1. G.R. No.

158791 July 22, 2005

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

The Civil Service Commission via the present petition for mandamus seeks to compel the Department of Budget and
Management to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this
Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.

By petitioner’s claim, the amount of ₱215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its Central Office by the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount to
₱285,660,790.44.1 It complains, however, that the total fund releases by respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal
year 2002 was only ₱279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of ₱5,807,392.30.

To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its "no report, no release" policy whereby
allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and
Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds.

Petitioner contends that the application of the "no report, no release" policy upon independent constitutional bodies of
which it is one is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.

Respondent, at the outset, opposes the petition on procedural grounds. It contends that first, petitioner did not exhaust
administrative remedies as it could have sought clarification from respondent’s Secretary regarding the extent of fiscal
autonomy before resorting to this Court. Second, even assuming that administrative remedies were exhausted, there are
no exceptional and compelling reasons to justify the direct filing of the petition with this Court instead of the trial court, thus
violating the hierarchy of courts.

On the merits, respondent, glossing over the issue raised by petitioner on the constitutionality of enforcing the "no report,
no release" policy, denies having strictly enforced the policy upon offices vested with fiscal autonomy, it claiming that it
has applied by extension to these offices the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC(Constitutional Mandate
on the Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy) issued on June 3, 1993, 3 particularly one of the guiding principles established therein
governing the budget of the Judiciary, to wit:

5. The Supreme Court may submit to the Department of Budget and Management reports of operation and income,
current plantilla of personnel, work and financial plans and similar reports only for recording purposes. The submission
thereof concerning funds previously released shall not be a condition precedent for subsequent fund releases.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of petitioner’s budget was not on account of any
failure on petitioner’s part to submit the required reports; rather, it was due to a shortfall in revenues. 4

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies invoked by respondent applies only where there is an express legal
provision requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. 5 As petitioner is not
mandated by any law to seek clarification from the Secretary of Budget and Management prior to filing the present action,
its failure to do so does not call for the application of the rule.

As for the rule on hierarchy of courts, it is not absolute. A direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may be
allowed where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. 6Petitioner
justifies its direct filing of the petition with this Court "as the matter involves the concept of fiscal autonomy granted to [it]
as well as other constitutional bodies, a legal question not heretofore determined and which only the Honorable Supreme
Court can decide with authority and finality".7 To this Court, such justification suffices for allowing the petition.

Now on the substantive issues.

That the "no report, no release" policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not
disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX
(A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.

In Province of Batangas v. Romulo,8 this Court, in construing the phrase "automatic release" in Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution reading:

Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them,

held:

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines "automatic" as "involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that
any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an
automaton." Further, the word "automatically" is defined as "in an automatic manner: without thought or conscious
intention." Being "automatic," thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are
not required to perform any act to receive the "just share" accruing to them from the national coffers. x x x" (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)9

By parity of construction, "automatic release" of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission
which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be
imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution of this Court which effectively
prohibited the enforcement of a "no report, no release" policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal
autonomy by the Constitution.10

Respecting respondent’s justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a shortfall in revenues, the
same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming
that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX
(A), Section 5 of the Constitution.

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs teaches that "[a]n interpretation should, if possible, be avoided
under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory." 11

If respondent’s theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release approved
appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month12 that there is a shortfall in revenues, thereby
emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering insignificant altogether, such mandate.

Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or
reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested
with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to
naught the distinction established by the Constitution.

The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of their
approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.

Significantly, the Year 2002 GAA itself distinguished between two types of public institutions in the matter of fund
releases. With respect to government agencies in general, the pertinent General Provisions of the GAA read as follows:

Sec. 62. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No appropriations authorized in this Act shall be
impounded through deduction or retention, unless in accordance with the guidelines for the imposition and release
of reserves and the rules and regulations for deduction, retention or deferral of releases shall have been issued
by the DBM in coordination with the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance.
Accordingly, all the funds appropriated for the purposes, programs, projects and activities authorized in this Act, except
those covered by Special Provision No. 1 of the Unprogrammed Fund shall be regularly andautomatically released in
accordance with the established allotment period and system by the DBM without any deduction, retention or imposition of
reserves. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Sec. 63. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or reduction of appropriations authorized in
this Act shall be effected only in cases where there is unmanageable national government budget deficit.

Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this Section shall be construed to mean that the actual
national government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target
deficit of P130.0 billion as indicated in the FY 2002 Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the
President to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution or there are clear economic indications of an
impending occurrence of such condition, as determined by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee and
approved by the President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In contrast, the immediately succeeding provision of the Year 2002 GAA, which specifically applied to offices vested with
fiscal autonomy, stated:

Sec. 64. Appropriations of Agencies Vested with Fiscal Autonomy. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized in this Act for the Judiciary, Congress of the Philippines, the Commission
on Human Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit and the
Commission on Elections shall be automatically and regularly released. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally allowed when there is an
unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity with the Constitution, excepted from such rule the
appropriations for entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there was a revenue shortfall as
respondent claimed, it could not withhold full release of petitioner’s funds without violating not only the Constitution but
also Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.

This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution also states as a guiding principle on the
Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy that:
4. After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and regularly released subject to
availability of funds. (Underscoring supplied)

This phrase "subject to availability of funds" does not, however, contradict the present ruling that the funds of entities
vested with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly released, a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding. What
is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation where total revenue collections are so low that they are not
sufficient to cover the total appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it would be
practically impossible to fully release the Judiciary’s appropriations or any of the entities also vested with fiscal autonomy
for that matter, without violating the right of such other entities to an automatic release of their own appropriations. It is
under that situation that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is
allowed.

Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small portion of the total national budget, only
in the most extreme circumstances will the total revenue collections fall short of the requirements of such agencies. To
illustrate, in the Year 2002 GAA the budget for agencies vested with fiscal autonomy amounted only to
₱14,548,620,000.00, which is 2.53% of the total appropriations in the amount of ₱575,123,728,000.00. 13 In Year 2003
GAA, which was re-enacted in 2004, the budget for the same agencies was ₱13,807,932,000.00, which is 2.27% of the
total appropriations amounting to ₱609,614,730,000.00.14 And in the Year 2005, the budget for the same agencies was
only ₱13,601,124,000.00, which is 2.28% of the total appropriations amounting to ₱597,663,400,000.00.15

Finally, petitioner’s claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower than that of the previous fiscal year, as is
the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected.

For with respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly provides:

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and
regularly released.16 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional Commissions, a similar proscription
against the reduction of appropriations below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5
merely states:

Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.

The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations below that for the
previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the
amount appropriated for them for the previous year.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of all the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. Respondent’s act of withholding the
subject funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Accordingly, respondent is directed to release to petitioner the amount of Five Million Eight Hundred Seven Thousand,
Three hundred Ninety Two Pesos and Thirty Centavos (₱5,807,392.30) representing the unreleased balance of
petitioner’s appropriation for its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act for FY 2002.

SO ORDERED.

2. SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 155336 November 25, 2004

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented by its President,

MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., vs.COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an upgrading and reclassification of personnel positions
without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employees' Association
(CHREA) challenging the Decision1 dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming
the Resolutions2 dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which sustained the
validity of the upgrading and reclassification of certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
despite the disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Also assailed is the resolution
dated 11 September 2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

The antecedent facts which spawned the present controversy are as follows:

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of
1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion
of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR. These special provisions state:
 1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of their
respective appropriations as authorized in this Act, the Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices, to fix
and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so
requires, make adjustments in their personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item
or creation of new positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions
are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in
accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the
appropriations of their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in
accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws.

2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are hereby authorized
to use savings in their respective appropriations for: (a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, and
training information materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of central and regional offices, facilities
and equipment; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d) necessary expenses for the
employment of temporary, contractual and casual employees; (e) payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous
expenses, commutable representation and transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials and
employees as may be authorized by law; and (f) other official purposes, subject to accounting and auditing rules
and regulations. (Emphases supplied)

on the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Reciña and
Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected
positions in the Commission, to wit:

WHEREAS, the General Appropriations Act, FY 1998, R.A. No. 8522 has provided special provisions applicable
to all Constitutional Offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy, particularly on organizational structures and authorizes the
same to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices to fix and determine the
salaries, allowances and other benefits of their personnel and whenever public interest so requires, make
adjustments in the personnel services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of
new positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected
by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance
with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpanded balance of, or savings in the appropriations of
their respective offices;

Whereas, the Commission on Human Rights is a member of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG)
and on July 24, 1998, CFAG passed an approved Joint Resolution No. 49 adopting internal rules implementing
the special provisions heretoforth mentioned;

NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal autonomy hereby approves and authorizes the
upgrading and augmentation of the commensurate amount generated from savings under Personal Services to
support the implementation of this resolution effective Calendar Year 1998;

Let the Human Resources Development Division (HRDD) prepare the necessary Notice of Salary Adjustment and
other appropriate documents to implement this resolution; . . . .3 (Emphasis supplied)

Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position,
with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process
Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. 4

On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-0555 providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grades of the
following positions in the Commission:

Number Position Salary Grade Total Salary

of Requirements
Positions Title
From To From To
12 Attorney VI Director IV 26 28 P229,104.00
(In the
Regional
Field Offices)
4 Director III Director IV 27 28 38,928.00
1 Financial & Director IV 24 28 36,744.00
Management
Officer II
1 Budget Budget Officer 18 24 51,756.00
Officer III IV
1 Accountant III Chief 18 24 51,756.00
Accountant
1 Cashier III Cashier V 18 24 51,756.00
 1 Information Director IV 24 28 36,744.006
Officer V

It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of the following positions:

A. Creation

Number of Position Title Salary Grade Total Salary

Positions Requirements
4 Security Officer II 15 684,780.00
(Coterminous)

B. Upgrading

Number of Position Title Salary Grade Total Salary

Positions Requirements
From To From To
1 Attorney V Director IV 25 28 P28,092.00
2 Security Security 11 15 57,456.00
Officer I Officer II
----------------
Total 3 P 85,548.007

To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a
commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services.

By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR "collapsed" the vacant positions in the body to
provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III,
four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. 8

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the
then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the following justification:

… Based on the evaluations made the request was not favorably considered as it effectively involved the elevation of the
field units from divisions to services.

The present proposal seeks further to upgrade the twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28. This
would elevate the field units to a bureau or regional office, a level even higher than the one previously denied.

The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office in effect
would elevate the services to Office and change the context from support to substantive without actual change in
functions.

In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of divisions to a
bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, we reiterate our previous stand denying the upgrading of the twelve
(12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director III, SG-27 or Director IV, SG-28, in the Field Operations Office (FOO) and
three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28 in the Central Office.

As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum to the DBM Secretary dated 10 December 1997, directing
the latter to increase the number of Plantilla positions in the CHR both Central and Regional Offices to implement the
Philippine Decade Plan on Human Rights Education, the Philippine Human Rights Plan and Barangay Rights Actions
Center in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no organizational unit
or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the creation of a
Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given favorable recommendation.

Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation Standardization Law, the
Department of Budget and Management is directed to establish and administer a unified compensation and position
classification system in the government. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that this Department has the sole power and discretion to administer the
compensation and position classification system of the National Government.

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and
create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement
the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority
is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation
System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore
reiterate our previous stand on the matter.9 (Emphases supplied)

In light of the DBM's disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office,
through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be
rejected owing to the DBM's disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the
CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the
DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification
and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. The decretal portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the request of Ronnie N. Rosero, Hubert V. Ruiz, Flordeliza A. Briones, George Q. Dumlao [and],
Corazon A. Santos-Tiu, is hereby denied.10

CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same on 09 June 2000.

Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC, petitioner CHREA elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the
validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is
within the ambit of CHR's fiscal autonomy. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision provides:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered DISMISSED and the questioned Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 99-2800 dated December 16, 1999 as well as No. 001354 dated June 9, 2000, are
hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.11

The central question we must answer in order to resolve this case is: Can the Commission on Human Rights validly
implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission
without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

Petitioner CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning the CHR's
alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to
such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that
CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and
reclassification of positions therein.

Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there exists no official written record
in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records
to show that its president, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr., has the authority to sue the CHR. The CHR contends that it has the
authority to cause the upgrading, reclassification, plantilla creation, and collapsing scheme sans the approval of the DBM
because it enjoys fiscal autonomy.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments of both parties and an assiduous scrutiny of the records in the case at
bar, it is the Court's opinion that the present petition is imbued with merit.

On petitioner's personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained
or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. 13 Here, petitioner, which consists of
rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a
select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees.
This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR's upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating
up the Commission's savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which
the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREA's
request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREA's personality to bring the suit
was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be
tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor
in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice, and due process.14

We now delve into the main issue of whether or not the approval by the DBM is a condition precedent to the enactment of
an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in the CHR.

Germane to our discussion is Rep. Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification
System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, dated 01 July 1989, which
provides in Sections 2 and 4 thereof that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and
Position Classification System. Thus:
 SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially
equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard shall be given to, among
others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. For this purpose, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) is hereby directed to establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position
Classification System, hereinafter referred to as the System as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 985, as
amended, that shall be applied for all government entities, as mandated by the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.)

SEC. 4. Coverage. – The Compensation and Position Classification System herein provided shall apply to all
positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions.

The term "government" refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the Constitutional
Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts,
tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state colleges and universities, local government units,
and the armed forces. The term "government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions" shall include all
corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by the National Government, whether such corporations and
financial institutions perform governmental or proprietary functions. (Emphasis supplied.)

The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is
flawed considering that the coverage thereof, as defined above, encompasses the entire gamut of government offices,
sans qualification.

This power to "administer" is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the Court of Appeals. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct
of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.15

The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In
the recent case of Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) v. Jesusito L. Buñag, 16 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Reynato Puno, ruled that compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without
the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular. In the words of the Court –

Despite the power granted to the Board of Directors of PRA to establish and fix a compensation and benefits scheme for
its employees, the same is subject to the review of the Department of Budget and Management. However, in view of the
express powers granted to PRA under its charter, the extent of the review authority of the Department of Budget and
Management is limited. As stated in Intia, the task of the Department of Budget and Management is simply to review the
compensation and benefits plan of the government agency or entity concerned and determine if the same complies with
the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard. The role of the Department of Budget and Management is
supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to
be given to PRA officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws.

In Victorina Cruz v. Court of Appeals,17 we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the
compensation and position classification system of the national government.

In Intia, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,18 the Court held that although the charter19 of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC)
grants it the power to fix the compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules
and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the
compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM. This Court intoned:

It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of its
personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the
latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBM's function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of
Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC's compensation system "conforms as closely as
possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758." (Emphasis supplied.)

As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to
implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of the
DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National
Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of
more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation and
position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of
legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications. (Emphasis supplied.)

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional
plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of positions
as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming
that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.20

Palpably, the Court of Appeals' Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of
constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the
appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Thus:

Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically
and regularly released.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution of Powers of
Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5,
Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police commission.
Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and planning
agency. (Emphasis ours.)

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of
Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express
mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum
– what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.21

Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy
entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and
utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from
time to time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy
fiscal autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon,24 we explained:

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee
of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the
highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse
such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

...

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner
the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema
to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional
system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, [the] Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners
that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision. (Emphasis supplied.)

Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso
facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.

We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the CHR, did
not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement
organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying
fiscal autonomy. In contrast, the Special Provision Applicable to the Judiciary under Article XXVIII of the General
Appropriations Act of 1998 specifically mentions that such special provision applies to the judiciary and had categorically
authorized the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to formulate and implement the organizational structure of the
Judiciary, to wit:
 1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of their
respective appropriations authorized in this Act, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is authorized to formulate
and implement organizational structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other
benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in the personal services
itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in the Judiciary;
PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments
shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing law, which shall be payable
from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective offices: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other
benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws. (Emphasis supplied.)

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices
accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal
autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are
of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and
create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement
the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority
is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation
System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. 25 (Emphasis
supplied.)

The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 "that the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws."26

Indeed, the law upon which respondent heavily anchors its case upon has expressly provided that any form of adjustment
in the organizational structure must be within the parameters of the Salary Standardization Law.

The Salary Standardization Law has gained impetus in addressing one of the basic causes of discontent of many civil
servants.27 For this purpose, Congress has delegated to the DBM the power to administer the Salary Standardization Law
and to ensure that the spirit behind it is observed. This power is part of the system of checks and balances or system of
restraints in our government. The DBM's exercise of such authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant
to the paramount law of the land, the Salary Standardization Law and the Administrative Code.

In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of "providing equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions," the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough
evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.

The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR
heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that "no organizational unit or changes in key
positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President." Here, the DBM discerned that there is
no law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHR's
proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27
to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the context from support to
substantive without actual change in functions.

This view of the DBM, as the law's designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is
beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is
accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of
Appeals,28 we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge
and training of such agencies.

To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nation's coffers, the Secretary of the DBM, as the
President's alter ego, knows from where he speaks inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects of an
unwarranted upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in particular and in the entire government in general.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59678 and its Resolution dated 11 September 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling dated 29
March 1999 of the Civil Service Commision-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The Commission on Human Rights
Resolution No. A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 October 1998 and Resolution No.
A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the Department of Budget and Management are disallowed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
3. EN BANC

G.R. No. 140335 December 13, 2000

THELMA P. GAMINDE vs. COA and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAUL C. FLORES and EMMANUEL M.
DALMAN

The Case

The case is a special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set aside two "decisions" of the Commission on Audit
ruling that petitioner’s term of office as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11,
1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as set forth in her appointment paper.

The Facts

On June, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim,Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the
Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment.

However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her
term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 19982 opined that
petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.

Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman
Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P.
Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on
February 02, 1999.

On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that "the term of Commissioner
Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent."3

Consequently, CSC Resident Auditor Felipe issued notice of disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and
emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February 02, 1999.4

The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner’s term of office
may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02,
1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied
acquiescence of the Office of the President.5

ISSUE: Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she
was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02,
2000, as claimed by her.

The Court’s Ruling

The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution,
as follows:

"Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman
shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."8

The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the Civil Service
Commission. The provision on the 1973 Constitution reads:

"x x x The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the Prime Minister for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of the Commissioners first appointed, one shall hold office for seven years, another for five years, and the
third for three years. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor." 9

Actually, this was a copy of the Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935 Constitution of a rotational system for the
appointment of the Chairman and members of the Commission on Elections. The Constitutional amendment creating an
independent Commission on Elections provides as follows:

"Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other Members to
be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of
nine years and may not be reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first appointed, one shall hold office for nine
years, another for six years, and the third for three years. The Chairman and the other Members of the Commission on
Elections may be removed from office only by impeachment in the manner provided in this Constitution." 10

In Republic vs. Imperial: that "the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its
workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and,

(2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled
only for the unexpired balance of the term."12

Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987
Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of
the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular
recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms.

Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first
appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of
the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter.

In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "TERM" AND "TENURE."

"[T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which
the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another.

The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by
the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent." 15

In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the
Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1
(2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a seven-
year term of office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first appointees
terms of seven, five and three years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is
understood to coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02, 1987).

On the other hand, Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions, 1987 Constitution provides:

"SEC. 15. The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission
on Audit shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for
cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term thereunder. In no case
shall any Member serve longer than seven years including service before the ratification of this Constitution." 16

What the above quoted Transitory Provisions contemplate is "tenure" not "term" of the incumbent Chairmen and Members
of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, who "shall continue in office
for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated
to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term thereunder."

The term "unless" imports an exception to the general rule.17 Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent
members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution
under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by:

(1) their removal from office for cause;

(2) their becoming incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or

(3) their appointment to a new term thereunder, all of which events may occur before the end of the one year period after
the effectivity of the Constitution.

However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, providing for a seven-five-three year
rotational interval for the first appointees under this Constitution.

At the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the incumbent Chairman and members of the Civil Service
Commission were the following: (1) Chairperson Celerina G. Gotladera. She was initially appointed as OIC Chairman on
March 19, 1986, and appointed chairman on December 24, 1986, which she assumed on March 13, 1987. (2) Atty. Cirilo
G. Montejo. On June 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed him Commissioner, without any term. He
assumed office on July 9, 1986, and served until March 31, 1987, when he filed a certificate of candidacy for the position
of Congressman, 2nd District, Leyte, thereby vacating his position as Commissioner. His tenure was automatically cut-off
by the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (3) Atty. Mario D. Yango. On January 22, 1985, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
appointed him Commissioner for a term expiring January 25, 1990. He served until February 2, 1988, when his term
ended in virtue of the transitory provisions referred to. On May 30, 1988, President Aquino re-appointed him to a new
three-year term and served until May 31, 1991, exceeding his lawful term, but not exceeding the maximum of seven
years, including service before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Under this factual milieu, it was only Commissioner
Yango who was extended a new term under the 1987 Constitution. The period consumed between the start of the term on
February 02, 1987, and his actual assumption on May 30, 1988, due to his belated appointment, must be counted against
him.

The line of succession, terms of office and tenure of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission may be
outlined as follows:28

Chairman Term Tenure

(7-year original)

Sto. Tomas – 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to Mar. 04, 1988 to

Feb. 02, 1994 March 08, 1995

De Leon – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1994 to March 22, 1995 to

(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2001 Feb. 02, 2001

_______ - 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 2001 to

Feb. 02, 2008

2nd Member Term Tenure

(5-year original)

Barlongay – 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to March 04, 1988 to

Feb. 02, 1992 March 04, 1993

Gaminde – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1992 to June 11, 1993 to

Feb. 02, 1999 Feb. 02, 2000

Valmores – 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1999 to Sept. 08, 2000 to

(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2006 Feb. 02, 2006

3rd Member Term Tenure

(3-year original)

Yango - 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to May 30, 1988 to

Feb. 02, 1990 May 31, 1991

Ereñeta – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1990 to Dec. 12, 1991 to

Feb. 02, 1997 Feb. 02, 1997

Erestain, Jr. – 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1997 to Feb. 11, 1997 to

(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2004 Feb. 02, 2004

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February
02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her
salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in
audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.

4. G.R. No. 191890 December 04, 2012

EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON
MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR., vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order, 1 seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Commission on Elections
(Co melee) Resolution No. 8808 issued on March 30, 2010.2 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1568, as amended,3 extends a five-
year lump sum gratuity to the chairman or any member of the Comelec upon retirement, after completion of the term of
office; incapacity; death; and resignation after reaching 60 years of age but before expiration of the term of office. The
Comelec en banc determined that former Comelec Commissioners Evalyn I. Fetalino4 and Amado M.
Calderon5 (petitioners) - whose ad interim appointments were not acted upon by the Commission on Appointments (CA)
and, who were subsequently, not reappointed — are not entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity because they did not
complete in full the seven year term of office.

The Antecedent Facts

On February 10, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to the petitioners as Comelec
Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.6 Eleven
days later (or on February 21, 1998), Pres. Ramos renewed the petitioners’ ad interim appointments for the same
position. Congress, however, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA could act on their appointments. The constitutional
ban on presidential appointments later took effect and the petitioners were no longer re-appointed as Comelec
Commissioners.7 Thus, the petitioners merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months, or
from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998.8

Subsequently, on March 15, 2005, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the
Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568.9 The Comelec initially approved the petitioners’ claims pursuant to its Resolution No.
06-136910 dated December 11, 2006 whose dispositive portion reads:

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the recommendation of Director Alioden D. Dalaig,
Law Department, to grant the request of former Comelec Commissioners Evalyn Fetalino and Amado Calderon for the
payment of their retirement benefits, subject to release of funds for the purpose by the Department of Budget and
Management.11

On February 6, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 07-0202 granting the petitioners a pro-rated gratuity and
pension.12 Subsequently, on October 5, 2007, the petitioners asked for a re-computation of their retirement pay on the
principal ground that R.A. No. 1568,13 does not cover a pro-rated computation of retirement pay. In response, the Comelec
issued a resolution referring the matter to its Finance Services Department for comment and recommendation. 14 On July
14, 2009, the Comelec issued another resolution referring the same matter to its Law Department for study and
recommendation.15

In the presently assailed Resolution No. 880816 dated March 30, 2010, the Comelec, on the basis of the Law Department’s
study, completely disapproved the petitioners’ claim for a lump sum benefit under R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec reasoned
out that:

Of these four (4) modes by which the Chairman or a Commissioner shall be entitled to lump sum benefit, only the first
instance (completion of term) is pertinent to the issue we have formulated above. It is clear that the non-confirmation
and non-renewal of appointment is not a case of resignation or incapacity or death. The question rather is: Can it be
considered as retirement from service for having completed one’s term of office?

xxxx

The full term of the Chairman and the Commissioners is seven (7) years. When there has been a partial service, what
remains is called the "unexpired term." The partial service is usually called tenure. There is no doubt in the distinction
between a term and tenure. Tenure is necessarily variable while term is always fixed. When the law, in this case, RA 1568
refers to completion of term of office, it can only mean finishing up to the end of the seven year term. By completion of
term, the law could not have meant partial service or a variable tenure that does not reach the end. It could not have
meant, the "expiration of term" of the Commissioner whose appointment lapses by reason of non-confirmation of
appointment by the Commission on Appointments and non-renewal thereof by the President. It is rightly called expiration
of term but note: it is not completion of term. RA 1568 requires ‘having completed his term of office’ for the Commissioner
to be entitled to the benefits.

Therefore, one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to fall
under the provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum benefit of five (5) years
salary.17 (emphasis, italics and underscores ours)

On this basis, the Comelec ruled on the matter, as follows:

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to APPROVE and ADOPT the study of
the Law Department on the payment of retirement benefits to members of the Commission.

Consequently, the following former Chairman and Commissioners of this Commission whose appointments expired by
reason of nonapproval by Commission on Appointments and non-renewal by the President are not entitled to a lump
sum benefit under Republic Act 1528 (sic):

Name Position Date of Service

1. Alfredo Benipayo, Jr. Chairman Feb. 16, 2001 to June 5, 2002

2. Evalyn Fetalino Commissioner Feb. 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998

3. Amado Calderon Commissioner Feb. 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998

4. Virgilio Garciliano Commissioner Feb. 12, 2004 to June 10, 2005

5. Manuel Barcelona, Jr. Commissioner Feb. 12, 2004 to June 10, 2005

6. Moslemen Macarambon Commissioner Nov[.] 05, 2007 to Oct. 10, 2008

7. Leonardo Leonida Commissioner July 03, 2008 to June 26, 2009

This resolution shall also apply to all requests of former COMELEC Chairmen and Commissioners similarly situated. All
previous resolutions which are inconsistent herewith are hereby AMENDED or REVOKED accordingly.

Let the Finance Services and Personnel Departments implement this resolution.18 (emphasis ours)

The Petitions

The petitioners sought the nullification of Comelec Resolution No. 8808 via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. later joined the petitioners in questioning the assailed
resolution. Like the petitioners, Barcelona did not complete the full seven-year term as Comelec Commissioner since he
served only from February 12, 2004 to July 10, 2005. The petitioners and Barcelona commonly argue that:

(1) the non-renewal of their ad interim appointments by the CA until Congress already adjourned qualifies
as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full five-year lump sum gratuity;

(2) Resolution No. 06-1369 that initially granted the five-year lump sum gratuity is already final and executory and
cannot be modified by the Comelec; and

(3) they now have a vested right over the full retirement benefits provided by RA No. 1568 in view of the finality of
Resolution No. 06- 1369.19

In the main, both the petitioners and Barcelona pray for a liberal interpretation of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568. They submit
that the involuntary termination of their ad interim appointments as Comelec Commissioners should be deemed by this
Court as a retirement from the service. Barcelona, in support of his plea for liberal construction, specifically cites the case
of Ortiz v. COMELEC.20 The Court ruled in this cited case that equity and justice demand that the involuntary curtailment
of Mario D. Ortiz’s term be deemed a completion of his term of office so that he should be considered retired from the
service.

In addition, the petitioners also bewail the lack of notice and hearing in the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8808.
Barcelona also assails the discontinuance of his monthly pension on the basis of the assailed Comelec issuance. 21

The Case for the Respondents

On July 22, 2010, the Comelec filed its Comment22 through the Office of the Solicitor General. The Comelec prays for the
dismissal of the petition on the grounds outlined below:

First, it submits that the petitioners’ reliance on Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure to show
that Resolution No. 06-1369 has attained finality is misplaced as this resolution is not the final decision
contemplated by the Rules. It also argues that estoppel does not lie against the Comelec since the erroneous
application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not estop the Government from making a subsequent
correction of its errors.23

Second, the Comelec reiterates that the petitioners are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity, considering that they
cannot be considered as officials who retired after completing their term of office. It emphasizes that R.A. No.
1568 refers to the completion of the term of office, not to partial service or to a variable tenure that does not reach
 its end, as in the case of the petitioners. The Comelec also draws the Court’s attention to the case of Matibag v.
Benipayo24 where the Court categorically ruled that an ad interim appointment that lapsed by inaction of the
Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office.25

Third, it argues that the petitioners do not have any vested right on their retirement benefits considering that the
retirements benefits afforded by R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; they are not similar to pension
plans where employee participation is mandatory so that they acquire vested rights in the pension as part of their
compensation. Without such vested rights, the Comelec concludes that the petitioners were not deprived of their
property without due process of law.26

The Court’s Ruling

We DISMISS the petition and DENY Barcelona’s petition for intervention.

Preliminary Considerations

R.A. No. 1568 provides two types of retirement benefits for a Comelec Chairperson or Member: a gratuity or five-year
lump sum, and an annuity or a lifetime monthly pension.27 Our review of the petitions, in particular, Barcelona’s petition for
intervention, indicates that he merely questions the discontinuance of his monthly pension on the basis of Comelec
Resolution No. 8808.28 As the assailed resolution, by its plain terms (cited above), only pertains to the lump sum benefit
afforded by R.A. No. 1568, it appears that Barcelona’s petition for intervention is misdirected. We note, too, that Barcelona
has not substantiated his bare claim that the Comelec discontinued the payment of his monthly pension on the basis of
the assailed Resolution.

To put the case in its proper perspective, the task now before us is to determine whether the petitioners are entitled to the
full five-year lump sum gratuity provided for by R.A. No. 1568. We conclude under our discussion below that they are not
so entitled as they did not comply with the conditions required by law.

The petitioners are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended

That the petitioners failed to meet conditions of the applicable retirement law — Section 1 of R.A. No. 156829 — is beyond
dispute. The law provides:

Sec. 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections retires from the
service for having completed his term of office or by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, or dies
while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty years but before the expiration of his term of
office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service
based upon the last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the
case may be: Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in the
government; And, provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life
equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation. [italics
supplied]

To be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, any of the following events must
transpire:

(1) Retirement from the service for having completed the term of office;

(2) Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office;

(3) Death while in the service; and

(4) Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the expiration of the term of office. In addition,
the officer should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government at the time of retirement.

Death during the service obviously does not need to be considered in the present case, thus
leaving retirement, incapacity and resignation as the event that must transpire in order to be entitled to the lump sum
gratuity.

We note that the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments could hardly be considered as incapacity since it
was not the result of any disability that rendered them incapable of performing the duties of a Commissioner. Thus,
incapacity is likewise effectively removed from active consideration.

"Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the
further right to it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear
intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment." 30 In this sense, resignation
likewise does not appear applicable as a ground because the petitioners did not voluntarily relinquish their position as
Commissioners; their termination was merely a consequence of the adjournment of Congress without action by the CA on
their ad interim appointments.
This eliminative process only leaves the question of whether the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments
amounted to retirement from the service after completion of the term of office. We emphasize at this point that the right to
retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are met: first, when the conditions imposed by the applicable law –
in this case, R.A. No. 1568 — are fulfilled; and second, when an actual retirement takes place.31 This Court has repeatedly
emphasized that retirement entails compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and
jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law.32

Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the Comelec who
has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. The petitioners obviously did not retire under R.A.
No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the full seven-year term of office prescribed by Section 2, Article IX-D
of the 1987 Constitution; they served as Comelec Commissioners for barely four months, i.e., from February 16, 1998 to
June 30, 1998. In the recent case of Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic
Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946,33 where the Court did not allow Judge Macarambon to retire under
R.A. No. 910 because he did not comply with the age and service requirements of the law, the Court emphasized:

Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of exception
remains to be on a case to case basis. We have ruled that the Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for
certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to grant such exception. (emphasis ours; citations
omitted)

More importantly, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioners’ service, if any, could only amount to tenure in
office and not to the term of office contemplated by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568. Tenure and term of office have well-
defined meanings in law and jurisprudence. As early as 1946, the Court, in Topacio Nueno v. Angeles,34 provided clear
distinctions between these concepts in this wise:

The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than
the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term
of an office may be extended by reason of war. [emphasis ours]

This is the ruling that has been followed since then and is the settled jurisprudence on these concepts. 35

While we characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo36 "as a permanent appointment that takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office," we have also
positively ruled in that case that "an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office."37 We consequently ruled:

However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute
a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed
term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and
complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This
interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments. 38 (emphasis ours; italics supplied)

Based on these considerations, we conclude that the petitioners can never be considered to have retired from the service
not only because they did not complete the full term, but, more importantly, because they did not serve a "term of office"
as required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended.

Ortiz v. COMELEC cannot be applied to the present case

We are not unmindful of the Court’s ruling in Ortiz v. COMELEC39 which Barcelona cites as basis for his claim of
retirement benefits despite the fact that — like the petitioners — he did not complete the full term of his office.

In that case, the petitioner was appointed as Comelec Commissioner, for a term expiring on May 17, 1992, by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and took his oath of office on July 30, 1985. When President Corazon Aquino assumed
the Presidency and following the lead of the Justices of the Supreme Court, Ortiz — together with the other Comelec
Commissioners — tendered his courtesy resignation on March 5, 1986. On July 21, 1986, President Aquino accepted
their resignations effective immediately. Thereafter, Ortiz applied for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568, which
application the Comelec denied. The Court, however, reversed the Comelec and held that "[t]he curtailment of [Ortiz’s]
term not being attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the petitioner, equity and justice demand that he should be
deemed to have completed his term xxx. [That he] should be placed in the same category as that of an official holding a
primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon his superior’s loss of confidence in him." Thus, as "he is deemed to
have completed his term of office, [Ortiz] should be considered retired from the service." 40

A close reading of Ortiz reveals that it does not have the same fact situation as the present case and is thus not decisive
of the present controversy. We note that the impact of the principle of stare decisis that Barcelona cited as basis is
limited; specific judicial decisions are binding only on the parties to the case and on future parties with similar or
identical factual situations.41 Significantly, the factual situation in Ortiz is totally different so that its ruling cannot simply
be bodily lifted and applied arbitrarily to the present case.

First, in Ortiz, Ortiz’s appointment was a regular appointment made by then President Marcos, while the petitioners were
appointed by President Ramos ad interim or during the recess of Congress.
Second, Ortiz’s appointment was made under the 1973 Constitution which did not require the concurrence of the CA.
Notably, the 1973 Constitution abolished the CA and did not provide for an executive limit on the appointing authority of
the President. In the present case, the petitioners’ ad interim appointment was made under the 1987 Constitution which
mandated that an appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of
Congress.

Third, in Ortiz, the Court addressed the issue of whether a constitutional official, whose "courtesy resignation" had been
accepted by the President of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution, may be entitled to
retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568. In the present case, the issue is whether the termination of the petitioners’ ad
interim appointments entitles them to the full five-year lump sum gratuity provided for by R.A. No. 1568.

No occasion for liberal construction since Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended, is clear and unambiguous

The petitioners’ appeal to liberal construction of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 is misplaced since the law is clear and
unambiguous. We emphasize that the primary modality of addressing the present case is to look into the provisions of the
retirement law itself. Guided by the rules of statutory construction in this consideration, we find that the language of the
retirement law is clear and unequivocal; no room for construction or interpretation exists, only the application of the letter
of the law.

The application of the clear letter of the retirement law in this case is supported by jurisprudence. As early as 1981, in the
case of In Re: Claim of CAR Judge Noel,42 the Court strictly adhered to the provisions of R.A. No. 910 and did not allow
the judge’s claim of monthly pension and annuity under the aforementioned law, considering that his length of government
service fell short of the minimum requirements.

Similarly, in Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes,43 the Court dismissed CTA Judge Reyes’ invocation of the doctrine of liberal
construction of retirement laws to justify his request that the last step increment of his salary grade be used in the
computation of his retirement pay and terminal leave benefits, and held:

In Borromeo, the court had occasion to say: "It is axiomatic that retirement laws are liberally construed and administered
in favor of the persons intended to be benefited. All doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the
retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes." Such interpretation in favor of the retiree is unfortunately not called
for nor warranted, where the clear intent of the applicable law and rules are demonstrably against the petitioner's
claim. (Paredes v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 88879, March 21, 1991). Section 4 is explicit and categorical in its prohibition
and, unfortunately for Judge Reyes, applies squarely to the instant case.44 (emphasis ours; italics supplied)

Finally, in Gov’t Service Insurance System v. Civil Service Commission,45 the Court was asked to resolve whether
government service rendered on a per diem basis is creditable for computing the length of service for retirement
purposes. In disregarding the petitioners’ plea for liberal construction, the Court held:

The law is very clear in its intent to exclude per diem in the definition of "compensation." Originally, per diem was not
among those excluded in the definition of compensation (See Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186), not until the passage of the
amending laws which redefined it to exclude per diem.

The law not only defines the word "compensation," but it also distinguishes it from other forms of remunerations. Such
distinction is significant not only for purposes of computing the contribution of the employers and employees to the GSIS
but also for computing the employees' service record and benefits.

xxxx

Private respondents both claim that retirement laws must be liberally interpreted in favor of the retirees. However, the
doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in the instant petitions, where the law invoked is clear,
unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or construction. Moreover, to accommodate private respondents'
plea will contravene the purpose for which the law was enacted, and will defeat the ends which it sought to attain (cf. Re:
Judge Alex Z. Reyes, 216 SCRA 720 [1992]).46 [italics supplied; emphasis ours]

No compelling reasons exist to warrant the liberal application of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended, to the
present case

We find no compelling legal or factual reasons for the application of the Court’s liberality in the interpretation of retirement
laws to the present case. The discretionary power of the Court to exercise the liberal application of retirement laws is not
limitless; its exercise of liberality is on a case-to-case basis and only after a consideration of the factual circumstances
that justify the grant of an exception. The recent case of Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T.
Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946 47 fully explained how a liberal approach
in the application of retirement laws should be construed, viz:

The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. However, when in the interest of
liberal construction the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices,
there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack
of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on a case to case basis.
In some instances, the lacking element—such as the time to reach an age limit or comply with length of service is de
minimis. It could be that the amount of accumulated leave credits is tremendous in comparison to the lacking period of
time.

More important, there must be present an essential factor before an application under the Plana or Britanico rulings
may be granted. The Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of required age or service only if satisfied that the
career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to the public service; it was only a bowing to
policy considerations and an acceptance of the realities of political will which brought him or her to premature retirement.
(emphases and italics ours; citation omitted)

In the present case, as previously mentioned, Ortiz cannot be used as authority to justify a liberal application of Section 1
of R.A. No. 1568, as amended not only because it is not on all fours with the present case; more importantly, the Court
in Ortiz had ample reasons, based on the unique factual circumstances of the case, to grant an exception to the service
requirements of the law. In Ortiz, the Court took note of the involuntariness of Ortiz’s "courtesy resignation," as well as the
peculiar circumstances obtaining at that time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 calling for the courtesy
resignation of all appointive officials, viz:

From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element of clear intention to surrender his position.
We cannot presume such intention from his statement in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he was placing his position at the
disposal of the President. He did not categorically state therein that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It should
be remembered that said letter was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued on
February 25, 1986 when she called on all appointive public officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to
restore confidence in public administration."48

In stark contrast, no such peculiar circumstances obtain in the present case.

Finally, in the absence of any basis for liberal interpretation, the Court would be engaged in judicial legislation if we
grant the petitioners’ plea. We cannot overemphasize that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should not be to
the point of engaging in judicial legislation — an act that the Constitution absolutely forbids this Court to do. In the oft-cited
case of Tanada v. Yulo,49 Justice George A. Malcolm cautioned against judicial legislation and warned against liberal
construction being used as a license to legislate and not to simply interpret, 50 thus:

Counsel in effect urges us to adopt a liberal construction of the statute. That in this instance, as in the past, we aim to do.
But counsel in his memorandum concedes "that the language of the proviso in question is somewhat defective and does
not clearly convey the legislative intent", and at the hearing in response to questions was finally forced to admit that what
the Government desired was for the court to insert words and phrases in the law in order to supply an intention for the
legislature. That we cannot do. By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language used, the subject matter, and
the purposes of those framing them are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however, between
construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which
someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial
power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of
government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.51

In the present case, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, by its plain terms, is clear that retirement entails the completion of the
term of office. To construe the term "retirement" in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 to include termination of an ad
interim appointment is to read into the clear words of the law exemptions that its literal wording does not support; to depart
from the meaning expressed by the words of R.A. No. 1568 is to alter the law and to legislate, and not to interpret. We
would thereby violate the timehonored rule on the constitutional separation of powers. The words of Justice E. Finley
Johnson in the early case of Nicolas v. Alberto52 still ring true today, viz.:

The courts have no legislative powers. In the interpretation and construction of statutes their sole function is to determine,
and, within the constitutional limits of the legislative power, to give effect to the intention of the legislature. The courts
cannot read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the
statute itself. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words of a statute, is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to
interpret. The responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation rests with the legislature, and it is the province of the
courts to construe, not to make the laws.

To reiterate, in light of the express and clear terms of the law, the basic rule of statutory construction should therefore
apply: "legislative intent is to be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words,
there is no room for construction."53

The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of judgments

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 06-1369, which initially granted them a five-year lump sum gratuity, attained finality
thirty (30) days after its promulgation, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, and, thus, can
no longer be modified by the Comelec.

We cannot agree with this position. Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads:

Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. –

a. In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.

A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies
and special reliefs. Under Section 5, Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedures, ordinary actions refer to election
protests, quo warranto, and appeals from decisions of courts in election protest cases; special proceedings refer to
annulment of permanent list of voters, registration of political parties and accreditation of citizens’ arms of the
Commission; provisional remedies refer to injunction and/or restraining order; and special reliefs refer to certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and contempt. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the issuance of Resolution
No. 06-1369 do not fall within the coverage of the actions and proceedings under Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure. Thus, the Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of judgments.1âwphi1

No denial of due process

We also find no merit in the petitioners’ contention that that they were denied due process of law when the Comelec
issued Resolution No. 8808 without affording them the benefit of a notice and hearing. We have held in the past that "[t]he
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [Thus, a] formal or
trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are
given fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute
lack of notice and hearing." 54 In Bautista v. Commission on Elections,55 we emphasized:

In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), we held that the right to be heard does not only refer to the right to
present verbal arguments in court. A party may also be heard through his pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard is
accorded either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. As reiterated
in National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998), the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side. Hence, in Navarro III vs. Damaso (246 SCRA 260 1995), we held that a formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and not in all instances essential.56 (italics supplied)

Thus, "a party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was accorded the opportunity of a hearing,
through either oral arguments or pleadings. There is no denial of due process when a party is given an opportunity
through his pleadings."57 In the present case, the petitioners cannot claim deprivation of due process because they
actively participated in the Comelec proceedings that sought for payment of their retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568.
The records clearly show that the issuance of the assailed Comelec resolution was precipitated by the petitioners’
application for retirement benefits with the Comelec. Significantly, the petitioners were given ample opportunity to present
and explain their respective positions when they sought a re-computation of the initial pro-rated retirement benefits that
were granted to them by the Comelec. Under these facts, no violation of the right to due process of law took place.

No vested rights over retirement benefits

As a last point, we agree with the Solicitor General that the retirement benefits granted to the petitioners under Section 1
of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested right over these benefits. 58 Retirement benefits
as provided under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a pension which is a form of deferred compensation for
services performed; in a pension, employee participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire contractual or vested
rights over the pension as part of their compensation. 59 In the absence of any vested right to the R.A. No. 1568 retirement
benefits, the petitioners' due process argument must perforce fail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Evalyn I. Fetalino
and Amado M. Calderon for lack of merit. We likewise DENY Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr.'s petition for intervention for lack of
merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 142527 March 1, 2001

ARSENIO ALVAREZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LA RAINNE ABAD-SARMIENTO

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc, denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of herein petitioner and affirming the Resolution of the Second Division of the COMELEC that modified
the decision dated December 4, 1997 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. 40, of Quezon City in Election Case No. 97-684.
Said decision declared herein private respondent La Rainne Abad-Sarmiento the duly elected Punong Barangay of
Barangay Doña Aurora, Quezon City during the May 12, 1997 elections; directed the herein petitioner to vacate and
turnover the office of Punong Barangay to private respondent upon the finality of the resolution; and directed the Clerk of
the COMELEC to notify the appropriate authorities of the resolution upon final disposition of this case, in consonance with
the provisions of Section 260 of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, as amended. 1

The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 12, 1997, petitioner was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Doña Aurora, Quezon City. He received
590 votes while his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed an
election protest claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors.
After petitioner answered and the issues were joined, the Metropolitan Trial Court ordered the reopening and recounting
of the ballots in ten contested precincts. It subsequently rendered its decision that private respondent won the election.
She garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount. 2

On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that private respondent won over petitioner. Private respondent,
meanwhile, filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. Both petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration and private respondent's Motion for Execution pending appeal were submitted for resolution. The
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the Second Division. 3 It granted
the Motion for Execution pending appeal.

Petitioner brought before the Court this petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC when:

(1) it did not preferentially dispose of the case;

(2) it prematurely acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal; and

(3) it misinterpreted the Constitutional provision that "decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
Election contests involving municipal and barangay officials shall be final, executory and not appealable".

First, petitioner avers that the Commission violated its mandate on "preferential disposition of election contests" as
mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution as well as Section 257, Omnibus Election Code that the
COMELEC shall decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days from the date of submission. He points out
that the case was ordered submitted for resolution on November 15, 19994 but the COMELEC En Banc promulgated its
resolution only on April 4, 2000,5 four months and four days after November 14, 1999.

We are not unaware of the Constitutional provision cited by petitioner. We agree with him that election cases must be
resolved justly, expeditiously and inexpensively. We are also not unaware of the requirement of Section 257 of the
Omnibus Election Code that election cases brought before the Commission shall be decided within ninety days from the
date of submission for decision.6 The records show that petitioner contested the results of ten (10) election precincts
involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal, validity, invalidity, legibility, misspelling, authenticity, and other irregularities in
these ballots. The COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering further the
tribunal's manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically.
Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack
of material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction might
allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous
cases.

Petitioner avers the COMELEC abused its discretion when it failed to treat the case preferentially. Petitioner misreads the
provision in Section 258 of the Omnibus Election Code. It will be noted that the "preferential disposition" applies to cases
before the courts7and not those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show.

Further, we note that petitioner raises the alleged delay of the COMELEC for the first time. As private respondent pointed
out, petitioner did not raise the issue before the COMELEC when the case was pending before it. In fact, private
respondent points out that it was she who filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the case when it was before the
COMELEC. The active participation of a party coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-
judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by
the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later impugning the court or the body's jurisdiction. 8 On the matter of
the assailed resolution, therefore, we find no grave abuse of discretion on this score by the COMELEC.

Second, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal of private
respondents on April 2, 2000 when the appeal was no longer pending. He claims that the motion had become obsolete
and unenforceable and the appeal should have been allowed to take its normal course of "finality and execution" after the
30-day period. Additionally, he avers it did not give one good reason to allow the execution pending appeal.

We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner had a motion for reconsideration before
the Second Division. This pending motion for reconsideration suspended the execution of the resolution of the Second
Division. Appropriately then, the division must act on the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when the Second Division
resolved both petitioner's motion for reconsideration and private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal, it did
so in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The requisites for the grant of execution pending appeal are: (a)
there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for the
execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.9 In our view, these three requisites
were present. In its motion for execution, private respondent cites that their case had been pending for almost three years
and the remaining portion of the contested term was just two more years. In a number of similar cases and for the same
good reasons, we upheld the COMELEC's decision to grant execution pending appeal in the best interest of the
electorate.10 Correspondingly, we do not find that the COMELEC abused its discretion when it allowed the execution
pending appeal.

Third, petitioner contends that the COMELEC misinterpreted Section 2 (2), second paragraph, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution. He insists that factual findings of the COMELEC in election cases involving municipal and barangay officials
may still be appealed. He cites jurisprudence stating that such decisions, final orders or rulings do not preclude a recourse
to this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari,11 when grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual
determination,12 and when there is arbitrariness in the factual findings.13

We agree with petitioner that election cases pertaining to barangay elections may be appealed by way of a special civil
action for certiorari. But this recourse is available only when the COMELEC's factual determinations are marred by grave
abuse of discretion. We find no such abuse in the instant case. From the pleadings and the records, we observed that the
lower court and the COMELEC meticulously pored over the ballots reviewed. Because of its fact-finding facilities and its
knowledge derived from actual experience, the COMELEC is in a peculiarly advantageous position to evaluate, appreciate
and decide on factual questions before it. Here, we find no basis for the allegation that abuse of discretion or arbitrariness
marred the factual findings of the COMELEC. As previously held, factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own
assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive on this Court, more so in the absence of a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law in the questioned resolutions. 14 Unless any of these causes are clearly
substantiated, the Court will not interfere with the COMELEC's findings of fact.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, and the En Banc Resolution of the Commission on Election is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

6. G.R. No. 176162 : October 9, 2012

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY.
AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR

G.R. No. 178845

ATTY. HONESTO L. CUEVA, v. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY.
AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR,

The Facts

Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar) were the Officer-in-
Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively, of the Polytechnic University of
the Philippines (PUP)2ςrνll in 2005.

On September 27, 2005, petitioner Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an
administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of
official documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously undesirable,
and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713.3ςrνll Cueva charged Guevarra with
falsification of a public document, specifically the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and
Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his pending
criminal and administrative cases. As the head of the school, Guevarra was required to be bonded in order
to be able to engage in financial transactions on behalf of PUP.4ςrνll In his Application for Bond of
Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines (General Form No. 58-A), he
answered Question No. 11 in this wise:

11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? NO. If so, state briefly the nature thereof
NO.5ςrνll

This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had 17
pending cases for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. 6ςrνll Cezar,
knowing fully well that both he and Guevarra had existing cases before the Sandiganbayan, endorsed and
recommended the approval of the application.7ςrνll

The respondents explained that they believed "criminal or administrative records" to mean final conviction
in a criminal or administrative case.8ςrνll Thus, because their cases had not yet been decided by the
Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded to Question No. 11 in General Form No. 58-A
correctly and in good faith.9ςrνll
On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Resolution No. 060521 10ςrνll formally
charging Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
after a prima facie finding that they had committed acts punishable under the Civil Service Law and Rules.

Subsequently, the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of
Prima Facie Case11ςrνll praying that the case be suspended immediately and that the CSC declare a
complete absence of a prima facie case against them. Cueva, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of Preventive Suspension 12ςrνll and an Omnibus Motion13ςrνll seeking the
issuance of an order of preventive suspension against Guevarra and Cezar and the inclusion of the
following offenses in the formal charge against them: Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Official Document,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Being Notoriously Undesirable, and Violation of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713.

In Resolution No. 061141, dated June 30, 2006, 14ςrνll the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by the respondents for being a non-responsive pleading, akin to a motion to dismiss, which was a
prohibited pleading under Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
Commission.15ςrνll It also denied Cuevas motion to include additional charges against the respondents.
The CSC, however, placed Guevarra under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, believing it to be
necessary because, as the officer-in-charge of PUP, he was in a position to unduly influence possible
witnesses against him.

Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA essentially
questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative complaint filed against them by Cueva. On
December 29, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullifying and setting aside the
questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been rendered without jurisdiction. According to the CA,
Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of
1987), the second paragraph of which states that heads of agencies and instrumentalities "shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction," bestows upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against respondents Guevarra and Cezar. In addition, the CA noted
that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out that the latter should have
exhausted all administrative remedies by first bringing his grievances to the attention of the PUP Board of
Regents.

Hence, these petitions.

THE ISSUE

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases falling under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are meritorious.

Both CSC and Cueva contend that because the CSC is the central personnel agency of the government, it
has been expressly granted by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 the authority to assume original jurisdiction
over complaints directly filed with it. The CSC explains that under the said law, it has appellate jurisdiction
over all administrative disciplinary proceedings and original jurisdiction over complaints against
government officials and employees filed before it by private citizens. Accordingly, the CSC has concurrent
original jurisdiction, together with the PUP Board of Regents, over the administrative case against
Guevarra and Cezar and it can take cognizance of a case filed directly with it, despite the fact that the
Board of Regents is the disciplining authority of university employees.

Respondents Guevarra and Cezar, on the other hand, fully adopted the position of the CA in its questioned
decision and propounded the additional argument that the passage of R.A. No. 8292 has effectively
removed from the CSC the authority to hear and decide on cases filed directly with it.

CSC has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who initiated the complaint

The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its
officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it
directly or on appeal.17ςrνll Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of the
civil service:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341,18ςrνll PUP became a chartered state university, thereby
making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees are
part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292.19ςrνll

The parties in these cases do not deny that Guevarra and Cezar are government employees and part of
the Civil Service. The controversy, however, stems from the interpretation of the disciplinary jurisdiction
of the CSC as specified in Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292:

SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in
an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or
agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be
taken.

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension
for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed
to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except
when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
Secretary concerned. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

While in its assailed decision, the CA conceded that paragraph one of the same provision abovequoted
allows the filing of a complaint directly with the CSC, it makes a distinction between a complaint filed by a
private citizen and that of an employee under the jurisdiction of the disciplining authority involved. The CA
resolved that because Cueva was then the Dean of the College of Law and the Chief Legal Counsel of PUP
when he filed the complaint with the CSC, he was under the authority of the PUP Board of Regents. Thus,
it is the Board of Regents which had exclusive jurisdiction over the administrative case he initiated against
Guevarra and Cezar.

The Court finds itself unable to sustain the reading of the CA.

The issue is not novel.

The understanding by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which
states that "a complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a
government official or employee" is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a case filed directly before it
if the complaint was made by a private citizen.

The Court is not unaware of the use of the words "private citizen" in the subject provision and the plain
meaning rule of statutory construction which requires that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it must
be taken to mean exactly what it says. The Court, however, finds that a simplistic interpretation is not in
keeping with the intention of the statute and prevailing jurisprudence. It is a well-established rule that
laws should be given a reasonable interpretation so as not to defeat the very purpose for which they were
passed. As such, "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd
results."20ςrνll In Secretary of Justice v. Koruga,21ςrνll the Court emphasized this principle and
cautioned us on the overzealous application of the plain meaning rule:

The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. However,
a literal interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or
contract the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole. After all, statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable
consequences.22ςrνll

A literal interpretation of E.O. 292 would mean that only private citizens can file a complaint directly with
the CSC. For administrative cases instituted by government employees against their fellow public
servants, the CSC would only have appellate jurisdiction over those. Such a plain reading of the subject
provision of E.O. 202 would effectively divest CSC of its original jurisdiction, albeit shared, provided by
law. Moreover, it is clearly unreasonable as it would be tantamount to disenfranchising government
employees by removing from them an alternative course of action against erring public officials.

There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a private citizen and one filed by a
member of the civil service, especially in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
the same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to "hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal" without any qualification.

In the case of Camacho v. Gloria,23ςrνll the Court stated that "under E.O. No. 292, a complaint against a
state university official may be filed with either the universitys Board of Regents or directly with the Civil
Service Commission."24ςrνll It is important to note that the Court did not interpret the Administrative
Code as limiting such authority to exclude complaints filed directly with it by a member of the civil service.

Moreover, as early as in the case of Hilario v. Civil Service Commission, 25ςrνll the Court interpreted
Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 as allowing the direct filing with the CSC
by a public official of a complaint against a fellow government employee. In the said case, Quezon City
Vice-Mayor Charito Planas directly filed with the CSC a complaint for usurpation, grave misconduct, being
notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
against the City Legal Officer of Quezon City. The CSC issued a resolution ruling that the respondent
official should not be allowed to continue holding the position of legal officer. In a petition to the Supreme
Court, the official in question asserted that the City Mayor was the only one who could remove him from
office directly and not the CSC. The Court upheld the decision of the CSC, citing the same provision of the
Administrative Code:

Although respondent Planas is a public official, there is nothing under the law to prevent her from filing a
complaint directly with the CSC against petitioner. Thus, when the CSC determined that petitioner was no
longer entitled to hold the position of City Legal Officer, it was acting within its authority under the
Administrative Code to hear and decide complaints filed before it.26ςrνll [Underscoring supplied]

It has been argued that Hilario is not squarely in point.27ςrνll While it is true that the circumstances
present in the two cases are not identical, a careful reading of Hilario reveals that petitioner therein
questioned the authority of the CSC to hear the disciplinary case filed against him, alleging that the CSCs
jurisdiction was only appellate in nature. Hence, the reference to the abovequoted passage in Hilario is
very appropriate in this case as respondents herein pose a similar query before us.

It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over an administrative case by the CSC. The law is quite clear that the CSC may hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may deputize any department or
agency to conduct an investigation.

CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of Regents over administrative cases

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service28ςrνll (the Uniform Rules) explicitly allows
the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases directly brought before it:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the
final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the
civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and
employees. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

The CA construed the phrase "the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the
removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service" to mean that the
CSC could only step in after the relevant disciplinary authority, in this case the Board of Regents of PUP,
had investigated and decided on the charges against the respondents. Regrettably, the CA failed to take
into consideration the succeeding section of the same rules which undeniably granted original concurrent
jurisdiction to the CSC and belied its suggestion that the CSC could only take cognizance of cases on
appeal:

Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities,

municipalities and other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission,
over their respective officers and employees.29ςrνll [Emphasis supplied]

It was also argued that although Section 4 of the Uniform Rules is silent as to who can file a complaint
directly with the CSC, it cannot be construed to authorize one who is not a private citizen to file a
complaint directly with the CSC. This is because a rule issued by a government agency pursuant to its law-
making power cannot modify, reduce or enlarge the scope of the law which it seeks to implement.30ςrνll

Following the earlier disquisition, it can be said that the Uniform Rules does not contradict the
Administrative Code. Rather, the former simply provides a reasonable interpretation of the latter. Such
action is perfectly within the authority of the CSC, pursuant to Section 12(2), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of E.O. No. 292, which gives it the power to "prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations
for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws."

Another view has been propounded that the original jurisdiction of the CSC has been further limited by
Section 5 of the Uniform Rules, such that the CSC can only take cognizance of complaints filed directly
with it which: (1) are brought against personnel of the CSC central office, (2) are against third level
officials who are not presidential appointees, (3) are against officials and employees, but are not acted
upon by the agencies themselves, or (4) otherwise require direct or immediate action in the interest of
justice:

Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. The Civil Service Commission Proper shall
have jurisdiction over the following cases:

A. Disciplinary

1. Decisions of the Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review;

2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other

instrumentalities, imposing penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days salary brought before it on appeal;

3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper personnel;

4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential appointees;

5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are not acted upon by the agencies and
such other complaints requiring direct or immediate action, in the interest of justice;

6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by Civil Service Regional Offices;

7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and

8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in connection with the foregoing
enumerations.

It is the Courts position that the Uniform Rules did not supplant the law which provided the CSC with
original jurisdiction. While the Uniform Rules may have so provided, the Court invites attention to the
cases of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso31ςrνll and Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,32ςrνll to be
further discussed in the course of this decision, both of which buttressed the pronouncement that the
Board of Regents shares its authority to discipline erring school officials and employees with the CSC. It
can be presumed that, at the time of their promulgation, the members of this Court, in Alfonso and Sojor,
were fully aware of all the existing laws and applicable rules and regulations pertaining to the jurisdiction
of the CSC, including the Uniform Rules. In fact, Sojor specifically cited the Uniform Rules in support of its
ruling allowing the CSC to take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against the
president of a state university. As the Court, in the two cases, did not consider Section 5 of the Uniform
Rules as a limitation to the original concurrent jurisdiction of the CSC, it can be stated that Section 5 is
merely implementary. It is merely directory and not restrictive of the CSCs powers. The CSC itself is of
this view as it has vigorously asserted its jurisdiction over this case through this petition.

The case of Alfonso33ςrνll is on all fours with the case at bench. The case involved a complaint filed
before the CSC against a PUP employee by two employees of the same university. The CA was then faced
with the identical issue of whether it was the CSC or the PUP Board of Regents which had jurisdiction over
the administrative case filed against the said PUP employee. The CA similarly ruled that the CSC could
take cognizance of an administrative case if the decisions of secretaries or heads of agencies,
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities were appealed to it or if a private citizen directly filed
with the CSC a complaint against a government official or employee. Because the complainants in the said
case were PUP employees and not private citizens, the CA held that the CSC had no jurisdiction to hear
the administrative case. It further posited that even assuming the CSC had the authority to do so,
immediate resort to the CSC violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the
complaint should have been first lodged with the PUP Board of Regents to allow them the opportunity to
decide on the matter. This Court, however, reversed the said decision and declared the following:

xxx. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government
departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC,
and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a
department or an agency to conduct the investigation. x x x

xxxxxxxxx
We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinary committees and
governing bodies in different branches, subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the government to
hear and decide administrative complaints against their respective officers and employees. Be that as it
may, we cannot interpret the creation of such bodies nor the passage of laws such as R.A. Nos. 8292 and
4670 allowing for the creation of such disciplinary bodies as having divested the CSC of its inherent power
to supervise and discipline government employees, including those in the academe. To hold otherwise
would not only negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established, i.e. to instill professionalism,
integrity, and accountability in our civil service, but would also impliedly amend the Constitution itself.

xxxxxxxxx

But it is not only for this reason that Alfonsos argument must fail. Equally significant is the fact that he
had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit and his
motion for reconsideration and requested for a change of venue, not from the CSC to the BOR of PUP, but
from the CSC-Central Office to the CSC-NCR. It was only when his motion was denied that he suddenly
had a change of heart and raised the question of proper jurisdiction. This cannot be allowed because it
would violate the doctrine of res judicata, a legal principle that is applicable to administrative cases as
well. At the very least, respondents active participation in the proceedings by seeking affirmative relief
before the CSC already bars him from impugning the Commissions authority under the principle of
estoppel by laches.

