme Court [held] that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
[19]
remedy against [him]. x x x
Petitioner filed this petition raising the following issues:
I
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE
IS THE REGISTERED OWNER OF THE LOT OCCUPIED BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
INSTEAD OF DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OUTRIGHT FOR LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY
TO SUE.
II
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR
DESPITE LACK OF JURISDICTION.
III
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THIS INSTANT CASE
SUBJECT OF THIS APPEAL BE DECIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7 OF THE
[20]
RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE.
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Petitioner appealed from the RTCs decision directly to this Court on pure questions of law.
There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
[21]
the falsehood of alleged facts.
[22]
Moreover, Republic v. Sandiganbayan ruled:
x x x A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of
fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and
[23]
to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
The Court notes that petitioner raised both questions of fact and law in her petition. The Court
shall resolve only the pertinent questions of law raised.
First, petitioner questioned respondent Nenita Concepcions capacity to sue as a representative

of the Estate of her husband, Arsenio Concepcion, alleging absence of proof of the issuance of the
requisite letters testamentary or letters of administration evidencing her legal capacity to sue in behalf
of the Estate of Arsenio Concepcion in contravention of Section 4, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, thus:
Sec. 4. Capacity. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be
averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include
such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleaders knowledge.
Petitioner asserts that lack of legal capacity to sue is a ground for dismissal under Section 1 (d)
of Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, and considering that a motion to dismiss is a prohibited
pleading under the summary procedure, the trial court failed to exercise its duty to order the outright
[24]
dismissal of the complaint as mandated under Section 4 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Petitioners contention lacks merit.
Section 4, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

2/18/2018 G.R. No. 160239
Sec. 4. Capacity. x x x A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party
or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific
denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleaders
[25]
knowledge.
Based on the provision cited above, the RTC correctly ruled:
The argument is not tenable. This court, upon cursory reading of the provisions of Rule 8,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court, in relation to the Rules on Summary Procedure, finds it relevant to note
x x x that although a Motion to Dismiss or a Motion for Bill of Particulars cannot be availed of to
challenge the capacity of the party under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the DefendantAppellant
should have at least SPECIFICALLY DENIED such capacity of the party in the Answer, which should
have included such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleaders knowledge. The case
records clearly disclosed that no such specific denial was made by the appellant and this court believes
that the lower court had carefully and dutifully taken into account the applicable rules particularly
Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, in relation to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court and pertinent jurisprudence, before rendering the assailed decision dated April 8, 2003. The
presumption of the regular performance of duties applies in this case and the same shall prevail over
[26]
mere allegations of the herein Defendant-Appellant.
Further, as the successor-in-interest of the late Arsenio E. Concepcion and co-owner of the
subject property, respondent Nenita S. Concepcion is entitled to prosecute the ejectment case not only
in a representative capacity, but as a real party-in-interest. Article 487 of the Civil Code states, Any
one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. Hence, assuming that respondent failed to
submit the proper documents showing her capacity to sue in a representative capacity for the estate of
her deceased husband, the Court, in the interest of speedy disposition of cases, may deem her
capacitated to prosecute the ejectment case as a real party-in-interest being a co-owner of the subject
property considering that the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and has also acquired
jurisdiction over the parties, including respondent Nenita S. Concepcion.
Second, petitioner questions whether respondent has established by a preponderance of

evidence that she is entitled to the relief prayed for, which is the ejectment of petitioner from the
subject property. Petitioner contends that respondent admitted in her Complaint that her right to the
subject property arose only in 1978, when the late Arsenio E. Concepcion acquired the same.
Petitioner alleges that to the contrary, substantial evidence exists that she and her predecessors-in-
interest have continuously and openly occupied and possessed, in the concept of owner, the subject
property since time immemorial.
The Court holds that the RTC correctly affirmed the ejectment of petitioner from the property.
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 160239
[27]
To make out a case of unlawful detainer under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
Complaint must allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding from the plaintiff the possession
of certain real property after the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession by
virtue of a contract, express or implied, and that the action is being brought within one year from the
[28]
time the defendants possession became unlawful.
The Complaint alleged that petitioner occupied the subject property by tolerance of the late
Arsenio Concepcion. While tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand to
[29]
vacate by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.
Respondent sent petitioner a demand letter dated September 22, 2000 to vacate the subject property,
but petitioner did not comply with the demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the
latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
[30]
proper remedy against him. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the one-year period
within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of
[31]
demand, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.
Respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioner on April 27, 2001, which was less than a year
from the date of formal demand. Clearly, therefore, the action was filed within the one-year period
prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer case.
[32]
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession.
All that the trial court can do is to make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property,
[33]
so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve ownership.
Courts in ejectment cases decide questions of ownership only it is necessary to decide the question of
[34]
possession. The reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from trifling with the summary
nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed property.
[35]
In this case, the trial court found that respondent owns the property on the basis of Transfer
[36]
Certificate of Title No. 12892, which was issued in the name of Arsenio E. Concepcion, x x x
married to Nenita L. Songco. It is settled rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 160239
[37]
entitled to possession thereof. Hence, as the registered owner of the subject property, respondent
[38]
is preferred to possess it.

