A legislature is a kind of deliberative assembly with the power to

pass, amend, and repeallaws.[1] The law created by a legislature is

called legislation or statutory law. In addition toenacting laws,
legislatures usually have exclusive authority to raise or
lower taxes and adopt thebudget and other money bills.
Legislatures are known by many names, the most common
being parliament and congress, although these terms also have
more specific meanings.

Legislative intent
In law, the legislative intent of the legislature in
enacting legislation may sometimes be considered by
the judiciary when interpreting the law (see judicial interpretation).
The judiciary may attempt to assess legislative intent where
legislation is ambiguous, or does not appear to directly or
adequately address a particular issue, or when there appears to
have been a legislative drafting error.
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts have said,
repeatedly, that the inquiry into legislative intent ends at that point. It
is only when a statute could be interpreted in more than one fashion
that legislative intent must be inferred from sources other than the
actual text of the statute.

Sources of legislative intent

Courts frequently look to the following sources in attempting to
determine the goals and purposes that the legislative body had in
mind when it passed the law:
 the text of the bill as proposed to the legislative body,
 amendments to the bill that were proposed and accepted or rejected,
 the record of hearings on the topic,
 legislative records or journals,
 speeches and floor debate made prior to the vote on the bill,
 legislative subcommittee minutes, factual findings, and/or reports,
 other relevant statutes which can be used to understand the
definitions in the statute on question,
 other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in
question,
 legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or
president,

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 case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the
problems the legislature was attempting to address with the bill, or
 constitutional determinations (i.e. "Would Congress still have
passed certain sections of a statute 'had it known' about the
constitutional invalidity of the other portions of the statute?").
 legislative intent- the reason for passing the law
literal meaning or plain meaning rule. If the statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
you get the meaning of the law from the word per word written law. Literal
meaning or plain rule means INTERPRETATION of the LAW. ALL WORDS words
in a statute should if possible, be given effect.

Where a statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or

phrase should not, by CONSTRUCTION, be given a different meaning. When
the legislature defines a word used in a statute, it does not usurp the courts
function to interpret the laws but it merely LEGISLATES what should form part
of the law itself.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to define words, words and
phrases used in statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning which is supported by the maximgeneralia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda or what is generally spoken shall be generally
understood. It is also the same as GENERALI DICTUM GENERALITIR EST
INTERPRETANDUM a general statement is understood in a general sense.

WORDS MUST BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTENT

and not intent to words.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the
law does not distinguish, do not distinguish.

dura lex sed lex or HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX
SCRIPTA EST.
The law maybe harsh, but is still the law. It is exceedingly hard,
but so the law is written.

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Doctrine of necessary implication this doctrine states
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as
that which is expressed. Every statute is understand by implication
to contain all such provision as may be necessary to effectuate to its
object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. The
principle is expressed in the maxim EX NECESSITATE LEGIS or from the
necessity of the law.

ejusdem generis . THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE. This is to give

effect to both the particular and general words, by treating
the particular words as indicating the class and the general
words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although
not specifically named by the particular words.
The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used to
carry out, not to defeat the intent or purpose of the law; the rule must give
way in favor of the legislative intent;

limitations of ejusdem generis

requisites:
1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific
words, followed by a general word or phrase;
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are
of the same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is
not exhaustive or is not merely by examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general
words or phrases a broader meaning.
expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
the expression of 1 person, thing or consequence IMPLIES
the EXCLUSION of OTHERS or
What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

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EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM, where a Statute,
by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or CONSTRUCTION, be extended to
other matters.
These also follows that when a statute specifically lists downs the exceptions,
what is not list down as an exception is ACCEPTED express in the
maxim EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS,
the express exception, exemption or savings excludes others.

application of expressio unius rule. This auxiliary rule

is used in CONSTRUCTIONof statutes granting
powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights,
andimposing penalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes which are
strictly construed. It is only a tool and not a mandatory rule used for
ascertaining the legislative intent. The rule must also yield to legislative
intent.

negative- opposite doctrine, WHAT IS EXPRESSED

PUTS AN END TO WHAT IS IMPLIED is known as negative-opposite
doctrine or argumentum a contrario.

doctrine of casus omissus (case of

omission) pro omisso habendus est. A person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held
to have been omitted intentionally. This rule is not absolute if it
can be shown that the legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing or
object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly indicated, the
COURT may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the intent of the
legislature and will not do violence to its language.

doctrine of last antecedent or AD PROXIMUM

ANTECEDENS FIAL RELATIO NISI IMPEDIATUR
SENTENTIA or relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the
context otherwise requires. QUALIFYING WORDS restrict or modify only
the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated.

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The last antecedent rule is a doctrine of interpretation of
a statute, by which "Referential and qualifying phrases, where no contrary
intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent." The rule is typically
bound by "common sense" and is flexible enough to avoid application that
"would involve an absurdity, do violence to the plain intent of the language, or
if the context for other reason requires a deviation from the rule." Evidence
that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all
antecedents instead of only to the immediately
preceding one may be found in the fact that it is
separated from the antecedents by a comma."

reddendo singula singulis when

two
descriptions makes it impossible to reconcile,
reconcile it to have a “singular meaning” to
settle the issue.
refers to each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put
in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken DISTRIBUTIVELY to
effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by
context most appropriate related and to which it is most applicable.

REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS, construction. By

rendering each his own; for example, when two
descriptions of property are given together in one
mass, both the next of kin and the heir cannot take,
unless in cases where a construction can be made
reddendo singula singulis, that the next of kin shall
take the personal estate and the heir at law the real
estate. 14 Ves. 490. Vide 11 East,, 513, n.; Bac. Ab.
Conditions, L.

