FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON.

RAUL
MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case Digest
Facts:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his
deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and
enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners
contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty
of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the
petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

Issue:

Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

Ruling:

The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems
of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on
the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the state and instigate more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against
threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct
protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is
DISMISSED.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and
had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into
the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.
According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the

Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly
have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple
to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and
sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus
the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that
the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal
of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

NPC v. City of Cabanatuan

on 11:48 AM in Case Digests, Taxation
0

G.R. No. 149110, April 9, 2003

o TAXATION: The most effective means to raise revenues; LGU's Power of Taxation, exception to
Non-delegation of taxing power; Tax Exemptions, construed strongly against the claimant

Facts:

NPC, a GOCC, created under CA 120 as amended, selling electric power, was assessed by the
City of Cabanatuan for franchise tax pursuant to sec. 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92. NPC refused
to pay the tax assessment on the grounds that the City of Cabanatuan has no authority to
impose tax on government entities and also that it is exempted as a non-profit organization. For
its part, the City government alleged that NPC’s exemption from local taxes has been repealed
by sec. 193 of RA 7160.

Issue:

o Whether NPC is liable to pay an annual franchise tax to the City government

Held:

One of the most significant provisions of the LGC is the removal of the blanket exclusion of
instrumentalities and agencies of the national government from the coverage of local taxation.
Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now admits an exception, i.e.,
when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to impose taxes, fees or charges on
the aforementioned entities.

As commonly used, a franchise tax is "a tax on the privilege of transacting business in the state
and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state." It is not levied on the corporation
simply for existing as a corporation, upon its property or its income, but on its exercise of the
rights or privileges granted to it by the government. Hence, a corporation need not pay franchise
tax from the time it ceased to do business and exercise its franchise. It is within this context that
the phrase "tax on businesses enjoying a franchise" in section 137 of the LGC should be
interpreted and understood. Verily, to determine whether the petitioner is covered by the
franchise tax in question, the following requisites should concur: (1) that petitioner has a
"franchise" in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its rights
or privileges under this franchise within the territory of the respondent city government.

NPC fulfills both requisites. To stress, a franchise tax is imposed based not on the ownership
but on the exercise by the corporation of a privilege to do business. The taxable entity is the
corporation which exercises the franchise, and not the individual stockholders. By virtue of its
charter, petitioner was created as a separate and distinct entity from the National Government.
It can sue and be sued under its own name, and can exercise all the powers of a corporation
under the Corporation Code.

We also do not find merit in the petitioner's contention that its tax exemptions under its charter
subsist despite the passage of the LGC.

As a rule, tax exemptions are construed strongly against the claimant. Exemptions must be
shown to exist clearly and categorically, and supported by clear legal provisions. In the case at
bar, the petitioner's sole refuge is section 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395 exempting from, among
others, "all income taxes, franchise taxes and realty taxes to be paid to the National
Government, its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and
instrumentalities."

It is worth mentioning that section 192 of the LGC empowers the LGUs, through ordinances duly
approved, to grant tax exemptions, initiatives or reliefs.77 But in enacting section 37 of
Ordinance No. 165-92 which imposes an annual franchise tax "notwithstanding any exemption
granted by law or other special law," the respondent city government clearly did not intend to
exempt the petitioner from the coverage thereof.

Doubtless, the power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance
and support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic services
essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and
prosperity of the people. As this Court observed in the Mactan case, "the original reasons for the
withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned or controlled corporations
and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion
and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises." With the added burden of
devolution, it is even more imperative for government entities to share in the requirements of
development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying taxes or other charges due from them.

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated March 12, 2001 and July 10, 2001, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED."

USA vs Guinto
Doctrine of incorporation; Doctrine of Immunity from Suit

USA VS GUINTO
G.R. No. 76607 182 SCRA 644 February 26, 1990
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City,
ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.

Facts:
The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case
at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not
consented.

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the
bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. Among those who submitted their
bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.

The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had
made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to
bid.

The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and
the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions
and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions
pending litigation.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the
ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability, but trial court
denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.
2. Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by
them in the performance of their official duties.

Discussions:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international
law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated
to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been
formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of
the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.

SECOND DIVISION

January 11, 2016

G.R. No. 209387

ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants,
are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so
literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.

For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated September 28,
2012 and the Resolution3 dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City.4 The Court of
Appeals affirmed5 the trial court’s Judgment6 finding petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possessing unlicensed firearms under Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 77647 in relation to Section 2618 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 8819 during the 2007
election period.10

Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel.11 He frequently traveled, "coming back
and forth taking a vessel."12 At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the
Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo.13 While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor
with a porter.14 It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket.15

Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning
machine for inspection.16 The operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag.17

Cutie Pie Flores (Flores) was the x-ray machine operator-on-duty on May 11, 2007.18 She saw the
impression of what appeared to be three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag.19 Upon seeing the
suspected firearms, she called the attention of port personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who was the
baggage inspector then.20

Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag.21 Dela Cruz answered Igot in the
affirmative and consented to Igot’s manual inspection of the bag.22

"Port Police Officer Adolfo Abregana [(Officer Abregana)] was on duty at the terminal of the Cebu
Domestic Port in Pier 1-G when his attention was called by . . . Igot."23 Igot told Officer Abregana that
there were firearms in a bag owned by a certain person.24 Igot then pointed to the person.25 That
person was later identified as Dela Cruz.26

Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag.27 The bag was then inspected and the following
items were found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman’s book; other personal items;
and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder.28 When asked whether he had the proper
documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative.29

Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law.30 He was
also informed of his constitutional rights.31

In the Information dated November 19, 2003, Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act
No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms:32

Criminal Case No. CBU -80084

That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with the deliberate intent and
without being authorized by law, did then and there possess and carry outside his residence one (1)
Cal. 38 Simith [sic] & Wesson revolver without serial number; one (1) .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum
revolver without serial number; one (1) North American Black Widow magnum revolver without serial
number and four rounds of live ammunitions for cal. 38 without first securing the necessary license
to possess and permit to carry from the proper authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.33

Subsequently, another Information was filed charging Dela Cruz with the violation of Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881:34

Criminal Case No. CBU 80085

That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 in the afternoon, which is within the
election period for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, in the City of Cebu, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then
and there possess and carry outside his residence the following:
 One (1) cal. .38 Simith [sic] & Wesson revolver without serial number;

One (1) cal. .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum revolver without serial number;

One (1) North American Black Widow magnum revolver without serial number and four (4)
rounds of live ammunitions for cal. 38.