The validity of respondents certificate of title cannot be attacked by petitioner in this case for
ejectment. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject
[39]
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for
[40]
that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can
[41]
only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioner
has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the trial court to determine
[42]
in an action for unlawful detainer.
Although petitioner alleges that substantial evidence exists that she and her predecessors-in-
interest had continuously and openly occupied and possessed, in the concept of owner, the subject
property since time immemorial, petitioner failed to present evidence to substantiate her allegation.
Whereas respondent holds a Torrens title over the subject property; hence, she is entitled to the
[43]
possession of the property.
The court's adjudication of ownership in an ejectment case is merely provisional, and
affirmance of the trial courts decision would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the proper forum.
[44]

Lastly, petitioner contends that the lower court erred in deciding this case in accordance with
Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, thus:
SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30) days after the
last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall
be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the
dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in
accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants
sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the
[45]
preliminary conference.
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Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which is referred to by Section 7
above, states:
SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment
as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and
attorneys fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the
applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.
Petitioner asserts that considering that the cases against her, defendants Caballero and Sadol
were consolidated, and she and defendant Caballero signed and filed one common Answer to the
Complaint, thus, pleading a common defense, the trial court should not have rendered judgment on
her case based on Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure when she failed to
appear in the preliminary conference.
The contention lacks merit.
The Court notes that the ejectment case filed by respondent against petitioner was docketed in
the trial court as Civil Case No. 17973, the case against Alfredo Caballero was docketed as Civil Case
No. 17974, while the case against Severina Sadol was docketed as Civil Case No. 17932. These cases
were consolidated by the trial court.

Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, if a sole defendant shall
fail to appear in the preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance
with Section 6 of the Rule, that is, the court shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. However, [t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall
not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action, who had
pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the preliminary conference. Petitioner claims that the
preceding provision applies to her as a defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by the
trial court, and she and Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence, the trial court
should not have rendered judgment against her when she failed to appear in the preliminary
[46]
conference.
The Court holds that the italicized provision above does not apply in the case of petitioner,
since she and Caballero were not co-defendants in the same case. The ejectment case filed against
petitioner was distinct from that of Caballero, even if the trial court consolidated the cases and, in the
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 160239
interest of justice, considered the Answer filed by Caballero in Civil Case No. 17974 as the Answer
also of petitioner since she affixed her signature thereto.
Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case for ejectment from that of Caballero and
Sadol, petitioners failure to appear in the preliminary conference entitled respondent to the rendition
of judgment by the trial court on the ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case
No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 3, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, National Capital Judicial Region in Civil Case No.
MC-03-407-A is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 160239
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
[6] Records, pp. 1-3.
[7]
Id. at 13-15.
[8]
Id. at 20-27.
[9]
Id. at 32-33.
[10]
Joint Order dated December 18, 2001, records, p. 35.
[11]
Joint Order dated February 18, 2003, records, p. 44.
[12]
Id.
[13]
SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary
conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent
with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant
who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All
cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall
not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall
appear at the preliminary conference.
[14]
Records, pp. 45-47.
[15]
Id. at 46-47.
[16]
RTC Order, rollo, p. 36.
[17]
Rollo, pp. 35-43.
[18]
Id. at 42-43.
[19]
Id. at 39.
[20]
Id. at 16.
[21]
Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, et al., 125 Phil. 701, 705 (1967).
[22]
426 Phil. 104 (2002).
[23]
Id. at 110.
[24]
SEC. 4. Duty of Court. After the court determines that the case falls under summary procedure, it may, from an examination of
the allegations therein and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent
therefrom for the dismissal of a civil action
[25]
Emphasis supplied.
[26]
Rollo, p. 40.
[27]
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, x x x a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any
such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person , may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
[28]
Barbosa v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 133564, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 99.
[29]
Pangilinan v. Aguilar, 150 Phil. 166, 176 (1972).
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 160239
[30]
Id.
[31]
Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 542.
[32]
Arambulo v. Gungab, G.R. No. 156581, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 640, 649.
[33]
Id.
[34]
Id.
[35]
Id.
[36]
Records, p. 5.
[37]
Arambulo v. Gungab, supra note 32, at 649-650.
[38]
Id. at 649.
[39]
Apostol v. Court of Appeals, 476 Phil 403, 414 (2004).
[40]
Id.
[41]
Id.
[42]
Id.
[43]
Pangilinan v. Aguilar, supra note 29, at 145.
[44]
Id.
[45]
Emphasis supplied.
[46]
Italics supplied.
Id.
"_ftn46" title="">
<Id. at 649.
[39]
Apostol v. Court of Appeals, 476 Phil 403, 414 (2004).
[40]
Id.
[41]
Id.
[42]
Id.
[43]
Pangilinan v. Aguilar, supra note 29, at 145.
[44]
Id.
[45]
Id.
[45]
Emphasis supplied.
[46]
Italics supplied.
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152131