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Stare Decisis [Latin, Let the decision stand.] The policy of courts
to abide by or adhere to principles established by decisions in earlier
cases. (stah-ray duh-see-sis) n. Latin for "to stand by a decision," the
doctrine that a trial court is bound by appellate court decisions
(precedents) on a legal question which is raised in the lower
court. Reliance on such precedents is required of trial courts until
such time as an appellate court changes the rule, for the trial court
cannot ignore the precedent (even when the trial judge believes it
is "bad law")

Res Judicata [Latin, A thing adjudged.] A rule that a final

judgment on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is conclusive
between the parties to a suit as to all matters that were litigated or
that could have been litigated in that suit.
The party asserting res judicata, having introduced a final judgment
on the merits, must then show that the decision in the first lawsuit
was conclusive as to the matters in the second suit. For example,
assume that the plaintiff in the first lawsuit asserted that she was
injured in an auto accident. She sues the driver of the other auto
under a theory of Negligence. A jury returns a verdict that finds
that the defendant was not negligent. The injured driver then
files a second lawsuit alleging additional facts that would help her
prove that the other driver was negligent. A court would
dismiss the second lawsuit under res judicata because
the second lawsuit is based on the same Cause of
Action (negligence) and the same injury claim.

Obiter Dictum[Latin, By the way.] Words of an

opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case. A remark made or
opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a cause, "by the way", that is,
incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court
or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding
as precedent.

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AEQUITAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT
LEGIS . EQUITY never acts in contravention of the
law.
The reason of the Law is the Life of the Law
or RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA.
Interpretation and CONSTRUCTION of Statutes
must be done to avoid evil and injustice. EA EST
ACCIPIENDA INTERPRETATIO QUAE VITIO CARET.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat, the interpretation that will give the thing the EFFICACY is
to be adopted. Law must receive sensible interpretation to promote
the ends for which they are enacted. They should be given practical
CONSTRUCTION that will give LIFE to them, IF IT CAN BE DONE
without doing VIOLENCE to reason.

UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, A STATUTE must

be interpreted to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole
avoiding the nullification of provisions. IT is so that a legal provision
must not be so construed as to be a useless SURPLUSAGE.
Accordingly, in case of Doubt or obscurity, that construction should
make the statute fully operative and effective. IT IS PRESUMED
THAT THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT DO A VAIN THING IN THE
ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE.

In PARE MATERIA, of the same person or thing.

INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS
EST OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS, or every
statute must be so CONSTRUED and harmonized with other statutes
as to form a uniform system of Jurisprudence. ALL laws are
presumed to be consistent with each other.

DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET CONCORDABIS JURA,

distinguish times and you will harmonize laws.

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IN enacting a STATUTE, the legislature is presumed to have been
aware, and taken into account, PRIOR LAWS on the subject of
legislation. Thus, conflict on same subject is not intended and if
such occur, Court must construe, through reconciliation to give
effect to the statute. If it is impossible to reconcile and
harmonize, one statute has to give way to the other. The
latest statute shall prevail being the latest expression of the
legislative WILL.

A GENERAL LAW and a SPECIAL LAW are in pare materia. The

fact that one is general and the other special creates a presumption
that the special act is to be considered as remaining an exception of
the General Act. One as a General Law of the Land, the other
as a LAW for a Particular case. This shall apply all the time
regardless of which law was enacted first.

CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTIONS or CONTEMPORARY

CONSTRUCTIONS are made by the EXECUTIVE Departments.
First type of Contemporary Constructions are the interpretations
of the Executive on Statutes, for them to implement it, they must
understand it and interpret it if the language of the law is
AMBIGUOUS. The executive makes RULES or IRRs for this statutes,
or ADMINISTRATIVE RULES and PROCEDURES. These IRRs or
RULES issued by the executive to execute the Statute are
CONTEMPORARY Construction.
Second Type of Contemporary Constructions are the
INTERPRETATIONS of the JUSTICE Secretary in carrying out PENAL
LAWS and all OTHER LAWS, under her are the PROSECUTORS,
FISCALS of the Philippine Republic. The issuances on how laws are
to be prosecuted are CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION of the
Justice Secretary.
The third type are the DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES handling disputes in a QUASI-JUDICIAL MANNER. These
decisions are based on their UNDERSTANDING of Statutes passed
by congress, laws that are enforced. These are CONTEMPORARY
INTERPRETATIONS and Constructions.

THESE CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS STATUTES HAPPEN,

WHEN THERE ARENO ACTUAL CONTROVERSIES
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QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF STATUTES IN THE
SUPREME COURT, therefore,NO STARE DECISIS HAVE YET BEEN
MADE. IF THERE ARE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND
CONSTRUCTIONS, THEN THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS ARE
governing and are THE ONES followed BY THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS once promulgated by the Supreme Court.

CONGRESS, NOT BEING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY POWER TO

INTERPRET AND CONSTRUE THE LAWS THEY MAKE, MAY ALSO DO
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION IN FOLLOWING STATUTES THAT
THEY THEMSELVES ARE BOUND TO FOLLOW.

WITH THE GRANT OF POWERS, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES IS

ALSO THE RIGHT TO INCIDENTAL POWERS OF THE
POWERS, RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES. THE GREATER POWER
IMPLIES INCIDENTAL LESSER POWER. This is so because
the greater includes the lesser as expressed in the
maxim, in eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus.THERE
SHALL BE NO CONSTRUCTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO A LAW
THAT SHALL MAKE IT MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT WAS
INTENDED BY THE LAW.

Every statute is understood by IMPLICATION, to contain such

provisions as maybe necessary to EFFECTUATE its object and
purpose, or to make effective Rights, powers, privileges or
JURISDICTION which it grants, including all such COLLATERAL and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and LOGICALLY inferred
from its TERMS, as expressed in the maxim, Ex necessitate
legis or from the NECESSITY of the LAW. Doctrine of Necessary
Implication.
WHAT CANNOT BE DONE DIRECTLY CANNOT BE DONE
INDIRECTLY. QUANDO ALIQUID PROHIBETUR EX DIRECTO,
PROHIBETUR ET PER OBLIQUUM.