In this case, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two PUP employees. These complaints were not lodged
before the disciplinary tribunal of PUP, but were instead filed before the CSC, with averments detailing
respondents alleged violation of civil service laws, rules and regulations. After a fact-finding investigation,
the Commission found that a prima facie case existed against Alfonso, prompting the Commission to file a
formal charge against the latter. Verily, since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC
has opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSCs exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. To repeat, it may, however, choose to
deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials such as the BOR of PUP to conduct the
investigation, or to delegate the investigation to the proper regional office. But the same is merely
permissive and not mandatory upon the Commission.34ςrνll [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

It has been opined that Alfonso does not apply to the case at bar because respondent therein submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit before it, thereby preventing him
from later questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. Such circumstance is said to be totally absent in this
case.35ςrνll

The records speak otherwise. As in Alfonso, respondents herein submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the CSC when they filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit.36ςrνll It was only when their Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case 37ςrνll was denied by the CSC that
they thought to put in issue the jurisdiction of the CSC before the CA, clearly a desperate attempt to
evade prosecution by the CSC. As in Alfonso, respondents are also estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the CSC.

Based on all of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the CSC may take cognizance of an
administrative case filed directly with it against an official or employee of a chartered state college or
university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private citizen or a member of the civil
service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of Regents of the school.

Gaoiran not applicable

In its decision, the CA relied heavily on Gaoiran v. Alcala to support its judgment that it is the Board of
Regents, and not the CSC, which has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint filed against the
respondents.

A thorough study of the said case, however, reveals that it is irrelevant to the issues discussed in the case
at bench. Gaoiran speaks of a complaint filed against a high school teacher of a state-supervised school by
another employee of the same school. The complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the
Commission on Higher Education (LAS-CHED). After a fact-finding investigation established the existence
of a prima facie case against the teacher, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Director of LAS-CHED
issued a formal charge for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
together with the Order of Preventive Suspension. The newly-appointed Director of LAS-CHED, however,
dismissed the administrative complaint on the ground that the letter-complaint was not made under oath.
Unaware of this previous resolution, the Chairman of the CHED issued another resolution finding petitioner
therein guilty of the charges against him and dismissing him from the service. The trial court upheld the
resolution of the director of LAS-CHED but on appeal, this was reversed by the CA, affirming the decision
of the CHED chairman removing petitioner from service. One of the issues raised therein before this Court
was whether the CA erred in disregarding the fact that the complaint was not made under oath as
required by the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292.
In the said case, the Court concurred with the findings of the CA that it was the formal charge issued by
the LAS-CHED which constituted the complaint, and because the same was initiated by the appropriate
disciplining authority, it need not be subscribed and sworn to and CHED acquired jurisdiction over the
case. The Court further affirmed the authority of the heads of agencies to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against their officers and employees. It bears stressing, at this point, that
there is nothing in the case that remotely implies that this Court meant to place upon the Board of Regent
exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases filed against their employees.

In fact, following the ruling in Gaoiran, it can be argued that it was CSC Resolution No. 060521 which
formally charged respondents that constituted the complaint, and since the complaint was initiated by the
CSC itself as the disciplining authority, the CSC properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

R.A. No. 8292 is not in conflict with E.O. No. 292.

In addition, the respondents argue that R.A. No. 8292, which granted to the board of regents or board of
trustees disciplinary authority over school employees and officials of chartered state colleges and
universities, should prevail over the provisions of E.O. No. 292. 39ςrνll They anchor their assertion that
the Board of Regents has exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases on Section 4 of R.A. No.
8292,40ςrνll to wit:

Section 4. Powers and duties of Governing Boards. The governing board shall have the following specific
powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers
granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 otherwise
known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines;

xxxx

(h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees subject to the
provisions of the revised compensation and classification system and other pertinent budget and
compensation laws governing hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem
proper; to grant them, at its discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate,
any provisions of existing law to the contrary not with standing; and to remove them for cause in
accordance with the requirements of due process of law. [Emphasis supplied]

The respondents are mistaken.

Basic is the principle in statutory construction that interpreting and harmonizing laws is the best method
of interpretation in order to form a uniform, complete, coherent, and intelligible system of jurisprudence,
in accordance with the legal maxim interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi
modus.41ςrνll Simply because a later statute relates to a similar subject matter as that of an earlier
statute does not result in an implied repeal of the latter.42ςrνll

A perusal of the abovequoted provision clearly reveals that the same does not indicate any intention to
remove employees and officials of state universities and colleges from the ambit of the CSC. What it
merely states is that the governing board of a school has the authority to discipline and remove faculty
members and administrative officials and employees for cause. It neither supersedes nor conflicts with
E.O. No. 292 which allows the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases filed directly with it or on
appeal.

In addition to the previously cited case of Alfonso, the case of The Civil Service Commission v.
Sojor43ςrνll is likewise instructive. In the said case, this Court ruled that the CSC validly took cognizance
of the administrative complaints directly filed with it concerning violations of civil service rules committed
by a university president. This Court acknowledged that the board of regents of a state university has the
sole power of administration over a university, in accordance with its charter and R.A. No. 8292. With
regard to the disciplining and removal of its employees and officials, however, such authority is not
exclusive to it because all members of the civil service fall under the jurisdiction of the CSC:

Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not
exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials. Although the BOR of
NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no
showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive
unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law.
Being a non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.
Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the
CSC.44ςrνll [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

It has been pointed out that the case of Sojor is not applicable to the case at bar because the distinction
between a complaint filed by a private citizen and one filed by a government employee was not taken into
consideration in the said case.45ςrνll The dissent fails to consider that Sojor is cited in the ponencia to
support the ruling that R.A. No. 8292 is not in conflict with E.O. No. 292 and to counter respondents
flawed argument that the passage of R.A. No. 8292 granted the Board of Regents exclusive jurisdiction
over administrative cases against school employees and officials of chartered state colleges and
universities. Also noteworthy is the fact that the complainants before the CSC in Sojor were faculty
members of a state university and were, thus, government employees. Nevertheless, despite this, the
Court allowed the CSC to assert jurisdiction over the administrative case, proclaiming that the power of
the Board of Regents to discipline its officials and employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with the
CSC.46ςrνll

The case of University of the Philippines v. Regino47ςrνll was also cited to bolster the claim that original
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases against government officials is vested upon the department secretaries
and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities, whereas the CSC only
enjoys appellate jurisdiction over such cases.48ςrνll The interpretation therein of the Administrative Code
supposedly renders effectual the provisions of R.A. No. 8292 and does not "deprive the governing body of
the power to discipline its own officials and employees and render inutile the legal provisions on
disciplinary measures which may be taken by it."49ςrνll

The Court respectfully disagrees. Regino is obviously inapplicable to this case because there, the school
employee had already been found guilty and dismissed by the Board of Regents of the University of the
Philippines. Therefore, the issue put forth before this Court was whether the CSC had appellate jurisdiction
over cases against university employees, considering the university charter which gives it academic
freedom allegedly encompassing institutional autonomy. In contrast, no administrative case was filed
before the Board of Regents of PUP because the case was filed directly with the CSC and so, the question
here is whether the CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction over disciplinary cases. Rationally, the quoted
portions in Regino find no application to the case at bench because those statements were made to uphold
the CSCs appellate jurisdiction which was being contested by petitioner therein. At the risk of being
repetitive, it is hereby stressed that the authority of the CSC to hear cases on appeal has already been
established in this case. What is in question here is its original jurisdiction over administrative cases.

A different interpretation of the Administrative Code was suggested in order to harmonize the provisions
of R.A. No. 8292 and E.O. 292. By allowing only a private citizen to file a complaint directly with the CSC,
the CSC maintains its power to review on appeal decisions of the Board of Regents while at the same time
the governing board is not deprived of its power to discipline its officials and employees. 50ςrνll

To begin with, there is no incongruity between R.A. No. 8292 and E.O. No. 292, as previously explained in
Sojor. Moreover, the Court fails to see how a complaint filed by a private citizen is any different from one
filed by a government employee. If the grant to the CSC of concurrent original jurisdiction over
administrative cases filed by private citizens against public officials would not deprive the governing
bodies of the power to discipline their own officials and employees and would not be violative of R.A. No.
8292, it is inconceivable that a similar case filed by a government employee would do so. Such a
distinction between cases filed by private citizens and those by civil servants is simply illogical and
unreasonable. To accede to such a mistaken interpretation of the Administrative Code would be a great
disservice to our developing jurisprudence.

It is therefore apparent that despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8292 giving the board of regents or board
of trustees of a state school the authority to discipline its employees, the CSC still retains jurisdiction over
the school and its employees and has concurrent original jurisdiction, together with the board of regents
of a state university, over administrative cases against state university officials and employees.

Finally, with regard to the concern that the CSC may be overwhelmed by the increase in number of cases
filed before it which would result from our ruling,51ςrνll it behooves us to allay such worries by
highlighting two important facts. Firstly, it should be emphasized that the CSC has original concurrent
jurisdiction shared with the governing body in question, in this case, the Board of Regents of PUP. This
means that if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the complaint, then it shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC. 52ςrνll Thus, not all administrative cases will fall directly under
the CSC. Secondly, Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code affords
the CSC the option of whether to decide the case or to deputize some other department, agency or official
to conduct an investigation into the matter, thereby considerably easing the burden placed upon the CSC.

Having thus concluded, the Court sees no need to discuss the other issues raised in the petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Resolution Nos. 060521 and 061141 dated March 24, 2006 and June
30, 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED.ςrαlαωlιbrαr

SO ORDERED.

7. G.R. No. 112513 August 21, 1997

EDGAR R. DEL CASTILLO, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION and/or ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
MARIANO A. MENDIETA of the Professional Regulation Commission, respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a "Motion for Clarificatory Relief" filed by petitioner in G.R. No. 112513 entitled Edgar R. Del Castillo vs. Civil
Service Commission, et al.1 seeking a clarification of the decision of this Court in said case and praying for an award of
backwages and other benefits accruing to petitioner as a result of his illegal dismissal.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On August 1, 1990, petitioner, an employee of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), was placed under
preventive suspension by the PRC for "grave misconduct" and "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service."
After due investigation, petitioner was found guilty of grave misconduct and was dismissed from the service with forfeiture
of all benefits.

Petitioner appealed the PRC's decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which exonerated him of said
charge.

On appeal by the PRC, however, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct, and
imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. 2

Petitioner, thus, filed in this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CSC
committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the PRC's appeal, among other grounds.

This Court granted said petition in an En Banc Decision promulgated on February 14, 1995. The dispositive part of said
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, Resolution No. 92-1249 dated September 8, 1992 and
Resolution No. 93-4502 dated October 12, 1993 of the respondent Civil Service Commission are hereby
REVERSED and the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.3

However, it may be noted that the decision of the MSPB referred to above merely ordered the reinstatement of petitioner
to his former position and was silent on the award of back salaries. Thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the PRC Resolution dated September 19, 1990 is
hereby set aside there being no substantial evidence adduced to support the conviction or finding of guilt.
Thus, respondent-appellant Edgar R. del Castillo is exonerated of the charge of grave misconduct
levelled (sic) against him. The Professional Regulations Commission is thus directed to reinstate him to
his former position effective immediately.4

Nevertheless, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to PRC Chairman Hermogenes Pobre requesting not only reinstatement
but payment of back salaries as well.

Petitioner was eventually reinstated on July 17, 1995. However, his claim for backwages was in effect denied by
Chairman Pobre in a Letter5 to petitioner dated November 28, 1995. Attached to said letter was a
Correspondence6addressed to Chairman Pobre and signed by a certain Julieta de la Torre of the Department of Bureau
and Management. The pertinent portion of said correspondence reads:

We regret to inform you of the inability of this Department to give favorable consideration on the above
request since there is no valid legal basis for the payment of back salaries and other benefits of Mr. Del
 Castillo. The Supreme Court decision is silent on the payment of such claim, hence, we cannot read into
the Supreme Court decision something not stated therein unless the decision in question is subsequently
clarified on this point by the Supreme Court or by any other competent authority like the Department of
Justice, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) or the Legal Office of the Office of the President.

Hence, this "Motion for Clarificatory Relief."

In our Resolution dated March 26, 1996, we required the respondents to comment on petitioner's motion.

Accordingly, the CSC filed its Comment on October 29, 1996, stating thus:

The sole issue in this motion is whether or not Edgar del Castillo, who is exonerated in the administrative
case and later ordered reinstated, is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of
his preventive suspension on August 1, 1990 up to the time of his actual reinstatement on July 17, 1995.

In so many cases, this Honorable Court had the occasion to rule, as follows:

It is already settled in this jurisdiction that a government official or employee is entitled to backwages not
only if he is exonerated in the administrative case but also when the suspension is unjustified. (Miranda
vs. COA, 200 SCRA 657 citing Abellena vs. City of Baguio, 19 SCRA 600 citing Reyes vs. Hernandez, 71
Phil. 297; Villamor vs. Lacson, G.R. No. L-15945, November 28, 1964)

. . . Such right (to backwages) is afforded only to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus
ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them. (notes in emphasis
ours) Isabelo T . Sabello vs. DECS, 180 SCRA 623.7

From the foregoing, it appears that the CSC does not pose any objection to petitioner's motion. Indeed, the Commission
"submits to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court the resolution of the instant motion." 8

The Solicitor General, for his part, recommends that petitioner's prayer for payment of backwages be granted. 9 In support
of said recommendation, the Solicitor General cites the following authorities:

This Honorable Court in the case of Tan, Jr. vs. Office of the President, 229 SCRA 677, stated:

Section 42 of P.D. No. 807, however, is really not in point. The provision refers to
preventive suspension[s] during the pendency of administrative investigation[s], and it
does not cover dismissed civil servants who are ultimately exonerated and ordered
reinstated to their former or equivalent positions. The rule in the latter instance, just as we
have said starting with the case of Cristobal v. Melcher (101 SCRA 857), is that when [']a
government official or employee in the classified civil service had been illegally
dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal [purposes he is
considered as not having left his office, so] that he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held.'] Such award of
backwages, however, has since been limited to a maximum period of five (5) years (San
[Luis] vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258).

Likewise, in Gabriel vs. Domingo, 189 SCRA 672, this Honorable Court ruled that an employee who is
reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is entitled to back salaries for the period of his illegal
dismissal. 10

We are in full accord with the Solicitor General's recommendation.

As we recently held in De Guzman v. Civil Service Commission: 11

When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement has later been ordered, for all
legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held (Tañada v. Legaspi, 13 SCRA 566 [1965]).

Back salaries may be ordered paid to said officer or employee (City Mayor of Zamboanga v. Court of
Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).

Having been exonerated of the charges against him, petitioner should clearly be awarded back salaries, the silence of the
MSPB's decision notwithstanding. In Cristobal vs. Melchor, 12 Justice Claudio Teehankee, speaking for this Court, said:

As likewise reaffirmed by the Court in Perez vs. Evite, "under Section 45 of Rule 39, Rules of Court. . . . a
judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto." The late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro stressed for the Court
in Padua vs. Robles, that "(T)he sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by
its substancerather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects
that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used, govern. Also, its
meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a
 judgment rests on the intention of the court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to
which it applies and the attendant circumstances. 13

WHEREFORE, petitioner's motion for clarificatory relief is GRANTED. It is hereby ordered that petitioner be paid back
salaries and other benefits due him at the rate prescribed for the position he held as a civil servant from the time of his
preventive suspension on August 1, 1990 until his actual reinstatement on July 17, 1995, without deduction. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

8. SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 177333 April 24, 2009

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) represented by ATTY. CARLOS R.

BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE
AUTHORITY, et al., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition.

Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February 23, 1995, created the Zamboanga City
Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the law gives the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f), viz:

Section 7.

xxxx

(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities,
including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities;

xxxx

Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated August 19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent Philippine E-
Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance.

PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as such licensor/regulator to the international
business and gaming community, drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the
present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or
regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.

PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does not give power or authority to the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
Citing three (3) statutes, which it claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903 as it likewise created economic zones and
provided for the powers and functions of their respective governing and administrative authorities, PAGCOR posits that
the grant therein of authority to operate games of chance is clearly expressed, but it is not similarly so in Section 7(f) of
R.A. No. 7903.

Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their respective pertinent provisions:

Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Authority Act" enacted on March 13, 1992:

Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. –

xxxx

(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. – The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, otherwise
known as the Subic Authority, shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx
(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-related activities subject to priorities and standards set by the Subic
Authority including games and amusements, except horse-racing, dog-racing and casino gambling which shall continue to
be licensed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) upon recommendation of the Conversion
Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested areas as a national park;

xxxx

Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone Act of 1995" enacted on February 24, 1995:

Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority – The Cagayan Economic Zone Authority
shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities,
including games, amusements, recreational and sports facilities such as horse-racing, dog-racing gambling, casinos, golf
courses, and others, under priorities and standards set by the CEZA;

xxxx

And Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic Zone Act of 1995," enacted on February 24, 1995 authorizing other
economic zones established under the defunct Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and its successor Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) to establish casinos and other games of chance under the license of PAGCOR by way
of the ipso facto clause, viz:

SECTION 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions granted to special economic zones
under Republic Act No. 7227 shall ipso facto be accorded to special economic zones already created or to be created
under this Act. The free port status shall not be vested upon the new special economic zones.

PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the above-quoted provisions of the ecozone-related statutes, Section 7(f) of R.A.
No. 7903 does not categorically empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or authorize entities to
operate games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and "amusement" employed therein do not include "games of
chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes, ZAMBOECOZONE Authority’s grant of license to private respondent PEJI
encroached on its (PAGCOR’s) authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis the above-stated special laws to
centralize and regulate all games of chance.

ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its Comment,1 contends that PAGCOR has no personality to file the present petition as it
failed to cite a superior law which proves its claim of having been granted exclusive right and authority to license and
regulate all games of chance within the Philippines; and that, contrary to PAGCOR’s assertion, the words "games" and
"amusements" in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 include "games of chance" as was the intention of the lawmakers when
they enacted the law.

In its Reply Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam,2 PAGCOR cites the November 27, 2006 Opinion3 rendered by the Office of the
President through Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the pertinent portions of which read:

Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related
activitiesincluding games and amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to
ZAMBOECOZONE.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not
authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing
the same. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or license
games of chance/gambling.

Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate on its own, either directly or
through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational
and sports facilities."

It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. 4

The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention),
rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will,
and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to
have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis
non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.5
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly different from
"game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while an "amusement" is a
pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment. 6 On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in
which chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a play for value
against an uncertain event in hope of gaining something of value." 7

A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 with similar provisions in the three cited statutes
creating ECOZONES shows that while the three statutes, particularly R.A. No. 7922 which authorized the Cagayan
Economic Zone Authority to directly or indirectly operate gambling and casinos within its jurisdiction, categorically stated
that such power was being vested in their respective administrative bodies, R.A. No. 7903 did not.

The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.8 Not any of these instances is present in the case at bar, however.
Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude "games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead to
absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have easily
employed the words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to
operate the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No. 7922 enacted a day after R.A. No.
7903. But they did not.

The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion of the Office of the President which, after differentiating the grant of
powers between the Cagayan Special Economic Zone and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, states that while the former
is authorized to, among other things, operate gambling casinos and internet gaming, as well as enter into licensing
agreements, the latter is not. The relevant portions of said Opinion read:

The difference in the language and grant of powers to CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE is telling. To the former, the grant of
powers is not only explicit, but amplified, while to the latter the grant of power is merely what the law (RA 7903) states.
Not only are the differences in language telling, it will be noted that both charters of CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE were
signed into law only one (1) day apart from each other, i.e., February 23, 1995 in the case of ZAMBOECOZONE and
February 24, 1995 in the case of CEZA. x x x Accordingly, both laws have to be taken in the light of what Congress
intended them to be, and the distinction that the lawmakers made when they enacted the two laws.

Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related activities
including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to
ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA included such activities as horse-racing, dog-racing and
gambling casinos.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not
authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing
the same. (Emphasis supplied)

Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of the President, the latter’s interpretation of
R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical
construction. In applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases thereof –
factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in
themselves. These factors include the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their
competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of
the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical
working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and
experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute. 8

In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to operate and/or license games of
chance/gambling.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is DIRECTED to
CEASE and DESIST from exercising jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise authorize and regulate the operation of
any games of chance. And private respondent Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated is DIRECTED to CEASE and
DESIST from operating any games of chance pursuant to the license granted to it by public respondent.

SO ORDERED.

9. EN BANC

G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN
POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE, Secretary-
General, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKAKULONG NA WALANG SALA
(KAKUSA), BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON
PINOY, AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP), PUWERSA NG BAYANING
ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN,
INC. (AGHAM), BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN (BABAE KA), AKSYON SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA BAYAN
NG MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT REPORMANG KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK), AGBIAG TIMPUYOG ILOCANO,
INC. (AGBIAG!), ABANTE ILONGGO, INC. (ABA ILONGGO), AANGAT TAYO (AT), AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN
(ANAK), BAGO NATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF THE PHILIPPINES (BAGO), ANGAT ANTAS-KABUHAYAN
PILIPINO MOVEMENT (AANGAT KA PILIPINO), ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONAL (ABS),
ASSOSASYON NG MGA MALILIIT NA NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP INC. (AMANG), SULONG BARANGAY
MOVEMENT, KASOSYO PRODUCERS CONSUMER EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO), UNITED
MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNI-MAD), PARENTS ENABLING PARENTS (PEP), ALLIANCE OF NEO-
CONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS MOVEMENT (FPJPM), BIGKIS
PINOY MOVEMENT (BIGKIS), 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UNTAK), ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY
CONCERNS (ABC), BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), AKBAY
PINOY OFW-NATIONAL INC., (APOI), ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI SECTORAL PARTY
(ADVOCATES FOR OVERSEAS FILIPINO) AND ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS, PROFESSIONALS AND
SENIORS (AAPS),Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 177314 May 4, 2007

REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION, BANTAY KATARUNGAN

FOUNDATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain
issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to
participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban
Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents
Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously
determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to
represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request
for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups
mentioned in petitioner Rosales’ previous letter-request.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups named in the petitions,1 the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional prayers:
1) that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as
sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang
Bagong Bayani v. Comelec2]" and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the May 2007 elections.

In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public and private respondents to file
their respective comments on the petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice. Apart from
respondent Comelec, seven (7) private respondents3 in G.R. No. 177271 and one party-list group4 mentioned in G.R. No.
177314 submitted their separate comments. In the main, the separate comments of the private respondents focused on
the untenability and prematurity of the plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list
groups and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections.

The facts:

On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of
manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in
connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary
manifestations. Among these – and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007
elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA;
(5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN;
(11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a
longer, albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder
seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the
nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as
SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.

Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups
do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314,
addressed a letter5 dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of
that groups’ nominees. Another letter6 of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales
impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject request.

Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales’ requests. The April 13,
2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WON’T BARE PARTY-
LIST NOMINEES",7 with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented."

On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of
petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter8 to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales’
earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed
right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to
earlier, with a request for the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or
denying … the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst
then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en bancResolution 07-07249 under date April 3, 2007 virtually
declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. In its
relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:

RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in connection with
the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election day.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to the Commission inquiring on the
party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.)

According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007 Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She
would later state the observation that the last part of the "Order empowering the Law Department to ‘implement this
resolution and reply to all letters … inquiring on the party-list nominees’ is apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to
distort and mangle the truth and give the impression that the antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 … is the final answer
to the two formal requests … of Petitioners".10

The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.

To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec
to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees
do not appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec -

xxx committed grave abuse of discretion … when it granted the assailed accreditations even
without simultaneouslydetermining whether the nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or not, or whether or
not the nominees are likewise belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent in
Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong
Bayani11 case which states that, "not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees." In the case of private respondents, public respondent Comelec
granted accreditations without the required simultaneous determination of the qualification of the nominees as part of the
accreditation process of the party-list organization itself. (Words in bracket added; italization in the original)12

The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the
grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would entail going over and evaluating the qualities of
the sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent
marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter
which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court
is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record.13 The sole
function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include
a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence.14

Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in which petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the nominees of the respondent party-list groups named in their petition.

Petitioners BA-RA 7941’s and UP-LR’s posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere
in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the
accreditation of an organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka),
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec "not
later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not later than
forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall be chosen.
Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and captures the main issues
tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups,
has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and

2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said
nominees.

While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list
groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding the publication and the posting in polling places of a
certified list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names of
the party-list nominees in said certified list. Thus:

SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a
certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have
manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in
the polling places on election day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified
list. (Emphasis added.)

And doubtless part of Comelec’s reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is
deducible from the following excerpts of the news report appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila
Bulletin:

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to release the names of nominees of
sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to participate in the party-list election which will be held
simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term polls.

COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. … said he and [the other five COMELEC] Commissioners --- believe that
the party list elections must not be personality oriented.

Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 …, the people are to vote for sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions, not for their
nominees.

He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees. xxx (Words in
brackets and emphasis added)

Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.

Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to information
enshrined in the self-executory15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision enunciating the
policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And
for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to
respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. 16 Without a government’s
acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment
on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.

By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to information and
may seek its enforcement by mandamus.17 And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the
right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.18

Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records
are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people’s right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is
further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to
transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the
need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets
or those affecting national security.19

The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow
from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the
courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public.

If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as sanitarians of a health
department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a
matter of highest public concern and interest.

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate
demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions.
Mandamus, therefore, lies.

The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition
imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the
certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage
of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely
nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the
"Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of
the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the
Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.

The Comelec’s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken,
however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity,
impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information.20 While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a
party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House
of Representatives.

The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons behind the Comelec’s disinclination
to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed, however, that the Court is in the business of dispensing
justice on the basis of hard facts and applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always
assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of government officials and offices.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of
an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The
ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The
Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo,21 has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of
the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. 22 So it must be
here for still other reasons articulated earlier.

In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names
of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the
respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same
petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to
immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited
to participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its
compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof.

This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

10. EN BANC

G.R. No. 139792 November 22, 2000

ANTONIO P. SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, now known as METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari petitioner assails the decision of 19 August 1999 of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 48301, which held that petitioner’s separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 should be limited to the
number of years of his service in the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) only, excluding his years of service as judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City for which he has already been given retirement gratuity and pension.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

On 18 January 1983, petitioner was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City, and he thereafter assumed office. After
the military-backed EDSA revolt, petitioner was reappointed to the same position.

On 1 April 1992, petitioner optionally retired from the Judiciary under R.A. No. 910,2 as amended, and received his
retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has been
regularly receiving a monthly pension.

On 2 December 1993, petitioner re-entered the government service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation
Center of the MMA. His appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7924, which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA). Section 11 thereof reads:

Section 11. Transitory Provisions. – To prevent disruption in the delivery of basic urban services pending the full
implementation of the MMDA’s organizational structure and staffing pattern, all officials and employees of the interim
MMA shall continue to exercise their duties and functions and receive their salaries and allowances until they shall have
been given notice of change of duties and functions, and of being transferred to another office or position.

...

The civil service laws, rules and regulations pertinent to the displacement of personnel affected by this Act shall be strictly
enforced. The national government shall provide such amounts as may be necessary to pay the benefits accruing to
displaced employees at the rate of one and one-fourth (1¼) month’s salary for every year of service: Provided, That, if
qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws, said employees may opt to receive the benefits thereunder.

On 16 May 1996, the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order No. 372 approving the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7924. Pursuant thereto, the MMDA issued Resolution No. 16, series of 1996,
which, inter alia, authorized the payment of separation benefits to the officials and employees of the former MMA who
would be separated as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 7924.

On 30 August 1996, the MMDA issued a Memorandum to petitioner informing him that in view of his "voluntary option to
be separated from the service" his services would automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on 15
September 1996, and that he would be entitled to "separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1¼) monthly
salary for every year of service as provided under Section 11 of the MMDA Law."

In view of some doubt or confusion as to the extent of his separation benefits, petitioner submitted a Position Paper
wherein he asserted that since the retirement gratuity he received under R.A. No. 910, as amended, is not an additional or
double compensation, all the years of his government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited in
the computation of his separation benefits under R.A. No. 7924. The Assistant Manager for Finance of the MMDA referred
the Position Paper to the Regional Office of the CSC-NCR.

On 7 October 1996, Director IV Nelson Acebedo of the CSC-NCR handed down an opinion that the payment of
petitioner’s separation pay must be in accordance with Civil Service Resolution No. 92-063, pertinent portions of which
read:

[T]he payment of separation/[retirement] benefits cannot be subject to the prohibition against the [sic] double
compensation in cases when officers and employees who were previously granted said benefits are rehired or
reemployed in another government Agency or Office. Thus, there is no need for separated employees to refund the
separation/retirement benefits they received when subsequently reemployed in another government agency or office.

… This being so, while an employee who was paid separation/retirement benefits is not required to refund the same once
reemployed in the government service, as aforestated, for reasons of equity however, it would be proper and logical that
said separation/retirement benefits should nevertheless be deducted from the retirement/[separation] pay to be received
by the employee concerned. Moreover, in this instance, the employee concerned has the option either to refund his
separation/retirement benefits and claim his gross retirement/separation pay without any deduction corresponding to his
separation pay received, or not [to] refund his separation/retirement pay but suffer a deduction of his retirement/separation
gratuity for the total amount representing his previous separation/retirement pay received.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the opinion of Director Acebedo to the CSC.

On 21 October 1997, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 97-4266 affirming the opinion of Director Acebedo and
dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Citing Chaves v. Mathay,3 it held that petitioner cannot be paid retirement benefits twice –
one under R.A. No. 910, as amended, and another under R.A. No. 7924 – for the same services he rendered as MeTC
Judge. He can only exercise one of two options in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. 7924. These options
are (1) to refund the gratuity he received under R.A. No. 910, as amended, after he retired from the MeTC and get the full
separation pay for his entire years in the government, that is 9 years and 2 months with the MeTC plus two (2) years and
eight (8) months for his services as Director III in the defunct MMA, at the rate of one and one-fourth salary for every year
of service pursuant to MMDA Memorandum dated 30 August 1996; or (2) to retain the gratuity pay he received for his
services as MeTC Judge but an equivalent amount shall be deducted from the separation benefits due from the former
MMA for his entire government service.

On 9 June 1998, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 98-1422 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Accordingly, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to set aside these Resolutions.

On 19 August 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, now challenged in this case. It held that the CSC was
"correct in dismissing petitioner’s appeal from the opinion of Director Acebedo." It ratiocinated as follows:

There is no specific rule of law which applies to petitioner’s case. Nevertheless, the Court finds it equitable to deny his
claim for payment of separation pay at the rate of one and one-fourth (1¼) month’s salary for every year of his service in
government, that is, inclusive of the number of years he served as Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila [sic].

Petitioner already received and is continually receiving gratuity for his years of service as a Metropolitan Trial Court
Judge. Equity dictates that he should no longer be allowed to receive further gratuity for said years of service in the guise
of separation pay.

Suffice it to state that upon his retirement from his office as a Judge, petitioner has already closed a chapter of his
government service. The State has already shown its gratitude for his services when he was paid retirement benefits
under Republic Act No. 901 [sic]. For that is what retirement benefits are for. Rewards [are] given to an employee who has
given up the best years of his life to the service of his country (Gov’t. Service Insurance System v. Civil Service
Commission, 245 SCRA 179, 188).