FLORAIDA TERAA,
Petitioner, Present:
*QUISUMBING, J. Chairperson,
*CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - **TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
HON. ANTONIO DE SAGUN, Promulgated:

PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XIV, April 29, 2009
NASUGBU, BATANGAS AND
ANTONIO B. SIMUANGCO,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petitioner Floraida Terana (petitioner) asks us to reverse and set aside, through this
[1] [2]
Petition for Review on Certiorari, the September 7, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals
[3]
(CA), and its subsequent Resolution denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
THE FACTS
The respondent Antonio Simuangco (respondent) owned a house and lot at 138 J.P. Laurel
[4]
St., Nasugbu, Batangas, which he leased to the petitioner. Sometime in 1996, the petitioner
[5]
demolished the leased house and erected a new one in its place. The respondent alleged that
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/152131.htm 1/17
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
[6] [7]
this was done without his consent. The Contract of Lease defining the respective rights and
obligations of the parties contained the following provisions, which the petitioner allegedly
violated:
3. That the lessee obligated herself with the Lessor by virtue of this Lease, to do
the following, to wit:
a) xxx
b) To keep the leased property in such repair and condition as it was in the
commencement of the Lease with the exception of portions or parts which
may be impaired due to reasonable wear and tear;
c) xxx
d) Not to make any alterations in the Leased property without the knowledge
and consent of the Lessor; x x x
The petitioner allegedly also gave the materials from the demolished house to her sister, who
[8]
built a house adjacent to the respondents property. When the respondent discovered what the
[9]
petitioner did, he immediately confronted her and advised her to vacate the premises. She
refused. On February 3, 1997, the respondent sent a letter demanding the petitioner to vacate the
[10]
leased property. Despite this letter of demand, which the petitioner received on February 10,
[11]
she still refused to vacate the said property.
[12]
The respondent thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner on April
[13]
16, 1997 on the ground of the petitioners violation of the terms of the Contract of Lease. The
respondent prayed for the petitioners ejectment of the leased property, and for the award of
P70,000.00, representing the cost of the materials from the demolished house, attorneys fees,
[14]
and costs.
The presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Hon. Herminia
[15]
Lucas, inhibited from the case on the ground that she is related to the respondent.
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
[16]
The petitioner denied allegations of the complaint in her Sagot. She claimed that she
demolished the old building and built a new one with the knowledge and consent of the
[17]
respondent; that the original house was old and was on the verge of collapsing; that without
the timely repairs made by the petitioner, the houses collapse would have caused the death of the
petitioner and her family. The petitioner prayed for the court to: 1) dismiss the ejectment case
against her; and 2) award in her favor: a) P100,000.00 as moral damages, b) P200,000.00 as
reimbursement for the expenses incurred in building the new house, c) P50,000.00 as attorneys
[18]
fees, and d) P10,000.00 as costs incurred in relation to the suit.
The trial court called for a preliminary conference under Section 7 of the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure (RSP) and Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and required the
parties to file their position papers and affidavits of their witnesses after they failed to reach an
[19]
amicable settlement. Instead of filing their position papers, both parties moved for an
extension of time to file the necessary pleadings. The trial court denied both motions on the
ground that the RSP and the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 70, Section 13(5), prohibit the
[20]
filing of a motion for extension of time.
The MTC framed the issues in the case as follows:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the contract of lease when the old house was
demolished and a new house was constructed by the defendant; and
2. Whether or not defendant is entitled to be reimbursed for her expenses in the construction of
[21]
the new house.
[22]
THE MTCS DECISION
[23]
The MTC rendered its decision on November 5, 1997 despite the parties failure to timely
[24]
file their respective position papers. The decision stated that: according to the parties
Contract of Lease, the consent of the respondent must be obtained before any alteration or repair
could be done on the leased property; that the petitioner failed to produce any evidence that the
respondent had given her prior permission to demolish the leased house and construct a new
one; that even in her answer, she failed to give specific details about the consent given to her;
that in demolishing the old structure and constructing the new one, the petitioner violated the
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Contract of Lease; that this violation of the terms of the lease was a ground for judicial
ejectment under Article 1673(3) of the Civil Code; and that since the demolition and
construction of the new house was without the consent of the respondent, there was no basis to
order the respondent to reimburse the petitioner.
The MTC thus ruled:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

