Addressing Competitive

Responses to Acquisitions

David R. King
Svante Schriber

Competitive retaliation is a significant constraint to merger and acquisition performance that has largely been
overlooked by management research. This article employs competitive dynamics theory to explore how
acquisition characteristics impact the risk of competitor retaliation. It then outlines different tactics that
acquiring firms can use to reduce competitor awareness, motivation, and capability associated with retaliation.
It provides managers with a path to improving acquisition performance and also opens new avenues for
research. (Keywords: Competitive Strategy, Mergers & Acquisitions, Strategic Management)

R
esearch consistently shows that acquisitions typically fail to improve
the performance of acquirers, leading to calls for theory development.1
Traditionally, research takes the perspective of firm managers and
defines success or failure of an acquisition by its ability to improve the
competitiveness of the combined firms. Improved competitiveness for an acquirer
can result from entering valuable new markets,2 accessing valuable resources and
capabilities,3 and realizing acquisition benefits during the integration.4 Given recog-
nition that the best time to attack a competitor is when they are distracted by an
acquisition,5 there is surprisingly little research on reactions by external stakeholders
to acquisitions.
In considering external stakeholders, existing research mainly emphasizes the
importance of maintaining positive relations with suppliers6 and customers.7 How-
ever, in competitive industries, any advantages to acquiring firms likely come at the
expense of competitors that are also pursuing competitive advantage. This suggests
that competitors will respond to reduce the benefits to a firm making an acquisition.
Consequently, the ability of managers to predict, prevent, or mitigate the influence of
competitor retaliation to an acquisition can be expected to influence acquisition
performance. Still, the means of predicting or avoiding competitive responses have
not received significant research attention. This article addresses this gap and comple-
ments the interpretation of acquisitions as competitive moves. Acquisitions are met

CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 109
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

by competitor responses that contest the benefits of

David King is an Associate Professor of
Management at the College of Business,
making an acquisition. Further, since acquisitions
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. will vary in their vulnerability to such retaliatory
<drking@iastate.edu> responses, we develop a framework that connects
Svante Schriber is an Assistant Professor acquisition attributes with the likelihood of compet-
of Management at the Stockholm
itor retaliation and tactics to mitigate the effects of
Business School, Stockholm, Sweden.
<svante.schriber@hhs.se> retaliation. In building our framework, we bridge
the traditional separation of research on the periods
before and after an acquisition that are separated by the closing of a deal, when own-
ership and payment transfers occur.8

Case: Telecom Competitive Moves

Acquisition-driven change in the U.S. telecommunications industry over
the last decade illustrates the importance of considering competitive dynamics.
Industry consolidation began in 2004 when Sprint announced it would merge
with Nextel Corporation to increase market share and national coverage. However,
as a highly visible move, the other firms affected by this did not wait to respond to
Sprint’s plans. For example, suppliers with regional alliances to the combining
firms objected to the merger before it happened, forcing Sprint to pay $1.3 billion
in cash for wireless reseller U.S. Unwired in July 2005 to end its injunction blocking
the merger with Nextel.9 The success of this approach spurred additional protests
and settlements that further delayed completion of the Sprint/Nextel combination.
This also corresponds to observations that appealing to regulators is a common
response to telecommunications mergers.10
Direct competitors also responded to Sprint’s announcement. For exam-
ple, SBC (previously Southwestern Bell) announced it would acquire AT&T in
January 200511 in an apparent response to the Sprint/Nextel deal. Interestingly,
due in part to Sprint’s distraction with wireless resellers, the AT&T combination
was able to complete before Sprint’s acquisition of Nextel. This is consistent with
the observation that completing another acquisition is a common response to a rival
firm’s acquisition.12 Other competitive retaliation occurs after an acquisition, since
competitors both feel threatened and sense an opportunity to respond to a rival dis-
tracted by the integration of an acquisition.13
Competitor responses were visible in attempts to poach customers by
advertising to get customers to switch plans. The battles for customers resulting
from the competitive jostling around the acquisitions were called the Wireless
Wars and included incentives for customers to switch providers.14 For example,
in 2005, Sprint compared its plan to other carriers to highlight its unlimited data
plan.15 Competitors reacted vehemently, with AT&T (that had experienced problems
with dropped calls due to high demand)16 using its Cingular division to advertise “the
fewest dropped calls.”17 In addition to investing in advertising, firms can invest in
R&D to develop innovative products while a competitor is focused on integrating
an acquisition.18
Later steps taken by T-Mobile toward AT&T and Sprint are also worth
mentioning. In 2014, AT&T negotiated to buy T-Mobile in an agreement that