WHAT IS AUTOLIMITATION?
Doctrine of Autolimitation—It is the doctrine where the Philippines
adheres to principles of international law as a limitation to the
exercise of its sovereignty.

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Functus officio an officer or agency whose mandate has expired either
because of the arrival of an expiry date or because an agency has
accomplished the purpose for which it was created. Function is mere
FORMALITY.

Sin perjuico judgments are judgment, w/o any stated

facts in support of the conclusion.

RULES in STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The solemn decisions of the judges upon a statute become
part of the statute ; and the security of men's lives and property, require
that they should be adhered to:for precedents serve to regulate our conduct ;
and there is more danger to be apprehended from uncertainty, than from
any exposition; because, when the rule is settled, men know how to
conform to it; but, when all is uncertain, they are left in the dark, and
constantly liable to error; for the same offence which, at one time, was
thought entitled to clergy, at another, may be deemed capital ; and thus the
life or death of the citizen will be made to depend, not upon a fixt rule, but
upon the opinion of the judge, who may happen to try him, than which a more
miserable state of things cannot be conceived.

1. Presumption of Correctness
a. "When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, courts shall presume
the statute to be valid." Consequently, the burden to show the constitutional
defect is on the challenger. "Every act of the legislature is presumed
to be constitutional, and the Constitution is to be given a liberal
construction so as to sustain the enactment in question, if
practicable." "When the constitutionality of an act is challenged, a heavy
burden of proof is thrust upon the party making the challenge . All laws are
presumed to be constitutional and this presumption is one of the strongest
known to the law.

b. "Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in

enacting statutes, the CONGRESS has full knowledge of existing law and
interpretations thereof . Although the repeal of statutes by implication is not
favored, if two statutes are in pari materia, then to the extent that their
provisions are irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant, the latter
enactment repeals or amends the earlier enacted statute.
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 "The legislature is presumed to know the law when
c.

enacting legislation.
d. When amendments are enacted soon after controversies
arise "as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical
to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of
the original act, a formal change-rebutting the presumption
of substantial change.
e. " We "assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it
used when it enacted the relevant statute."

f.when current and prior versions of a statute are at

issue, there is a presumption that the CONGRESS, in amending a
statute, intended to effect a substantive change in the law.
"Further, we assume that CONGRESS’ amendments to a statute
are purposeful, rather than unnecessary.
g. "The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed that it is a presumption of
statutory construction that, where both
general and specific statutes appear to
address a matter, CONGRESS intends the specific statute to control the
subject
h. "When a statute begins with the phrase "notwithstanding any other
provision of law," it is presumed that CONGRESS intended to override
any potential conflicts with earlier legislation.
i. "The construction of statutes by agencies charged
with administration of those statutes is entitled to
great weight. A decision of an agency specified to execute the law
made by CONGRESS carries great weight and is entitled to deference
unless it is proven the agency erred. The grant of regulatory authority
extends only to duties or powers conferred by law. As such,
"regulations, promulgated pursuant to definitive statutory authority, have
the force and effect of law. Moreover, those regulations which "clearly and
explicitly mirror" statutory authority are likeliest to be sustained. Any
regulation of the Department must be reasonably grounded in an

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identifiable and definitive statutory foundation. "Generally, the court
accords substantial deference to an agency's interpretations of its own
regulations. Provided the interpretation "does not violate the
Constitution, it must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
j. we will overturn COURT’s decision only if it can be fairly
characterized as "arbitrary or capricious" and thus a "clear abuse of
delegated discretion." On the other hand, an "agency does not
possess specialized competence over the interpretation of a statute
merely because it addresses topics within the agency's
delegable authority. Pure statutory construction, a matter within
the "core competency of the judiciary," . "This axiom stems from
basic principles of separation of powers. It is emphatically the
province and duty of the JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT to say
what the law is. It necessarily follows that the a priori question
whether the statute delegates or withholds discretion is itself a
question of statutory interpretation, one implicating our duty of de
novo review."

k."The circuit court nonetheless deferred to the Technical Review

Board's reasoning, correctly noting that courts give "great
deference" to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. This
deference stems from Code § 2.2-4027, which requires that
reviewing courts "take due account" of the "experience and
specialized competence of the agency" promulgating the
regulation. Even so, "deference is not abdication, and it
requires us to accept only those agency interpretations that are
reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally
employ. No matter how one calibrates judicial deference,
the administrative power to interpret a
regulationdoes not include the power to rewrite
it. When a regulation is "not ambiguous," judicial deference "to the
agency's position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of
interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new
regulation." Though agencies may be tempted to adjudicate their
way around unwanted regulations, such overreaching undermines
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the notice and public hearing procedures of the rulemaking process
- thereby putting in jeopardy the "enhanced political accountability
of agency policy decisions adopted through the rulemaking process"
and the democratic virtue of allowing "all potentially affected
members of the public an opportunity to participate in the process
of determining the rules that affect them.

l. "However, whenever an "agency's statutory interpretation

conflicts with the language of the statute or when the
interpretation has not been consistently and regularly applied, the
usual deference accorded to an agency's interpretation should be
withheld.
When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it
commits to the implementation of an executive agency, it
has no control over that implementation (except, of course,
through further, more precise, legislation).The legislative
and executive functions are not combined. But when an agency
promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the implementation of that
rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule's meaning. And though
the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the
legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It
seems contrary to fundamental principles of
separation of powers to permit the person who
promulgates a law to interpret it as well.
Deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not encourage
Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes; the
vagueness effectively cedes power to the Executive. By contrast, deferring
to an agency's interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact
vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it
pleases.