Antonio B. Simuangco and against the defendant Aida Terana as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Aida Terana and all persons claiming right under her to
vacate and surrender possession of the subject house to the plaintiff;
2. Ordering the said defendant to pay the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
as Attorneys fees; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
[25]
SO ORDERED.
Unaware that a decision had already been rendered, the petitioner filed a letter entitled
[26] [27]
Kahilingan, to which she attached her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses.
The submission was essentially a motion for reconsideration of the denial of motion for
extension of time. On November 6, 1977, the MTC denied the petitioners Kahilingan as
follows:
Defendant Aida Teranias KAHILINGAN dated November 5, 1997 is DENIED for

being moot and academic on account of the decision on the merits rendered by this court
dated November 4, 1997 relative to the instant case.
[28]
SO ORDERED.
[29]
Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal on November 12, 1997. The records of the
case were ordered elevated to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) where the case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 439.
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
[30]
THE RTCS DECISION
The RTC rendered judgment affirming the decision of the MTC on February 26, 1998.
The RTC ruled that: 1) the ruling of the MTC was supported by the facts on record; 2) although
the respondent failed to submit his position paper and the affidavits of his witnesses, the MTC
correctly rendered its decision on the basis of the pleadings submitted by the parties, as well as
the evidence on record; 3) the petitioner failed to show enough reason to reverse the MTCs
decision. The court further declared that its decision was immediately executory, without
prejudice to any appeal the parties may take.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial on March 3, 1998.
[31]
The petitioner argued that the appealed MTC decision was not supported by any evidence,
and that the respondent failed to substantiate the allegations of his complaint and to discharge
the burden of proving these allegations after the petitioner denied them in her Sagot. In effect,
the petitioner argued that the allegations of the complaint should not have been the sole basis for
the judgment since she filed an answer and denied the allegations in the complaint; the RTC
should have also appreciated her position paper and the affidavit of her witnesses that, although
filed late, were nevertheless not expunged from the records.
In her motion for a new trial, the petitioner argued that her failure to submit her position
paper and the affidavits of her witnesses within the 10-day period was due to excusable
negligence. She explained that she incurred delay because of the distance of some of her
witnesses residence. The petitioner alleged that she had a good and meritorious claim against the
respondent, and that aside from her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses, she would
adduce receipts and other pieces of documentary evidence to establish the costs incurred in the
demolition of the old house and the construction of the new one.
On April 28, 1998, the RTC granted the motion for reconsideration, and thus reversed its
February 26, 1998 judgment, as well as the November 5, 1997 decision of the MTC. It noted
that: 1) the MTC rendered its decision before the petitioner was able to file her position paper
and the affidavit of her witnesses; 2) the rule on the timeliness of filing pleadings may be
relaxed on equitable considerations; and 3) the denial of the petitioners motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial will result to a miscarriage of justice. Thus, believing that it was
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
equitable to relax the rules on the timeliness of the filing of pleadings, the RTC remanded the
case to the MTC for further proceedings, after giving the respondent the opportunity to submit
his position paper and the affidavits of his witnesses. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, on considerations of equity and substantial justice, and in the light of

Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, the judgment of this Court dated February 26, 1998,
as well as the Decision dated November 4, 1997 of the Lower Court in Civil Case No. 1305, are
hereby both set aside. The lower court to which the records were heretofore remanded is hereby
ordered to conduct further proceedings in this case, after giving the plaintiff-appellee an
opportunity to file his position paper and affidavits of witnesses as required by Section 10, Rule
70, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [Underscoring supplied.]
SO ORDERED.
On May 9, 1998, the petitioner challenged the order of remand through another motion
[32]
for reconsideration. The petitioner argued that since the original action for unlawful detainer
had already been elevated from the MTC to the RTC, the RSP no longer governed the disposal
of the case. Before the RTC, the applicable rule is the Rules of Court, particularly Section 6 of
Rule 37, which reads:
Sec. 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial. If a new trial is granted in accordance with
the provisions of this Rule, the original judgment or final order shall be vacated, and the
action shall stand for trial de novo; but the recorded evidence taken upon the former trial, in
so far as the same is material and competent to establish the issues, shall be used at the new
trial without retaking the same.
Thus, the RTC should have conducted a trial de novo instead of remanding the case to the
MTC. The petitioner further argued that a remand to the court a quo may only be ordered under
[33]
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC denied the motion noting that the petitioner missed the whole point of the
reversal of the decision. First, the reversal was made in the interest of substantial justice and the
[34]
RTC hewed more to the spirit that vivifieth than to the letter that killeth, and that a lawsuit is
best resolved on its full merits, unfettered by the stringent technicalities of procedure. The RTC
further emphasized that a remand is not prohibited under the Rules of Court and that Section 6
of Rule 135 allows it:
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or officer, and if the procedure to be followed in
the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the
spirit of said law or rules.
Second, Rule 40 governs appeals from the MTC to the RTC. Nowhere in Rule 40 is there a
provision similar to Section 6 of Rule 37.
Third, Section 6 of Rule 37 contemplates a motion for new trial and for reconsideration filed
before a trial court a quo. The RTC in this case was acting as an appellate court; the petitioners
motion for new trial and reconsideration was directed against the appellate judgment of the
RTC, not the original judgment of the trial court.
Fourth, after Republic Act No. 6031 mandated municipal trial courts to record their
proceedings, a trial de novo at the appellate level may no longer be conducted. The appellate
courts may instead review the evidence and records transmitted to it by the trial court. Since the
petitioner is asking the court to review the records of the MTC, inclusive of her position paper
and the affidavits of her witnesses, it is also important to give the respondent an opportunity to
file his position paper and the affidavits of his witnesses before the MTC renders a judgment. It
is the MTC or the trial court that has the jurisdiction to do that.
THE CAS DECISION
[35]
The CA affirmed the RTC in a decision promulgated on September 7, 2001. The CA
noted that the RTCs order of remand was not just based on equity and substantial justice, but
was also based on law, specifically Section 6 of Rule 135. Thus, the CA ruled that the RTC did
not err in remanding the case to the MTC and ordering the conduct of further proceedings after
giving the respondent an opportunity to present his position paper and the affidavits of his
witnesses. This ruling did not satisfy petitioner, giving way to the present petition.
THE PETITION
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
Before this Court, the petitioner alleges: 1) that the respondent made a request for the
petitioner to vacate the subject property because his nearest of kin needed it; 2) that she was
only going to vacate the premises if she were reimbursed the actual cost incurred in building the
[36]
said house; 3) that the case be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings in
the court of origin, including memoranda and briefs submitted by the parties, instead of being
remanded to the MTC.
[37] [38]
In his Comment and Memorandum, the respondent joins the petitioners prayer
for a ruling based on the records instead of remanding the case to the MTC. He prays that, as the
MTC ruled, the petitioner be ordered to vacate the leased property, and that the petitioners claim
for reimbursement be denied. The respondent argues that the MTC correctly ruled on the basis
of the parties pleadings, the stipulation of facts during the preliminary conference, and the
records of the proceedings.
ISSUES
The petitioner submits the following as the issue to be decided:

[W]hether under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the Regional Trial Court, as well as the Court
of Appeals, may order the case remanded to the MTC after the plaintiff, herein respondent, failed
to submit evidence in support of his complaint because his Position Paper, affidavit of witnesses
and evidence, were not submitted on time and the extension of time to file the same was denied
[39]
because it is prohibited under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
which we break down into the following sub-issues: 1) whether a remand is proper; 2) whether
the Court should appreciate the petitioners position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses;
and 3) whether the complaint for unlawful detainer should be dismissed.
THE COURTS RULING
The petition is partly meritorious.
Remand Not Necessary
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We find that a remand of the case to the lower courts is no longer necessary, given the
pleadings and submissions filed, and the records of the proceedings below. A remand would
delay the overdue resolution of this case (originally filed with the MTC on April 16, 1997), and
[40]
would run counter to the spirit and intent of the RSP.
Petitioners Position Paper and the Affidavits of Her

Witnesses Cannot Be Admitted
Should the Court admit the petitioners position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses
attached to her Kahilingan?
The intent and terms of the RSP both speak against the liberality that the petitioner sees.
By its express terms, the purpose of the RSP is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of the cases they cover, among them, forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases.
[41]
To achieve this objective, the RSP expressly prohibit certain motions and pleadings that
could cause delay, among them, a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or
any other paper. If the extension for the filing of these submissions cannot be allowed, we
believe it illogical and incongruous to admit a pleading that is already filed late. Effectively, we
would then allow indirectly what we prohibit to be done directly. It is for this reason that in Don
[42]
Tino Realty Development Corporation v. Florentino, albeit on the issue of late filing of an
answer in a summary proceeding, we stated that [t]o admit a late answer is to put a premium on
dilatory measures, the very mischief that the rules seek to redress.
The strict adherence to the reglementary period prescribed by the RSP is due to the
essence and purpose of these rules. The law looks with compassion upon a party who has been
illegally dispossessed of his property. Due to the urgency presented by this situation, the RSP
provides for an expeditious and inexpensive means of reinstating the rightful possessor to the
[43]
enjoyment of the subject property. This fulfills the need to resolve the ejectment case
quickly. Thus, we cannot reward the petitioners late filing of her position paper and the
affidavits of her witnesses by admitting them now.
The failure of one party to submit his position paper does not bar at all the MTC from
issuing a judgment on the ejectment complaint. Section 10 of the RSP states:
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
Section 10. Rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last
affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall
render judgment. [Underscoring supplied.]
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during
the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to
submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said
order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or
the expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the
judgment.
Thus, the situation obtaining in the present case has been duly provided for by the Rules; it was
correct to render a judgment, as the MTC did, after one party failed to file their position paper
and supporting affidavits.
That a position paper is not indispensable to the courts authority to render judgment is
further evident from what the RSP provides regarding a preliminary conference: on the basis of
the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be
rendered without the need for further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be
[44]
rendered within 30 days from the issuance of the order. Thus, the proceedings may stop at
that point, without need for the submission of position papers. In such a case, what would be
extant in the record and the bases for the judgment would be the complaint, answer, and the
record of the preliminary conference.
Unlawful detainer
The special civil action for unlawful detainer has the following essential requisites:
1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied;

2) the expiration or termination of the possessor's right to hold possession;
3) withholding by the lessee of possession of the land or building after the expiration or
termination of the right to possess;
4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and
vacate the premises; and
5) the filing of the action within one year from the date of the last demand received by the
[45]
defendant.
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
Requisites 1, 4, and 5 have been duly established. The presence of the Contract of Lease
is undisputed; the letter of demand was sent on February 3, 1997, and received by the petitioner
on February 10, 1997; and the action was filed on April 16, 1997, well within the one-year
period from the letter of demand. For our determination is whether the petitioners right to
possess the subject property may be terminated by virtue of her violation of the terms of the
contract. If we answer in the affirmative, her continued detention of the property is illegal.
Section 1673(3) of the Civil Code answers this question by providing that the lessor may
[46]
terminate the lease contract for violation of any of the conditions or terms agreed upon, and
[47]
may judicially eject the lessee. One of the stipulated terms of the parties Contract of Lease,
as narrated above, is that no alterations may be made on the leased property without the
knowledge and consent of the lessor. The issue in this case is beyond the fact of alteration since
it is not disputed that the petitioner demolished the house under lease and built a new one. The
crucial issue is whether the demolition was with or without the knowledge and consent of the
respondent.
The petitioner contends that the Court should not give credence to the respondents claim that he
neither had knowledge of nor gave his consent to her acts. She argued that the respondent had
the burden of proving this allegation with positive evidence after she frontally denied it in her
answer. Since the respondent failed to discharge this burden, she argues that she no longer
needed to prove her defense that the demolition and construction were done with the
[48]
respondents knowledge and consent.
The petitioners contention is misplaced.
First, the material allegations in a complaint must be specifically denied by the defendant in his
answer. Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court, provides:
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not
admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he
shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the remainder. Where a
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a
denial.
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court likewise provides that material allegations in the
complaint which are not specifically denied, other than the amount of unliquidated damages, are
deemed admitted. A denial made without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon
in support of the denial, even when to do so is practicable, does not amount to a specific denial.
[49]
The petitioners denial in her answer consists of the following:
1. Maliban sa personal na katangian at tirahan ng nasasakdal, ay walang katotuhanan