110 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

included a $4 billion break-up fee that AT&T paid after regulatory concerns
blocked the combination.19 When the deal with AT&T did not complete, T-Mobile
turned around and negotiated another deal with Sprint that included a $2 billion
break-up fee in another merger that was not approved.20 This suggests competitors
can also drive up the price paid or negotiate concessions from an acquirer. It also
highlights the need to move early to make acquisitions at the start of industry consol-
idation. Finally, it shows that the consolidation in the U.S. telecommunications
industry was not a smooth, incremental process where the most attractive targets
were acquired and integrated without interruption.
Instead, this description shows that an understanding of consolidation in
the U.S. telecommunications is incomplete without considering the competitor
reactions that challenged an acquirer’s ability to improve performance. Acquiring
firm managers were not left undisturbed to create value either before completion
of the deal or during integration after the acquisition. The case shows acquisitions
involve multiple competitor interactions that required different tactics. Altogether,
the case underscores how not considering competitive dynamics surrounding
acquisitions risks lower performance. It also highlights the need for a framework
that analyzes the competitive dynamics surrounding acquisitions.

A Competitive Perspective of Acquisitions

In competitive markets, benefits gained by one firm often come at the
expense of external stakeholders that are not merely passive observers. Although
research generally assumes acquisitions improve an acquirer’s competitive posi-
tion, explicit attention to how external stakeholders react to acquisitions remains
limited. An exception involves recent research examining acquisitions from the
perspective of competitive dynamics.21 Traditionally, competitive dynamics theory
focuses on competitor characteristics to predict the likelihood that competitors will
respond to a strategic move.22 There appears to be great potential in building on this
and related research that suggests firms can shape their competitive environment
to more favorable conditions23 to outline decisions in acquisitions that can lower
the likelihood of competitive responses.
By developing a perspective of competitive dynamics surrounding acquis-
itions, we shift the dominant perspective in acquisition research that examines
the potential and realized value from a combination of acquirer and target
firms24 to considering the risk of competitor responses designed to lower the per-
formance of an acquirer. Our approach develops insights from competitive dynamics
to identify tactics that can minimize the risk of competitive responses to an acquisition,
and we organize them around the Awareness-Motivation-Capability framework.25
Although the risk of efficient retaliation is highest when these three factors interact,26
we summarize the different conditions of competitive dynamics surrounding acquisi-
tions and draw on acquisition research to suggest tactics that can be combined to miti-
gate competitive retaliation.
§ Awareness describes how visible an acquisition is to competitors and other
stakeholders. Though it is difficult to predict competitive behavior27 in consid-
ering the risk of competitor responses, more visible strategic moves increase

CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 111
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