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 Construed Against the State/ Vagueness
a. "It is an ancient maxim of the law that all such statutes
must be construed strictly against the state and favorably
to the liberty of the citizen. The maxim is founded on the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and on the plain principle
that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature and not in the
judicial department. No man incurs a penalty unless the act which subjects
him to it is clearly within the spirit and letter of the statute which imposes
such penalty. There can be no constructive offenses, and before a man can
be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the
statute. If these principals are violated, the fate of the accused is
determined by the arbitrary discretion of the judges and not by the express
authority of the law."
b. "When a statute is penal in nature, it "must be strictly
construed against the STATE and in favor of an
accused.
c. "While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed against
the STATE in criminal cases, "we will not apply 'an
unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute' that
would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein.
d. "In determining whether a legislative enactment is unconstitutionally
vague, the Supreme Court has considered whether the words used have
a well-settled . . . meaning . . . (citing dictionary to determine "generally
understood" meaning for adjective in ordinance). "A penal statute is
void for vagueness if it both fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence notice that her contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute and encourages selective prosecution

Statutory Exceptions, Negative Element v. Affirmative

Defense
1) "When construing PENAL STATUTES which contain
qualifications, exceptions or exemptions to their application, the limiting
language may be viewed as a negative element of the offense
which the prosecution must disprove. Alternately, the court may
determine that the exemption is a statutory defense, which the accused can
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assert to defeat the prima facie case of the prosecution. In determining
whether specific limiting language is an element of the offense or a
statutory defense, a court should look both to the intent of the statute as a
whole and the ability of the respective parties to assert the existence or
absence of the underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation.
When determining whether the limiting language is a negative element or a
statutory defense, this Court has identified four factors to be considered:
'the wording of the exception and its role in relation to the other words in
the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative action,
the exception is essential to complete the general prohibition intended;
whether the exception makes an excuse or justification for what would
otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and
whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.'
An application of these factors to the present case demonstrates that the
phrase "except as provided by law," as used in Code § 29.1-553,
establishes a statutory defense as opposed to a negative element
2) "In order to resolve whether there is a due process violation in
this case, we first must address the threshold issue of whether the
absence of a valid prescription is an affirmative defense or a
negative element of the offense. If it is the latter, the burden of proof is
on the STATE, and it cannot be shifted to the accused...When construing
penal statutes which contain qualifications, exceptions or exemptions to
their application, the limiting language may be viewed as a negative
element of the offense which the prosecution must disprove. Alternately,
the court may determine that the exemption is a statutory defense, which
the accused can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the prosecution.
The ACCUSED BEARS THE BURDEN OF
PRODUCING EVIDENCE OF THE NEGATION of
circumstances sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his
guilt. In determining whether specific limiting
language is an element of the offense or a statutory
defense, a court should look both to the intent of the
statute as a whole and the ability of the respective
parties to assert the existence or absence of the
underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the
limitation.Accordingly, we should consider the wording of the
15
exception and its role in relation to the other words in the statute; whether
in light of the situation prompting legislative action, the exception is
essential to complete the general prohibition intended; whether the
exception makes an excuse or justification for what would
otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative
defense; and whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant. (It is undoubtedly the general rule that the state
must prove all the essential facts entering into the
description of the offense. But it has been held in many
cases that when a negation of a fact lies peculiarly within
the knowledge of the defendant it is incumbent on him to
establish that fact).
We next observe that the "valid prescription" exemption of Code § 18.2-
250 relates to a fact that would be solely within the knowledge of the
accused. If we accept appellant's contention that the STATE must prove
appellant had no valid prescription, the offense would be virtually
unprovable. Under appellant's theory, to obtain a conviction under the facts
of this case, the STATE would be required to prove that no medical
professional, wherever located, in this Commonwealth or elsewhere, had
prescribed the drug to appellant. This would involve a nationwide search of
chain drugstores, as well as independent pharmacies, hospitals, prison
infirmaries, etc. Appellant, at oral argument, conceded that such an
undertaking would most likely be impossible. CONGRESS clearly did not
intend such a result, nor would they enact such an impotent statute

Constitutional Construction
1) "The rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights shall not be construed to
limit other rights of the people not therein expressed.

2)“The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the
limits of governmental activity. It thus proclaims, safeguards and
preserves in basic form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits,
and modes of thought and life of the people as developed under the
common law and as existing at the time of its adoption to the extent
and therein stated…The purpose and object sought to be attained
by the framers of the constitution is to be looked for, and the will and
intent of the people who ratified it is to be made effective. As we
16
have stated, CONGRESS may enact any law or take any action “not
prohibited by express terms, or by necessary implications by the
Constitution.
3)“A fundamental right is
one EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY implied guaranteed by the
constitution
4) "It is an "established principle of constitutional law that a court will not
rule upon the constitutionality of a statute unless such a determination is
absolutely necessary to decide the merits of the case. A statute will be
construed to avoid a constitutional question whenever this
is possible.
5) "The construction of a constitutional provision by
CONGRESS (note it is congress construing, not the supreme
court, that is why it is CALLED “CONTEMPORANEOUS
CONSTRUCTION”)is entitled to consideration, and if the construction
is contemporaneous with adoption of the constitutional
provision, it is entitled to great weight. In addition, Long
acquiescence in such an announced construction so strengthens it that it
should not be changed unless plainly wrong.
6) Constitutional provisions are EITHER SELF-
EXECUTING OR MANDATORY.

A self-executing provision does not require enabling legislation for

its enforcement.
A mandatory provision declares or imposes a duty
or requirement that must be followed.
A Directory provision sets forth procedures or " confers
discretion on the legislature" for its implementation.