CONTRARY TO LAW.35

Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment.36

After trial, Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City found Dela Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in
relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No. CBU 80085.37 Dela Cruz
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year with disqualification from holding public office
and the right to suffrage.38

According to the trial court, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dela
Cruz committed illegal possession of firearms.39 It proved the following elements: "(a) the existence
of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
license or permit to possess the same."40 The prosecution presented the firearms and live
ammunitions found in Dela Cruz’s possession.41 It also presented three (3) prosecution witnesses
who testified that the firearms were found inside Dela Cruz’s bag.42 The prosecution also presented a
Certification that Dela Cruz did not file any application for license to possess a firearm, and he was
not given authority to carry a firearm outside his residence.43

The trial court also held that the search conducted by the port authorities was reasonable and, thus,
valid:44

Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds the search conducted by the port authorities
reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Hence, when the
search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to
have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course
of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against [the] accused.45

The trial court did not give credence to Dela Cruz’s claim that the firearms were "planted" inside his
bag by the porter or anyone who could have accessed his bag while he was buying a
ticket.46 According to the trial court, Dela Cruz’s argument was "easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult
to disprove."47 Dela Cruz also did not show improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses
to discredit their testimonies.48

The trial court dismissed the case for violation of Republic Act No. 8294.49 It held that "Republic Act
No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested
committed ‘no other crime.’"50 Dela Cruz, who had been charged with illegal possession of firearms,
was also charged with violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764.51

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Consolidated Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of BP Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No. CBU-
80085, and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment for a period of one (1) year, and to
suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right to suffrage.

While Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for Violation of RA 8294 is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly,
the cash bond posted by accused therein for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and
released to said accused.

The subject firearms (Exhs. "H", "I" & "J"), and the live ammunitions (Exhs. "K to K-2"") shall,
however, remain in custodia legis for proper disposition of the appropriate government agency.

SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Judgment.53 It held that the defense failed
to show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by improper motive; thus, their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.54 The acts of government authorities were found to be regular.55

The Court of Appeals did not find Dela Cruz’s defense of denial meritorious.56 "Denial as a defense
has been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be
concocted."57 Dela Cruz did not present any evidence "to show that he had authority to carry outside
of residence firearms and ammunition during the period of effectivity of the Gun Ban [during] election
time."58 The prosecution was able to prove Dela Cruz’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed January 27, 2010
Consolidated Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12 of Cebu City in Criminal Case
CBU-59434 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs on accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.59 (Emphasis in the original)

Dela Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration,60 which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated August 23, 2013.61

Dela Cruz filed this Petition on November 4, 2013.62 In the Resolution63 dated December 9, 2013, this
court required respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, to submit its Comment on the
Petition. Respondent submitted its Comment64 on March 6, 2014, which this court noted in the
Resolution65 dated March 19, 2014.

Dela Cruz claims that he was an on-the-job trainee for an inter-island vessel.66 He was "well[-
]acquainted with [the] inspection scheme [at the] ports."67 He would not have risked placing
prohibited items such as unlicensed firearms inside his luggage knowing fully the consequences of
such an action.68

According to Dela Cruz, when he arrived at the port on May 11, 2007, he left his luggage with a
porter to buy a ticket.69 "A considerable time of fifteen minutes went by before he could secure the
ticket while his luggage was left sitting on the floor with only the porter standing beside it."70 He
claims that someone must have placed the unlicensed firearms inside his bag during the period he
was away from it.71 He was surprised when his attention was called by the x-ray machine operator
after the firearms were detected.72
Considering the circumstances, Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against
warrantless search:73

In petitioner’s case, it may well be said that, with the circumstances attending the search of his
luggage, he had no actual intention to relinquish his right against warrantless searches. He knew in
all honest belief that when his luggage would pass through the routine x-ray examination, nothing
incriminating would be recovered. It was out of that innocent confidence that he allowed the
examination of his luggage. . . . [H]e believed that no incriminating evidence w[ould] be found.
He knew he did not place those items. But what is strikingly unique about his situation is that a
considerable time interval lapsed, creating an opportunity for someone else to place inside his
luggage those incriminating items.74 (Emphasis in the original)

Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz’s right to unreasonable search and
seizure, thus warranting his conviction.75 Dela Cruz was "caught in flagrante delicto carrying three (3)
revolvers and four (4) live ammunitions when his bag went through the x-ray machine in the Cebu
Domestic Port on May 11, 2007, well within the election period."76 The firearms were seized during a
routine baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a common seaport security procedure.77

According to respondent, this case is similar to valid warrantless searches and seizures conducted
by airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security procedures.78

Records are also clear that Dela Cruz voluntarily waived his right to unreasonable searches and
seizure.79 The trial court found that Dela Cruz voluntarily gave his consent to the search.80

Dela Cruz’s claim that his bag was switched is also baseless.81 The witnesses categorically testified
that Dela Cruz was "in possession of the bag before it went through the x-ray machine, and he was
also in possession of the same bag that contained the firearms when he was apprehended."82

Dela Cruz raised the lone issue of "whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding [him] guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt[.]"83

The issues for resolution in this case are:

First, whether petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was in possession of the illegal firearms within the
meaning of the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881;

Second, whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and

Lastly, assuming that there was no waiver, whether there was a valid search and seizure in this
case.

We deny the Petition.

The present criminal case was brought to this court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The penalty
imposed on petitioner by the trial court is material in determining the mode of appeal to this court. A
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 must be differentiated from appeals under Rule 124,
Section 1384 involving cases where the lower court imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or, previously, death.85

In Mercado v. People:86

Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a criminal case brought to it on
appeal is at least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it should impose such penalty,
refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify the case and elevate the entire records to this Court
for review. This will obviate the unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases
between this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire jurisdiction over the
case from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully
completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.

On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less than reclusion perpetua, a
review of the case may be had only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 where only
errors or questions of law may be raised.87 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law are reviewed by this
court.88 The rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 is
based on sound and practical policy considerations stemming from the differing natures of a
question of law and a question of fact:

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question
of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.89

Concomitantly, factual findings of the lower courts as affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding
on this court.90

In contrast, an appeal in a criminal case "throws the whole case open for review[.]"91 The underlying
principle is that errors in an appealed judgment, even if not specifically assigned, may be
corrected motu propio by the court if the consideration of these errors is necessary to arrive at a just
resolution of the case.92 Nevertheless, "the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for
by law[.]"93

II

Petitioner argues that the firearms found in his bag were not his. Thus, he could not be liable for
possessing the contraband. Key to the resolution of this case is whether petitioner possessed
firearms without the necessary authorization from the Commission on Elections. Petitioner was
charged under special laws: Republic Act No. 8294 and Commission on Elections Resolution No.
7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The law applicable is Section 2(a) of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, which provides:

SECTION 2. Prohibitions. During the election period from January 14, 2007 it shall be unlawful for:
a. Any person, including those possessing a permit to carry firearms outside of residence or place of
business, to bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places including any
building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance. For the purpose firearm includes airgun,
while deadly weapons include hand grenades or other explosives, except pyrotechnics[.]

Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 states:

Section 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

....

(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. – Any person who, although
possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of
business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That
a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered a residence or place of business or
extension hereof. (Par. (l), Id.)

This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers while in the performance of their
duties or to persons who by nature of their official duties, profession, business or occupation
habitually carry large sums of money or valuables.

For a full understanding of the nature of the constitutional rights involved, we will examine three (3)
points of alleged intrusion into the right to privacy of petitioner: first, when petitioner gave his bag for
x-ray scanning to port authorities; second, when the baggage inspector opened petitioner’s bag and
called the Port Authority Police; and third, when the police officer opened the bag to search, retrieve,
and seize the firearms and ammunition.

III

The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag for inspection to port
personnel—the x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector manning the x-ray machine
station.94 With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different
from that imposed on state agents or authorized government authorities.

In People v. Marti,95 the private forwarding and shipping company, following standard operating
procedure, opened packages sent by accused Andre Marti for shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and
detected a peculiar odor from the packages.96 The representative from the company found dried
marijuana leaves in the packages.97 He reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation
and brought the samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for laboratory examination.98 Agents
from the National Bureau of Investigation subsequently took custody of the illegal drugs.99 Andre
Marti was charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.100

This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure.101 The evidence obtained against
the accused was not procured by the state acting through its police officers or authorized
government agencies.102 The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it
cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals:103

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.104

Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by private
persons are not covered by the exclusionary rule.105

To determine whether the intrusion by the port personnel in this case was committed by private or
public persons, we revisit the history and organizational structure of the Philippine Ports Authority.

Port security measures are consistent with the country’s aim to develop transportation and trade in
conjunction with national and economic growth. In 1974, the Philippine Ports Authority was created
for the reorganization of port administration and operation functions.106 The Philippine Ports
Authority’s Charter was later revised through Presidential Decree No. 857. The Revised Charter
provided that the Authority may:

after consultation with relevant Government agencies, make rules or regulations for the planning,
development, construction, maintenance, control, supervision and management of any Port or Port
District and the services to be provided therein, and for the maintenance of good order therein, and
generally for carrying out the process of this Decree.107

The Philippine Ports Authority was subsequently given police authority through Executive Order No.
513,108 which provides:

Sec. 2. Section 6 is hereby amended by adding a new paragraph to read as follows:

Section 6-c. Police Authority – The Authority shall have such police authority within the ports
administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes
and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other
law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:

a) To provide security to cargoes, port equipment, structure, facilities, personnel and

documents: Provided, however, That in ports of entry, physical security to import and export
cargoes shall be exercised jointly with the Bureau of Customs;

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles,
as well as movement within the port of watercraft;

c) To maintain peace and order inside the port, in coordination with local police authorities;

d) To supervise private security agencies operating within the port area; and

e) To enforce rules and regulations promulgated by the Authority pursuant to law. (Emphasis
supplied)

In 1992, the Cebu Port Authority was created to specifically administer all ports located in the
Province of Cebu.109 The Cebu Port Authority is a "public-benefit corporation . . . under the
supervision of the Department of Transportation and Communications for purposes of policy
coordination."110 Control of the ports was transferred to the Cebu Port Authority on January 1, 1996,
when its operations officially began.111
In 2004, the Office for Transportation Security was designated as the "single authority responsible
for the security of the transportation systems [in] the country[.]"112 Its powers and functions included
providing security measures for all transportation systems in the country:

b. Exercise operational control and supervision over all units of law enforcement agencies
and agency personnel providing security services in the transportation systems, except for
motor vehicles in land transportation, jointly with the heads of the bureaus or agencies to
which the units or personnel organically belong or are assigned;

c. Exercise responsibility for transportation security operations including, but not limited to,
security screening of passengers, baggage and cargoes, and hiring, retention, training and
testing of security screening personnel;

d. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and/or instrumentalities of the government,

formulate, develop, promulgate and implement comprehensive security plans, policies,
measures, strategies and programs to ably and decisively deal with any threat to the security
of transportation systems, and continually review, assess and upgrade such security plans,
policies, measures, strategies and programs, to improve and enhance transportation security
and ensure the adequacy of these security measures;

e. Examine and audit the performance of transportation security personnel, equipment and
facilities, and, thereafter, establish, on a continuing basis, performance standards for such
personnel, equipment and facilities, including for the training of personnel;

f. Prepare a security manual/master plan or programme which shall prescribe the rules and
regulations for the efficient and safe operation of all transportation systems, including
standards for security screening procedures, prior screening or profiling of individuals for the
issuance of security access passes, and determination of levels of security clearances for
personnel of the OTS, the DOTC and its attached agencies, and other agencies of the
government;

g. Prescribe security and safety standards for all transportation systems in accordance with
existing laws, rules, regulations and international conventions;

h. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the DOTC, issue Transportation Security
Regulations/Rules and amend, rescind or revise such regulations or rules as may be
necessary for the security of the transportation systems of the country[.]113 (Emphasis
supplied)

The Cebu Port Authority has adopted security measures imposed by the Office for Transportation
Security, including the National Security Programme for Sea Transport and Maritime Infrastructure.114

The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and
vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in
this case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be
considered agents of government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel
during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function.