the likelihood of competitive responses. Although great care is often taken to

keep an acquisition secret during negotiations, acquisition announcements
involve some information disclosure driven by legal requirements, and
acquirers often seek media attention.28 As a result, acquisitions rank among
the most visible strategic moves a firm can make. Acquisition disclosures to
regulators and investors also often outline an acquirer’s strategic logic to justify
the premium paid. Consequently, tactics to lower competitor awareness are
important since they reduce the risk of competitive responses.
§ The Motivation of competitors and stakeholders in responding to acquisi-
tions vary. For example, competitors perceiving minor impacts from
acquisitions will be less likely to cross a threshold perceived as requiring
a competitive response. Conversely, an acquisition with a large impact,
such as taking a substantial position in a market, is more likely to garner
a response.29 This remains true even if deterrents to competitive responses
are present.30 This suggests there are benefits from making acquisitions
that appear to have fewer impacts on competitors.
§ Importantly, the Capability of competitors, even if aware and motivated, to
retaliate is not constant for different firms or acquisitions. For example, the
willingness or confidence of a given competitor to arrange an effective
response will vary and might be difficult to predict.31 Less ambiguous are
the characteristics of a focal acquisition that impacts the capability of compet-
itors to respond. For instance, an aspect of acquisitions that make them more
vulnerable to retaliation is the time available to launch a response,32 with
additional time to complete an acquisition and longer integration increasing
the likelihood of competitor retaliation.
Our integration of competitive dynamics and acquisition research offers two
primary contributions. First, competitive dynamics is highly relevant to acquisitions
and it shows that acquisitions are vulnerable to retaliation in different ways.
Acquisitions are typically publicly announced, strategic in nature, and involve
investing substantial financial and managerial resources.33 This means competitors
react to reduce the benefits from completing an acquisition. In other words, tactics
to avoid and mitigate competitive responses to acquisitions represents an important
managerial consideration. Second, assessing the unique risk profile of a prospective
acquisition provides managers relevant information for evaluating target firms and
estimating acquisition performance. For example, considering competitor perspec-
tives using the Awareness-Motivation-Capability framework allows a repeatable
and structured approach to compare the risk of competitive responses.34 As a result,
considering competitor responses as part of a firm’s acquisition processes could
benefit acquirer performance by capturing more of the value from an acquisition.35
Although they are interrelated,36 we assess the risk of competitor retaliation
using the Awareness, Motivation, and Capability dimensions of competitive dynam-
ics before and after an acquisition completes. The opportunities for competitors to
intervene differ significantly before and after the completion of an acquisition. Before
an acquisition, acquirers typically assess their need for acquisitions in relation to their
overall strategy, and then begin the search and evaluation of targets, deal negotiation,
and the completion of due diligence. Competitor responses before an acquisition

112 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

include appealing to government regulators and driving up the price paid. The com-
pletion of an acquisition transfers ownership, and it is followed by organizational
change, such as structural, procedural and legal, cultural, and identity integration.37
Competitor responses after an acquisition include retaliatory price changes, complet-
ing a follow-on acquisition, as well as poaching employees and customers.38

Considering and Mitigating Competitor Responses to

Acquisitions
We outline ten tactics relating to the period of target selection, negotiation,
and regulatory and shareholder approval before an acquisition completes, and five
tactics during acquisition integration. These tactics increases the ability to avoid
competitive retaliation and improve acquisition outcomes, and they are summa-
rized in Table 1.

Before: Awareness
Confidentiality
Acquisitions that do not merit the attention of competitors are less likely to
experience retaliation. While most acquirers pay attention to confidentiality, we
have spoken with executives who have learned about competitor’s plans from
information left on whiteboards, corporate aircraft flight plans, or conversations
overheard in public. Having this information gave competitors early knowledge
of an acquisition that they used to their benefit. This suggests maintaining confi-
dentiality should be a priority. In addition, media attention surrounding an
acquisition’s announcement can tempt managers to reveal more than is beneficial
from a competitive standpoint. This requires a delicate balance between outlining

TABLE 1. Tactics Addressing Competitive Retaliation Surrounding Acquisitions

Awareness Motivation Capability

Before Completion Before Completion Before Completion

§ Focus on confidentiality
§ Work actively with deception § Aim for fragmented industries
regarding strategic intent
§ Faster completion give compet-
itors less time to form a
coherent view of an acquisition
§ Blend strategic moves to
reduce competitor awareness
§ Aim for growing industries
§ Target asymmetric acquisitions
§ Aiming for early acquisitions
in industry restructuring makes
competitors less able to
respond successfully
§ Secure toe-hold investments to
reduce competitor capability to
respond efficiently
§ Pursue friendly deals

After Completion After Completion After Completion

§ Focus on information § Nurture a portfolio of acquisi- § Build long-term acquisition
management tions capabilities
§ Scan the competitive landscape
continuously
§ Pursue related acquisitions

CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 113
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

sources of synergy necessary to address shareholder concerns and the risk of

revealing plans to competitors.39 If an option, firms can limit press coverage or
weigh the benefits of media coverage against the risks of revealing strategic aims.
For example, private firms have the luxury of not publicizing details in order to
make them less visible. Consciously addressing confidentiality lowers the initial
awareness of a proposed acquisition and limits the time available for others to
plan a response to it. One option is to leverage personal networks to provide
increased discretion that can limit visibility to competitors. For example, Cisco
depends on contacts between executives to monitor technology change and facili-
tate acquisitions.40

