FUJIKI vs MARINAY

G.R. No. 196049, January 26, 2013

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the Decision of the RTC in
dismissing the petition for “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage) based on improper venue and lack of personality of petitioner Minoru Fujiki to file the petition.

Minori Fujiki, a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz Marinay in the Philippines, however they
lost contact with each other since he could not bring Marinay to Japan because her marriage with the
respondent did not sit well with the petitioner’s family.

Then Marinay married Shinichi Maekara in Quezon City while the first marriage is still subsisting. Maekara
brought her to Japan where she allegedly suffered physical abuse. Marinay then contacted Fujiki and
rekindled their relationship.

Fujiki helped Marinay to obtain a judgement from the family court of Japan declaring the Marriage of
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki then filed a petition for the Judicial Declaration
of Foreign Judgment praying that (1) The Japan’s Family Court decision be recognized (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41
of the Family Code of the Philippines and (3) to order the Local Civil Registry of Quezon City to annotate
the Foreign Judgment in the Certificate of Marriage of Marinay and Maekara which the RTC dismissed.

RTC based its ruling in A.M. No 02-11-10 SC taking in the view that only the “husband or wife” in this case
only Marinay and Maekara can file the petition to declare their marriage void and not Fujiki. Fujiki moved
that the Order be reconsidered establishing that (1) the status and concomitant of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact that the Japanese Court rendered its decision declaring the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy is consistent with Article 35(4) of the
Family Code of the Philippines and therefore entitled to the recognition of Philippine Courts.

The Solicitor General also filed its comment favoring Fujiki as having the personality to file such petition
since Fujiki is the spouse of the first marriage is an injured party who can sue to declare the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The OSG contended that the Foreign Judgement be recognized in
accordance of a Rule 108 of proceedings.

Issue/s:

1. Whether A.M. No. 02-10-11 SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages is
applicable.
2. Whether a husband or a wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy.
3. Whether the RTC can recognize the Foreign Judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:

The Court grants the petition. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply when one of the spouses is a
citizen of a foreign country. It also doesn’t apply when the reason for the petition is bigamy.

1. A.M. No. 02-10-11-SC is not applicable, the Court held that if “every judgment of a foreign country
was reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of
action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation. Hence for the Philippine Courts
to recognize a foreign judgment to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country, the citizen only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court like the copy of a foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
under Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25 in relation to Rule 39 Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. The
Philippine Courts under Article 15 of the Civil Code must also determine if the foreign judgment
is consistent to domestic public policy and other mandatory laws to be effective.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
2. Fujiki has the personality to file the petition since it concerns his civil status as married to Marinay.
For the same reason he has also the personality under Rule 108 to file for the correction or
cancellation the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC also does not
preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of the subsequent marriage on
the ground of bigamy thus the husband or the wife of the prior marriage has the personality to
file such petition.
3. Upon the recognition of the foreign judgment, the right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition
of the of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is subsequent event that establishes
a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, thee will be
an inconsistency, between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the
public records in the Philippines.
 LAPUZ vs. EUFEMIO

G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972

Facts:

This is a petition for review by certiorari dismissing the case of legal separation on the ground of the death
of therein plaintiff Carmela Lapuz Sy during the pendency of the case. Macano Lapuz, the heir of the
plaintiff sought to substitute the deceased and to have case prosecuted to final judgment.

Carmela Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio alleging that they were
married on 1934 and had lived together as husband and wife until 1943 when her husband abandoned
her. They had no child and acquired several properties during their marriage when she discovered that
her husband was cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok. She prayed for the issuance of the
decree of legal separation and order that the defendant be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.

Eufemio filed his second amended answer claiming for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage
with Carmela on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage celebrated according to the Chinese law
and customs with one Go Hiok. However, before the trial could be proceeded Carmela died in a vehicular
accident.

Eufemio ordered for the dismissal of the case due to the death of the petitioner that abated the action
for legal separation. The counsel of the petitioner moved to substitute the deceased by her father,
Macario Lapuz. The court dismissed the case and the court ruled in negative that the cause of action has
survived because of the said substitution. Macario Lapuz filed a petition for review of the order of
dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court.

Issue:

Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation abate the action? If it
does will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?

Ruling:

Judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is affirmed.

Action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the
spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing
the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that
the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the
action causes the death of the action itself – action personalis moritur cum persona.

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the
expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.