In People v. Malngan,115 barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were deemed as law
enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III of the Constitution.116 In People v.
Lauga,117 this court held that a "bantay bayan," in relation to the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation under Article III, Section 12118 of the Constitution, "has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]"119

Thus, with port security personnel’s functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed
agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to
port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and
inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

In People v. Suzuki,120 the accused "entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport
Terminal."121 He was "bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was carrying a
small traveling bag and a box marked ‘Bongbong’s piaya.’"122 The accused "proceeded to the ‘walk-
through metal detector,’ a machine which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the
presence of metallic substance or object."123 "Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm
sounded, signifying the presence of metallic substance either in his person or in the box he was
carrying."124 When the accused was asked to open the content of the box, he answered "open,
open."125 Several packs of dried marijuana fruiting tops were then found inside the box.126 Suzuki
argued that the box was only given to him as "pasalubong" by a certain Pinky, whom he had sexual
relations with the night before.127 He did not know the contents of the box.128

This court in Suzuki found that the search conducted on the accused was a valid exception to the
prohibition against warrantless searches as it was pursuant to a routine airport security procedure:129

It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the
search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting
tops, appellant is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without
a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The packs of marijuana
obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against
appellant.130 (Citations omitted)

The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into
airports or ports of travel:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected
to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be
subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.131 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This rationale was reiterated more recently in Sales v. People.132 This court in Sales upheld the
validity of the search conducted as part of the routine security check at the old Manila Domestic
Airport—now Terminal 1 of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.133

Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray scanning machines
for inspection of passengers’ bags.134 When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of
firearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of petitioner’s bag.
Notably, petitioner did not contest the results of the x-ray scan.

IV

Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second point of intrusion—when the baggage
inspector opened petitioner’s bag and called the attention of the port police officer?

We rule in the negative.

The port personnel’s actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers
and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to
inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.

The presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of
whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned
or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that a
crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard the
passengers passing through ports or terminals. Probable cause is:

reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to

induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to
the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.135

It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person’s right to travel if

weighed against the safety of all passengers and the security in the port facility.

As one philosopher said, the balance between authority and an individual’s liberty may be confined
within the harm that the individual may cause others. John Stuart Mill’s "harm principle" provides:

[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good
reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but
not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the
conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else.
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.136
Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the presentation of person and effects for port security
measures is a permissible intrusion to privacy when measured against the possible harm to society
caused by lawless persons.

A third point of intrusion to petitioner’s right to privacy occurred during petitioner’s submission to port
security measures. This court should determine whether the requirements for a valid waiver against
unreasonable searches and seizures were met.

After detection of the firearms through the x-ray scanning machine and inspection by the baggage
inspector, Officer Abregana was called to inspect petitioner’s bag.

The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures.137 A
warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable.138 However, this court lays down the exceptions
where warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search;
(5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.139

In Caballes v. Court of Appeals:140

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches,
it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3)
the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.141

Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did not validly consent to the search conducted by
the port authorities. He argues that he did not have an actual intention to relinquish his right against
a warrantless search.

In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, events must
be weighed in its entirety. The trial court’s findings show that petitioner presented his bag for
scanning in the x-ray machine.142 When his bag went through the x-ray machine and the firearms
were detected, he voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the port authorities:

Prosecutor Narido:

Q. What did he tell you?

A. I asked him if I can check his bag?

Q. What was his response?

A. He consented and cooperated. I checked the bag.143

It was after the port personnel’s inspection that Officer Abregana’s attention was called and the bag
was inspected anew with petitioner’s consent.144

"[A]ppellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment of witnesses’ credibility by the trial
court, because the latter was in a better position to observe their demeanor and deportment on the
witness stand."145 We do not find anything erroneous as to the findings of fact of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals.

There was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to the search of his
personal effects. As the trial court found:

Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds the search conducted by the port authorities
reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Hence, when the
search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to
have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course
of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against [the] accused.146

Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui Malasugui147 and People v. Omaweng148 who permitted
authorities to search their persons and premises without a warrant, petitioner is now precluded from
claiming an invalid warrantless search when he voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In
addition, petitioner’s consent to the search at the domestic port was not given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances.149

This case should be differentiated from that of Aniag, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,150 which
involved the search of a moving vehicle at a checkpoint.151 In that case, there was no implied
acquiescence to the search since the checkpoint set up by the police authorities was conducted
without proper consultation, and it left motorists without any choice except to subject themselves to
the checkpoint:

It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied
waiver of petitioner’s right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the
seizure of the firearms.

While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that
"guidelines shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the
implementation of this authority," and that "the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall
be determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created
under Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323." The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five
o’clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes
later. It was not shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations,
and the reason for the same have been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the
informal checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its operation. As
a result, motorists passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind
the instant exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists
did not have any choice but to submit to the PNP’s scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout
albeit innocent would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the motorist
and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.

In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As
conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of
fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere
employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the
extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was
any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano’s part to the search, and
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.152 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
We also cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that there was no valid consent to the search
because his consent was premised on his belief that there were no prohibited items in his bag. The
defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found does not automatically negate valid
consent to the search when incriminating items are found. His or her belief must be measured
against the totality of the circumstances.153 Again, petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to port
security measures and, as he claimed during trial, he was familiar with the security measures since
he had been traveling back and forth through the sea port.

Consequently, we find respondent’s argument that the present petition falls under a valid consented
search and during routine port security procedures meritorious. The search conducted on petitioner’s
bag is valid.

VI

The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is different from a customs search.

Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are allowed when
"persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . . effect search and seizure . . . in the
enforcement of customs laws."154 The Tariff and Customs Code provides the authority for such
warrantless search, as this court ruled in Papa, et al. v. Mago, et al.:155

The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs
Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a
dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said
cases.156 (Citation omitted)

The ruling in Papa was echoed in Salvador v. People,157 in that the state’s policy to combat
smuggling must not lose to the difficulties posed by the debate on whether the state has the duty to
accord constitutional protection to dutiable articles on which duty has not been paid, as with a
person’s papers and/or effects.158

Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s conducting the search
was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the search was for the enforcement of
customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house. Here, the facts reveal that
the search was part of routine port security measures. The search was not conducted by persons
authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code or other customs laws. Although customs searches usually occur within ports or terminals, it is
important that the search must be for the enforcement of customs laws.

VII

In violations of the Gun Ban, the accused must be "in possession of a firearm . . . outside of his
residence within the period of the election gun ban imposed by the COMELEC sans authority[.]"159

In Abenes v. Court of Appeals,160 this court enumerated the elements for a violation of the Gun Ban:
"1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; 2) such
possession occurs during the election period; and, 3) the weapon is carried in a public place."161 This
court also ruled that under the Omnibus Election Code, the burden to show that he or she has a
written authority to possess a firearm is on the accused.162
We find that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for violation of the Gun Ban. The
firearms were found inside petitioner’s bag. Petitioner did not present any valid authorization to carry
the firearms outside his residence during the period designated by the Commission on Elections. He
was carrying the firearms in the Cebu Domestic Port, which was a public place.

However, petitioner raised the following circumstances in his defense: (1) that he was a frequent
traveler and was, thus, knowledgeable about the security measures at the terminal; (2) that he left
his bag with a porter for a certain amount of time; and (3) that he voluntarily put his bag on the x-ray
machine for voluntary inspection. All these circumstances were left uncontested by the prosecution.