Deception
If avoiding leaking information is one option, actively providing informa-
tion to deceive external stakeholders is another. Applying a policy of ambiguous
communication entails allowing multiple interpretations of the same message.41
Managers can work to increase ambiguity for competitors by presenting multiple
possible interpretations of the intent behind an acquisition. Although it is more
difficult to accomplish for public companies, one political strategy to marginalize
a stakeholder is to distract them with additional and inconsistent information that
can make the intent of an acquisition more ambiguous following its announce-
ment.42 Misinformation might also offer opportunities in immature industries
where news of an acquisition might not stir awareness of a growing threat.

Faster Completion
The time to complete an acquisition reflects the time between an acquisi-
tion’s announcement and the day firms combine into a single legal entity. To the
extent that less time is provided for competitors to react, a competitive response will
be less likely.43 Although limiting concessions during negotiations may achieve a
better deal, it risks prolonged completion and higher competitor awareness. While
faster completion might leave less time for due diligence, it also has the advantages
of lowering uncertainty for employees, suppliers, and customers of a combined
firm, as well as accelerating the realization of an acquisition’s benefits.44

Blend Moves
When the link between an acquirer’s strategic moves and long-term goals
are ambiguous, it is possible to enjoy improved performance.45 At the same time,
acquisitions inherently reveal firm strategy by virtue of involving significant and
largely non-reversible resource allocations—both in terms of the type of resources
or markets strived for and in potentially signaling acquisitions as a preferred
growth strategy. By making acquisition goals more ambiguous, managers can gain
more time to achieve benefits from an acquisition by making it more difficult for
competitors to analyze the true goals of the acquisition and to implement an effec-
tive response. Blending acquisitions with other strategic moves may make a firm’s
strategic intent and options less obvious.
Multiple, smaller moves can also lower competitor awareness. This is compa-
rable to the analogy of a frog staying in water that is slowly brought to a boil. Smaller

114 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

acquisitions or a blend of strategic moves that do not cross the threshold for a com-
petitor response may desensitize competitors or make it less alarming. For example,
IBM’s diversification with the acquisition of Rolm in 1984 resulted from a series of
moves that led to anticipation of IBM making an acquisition.46 In this circumstance,
a blend of moves sensitized competitors to an acquisition. It is also possible that a
blend of strategic moves offers the opportunity of making it more difficult to decipher
a firm’s strategic intent. Either circumstance is likely to make a single acquisition
(strategic move) less noteworthy to competitors. Thus, even if past acquisitions
reveal selection heuristics that could be used to predict future acquisitions,47 blend-
ing strategic moves may reduce competitor awareness of a firm’s overall intent.

Before: Motivation
Growing Industries
While industry growth can have a positive net effect on the performance of
any firm, acquirers can benefit from a more benevolent environment. When the
size of an industry is growing, there will be less concern that an acquisition will
take away from competitors. Meanwhile, acquisitions in a consolidating industry
environment will increase the stress of remaining competitors already concerned
with market share and even survival. As a result, it may be better to target grow-
ing industries for an acquisition, as contracting industries display increased com-
petitive responses.48 In general, acquisitions in a growing industry will experience
lower competitive retaliation, as investments by firms focus more on improving indi-
vidual results and less on decreasing the performance of rivals.49

Fragmented Industries
While targets in concentrated industries may offer an immediately estab-
lished position to would-be acquirers, it is unlikely these firms can be purchased
without a high premium or other complications, including regulatory oversight.
Depending on the regulatory environment, concentration of the industry, and size
of combining firms, acquisitions in the same industry may require government
approval. With fewer competitors, each competitor in a concentrated market has
more at stake, increasing motivation to respond to an acquisition. For example,
All Nippon Airways, which enjoyed a 50 percent domestic market share in Japan,
protested that the 2001 announced merger of Japan Airlines and Japan Air System
would reduce competition, driving concessions before the deal was completed in
2002.50 All Nippon Airway’s response to the proposed merger of its rivals reflected
its high stakes and the simple act of protesting reduced the advantages available to
its merging rivals. In contrast, competitor retaliation will be less when acquisitions
occur in a fragmented industry. For example, Nordic lock and security firm Assa
Abloy’s successful global growth through repeated acquisitions can largely be
explained by its operating in a fragmented industry where each acquisition repre-
sented only a gradual increase in competitor motivation to respond.

