JUST COMPENSATION
vs.
Invoking Ministerio v. City of Cebu, 40
SCRA 464, the Supreme Court said that
suit may lie because the doctrine of State
immunity cannot be used to perpetrate an
injustice. This ruling was reiterated in De
los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
223 SCRA 11, where it was held that the
“public respondents’ belief that the
property is public, even if buttressed by
statements of other public officials, is no
reason for the unjust taking of petitioner’s
property”; after all, the TCT was in the
name of the petitioner.
WHETHER MARINE MAMMALS,
THROUGH THEIR STEWARDS, HAVE
LEGAL STANDING TO PURSUE THE
CASE;
As to standing, the Court declined to
extend the principle of standing beyond
natural and juridical persons, even though
it recognized that the current trend in
Philippine jurisprudence “moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating
court access in environmental cases.” Id.,
p. 15. Instead, the Court explained, “the
need to give the Resident Marine Mammals
legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as
a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws.”
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y
MACARAMBON
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002
FACTS: The accused was convicted of
violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act). The antecedent facts of his conviction
are as follows:
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on
March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger
ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from
Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m.
on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about
to dock at the port of Iligan City when its
security officer, Diesmo, received a
complaint from passenger Canoy about her
missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of
her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the
culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members
of the vessel security force accompanied
Canoy to search for the suspect whom they
later found at the economy section. The
suspect was identified as the accused,
Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was
informed of the complaint and was invited
to go back to cabin no. 106. With his
consent, he was bodily searched, but no
jewelry was found. He was then escorted
by 2 security agents back to the economy
section to get his baggage. The accused
took a Samsonite suitcase and brought
this back to the cabin. When requested by
the security, the accused opened the
suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small
plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Suspecting the substance to be
“shabu,” the security personnel
immediately reported the matter to the
ship captain and took pictures of the
accused beside the suitcase and its
contents. They also called the Philippine
Coast Guard for assistance.
But the accused countered this by saying
that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or
“shabu” was forcibly opened and searched
without his consent, and hence, in
violation of his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Any
evidence acquired pursuant to such
unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is
inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid
HELD: YES
The right against unreasonable search and
seizure is a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution. Evidence acquired in
violation of this right shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Whenever this right is challenged, an
individual may choose between invoking
the constitutional protection or waiving his
right by giving consent to the search and
seizure. It should be stressed, however,
that protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent.
The constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures applies as
a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom
the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the
accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after
they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that
they called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the
suitcase and the contraband items was
therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search
and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the
accused-appellant that the search and
seizure performed by the vessel security
personnel should be considered as one
conducted by the police authorities for like
the latter, the former are armed and tasked
to maintain peace and order. The vessel
security officer in the case at bar is a
private employee and does not discharge
any governmental function.
NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the
following facts must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the
object identified as a prohibited or a
regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized
by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.
The things in possession of a person are
presumed by law to be owned by him. To
overcome this presumption, it is necessary
to present clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. In this case, the accused
points to a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi
as the owner of the contraband, but
presented no evidence to support his
claim. No witnesses were presented to
prove that there is such a living, breathing,
flesh and blood person named Alex
Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite
to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he
has friends, fellow businessmen and
acquaintances who could testify and
support the claim of the accused. Mere
denial of ownership will not suffice
especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the
keystone of the defense of the accused-
appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated.
It will take more than bare-bone
allegations to convince this Court that a
courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner
and has no knowledge or intent to possess
the same.
PUBLIC ASSEMBLY
SEC. 4. PERMIT WHEN REQUIRED AND
WHEN NOT REQUIRED. — A written
permit shall be required for any person or
persons to organize and hold a public
assembly in a public place. However, no
permit shall be required if the public
assembly shall be done or made in a
freedom park duly established by law or
ordinance or in private property, in which
case only the consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal possession is
required, or in the campus of a
government-owned and operated
educational institution which shall be
subject to the rules and regulations of said
educational institution. Political meetings
or rallies held during any election
campaign period as provided for by law are
not covered by this Act.
SEC. 5. APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS.
— ALL APPLICATIONS FOR A PERMIT
SHALL COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING
GUIDELINES:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and
shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration
thereof, and place or streets to be used for
the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the
transport and the public address systems
to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the
duty and responsibility of applicant under
Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the
office of the mayor of the city or
municipality in whose jurisdiction the
intended activity is to be held, at least five
(5) working days before the scheduled
public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which
must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
office of the city or municipal mayor shall
cause the same to immediately be posted
at a conspicuous place in the city or
municipal building.
SEC. 6. ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON THE
APPLICATION. —
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf to issue or grant
a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present
danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or
public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his
behalf shall act on the application within
two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the
permit shall be deemed granted. Should for
any reason the mayor or any official acting
in his behalf refuse to accept the
application for a permit, said application
shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and
shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is
imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who
must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in
writing and served on the application
within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf denies the application or modifies
the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an
appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal
Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the
Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions
may be appealed to the appropriate court
within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of
the same. No appeal bond and record on
appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying it in
terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be
immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this
section shall be decided within twenty-four
(24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed
to the executive judge for disposition or, in
his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by
formal appeals are hereby allowed.
KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, ONG G.R.
NO. 177721 JULY 3, 2007 CITIZENSHIP,
NATURALIZATION
DECEMBER 4, 2017
FACTS:
Respondent announced an appointment in
favor of respondent Ong as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the
vacancy created by the of Associate Justice
R. J. Callejo, Sr. Petitioners claim that
respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that
this fact is plain and incontestable, and
that his own birth certificate indicates his
Chinese citizenship. Petitioners contend
that the appointment extended to
respondent Ong through respondent
Executive Secretary is patently
unconstitutional and issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
IS SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE ONG A
NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN?
RULING:
No. It is clear from the records of the Court
that respondent Ong is a naturalized
Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by
the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
cannot amend the final decision of the trial
court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his
father. Furthermore, no substantial change
or correction in an entry in a civil register
can be made without a judicial order, and,
under the law, a change in citizenship
status is a substantial change.
The series of events and long string of
alleged changes in the nationalities of
respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various
births, marriages and deaths, all entail
factual assertions that need to be threshed
out in proper judicial proceedings so as to
correct the existing records on his birth
and citizenship. The chain of evidence
would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos,
respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino
citizen, contrary to what still appears in
the records of this Court. Respondent Ong
has the burden of proving in court his
alleged ancestral tree as well as his
citizenship under the time-line of three
Constitutions. Until this is done,
respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be
a violation of the Constitution. For this
reason, he can be prevented by injunction
from doing so.