Now, the state again wishes to show its gratitude to petitioner by awarding him separation pay for his services as a
director of the Metro Manila Authority (MMA), another chapter of petitioner’s government service which has come to a
close by the reorganization of the MMA into the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.

The Court, in limiting the computation of petitioner’s separation pay to the number of years of his service at the MMA,
merely is implementing the ruling in "Chavez, Sr. vs. Mathay" (37 SCRA 776), which ruling, if not actually in point, is
nevertheless applicable owing to its "common-sense consideration." Said ruling reads:

"The ‘common-sense consideration’ stated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes for the Court in Espejo, that if a retiree is being
credited with his years of service under his first retirement in computing his gratuity under his secondretirement, it is but
just that the retirement gratuity received by him under his first retirement should also be charged to his account, manifestly
govern the case at bar.1ªvvph!1 It is but in accordance with the rule consistently enunciated by the Court as in Anciano v.
Otadoy, affirming Borromeo, that claims for double retirement or pension such as petitioner’s, ‘would run roughshod over
the well-settled rule that in the absence of an express legal exception, pension and gratuity laws should be so construed
as to preclude any person from receiving double pension.’ (p. 780, underscoring supplied)

The case at bench is not, strictly speaking, about ‘double pension.’ It is, however, about the interpretation of a gratuity law,
viz., Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7924 which awards separation pay to those government employees who were
displaced by the reorganization of the MMA into the MMDA, which should be construed to preclude a government
employee from receiving double gratuity for the same years of service.

We affirm the assailed judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission that for the
purpose of computing or determining petitioner’s separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years of service in
the Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the MMA.

In the first place, the last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of "one and
one-fourth (1¼) months of salary for every year of service" cannot by any stretch of logic or imagination be interpreted to
refer to the total length of service of an MMA employee in the government, i.e., to include such service in the government
outside the MMA. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the
separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the MMA. The displacement amounted to an abolition of the
office or position of the displaced employees, such as that of petitioner. The rule is settled that Congress may abolish
public offices. Such a power is a consequent prerogative of its power to create public offices. 4 However, the power to
abolish is subject to the condition that it be exercised in good faith. 5 The separation partook of the nature of a disturbance
of compensation; hence, the separation pay must relate only to the employment thus affected.

Second, petitioner himself must have realized that Section 11 does not allow the tacking in of his previous government
service. If he were convinced that it does he could have instead applied for retirement benefits, since by adding his years
of service in the MMA to his previous years of service in the Government he could have retired under the third paragraph
of Section 11, which pertinently reads:

Provided, That, if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws, said employee may opt to receive the benefits
thereunder.
Third, after the approval of his optional retirement on 1 April 1992, petitioner was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under
R.A. No. 910, as amended; and five years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension.

The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which
provides:

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity
even if he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached. 6

Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do
not constitute double compensation. He could continue receiving the same even if after his retirement he had been
receiving salary from the defunct MMA as Director III thereof. This is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards
for his services as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his compensation for his services as Director III of the MMA.

However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. No. 7924
notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as
amended, would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC
Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same
services.7 More important, it would be in violation of the first paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution,
which proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation. Said provision reads:

No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless
specifically authorized by law… .

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 does not specifically authorize payment of additional compensation for years of government
service outside of the MMA.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the petition in this case is DENIED for want of
merit, and the decision of 19 August 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48301 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

11. EN BANC

G.R. No. 189041 July 31, 2012

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitoner,

vs.
DR. AGNES OUIDA P. YU, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) assails
the Decision1 dated March 30, 2009 and the Resolution2 dated July 9, 2009 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00327-MIN declaring Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu to have a vested right in the position of Chief of Hospital II until
her retirement on August 24, 2004.

The Facts

In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise
known as the ―The Local Government Code of 1991,” which affected the Department of Health (DOH) along with other
government agencies.

Prior to the devolution, Dr. Fortunata Castillo (hereinafter Dr. Castillo) held the position of Provincial Health Officer II (PHO
II) of the Department of Health (DOH) Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City and was the head of both the Basilan
Provincial Health Hospital and Public Health Services. Respondent Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu (Dr. Yu), on the other hand,
held the position of Provincial Health Officer I (PHO I). She was assigned, however, at the Integrated Provincial Health
Office in Isabela, Basilan.

Upon the implementation of the devolution program, then Basilan Governor Gerry Salapuddin (Governor Salapuddin)
refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II position that was to be devolved to the local government unit
of Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain Dr. Castillo at the Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City where she would
serve the remaining four years of her public service. She retired in 1996.
Meanwhile, in 1994, or two years after the implementation of the devolution program, Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr.
Yu to the PHO II position.

On February 23, 1998, Republic Act No. 8543, otherwise known as ―An Act Converting the Basilan Provincial Hospital in
the Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, into a Tertiary Hospital Under the Full Administrative and Technical
Supervision of the Department of Health, Increasing the Capacity to One Hundred Beds and Appropriating Funds
Therefor," was passed into law whereby the hospital positions previously devolved to the local government unit of Basilan
were re-nationalized and reverted to the DOH. The Basilan Provincial Health Hospital was later renamed the Basilan
General Hospital, and the position of PHO II was then re-classified to Chief of Hospital II.

While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted to the DOH with the re-nationalization of the Basilan General Hospital,
she was made to retain her original item of PHO II instead of being given the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II.
Subsequently, on August 1, 2003, then DOH Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit (Secretary Dayrit) appointed Dr. Domingo
Remus A. Dayrit (Dr. Dayrit) to the position of Chief of Hospital II.

Aggrieved, Dr. Yu filed a letter of protest dated September 30, 20033 before the CSC claiming that she has a vested right
to the position of Chief of Hospital II. The pertinent portions of said letter read:

I come before your good office protesting the appointment issued by … DOH Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit in favor of Dr.
Domingo Remus A. Dayrit as Chief of Hospital … of the Basilan General Hospital …

xxx

… the position of Chief of Hospital II to which Dr. Dayrit has been appointed is a mere conversion from the item of
Provincial Health Officer II previously occupied by the herein protestant.

When what used to be called the Basilan Provincial Hospital was re-nationalized, now called the Basilan General Hospital,
the position of Provincial Health Officer II, then occupied by the undersigned, was refused re-nationalized (sic) by DOH
alleging the same position to be an LGU-created position, that is, that the Local Government of Basilan created the
position. Thus, instead of the undersigned being automatically re-appointed Provincial Health Officer II of the Hospital,
later to be renamed Chief of Hospital II, pursuant to the Re-Nationalization Law, she was instead given an appointment
still as Provincial Health Officer II but under a co-terminous status at the Center for Health and Development, DOH …
which position the undersigned refused to accept...

On June 7, 2004, the CSC issued Resolution4 No. 040655 granting Dr. Yu's protest and revoking the appointment of Dr.
Dayrit as Chief of Hospital II of Basilan General Hospital. Further, Secretary Dayrit was directed to appoint Dr. Yu to said
position. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the CSC reversed itself and issued Resolution 5 No. 040967 dated
September 1, 2004 declaring that the position of PHO II was never devolved to the Provincial Government of Basilan but
was retained by the DOH; that the PHO II position held by Dr. Yu was a newly-created position; and that, therefore, she
did not have a vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position that was created by virtue of R.A No. 8543.

Dr. Yu then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CSC in its Resolution6 No. 050287 dated February
28, 2005. She then elevated her case to the CA on petition for review raising the sole issue of whether the item of PHO II
she previously occupied was a devolved position or a locally created one.

On March 30, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision in favor of Dr. Yu, disposing as follows:

FOR REASONS STATED, the Petition for Review is GRANTED and CSC Resolutions Nos. 040967 and 050287 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is declared to have a vested right in the Chief of Hospital II position up to her
retirement in August 24, 2004 and should receive her corresponding salaries and benefits.

SO ORDERED.7

In ruling that the PHO II position was devolved to the Basilan Provincial Government, the appellate court ratiocinated in
this wise:

xxx The CSC’s ruling that there are two PHO II positions is not implausible but contrary to the evidence on hand.

A perusal of the pleadings and attachments reveal that the PHO II position was devolved to the Basilan Provincial
Government. In a letter dated May 19, 1994, Ms. Vivian L. Young, Officer-in-Charge of the Department of Health, Local
Government Assistance & Monitoring Service informed former Governor Salapuddin that the PHO II position was
devolved to the local government, viz:

Dear Gov. Salapuddin,

This will refer to your letter relative to the item position of Dr. Fortunata C. Castillo which has been devolved to the
provincial government of BASILAN.

Please be informed that only the devolved health personnel who were not accepted by their Local Chief Executive have
been retained by DOH, the item positions per se remained in the respective LGU’s. xxx The LGU’s have the option to
retain the items vacated or to collapse the same for financial reasons.
xxx

Based on the foregoing letter, Dr. Milagros L. Fernandez, Director IV of the DOH – Regional Field Office No. IX,
Zamboanga City, wrote a letter to petitioner, to wit:

xxx

Madam:

The letter dated May 19, 1994 of Ms. Vivian L. Young, Office-in-Charge (sic), LGAMS, Department of Health, clarifies the
issue raised by the Provincial Governor, in his letter dated April 14, 1994, insofar as the retention of the Provincial Health
Officer II of the province, in the person of Dr. Fortunata Castillo by the DOH in view of the non-acceptance by the
Governor consistent with the provisions of law on devolution.

1. Dr. Fortunata A. Castillo, who was holding the position of Provincial Health Officer II of the province, and a
devolved health personnel, was retained by the DOH for reason above-mentioned.

2. While she, the occupant, was retained, the item position remained as among those items in the Plantilla of
Personnel of the Integrated Provincial Health Office devolved to the Office of the Provincial Governor.

3. The Governor, in such a case, may or may not retain her item in his Plantilla, or abolish it for reason therein
stated. The position herewith (sic) was left vacant with the retention of Dr. Castillo in this office.

4. The funds for salary and other benefits of the devolved item position of Provincial Health Officer II remained
devolved with the Office of the Governor.

In other words, with the retention of Dr. Castillo hereto, she never carried with her the item position and the funds
appropriated for salary and other benefits accruing to the position of Provincial Health Officer II.

xxx

In a letter dated October 26, 2001, Director Macybel Alfaro-Sashi of the Civil Service Commission Regional Office IX
informed the petitioner that:

At the outset, it is apparent that the position you presently occupy is one which should be included in the list of
renationalized positions notwithstanding the fact that the said position carries a position item number different from that
carried by the previous holder thereof. Hence, the contention of the DOH Regional Office that your position is not the
same as that of the previous holder simply because they bear different position item numbers deserves very scant
consideration. The position item numbers are immaterial in case of renationalization as such a system is merely adopted
for purposes of proper and systematic coding of all positions in the government, particularly in the budgeting process.
Thus, the position you are presently holding should be considered as one belonging to the national government prior to its
devolution, regardless of the position item number attached to the position of the previous holder thereof.

Thus, it is apparent that the PHO II position occupied by petitioner is one and the same position which was previously
occupied by Dr. Castillo before the devolution. When the latter was not accepted by Gov. Salapuddin, Dr. Castillo was
retained by the DOH but the PHO II item was devolved to the Provincial Government of Basilan. Consequently, the
position of PHO II became vacant. This is obvious by the fact that the salaries of Dr. Castillo were taken from a special
fund and not from the appropriation for the PHO II position.

The motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision filed by the CSC was denied by the CA in its Resolution 8 dated
July 9, 2009. Hence, in this petition for review on certiorari, the CSC alleged that -

The Issue

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PHO II POSITION PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED BY
RESPONDENT YU IS A DEVOLVED POSITION.9

The Ruling of the Court

In pursuance of the declared policy under The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) to provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization, 10 national agencies or
offices, including the DOH, were mandated to devolve to the local government units the responsibility for the provision of
basic services and facilities.11

As defined, ―devolution‖ is the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. 12 Specifically, Section 17(i) of the same Code
prescribes the manner of devolution, as follows:
(i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment,
and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and
responsibilities.

Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong or in
whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight
committee: Provided, further, That regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of
similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the
national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure.

To ensure the proper implementation of the devolution process, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 503, otherwise known as the ―Rules and Regulations Implementing the Transfer of Personnel and
Assets, Liabilities and Records of National Government Agencies Whose Functions Are To Be Devolved To The Local
Government Units And For Other Related Purposes," which laid down the following pertinent guidelines with respect to
the transfer of personnel:

Section 2. Principles and Policies Governing Transfer of Personnel. -

a. Coverage, Tenure, Compensation and Career Development. —

xxx

2. The absorption of the NGA personnel by the LGU shall be mandatory, in which case, the LGUs shall create the
equivalent positions of the affected personnel except when it is not administratively viable.

3. Absorption is not administratively viable when there is a duplication of functions unless the LGU opts to absorb
the personnel concerned.

4. The national personnel who are not absorbed by the LGUs under no. 3 above, shall be retained by the NGA
concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.

xxx

12. Except as herein otherwise provided, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by
the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992. xxx

On the basis of the foregoing, it was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the position of PHO II, as well as its
incumbent, Dr. Fortunata Castillo. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the use of the word ―shall‖ both in Section 17
(i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section 2(a)(2) of E.O. No. 503, which connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. 13 The only instance that the LGU
concerned may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption is not administratively viable, meaning, it
would result to duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the national government.
However, in the absence of the recognized exception, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed
Section 2(a)(12) by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June
30, 1992. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines ―automatic‖ as ―involuntary either wholly or to a major
extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible.” Being ―automatic‖, thus, connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory.14

There is no dearth of evidence showing that the item position of PHO II was, in fact, devolved to the Provincial
Government of Basilan. Governor Salapuddin himself certified15 that said position was included in the 1992
OSCAS16 received from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) with its corresponding budget appropriation.
He further declared that during the formal turn over program in 1993 attended by Dr. Milagros Fernandez, representing
the DOH Regional Office, the item position of PHO II was among the positions turned over to the Provincial Government
of Basilan. Thus, the argument17 of petitioner CSC that only 53 plantilla positions, not 54, were devolved to the local
government of Basilan does not hold water. It cannot be disputed that Dr. Castillo's PHO II position was devolved.

However, Governor Salapuddin refused to reappoint Dr. Castillo to her devolved position in the LGU for no other reason
than that he ―wanted to accept only the item position of PHO II.” 18 It was not shown, and no attempt was ever made on
the part of the LGU to show, that the absorption of Dr. Castillo was not administratively viable. There being no valid and
legal basis therefor, Governor Salapuddin's refusal to accept Dr. Castillo was, plainly and simply, whimsical.1âwphi1

Be that as it may, Governor Salapuddin's refusal did not prevent the devolution of Dr.Castillo which, together with that of
the PHO II position, took effect by operation of law. In order to solve his dilemma, Governor Salapuddin requested that Dr.
Castillo be detailed instead at the DOH, which was confirmed by then Secretary of Health Juan M. Flavier in his
Department Order19 No. 228, series of 1993, signed on July 9, 1993, reproduced hereunder as follows:

This will officially confirm the detail of Dr. Fortunata A. Castillo PHO-II – Basilan at the Regional Health Field Office No. IX,
Zamboanga City per request of the Governor of Basilan, the Honorable Jerry (sic) Salapuddin in his letter to Dr. Castillo,
provided that the provincial government of Basilan will continue to pay her salary and other benefits she's entitled thereto
until further notice or order. (Emphasis added)
Clearly therefore, the drawing of Dr. Castillo's salary from the LGU of Basilan which Governor Salapuddin claimed to have
allowed simply ―to accommodate her (Dr. Castillo)"20 was, in fact, a necessary consequence of her devolution to the LGU
and subsequent detail to the DOH. Officials and employees on detail with other offices shall be paid their salaries,
emoluments, allowances, fringe benefits and other personal services costs from the appropriations of their parent
agencies and in no case shall such be charged against the appropriations of the agencies where they are assigned or
detailed, except when authorized by law.21

A detail is defined and governed by Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), thus: 22

(6) Detail. A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment
and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific
positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission.
Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
(Emphasis added)

Had Dr. Castillo felt aggrieved by her detail to the DOH Regional Office, she was not without recourse. The law afforded
her the right to appeal her case to the CSC, but she had not seen fit to question the justification for her detail. We could
only surmise that, since Dr. Castillo was looking at only three more years from the time of her detail until her retirement in
1996, and considering that she obviously would not suffer any diminution in salary and rank, she found it pointless to
pursue the matter.

Neither did Dr. Castillo find need to raise a howl when, at the behest of Governor Salapuddin who was determined to
replace her, DOH officials categorized her as a devolution non-viable employee, along with 216 others nationwide, by the
mere fact that she was not accepted by the LGU of Basilan and not because of an actual non-viability. Hence, in 1994,
when Governor Salapuddin formally manifested his intention to stop the drawing of Dr. Castillo's salary from the LGU in
anticipation of his appointment of Dr. Yu to the PHO II position, Dr. Castillo ceased to be a detailed employee at the DOH
Regional Office but was re-absorbed by the DOH as a devolution non-viable employee and, consequently, paid salaries
and benefits from the Miscellaneous Personnel Benefits Fund that had been set aside under the Office of the Secretary of
Health precisely for such employees.

Ms. Vivian L. Young, Officer-In-Charge of the DOH Local Government Assistance and Monitoring Service,
assured23 Governor Salapuddin that, while Dr. Castillo was ―retained‖ by the DOH, her item position remained with the
LGU of Basilan. Moreover, Dr. Milagros L. Fernandez, Director IV of the DOH Regional Field Office No. IX in Zamboanga
City, clarified24 that Dr. Castillo ―never carried with her the item position and the funds appropriated for salary and other
benefits accruing to the position of Provincial Health Officer II.”

Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position PHO II.

The next question to be answered is – may Dr. Castillo be considered to have abandoned her position for consistently
failing to assert her rights thereto?

We certainly do not believe so.

―Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder with the intention of terminating his
possession and control thereof. In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstance
as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance
that the law will infer a relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs from and is accompanied by
deliberation and freedom of choice. There are, therefore, two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to
abandon and, second, an overt or 'external' act by which the intention is carried into effect." 25

By no stretch of the imagination can Dr. Castillo's seeming lackadaisical attitude towards protecting her rights be
construed as an abandonment of her position resulting in her having intentionally and voluntarily vacated the same.
Governor Salapuddin's tenacious refusal to accept Dr. Castillo negates any and all voluntariness on the part of the latter
to let go of her position. The risk of incurring the ire of a powerful politician effectively tied Dr. Castillo's hands, and it was
quite understandable that she could not don her gloves and fight, even if she wanted to. Considering, however, that
Governor Salapuddin's clear infraction of the law is not in issue before us, we need not make any pronouncement on this
matter.

We rule, therefore, under the attendant circumstances of the case, that with Dr. Castillo's re-absorption by the DOH which
appears to bear the former's approval, her devolved position with the LGU of Basilan was left vacant. In her May 19, 1994
letter to Governor Salapuddin, Ms. Vivian L. Young informed the local chief executive that he had the ―option to retain
the item vacated or to collapse the same for financial reasons.”26 Thus, we hold that Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the
position of PHO II in 1994 and, consequently, acquired a vested right to its re-classified designation – Chief of Hospital II.
As such, Dr. Yu should have been automatically re-appointed by Secretary Dayrit in accordance with the Guidelines for
the Re-Nationalization of Personnel, Assets and Appropriations of Basilan Provincial Hospital, 27 the pertinent portion of
which provides, as follows:

Item III. Principles and Policies Governing the Transfer of Basilan Provincial Hospital

A) xxx

3) The DOH shall assure that the re-nationalized personnel of the hospital shall:
 3.i) Not be involuntarily separated, terminated or laid off;

3.ii) Continue to enjoy security of tenure;

3.iii) Be automatically re-appointed by the Secretary immediately upon their transfer;

3.iv) Retain their pay or benefits without diminution. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering, however, that Dr. Yu had already retired on August 24, 2004, we uphold the following findings of the
appellate court, to wit:

xxx ln as much as a re-appointment is no longer feasible due to her retirement, petitioner should at least recover her
salaries for the services she had rendered. However, petitioner admitted that she received her salary as PHO II converted
to Chief of Hospital for the period August to November 2001. Therefore, she should receive her salary and benefits as
Chief of Hospital from December 2001 up to her retirement in August 24, 2004. 28

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated March 30, 2009 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00327-MIN is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

12. EN BANC

G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009

ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

We grant Rosalinda A. Penera’s (Penera) motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11 September 2009
(Decision).

The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En
Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera
from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed
Penera.

In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:

1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by
Section 13 of RA 9369.

2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against Penera for violation
of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has consistently disputed the
charge of premature campaigning.

4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she engaged in premature
election campaigning.

Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436,
as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period
for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy." The immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period." These two provisions
determine the resolution of this case.

The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of candidacy]
proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing
of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting
premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified."1
Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long
before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate
of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature
campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. lawphil

The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.

The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:

Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an
election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.

The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has filed a
certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a
"candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan
political activity is committed.

Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of
the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation
of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to
campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80
ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.

Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such
last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of
candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for elective public office usually file their certificates of
candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.

There is no dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were committed outside of
the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003,
was a "candidate" when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 days
before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from 23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier.
The crucial question is: did this change in the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy make one who filed his
certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 immediately liable for violation of Section 80 if he engaged in election
campaign or partisan political activities prior to the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?

Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:

SECTION 11. Official Ballot. – The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain
the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite.
Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using
the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to
authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.

Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.

For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/ manifestation to participate in
the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective
official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for president and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to
a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the
May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-President,
Senators and candidates under the party-list system as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate
in the party-list system shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other
positions shall be on March 27, 1998.

The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price
comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The
Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens’ arms of the
Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.

To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the
ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible
to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical
and security markings, are provided on the ballot.

The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered
voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.

Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the
printing of official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee:

SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the same[,] uniform for local and
national officials?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the present periods.

SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, he’s already a candidate, and there are
many prohibited acts on the part of candidate.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .

SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began (sic).

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we don’t provide that the filing of the certificate will not bring about one’s being a
candidate.

SENATOR GONZALES. If that’s a fact, the law cannot change a fact.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the certificate of candidacy will not result
in that official vacating his position, we can also provide that insofar he is concerned, election period or his being a
candidate will not yet commence. Because here, the reason why we are doing an early filing is to afford enough time to
prepare this machine readable ballots.

So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will withdraw its proposal
and will agree to the 120-day period provided in the Senate version.

THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

xxxx

SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan acts which apply immediately upon
being a candidate?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this provision is just to afford the Comelec enough
time to print the ballots, this provision does not intend to change the campaign periods as presently, or rather election
periods as presently fixed by existing law.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other prohibition.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). That’s right.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no conflict anymore because we are
talking about the 120-day period before election as the last day of filing a certificate of candidacy, election period starts
120 days also. So that is election period already. But he will still not be considered as a candidate.

Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his
certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy
before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing
of ballots. This legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those
filing to meet the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by
existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a
candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)

Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained the intent of the provisions
of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an automated election system. There was no express provision in the
original RA 8436 stating that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, realizing that
Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that —

The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and
that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate." 4 (Emphasis supplied)

Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the
automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the
campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third
paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:

xxx

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of
his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing and underlining supplied)

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third
paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court except on the sole ground of its
unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot
would mean repealing this second sentence.

The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any portion of Section 15
of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision considers the entire Section 15 good law.
Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence,
which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of
the second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436. The
original provision in RA 8436 states —

x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period, x x x.

In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads —

x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed
by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign
period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.

When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not
consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period. There is
absolutely no room for any other interpretation.

We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:

x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read together with the
amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "‘candidate’ refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who
has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties."
However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate
because "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus file a certificate of
candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of candidacy yet that person shall be considered a
candidate, for purposes of determining one’s possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed,
there is no "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the
campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider Penera a
candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the start of the campaign period. x
xx

The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her certificate of
candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On
29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts
committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a "candidate," even if constituting election
campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts
are within the realm of a citizen’s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the campaign period
are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period. 5

The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the first proviso in the third paragraph, the amended
Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to candidates take effect only upon the start of the campaign
period. The Decision states that:

x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period," does not mean that the acts
constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the
campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in said proviso was it stated that campaigning
before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with impunity.

As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the
start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code
as election campaign or partisan political activity, However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the
beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can
his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the
campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her
prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are
only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already
enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.6(Emphasis supplied)

It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is specially true to
expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds involving clear, present and
imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is
lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political
partisan activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful
act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The only
inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign
period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any
election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature
campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and
express provision of the law.

The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only
after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is "any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision
is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period
starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law
state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes
unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as
envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for
vagueness.

Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period.
This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he
filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that
"any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."

The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature.
This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second sentence, and its
immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of
this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30
January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224.
Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.

SO ORDERED.

13. EN BANC
G.R. No. 189698 December 1, 2009

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo.
Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers.
Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day. 1 It is in this light that we
should address the instant case.

Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). In view of pressing contemporary events, the petition begs for immediate resolution.

The Antecedents

This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES).

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR
LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof reads:

SEC. 11. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain the
titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under
each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same
type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to
authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.

Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.

For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in
the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: - Provided, That, any elective
official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for president and vice president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to
a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the
May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice President,
Senators and candidates under the Party-List System as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to
participate in the Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy
for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.

The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price
comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The
Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the
Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.

To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the
ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible
to reproduce on a photocopying machine and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and
security markings, are provided on the ballot.

The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered
voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.2

Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No. 9369, entitled "AN
ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN
SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY,
CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA
BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 13 of the amendatory law modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436,
thus:

SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 15. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display and/or the size and form of
the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an
initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable, electronic displays must be constructed to present the names of all
candidates for the same position in the same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be constructed to
present the entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure that the voter sees all of the ballot
options on all pages before completing his or her vote and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot choices prior
to completing and casting his or her ballot. Under each position to be filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the same type size. The maiden or married name shall be listed
in the official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be
uniformly indicated using the same font and size.

A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the
official ballot shall be provided.

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of
his/her certificate of candidacy.

Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official candidates within thirty (30) days before the start
of the period for filing a certificate of candidacy.

With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which
the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the
National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political
parties and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission shall assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of
official ballots.

To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the necessary safeguards,
such as, but not limited to, bar codes, holograms, color shifting ink, microprinting, are provided on the ballot.

The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one ballot for every registered
voter with a provision of additional three ballots per precinct.3

Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from
November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until midnight.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in
the coming elections,5 filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.

The Petitioners' Contention

Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver
that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early printing of the official
ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the
CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. In fact, the law considers him a candidate only at the start of the campaign
period. Petitioners then assert that this being so, they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government
offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be
considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already
considered as candidates.6
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two
conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that
they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs. 7

Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs
is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.8

The Respondent's Arguments

On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent COMELEC,
argues that petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit." Petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, hence, they
are not yet affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution. The OSG further claims that the petition is
premature or unripe for judicial determination." Petitioners have admitted that they are merely planning to file their CoCs
for the coming 2010 elections. Their interest in the present controversy is thus merely speculative and contingent upon the
filing of the same. The OSG likewise contends that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. They are questioning an
issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of the latter's rule-making power. Certiorari under Rule 65 is then an
improper remedy.9

On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section
4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 for it merely copied what is in the law. The OSG, however, agrees with petitioners that there
is a conflict in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that should be resolved. According to the OSG, there seems to be no basis to
consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned and to require them to vacate their positions on the same day that they
file their CoCs, because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Further, this - deemed resigned- provision
existed in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 881, and no longer finds a place in our present election laws with the
innovations brought about by the automated system.10

Our Ruling

I.

At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect. What petitioners assail in their petition is a
resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to
Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the
exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.11 Prohibition is also an inappropriate remedy, because what petitioners
actually seek from the Court is a determination of the proper construction of a statute and a declaration of their rights
thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one for declaratory relief,12 over which this Court does not exercise original
jurisdiction.13

However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of both the COMELEC
resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the instant petition.

The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the compelling state interest involved in
their early resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started and hundreds of civil
servants intending to run for elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing imminent and irreparable
damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the government's manpowerfurther dictate that the
Court must, for propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite the adjudication of all,
especially the constitutional, issues.

In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of procedure and resolve the
merits of a case. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the Rules were promulgated to provide
guidelines for the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would
be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. 14

II.

To put things in their proper perspective, it is imperative that we trace the brief history of the assailed provision. Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369, which for ready reference is quoted as follows:

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of
his/her certificate of candidacy.15

Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law amended by R.A. No. 9369. The proviso was
lifted from Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.- Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

It may be recalled-in inverse chronology-that earlier, Presidential Decree No. 1296, or the 1978 Election Code, contained
a similar provision, thus'

SECTION 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. - Every person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of
candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of certificate
of candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines.

Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election Code of 1971, likewise stated in its Section 23 the following:

SECTION 23. Candidates Holding Appointive Office or Position. - Every person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and every officer or employee in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That the filing of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities which he may have incurred.

Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or the Revised Election Code approved on June 21, 1947, also provided that

SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and employees who are candidates. - Every person holding a
public appointive office or position shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of
candidacy.

During the Commonwealth era, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 725, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE NEXT
ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR," approved on
January 5, 1946, contained, in the last paragraph of its Section 2, the following:

A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies or
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether such office by appointive or elective, shall be considered to have
resigned from such office from the moment of the filing of such certificate of candidacy.

Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE FIRST ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT
AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS, AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMENDMENTS THEREOF," enacted without executive
approval on June 22, 1941, the precursor of C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic resignation of elective, but not
appointive, officials.

Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election Code approved on August 22, 1938, had, in its Section 22, the same verbatim
provision as Section 26 of R.A. No. 180.

The earliest recorded Philippine law on the subject is Act No. 1582, or the Election Law enacted by the Philippine
Commission in 1907, the last paragraph of Section 29 of which reads:

Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers.- x x x.

No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for election, nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds said
public office to election, at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the position which he
may be holding, and no judge of the Court of First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of
the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take any
part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under penalty of being deprived of his office and being disqualified
to hold any public office whatever for a term of five years: Provided, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be
construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election.

From this brief historical excursion, it may be gleaned that the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369- that any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces,
and officers, and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy- traces
its roots to the period of the American occupation.

In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 2231, the bill later to be consolidated with House Bill No. 5352 and
enacted as R.A. No. 9369, Senator Richard Gordon, the principal author of the bill, acknowledged that the said proviso in
the proposed legislative measure is an old provision which was merely copied from earlier existing legislation, thus'

Senator Osmeña.- May I just opine here and perhaps obtain the opinion of the good Sponsor.- This reads like, "ANY
PERSON HOLDING [means currently] A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE POSITION" SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO
RESIGNED- [which means that the prohibition extends only to appointive officials] "INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF
THE ARMED FORCES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES"- This is a prohibition, Mr. President.- This means if one is
chairman of SSS or PDIC, he is deemed ipso facto resigned when he files his certificate of candidacy.- Is that the
intention

Senator Gordon.- This is really an old provision, Mr. President.

Senator Osmeña.- It is in bold letters, so I think it was a Committee amendment.

Senator Gordon.- No, it has always been there.

Senator Osmeña.- I see.

Senator Gordon.- I guess the intention is not to give them undue advantage, especially certain people.