7) "We review arguments regarding the CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

A STATUTE DE NOVO. When the constitutionality of a statute is
challenged, we are guided by the principle that all acts of CONGRESS are
presumed to be constitutional. Where a statute is constitutional as

17
applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute
on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as
applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation. As a
general rule, "a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
statuteonly insofar as it has an adverse impact on
his own rights
8) "However, when a court, in determining the constitutionality
of a statute, departs from the express limitations of the
Constitution and relies instead on implied constitutional
restrictions, the legislative usurpation must be very clear and
palpable to justify the court’s holding that an enactment is
unconstitutional.
9) "This Court’s jurisprudence with respect to Article IV, Section
12 is well established. “The fact that many things of a diverse
nature are authorized or required to be done in the body of the
act, though not expressed in its title is not objectionable, if what
is authorized by the act is germane to the object expressed in
the title, or has a legitimate and natural association therewith,
or is congruous therewith, the title is sufficient. “[I]f there is doubt
as to the sufficiency of the title, the doubt must be resolved in favor
of its sufficiency, as courts will not declare an act of the legislature
unconstitutional unless it is plainly so. The analysis of a particular act
must necessarily “stand on its own,” and we must look to both the body
and to the title of the act under scrutiny to determine whether the act
violates the Constitution.
10) "As a general rule, where a statute is constitutional
as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge
the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its
face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical
situation." We have said that classification ordinarily will be upheld "if
any state of facts can be reasonably conceived that would support it." But
where the statute creates a "suspect classification" (e.g. race,

18
sex, or religion) or where it affects a fundamental constitutional right,
the presumption of constitutionality fades, and the "strict scrutiny" test,
rather than the more relaxed "rational relationship" test applies.
"Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of
11)

law and is accordingly subject to de novo review by this

Court.
de novo is a Latin expression meaning "from the beginning,"
"afresh," "anew," "beginning again."
Retroactive Enactment of Laws
1) "Accordingly, when a statute is amended while an action is pending, the
rights of the parties are to be deemed in accordance with the law in effect
when the action is begun, unless the amended statute shows a clear
intention to vary such rights. (Our analysis is guided by the
fundamental principles of statutory construction that retroactive
laws are not favored, and that a statute is always construed to
operate prospectively unless a contrary legislative intent is
manifest.); New laws will apply only to future cases unless there is
something in the very nature of the case, or in the language of the new
provision, which shows that the new law was intended to have
a retrospective effect. Further, every reasonable doubt is resolved
against a retroactive operation of a statute, and words of a statute
ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear,
strong and imperative that no other meaning can be
annexed to them . Retroactive effect will be given to a statute only
when legislative intent that a statute be so applied is stated in clear,
explicit, and unequivocal terms.

Common Law
1) In construing statutes, the statutory definition must
prevail over the common law definition
2) CONGRESS is presumed to have known and to have had
the common law in mind in the enactment of a statute. The
statute must therefore be read along with the provisions of the
common law, and the latter will be read into the statute unless it

19
clearly appears from express language or by necessary implication
that the purpose of the statute was to change the common law.

3) "We also apply the established principle that a statutory provision

will not be held to change the common law unless the
legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested. Therefore, a
statutory change in the common law will be recognized only in that which
is expressly stated in the words of the statute or is necessarily implied by
its language.
4) "A statutory provision will not be held to change the common law
unless the legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested. "Statutes in
derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and not to be
enlarged in their operation by construction beyond their express terms.
Accordingly, "[a] statutory change in the common law is limited to that
which is expressly stated in the statute or necessarily implied by its
language because there is a presumption that no change was intended.
"When an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the
common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to the extent that its
terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule

Previous Construction of a Statute

1) "Where a statute has been construed by the
courts, and is then re-enacted by the legislature,
the construction given to it is presumed to be
sanctioned by the legislature, and thenceforth
becomes obligatory upon the courts." Hence,
when the court finds the old construction should be
modified, it cannot anymore, since the court is BOUND by
its old construction because such statute was RE-Enacted.
2) "The term "battery" possesses "a long history of definition by" the
courts, and therefore, it "carries its historical construction" when
used by CONGRESS in a statute.

20
3) "Wehave said that “when judicial interpretations have settled the
meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same
language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent
to incorporate its judicial interpretations as well.” (STARE DECIS
becomes the interpretation and construction of a law or STATUTE that is
ambiguous even if it was applied to a private case)
New Law New Remedy
4) "It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute
prescribing a new remedy for an existing right should never be
construed to abolish a pre-existing remedy in the absence of
express words or necessary implication. Further, " 'when a statute
gives a new remedy, and contains no negative, express or
implied, of the old remedy, the new one provided by it is
cumulative, and the party may elect between the two.'

Two Statutes Pertaining to the Same Subject

1) "It is well accepted that statutes relating to the same
subject should not be read in isolation. Such statutes should be
considered in pari materia. Moreover, statutes dealing with the same subject
matter should be construed together to achieve a harmonious result,
resolving conflicts to give effect to legislative intent. An accepted principle
of statutory construction is that, when it is not clear which of two
statutes applies, the more specific statute prevails over the more
general. Also, when statutes provide different procedures on
the same subject matter, "the general must give way to the
specific.
"As a preliminary matter applicable to all of
your questions and in accord with the rule
of statutory construction in pari materia,
statutory provisions are not to be considered as isolated
fragments of law. Such provisions are to be considered as a
whole, or as parts of a greater connected, homogeneous system of
laws, or a single and complete statutory compilation.