Target Asymmetric Acquisitions

Competitors are not always inclined to retaliate. Another reason involves
mutual forbearance, or a lowered willingness to retaliate due to the threat of the

CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 115
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

effected competitor responding in another market.51 This suggests that the motiva-
tion to engage in competitive jostling is not always balanced, but can be asymmetric
with one competitor being relatively more vulnerable than another.52 An acquisi-
tion that targets an area where competitor retaliation is restrained may achieve
higher performance, even if the competitor is aware of the move. However, it is
possible that change, such as an acquisition, may disrupt forbearance.53 As a result,
an acquirer should have a clear understanding of its position relative to competitors
in markets beyond the industry targeted for an acquisition in order to benefit from
competitive asymmetry.

Before: Capability
Early Acquisitions
Acquisitions occur in waves, and when consolidation first begins in an indus-
try, early acquirers are able to pick the best targets. For example, Lockheed Corpora-
tion’s acquisition of General Dynamics’ aircraft division in 1993 occurred early in
that decade’s defense industry consolidation and it involved one of the strongest air-
craft product lines and production facilities.54 Although opportunities can come from
competitors divesting assets following an acquisition,55 research suggests that early
acquirers benefit from first-mover advantages that keep resources from a rival.56
Further, early acquisitions receive less regulatory oversight, and at the same time
they may preclude later acquisitions due to increased competition concerns. This
occurred with the 1995 acquisition of Scott Paper by Kimberly-Clark that contributed
to losses by competitors who were prevented from pursuing consolidation.57
When valuable to multiple competitors, resources acquired by early mov-
ers will put late movers at a disadvantage, resulting in a race to acquire better
resources,58 as exemplified by a five-way “takeover frenzy” in the U.S. healthcare
industry that became public in June 2015.59 The implications of losing these races
can be significant. For example, competitor share prices have been found to fall
significantly when acquisition announcements state others lost the race to acquire
a target.60 Further, follow-on acquisitions used to retaliate to an acquisition in an
industry have been found to be associated with lower performance.61

Toe-Hold Investments
Small investments with an equity or non-equity alliance or minority acqui-
sition enable testing the waters for a full acquisition with lower risk. A minority
acquisition (purchasing less than 50 percent of a target) can help overcome infor-
mation asymmetry and valuation concerns to avoid the “lemons problem” of
adverse selection in a later, full acquisition.62 While they can make competitors
aware of a firm’s intentions, small investments have the advantage of previewing
a target and make an acquisition less urgent by reducing the chance of a compet-
ing bid.63 Google appears to have taken the pursuit of advanced information with
small investments one step further by exploring partnerships with private equity
firms to help identify and structure acquisitions of privately held firms that com-
petitors are less likely to disrupt.64 Additionally, prior interactions may facilitate
integration. This suggests toe-hold investments can reduce competing bids by
competitors designed to disrupt an acquisition before it completes.65

116 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

Friendly Deals
There are advantages of acquiring a target that wants to be acquired. When
a target is open to an acquisition, there is an increased chance that integration
resulting in a combined firm will be easier and faster.66 In contrast, managers
attempting hostile acquisitions risk higher premiums to overcome resistance to
completion of a deal, as well as inviting competing bids that drive up acquisition
premiums associated with firms that win competing bids risking a “winner’s curse”
from paying a price higher than justified.67 Integration of hostile deals can also be
complicated by higher personnel turnover.68 Though there is less turnover of target
managers in a friendly deal, target managers often still feel taken advantage of in an
acquisition.69 Steps taken by an acquiring firm to maintain the support of target firm
managers can improve acquisition outcomes.70 While acquirers need to consider the
conditions following an acquisition that influence competitor success in reducing
planned benefits from making an acquisition, competitors are less capable of interfer-
ing with friendly (vs. hostile) deals before an acquisition.