Senator Osmeña.- All right.16

In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago expressed her concern over the inclusion of the
said provision in the new law, given that the same would be disadvantageous and unfair to potential candidates holding
appointive positions, while it grants a consequent preferential treatment to elective officials, thus'

Senator Santiago.- On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing cause, so I make this point more as a matter of record
than of any feasible hope that it can possibly be either accepted or if we come to a division of the House, it will be upheld
by the majority.

I am referring to page 15, line 21.- The proviso begins: "PROVIDED FINALLY, THAT ANY PERSON HOLDING A PUBLIC
APPOINTIVE OFFICE - SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS/HER OFFICE."

The point that I made during the appropriate debate in the past in this Hall is that there is, for me, no valid reason for
exempting elective officials from this inhibition or disqualification imposed by the law.- If we are going to consider
appointive officers of the government, including AFP members and officers of government-owned and controlled
corporations, or any other member of the appointive sector of the civil service, why should it not apply to the elective
sector for, after all, even senators and congressmen are members of the civil service as well

Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or for the Congress in general, to give an exception to itself which is not available
to other similarly situated officials of government. Of course, the answer is, the reason why we are special is that we are
elected. Since we are imposing a disqualification on all other government officials except ourselves, I think, it is the better
part of delicadeza to inhibit ourselves as well, so that if we want to stay as senators, we wait until our term expires. But if
we want to run for some other elective office during our term, then we have to be considered resigned just like everybody
else. That is my proposed amendment. But if it is unacceptable to the distinguished Sponsor, because of sensitivity to the
convictions of the rest of our colleagues, I will understand.

Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is well-thought of.- It is a good policy.- However, this is something
that is already in the old law which was upheld by the Supreme court in a recent case that the rider was not upheld and
that it was valid.17

The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic resignation of appointive civil servants must have
been the reason why Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of the following during the period of amendments: "ANY
PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS
A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC."18 The said proviso
seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs
as candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding appointive
positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the campaign period when they are already treated by law as
candidates.

Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC and Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436 contained a similar
provision on automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs for any office other than that which they
hold in a permanent capacity or for President or Vice-President. However, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9006, or the
Fair Election Act,19 in 2001, this provision was repealed by Section 1420 of the said act. There was, thus, created a
situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices
upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were not.

This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Fari᳠v. The Executive Secretary21 when it ruled that

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006

Is Not Violative of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Constitution

The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials
gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution, is tenuous.

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.- If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.- It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.- It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.- The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom
only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto
by an appointing authority.- Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security
of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A.
Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part
in any election except to vote.- Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat
these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates
of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them.- Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass
upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is
anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are
similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed. 22

However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Fari᳠/i>, was intently focused on the main issue of whether the
repealing clause in the Fair Election Act was a constitutionally proscribed rider, in that it unwittingly failed to ascertain with
stricter scrutiny the impact of the retention of the provision on automatic resignation of persons holding appointive
positions (Section 66) in the OEC, vis-୶is the equal protection clause.- Moreover, the Court's vision in Fari᳠/i> was
shrouded by the fact that petitioners therein, Fari᳠et al., never posed a direct challenge to the constitutionality of Section
66 of the OEC. Fari᳠et al. rather merely questioned, on constitutional grounds, the repealing clause, or Section 14 of the
Fair Election Act. The Court's afore-quoted declaration in Fari᳠/i> may then very well be considered as an obiter dictum.

III.

The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the constitutional challenge advanced by petitioners,
once and for all, to settle the issue of whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, a
reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which, as shown above, was based on provisions dating back to the American
occupation, is violative of the equal protection clause.

But before delving into the constitutional issue, we shall first address the issues on legal standing and on the existence of
an actual controversy.

Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 23 In this case, petitioners allege that
they will be directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run
in the 2010 elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet
candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution.

The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the
constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged
measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of candidates
do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative
effect on voters.24 The Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the
assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights.25

In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.26
We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination
and resolution of actual cases and controversies.27 The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or controversy exists
between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and administration of all election
laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the very acts that would trigger the
enforcement of the provisionthey would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed provision
provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or
hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy.28

IV.

Having hurdled what the OSG posed as obstacles to judicial review, the Court now delves into the constitutional
challenge.

It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two fundamental freedoms, those of
expression and of association. This premise is best explained in Mancuso v. Taft, 29 viz.:

Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the opportunity to write a letter to the local newspaper, speak out in a
public park, distribute handbills advocating radical reform, or picket an official building to seek redress of grievances. All of
these activities are protected by the First Amendment if done in a manner consistent with a narrowly defined concept of
public order and safety. The choice of means will likely depend on the amount of time and energy the individual wishes to
expend and on his perception as to the most effective method of projecting his message to the public. But interest and
commitment are evolving phenomena. What is an effective means for protest at one point in time may not seem so
effective at a later date. The dilettante who participates in a picket line may decide to devote additional time and resources
to his expressive activity. As his commitment increases, the means of effective expression changes, but the expressive
quality remains constant. He may decide to lead the picket line, or to publish the newspaper. At one point in time he may
decide that the most effective way to give expression to his views and to get the attention of an appropriate audience is to
become a candidate for public office-means generally considered among the most appropriate for those desiring to effect
change in our governmental systems. He may seek to become a candidate by filing in a general election as an
independent or by seeking the nomination of a political party. And in the latter instance, the individual's expressive activity
has two dimensions: besides urging that his views be the views of the elected public official, he is also attempting to
become a spokesman for a political party whose substantive program extends beyond the particular office in question. But
Cranston has said that a certain type of its citizenry, the public employee, may not become a candidate and may not
engage in any campaign activity that promotes himself as a candidate for public office. Thus the city has stifled what may
be the most important expression an individual can summon, namely that which he would be willing to effectuate, by
means of concrete public action, were he to be selected by the voters.

It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run for office also affects the freedom to associate. In Williams
v. Rhodes, supra, the Court used strict review to invalidate an Ohio election system that made it virtually impossible for
third parties to secure a place on the ballot. The Court found that the First Amendment protected the freedom to associate
by forming and promoting a political party and that that freedom was infringed when the state effectively denied a party
access to its electoral machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us also affects associational rights, albeit in a
slightly different way. An individual may decide to join or participate in an organization or political party that shares his
beliefs. He may even form a new group to forward his ideas. And at some juncture his supporters and fellow party
members may decide that he is the ideal person to carry the group's standard into the electoral fray. To thus restrict the
options available to political organization as the Cranston charter provision has done is to limit the effectiveness of
association; and the freedom to associate is intimately related with the concept of making expression effective. Party
access to the ballot becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party machinery to carry the party's programs
to the people are precluded from doing so because those nominees are civil servants.

Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of individual expression or associational
effectiveness, wide opportunities exist for the individual who seeks public office. The fact of candidacy alone may open
previously closed doors of the media. The candidate may be invited to discuss his views on radio talk shows; he may be
able to secure equal time on television to elaborate his campaign program; the newspapers may cover his candidacy; he
may be invited to debate before various groups that had theretofore never heard of him or his views. In short, the fact of
candidacy opens up a variety of communicative possibilities that are not available to even the most diligent of picketers or
the most loyal of party followers. A view today, that running for public office is not an interest protected by the First
Amendment, seems to us an outlook stemming from an earlier era when public office was the preserve of the professional
and the wealthy. Consequently we hold that candidacy is both a protected First Amendment right and a fundamental
interest. Hence any legislative classification that significantly burdens that interest must be subjected to strict equal
protection review.30

Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the
Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the opportune time for the Court to strike
down the said proviso for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs,
but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against
the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those
occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm
of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
 (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently.
As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, 31 a real and substantial distinction
exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from
plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily
overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.

Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement if it is not germane
to the purpose of the law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his treatise on constitutional law, explains,

The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
To illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina between men and women will justify the prohibition of the latter
from employment as miners or stevedores or in other heavy and strenuous work. On the basis of this same classification,
however, the law cannot provide for a lower passing average for women in the bar examinations because physical
strength is not the test for admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a higher rate than locally
assembled automobiles for the protection of the national economy, but their difference in origin is no justification for
treating them differently when it comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations. The source of the vehicle has no
relation to the observance of these rules.32

The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem
sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid
if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.33

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive
offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one's
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public.34 The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect
or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work.

If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued
on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the
purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented
by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield
the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected
Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local
government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat
them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the
example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use
the resources of his office to support his campaign.

As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the
inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a
greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.

Mancuso v. Taft,35 cited above, explains that the measure on automatic resignation, which restricts the rights of civil
servants to run for officea right inextricably linked to their freedom of expression and association, is not reasonably
necessary to the satisfaction of the state interest. Thus, in striking down a similar measure in the United States, Mancuso
succinctly declares'

In proceeding to the second stage of active equal protection review, however, we do see some contemporary relevance of
the Mitchell decision. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, supra. In order for the Cranston charter provision to withstand strict
scrutiny, the city must show that the exclusion of all government employees from candidacy is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest. And, as stated in Mitchell and other cases dealing with similar statutes, see Wisconsin State
Employees, supra; Broadrick, supra, government at all levels has a substantial interest in protecting the integrity of its civil
service. It is obviously conceivable that the impartial character of the civil service would be seriously jeopardized if people
in positions of authority used their discretion to forward their electoral ambitions rather than the public welfare. Similarly if
a public employee pressured other fellow employees to engage in corrupt practices in return for promises of post-election
reward, or if an employee invoked the power of the office he was seeking to extract special favors from his superiors, the
civil service would be done irreparable injury. Conversely, members of the public, fellow-employees, or supervisors might
themselves request favors from the candidate or might improperly adjust their own official behavior towards him. Even if
none of these abuses actually materialize, the possibility of their occurrence might seriously erode the public's confidence
in its public employees. For the reputation of impartiality is probably as crucial as the impartiality itself; the knowledge that
a clerk in the assessor's office who is running for the local zoning board has access to confidential files which could
provide pressure points for furthering his campaign is destructive regardless of whether the clerk actually takes advantage
of his opportunities. For all of these reasons we find that the state indeed has a compelling interest in maintaining the
honesty and impartiality of its public work force.

We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by Cranston-a flat prohibition on office-seeking of all kinds
by all kinds of public employees-as even reasonably necessary to satisfaction of this state interest. As Justice Marshall
pointed out in Dunn v. Blumstein, [s]tatutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with precision. For three sets of
reasons we conclude that the Cranston charter provision pursues its objective in a far too heavy-handed manner and
hence must fall under the equal protection clause. First, we think the nature of the regulation-a broad prophylactic rule-
may be unnecessary to fulfillment of the city's objective. Second, even granting some sort of prophylactic rule may be
required, the provision here prohibits candidacies for all types of public office, including many which would pose none of
the problems at which the law is aimed. Third, the provision excludes the candidacies of all types of public employees,
without any attempt to limit exclusion to those employees whose positions make them vulnerable to corruption and
conflicts of interest.

There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply
fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second
proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection
clause.

V.

The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad.

First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high
positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned
once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his
position in the government to wield influence in the political world.

While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who occupy relatively high
positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public
elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution
and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the
citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of
democracy.

Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a
compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. 36

Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of
the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental power emanates from them.

Mancuso v. Taft,37 on this point, instructs

As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there exists the device of the leave of absence. Some system of
leaves of absence would permit the public employee to take time off to pursue his candidacy while assuring him his old
job should his candidacy be unsuccessful. Moreover, a leave of absence policy would eliminate many of the opportunities
for engaging in the questionable practices that the statute is designed to prevent. While campaigning, the candidate would
feel no conflict between his desire for election and his publicly entrusted discretion, nor any conflict between his efforts to
persuade the public and his access to confidential documents. But instead of adopting a reasonable leave of absence
policy, Cranston has chosen a provision that makes the public employee cast off the security of hard-won public
employment should he desire to compete for elected office.

The city might also promote its interest in the integrity of the civil service by enforcing, through dismissal, discipline, or
criminal prosecution, rules or statutes that treat conflict of interests, bribery, or other forms of official corruption. By thus
attacking the problem directly, instead of using a broad prophylactic rule, the city could pursue its objective without unduly
burdening the First Amendment rights of its employees and the voting rights of its citizens. Last term in Dunn v. Blumstein,
the Supreme Court faced an analogous question when the State of Tennessee asserted that the interest of ballot box
purity justified its imposition of one year and three month residency requirements before a citizen could vote. Justice
Marshall stated, inter alia, that Tennessee had available a number of criminal statutes that could be used to punish voter
fraud without unnecessary infringement on the newcomer's right to vote. Similarly, it appears from the record in this case
that the Cranston charter contains some provisions that might be used against opportunistic public employees.

Even if some sort of prophylactic rule is necessary, we cannot say that Cranston has put much effort into tailoring a
narrow provision that attempts to match the prohibition with the problem. The charter forbids a Cranston public employee
from running for any office, anywhere. The prohibition is not limited to the local offices of Cranston, but rather extends to
statewide offices and even to national offices. It is difficult for us to see that a public employee running for the United
States Congress poses quite the same threat to the civil service as would the same employee if he were running for a
local office where the contacts and information provided by his job related directly to the position he was seeking, and
hence where the potential for various abuses was greater. Nor does the Cranston charter except the public employee who
works in Cranston but aspires to office in another local jurisdiction, most probably his town of residence. Here again the
charter precludes candidacies which can pose only a remote threat to the civil service. Finally, the charter does not limit
its prohibition to partisan office-seeking, but sterilizes also those public employees who would seek nonpartisan elective
office. The statute reviewed in Mitchell was limited to partisan political activity, and since that time other courts have found
the partisan-nonpartisan distinction a material one. See Kinnear, supra; Wisconsin State Employees, supra; Gray v.
Toledo, supra. While the line between nonpartisan and partisan can often be blurred by systems whose true characters
are disguised by the names given them by their architects, it seems clear that the concerns of a truly partisan office and
the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed from regular party politics to
warrant distinctive treatment in a charter of this sort.

The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of the Cranston charter relates not to the type of office
sought, but to the type of employee seeking the office. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent in Mitchell, 330 U.S.
at 120-126, 67 S.Ct. 556, restrictions on administrative employees who either participate in decision-making or at least
have some access to information concerning policy matters are much more justifiable than restrictions on industrial
employees, who, but for the fact that the government owns the plant they work in, are, for purposes of access to official
information, identically situated to all other industrial workers. Thus, a worker in the Philadelphia mint could be
distinguished from a secretary in an office of the Department of Agriculture; so also could a janitor in the public schools of
Cranston be distinguished from an assistant comptroller of the same city. A second line of distinction that focuses on the
type of employee is illustrated by the cases of Kinnear and Minielly, supra. In both of these cases a civil service deputy
decided to run for the elected office of sheriff. The courts in both cases felt that the no-candidacy laws in question were
much too broad and indicated that perhaps the only situation sensitive enough to justify a flat rule was one in which an
inferior in a public office electorally challenged his immediate superior. Given all these considerations, we think Cranston
has not given adequate attention to the problem of narrowing the terms of its charter to deal with the specific kinds of
conflict-of-interest problems it seeks to avoid.

We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours campaigning will drain the energy of the public employee to
the extent that he is incapable of performing his job effectively and that inevitable on-the-job campaigning and discussion
of his candidacy will disrupt the work of others. Although it is indisputable that the city has a compelling interest in the
performance of official work, the exclusion is not well-tailored to effectuate that interest. Presumably the city could fire the
individual if he clearly shirks his employment responsibilities or disrupts the work of others. Also, the efficiency rationale
common to both arguments is significantly underinclusive. It applies equally well to a number of non-political,
extracurricular activities that are not prohibited by the Cranston charter. Finally, the connection between after-hours
campaigning and the state interest seems tenuous; in many cases a public employee would be able to campaign
aggressively and still continue to do his job well.38

Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing39 sustained as constitutional a provision on the automatic resignation of District Clerks,
County Clerks, County Judges, County Treasurers, Criminal District Attorneys, County Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and
Animals, County Commissioners, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and Collectors of Taxes, District Attorneys,
County Attorneys, Public Weighers, and Constables if they announce their candidacy or if they become candidates in any
general, special or primary election.

In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating differently particular officials, as distinguished from all
others, under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law, merits the stamp of approval from American
courts. Not, however, a general and sweeping provision, and more so one violative of the second requisite for a valid
classification, which is on its face unconstitutional.

On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had
already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional. It is high-time that we, too, should follow suit and,
thus, uphold fundamental liberties over age-old, but barren, restrictions to such freedoms.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

14. EN BANC

G.R. No. 191084 March 25, 2010

JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. And if statutory
construction be necessary, the statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant
to, any constitutional command or prescription. 1 It is upon these basic principles that the petition must be granted.

The factual and procedural antecedents are not in dispute.

Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan,
besting respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan by a margin of 15,732 votes. On 1 June 2007, respondent filed the Election
Protest which, anchored on the massive electoral fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioner, was raffled to the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) as EPC No. 2007-44. With petitioner’s filing of his Answer with
Counter-Protest on 18 June 2007, the COMELEC proceeded to conduct the preliminary conference and to order a
revision of the ballots from the contested precincts indicated in said pleadings.

Upon the evidence adduced and the memoranda subsequently filed by the parties, the COMELEC Second Division went
on to render the 1 December 2009 Resolution, which annulled and set aside petitioner’s proclamation as governor of
Bulacan and proclaimed respondent duly elected to said position by a winning margin of 4,321 votes. Coupled with a
directive to the Department of Interior and Local Government to implement the same, the resolution ordered petitioner to
immediately vacate said office, to cease and desist from discharging the functions pertaining thereto and to cause a
peaceful turn-over thereof to respondent.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing resolution with the COMELEC En Banc. Against
respondent’s Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner also filed an Opposition to
the Motion for Execution before the COMELEC Second Division. On 8 February 2010, however, the COMELEC En Banc
issued a Resolution, effectively disposing of the foregoing motions/incidents in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission En Banc DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit. The Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on December 1, 2009 ANNULLING the
proclamation of JOSELITO R. MENDOZA as the duly elected Governor of Bulacan and DECLARING ROBERTO M.
PAGDANGANAN as duly elected to said Office is AFFIRMED with modification.

Considering the proximity of the end of the term of office involved, this Resolution is declared immediately executory.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc hereby ISSUES a WRIT OF EXECUTION directing the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Bulacan, in coordination with the DILG Provincial Operations Officer to implement the Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) dated December 1, 2009 and this Resolution of the Commission En Banc by ordering
JOSELITO R. MENDOZA to CEASE and DESIST from performing the functions of Governor of the Province of Bulacan
and to VACATE said office in favor of ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Bulacan, and the DILG Provincial Operations Officer of the Province of Bulacan.
(Underscoring supplied)

On 11 February 2010, petitioner filed before the COMELEC an Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on
February 8, 2010 on the following grounds: (a) lack of concurrence of the majority of the members of the Commission
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; (b) lack of re-hearing pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18
of the Rules; and (c) lack of notice for the promulgation of the resolution pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of said Rules.
Invoking Section 13, Rule 18 of the same Rules, petitioner additionally argued that the resolution pertained to an ordinary
action and, as such, can only become final and executory after 30 days from its promulgation.

On 12 February 2010, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Directed against the 8
February 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, the petition is noticeably anchored on the same grounds raised in
petitioner’s urgent motion to recall the same resolution before the COMELEC. In addition, the petitioner disputes the
appreciation and result of the revision of the contested ballots.

In the meantime, it appears that the COMELEC En Banc issued a 10 February 2010 Order, scheduling the case for re-
hearing on 15 February 2010, on the ground that "there was no majority vote of the members obtained in the Resolution
of the Commission En Banc promulgated on February 8, 2010." At said scheduled re-hearing, it further appears that the
parties agreed to submit the matter for resolution by the COMELEC En Banc upon submission of their respective
memoranda, without further argument. As it turned out, the deliberations which ensued again failed to muster the required
majority vote since, with three (3) Commissioners not taking part in the voting, and only one dissent therefrom, the
assailed 1 December 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only garnered three concurrences.

In their respective Comments thereto, both respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General argue that, in addition to its
premature filing, the petition at bench violated the rule against forum shopping. Claiming that he received the 10 February
2010 Order of the COMELEC En Banc late in the morning of 12 February 2010 or when the filing of the petition was
already underway, petitioner argued that: (a) he apprised the Court of the pendency of his Urgent Motion to Recall the
Resolution Promulgated on 8 February 2010; and, (b) that the writ of execution ensconced in said resolution compelled
him to resort to the petition for certiorari before us.

On 4 March 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order for the issuance of a Writ of Execution directing the
implementation of the 1 December 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. While the COMELEC Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) issued the corresponding Writ of Execution on 5 March 2010, the record
shows that COMELEC En Banc issued an Order on the same date, directing the ECAD to deliver said 4 March 2010
Order and 5 March 2010 Writ of Execution by personal service to the parties. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the following
motions with the COMELEC En Banc on 5 March 2010, viz.: (a) Urgent Motion to Declare Null and Void and Recall Latest
En Banc Resolution Dated March 4, 2010; and, (b) Urgent Motion to Set Aside 4 March 2010 En Banc Resolution
Granting Protestant’s Motion for Execution Pending Motion for Reconsideration.

On 8 March 2010, petitioner filed before us a Supplement to the Petition with a Most Urgent Reiterating Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Status Quo Order. Contending that respondent’s protest should have
been dismissed when no majority vote was obtained after the re-hearing in the case, petitioner argues that: (a) the 4
March 2010 Order and 5 March 2010 Writ of Execution are null and void; (b) no valid decision can be rendered by the
COMELEC En Banc without the appreciation of the original ballots; (c) the COMELEC ignored the Court’s ruling in the
recent case of Corral v. Commission on Elections;2 and (d) the foregoing circumstances are indicative of the irregularities
which attended the adjudication of the case before the Division and En Banc levels of the COMELEC.

Despite receipt of respondent’s Most Respectful Urgent Manifestation which once again called attention to petitioner’s
supposed forum shopping, the Court issued a Resolution dated 9 March 2010 granting the Status Quo Ante Order sought
in the petition. With respondent’s filing of a Manifestation and Comment to said supplemental pleading on 10 March 2010,
petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion to Appreciate Ballots Invalidated as Written by One Person and Marked Ballot
on 12 March 2010.

The submissions, as measured by the election rules, dictate that we grant the petition, set aside and nullify the assailed
resolutions and orders, and order the dismissal of respondent’s election protest.

The Preliminaries

More than the justifications petitioner proffers for the filing of the petition at bench, the public interest involved in the case
militates against the dismissal of the pleading on technical grounds like forum shopping. On the other hand, to rule that
petitioner should have filed a new petition to challenge the 4 March 2010 Order of the COMELEC En Banc is to disregard
the liberality traditionally accorded amended and supplemental pleadings and the very purpose for which supplemental
pleadings are allowed under Section 6, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 More importantly, such a course of
action would clearly be violative of the injunction against multiplicity of suits enunciated in a long catena of decisions
handed down by this Court.

The Main Matter

Acting on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the 1 December 2009 Resolution issued by the COMELEC Second
Division, the COMELEC En Banc, as stated, initially issued the Resolution dated 8 February 2010, denying the motion for
lack of merit and declaring the same resolution immediately executory. However, even before petitioner’s filing of his
Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on 8 February 2010 and the instant Petition for Certiorari with an
Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, the record shows that the COMELEC En Banc issued the 10 February 2010 Resolution, ordering the re-
hearing of the case on the ground that "there was no majority vote of the members obtained in the Resolution of the
Commission En Banc promulgated on February 8, 2010." Having conceded one of the grounds subsequently raised in
petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc
significantly failed to obtain the votes required under Section 5(a), Rule 3 of its own Rules of Procedure 4 for a second
time.

The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing
should have caused the dismissal of respondent’s Election Protest. Promulgated on 15 February 1993 pursuant to
Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this
matter. Without any trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or
proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order
appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

The propriety of applying the foregoing provision according to its literal tenor cannot be gainsaid. As one pertaining to the
election of the provincial governor of Bulacan, respondent’s Election Protest was originally commenced in the COMELEC,
pursuant to its exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. Although initially raffled to the COMELEC Second Division, the
elevation of said election protest on motion for reconsideration before the Commission En Banc cannot, by any stretch of
the imagination, be considered an appeal. Tersely put, there is no appeal within the COMELEC itself. As aptly observed in
the lone dissent penned by COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, respondent’s Election Protest was filed with
the Commission "at the first instance" and should be, accordingly, considered an action or proceeding "originally
commenced in the Commission."

The dissent reads Section 6 of COMELEC Rule 18 to mean exactly the opposite of what it expressly states. Thus was
made the conclusion to the effect that since no decision was reached by the COMELEC En Banc, then the decision of the
Second Division should stand, which is squarely in the face of the Rule that when the Commission En Banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be re-heard, and if on re-hearing, no decision
is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission. The reliance is on
Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution which provides:

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit En Banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure
in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall
be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission En Banc.

The dissent reasons that it would be absurd that for a lack of the necessary majority in the motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC En Banc, the original protest action should be dismissed as this would render nugatory the
constitutional mandate to authorize and empower a division of the COMELEC to decide election cases.

We cannot, in this case, get out of the square cover of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. The provision is not
violative of the Constitution.

The Rule, in fact, was promulgated obviously pursuant to the Constitutional mandate in the first sentence of Section 3 of
Article IX(C). Clearly too, the Rule was issued "in order to expedite disposition of election cases" such that even the
absence of a majority in a Commission En Banc opinion on a case under reconsideration does not result in a non-
decision. Either the judgment or order appealed from "shall stand affirmed" or the action originally commenced in the
Commission "shall be dismissed."

It is easily evident in the second sentence of Section 3 of Article IX(C) that all election cases before the COMELEC are
passed upon in one integrated procedure that consists of a hearing and a decision "in division" and when necessitated by
a motion for reconsideration, a decision "by the Commission En Banc."

What is included in the phrase "all such election cases" may be seen in Section 2(2) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution
which states:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal of
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.

Section 2(2) read in relation to Section 3 shows that however the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is involved, either in the
exercise of "exclusive original jurisdiction" or an "appellate jurisdiction," the COMELEC will act on the case in one whole
and single process: to repeat, in division, and if impelled by a motion for reconsideration, en banc.

There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over election contests. The difference
inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. When a
decision of a trial court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the
appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a
decision. If the process ends without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed. Upon the
other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest
invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division,
which process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision
is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that
can be deemed affirmed.

It is easy to understand the reason for the difference in the result of the two protests, one as original action and the other
as an appeal, if and when the protest process reaches the COMELEC En Banc. In a protest originally brought before the
COMELEC, no completed process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the process. If, at that
completion, no conclusive result in the form of a majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice except to
dismiss the protest. In a protest placed before the Commission as an appeal, there has been a completed proceeding that
has resulted in a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as an appellate body, and after the appellate process is
completed, reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and resultingly, the decision appealed from is
affirmed.1avvphi1

To repeat, Rule 18, Section 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure follows, is in conformity with, and is in implementation
of Section 3 of Article IX(C) of the Constitution.

Indeed, the grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is patent in the fact that despite the existence in its books of the
clearly worded Section 6 of Rule 18, which incidentally has been acknowledged by this Court in the recent case of
Marcoleta v. COMELEC,5 it completely ignored and disregarded its very own decree and proceeded with the questioned
Resolution of 8 February 2010 and Order of 4 March 2010, in all, annulling the proclamation of petitioner Joselito R.
Mendoza as the duly elected governor of Bulacan, declaring respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan as the duly elected
governor, and ordering petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza to cease and desist from performing the functions of the Governor
of Bulacan and to vacate said office in favor of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan.1avvphi1
The grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is underscored by the fact that the protest that petitioner Pagdanganan
filed on 1 June 2007 overstayed with the COMELEC until the present election year when the end of the term of the
contested office is at hand and there was hardly enough time for the re-hearing that was conducted only on 15 February
2010. As the hearing time at the division had run out, and the re-hearing time at the banc was fast running out, the
unwanted result came about: incomplete appreciation of ballots; invalidation of ballots on general and unspecific grounds;
unrebutted presumption of validity of ballots.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution of the COMELEC promulgated on 8 February 2010
in EPC No. 2007-44 entitled "Roberto M. Pagdanganan v. Joselito R. Mendoza," the Order issued on 4 March 2010, and
the consequent Writ of Execution dated 5 March 2010 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The election protest of
respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

15. EN BANC

G.R. No. 196804 October 9, 2012

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197015

PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the winner
of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the office following the substitute’s disqualification.

The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set aside the En Banc Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 in
SPC No. 10-024 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the Second Division;

2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of Roderick A. Alcala;

3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of respondent Barbara C. Talaga as mayor of Lucena City and
CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation issued therefor;

4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of
the Mayor;

5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Lucena City, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is
ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as provided under Section 44 of the Local Government Code;

6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Resolution to the Office of the
President of the Philippines, the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Department of Finance and
the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Lucena City.

Let the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Regional Election Director of Region IV of COMELEC
implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.1

Antecedents
On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed
their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10,
2010 national and local elections.2

Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD,3 declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was
seeking to be elected to.

Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already
Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena, which was docketed as SPA 09-029 (DC).4 He alleged

therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of
Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.

The pertinent portions of Castillo’s petition follow:

1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of Barangay Mayao Crossing, Lucena City but may
be served with summons and other processes of this Commission at the address of his counsel at 624 Aurora
Blvd., Lucena City 4301;

2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of legal age, married, and a resident of Barangay Ibabang Iyam,
Lucena City and with postal address at the Office of the City Mayor, City Hall, Lucena City, where he may be
served with summons and other processes of this Commission;

3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of Lucena having been elected during the 2007 local elections, is
running for city mayor of Lucena under the Liberal party this coming 10 May 2010 local elections and has filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor of Lucena;

4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007 local elections based on
the records of the Commission on Elections of Lucena City and had fully served the aforesaid three (3) terms
without any voluntary and involuntary interruption;

5. Except the preventive suspension imposed upon him from 13 October 2005 to 14 November 2005 and from 4
September 2009 to 30 October 2009 pursuant to Sandiganbayan 4th Division Resolution in Criminal Case No.
27738 dated 3 October 2005, the public service as city mayor of the respondent is continuous and uninterrupted
under the existing laws and jurisprudence;

6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the filing of the certificate of candidacy of the respondent, hence,
such act is outrightly unconstitutional, illegal, and highly immoral;

7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected for and had fully served three (3) consecutive terms as a city
mayor of Lucena, he still filed his Certificate of Candidacy for City Mayor of Lucena for this coming 10 May 2010
national and local elections;

8. Under the Constitution and existing Election Laws, New Local Government Code of the Philippines, and
jurisprudence the respondent is no longer entitled and is already disqualified to be a city mayor for the fourth
consecutive term;

9. The filing of the respondent for the position of city mayor is highly improper, unlawful and is potentially injurious
and prejudicial to taxpayers of the City of Lucena; and

10. It is most respectfully prayed by the petitioner that the respondent be declared disqualified and no longer
entitled to run in public office as city mayor of Lucena City based on the existing law and jurisprudence. 5

The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent be
denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate under the existing Election
Laws and by the provisions of the New Local Government Code. 6 (Emphasis supplied.)

Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second and third
terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence 7 to the effect that
an involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the application of
the three-term limit rule.