ang mga isinasakdal ng nagsasakdal;
2. Na hindi lumabag sa kasunduan ng upahan ang nasasakdal;
3. Na, ang pagpapagawa ng bahay na inuupahan ng nasasakdal ay sa kaalaman at

kapahintulutan ng nagsasakdal at higit na gumanda at tumibay ang bahay ng
[50]
nagsasakdal sa pamamagitan ng pagpapagawa ng nasasakdal; xxx
We do not find this denial to be specific as the petitioner failed to set forth the substance of the
matters in which she relied upon to support her denial. The petitioner merely alleged that
consent was given; how and why, she did not say. If indeed consent were given, it would have
been easy to fill in the details. She could have stated in her pleadings that she verbally informed
the respondent of the need for the repairs, or wrote him a letter. She could have stated his
response, and how it was conveyed, whether verbally or in writing. She could have stated when
the consent was solicited and procured. These, she failed to do. Ergo, the petitioner is deemed to
have admitted the material allegations in the complaint.
Second, both parties failed to present evidence other than the allegations in their pleadings.
Thus, the court may weigh the parties allegations against each other. The petitioner presented a
general denial, while the respondent set forth an affirmative assertion. This Court has time and
[51]
again said that a general denial cannot be given more weight than an affirmative assertion.
Damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer action are