21
 Statutes in pari materia are considered as if they constituted
but one act, so that sections of one act may be considered as
though they were parts of the other act.
As a general rule, where legislation dealing with a particular
subject consists of a system of related general provisions indicative
of a settled policy, new enactments of a fragmentary nature on that
subject are to be taken as intended to fit into the existing system
and to be carried into effect conformably to it, and they should be
so construed as to harmonize the general tenor or purport of the
system and make the scheme consistent in all its parts and uniform
in its operation, unless a different purpose is shown plainly or with
irresistible clearness. It will be assumed or presumed, in the
absence of words specifically indicating the contrary, that the
legislature did not intend to innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter
or violate a general statute or system of statutory provisions the
entire subject matter of which is not directly or necessarily involved
in the act (noting that in absence of words to contrary, legislature
did not intend to alter or repeal general statute or system).
3) Closely related statutes must be read as being consistent with one
another. Two statutes which are closely interrelated must be
read and construed together and effect given to all of their
provisions. Statutes should be construed, if possible, so as to
harmonize, and force and effect should be given the provisions of
each.
4) The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to legislative intent. 'In interpreting statutes, "courts should give the
fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire
statutory enactment. Potentially conflicting statutes should
be harmonized to give force and effect to each.

City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with the laws of the
Constitution. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can be given
effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them together.

22
The Meaning of Words

1) In the absence of a contrary definition, the words in a statute are

presumed to have their usual and ordinary meaning.
3) A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a
statute be presumed to have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless
unless absolutely necessary. "We must assume that the legislature did not
intend to do a vain and useless thing. "It is a well established rule of
construction that a statute ought to be interpreted in such a manner that it
may have effect, and not found to be vain and elusive. "A word or clause
contained in a statute may only be rejected as surplusage if it "appears to
have been inserted through inadvertence or mistake, and which is
incapable of any sensible meaning," or is otherwise repugnant to the rest of
the statute.

4) "We will not construe a statute by singling out a particular term or

phrase, but will construe the words and terms at issue in the context of the
other language used in the statute.
5) While in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the courts
is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, that
intention must be gathered from the words used, unless a literal
construction would involve a manifest absurdity. "The Court has stated the
related principle that "the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute
is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction."
Statutes should not be interpreted in ways that produce absurd or irrational
consequences.

6) "A statute must be construed with reference to its subject matter, the
object sought to be attained, and the legislative purpose in enacting it; the
provisions should receive a construction that will render it harmonious
with that purpose rather than one which will defeat it.

7)[i]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning
perfectly clear and definite, effect must be given to it. It is unnecessary to
resort to any rules of statutory construction when the language of a statute
is unambiguous. In those situations, the statute's plain meaning and intent
govern.
"Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more than one
way, refers to two or more things simultaneously, is difficult to
comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness.”
23
9) "Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (8th ed. 2004) defines "valid" as "Legally
sufficient; binding." (noting that if the STATUTE does not provide a
statutory definition we may look to the dictionary definition to determine
legislative intent

10) "In drafting the statute, the legislature separated the two prohibitions
with a comma followed by the disjunctive word "nor." We have noted that,
pursuant to the rules of grammar, "phrases separated by a comma and [a]
disjunctive . . . are independent. The disjunctive serves to connect the two
parts of the sentence but also to keep them separate and independent.”

12) "The word [willful] often denotes an act which is intentional, or

knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in
a criminal statute it generally means an act done with a bad purpose;
without justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely[.] The
word is also employed to characterize a thing done without ground for
believing it is lawful. The term "willful act" imports knowledge and
consciousness that injury will result from the act done. The act done must
be intended or it must involve a reckless disregard for the rights of another
and will probably result in an injury. [T]he term "gross, wanton, and
culpable" describes conduct. The word "gross" means "aggravated or
increased negligence" while the word "culpable" means "deserving of
blame or censure." 'Gross negligence' is culpable or criminal when
accompanied by acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful
nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others,
under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury, or which
make it not improbable that injury will be occasioned, and the offender
knows, or is charged with the knowledge of, the probable result of his acts

13) "But, courts are not permitted to add language to a statute nor are they
permitted to accomplish the same result by judicial interpretation." Rather,
when the language of a statute is unambiguous, courts are bound by the
plain meaning of that language and may not assign a construction that
amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it
actually has stated.

14) "It is equally well established, however, that if the language of a

statute is clear and unambiguous, a regulatory interpretation by the
Department that is in conflict with the plain language of the statute cannot
be sustained.
24
 15) "Under the rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of persons
or things is enumerated in a statute and general words follow, the general
words are to be restricted in their meaning to a sense analogous to the less
general, particular words. Likewise, according to the maxim noscitur a
sociis (associated words) when general and specific words are grouped, the
general words are limited by the specific and will be construed to embrace
only objects similar in nature to those things identified by the specific
words.
16) If a statute expressly excepts a class which would otherwise fall within
its terms, the exception negates the idea that any other class is to be
excepted.

17) One such rule, sometimes referred to as the last antecedent doctrine,
is particularly applicable here and can be summarized as follows:
Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention
appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. The last antecedent is 'the last
word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing
the meaning of the sentence.' Thus a proviso usually is construed to
apply to the provision or clause immediately preceding it. (explaining and
applying "the grammatical 'rule of the last antecedent,' according to which
a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only
the noun or phrase that it immediately follows . . . ."); (noting that
construction of a statute according to the last antecedent rule is "quite
sensible as a matter of grammar
19) "An erroneous interpretation of a statute by those charged with its
enforcement cannot be permitted to override [the statute's] clear meaning.
Amendments of statutes can only be made by the legislature and not by the
courts or administrative officers charged with their enforcement