In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,8 holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the
effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, on December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion
to Resolve, taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino. Relevant portions of his Manifestation with Motion to
Resolve are quoted herein, viz:
4. When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City, the rule that ‘where the
separation from office is caused by reasons beyond the control of the officer – i.e. involuntary – the service of term is
deemed interrupted’ has not yet been overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, the
prevailing rule then of the Honorable Commission in [sic] respect of the three (3)-term limitation was its decision in the
case of Aldovino, et al. vs. Asilo where it stated:

"Thus, even if respondent was elected during the 2004 elections, which was supposedly his third and final term as city
councilor, the same cannot be treated as a complete service or full term in office since the same was interrupted when he
was suspended by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division. And the respondent actually heeded the suspension order since
he did not receive his salary during the period October 16-31 and November 1-15 by reason of his actual suspension from
office. And this was further bolstered by the fact that the DILG issued a

Memorandum directing him, among others, to reassume his position." (Emphasis supplied.)

5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the part of respondent as would constitute a ground for the denial of due
course to and/or the cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy at the time he filed the same. Petitioner’s ground
for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy thus has no basis, in fact
and in law, as there is no ground to warrant such relief under the Omnibus Election Code and/or its implementing laws.

6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the Supreme Court in respect of the issue on the three (3)-term limitation,
respondent acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City having served
three (3) (albeit interrupted) terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the 2010
elections.

7. In view of the foregoing premises and new jurisprudence on the matter, respondent respectfully submits the present
case for decision declaring him as DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City.9

Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national
and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC.

Acting on Ramon’s Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution on April 19,
2010,10 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is
hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.

Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.11 Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending
Motion for Reconsideration.12 At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in
substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-
CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon.13

On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramon’s Ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal, declared the
COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final and executory. 14

On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were
counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with
44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.15

Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of Barbara Ruby’s
proclamation.16

It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of its Law Department,17 gave due
course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC and CONA through Resolution No. 8917, thereby including her in the certified list of
candidates.18 Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City.19

On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC, 20 docketed as SPC 10-024.
He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course;
and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution
three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.

In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation,21 Barbara Ruby maintained the validity of her substitution.
She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of
his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of
due course to or cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No.
900622 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her favor.
On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene,23 positing that
he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost
the elections.

On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s petition-in-
intervention,24 holding:

In the present case, Castillo was notified of Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it was the basis for the proclamation of
Ruby on that date. He, however, failed to file any action within the prescribed period either in the Commission or the
Supreme Court assailing the said resolution. Thus, the said resolution has become final and executory. It cannot anymore
be altered or reversed.

xxxx

x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed by Castillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was actually for the disqualification
of Ramon for having served three consecutive terms, which is a ground for his disqualification under the Constitution in
relation to Section 4(b)3 of Resolution 8696. There was no mention therein that Ramon has committed material
representation that would be a ground for the cancellation or denial of due course to the CoC of Ramon under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code. The First Division, in fact, treated the petition as one for disqualification as gleaned from
the body of the resolution and its dispositive portion quoted above. This treatment of the First Division of the petition as
one for disqualification only is affirmed by the fact that its members signed Resolution No. 8917 where it was clearly
stated that the First Division only disqualified Ramon.

Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable. Ramon was rightly substituted
by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon cannot be considered as stray votes but should be counted in favor of Ruby since
the substituted and the substitute carry the same surname – Talaga, as provided in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006.

xxxx

Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code or any election laws for that matter which requires that the
substitution and the Certificate of Candidacy of the substitute should be approved and given due course first by the
Commission or the Law Department before it can be considered as effective. All that Section 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code as implemented by Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678 requires is that it should be filed with the proper office. The
respondent is correct when she argued that in fact even the BEI can receive a CoC of a substitute candidate in case the
cause for the substitution happened between the day before the election and mid-day of election day. Thus, even if the
approval of the substitution was made after the election, the substitution became effective on the date of the filing of the
CoC with the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance.

There being no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon as candidate for mayor of Lucena City, the counting of
the votes of Ramon in favor of Ruby is proper. The proclamation, thus, of Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order.
Hence, we find no cogent reason to annul the proclamation of respondent Barbara Ruby C. Talaga as the duly elected
Mayor of the City of Lucena after the elections conducted on May 10, 2010. 25

Acting on Castillo and Alcala’s respective motions for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed
Resolution dated May 20, 2011 reversing the COMELEC Second Division’s ruling. 26

Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not attain finality for being issued without a hearing as a mere incident of the
COMELEC’s ministerial duty to receive the COCs of substitute candidates; (b) Resolution No. 8917 was based on the
wrong facts; and (c) Ramon’s disqualification was resolved with finality only on May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc
concluded that Barbara Ruby could not have properly substituted Ramon but had simply become an additional candidate
who had filed her COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed to the position pursuant to Section 44
of the Local Government Code (LGC).27

Issues

The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena
City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.

Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending parties should assume the contested
elective position.

Ruling

The petitions lack merit.

1.

Existence of a valid CoC is a condition

sine qua non for a valid substitution
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a
candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a COC, viz:

Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed
by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x x x

The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing them are, namely: (a) to
enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the regular election, the candidates from among whom they are to
make the choice; and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. If the law does not
confine to the duly-registered candidates the choice by the voters, there may be as many persons voted for as there are
voters, and votes may be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a
candidate for another office in the same election.28 Moreover, according to Sinaca v. Mula,29 the CoC is:

x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political creed or lack of political creed. It
is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office
mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any,
and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.

Accordingly, a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the
eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that
render the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate.

There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through a petition for
disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court
differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, 30 thuswise:

x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can
only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have
different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the
person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if
he/she never filed a CoC.31

Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., prohibited acts of
candidates, and the fact of a candidate’s permanent residency in another country when that fact affects the residency
requirement of a candidate) are separate and distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of or denying due course to a
COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code; and material misrepresentation under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code), the Court has recognized in Miranda v. Abaya32 that the following
circumstances may result from the granting of the petitions, to wit:

(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid CoC;

(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a valid CoC; and

(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or cancelled.

In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws his CoC before the elections,
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the option of substitution, to wit:

Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. — If after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day
of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and
mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where
he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be
substituted.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, 33 there can be no valid substitution of the
candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a
valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the
same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. 34

Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code may
not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior
to the election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. 35

2.

Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification

rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not
a valid candidate to be properly substituted

In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the Court concurs with the conclusion of the COMELEC En Banc that the
Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on Elections: 36

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel
such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in
the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation
of the winning candidate.

Castillo’s petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Ramon made a false
representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right
of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (c) Ramon made the
false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately
attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible. 37 The petition expressly
challenged Ramon’s eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and the Local
Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that "the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by the respondent Ramon be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a
disqualified candidate."38

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person lacks
a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false. 39 A petition for the denial of due course to or
cancellation of CoC that is short of the requirements will not be granted. In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 40 the Court
stressed that there must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus:

The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to
deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that
Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to
deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the
misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who
falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for
violation of the election laws.

It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused with a Section 68 petition.
The remedies under the two sections are different, for they are based on different grounds, and can result in different
eventualities.41 A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose
CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that
of a person who has not filed a CoC.42 Miranda v. Abaya43 has clarified that a candidate who is disqualified under Section
68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person
whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not
considered a candidate.1âwphi1

To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the Constitution and statutory
law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for all elective local officials, to wit:

Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)

The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power
over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office." The Court underscored this
objective in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,44 stating:

x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor
after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers
when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos,
petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for
a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred
by it.

To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility
to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio
for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of
his CoC made his situation even worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate may remain
eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.45

Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December
30, 2009 in the COMELEC.46 That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the
COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.

We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda v. Abaya aptly put it:

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute presupposes
the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who
never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place
because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not
a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we
were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing
thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution. 47 (Emphasis
supplied)

3.

Granting without any qualification of petition in

SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s intention to
declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC

That the COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon committed any deliberate misrepresentation in his CoC was of
little consequence in the determination of whether his CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.

In Miranda v. Abaya,48 the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due course and/or
cancelled." The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced — in apparent contradiction — that
Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The

Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at
the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda’s CoC. The Court explained:

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the Comelec in its
May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of Mayor for
the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec ruled favorably in the
following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE
"Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May
11, 1998 national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is
sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no
qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific
prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. x x x.49

xxxx

x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due
course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no
question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that
whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains
that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course
and cancelled. x x x.50

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of cancelling or
denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification.

Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although Castillo’s petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC) specifically sought both the
disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC categorically stated in
the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 that it was granting the petition. Despite the COMELEC making no finding of material
misrepresentation on the part of Ramon, its granting of Castillo’s petition without express qualifications manifested that
the COMELEC had cancelled Ramon’s CoC based on his apparent ineligibility. The Resolution dated April 19, 2010
became final and executory because Castillo did not move for its reconsideration, and because Ramon later withdrew his
motion for reconsideration filed in relation to it.

4.

Elected Vice Mayor must succeed

and assume the position of Mayor
due to a permanent vacancy in the office

On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the doctrine on the rejection
of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections 51 should not apply to him because Ramon’s
disqualification became final prior to the elections.52 Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on Elections,53 where the
Court said:

x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidate’s
disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other
cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition — the
disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the
present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On
election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days
before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s
candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and
votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be

counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
(Emphasis added)

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final
before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the
disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is
categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall
not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections.
Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none. 54

Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was entitled to assume the position of Mayor of Lucena
City for having obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining qualified candidates.

It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Ramon disqualified is decisive.
According to Section 10, Rule 19 of the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 8804, 55 a decision or resolution of a Division
becomes final and executory after the lapse of five days following its promulgation unless a motion for reconsideration is
seasonably filed. Under Section 8, Rule 20 of Resolution No. 8804, the decision of the COMELEC En Banc becomes final
and executory five days after its promulgation and receipt of notice by the parties.

The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution dated April 19, 2010, the copy of which
Ramon received on the same date.56 Ramon filed a motion for reconsideration on April 21, 2010 57 in accordance with
Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696,58 but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010,59 ostensibly to allow his
substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any motion for reconsideration. Such circumstances
indicated that there was no more pending matter that could have effectively suspended the finality of the ruling in due
course. Hence, the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have attained finality upon the lapse of five days from
its promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This happened probably on April 24, 2010. Despite such finality, the
COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the withdrawal by Ramon of his motion for reconsideration through the May 5,
2010 Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division final and executory.

Yet, we cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion that with Ramon’s disqualification becoming final prior to the May 10, 2010
elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Ruby’s filing of her CoC in substitution of Ramon
significantly differentiated this case from the factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the
petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his disqualification became final before the May 10, 2004
elections. Considering that no substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the only
candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May 10,
2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the
electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as
Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillo’s claim of being the candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes, and of being consequently entitled to assume the office of Mayor.

Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer.1âwphi1 Labo, Jr. should be applied. There,
the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office could not
assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was "not the choice of the
sovereign will."60 Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be deemed elected to the
office.61 There was to be no question that the second placer lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and
could not assume the vacated position.62 No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser
to be their political leader or their representative. 63

The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites
concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was
fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety
but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.64 Under this sole exception, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed
elected.65 But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element was absent. The
electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the
COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the
decisions.

On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of
Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also, Ramon did
not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly,
she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010
was beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate. 66

A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to
the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:67

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. – If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. x x x

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases; AFFIRMS the Resolution issued on May
20, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

16. EN BANC

G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails and seeks to nullify (1) the
February 8, 2012 Resolution1 of the Second Division, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010
and (2) the May 10, 2012 Resolution2 of the COMELEC en banc affirming that division’s disposition. The assailed
issuances, in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated
August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55 declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010
elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.

The antecedent facts are undisputed.

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo
vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004
electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres),
who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation.
Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of
office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year
and one month.

Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his
certificate of candidacy3 for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s
disqualification to run, the corresponding petition,4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-
consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution 5 finding for Abundo, who
in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes6 and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.

Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres initiated
against Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto 7 action before the RTC-
Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds
Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo Abundo, Sr. ineligible to
serve as municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.

SO ORDERED.9
In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have already served three consecutive
mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth,
consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his
protest and occupied the position of and actually served as Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from
May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year and a month service constitutes a complete and full
service of Abundo’s second term as mayor.

Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010.

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELEC’s Second Division rendered the first assailed
Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is
AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.11

Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that
service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as
service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule.

In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its equally assailed Resolution of
May 10, 2012. The fallo of the COMELEC en banc’s Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.12

In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc held in essence the following: first, there was no
involuntary interruption of Abundo’s 2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he
is considered never to have lost title to the disputed office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the
Constitution prohibits is for an elective official to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms
and not to the service of the term.

Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary
injunction.

Intervening Events

In the meantime, following the issuance by the COMELEC of its May 10, 2012 Resolution denying Abundo’s motion for
reconsideration, the following events transpired:

1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Order13 declaring its May 10, 2012 Resolution final and executory.
The following day, June 21, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Entry of Judgment.14

2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for Execution 15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes.

3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on Vega’s counsel’s motion16 filed a day earlier, issued an
Order17 directing the bailiff of ECAD (COMELEC) to personally deliver the entire records to said RTC.

On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the entire records of the instant case to, and
were duly received by, the clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43.

4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes
granted Vega’s Motion for Execution through an Order18 of even date. And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on
the same day.

5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served the same at the office of Mayor
Abundo on the same day via substituted service.

6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.

7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July 3, 2012 Resolution 21 and a copy of the TRO. On the same day,
Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of
office22 as mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively.
 8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of Abundo’s Seventh (7th) Most Extremely Urgent Manifestation and
Motion23 dated June 28, 2012 praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or status quo ante Order. On the same day,
Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes––who had taken their oaths of office the
day before—assumed the posts of mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.24

9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To Admit Attached Manifestation) 25 and Manifestation with Leave
to Admit26 dated July 5, 2012 stating that the TRO thus issued by the Court has become functus officio owing to
the execution of the RTC’s Decision in Election Case No. 55.

10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his Comment/Opposition with Leave to the Petitioner’s Prayer for the Issuance of
a Status Quo Ante Order27 reiterating the argument that since Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor
Cesar O. Cervantes already assumed the posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, then a Status
Quo Ante Order would serve no purpose.

11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the July 3, 2012 TRO
into a Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the Unreasonable and Inappropriate Progression of Events).28

It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from his post as incumbent mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes. To be sure, the speed which characterized Abundo’s ouster despite the supervening issuance by the Court
of a TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the Court. While it is not clear whether Vice-Mayor Tarin and First Councilor
Cervantes knew of or put on notice about the TRO either before they took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before
assuming the posts of mayor and vice-mayor on July 5, 2012, the confluence of events following the issuance of the
assailed COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to show that the TRO––issued as it were to maintain the status quo, thus
averting the premature ouster of Abundo pending this Court’s resolution of his appeal––appears to have been trivialized.

On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on Abundo’s petition, followed not long after by public respondent
COMELEC’s Consolidated Comment.29

The Issues

Abundo raises the following grounds for the allowance of the petition:

6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it declared the arguments in Abundo’s motion for reconsideration as mere rehash and reiterations of the
claims he raised prior to the promulgation of the Resolution.

6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms despite the fact that he only served the
remaining one year and one month of the second term as a result of an election protest. 30

First Issue:

Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not Mere Reiteration

The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo’s motion for reconsideration on the basis that his arguments in said motion are
mere reiterations of what he already brought up in his appeal Brief before the COMELEC Second Division. In this petition,
petitioner claims otherwise.

Petitioner’s assertion is devoid of merit.

A comparison of Abundo’s arguments in the latter’s Brief vis-à-vis those in his Motion for Reconsideration (MR) reveals
that the arguments in the MR are elucidations and amplications of the same issues raised in the brief. First, in his Brief,
Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to consider the quo warranto case since the alleged
violation of the three-term limit has already been rejected by the COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC),
while in his MR, Abundo raised the similar ground of the conclusiveness of the COMELEC’s finding on the issue of his
qualification to run for the current term. Second, in his Brief, Abundo assailed RTC’s reliance on Aldovino, Jr., while in his
MR, he argued that the Court’s pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which dealt with preventive suspension, is not applicable
to the instant case as it involves only a partial service of the term. Abundo argued in his Brief that his situation cannot be
equated with the case of preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued before that the almost
two years which he did not sit as mayor during the 2004-2007 term is an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term.

Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues in the MR are a rehash of those in the Brief.

Core Issue:

Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms

The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official
arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term
for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.
On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s
three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived
of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually
declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)

and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. —

xxxx

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis Ours.)

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory
provisions, the following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post;
and

(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31

Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus, has its complicated
side. We shall revisit and analyze the various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on the matter.

As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the
office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive
terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the observation that the law "does not textually state that
voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect ‘continuity of service for a full term’ for
purposes of the three-term limit rule."32

As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections,33 the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only
consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective
local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term,34albeit he is allowed
to seek a fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to
do so by reason of the prohibition.

There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An
interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the
basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected." This
qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely
resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption
which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes resulting from the
varying interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for three terms or more, but whose terms or
service was punctuated by what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents
perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes:
succession or assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as
the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest,
proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official by operation of law, and other
analogous causes.

This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms were considered or not
considered as having been "involuntarily interrupted or broken."

(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law

In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr.35 (1998) and Montebon v. Commission on
Elections36 (2008), the Court delved on the effects of "assumption to office by operation of law" on the three-term limit
rule. This contemplates a situation wherein an elective local official fills by succession a higher local government post
permanently left vacant due to any of the following contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.37

In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June
30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent mayor,
Cesar Borja. Capco was then elected and served as mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When Capco expressed
his intention to run again for the mayoralty position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a
candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification for violation of the three-term limit rule.

Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for
Capco "was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law"39 when a permanent vacancy occurred in that office.

The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There, Montebon had been elected for three
consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in
January 2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when
the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a
petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that Montebon’s
assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as councilor. The Court
emphasized that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary severance
from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vice-
mayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as
councilor.

(2) Recall Election

With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission on Elections 40(2002)
and the aforementioned case of Socrates (2002) provide guidance.

In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and
1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term
ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until
June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground he had already served as
mayor for three consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit rule. The Court held therein that the remainder of
Tagarao’s term after the recall election during which Talaga served as mayor should not be considered for purposes of
applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the continuity of Talaga’s mayorship was disrupted by his
defeat during the 1998 elections.

A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the COMELEC
Resolution which declared Edward Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall election. It appeared that Hagedorn had
been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and
1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in
the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall
proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought
Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule.

In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:

x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of
September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During
the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of
Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. 41

The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term and, hence, any subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered x x x."42

(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City

On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s
continuity of service. The Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on Elections 43 (2003).

Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as mayor of the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a
component city, with the corresponding cityhood law providing the holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed his
certificate of candidacy as mayor for the 2001 elections, the Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of
Digos City for violation of the three-term limit rule on the basis of the following ratiocination:

This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been
deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also
assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped
down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never
ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.

(Emphasis supplied.)

(4) Period of Preventive Suspension

In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the period during which a local elected official is
under preventive suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service. The Court explained
why so:

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an
interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a
term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s
continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.)

(5) Election Protest

With regard to the effects of an election protest vis-à-vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudence presents a more differing
picture. The Court’s pronouncements in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections 45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre46(2006), Rivera III
v. Commission on Elections47 (2007) and Dizon v. Commission on Elections 48 (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating.

In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms
1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was
eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections. On February
27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a
COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term. In
the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for
disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same post. The Court,
citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must concur for the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms."49

In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in the case of Lonzanida. The Court held
that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections since his
assumption of office as mayor "cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation." And as a corollary point, the Court stated that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term
having been ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an involuntary
relinquishment of office.This Court deviated from the ruling in Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre50 owing to a variance in the
factual situations attendant.

In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for terms 1995-1998,
1998-2001, and 2001-2004. During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his supposed second term, the COMELEC
nullified Ong’s proclamation on the postulate that Ong lost during the 1998 elections. However, the COMELEC’s decision
became final and executory on July 4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact
already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same position as mayor, which his opponent opposed for violation of the three-term limit
rule.

Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998-
2001 because he was not duly elected to the post and merely assumed office as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing
Ong’s argument, the Court held that his assumption of office as mayor for the term 1998-2001 constitutes "service for the
full term" and hence, should be counted for purposes of the three-term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated
in Lonzanida in the sense that Ong’s service was deemed and counted as service for a full term because Ong’s
proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term. The Court noted that the COMELEC decision which declared
Ong as not having won the 1998 elections was "without practical and legal use and value" promulgated as it was after the
contested term has expired. The Court further reasoned:

Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions
thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term
rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that
Alegre would – under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless
electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an
election.51 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong was different, to wit:

The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the
mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the
proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For
another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a
result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)

Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the consolidated cases of Rivera III v.
Commission on Elections53 and Dee v. Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the
following consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004. In relation to the 2004 elections, Morales again ran
as mayor of the same town, emerged as garnering the majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term
commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo warranto was later filed against Morales predicated on the
ground that he is ineligible to run for a "fourth" term, having served as mayor for three consecutive terms. In his answer,
Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001 term cannot be considered against him, for, although he was proclaimed by
the Mabalacat board of canvassers as elected mayor vis-à-vis the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of mayor until
June 30, 2001, his proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his closest rival, Anthony Dee,
proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served as a mere caretaker.

The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and held that the case of Morales presents a factual milieu similar with Ong,
not with Lonzanida. For ease of reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like
Morales, had served the three-year term from the start to the end of the term. Hence, the Court concluded that Morales
exceeded the three-term limit rule, to wit:

Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as
mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral
protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such
circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.

xxxx

Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break
since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)
continuous years.55 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the term, cannot constitute an
interruption in Morales’ service of the full term; neither can Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a "caretaker of
the office" or a mere "de facto officer" for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule.

In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections,56 the Court would again find the same Mayor Morales as
respondent in a disqualification proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty candidate during the 2007 elections for a
term ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated from his post by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Rivera, Morales would
argue this time around that the three-term limit rule was no longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the
Court ruled in his favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule was no longer a
disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote:

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term.
Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The
next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17
May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may
seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004
to 30 June 2007.57 (Emphasis supplied)

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or
involuntary interruption, viz:

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position
pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the
replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory
provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for
the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by
operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).

2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for
what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s
 service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private
citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work
to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).

4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to
the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions
of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted
when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would
otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon).
The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an
interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service
(Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served
the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has
managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the
application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong
and Rivera).

The Case of Abundo

Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that he had already served three consecutive
terms and is, thus, barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current 2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo
arguments run thusly:

1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt with preventive suspension which does
not interrupt the continuity of service of a term;

2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be interrupted so as to remove him from the
reach of the constitutional three-term limitation;

3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a mere portion of the
Decision and not on the unified logic in the disquisition;

4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida58 and Rivera III v. Commission on
Elections.59

5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no interruption in the service of Abundo since
what he considered as an "interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred before his term started; and

6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was adjudged invalid was interrupted while
that of the protestant (Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner was not so interrupted is at once absurd as
it is illogical.

Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the instant
case. The COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his victory in the protest case confirmed his
entitlement to said office and he was only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the pendency
of the election protest.

We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election protest, for which the rulings in Lonzanida,
Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of the imposition
of a preventive suspension being the very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundo’s
case presents a different factual backdrop.

Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject of disqualification were candidates
who lost in the election protest and each declared loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the election
protest and was declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were
both unseated toward the end of their respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had
assumed the remainder of the term.

Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s pronouncements in the past as instructive, and consider several doctrines
established from the 1998 case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving
at this Court’s conclusion.

The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and prevent
elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their position"60 but also to "enhance the people’s freedom of
choice."61 In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of
power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed." 62

In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his
opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s
case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007,
was the duly elected mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his election protest against Torres and his consequent
proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on
the three-term limit that the official has been elected is satisfied.

This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for "three consecutive terms," as the
phrase is juridically understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and local elections.
Subsumed to this issue is of course the question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during
the three three-year periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.

The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term.

There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election
protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or
for a period of a little over one year and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in
Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise
entitled.

A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the
law describes that an officer may hold an office."64 It also means the "time during which the officer may claim to hold office
as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another."65 It is the period
of time during which a duly elected official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a)
of Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30 of the first year of
said term.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo
cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he
assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to
hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed
election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his
declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little
over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3)
years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually
served less.

Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to
be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the
context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.67

The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service and voluntary
renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension. 68To interrupt is to
obstruct, thwart or prevent.69 When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the
obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a
term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation" connotes the
idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign.70 Voluntary
renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and to
cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.

In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino, Jr., 71 held:

It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence deems an exception to the three-term limit
rule, implies that the service of the term has begun before it was interrupted. Here, the respondent did not lose title to the
office. As the assailed Resolution states:

In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the office. On the contrary, he actively sought
entitlement to the office when he lodged the election protest case. And respondent-appellant’s victory in the said case is a
final confirmation that he was validly elected for the mayoralty post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most,
respondent-appellant was only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office to which he was validly elected
during the pendency of the election protest, but he never lost title to the said office.72 (Emphasis added.)

The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the actual length of service by the public official in
a given term is immaterial by reckoning said service for the term in the application of the three-term limit rule, thus:

As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear command
suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to the argument that since respondent
Abundo served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007 "term" should not be considered for purposes of the application
of the three term limit rule. When the framers of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the three term limit rule, it is
clear that reference is to the term, not the actual length of the service the public official may render. Therefore, one’s
actual service of term no matter how long or how short is immaterial.73

In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the actual service of the term is immaterial in
his case as he was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor.

The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend themselves for concurrence.
The Court cannot simply find its way clear to understand the poll body’s determination that Abundo was only temporarily
unable to discharge his functions as mayor during the pendency of the election protest.

As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to
serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the
2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent
(Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have
served the full 2004-2007 term.

This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his
election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the
2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004—the start of
the term—until May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private
citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to
serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the
election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position.

Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent’s cause of action, or to COMELEC’s resolution against Abundo.
In Aldovino Jr., the Court succinctly defines what temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective office means, thus:

On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary,
should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least
an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions
of his office for a reason provided by law.74

We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous
to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post. For one,
during the intervening period of almost two years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said
to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the
legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For another, not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be
said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for
all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in the election protest accords him title to the elective office from
the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his
favor.1âwphi1

Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption of his service, until
he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the remaining term. At this juncture, We observe the apparent
similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as
Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not proclaimed winners since they were non-candidates in the regularelections. They
were proclaimed winners during the recall elections and clearly were not able to fully serve the terms of the deposed
incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Court deemed their terms as involuntarily interrupted, Abundo also
became or was a private citizen during the period over which his opponent was serving as mayor. If in Lonzanida, the
Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanida’s service because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest,
then with more reason, Abundo’s term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since he was not proclaimed winner
after the 2004 elections and was able to assume the office and serve only for a little more than a year after winning the
protest.

As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the "law contemplates a rest period during which the
local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit."75 Applying the said principle in the present case, there is no question
that during the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people
of Viga, Catanduanes.

Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break
in his service because, as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundo’s opponent, Torres,
who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.

As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest
because while Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and
opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election system. While
admittedly the Court does not possess the mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with
enough authority to establish a fortress against the injustices it may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave injustice to Abundo––an elected official
who was belatedly declared as the winner and assumed office for only a short period of the term. If in the cases of
Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing candidate––or the person who was adjudged not legally entitled
to hold the contested public office but held it anyway––We find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-
protestant who, by popular vote, deserves title to the public office but whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by
an invalid proclamation.

Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may likewise be committed
against the people of Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the
Constitution, We bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want"76 and
hence, should, as much as possible, "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own
strength to curtail the power when it overreaches itself."77 For democracy draws strength from the choice the people make
which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed February 8, 2012 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC
(AE) No. A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August
9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was
duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal,
Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor,
respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.

The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

17. EN BANC

G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 193536

AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner,

vs.
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

These are two special civil actions for certiorari1 questioning the resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
in SPA No. 09-076 (DC). In G.R. No. 193237, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. (Jalosjos) seeks to annul the 10 May 2010
Resolution2 of the COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution3 of the COMELEC En Banc, which both
ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material representation. In G.R. No. 193536,
Agapito J. Cardino (Cardino) challenges the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which applied the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code in filling the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte created by the cancellation of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy.

The Facts

Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections.
Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos
made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for
the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final
judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in
Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos
admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked
Jalosjos’ probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order
dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that
during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the same grounds. 4

The COMELEC En Banc narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos’ criminal record as follows:

As backgrounder, Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of robbery on January 22, 1969 in Cebu City.
On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found him and his co-
accused guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of prision correccional minimum to prision mayor
maximum. Jalosjos appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on August 9, 1973. It
was only after a lapse of several years or more specifically on June 17, 1985 that Jalosjos filed a Petition for Probation
before the RTC Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by the court. But then, on motion filed by his Probation Officer,
Jalosjos’ probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on March 19, 1987 and the corresponding warrant for his arrest
was issued. Surprisingly, on December 19, 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a
Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation. This
Certification was the one used by respondent Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of the disqualification case filed against him
by Adasa in 2004, docketed as SPA No. 04-235.

This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September
29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration, guilty of violating
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting to the fact that respondent
Jalosjos had fully complied with the terms and conditions of his probation. A portion of the decision of the Sandiganbayan
is quoted hereunder:

The Court finds that the above acts of the accused gave probationer Dominador Jalosjos, Jr., unwarranted benefits and
advantage because the subject certification, which was issued by the accused without adequate or official support, was
subsequently utilized by the said probationer as basis of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of
Arrest that he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which prompted the said court to issue the Order dated
February 5, 2004 in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU, declaring that said probationer has complied with the order of
probation and setting aside its Order of January 16, 2004 recalling the warrant or [sic] arrest; and that said Certification
was also used by the said probationer and became the basis for the Commission on Elections to deny in its Resolution of
August 2, 2004 the petition or [sic] private complainant James Adasa for the disqualification of the probationer from
running for re-election as Mayor of Dapitan City in the National and Local Elections of 2004. 5

The COMELEC’s Rulings

On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy.
The COMELEC First Division concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not
by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served." 6 The COMELEC First
Division found that Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet
served his sentence. The penalty imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of one year, eight months and
twenty days of prisión correccional as minimum, to four years, two months and one day of prisión mayor as maximum.
The COMELEC First Division ruled that Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his disqualification as provided for in Section
40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160."7

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration. The pertinent portions of the 11
August 2010 Resolution read:

With the proper revocation of Jalosjos’ earlier probation and a clear showing that he has not yet served the terms of his
sentence, there is simply no basis for Jalosjos to claim that his civil as well as political rights have been violated. Having
been convicted by final judgment,

Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office. His proclamation as the elected mayor in the
May 10, 2010 election does not deprive the Commission of its authority to resolve the present petition to its finality, and to
oust him from the office he now wrongfully holds.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied for utter lack of merit. Jalosjos is hereby
OUSTED from office and ordered to CEASE and DESIST from occupying and discharging the functions of the Office of
the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga. Let the provisions of the Local Government Code on succession apply.

SO ORDERED.8

Jalosjos filed his petition on 25 August 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237, while Cardino filed his petition on 17
September 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193536.

On 22 February 2011, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing G.R. No. 193237.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution
dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution dated August 11, 2010 of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC)
are hereby AFFIRMED.9

Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial notice of its resolution in G.R. No.
193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this Court resolved11 to
consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.Jalosjos then filed a Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated that
"he has resigned from the position of Mayor of the City of Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which resignation was accepted
by the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Rolando E. Yebes." 12 Jalosjos’ resignation was made "in
deference with the provision of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to his candidacy as Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013."13

These cases are not rendered moot by Jalosjos’ resignation. In resolving Jalosjos’ Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No.
193237 and Cardino’s Petition in G.R. No. 193536, we address not only Jalosjos’ eligibility to run for public office and the
consequences of the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, but also COMELEC’s constitutional duty to enforce and
administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as
candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy without
making a finding that Jalosjos committed a deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in good
faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same position from which he is now being ousted.
Finally, the Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.