After: Awareness
Information Management
Limiting information available about a firm’s integration plans can increase
competitor uncertainty. Typically, employees will want to understand the implications
of an acquisition driving the need to reduce their uncertainty following an acquisition.
Failure to provide sufficient information correlates with employee dissatisfaction and
turnover that can enable competitor poaching of employees.71 Meanwhile, providing
employees with information on different scenarios that allows for vagueness and mul-
tiple interpretations can facilitate change.72 Limiting disclosure of specifics can also
limit publicly available information on plans that competitors could then disrupt.
Additionally, ambiguity may facilitate integration by allowing multiple employee per-
spectives to coalesce around a common understanding.73 A successful balance toward
information disclosure and ambiguity relates to governments classifying information
on a “need to know” basis. To the extent competitors can disrupt plans, what is
intended with an acquisition should be kept out of the public arena.

After: Motivation
Portfolio of Acquisitions
Managers have fewer options to alter the motivation of a competitor to respond
once an acquisition has taken place. Still, making an acquisition part of a portfolio or a
series of smaller acquisitions will entail less risk than a large acquisition by spreading a
firm’s investment across multiple acquisitions. Pacing the rate at which acquisitions
are made offers additional advantages. First, it reduces indigestion problems by allow-
ing managers to focus on integrating the target to enable better acquisition outcomes
than possible with concurrent acquisitions.74 Second, smaller acquisitions also offer
the benefit of reducing competitor motivation to respond by having less at stake.
Finally, small acquisitions enable faster integration that can give competitors less time
to respond effectively. These advantages contrast with the risk and threat posed by
merger of equals that generally do not end well (e.g., Daimler-Chrysler; AOL and Time
Warner).

CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 117
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

After: Capability
Build Capabilities
Firms with developed organizational acquisition capabilities are better at
integrating firms. However, building an acquisition capability requires consistent
and varied acquisition experience to help managers know when prior experience
applies.75 A long-term commitment to ensure that capabilities to complete an
acquisition exist is needed prior to engaging in acquisition activity, but this begins
with codifying experience after an acquisition.76 In addition, by considering com-
petitor retaliation to reduce the benefits of an acquisition, the primary benefit
from a firm having an acquisition capability comes from reducing retaliation after
an acquisition completes.
There are several reasons an acquisition capability can help firms mitigate
competitor retaliation. First, acquisitions by firms with developed acquisition
capabilities experience more positive investor responses.77 Positive stakeholder
responses carry over to integration to facilitate reaching acquisition goals more
quickly. For example, Cisco’s reputation from making acquisitions facilitates its
negotiations with and integration of target firms.78 Second, more capable
acquirers will have processes in place to enable reaching agreement on a deal
quickly. This is illustrated by the agreement to combine Lockheed Corporation
and General Dynamic’s aircraft division in 1993, only 27 days after the first meet-
ing by the CEOs.79 Third, faster integration minimizes disruption to employees
and customers and prolongs the time that benefits are enjoyed before competitors
respond. Although speed must be weighed against internal, socio-cultural consid-
erations,80 speed can limit the ability of competitors to respond by accelerating the
value creation from an acquisition. For instance, competitor adjustments can
begin to deteriorate the benefits from making an acquisition a year after the
acquisition.81 A clear advantage of having developed acquisition routines then
relates to reducing competitors’ capability to retaliate to an acquisition by swiftly
achieving planned benefits. This explains the emphasis by General Electric on
the first 100 days following an acquisition.82 Finally, an acquisition capability
can include routines for responding to competitors, or serve as a form of deter-
rence.83 The risks of competitive retaliation can be reduced if firms invest in
developing capabilities from acquisition experience.

Related Acquisitions
Relatedness also impacts the degree of influence that competitors can exert
over the integration process. Relatedness is closely intertwined with the type of
gains attributable to acquisitions. For example, related acquisitions are motivated
by increased efficiency and economies of scale that are viewed as an aggressive
move to lower costs, thus motivating competitor responses. However, competitor
influence over cost reductions associated with reducing duplication in related
acquisitions are more limited and provide smaller vulnerability to competitive
responses. Thus, even if the impact of related acquisitions is more visible, antici-
pated benefits are less open to competitor retaliation. In comparison, for unrelated
acquisitions, the benefits from the differences between acquirer and target rely on
creating unique customer offerings.84 As a result, new or multimarket competitors

