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Appellants.: Succession - 3rd - 3 Molo V Molo
Appellants.: Succession - 3rd - 3 Molo V Molo
"This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually applied where the CASE DIGEST
testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a
present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new FACTS:
disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for some reason. The doctrine is not limited to 1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will
the existence of some other document, however, and has been applied where a will was contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any
destroyed as a consequence of a mistake of law . . . ." (68 C. J. p. 799). forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the
probate were his nephews and nieces.
"The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another
will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend 2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of
upon the efficacy of the new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the failed to prove its due execution.
new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original
will remains in full force." (Gardner, pp. 232, 233.) 3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again
the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They
"This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of the new testamentary contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus
disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a effectively nullified the 1918 will.
suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to
make at some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It ISSUE: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the
must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will." (1 subsequent disallowed 1939 will
Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p. 233.)
RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
We hold, therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it
testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be
given due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately
intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in
different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of
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Succession - 3rd - 3 Molo v Molo
dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a
will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect
for some reason.