In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it added to the dispositive portion of its 11 August 2010 Resolution that the provisions of the Local
Government Code on succession should apply.

This Court’s Ruling

The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a material
fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a
result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered
the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and the 11
August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. The dissenting opinions erroneously limit the remedy against Jalosjos
to disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and apply the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code.

A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is a false material
representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the same Code. Sections 74 and 78 read:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed
by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he is eligible for said office." A
candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. 14 If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred
by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is
a ground for a petition under Section 78.

A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government
Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate
under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:

Section 40, Local Government Code:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to
avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate
and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision
by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80,
83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.

Revised Penal Code:

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x

Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prisión mayor and temporary
disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed
as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.

xxxx

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by
popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article
shall last during the term of the sentence.
 4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.
— The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular
election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification.

Art. 42. Prisión mayor — its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión mayor shall carry with it that of temporary
absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall
suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Emphasis supplied)

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, 15 the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary
absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means
that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold
elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a
false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

In Lacuna v. Abes,16 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import of the accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification:

On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellee’s conviction of a crime penalized
with prisión mayor which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code
disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to
vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal
Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise
of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public
office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence.
Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.
— The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular
election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their respective
antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during
the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the
temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one
period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means according to whether the
penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the convict of the right
to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually."

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction
becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on
whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his perpetual special disqualification." Once the judgment of
conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his
conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public
office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office
from the time his judgment of conviction became final.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this
accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As used in Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the
right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public
office. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,17 the false material representation may refer to
"qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a
person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible
to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation
that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in Fermin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel
such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in
the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation
of the winning candidate.18 (Emphasis supplied)

Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to which perpetual special disqualification
attaches by operation of law, is not a ground for a petition under Section 68 because robbery is not one of the offenses
enumerated in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned, Section 68 refers only to election offenses under the
Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes under the Revised Penal Code. For ready reference, we quote again Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision
by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;

(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident
of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied)

There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify including the crime of robbery as one of the
offenses enumerated in this Section. All the offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus
Election Code. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes gravely errs when it holds that Jalosjos’ conviction for the crime of
robbery under the Revised Penal Code is a ground for "a petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC and not
for cancellation of COC under Section 78 thereof." This Court has already ruled that offenses punished in laws other than
in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a ground for a petition under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia, 19 the Court
declared:

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. (Emphasis supplied)

A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four statements: (1) a statement that the
candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of,
or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and (4) a
statement of the candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 20

We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy when he stated under
oath that he was eligible to run for mayor? The COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all found that Jalosjos was not
eligible to run for public office. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos made a false material representation that is a
ground for a petition under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility of
Jalosjos is a disqualification which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 and not under Section 78. The dissenting
opinion of Justice Brion concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification that is not a ground under Section 78
without, however, saying under what specific provision of law a petition against Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his
certificate of candidacy.

What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión mayor, a petition under Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner
has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40
of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt
belongs to the petitioner.
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of
ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.21 Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run
for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified
candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections – Cardino – who received the highest number of votes.

Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or
declared ineligible22 should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the
time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that
took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the
person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such
non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the
elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. 23 If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled
one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of
candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation
of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat
one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering
from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running
for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other
government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that
the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because
under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election."24 The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as
affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the
conduct of elections.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of one suffering from
perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior
perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss
in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio
bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED, and the Petition in G.R. No. 193536 is
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 of the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC
En Bane, respectively, in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Agapito J. Cardino ran
unopposed in the May 2010 elections and thus received the highest number of votes for Mayor. The COMELEC En Bane
is DIRECTED to constitute a Special City Board of Canvassers to proclaim Agapito J. Cardino as the duly elected Mayor
of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the Department of Justice and the Department of Interior and
Local Government so they can cause the arrest of, and enforce the jail sentence on, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. due to his
conviction for the crime of robbery in a final judgment issued by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 18) of Cebu City in
Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU.

SO ORDERED.

18. EN BANC

G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN, Respondents.

SERENO,*

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ *

DECISION
REYES, J.:

Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.

The Case

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Resolution2 dated
September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010. The assailed
resolution (a) reversed the Order3 dated November 30, 2010 of COMELEC Second Division dismissing petitioner’s
appeal; and (b) affirmed the consolidated Decision4 dated October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang, La
Union, Branch 33, declaring petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon (petitioner) disqualified and ineligible to her position as
Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union.

The Undisputed Facts

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13,
1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September
27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again
sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents)
all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility
before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground
that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian
citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently
complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her
Australian citizenship.

Ruling of the RTC

In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner herself during trial,
the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the
document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before any public officer authorized to
administer oath. Consequently, the RTC’s decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in FAVOR of [private respondents] and AGAINST
(petitioner):

1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, disqualified and ineligible to hold the office of Vice-Mayor
of Caba, La Union;

2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-Mayor of said municipality; and

3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant.

SO ORDERED.9

Ruling of the COMELEC

The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by the Second Division in its Order 10 dated
November 30, 2010 for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion for reconsideration, the
appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its Resolution 11 dated September 6, 2011. In the same issuance, the
substantive merits of the appeal were given due course. The COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and
conclusions of the RTC; it also granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private respondents.
The decretal portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES as follows:

1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit;

2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a quo; and

3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.

The Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual
citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections.
Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual
citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.

She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. In support thereof, she
cites portions of the Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003 containing the sponsorship speech
for House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.

She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility since they failed to do so when she
filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections.

Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take cognizance of the substantive merits of her appeal
instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC Second Division for the continuation of the appeal proceedings; and (b)
allow the execution pending appeal of the RTC’s judgment.

The Issues

Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits of an appeal after
ruling on its reinstatement; II) Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial
court in an election case; III) Whether the private respondents are barred from questioning the qualifications of the
petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the petitioner’s eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.

The Court’s Ruling

I. An appeal may be simultaneously

reinstated and definitively resolved
by the COMELEC en banc in a
resolution disposing of a motion for
reconsideration.

The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en banc by Section 3,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission
en banc.

A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc
except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order.

Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en banc’s prerogative in resolving a
motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an
appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that initially dismissed it.

We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it
proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the petitioner’s appeal after ruling for its reinstatement.

Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, the petitioner not only
proffered arguments on the issue on docket fees but also on the issue of her eligibility. She even filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration attaching therewith supporting documents13 to her contention that she is no longer an
Australian citizen. The petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable decision, cannot be permitted to disavow the en banc’s
exercise of discretion on the substantial merits of her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the first place.

The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the Division that initially dismissed them cannot
serve as a precedent to the disposition of the petitioner’s appeal. A decision or resolution of any adjudicating body can be
disposed in several ways. To sustain petitioner’s argument would be virtually putting a straightjacket on the COMELEC en
banc’s adjudicatory powers.

More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second Division would be unnecessarily circuitous and
repugnant to the rule on preferential disposition of quo warranto cases espoused in Rule 36, Section 15 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.14

II. The COMELEC en banc has the

power to order discretionary
execution of judgment.

We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s submission that the COMELEC en banc has no power to order the issuance of a writ
of execution and that such function belongs only to the court of origin.

There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in view of the fact
that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure.15

Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the
trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron,16 we stressed the import of the provision vis-à-vis election cases when
we held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts
and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

III. Private respondents are not

estopped from questioning
petitioner’s eligibility to hold public
office.

The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010
elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC.

Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two instances where a petition questioning
the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be
raised, to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election; and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. – Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a
sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
(Emphasis ours)

Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the twenty-five
(25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not
leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for
quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code.17

The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code cannot serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto petition under Section
253.

IV. Petitioner is disqualified from

running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens
of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of
the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and
obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing
laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath
of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended
to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens. (Emphasis ours)

Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she
took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual
citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of
Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.

To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to interpret the "sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in conformity with the
intent of the Legislature. She anchors her submission on the statement made by Representative Javier during the floor
deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.

At the outset, it bears stressing that the Court’s duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is exercised only when
the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. As such,
when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for
application.19 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance.

Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to
two or more things at the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must admit of two or more possible
meanings.20

The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, 21 we declared its categorical and single
meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or
she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also
expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit
duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms
that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal,22 when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in
the Philippines, thus:

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or
those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section
3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous
to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking
other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions
of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where
the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel
Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship;

xxxx

The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign
citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections,
Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship. 23 (Citation omitted and italics and underlining
ours)

Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,24 we declared petitioner therein to be disqualified from running for the position of
vice-mayor for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.

We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings to the phrase "sworn renunciation".
The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning and must
thus be read literally.25 The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath.

It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. 26 Even a resort to the Journal
of the House of Representatives invoked by the petitioner leads to the same inference, viz:

INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER

Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is only limited to natural-born Filipinos and not to
naturalized Filipinos.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.

Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides that natural-born Filipinos who have dual
citizenship shall continue to enjoy full civil and political rights. This being the case, he sought clarification as to whether
they can indeed run for public office provided that they renounce their foreign citizenship.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only have to make a personal and sworn renunciation
of foreign citizenship before any authorized public officer.

Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the Bill provides them with full civil and political
rights as Filipino citizens, the measure also discriminates against them since they are required to make a sworn
renunciation of their other foreign citizenship if and when they run for public office. He thereafter proposed to delete this
particular provision.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all doubts regarding any issues that might be
raised pertaining to the citizenship of any candidate. He subsequently cited the case of Afroyim vs. Rusk,
wherein the United States considered a naturalized American still as an American citizen even when he cast his
vote in Israel during one of its elections.
Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different because in voting, one is not required to renounce
his foreign citizenship. He pointed out that under the Bill, Filipinos who run for public office must renounce their foreign
citizenship. He pointed out further that this is a contradiction in the Bill.

Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship and are now entitled to
reacquire their Filipino citizenship will be considered as natural-born citizens. As such, he likewise inquired whether they
will also be considered qualified to run for the highest elective positions in the country.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement is that they make a sworn renunciation of their
foreign citizenship and that they comply with the residency and registration requirements as provided for in the
Constitution.

Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who are citizens at the time of
birth without having to perform an act to complete or perfect his/her citizenship.

Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill seeks the repeal of CA No. 63. The repeal, he
said, would help Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship. With regard then to Section 5
of the Bill, he explained that the Committee had decided to include this provision because Section 18, Article XI of the
Constitution provides for the accountability of public officers.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn renunciation of a foreign citizenship will only become a
pro forma requirement.

On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born Filipino citizens who became foreign citizens
and who have reacquired their Filipino citizenship under the Bill will be considered as natural-born citizens, and therefore
qualified to run for the presidency, the vice-presidency or for a seat in Congress. He also agreed with the observation of
Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the country at the time of birth. He also explained that the
Bill will, in effect, return to a Filipino citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship, the status of being a natural-born citizen
effective at the time he lost his Filipino citizenship.

As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating against naturalized Filipino citizens and Filipino
citizens by election who are all disqualified to run for certain public offices. He then suggested that the Bill be amended by
not considering as natural-born citizens those Filipinos who had renounced their Filipino citizenship and acquired foreign
citizenship. He said that they should be considered as repatriated citizens.

In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take note of the latter’s comments on the matter. He
however stressed that after a lengthy deliberation on the subject, the Committees on Justice, and Foreign Affairs had
decided to revert back to the status of being natural-born citizens those natural-born Filipino citizens who had acquired
foreign citizenship but now wished to reacquire their Filipino citizenship.

Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to a foreigner can
regain her repatriated Filipino citizenship, upon the death of her husband, by simply taking her oath before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair to other Filipino citizens who are not considered
natural-born. He reiterated that natural-born Filipino citizens who had renounced their citizenship by pledging allegiance to
another sovereignty should not be allowed to revert back to their status of being natural-born citizens once they decide to
regain their Filipino citizenship. He underscored that this will in a way allow such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship.

On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the position of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan stated that
this will defeat the purpose of the Bill.

Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenships and later
decided to regain their Filipino citizenship, will be considered as repatriated citizens.

Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme Court had ruled that only naturalized Filipino
citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.

In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those whose mothers are Filipino citizens under the 1935
Constitution and who elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity, are not deemed as natural-born
citizens.

In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case, repatriation results in the recovery of one’s original
nationality and only naturalized citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.

On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of being natural-born citizens to natural-born Filipino
citizens who acquired foreign citizenship, Rep. Libanan remarked that the Body in plenary session will decide on the
matter.27

The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative Javier’s statement; she conveniently disregards
the preceding and succeeding discussions in the records.
The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that Representative Javier’s statement ought to be understood
within the context of the issue then being discussed, that is – whether former natural-born citizens who re-acquire their
Filipino citizenship under the proposed law will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens and thus be qualified
to run for government positions reserved only to natural-born Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the
Congress.

It was Representative Javier’s position that they should be considered as repatriated Filipinos and not as natural-born
citizens since they will have to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Natural-born citizens are
those who need not perform an act to perfect their citizenship. Representative Libanan, however, maintained that they will
revert to their original status as natural-born citizens. To reconcile the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the
principle that natural-born citizens are those who need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship, Representative
Javier suggested that the sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma requirement.

Petitioner’s argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal
requirement only with respect to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a natural-born Filipino so as to override the effect of
the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or
even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and
thereafter run for public office has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.

It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement Section 18, Article XI of the
Constitution on public officers’ primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides:

Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer
or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law.

An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person or thing, that one’s statement is
true or that one will be bound to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if the statement is
untrue or the promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony
is false.28

Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to the prospective public
officer’s abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines.

To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also
accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the
legislature clearly demand otherwise.

Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed to have lost her
citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. 29 To prove a foreign
law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis ours)

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign law may also be
established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the
foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and states that the same was in force at the time
material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the
law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of
practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is
"satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the
Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a competent proof of that law. 30

The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above methods. As uniformly
observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of the law during trial. Also, the
letter issued by the Australian government showing that petitioner already renounced her Australian citizenship was
unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in disregarding the same.
We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence the said letter in view of
the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia attached to the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS)
Member v. Datumanong31 that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern itself with the actual status
of the other citizenship.

This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do so conformably with the
wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the
application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed wise to
require. To do so would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.32

The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian
citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of
candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, 33 such ruling was already adjudged superseded by
the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship.34

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes
does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory
provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.35

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective
office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer
prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. 36 The
rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they
are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office.

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their
citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The
petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration
of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political
right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run
for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6, 2011
of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

19. EN BANC

G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012

EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to review and nullify the Resolution2 dated 2 February 2011 and the
Order3 dated 12 January 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo v. Romeo
D. Lonzanida, docketed as SPA No. 09-158 (DC). The petition asserts that the COMELEC issued the Resolution and
Order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. 4 On 8
December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to
disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that
Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately
prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section
8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution5 and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code6 both prohibit a local elective
official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution7 on 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy. Pertinent portions of the 18 February 2010 Resolution read:

Respondent Lonzanida never denied having held the office of mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than nine
consecutive years. Instead he raised arguments to forestall or dismiss the petition on the grounds other than the main
issue itself. We find such arguments as wanting. Respondent Lonzanida, for holding the office of mayor for more than
three consecutive terms, went against the three-term limit rule; therefore, he could not be allowed to run anew in the 2010
elections. It is time to infuse new blood in the political arena of San Antonio.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Certificate of Candidacy of
Respondent Romeo D. Lonzanida for the position of mayor in the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby
CANCELLED. His name is hereby ordered STRICKEN OFF the list of Official Candidates for the position of Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales in May 10, 2010 elections.

SO ORDERED.8

Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections.
Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed
Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75,
Olongapo City on 5 July 2010.9 On the same date, Aratea wrote the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in
view of Lonzanida’s disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 2010 10 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold
office by reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida’s disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was
deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice
to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration. In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea
requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24
August 2010, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the
[COMELEC]."11

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution12 disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the
May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected
and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been
convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for
each count of falsification to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prisión correccional as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in
the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People,13 before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December
2009. Pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than
three (3) consecutive terms and for having been convicted by a final judgment of a crime punishable by more than one (1)
year of imprisonment, is clearly disqualified to run for the same position in the May 2010 Elections.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.14

On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention.15 She
claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate
when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate
of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 2010 elections.

In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the second
highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet
final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification
resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by
Section 4416 of the Local Government Code to succeed as Mayor.

The COMELEC’s Rulings

The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12 January 2011, stating:

Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention" filed by Estela D. Antipolo
(Antipolo) and pursuant to the power of this Commission to suspend its Rules or any portion thereof in the interest of
justice, this Commission hereby RESOLVES to:

1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion;

2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by Antipolo;

3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN RACEL ARATEA, proclaimed Vice-
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, to file their respective Comments on the Petition-in- Intervention within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days from receipt thereof;

4. SET the above-mentioned Petition-in-Intervention for hearing on January 26, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. COMELEC Session
Hall, 8th Floor, Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros, Manila.

WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for their information and compliance.

SO ORDERED.17

In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc no longer considered Lonzanida’s qualification as an
issue: "It is beyond cavil that Lonzanida is not eligible to hold and discharge the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales. The sole issue to be resolved at this juncture is how to fill the vacancy resulting from Lonzanida’s
disqualification."18 The Resolution further stated:

We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo could never be proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor of Antipolo [sic] for being a second placer in the elections. The teachings in the cases of Codilla vs. De
Venecia and Nazareno and Domino vs. COMELEC, et al., while they remain sound jurisprudence find no application in
the case at bar. What sets this case apart from the cited jurisprudence is that the notoriety of Lonzanida’s disqualification
and ineligibility to hold public office is established both in fact and in law on election day itself. Hence, Lonzanida’s name,
as already ordered by the Commission on February 18, 2010 should have been stricken off from the list of official
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby:

1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of respondent ROMEO D. LONZANIDA;

2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo;

3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to PROCLAIM Intervenor Estela D.
Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales;

4. Orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor,
and to cause a peaceful turn-over of the said office to Antipolo upon her proclamation; and

5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as well as the Regional Election Director of Region III to cause the
implementation of this Resolution and disseminate it to the Department of Interior and Local Government.

SO ORDERED.19

Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February 2011.

The Issues

The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon
the determination of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution and 12 January 2011 Order. They hold that
Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, should be declared Mayor pursuant to the Local
Government Code’s rule on succession.

The dissenting opinions make three grave errors: first, they ignore prevailing jurisprudence that a false representation in
the certificate of candidacy as to eligibility in the number of terms elected and served is a material fact that is a ground for
a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; second, they ignore that a false representation as to
eligibility to run for public office due to the fact that the candidate suffers from perpetual special disqualification is a
material fact that is a ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; and third, they resort to a
strained statutory construction to conclude that the violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for cancellation
of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, even when it is clear and plain that violation of the three-term limit rule is an
ineligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office.

The dissenting opinions tread on dangerous ground when they assert that a candidate’s eligibility to the office he seeks
election must be strictly construed to refer only to the details, i.e., age, citizenship, or residency, among others, which the
law requires him to state in his COC, and which he must swear under oath to possess. The dissenting opinions choose to
view a false certification of a candidate’s eligibility on the three-term limit rule not as a ground for false material
representation under Section 78 but as a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the same Code. This is clearly
contrary to well-established jurisprudence.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes.
Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

Qualifications and Disqualifications

Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for the qualifications of elective local
officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section 40 of the Local Government Code provide in pertinent part:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. ‒ (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city or province x x x; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

xxxx

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or
municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

xxxx

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of
the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code are specifically enumerated:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision
by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration
to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by
this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident
of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied)

A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and possession of a
permanent resident status in a foreign country."20 All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses
under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language
of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v.
de Venecia,21 this Court ruled:

[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. x x x

Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of the crime of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition under Section 68.

False Material Representation

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there
is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address
for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in
the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was thus required to provide 12 items of information in the certificate of
candidacy:22 name; nickname or stage name; gender; age; place of birth; political party that nominated the candidate; civil
status; residence/address; profession or occupation; post office address for election purposes; locality of which the
candidate is a registered voter; and period of residence in the Philippines before 10 May 2010. The candidate also
certifies four statements: a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; a statement that
the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; a statement that the candidate is
eligible for the office he seeks election; and a statement of the candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines.23 The certificate of candidacy should also be under oath, and filed within the period
prescribed by law.

The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from
holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect
upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. The pertinent
provisions of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x

Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prisión mayor and temporary
disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification
is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.

xxxx

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by
popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last
during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence,
according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.
— The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the
offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in
any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.

Art. 42. Prisión mayor — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it that of temporary
absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender
shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon. (Emphasis supplied)

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,24 the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary
absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office.” The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty of prisión mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification
constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run
for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy
that he is eligible to so run.

In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import of the accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification:

On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellee’s conviction of a crime penalized
with prision mayor which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code
disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to
vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal
Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise
of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public
office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence.
Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.
— The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular
election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their respective
antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during
the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the
temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one
period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means according to whether the
penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the convict of the
right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually.”

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of
conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal
penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender
shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the
judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the
time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any
elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for,
any elective public office from the time the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of
conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his
certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 . 26

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because
this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections,27 the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers
from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special
disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly
required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under
Section 78. As this Court explained in Fermin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her
CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to
the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is
empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation,
while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. 28 (Emphasis supplied)

Latasa, Rivera and Ong:

The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility

Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. Thus, Section 74
states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office.” The three-
term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of
choice,29 is found both in the Constitution30 and the law.31 After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an
elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election 32 because he
is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section
74, the word "eligible"33 means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and
none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.

In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,34 petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao
del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality of Digos was converted into the City of Digos during Latasa’s third
term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. Romeo Sunga, Latasa’s opponent, filed
before the COMELEC a "petition to deny due course, cancel certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section
78 on the ground that Latasa falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos
City. Latasa argued that he did not make any false representation. In his certificate of candidacy, Latasa inserted a
footnote after the phrase "I am eligible" and indicated "*Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now
running for the first time as city mayor." The COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasa’s certificate of candidacy for
violation of the three-term limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court affirmed the COMELEC En Banc’s
denial of Latasa’s motion for reconsideration.

We cancelled Marino Morales’ certificate of candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission on Elections (Rivera).35 We held that
Morales exceeded the maximum three-term limit, having been elected and served as Mayor of Mabalacat for four
consecutive terms (1995 to 1998, 1998 to 2001, 2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We declared him ineligible as a
candidate for the same position for the 2007 to 2010 term. Although we did not explicitly rule that Morales’ violation of the
three-term limit rule constituted false material representation, we nonetheless granted the petition to cancel Morales’
certificate of candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed the cancellation of Francis Ong’s certificate of candidacy
in Ong v. Alegre,36 where the "petition to disqualify, deny due course and cancel" Ong’s certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 was predicated on the violation of the three-term limit rule.

Loong, Fermin and Munder:

When Possession of a Disqualifying Condition

is Not a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification
It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for eligibility and
ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may represent that he is a resident of a
particular Philippine locality37 when he is actually a permanent resident of another country. 38 In cases of such overlap, the
petitioner should not be constrained in his choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available
multiple remedies.39 Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the election. Despite the overlap
of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification using grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a
petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.

The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was discussed in Loong v.
Commission on Elections40 with respect to the applicable prescriptive period. Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a
petition under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional Vice-Governor of the
Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to his age. The petition was filed 16 days after
the election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day period from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy. This
Court ruled that Ututalum’s petition was one based on false representation under Section 78, and not for disqualification
under Section 68. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period provided in Section 78 should be strictly applied. We recognized
the possible gap in the law:

It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a certificate of candidacy,
under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the
Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of
the candidate committing the misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the
time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the
Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap"
the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for
the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing
a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which,
according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied.

At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the government to fix a
definite time within which petitions of protests related to eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen
in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called
“procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribe what the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The
question of whether the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide
and remedy.41

In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,42 the issue of a candidate’s possession of the required one-year residency
requirement was raised in a petition for disqualification under Section 68 instead of a petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Despite the question of the one-year residency being a proper ground
under Section 78, Dilangalen, the petitioner before the COMELEC in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and 5(C)(3)(a)(4)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 780043 and filed the petition under Section 68. In Fermin, we ruled that "a COMELEC rule or
resolution cannot supplant or vary legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those
of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds."44 A petition for disqualification can only be
premised on a ground specified in Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. Thus, a petition questioning a candidate’s possession of the required one-year residency requirement, as
distinguished from permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country, should be filed under Section 78, and a
petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy.

In Munder v. Commission on Elections,45 petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Bubong,
Lanao del Sur on 26 November 2009. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip filed a petition for Munder’s disqualification on 13 April
2010. Sarip claimed that Munder misrepresented that he was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he
was eligible to register as a voter in 2003 even though he was not yet 18 years of age at the time of the voter’s
registration. Moreover, Munder’s certificate of candidacy was not accomplished in full as he failed to indicate his precinct
and did not affix his thumb-mark. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Sarip’s petition and declared that his
grounds are not grounds for disqualification under Section 68 but for denial or cancellation of Munder’s certificate of
candidacy under Section 78. Sarip’s petition was filed out of time as he had only 25 days after the filing of Munder’s
certificate of candidacy, or until 21 December 2009, within which to file his petition.

The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the COMELEC Second Division, the COMELEC En
Banc did not rule on the propriety of Sarip’s remedy but focused on the question of whether Munder was a registered
voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court reinstated the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution. This Court ruled that
the ground raised in the petition, lack of registration as voter in the locality where he was running as a candidate, is
inappropriate for a petition for disqualification. We further declared that with our ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected
the claim that lack of substantive qualifications of a candidate is a ground for a petition for disqualification under Section
68. The only substantive qualification the absence of which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 is the candidate’s
permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country.

The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under Section 68 as the
violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from running for public office despite the
possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the [Local Government Code]." In so holding the dissenting
opinions write in the law what is not found in the law. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification
under said Section. The grounds for filing a petition for disqualification under Section 68 are specifically enumerated in
said Section. However, contrary to the specific enumeration in Section 68 and contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, the
dissenting opinions add to the enumerated grounds the violation of the three-term limit rule and falsification under the
Revised Penal Code, which are obviously not found in the enumeration in Section 68.

The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanida’s possession of a disqualifying condition (violation of the three-term limit rule)
with the grounds for disqualification under Section 68. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification:
the commission of specific prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code and possession of a permanent residency or
immigrant status in a foreign country. Any other false representation regarding a material fact should be filed under
Section 78, specifically under the candidate’s certification of his eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the three-term limit as
a condition for eligibility, the dissenting opinions resort to judicial legislation, ignoring the verba legis doctrine and well-
established jurisprudence on this very issue.

In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and thus qualification, to the office
he seeks election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not specifically ask the candidate for the number of
terms elected and served in an elective position, such fact is material in determining a candidate’s eligibility, and thus
qualification for the office. Election to and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a
candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida misrepresented his
eligibility because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term.
Thus, Lonzanida’s representation that he was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material
representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.

Legal Duty of COMELEC

to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification

Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the
convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification
is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch,
but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that
the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because
under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election."46 The disqualification of a convict to run for elective public office under the Revised Penal Code,
as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all the laws"
relating to the conduct of elections.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.47 We
quote from the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution with approval:

As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second Division had already ordered the
cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the list of official candidates for the
mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in its resolution dated August 11, 2010
unanimously affirmed the resolution disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme Court
no less. The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in
our En Banc resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the
three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten
(10) counts of Falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent
Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a
candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the
highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. 48 (Boldfacing
and underscoring in the original; italicization supplied)

Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for
Mayor.1âwphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being
void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who therefore
received the highest number of votes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and the Order dated 12 January 2011
of the COMELEC En Bane in SPA No. 09-158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute
a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales. Petitioner Efren Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of
the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

SO ORDERED.

20. EN BANC
G.R. No. 192221 November 13, 2012

CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOHN LLOYD M. PACETE, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging concerns is the application of the law
on nuisance candidates under a new voting system wherein voters indicate their choice of candidates by shading the oval
corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate printed on the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name on the
appropriate space provided in the ballots as in previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose
certificate of candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in
the official ballots on election day,should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in
favor of the bona fide candidate?

The Case

In this petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 64 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed on May 31, 2010, Casimira S. Dela Cruz (petitioner) assails COMELEC
Resolution No. 88441 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or
whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose names still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists
of candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.

Petitioner prays for the following reliefs:

1. Upon the filing of the instant Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction be
issued enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of Private Respondent John Lloyd Pacete as Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong;

2. After the Petition is submitted for resolution, a decision be rendered granting the instant Petition and:

(a) declaring as null and void the portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 considering as stray the
votes cast in favor of the disqualified nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz;

(b) ordering that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio N. Dela Cruz be counted and tallied in favor of
Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116; and

(c) requiring the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique where the Petitioner’s Election Protest is
pending to proclaim as Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes after the votes in favor of nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz is counted
and tallied to the votes garnered by Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz.

3. Permanently enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of Private Respondent if Petitioner is
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.2

Factual Antecedents

In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, petitioner ran for and was elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan(SB) of
Bugasong, Antique. On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy3 for the position of Vice-Mayor of
the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique under the ticket of the National People’s Coalition (NPC).
Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of candidacy4 for the same position.

On December 6, 2009, petitioner filed a petition5 to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate on the ground that he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position to put the election process in mockery and to cause confusion
among voters due to the similarity of his surname with petitioner’s surname. Petitioner emphasized that she is considered
a very strong candidate for the said position having been elected as member of the SB for three consecutive terms under
the ticket of the NPC and obtained the fifth (2001), fourth (2004) and third (2007) highest number of votes. In contrast,
Aurelio is an unknown in the political scene with no prior political experience as an elective official and no political party
membership. Being a retiree and having no known business, Aurelio has no sufficient source of income but since the
2007 elections petitioner’s opponents have been prodding him to run for the same position as petitioner in order to sow
confusion and thwart the will of the voters of Bugasong. Petitioner further cited Aurelio’s miserable showing in the
previous local elections when he ran and garnered only 126 and 6 votes forthe positionsof SB member (May 2007) and
barangay captain of Barangay Maray, Bugasong (November 2007), respectively. Citing Bautista v. COMELEC, 6 petitioner
asserted that these circumstances clearly demonstrate Aurelio’s lack of a bona fide intention and capability to run for the
position of Vice-Mayor, thus preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution7 declaring Aurelio as a nuisance candidate and
cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position in Bugasong.

Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate, however, his name was not deleted in the Certified List of
Candidates8 and Official Sample Ballot9 issued by the COMELEC. The names of the candidates for Vice-Mayor, including
Aurelio and respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete, appeared on the Official Sample Ballot as follows:

VICE-MAYOR
Vote for not more than 1
O 1. DELA CRUZ, Aurelio N. O 2. DELA CRUZ, Casimira O 3. PACETE, John Lloyd M.
"REL" (IND.) S. "MIRAY" (NPC) "BINGBING" (NP)

Consequently, petitioner filed on March 23, 2010, an Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion10 praying, among other things, that
COMELEC issue an order directing the deletion of Aurelio’s name from the Official List of Candidates for the position of
Vice-Mayor, the Official Ballots, and other election paraphernalia to be used in Bugasong for the May 2010 elections. She
also prayed that in the event Aurelio’s name can no longer be deleted in time for the May 10, 2010 elections, the
COMELEC issue an order directing that all votes cast in favor of Aurelio be credited in her favor, in accordance with
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated May 7, 2001.