20) "But principles of statutory construction are not so rigid. Although we

presume that the same term has the same meaning when it occurs here and
there in a single statute, the Court of Appeals mischaracterized that
presumption as “effectively irrebuttable.” We also understand that “[m]ost
words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be
variously construed, not only when they occur in different statutes, but
when used more than once in the same statute or even in the same section.”
Thus, the “natural presumption that identical words used in different parts
of the same act are intended to have the same meaning … is not rigid and
readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which
the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were
25
employed in different parts of the act with different intent.” Ibid. A given
term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association
with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation
strategies."
Ibid. (Latin, short for ibidem, meaning "the same place") is the term used
to provide an endnote or footnote citation orreference for a source that was
cited in the preceding endnote or footnote. It is similar in meaning to idem
(meaning something that has been mentioned previously; the same),
abbreviated Id., which is commonly used in legal citation.[1] To find the
ibid.source, one must look at the reference preceding it.
21) "Generally, phrases separated by a comma and the disjunctive "or,"
are independent. (finding that, the word "or" connects two parts of a
sentence, "'but disconnect[s] their meaning'"); (noting disjunctive results in
alternatives, which must be treated separately); (finding that limiting
phrase in statute is independent of and does not modify two earlier phrases
because the limiting phrase is separated from the first two by a comma and
the disjunctive "or"); (interpreting the use of a comma and the disjunctive
"or" as implying two separate and independent phrases in a Virginia statute
authorizing payment of dividends by corporation "out of net earnings, or
out of its net assets in excess of its capital"). Accordingly, the phrase,
"made by the Defendant to any law enforcement officer," is independent of
and does not modify the phrase, "[a]ny written or recorded statement or
confessions."

The Terms May/Shall

1) The term "may," as used in a statute, should be given its ordinary

meaning intended by the CONGRESS -permission, importing discretion.
2) It is also true, however, that the Supreme Court has held that the word
"may," while ordinarily importing permission, will be construed to be
mandatory when it is necessary to accomplish the manifest purpose of the
legislature.
3) The use of the word "shall" in a statute generally implies that its terms
are intended to be mandatory, rather than permissive or directive.
4) "[T]he use of ‘shall,’ in a statute requiring action by a public official, is
directory and not mandatory unless the statute manifests a contrary
intent."14 "A statute directing the mode of proceeding by public officers is
to be deemed directory, and a precise compliance is not to be deemed
essential to the validity of the proceedings, unless so declared by statute.

26
 The Term Aggrieved “Locus Standi”
1) ""The term 'aggrieved' has a settled meaning when it becomes
necessary to determine who is a proper party to seek court relief from an
adverse decision. In order for a petitioner to be 'aggrieved,' it must
affirmatively appear that such person had some direct interest
in the subject matter of the proceeding that he seeks to
attack. . . . The petitioner 'must show that he has an immediate,
pecuniary and substantial interest in the litigation, and not a remote
or indirect interest.' . . . Thus, it is not sufficient that the sole
interest of the petitioner is
to advance some perceived public right or to redress
someanticipated public injury when the only wrong he has
suffered is in common with other persons similarly
situated. The word 'aggrieved' in a statute contemplates a substantial
grievance and means a denial of some personal or property right, legal or
equitable, or imposition of a burden or obligation upon the petitioner
different from that suffered by the public generally.

Mens Rea/ Scienter/ Intent

1) "In the final analysis, the issue whether mens rea or scienter is a
necessary element in the indictment and proof of a particular crime
becomes a question of legislative intent to be construed by the
court. Thus, to insert a mens rea element into the offense, and to require
proof thereof, would defeat the statutory purpose, which is to criminalize
the introduction of firearms into a school environment. So we will not add,
by implication, language to the statute that the legislature expressly has
chosen not to include. Consequently, we hold that the trial court correctly
decided, in refusing the instruction in question, that this statute is one of
strict criminal liability, and that the Commonwealth was required to prove
only that the defendant had possessed, on school property, a firearm of the
type described in the statute.

2) "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when

inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of

27
the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual
to choose between good and evil.
A relation between some mental element and punishment for a
harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But
I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and
unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation
and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution.
Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in
the Eighteenth Century was indicated by Blackstone's sweeping
statement that to constitute any crime there must first be a
"vicious will." Common-law commentators of the Nineteenth
Century early pronounced the same principle, although a few
exceptions not relevant to our present problem came to be recognized.
Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from
concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was
congenial to an intense individualism.
As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments
were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not
signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was
so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory
affirmation.
Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implication of the
requirement as to offenses that were taken over from the common law.
The unanimity with which they have adhered to the central thought
that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by
the variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite
but elusive mental element.

However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of

different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not
scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms as
"felonious intent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought,"
"guilty knowledge," "fraudulent intent," "wilfulness," "scienter,"
to denote guilty knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil
purpose or mental culpability.

28
By use or combination of these various tokens, they have sought to
protect those who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction of
infamous common-law crimes....The Government asks us by a feat of
construction radically to change the weights and balances in the
scales of justice.

The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a
guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the
defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence
of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed
juries.

Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should

not be extended to common-law crimes on judicial initiative.
3) "The presence of a "vicious will" or mens rea was long a
requirement of criminal responsibility. But the list of exceptions grew,
especially in the expanding regulatory area involving activities
affecting public health, safety, and welfare. Id., at 254. The statutory
offense of embezzlement, borrowed from the common law where
scienter was historically required, was in a different category. 13 Id.,
at 260-261.
"[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning [401 U.S. 601, 608] of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that
were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from
which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial
mind unless otherwise instructed."

The Dillon Rule and Grants of Authority

The Dillon Rule of strict construction controls our determination of the
powers of local governing bodies. This rule provides that municipal
corporations have only those powers that are expressly
granted, those necessarily or fairly implied from expressly granted
powers, and those that are essential and indispensable.