This court is now asked to determine whether these circumstances are sufficient to raise reasonable
doubt on petitioner’s guilt.

When petitioner claimed that someone planted the illegal firearms in his bag, the burden of evidence
to prove this allegation shifted to him. The shift in the burden of evidence does not equate to the
reversal of the presumption of innocence. In People v. Villanueva,163 this court discussed the
difference between burden of proof and burden of evidence, and when the burden of evidence shifts
to the accused:

Indeed, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only
the commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of
the person or persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but
remains in the prosecution throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in
discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of
the allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the
burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order
to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case.164 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Petitioner failed to negate the prosecution’s evidence that he had animus possidendi or the intent to
possess the illegal firearms. In People v. De Gracia,165 this court elucidated on the concept of animus
possidendi and the importance of the intent to commit an act prohibited by law as differentiated from
criminal intent.166 The accused was charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 resulting from the coup
d’etat staged in 1989 by the Reform Armed Forces Movement - Soldiers of the Filipino
People.167 This court held that the actions of the accused established his intent to possess the illegal
firearms:

When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary.
It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special
law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may
not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is,
by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be
criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done
freely and consciously.

In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to
possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal
possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to
possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other
criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm.
Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No.
1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the
accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same,
even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.

Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm

cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such
as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as
long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.

Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed
guilty of having intentionally possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the
requisite license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified
that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the
same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives marked in
evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then,
he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano
does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the
same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of
impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.

Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into
consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances.
What exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that
appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his
separation from the service for going on absence without leave (AWOL). We do not hesitate,
therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the dynamites,
"molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his
possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the
dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance on the import of
having in his possession such a large quantity of explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place
where the explosives were found is not a military camp or office, nor one where such items can
ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent
man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place intended to
carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the
trade of firearms and ammunition.168 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The disquisition in De Gracia on the distinction between criminal intent and intent to possess, which
is relevant to convictions for illegal possession of firearms, was reiterated in Del Rosario v.
People.169 This court ruled that "[i]n the absence of animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm
incurs no criminal liability."170

In this case, petitioner failed to prove that his possession of the illegal firearms seized from his bag
was "temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession[.]"171 As put by the trial court, petitioner’s
claim that anyone could have planted the firearms in his bag while it was unattended is
flimsy.172 There are dire consequences in accepting this claim at face value, particularly that no one
will be caught and convicted of illegal possession of firearms.

Courts must also weigh the accused’s claim against the totality of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. This includes determination of: (1) the motive of whoever allegedly planted the illegal
firearm(s); (2) whether there was opportunity to plant the illegal firearm(s); and (3) reasonableness of
the situation creating the opportunity.
Petitioner merely claims that someone must have planted the firearms when he left his bag with the
porter. He did not identify who this person could have been and he did not state any motive for this
person to plant the firearms in his possession, even if there was indeed an opportunity to plant the
firearms.

However, this court is mindful that, owing to the nature of his work, petitioner was a frequent traveler
who is well-versed with port security measures. We cannot accept that an average reasonable
person aware of travel security measures would leave his belongings with a stranger for a relatively
long period of time. Also, records show that petitioner had only one (1) bag. There was no evidence
to show that a robust young man like petitioner would have need of the porter’s services. The
defense did not identify nor present this porter with whom petitioner left his bag.

VIII

The trial court was correct when it dismissed Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for violation of Republic
Act No. 8294, otherwise known as illegal possession of firearms. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294
provides:

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Emphasis supplied)

Agote v. Judge Lorenzo173 already settled the question of whether there can be a "separate offense
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition if there is another crime committed[.]"174 In that
case, the petitioner was charged with both illegal possession of firearms and violation of the Gun
Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 2826.175 This court acquitted petitioner in the
case for illegal possession of firearms since he simultaneously violated the Gun Ban.176 This court
also held that the unlicensed firearm need not be actually used in the course of committing the other
crime for the application of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294.177

Similarly, Madrigal v. People178 applied the ruling in Agote and held that Section 1 of Republic Act No.
8294 is express in its terms that a person may not be convicted for illegal possession of firearms if
another crime was committed.179

IX

We note that the trial court imposed the penalty of imprisonment for a period of one (1) year and to
suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right to suffrage. Under Section 264
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, persons found guilty of an election offense "shall be punished with
imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to
probation."180 The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to offenses punished by both the Revised
Penal Code and special laws.181
The penalty to be imposed is a matter of law that courts must follow. The trial court should have
provided minimum and maximum terms for petitioner’s penalty of imprisonment as required by the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.182 Accordingly, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court. Based
on the facts, we deem it reasonable that petitioner be penalized with imprisonment of one (1) year as
minimum to two (2) years as maximum.183

The records are unclear whether petitioner is currently detained by the state or is out on bail.
Petitioner’s detention is relevant in determining whether he has already served more than the
penalty imposed upon him by the trial court as modified by this court, or whether he is qualified to
the credit of his preventive imprisonment with his service of sentence.

Article 29184 of the Revised Penal Code states:

ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. – Offenders or
accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone
preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of
the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any
crime; and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to
surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in
the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment. 1âwphi 1

Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty
(30) years.

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not
yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial
thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive
imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of
detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent
without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged
with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to
which the accused may be sentenced is lestierro [sic], he shall be released after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment.

In case credit of preventive imprisonment is due, petitioner must first signify his agreement to the
conditions set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.185 If petitioner has already served more
than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court, then his immediate release from custody is in
order unless detained for some other lawful cause.186
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 8, 2012
and the Resolution dated August 23, 2013 in CA-GR CEB CR No. 01606
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Erwin Libo-On Dela Cruz is sentenced to
imprisonment of one (1) year as minimum to two (2) years as maximum in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The period of his preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his
favor if he has given his written conformity to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and if he is not out
on bail.

SO ORDERED.

Alejandrino vs Quezon GR No
22041 11 September 1924

09 MondayMAR 2015

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

≈ LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente
de Vera. He was deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a senator.
He filed mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon
from executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void?
Decision: Petition dismissed. Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be
directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The
court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition.