On May 1, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 884411 listing the names of disqualified candidates,
including Aurelio, and disposing as follows:

NOW THEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:

1. to delete the names of the foregoing candidates from the certified list of candidates; and

2. to consider stray the votes of said candidates, if voted upon.12 (Emphasis supplied)

On May 10, 2010, the first automated national and local elections proceeded as scheduled. Aurelio’s name remained in
the official ballots.

During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010,
petitioner insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing
Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong13 showed the following
results of the voting:

TOTAL RANK

DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3

DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2

PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1

Consequently, on May 13, 2010, private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by
the MBOC of Bugasong.14

On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique an election protest praying for
(1) the tallying in her favor of the 532 votes cast for Aurelio; (2) the annulment of respondent Pacete’s proclamation as
Vice-Mayor of Bugasong; and (3) her proclamation as winning candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Bugasong.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Considering that private respondent won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes over petitioner’s 6,389 votes, petitioner
contends that she would have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or
added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes. Thus, petitioner insists she would have garnered a total of 6,921 votes as
against the 6,428 votes of private respondent. By issuing a directive to consider the votes cast for Aurelio as stray votes
instead of counting the same in favor of petitioner in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, the COMELEC’s
First Division gravely abused its discretion.

Petitioner argues that Resolution No. 8844 violates her constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because there is
no substantial difference between the previous manual elections and the automated elections conducted in 2010 to justify
non-observance of Resolution No. 4116 issued in 2001,particularly on the matter of votes cast for a candidate who was
declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment where such nuisance candidate has the same name with that of the
bona fide candidate. Moreover, in contrast to the assailed resolution, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 properly recognized
the substantial distinctions between and among (a) disqualified candidates, (b) nuisance candidates whose names are
similar to those of the bona fide candidates, (c) nuisance candidates who do not have similar names with those of the
bona fide candidates, and (d) candidates who had voluntarily withdrawn their certificates of candidacy. As a result of the
failure of the COMELEC’s First Division to make these important distinctions when it issued Resolution No. 8844 that
applies to disqualified candidates, nuisance candidates and all other candidates whose certificates of candidacy had been
cancelled or denied course, petitioner’s right to due process was clearly violated, and only made possible the very evil that
is sought to be corrected by the former rule not to consider the votes cast for the nuisance candidate as stray but count
them in favor of the bona fide candidate.

Respondents’ Arguments

COMELEC maintains that there is a presumption of validity with respect to its exercise of supervisory or regulatory
authority in the conduct of elections. Also, the time-honored rule is that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that
the party assailing it must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving its invalidity. Thus, to strike down a law
as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the law prohibits, the statute permits. In this
case, petitioner miserably failed to prove a clear breach of the Constitution; she merely invokes a violation of the equal
protection clause and due process of law without any basis.

On the claim of equal protection violation, COMELEC contends that there is a substantial distinction between a manual
election where Resolution No. 4116 applies, and an automated election governed by Resolution No. 8844. While the
votes for the nuisance candidate were not considered stray but counted in favor of the bona fide candidate, this is no
longer the rule for automated elections. COMELEC cites the following factors which changed the previous rule: (1) the
official ballots in automated elections now contain the full names of the official candidates so that when a voter shaded an
oval, it was presumed that he carefully read the name adjacent to it and voted for that candidate, regardless of whether
said candidate was later declared disqualified or nuisance; (2) since the names of the candidates are clearly printed on
the ballots, unlike in manual elections when these were only listed in a separate sheet of paper attached to the ballot
secrecy folder, the voter’s intention is clearly to vote for the candidate corresponding to the shaded oval; (3) the rules on
appreciation of ballots under Section 211, Article XVIII of the Omnibus Election Code apply only to elections where the
names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots; and (4) with the use of the automated election system where the
counting of votes is delegated to the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines, pre-proclamation controversies,
including complaints regarding the appreciation of ballots and allegations of misreading the names of the candidates
written, were flaws which the automation rectified. Aside from being germane to the purpose of our election laws,
Resolution No. 8844 is not limited to existing conditions as it is applicable to all persons of the same class even in
succeeding elections, and covered all disqualified and nuisance candidates without distinction.

Lastly, COMELEC asserts there is no violation of the right to due process. For public office is not a property right and no
one has a vested right to any public office.

On his part, private respondent Pacete asserts that petitioner cannot validly claim the votes cast for Aurelio in view of the
rule provided in Section 211 (24) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which cannot be supplanted by Resolution No. 4116. He
also cites an annotation on election law,15 invoking this Court’s ruling in Kare v. COMELEC16 that the aforesaid provision
when read together with Section 72, are understood to mean that "any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose
disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray."

Private respondent also points out the fact that on May 4, 2010, COMELEC caused the publication of Resolution No. 8844
in two newspapers of general circulation in the country. There was thus an earnest effort on the part of COMELEC to
disseminate the information, especially to the voters in Bugasong, Antique, that the name of Aurelio was printed on the
official ballots as one of the candidates for Vice-Mayor. Said voters were amply forewarned about the status of Aurelio’s
candidacy and the consequences that will obtain should he still be voted for. Additionally, the petitioner and Aurelio bear
different first names, female and male, respectively; petitioner and her political party engaged in a massive voter
education during the campaign period, emphasizing to her supporters that she was given the corresponding number ("2")
in the official ballots, and the voters should be very circumspect in filling up their ballots because in case of error in filling
up the same, they will not be given replacement ballots. As to the Judicial Affidavits of those who voted for petitioner
attesting to the fact of mistakenly shading the oval beside the name of Aurelio in the ballots, which was attached to the
petition, petitioner in effect would want this Court to sit in judgment as trier of facts.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court is
whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 17 For a
petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.
There is also grave abuse of discretion when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.18

COMELEC being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its factual findings,
conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this
Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. 19 In this case, Resolution
No. 8844 issued by COMELEC clearly contravened existing law and jurisprudence on the legal effect of declaration of a
candidate as a nuisance candidate, especially in the case of nuisance candidates who have the same surnames as those
of bona fide candidates.

Private respondent argues that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed on COMELEC when it issued Resolution No.
8844 which is simply consistent with the rule laid down in Section 211 (24), Article XVIII and Section 72, Article IX of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Said provisions state:
SEC. 72. Effects of Disqualification cases and priority. -- The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days
before the election in which the disqualification is sought.Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption of office.

SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be
presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors shall
observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the voter’s will:

xxxx

24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment shall be considered as stray and
shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.

Private respondent cites the case of Kare v. COMELEC20 where this Court, construing the above provisions, stated:

According to the Comelec, Section 211 (24) of the OEC is a clear legislative policy that is contrary to the rule that the
second placer cannot be declared winner.

We disagree.

The provision that served as the basis of Comelec’s Decision to declare the second placer as winner in the mayoral race
should be read in relation with other provisions of the OEC. Section 72 thereof, as amended by RA 6646, provides as
follows:

xxxx

When read together,these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose
disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray. The Comelec
misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to disqualification by conviction in a final judgment.

Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final judgment; the law lists other grounds for
disqualification. It escapes us why the Comelec insists that Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those convicted by a
final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the other provisions of the election code. 21 (Emphasis
supplied; italics not ours)

Private respondent thus suggests that regardless of the ground for disqualification, the votes cast for the disqualified
candidate should result in considering the votes cast for him as stray as explicitly mandated by Section 211(24) in relation
to Section 72 of the OEC.

We disagree.

It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to cancel or deny
due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown
to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates,
or other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office
for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or material consideration to influence
or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving
or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 4022 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).

In Fermin v. COMELEC,23 this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a petition to cancel
or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different
rules and have distinct outcomes.

At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a "Section 68"
petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. Private
respondent’s insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a
disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a "Petition for Disqualification," does not persuade the
Court.

xxxx

To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or
Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate
is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can
validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person
whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never
considered a candidate.24 (Additional emphasis supplied)

Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in Section 78 cannot be treated in the
same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what COMELEC did when it applied the rule provided in
Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be considered stray, to those registered candidates whose
COC’s had been cancelled or denied due course. Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was
cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes cast for the
candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered stray?

COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in special action cases,
provides:

This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the commission en banc or division, particularly on special
actions (disqualification cases).

special action cases refer to the following:

(a) petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;

(b) petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;

(c) petition to disqualify a candidate; and

(d) petition to postpone or suspend an election.

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on special action
cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:

(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and executory
after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;

xxx

(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the nuisance candidate has the
same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;

(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate has the
same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and
tallied for the bona fide candidate.

All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed. (Emphasis supplied) 25

The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a final judgment was applied
by this Court in Bautista v. COMELEC26 where the name of the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the same
surname with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on election day because while the COMELEC
rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautista’s COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on
May 13, 1998 or three days after the election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on orders
of the COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are not really stray votes. These
separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a potential
nuisance candidate.

But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet final on electionday, this
Court also considered those factual circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to
only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further
noted that the voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista
as a candidate for mayor.

A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This is, however, not the
situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and other
forms of notification, the voters were informed of the COMELEC’s decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate.27

In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 28 this Court likewise applied the
rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to count them in
favor of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such was issued only after the
elections.

As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably exposes
the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter’s will and frustrates the same. It
may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec
resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the
electorate having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of
election. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter’s will was similarly present in this case, if not worse,
considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or

"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as stray votes, the
invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private respondent’s lead of only 453 votes after the recount. 29

Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of Resolution No.
4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELEC’s
changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant number of votes and
the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez:

Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will
of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona
fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by
the mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the
probability of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to
write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.

The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the May 2010 elections
will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the
apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable,
following the precedent in Bautista. x x x30

COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating
those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and
counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and automated elections validly altered the rules
on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III,
COMELEC opines that these find no application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of ballotsapply only
to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.

The Court is not persuaded.

In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections, political rivals or operators benefited
from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential nuisance
candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full
name of their candidate on the ballot, but still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist. 31

As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same position
and putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system where the
voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the
names of disqualified candidates not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed,
what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates
if the official ballots still carry their names?

We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a
final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate,
notstray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As earlier discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC
under Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal
effect of such cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds
provided in the OEC and Local Government Code.

Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of COC of Aurelio because
COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters’ constructive knowledge of
such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for
Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate, petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of
candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or
eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval
beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer
ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.1âwphi1

Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our
jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities.32 Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance
candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be
prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED. COMELEC
Resolution No. 8844 dated May 1, 2010 insofar as it orders that the votes cast for candidates listed therein, who were
declared nuisance candidates and whose certificates of candidacy have been either cancelled or set aside, be considered
stray, is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Consequently, the 532 votes cast for Aurelio N. Del a Cruz during the elections
of May 10, 2010 should have been counted in favor of Casimira S. Dela Cruz and not considered stray votes, making her
total garnered votes 6,921 as against the 6,428 votes of private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete who was the declared
winner.

Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong,
Province of Antique in the May 10, 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

21. EN BANC

G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013

FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A. ANTONI, AND MAUREEN A.

BIEN, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY ITS
COMMISSIONERS, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
Decision Nos. 2010-0512 and 2011-045,3 dated April 8, 2010 and August 8, 2011, respectively, of
respondent Commission on Audit (CoA) which affirmed Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2008-09-01
(SAT)4 dated September 8, 2008 for the amount of P3,386,697.10 and thereby held petitioners Filomena
G. Delos Santos, Josefa A. Bacaltos, Nelanie A. Antoni, and Maureen A. Bien (petitioners), inter alia,
solidarily liable therefor.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second District of Cebu
City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement5 (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center
(VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr. Eusebio M. Alquizalas (Dr. Alquizalas), Medical Center Chief,
appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health
Program (TNT Program).6 It was agreed, inter alia, that: (a) Cuenco shall identify and recommend the
indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of the TNT Program for an amount not exceeding
P5,000.00 per patient, except those with major illnesses for whom a separate limit may be specified; (b)
an indigent patient who has been a beneficiary will be subsequently disqualified from seeking further
medical assistance; and (c) the hospital shall purchase medicines intended for the indigent patients from
outside sources if the same are not available in its pharmacy, subject to reimbursement when such
expenses are supported by official receipts and other documents. 7 In line with this, Ma. Isabel Cuenco,
Project Director of the TNT Program, wrote8 petitioner Nelanie Antoni (Antoni), Pharmacist V of VSMMC,
requesting the latter to purchase needed medicines not available at the hospital pharmacy from Sacred
Heart Pharmacy or Dell Pharmacy which were supposedly accredited suppliers of the Department of
Health. The said request was approved.9cralaw virtualaw library

The Audit Proceedings

Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions
and referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. On December 14, 2004,
petitioner Filomena G. Delos Santos (Delos Santos), who succeeded 10 Dr. Alquizalas, created, through
Hospital Order No. 1112,11 a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter.

Within the same month, Beatriz M. Booc (Booc), State Auditor IV, who was assigned to audit the hospital,
came up with her own review of the account for drugs and medicines charged to the PDAF of Cuenco. She
furnished Delos Santos the results of her review as contained in Audit Observation Memoranda (AOM)
Nos. 2004-21,12 2004-21B,13 and 2004-21C,14 all dated December 29, 2004, recommending the
investigation of the following irregularities:

a. AOM No. 2004-21 x x x involving fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions for anti-rabies and drugs
costing P3,290,083.29;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

b. AOM No. 2004-21B x x x involving issuance of vitamins worth P138,964.80 mostly to the staff of
VSMMC and TNT Office covering the period January to April 2004; and

c. AOM No. 2004-21C x x x covering fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions for other drugs and
medicines worth P552,853.85 and unpaid falsified prescriptions and referral letters for drugs and
medicines costing P602,063.50.15cralaw virtualaw library

Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee created by Delos Santos submitted its Report16 dated January 18,
2005 essentially affirming the “unseen and unnoticeable” irregularities attendant to the availment of the
TNT Program but pointing out, however, that: (a) VSMMC was made an “unwilling tool to perpetuate a
scandal involving government funds”;17 (b) the VSMMC management was completely “blinded” as its
participation involved merely “a routinary ministerial duty” in issuing the checks upon receipt of the
referral slips, prescriptions, and delivery receipts that appeared on their faces to be regular and
complete;18 and (c) the detection of the falsification and forgeries “could not be attained even in the
exercise of the highest degree or form of diligence”19 as the VSMMC personnel were not handwriting
experts.

In the initial investigation conducted by the CoA, the results of which were reflected in AOM No. 2005-
00120 dated October 26, 2005, it was found that: (a) 133 prescriptions for vaccines, drugs and medicines
for anti-rabies allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P3,407,108.40, and already paid by VSMMC
from the PDAF of Cuenco appeared to be falsified; 21 (b) 46 prescriptions for other drugs and medicines
allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P705,750.50, and already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of
Cuenco likewise appeared to be falsified;22 and (c) 25 prescriptions for drugs and medicines allegedly
issued by Dell Pharmacy costing P602,063.50 were also ascertained to be falsified and have not been paid
by VSMMC.23cralaw virtualaw library

In her Comment/Reply24 to the aforementioned AOM No. 2005-001 addressed to Leonor D. Boado
(Boado), Director of the CoA Regional Office VII in Cebu City, Delos Santos explained that during the
initial stage of the implementation of the MOA (i.e., from 2000 to 2002) the hospital screened,
interviewed, and determined the qualifications of the patients-beneficiaries through the hospital’s social
worker.25 However, sometime in 2002, Cuenco put up the TNT Office in VSMMC, which was run by his own
staff who took all pro forma referral slips bearing the names of the social worker and the Medical Center
Chief, as well as the logbook.26 From then on, the hospital had no more participation in the said program
and was relegated to a mere “bag keeper.”27 Since the benefactor of the funds chose Dell Pharmacy as the
sole supplier, anti-rabies medicines were purchased from the said pharmacy and, by practice, no public
bidding was anymore required.28cralaw virtualaw library

Consequently, a special audit team (SAT), led by Team Leader Atty. Federico E. Dinapo, Jr., State Auditor
V, was formed pursuant to Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO) Order Nos. 2005-019-A dated August 17,
2005 and 2005-019-B dated March 10, 2006 to conduct a special audit investigation with respect to the
findings of Booc and her team.29 Due to time constraints, however, AOM No. 2005-001 was no longer
included in the SAT focus.30 On October 15, 2007, the SAT reported 31 the following findings and
observations:

1. The provision of National Budget Circular No. 476 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the
guidelines on the release of funds for the PDAF authorized under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8760, as
Reenacted (GAA for CY 2001) were not followed;32cralaw virtualaw library

2. Existing auditing law, rules and regulations governing procurement of medicines were not followed in
the [program's] implementation;33cralaw virtualaw library

3. The [program's] implementation did not follow the provisions of the MOA by and between
[Congressman Cuenco] and the Hospital;34 and

4. Acts committed in the implementation of the project were as follows:

a. There were [one hundred thirty-three (133)] falsified prescriptions for anti-rabies vaccines, drugs
and medicines [costing] P3,345,515.75 [allegedly] dispensed by Dell Pharmacy [were] paid by
VSMMC from the [PDAF of Congressman Cuenco];chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
 b. [Forty-six (46) falsified prescriptions] for other drugs and medicines costing P695,410.10 [were
likewise reportedly] dispensed by Dell Pharmacy and paid by VSMMC from the [said PDAF] x x x;
and

c. [Twenty-five (25) prescriptions worth] P602,063.50 [were also claimed to have been] served by
Dell Pharmacy but still unpaid x x x.35cralaw virtualaw library

Examination by the SAT of the records and interviews with the personnel involved showed that the
purported patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was no actual
procedure followed except for the mere preparation of payment documents which were found to be
falsified as evidenced by the following:

1. Thirteen (13) hospital surgeons disowned the signatures on the prescriptions supporting the claims.
Surgeons do not prescribe anti-rabies vaccines; they operate on patients.

2. Almost all of the patients named in the prescriptions were not treated or admitted at the Hospital or in
its Out-patient Department. Those whose names appeared on Hospital records were treated at
different dates than those appearing on the prescriptions:

PATIENT TREATED BILL

Leah Clamon
Nov. 12, 2003 11/11/03

Jean Cañacao
Nov. 30, 2003 11/25/03

Felipe Sumalinog
Dec. 17, 2004 12/10/03

Vicente Perez
Mar. 12, 2004 11/26/03

Vincent Rabaya
Sept. 8, 2003 12/12/03

Rodulfo Cañete
July 24, 2004 01/16/04

3. Full dosages of anti-rabies vaccines were allegedly given to the patients although it is gross error to do
so for these medicines are highly perishable. These should be refrigerated and injected immediately
and periodically. For instance:
a. Mr. Vicente Perez received the full dosage on November 26, 2003 and again on November 27,
2003. (Hospital records showed that Mr. Perez was admitted in March 2003 for surgery.)

b. Mr. Maximo Buaya received the full dosage on January 25 and on February 29, 2004.

c. Mr. Gregorio Rabago received his full dosage on December 6, 2003.

4. The dates of 80 prescriptions for anti-rabies and 45 for other drugs and medicines are earlier than the
dates of the corresponding delivery receipts. The gaps in the dates ranged from 1 to 47 days. On the
other hand, 33 prescriptions for anti-rabies had later dates than the dates of the delivery receipts. The
difference in the dates ranged from 1 to 22 days.

5. The Pharmacy Unit still prepared Purchase Request [PR] for the claims Dell [Pharmacy] submitted to
that office when the PR is no longer necessary as the medicines have already been taken by the
patients.

6. Of the three South District residents personally interviewed by the Team, two denied having sought or
received help from the [TNT] Program or being hospitalized at VSMMC for dog bite.

7. The hospital social worker, Ms. Mergin Acido, declared that she was bypassed in the evaluation of the
alleged patients for the TNT Office has clerks who “evaluate” the eligibility of the patients. The
prescriptions and referral slips were directly forwarded to the Pharmacy Unit for stamping and
submission to the Dell Pharmacy. She had no opportunity then to see the patients personally.

8. Mr. Louies James S. Yrastorza has stated under oath the falsity of the claims for payment. He stated
that he was ordered to submit to the Pharmacy Unit falsified prescriptions accompanied by referral
slips signed by Mr. James Cuenco for non-existing patients. Subsequently, sometime in September
2007 Mr. Yrastorza “clarified” his statements effectively recanting his first oath.
9. The Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor certified that out of the 30 names of the patients
randomly selected, only 15 were found listed in the registered voters' database.

10. Prescriptions were stamped “VSMMC” signed/initialed by the Pharmacist who is off duty as shown by
the attendance record, e.g. Mesdames Arly Capuyan, Norma Chiong, Corazon Quiao, Rowena Rabillas,
and Riza Sei[s]mundo.36cralaw virtualaw library

Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008, the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado, issued ND No. 2008-09-
01,37 disallowing the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies
with falsified prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials,
solidarily liable therefor.38 Petitioners’ respective participations were detailed as follows: (a) for Delos
Santos, in her capacity as Medical Center Chief, for signing and approving the disbursement vouchers and
checks; (b) for petitioner Dr. Josefa A. Bacaltos, in her capacity as Chief Administrative Officer, for
certifying in Box A that the expenses were lawful, necessary and incurred in her direct supervision; (c) for
Antoni, in her capacity as Chief of the Pharmacy Unit, for approving the supporting documents when the
imputed delivery of the medicines had already been consummated; (d) for petitioner Maureen A. Bien, in
her capacity as Hospital Accountant, for certifying in Box B of the disbursement voucher that the
supporting documents for the payment to Dell Pharmacy were complete and proper. 39cralaw virtualaw
library

Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective appeals40 before the CoA which were denied through Decision
No. 2010-05141 dated April 8, 2010, maintaining their solidary liability, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal[s] of Dr. Filomena [G]. Delos Santos, Dr. Josefa A.
Bacaltos, Ms. Nelanie A. Antoni and Ms. Maureen A. Bien [are] hereby DENIED for lack of merit. However,
the appeal of Ms. Corazon Quiao, Ms. Norma Chiong, Ms. Rowena Rabillas and Ms. Riza Seismundo is
hereby given due course. Likewise, Ms. Arly Capuyan who is similarly situated is excluded although she
did not file her appeal. ND No. 2008-09-01 (SAT) dated September 8, 2008 involving the amount of
P3,386,697.10 is hereby affirmed with the modification by excluding therein the names [of[ Ms. Corazon
Quiao, Ms. Norma Chiong, Ms. Rowena Rabillas, Ms. Riza Seismundo, and Ms. Arly Capuyan as persons
liable. The other persons named liable therein, i.e., Ma. Isabel Cuenco and Mr. James R. Cuenco, TNT
Health Program Directors, and Mr. Sisinio Villacin, Jr., proprietor of Dell Pharmacy, and herein
appellants Delos Santos, Bacaltos, Antoni and Bien remain solidarily liable for the
disallowance.42 (Emphasis supplied)
The Motion for Reconsideration43 of the foregoing decision was further denied in Decision No. 2011-
04544 dated August 8, 2011. Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
petitioners solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent,
and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of
government.45cralaw virtualaw library

Corollary thereto, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.
Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and
order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is
only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not
based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism.46 In this case, the Court finds no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CoA in issuing the assailed Decisions as will be discussed below.

The CoA correctly pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply involved in the
implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as such, has acted as
custodian and disbursing agency of Cuenco’s PDAF.47 Further, under the MOA executed between VSMMC
and Cuenco, the hospital represented itself as “willing to cooperate/coordinate and monitor the
implementation of a Medical Indigent Support Program.”48 More importantly, it undertook to ascertain that
“[a]ll payments and releases under [the] program x x x shall be made in accordance with existing
government accounting and auditing rules and regulations.” 49 It is a standing rule that public officers who
are custodians of government funds shall be liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely
guarded against loss or damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in
accordance with the law and existing regulations, and on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary
records.50 However, as pointed out by the SAT, provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC)
47651 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for a congressman’s
PDAF authorized under Republic Act No. 876052 were not followed in the implementation of the TNT
Program, as well as other existing auditing laws, rules and regulations governing the procurement of
medicines.

In particular, the TNT Program was not implemented by the appropriate implementing agency, i.e., the
Department of Health, but by the office set up by Cuenco. Further, the medicines purchased from Dell
Pharmacy did not go through the required public bidding in violation of the applicable procurement laws
and rules.53 Similarly, specific provisions of the MOA itself setting standards for the implementation of the
same program were not observed. For instance, only seven of the 133 prescriptions served and paid were
within the maximum limit of P5,000.00 that an indigent patient can avail of from Cuenco’s PDAF. Also,
several indigent patients availed of the benefits more than once, again in violation of the provisions of the
MOA.54 Clearly, by allowing the TNT Office and the staff of Cuenco to take over the entire process of
availing of the benefits of the TNT Program without proper monitoring and observance of internal control
safeguards, the hospital and its accountable officers reneged on their undertaking under the MOA to
“cooperate/coordinate and monitor” the implementation of the said health program. They likewise violated
paragraph 555 of NBC 476 which requires a “regular monitoring activity” of all programs and projects
funded by the PDAF, as well as Sections 12356 and 12457 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,58 otherwise
known as the “Government Auditing Code of the Philippines” (Auditing Code), which mandates the
installation, implementation, and monitoring of a “sound system of internal control” to safeguard assets
and check the accuracy and reliability of the accounting data.

By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the
disbursement of funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith in the performance of their
respective duties, capitalizing on the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses
in the implementation of the TNT Program were attended by malice or bad faith.

The Court is not persuaded.

Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit
rule that was violated.59 For instance, in Reyna v. CoA60 (Reyna), the Court affirmed the liability of the
public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered claims of good faith, since their actions violated an
explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines’ Manual on Lending Operations. 61 In similar regard, the
Court, in Casal v. CoA62(Casal), sustained the liability of certain officers of the National Museum who
again, notwithstanding their good faith participated in approving and authorizing the incentive award
granted to its officials and employees in violation of Administrative Order Nos. 268 and 29 which prohibit
the grant of productivity incentive benefits or other allowances of similar nature unless authorized by the
Office of the President.63 In Casal, it was held that, even if the grant of the incentive award was not for a
dishonest purpose, the patent disregard of the issuances of the President and the directives of the CoA
amounts to gross negligence, making the [“approving officers”] liable for the refund [of the disallowed
incentive award].64cralaw virtualaw library

Just as the foregoing public officers in Reyna and Casal were not able to dispute their respective violations
of the applicable rules in those cases, the Court finds that the petitioners herein have equally failed to
make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules and regulations, and of their duties
under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF
facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-
rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne
out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. 65 Had there been an internal control system
installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital would have been
prevented from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily,
petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office on
the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that it was his money.66 Neither may deviations, from the
usual procedure at the hospital, such as the admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in the
qualification of the indigent-beneficiaries,67 be justified as “a welcome relief to the already overworked and
undermanned section of the hospital.”68cralaw virtualaw library

In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos’ argument that the practices of the TNT Office were
already pre-existing when she assumed her post and that she found no reason to change the
same69 remains highly untenable. Records clearly reveal that she, in fact, admitted that when she was
installed as the new Medical Center Chief of VSMMC sometime “in the late 2003,” Antoni disclosed to her
the irregularities occurring in the hospital specifically on pre-signed and forged prescriptions.70 Hence,
having known this significant information, she and Antoni should have probed into the matter further, and,
likewise, have taken more stringent measures to correct the situation. Instead, Delos Santos contented
herself with giving oral instructions to resident doctors, training officers, and Chiefs of Clinics not to leave
pre-signed prescriptions pads, which Antoni allegedly followed during the orientations for new
doctors.71 But, just the same, the falsification and forgeries continued, and it was only a year after, or in
December 2004, that Delos Santos ordered a formal investigation of the attendant irregularities. By then,
too much damage had already been done.

All told, petitioners’ acts and/or omissions as detailed in the assailed CoA issuances 72 and as
aforedescribed reasonably figure into the finding that they failed to faithfully discharge their respective
duties and to exercise the required diligence which resulted to the irregular disbursements from Cuenco’s
PDAF. In this light, their liability pursuant to Sections 104 73and 10574 of the Auditing Code, as well as
Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts,75 as prescribed in CoA Circular
No. 2009-006, must perforce be upheld. Truly, the degree of their neglect in handling Cuenco’s PDAF and
the resulting detriment to the public cannot pass unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability
be loosely protected and even rendered illusory.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

22. EN BANC

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division
dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution 2 of
the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S.
passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political
rights and privileges of the United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which
contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10
May 2010 local and national elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner,
attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum
a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport
No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April
2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24
November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21
April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order 13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer
and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number
of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following documents as evidence: 14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin,
all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been
conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating
that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating
that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15
February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered
voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado
is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his
contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement under the Local Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s
act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US
citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind
eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a
passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges
reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance
and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount to a
repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the
Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that
he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Division’s
treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have been
filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a
Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling
argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy
and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful
votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration.
Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been
rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced
or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in
proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive
portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and
ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law, 24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not
later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for
Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as
though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a
pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there
is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier
on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a
naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The
Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case,
respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then
decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his
renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine
passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine
passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the
following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010.
This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet
issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his
control during that time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one
of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be
lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said
principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be
a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case
respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of
his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts
should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States. The
latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous
renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine
citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the
requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he
lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent
obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements
regarding his citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of
votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election
against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest number of
votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex
because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To
apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when
they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado
is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the
COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of
Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the
COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is
disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent
questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number
of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in
the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition
as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent
is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has
yet been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that
Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of
the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not
appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor
prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the
disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for
public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had
therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued
to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009.
The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC,
he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring
before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil
and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust,
there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against
anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place
the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the
oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of
foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and
privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14
April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from
running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would
be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently
represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3)
months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a
Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he
took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport,
the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three
months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he
would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign
citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his
foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his
earlier use of his US passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding
public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the
same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes 45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle
that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible
candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal
president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office.
Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible
in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years
required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election
absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision
that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections
is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court,
after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a
plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the
election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and
counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the
former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it
be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner,
and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case
the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the
personal character and circumstances of a single individual. 48 (Emphasis supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in
contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing
parties are striving for supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to
try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election,
its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his
jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general
election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his
stead. The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general
election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and,
although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some
new and additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered. 49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a
mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an
independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots
and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the
next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he
could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had
the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding
the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor
cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even
becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of
votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty
to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in
Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of
the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We
said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of
interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and
Saya-ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the
realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance
for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around
the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make
an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic
qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that
sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the
petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC
data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory
will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and
employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate
and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects
the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules
are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves
as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce
any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even
more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign
voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are
allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the
laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications
set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC 56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm of
notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated
the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer
to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after
he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from
holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an
American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based
on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position."
The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as
candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted
already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although
made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a
candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2
February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from
running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.