"In determining legislative intent, the rule is clear that

where a power is conferred and the mode of its

29
execution is specified, no other method may be
selected; any other means would be contrary to legislative
intent and, therefore, unreasonable. A necessary corollary is that
where a grant of power is silent upon its mode of execution, a method of
exercise clearly contrary to legislative intent, or inappropriate to the ends
sought to be accomplished by the grant, also would be unreasonable.
"Consistent with the necessity to uphold legislative intent, the doctrine
of implied powers should never be applied to create a
power that does not exist or to expand an existing
power beyond rational limits. Always, the test in application of
the doctrine is reasonableness, in which concern for what is necessary
to promote the public interest is a key element.

Finally, when a statute creates a specific grant of authority, the

authority exists only to the extent specifically granted in the
statute. It can never go beyond the authority given .

6)“When the legislature delegates authority to an

administrative agency to promulgate regulations, those
regulations must neither exceed the scope of the authority
delegated nor be inconsistent with it. Furthermore, "delegations
of legislative power are valid only if they establish specific policies and fix
definite standards to guide the official, agency, or board in the exercise of
the power. Delegations of legislative power which lack such policies and
standards are unconstitutional and void." For example, language in an
enabling statute which provides merely "that the regulations be designed
to protect and promote the safety and health of employees" is insufficient.
7) "We consistently have held that when the primary purpose of an
enactment is to raise revenue, the enactment will be considered a
tax, regardless of the name attached to the act. The General
Assembly is directly prohibited from enacting “any local, special, or
private law . . . [f]or the assessment and collection of taxes. There
is, however, an exception to this specific prohibition.

30
The General Assembly may by special act like RA
7160(Local Government Code)delegating the power of
taxation to any province, city, municipality.

Inconsistent Regulations/Laws
As a preliminary matter, we agree with Manassas' statements that
regulations of Executive Departments have the force of law, and that
any Executive Department concerned with the execution of a statute’s
interpretation of its governing statutes, as reflected in its regulations, is
entitled to great weight. Regulations, however, may not
conflict with the authorizing statute. Whether a regulation
is inconsistent with its enabling legislationis properly a subject
of judicial review.
If both the statute and the ordinance can stand together and
be given effect, it is the duty of the courts to harmonize them
and not nullify the ordinance.
City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with
STATUTES. Such ordinances are inconsistent with state
law when they cannot co-exist with a statute. The fact that a
county or municipal ordinance enlarges on a statute's provisions does not
create a conflict with the statute unless the statute limits the
requirements (Separability Clause is inserted)for all cases to its own
terms. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can be given
effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them together.

A Single Body of Law

1) "When attempting to define terms in one part of the Code, courts should
read a statute with "a view toward harmonizing it with other
statutes. "Ordinarily, when a particular word in a statute is not
defined therein, a court must give it its ordinary meaning.
2) "When asked to interpret various code sections, the
SUPREME Court oftenexamines other related

31
statutes that contain similar or contrasting
language to help determine legislative intent.

The Exclusion Rule

Ambiguity
1) "Language isambiguous when it may
be understood in more than one way, or
simultaneously refers to two or more things.
2) "When the language of a statute is ambiguous, it must be
interpreted in a manner that will give effect to the intent
of CONGRESS.
3) "The primary goal of statutory construction is to discern and
give effect to legislative intent, with the reading of a statute as a
whole influencing the proper construction of ambiguous individual
provisions
4) Doctrine of Contra proferentem: "Used in the
connection with the construction of written documents to the
effect that an ambiguous provision is construed most strongly
against the person who selected the language." Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed.
5) "Instead, we find the restrictive covenant, in particular the phrase
"residential purposes," to be ambiguous in several respects....Indeed, even
the circuit court's interpretation that the term " '[r]esidence' means more
than mere physical presence and less than domicile" is ambiguous. It can
be argued that a nightly or weekly rental is more than mere physical
presence. Moreover, if the phrase "residential purposes" carries with it a
"duration of use" component, it is ambiguous as to when a rental of the
property moves from short-term to long-term. Under our case law, a
restrictive covenant of "substantial doubt or ambiguity" must be interpreted
"in favor of the free use of property and against restrictions

Criminal Versus Civil Intent of a Statute

The question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or
criminal is a matter of statutory construction." First, one must

32
determine whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing
mechanism, indicates either expressly or impliedly a preference for one
label or the other. Second, where the legislature has indicated an
intention to establish a civil penalty, one must address "whether the
statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate that intention

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution

1) "By virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution supersedes any conflicting state law. The
preemption of Local laws by STATUTES may occur by express
statutory language or other clear indication that Congress intended to
legislate exclusively in the area. Even if Congress does not intend
the enactment of a STATUTORY scheme completely to preempt
Local laws in the area, congressional enactments in the same field
override Local laws with which they conflict.

The Supreme Court has identified three ways in

which preemption may occur:
(1) Congressmay adopt express language setting forth the
existence and scope of preemption;
(2) Congress may adopt a framework for regulation
that "occupies the field" and leaves no room for states to
adopt supplemental laws; and
(3) when statute actually conflicts with the constitution, typically
when compliance with both laws is a "physical impossibility" or
the statute stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
2) "Settled legal principles provide that the Constitution, not a
state court erroneous interpretation of it, is controlling. (in
context of determining whether to apply retroactively a new rule
for the conduct of criminal prosecutions, adopting Blackstonian
view that judges...find the law rather than make the law and that
33
judicial declaration of law is merely a statement of what the law
has always been.

Public Policy
1) "A court may not "second-guess the lawmakers on matters
of economics, sociology and public policy. . . .
Those considerations belong exclusively in the legislative
domain. Regardless of whether it "may or may not be better
public policy". Meaning COURTS do not interpret provisions for
ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY and PUBLIC POLICY.
2) "Judicial review does not evaluate the "propriety,
wisdom, necessity and expediency" of legislation. We
ask only whether the statutory classification erects an
irrational, arbitrary distinction - one that no
conceivable state of facts could reasonably sustain.

34