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

DECISION
 (En Banc)

LAUREL, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest
against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following
day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will
not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding
the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
 The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the
election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in
any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed.
[W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PAQUITO OCHOA,

GR No. 204605, 2016-07-19
Facts:
the Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL)
It ultimately arrived at the conclusion that accession would benefit the country and help
raise the level of competitiveness for Filipino brands. Hence, it recommended in September
2011 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) that the Philippines should accede to the
Madrid Protocol.
After its own review, the DFA endorsed to the President the country's accession to the
Madrid Protocol.
the DFA determined that the Madrid Protocol was an executive agreement. The IPOPHL,
the Department of Science and Technology, and the Department of Trade and Industry
concurred in the recommendation of the DFA.
President Benigno C. Aquino III ratified the Madrid Protocol through an instrument of
accession. The instrument of accession was deposited with the Director General of the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on April 25, 2012,[8] The Madrid Protocol
entered into force in the Philippines on July 25, 2012
IPAP, an association of more than 100 law firms and individual practitioners in Intellectual
Property Law... has commenced this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition... to
challenge the validity of the President's accession to the Madrid Protocol without the
concurrence of the Senate
According to the IPAP, the Madrid Protocol is a treaty, not an executive agreement; hence,
respondent DFA Secretary Albert Del Rosario acted with grave abuse of discretion in
determining the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement.
The IPAP has argued that the implementation of the Madrid Protocol in the Philippines,
specifically the processing of foreign trademark applications, conflicts with the IP Code,[14]
whose Section 125 states
The IPAP has insisted that Article 2 of the Madrid Protocol means that foreign trademark
applicants may file their applications through the International Bureau or the WIPO, and
their applications will be automatically granted trademark protection without the need for
designating their resident agents in the country.
The IPAP has prayed that the implementation of the Madrid Protocol in the Philippines be
restrained in order to prevent future wrongs considering that the IPAP and its constituency
have a clear and unmistakable right not to be deprived of the rights granted them by the IP
Code and existing local laws.
Issues:
Whether or not the President's ratification of the Madrid Protocol is valid and constitutional;
Whether or not the Madrid Protocol is in conflict with the IP Code.
Ruling:
Accession to the Madrid Protocol was constitutional
International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of
treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-
established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or
less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.
In view of the expression of state policy having been made by the Congress itself, the IPAP
is plainly mistaken in asserting that "there was no Congressional act that authorized the
accession of the Philippines to the Madrid Protocol."
Accordingly, DFA Secretary Del Rosario's determination and treatment of the Madrid
Protocol as an executive agreement, being in apparent contemplation of the express state
policies on intellectual property as well as within his power under Executive Order No. 459,
are upheld.
There is no conflict between the Madrid Protocol and the IP Code
The IPAP also rests its challenge on the supposed conflict between the Madrid Protocol and
the IP Code, contending that the Madrid Protocol does away with the requirement of a
resident agent under Section 125 of the IP Code; and that the Madrid Protocol is
unconstitutional for being in conflict with the local law, which it cannot modify,The IPAP's
contentions stand on a faulty premise. The method of registration through the IPOPHL, as
laid down by the IP Code, is distinct and separate from the method of registration through
the WIPO, as set in the Madrid Protocol. Comparing the two methods of registration despite
their being governed by two separate systems of registration is thus misplaced.In arguing
that the Madrid Protocol conflicts with Section 125 of the IP Code, the IPAP highlights the
importance of the requirement for the designation of a resident agent, It underscores that
the requirement is intended to ensure that non-resident entities seeking protection or
privileges under Philippine Intellectual Property Laws will be subjected to the country's
jurisdiction. It submits that without such resident agent, there will be a need to resort to
costly, time consuming and cumbersome extraterritorial service of writs and
processes.[37]The IPAP misapprehends the procedure for examination under the Madrid
Protocol. The difficulty, which the IPAP illustrates, is minimal, if not altogether inexistent.
The IPOPHL actually requires the designation of the resident agent when it refuses the
registration of a mark. Local representation is further required in the submission of the
Declaration of Actual Use, as well as in the submission of the license contract.[38] The
Madrid Protocol accords with the intent and spirit of the IP Code, particularly on the subject
of the registration of trademarks. The Madrid Protocol does not amend or modify the IP
Code on the acquisition of trademark rights considering that the applications under the
Madrid Protocol are still examined according to the relevant national law. In that regard, the
IPOPHL will only grant protection to a mark that meets the local registration requirements.
Principles:
The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks {Madrid System), which is the
centralized system providing a one-stop solution for registering and managing marks
worldwide, allows the trademark owner to file one application in one language, and to pay
one set of fees to protect his mark in the territories of up to 97 member-states.[2] The
Madrid System is governed by the Madrid Agreement, concluded in 1891, and the Madrid
Protocol, concluded in 1989.
The Madrid Protocol, which was adopted in order to remove the challenges deterring some
countries from acceding to the Madrid Agreement, has two objectives, namely: (1) to
facilitate securing protection for marks; and (2) to make the management of the registered
marks easier in different countries.