limited to rentals or reasonable compensation for the
use of the property
This Court has no jurisdiction to award the reimbursement prayed for by both parties.
Both parties seek damages other than rentals or reasonable compensation for the use of the
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
property, which are the only forms of damages that may be recovered in an unlawful detainer
[52]
case. Rule 70, Section 17 of the Rules of Court authorizes the trial court to order the award
of an amount representing arrears of rent or reasonable compensation for the use and
[53]
occupation of the premises if it finds that the allegations of the complaint are true.
The rationale for limiting the kind of damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer case
[54]
was explained in Araos v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court held that:
The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage
that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised
in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered
are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the
loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have
suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not be properly joined
with the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial,
while an action for unlawful detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary
procedure. The joinder of the two actions is specifically enjoined by Section 5 of Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of
parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by
special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different
venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of
the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. [Underscoring supplied.]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-48534 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The petitioner
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FLORAIDA TERANA and all persons claiming right under her are ordered to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject property to the respondent ANTONIO SIMUANGCO. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
* On official leave.
** Designated Acting Chairperson of the Second Division per Special Order No. 592 dated March 19, 2009.
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
Penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia (retired member of this Court), with Justice Hilarion L. Aquino (also retired) and Justice Jose
L. Sabio concurring; rollo, pp. 23-32.
[3]
Id., pp. 34-35.
[4]
Id., p. 149.
[5]
Id., p. 150.
[6]
Id., p. 150.
[7]
CA rollo, p. 57.
[8]
Id., p. 34.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 1305 and entitled Antonio B. Simuangco, versus Aida Terania,; CA rollo, pp. 33-36.
[13]
Id., p. 34.
[14]
Id., p. 35.
[15]
Rollo, p. 25.
[16]
CA rollo, pp. 37-39.
[17]
In her Sagot, the petitioner alleged that the house was already 20 years old. However, in other parts of the record, she alleged that
the structure was only 10 years old.
[18]
CA rollo, p. 38.
[19]
Id.,, pp. 40-41.
[20]
Id., pp. 40-41.
[21]
Ibid.
[22]
CA rollo, p. 59
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
[23]
Id., , pp. 54-59.
[24]
Petitioners Motion for Extension of Time to File Position Paper was denied by the MTC in its Order dated October 28, 1997.
[25]
CA rollo, p. 59.
[26]
Id., p.43
[27]
Id., pp.44-52
[28]
Id., p.53.
[29]
Id., p. 60.
[30]
Id., pp. 67-74.
[31]
Id., pp. 75-83.
[32]
Id., pp. 84-86.
[33]
Rule 40 provides for the manner of appeal from the MTC to the RTC. The rule reads:
Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. If an appeal is taken from an
order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or
reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case
was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the
case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.
[34]
CA rollo, p. 28.
[35]
Rollo, pp. 24-33.
[36]
Ibid, p. 129.
[37]
Id., pp. 102-109.
[38]
Id., pp. 147-155.
[39]
Id., p. 131.
[40]
RSP, Preambulatory clause.
[41]
Id., Rule I, Section 1 (A) (1).
[42]
G.R. No. 134222, September 10, 1999, 314 SCRA 197.
[43]
Tubiano v. Razo, G. R. No. 132598, July 13, 2000, 335 SCRA 531.
[44]
RSP, Rule II, Section 8(3); see also RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Section 9 (3).
[45]
Pasricha v. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 136409, March 14, 2008, 22 SCRA 215.
[46]
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119872, July 7, 1997, 275 SCRA 167.
[47]
Dayao v. Shell Company of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-32475, April 30, 1980, 97 SCRA 497; Puahay Lao v. Suarez, G.R. No. L-
22468, 22 SCRA 215, January 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 215.
[48]
Rollo, p. 131.
[49]
Republic of the Philippines v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. et al., G.R. Nos. 156951 and 173408, September 22, 2006,
502 SCRA 587. See generally: Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003, 406 SCRA 190.
[50]
CA rollo, p. 37.
[51]
See generally Arboleda v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119509, February 11, 1999, 303 SCRA 38; Caca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
116962, July 7, 1997, 275 SCRA 123.
[52]
Araos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107057. June 2, 1994, 232 SCRA 770; See also Herrera v. Bollos, G.R. No. 138258, January
18, 2002, 374 SCRA 107
2/18/2018 G.R. No. 152131
[53]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment
in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations
are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court
shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires.
[54]
Supra note 52.

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2/18/2018 G.R. No.

ESTATE OF FELOMINA G.R. No. 156809

The Antecedent Facts

On 18 January 2000, Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang (Atty. Macadangdang), acting as

Defendants counterclaims being compulsory are dismissed.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 3 October 2000, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. -

We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.

RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

* Designated member per Special Order No. 570.

Republic of the Philippines

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 194880

SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT

June 20, 2012

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after

1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and all

2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to pay

from judgment, or a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any

Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary circumstances that

1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract

3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and

The petition fails.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

l\epublic of tbe ~bilippines

FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT G.R. No. 217694

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 seeking to reverse and set

In a complaint 6 for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No.

On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal letter7 to Po demanding

On March 1, 2013, Po’s counsel filed his Entry of Appearance with

The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po’s answer to the

The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

In its memorandum,12 Fairland argued that an unlawful detainer case

Fairland continued that the failure to file an answer in an ejectment

Further, all the statements in the complaint were mere allegations

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Fairland filed a motion for reconsideration15 attaching its condominium

Undaunted, Fairland filed a petition for review18 under Rule 42 of the

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In the assailed Decision, dated October 31, 2014, the CA dismissed

Hence, this petition.

IN AN EJECTMENT CASE WHEREIN NO ANSWER WAS

HOLDING THAT EVIDENCE IN AN EJECTMENT CASE

Fairland argues that in ejectment cases, presentation of evidence was

In his Comment, 20 Po countered that the present petition raised a

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Complaint has a valid

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements

Section 1. – Who may institute proceedings, and when. –

Stated differently, unlawful detainer is a summary action for the

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful

There is no question that the complaint filed by Fairland adequately

4. There is no current written lease contract between plaintiff and

6. Due to defendant’s continuous failure to pay rent, plaintiff

7. Despite receipt of the aforesaid demand letter and lapse of the

The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently alleged that