148 Phil. 443

FERNANDO, J.:
A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if any, to
be attached to a statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of this
appeal from a lower court decision. Plaintiff Francisca Serrano
de Agbayani, now appellee, was able to obtain a favorable judgment in her
suit against defendant, now appellant Philippine National Bank,
permanently enjoining the other defendant, the Provincial Sheriff
of Pangasinan, from proceeding with an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of
land belonging to plaintiff mortgaged to appellant Bank to secure a loan
declared no longer enforceable, the prescriptive period having
lapsed. There was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant
that if the moratorium under an Executive Order and later an Act
subsequently found unconstitutional were to be counted in the
computation, then the right to foreclose the mortgage was still
subsisting. In arriving at such a conclusion, the lower court manifested a
tenacious adherence to the inflexible view that an unconstitutional act is
not a law, creating no rights and imposing no duties, and thus as
inoperative as if it had never been. It was oblivious to the force of the
principle adopted by this Court that while a statute's repugnancy to the
fundamental law deprives it of its character as a juridical norm, its having
been operative prior to its being nullified is a fact that is not devoid of legal
consequences. As will hereafter be explained, such a failing of the lower
court resulted in an erroneous decision. We find for appellant Philippine
National Bank, and we reverse.
There is no dispute as to the facts. Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount
of P450.00 from defendant Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19,
1944, secured by real estate mortgage duly registered covering property
described in T. C.T. No. 11275 of the province of Pangasinan. As of
November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of
P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant instituted extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff
of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining
unpaid. Plaintiff countered with this suit against both defendants on
August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage sought to be
foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date
of maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was
made permanent in the decision now on appeal. Defendant Bank in its
answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory
the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March
10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32[1] was issued, to July 26, 1948, when
the subsequent legislative act[2] extending the period of moratorium was
declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time
during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As
noted, the lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided
the suit in favor of plaintiff.
Hence this appeal, which, as made clear at the outset, possesses merit,
there being a failure on the part of the lower court to adhere to the
applicable constitutional doctrine as to the effect to be given to a statute
subsequently declared invalid.
1. The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal
ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of
any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under
it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in
its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil
Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."[3] It
is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot
survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It
may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that
prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive
act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may
have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a
subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such
legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect
awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure
is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power
of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official."[4] This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution
in Araneta v. Hill[5] and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v.
Flores.[6] An even more recent instance is the opinion of
Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co.[7]
2. Such an approach all the more commends itself whenever police power
legislation intended to promote public welfare but adversely affecting
property rights is involved. While subject to be assailed on due process,
equal protection and non-impairment grounds, all that is required to avoid
the corrosion of invalidity is that the rational basis or reasonableness test is
satisfied. The legislature on the whole is not likely to allow an enactment
suffering, to paraphrase Cardozo, from the infirmity of outrunning the
bounds of reason and resulting in sheer oppression. It may be of course
that if challenged, an adverse judgment could be the result, as its running
counter to the Constitution could still be shown. In the meanwhile though,
in the normal course of things, it has been acted upon by the public and
accepted as valid. To ignore such a fact would indeed be the fruitful parent
of injustice. Moreover, as its constitutionality is conditioned on its being
fair or reasonable, which in turn is dependent on the actual situation, never
static but subject to change, a measure valid when enacted may
subsequently, due to altered circumstances, be stricken down.
That is precisely what happened in connection with Republic Act No. 342,
the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32,
issued by the then President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of
payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war
sufferers. So it was explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban[8] where such
enactment was considered in 1953 "unreasonable and oppressive, and
should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should
be declared null and void and without effect."[9] At the time of the issuance
of the above Executive Order in 1945 and of the passage of such Act in 1948,
there was a factual justification for the moratorium. The Philippines was
confronted with an emergency of impressive magnitude at the time of her
liberation from the Japanese military forces in 1945. Business was at a
standstill. Her economy lay prostrate. Measures, radical measures, were
then devised to tide her over until some semblance of normalcy could be
restored and an improvement in her economy noted. No wonder then that
the suspension of enforcement of payment of the obligations then existing
was declared first by executive order and then by legislation. The Supreme
Court was right therefore in rejecting the contention that on its face, the
Moratorium Law was unconstitutional, amounting as it did to the
impairment of the obligation of contracts. Considering the circumstances
confronting the legitimate government upon its return to the Philippines,
some such remedial device was needed and badly so. An unyielding
insistence then on the right to property on the part of the creditors was not
likely to meet with judicial sympathy. Time passed however, and
conditions did change.
When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question before it
was its satisfying the rational basis test, not as of the time of its enactment
but as of such date. Clearly, if then it were found unreasonable, the right to
non-impairment of contractual obligations must prevail over the assertion
of community power to remedy an existing evil. The Supreme Court was
convinced that such indeed was the case. As stated in the opinion of Justice
Bautista Angelo: "But we should not lose sight of the fact that these
obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of
Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still
inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would
continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to
prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves,
which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a
vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could affect a liquidation of
their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us
unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is
plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to
creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to
effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are
unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the
debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief,
unlike similar statutes in the United States."[10] The conclusion to which the
foregoing considerations inevitably led was that as of the time of
adjudication, it was apparent that Republic Act No. 342 could not survive
the test of validity. Executive Order No. 32 should likewise be
nullified. That before the decision they were not constitutionally infirm was
admitted expressly. There is all the more reason then to yield assent to the
now prevailing principle that the existence of a statute or executive order
prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached.
3. Precisely though because of the judicial recognition that moratorium
was a valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were
war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases
impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period
that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force,
prescription did not run. So it has been held from Day v. Court of First
Instance,[11] decided in 1954, to Republic v. Hernaez,[12] handed down only
last year. What is deplorable is that as of the time of the lower court
decision on January 27, 1960, at least eight decisions had left no doubt as to
the prescriptive period being tolled in the meanwhile prior to such
adjudication of invalidity.[13] Speaking of the opposite view entertained by
the lower court, the present Chief Justice, in Liboro v. Finance and Mining
Investments Corp.[14] has categorized it as having been "explicitly and
consistently rejected by this Court."[15]
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus
manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959,
when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant
Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive
period was tolled, however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of
Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v.
Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight
days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the
foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before
prescription could be availed of as a defense.
WHEREFORE, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit
of plaintiff filed August 10, 1959 dismissed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz
Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

League of Cities v. Comelec

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood
Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took
effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
“the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective,
not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a
city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort
to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage
of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government
Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council

Facts:

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC
as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of
Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either
divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism,
as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

Issue:
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
met in this case?

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are
present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is
put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
“personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition
for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the
Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts
all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the
very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy.
The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern,
not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the

Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,

and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated

Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the

private sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and
places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the
regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part
lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the
JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a
representative of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and
leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from
the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non
est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress”
used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being
referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the
JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose,
that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads
the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting
process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered
illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to
presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said
provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress.
Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress,
the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers.
An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a
vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case
of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the
JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no

duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed
at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
This is essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy
or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.
202242, July 17, 2012)

SALONGA vs PAÑO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by
the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the
filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and
prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute
him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the
months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims
of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary
Investigation” in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused),
stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock
p.m. on December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the
charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The
petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite
assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any
copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen.
Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the
violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the
counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani
Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City)
denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an
information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people,
including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January
1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no
prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information
against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence
against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the
Supreme Court

Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s
judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and
separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted
the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the
petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its
evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused
in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw
the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in
the Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is
concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the
prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it
has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was
clearly apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the
extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could
validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the
Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers under martial law.
Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and
development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the
Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was
moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from
promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.

nd 4 readily shows that these are distinct andindependent provisions. It is true that the proviso
in Section 3(d) disqualifies lawenforcement officers from being admitted into the Program
when they "testify beforeany judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating
authority." This is thegeneral rule. However, Section 4 provides for a specific and separate
situationwhere a witness testifies before a legislative investigation. An investigation by
alegislative committee does not fall under the category of "any investigating authority"referred to
in Section 3. Section 4 contains only a proviso that the witness'admission to the Program must
be recommended by the legislative committee when

in its judgment there is a pressing necessity therefor and said recommendation isapproved by
the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may
be. Section 4 does not contain any provisosimilar to Sec. 3(d) as quoted above, nor does
Section 4 refer to the application of the proviso under Section 3. In other words, Section 4 did
not make any qualificationor distinction.It is basic under the law on statutory construction that
where the law does notdistinguish, courts should not distinguish.
5
The operation of a proviso is usually andproperly confined to the clause or distinct portion of the
enactment whichimmediately precedes it or to which it pertains, and does not extend to or
qualifyother sections or portions of the statute, unless the legislative intent that it shall sooperate
is clearly disclosed.
6
In the present case, it is clear that the legislative intent that the proviso under Section 3(d) of
R.A. No. 6981 does not apply to Section 4. The trial court did not err in concluding that if the
framers of the law intended otherwise, they could haveeasily placed the same proviso of
Section 3(d) or referred to it under Section 4.Hence, in the absence of a clear proviso or
reference to Section 3(d), a witness in alegislative investigation whether or not he is a
law enforcement officer, may beadmitted into the Program subject only to the requirements
provided for under Section 4. It is not disputed that the Senate Committee on Justice and
HumanRights, chaired by then Senator Raul Roco, had recommended the admission of SPO2
delos Reyes and dela Cruz into the Program and was duly indorsed by thenSenate President
Edgardo J. Angara.
WHEREFORE,
we
DENY DUE COURSE
to the petition and
AFFIRM
the assaileddecision.SO ORDERED

GP vs Monte de Piedad
Doctrine of Parens Patria
GP VS MONTE DE PIEDAD
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the
Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions
amounting to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of
an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable
institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of
$80,000 as a loan.

In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000.
The respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement.

On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-
General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with
interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in
favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency,
together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.

The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question
the competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could
be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.

Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent
bank for the reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?
Discussions:
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the
rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the
public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the
people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in
representation of the legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens
patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general
superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that
power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and
often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to
those who cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of
vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens
patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change of
government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department,
ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a
clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN v. QUEZON CITY, GR No. 225442,

2017-08-08
Facts:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew
for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their
curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part
of "Oplan Rody."[3]
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents:
Petitioners,[9] spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an
association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in
particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors[10] - filed this
present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a)
result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for
vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process;[16] and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and
for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.
Issues:
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The petition is partly granted.
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial
power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies
involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable
They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts
with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status
offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias."[31] In light of the foregoing,
petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-
ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the
[Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
petition[.]"[32] This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or
regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,"[33] as in this case. Hence,
petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review. "The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case."[34] In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
 1. Actual Case or Controversy.

there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis
of existing law and jurisprudence.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy
in this case given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the
Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the
Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344.

2. Legal Standing.

[Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a
consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act."
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal
standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's right to travel,[43] because: (a) she was still
a minor at the time the petition was filed before this Court,[44] and, hence, a proper subject
of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at
night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew
Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro
Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in
the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage.
Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any
direct injury as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances
violate the parents' right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before
this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been
infringed. I
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal
personality to bring an action in court.[45] Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue,
SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its members who
were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the
controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged
violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.
Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and
take cognizance of the suit.
Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a
relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing
sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled
discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in
these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they
were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the
suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted
arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires
enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said
ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to show his
age.[
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."[48]
They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not
prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the
provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of
a suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal
provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness
doctrine.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law
enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law
when implementing ordinances.
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because RA
10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory
law.[53] Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,[54] minors
caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its
provisions.[
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children. Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances
are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the
rearing of the youth without substantive due process.
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the
rights of parents in the rearing of their children: Section 12. The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over
their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously.
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when
actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the
child, the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate interests."[66] Thus, "[i]n cases in
which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or
welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified
right to control the upbringing of their children."[67]
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children,[70] and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill
their parental obligations.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the
minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) -
accompanied by their parents.
This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are
effectively given unfettered authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when
they are able to supervise them.
In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to
apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their
minors' activities.[74] As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit
reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors'
right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore,
necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny te
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine,
considering that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech
or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern Hemisphere),[80] this Court explained that "the
application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to
the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"[81] viz.:
In Virginia v. Hicks,[84] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed
against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related
conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression."'[85]... transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression."'[85]
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this
case, there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this
Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right[88] under Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines
to other countries or within the Philippines.[89] It is a right embraced within the general
concept of liberty.[
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other
rights, such as the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion
As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State[96] may impose limitations on the exercise
of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health; and (2) are provided by law.[97]
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety
and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences
and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability
of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to
the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is
replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children,...
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local
government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise
constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess
and enjoy constitutional rights,[108] but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as
those of adults.[
In Bellotti,[117] the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential
treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of
children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner;
and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing:[118]
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways.
But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses,
whether in work or in other things, this difference may be magnified.[12... i) interferes with
the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications.[122] The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification
either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.[123] The intermediate
scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental
rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.[124] Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the
first two tests.[125]
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no
less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test[126] is the applicable test.
Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to
achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.[132]... a.
Compelling State Interest.
This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for
them as parens patriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the
Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of
public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and
to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include
themselves. A
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and
Manila presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming
prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective
localities.[139] Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact
curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general welfare clause.[140] In
this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in
fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect
to minors. A... b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid
conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.[1
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that
only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila
and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew,
namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian;
(b) those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication
facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by
virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00
p.m.; and (d) those working at night.[146] For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more
exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who
attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office; (d)
those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the
supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them;
(f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the
curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve,
New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and
All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunda
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their
exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms.
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from
engaging in legitimate non-school or non-church activities in the streets or going to and from
such activities; thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve
and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious
activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults,... Third, the Navotas
Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend
city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably
assemble and to free expression.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their
exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew
regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental
rights.
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City
Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association,
free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the
protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by
enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school
or church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and
of free expression are also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the
official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew hours.
Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently
safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance
Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the age
and frequency of violations, to wit: SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child
or youth violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows: (a) If the offender
is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the
youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising
parental authority. (b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18)
years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be: For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and
Admonition; For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about
the legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and For the THIRD AND
SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court,
PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by the Punong Barangay with the office of the
City Prosecutor.[156] (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors
these sanctions - i.e., (a) community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d)
imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the
imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:... what
they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of
intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and
expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor.
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition
are clearly not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive
on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform
and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as
to aid him in his future conduct.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided
in our various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of
the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to
promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the
Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the
only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this
interest.
In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable
minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and
therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been
construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement,
however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit. In fine, the Manila and
Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon
City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.
Principles:
i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.