118 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

are better able to respond to unrelated acquisitions where benefits from an acqui-
sition depend on customer acceptance that is sensitive to retaliation.85

Continuous Scanning
Military history underscores the benefit of continued reconnaissance. Sim-
ilarly, managers need to avoid thinking that the competitive pressures that drive
acquisitions recede following the completion of an acquisition, and they should
avoid overly focusing their attention on internal integration issues. Continued
scanning of a firm’s environment for opportunities and competitive threats will
continue to be necessary, as competitor responses to an acquisition will be less
public, eliciting the need to actively scan for them. Adjusting integration to mini-
mize or avoid the damage of competitive retaliation depends on established pro-
cesses for continuous environmental scanning, and it is comparable to firms
earning a reputation as “acquirer of choice” in their industries. Specifically, firms
with a demonstrated understanding of the competitive dynamics surrounding
acquisitions may also develop a reputation for vigorously defending their acquisi-
tion profits, which reduces competitor motivation to retaliate.

Discussion
The success or failure of an acquisition is defined by its ability to improve
the competitiveness of the involved firms. Our combination of acquisition and
competitive dynamics research illustrates how improving the success of acquisi-
tions depends not only on pursuing benefits, but also mitigating the risk and
effects of competitor retaliation. Our integration of acquisition and competitive
dynamics research demonstrates that a traditional focus on the pre-acquisition
strategic fit or post-acquisition integration between firms is incomplete, and that
research attention must also begin to consider the competitive environment sur-
rounding an acquisition. Importantly, our framework also shows that acquiring
firm managers can combine different tactics to lower competitor awareness, moti-
vation, and/or capability to retaliate.
While we have treated each phase and element of the Awareness-Motivation-
Capability framework separately for analytical reasons, they are highly intertwined in
most real-world competitive situations. Actions before acquisitions have repercus-
sions after they are completed, as well as integration efforts that influence competitor
willingness to respond in subsequent acquisitions or that even impact the willingness
of firms to be acquired. For instance, some tactics can be expected to be mutu-
ally reinforcing, such as a focus on confidentiality before completion usually
being followed by careful information management that also works in favor of
reducing competitor awareness after completion. However, the effects of differ-
ent strategic actions can be expected to partly contradict one another. For
example, blending strategic moves to reduce competitor awareness before com-
pletion can reduce the organization’s ability to develop acquisition capabilities
that depend on repeated use of acquisitions.86
The interaction effects between tactics are usually idiosyncratic to each
particular deal and its competitive environment. Put differently, not only does it

CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 119
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

matter that no two acquisitions are alike,87 the competitive landscape and poten-
tial for retaliation will also be unique for each acquisition. For example, actions
made by larger firms are more visible and are more likely to drive competitor
retaliation.88 However, larger competitors tend to announce responses quickly
as a signal to protect their image, but they are then slow to implement them.89
The consequence is that the tactics need to be balanced against each other into an
overall acquisition strategy. While selection based on pre-acquisition characteristics
of combining firms remains important and can influence competitor retaliation to
an acquisition, anticipating improved acquisition performance from pre-acquisition
characteristics likely relates to a necessary but not sufficient condition. Instead,
improved acquisition performance depends on managing both internal organiza-
tional processes with external competitive dynamics. To the extent that a combined
focus on internal and external (as well as pre-acquisition and post-acquisition) con-
siderations is achieved, managers will realize more of the gains expected from an
acquisition for their firms and shareholders.
Research clearly shows that acquisitions, on average, do not create value.90
Mainly, research has focused on factors internal to combining firms, including poor
strategic fit or problems during integration. However, additional insight can be gained
from considering factors external to the involved organizations. While prior acquisi-
tion research has pointed to dynamics in business relations, little explicit attention has
been given to competitor retaliation to acquisitions. This is curiously at odds with the
dominant strategic perspective that acquisitions can contribute to competitive advan-
tage and represent a strategic move by firms. As a result, our consideration of the
competitive dynamics surrounding acquisitions, as well as our identifying the factors
that influence it, offers a more balanced perspective for acquisition theory.

Managerial Implications
Our framework aims to complement and not compete with current manage-
rial advice. We have outlined some tactics that can be employed to reduce the risk of
competitive retaliation to acquisitions in a framework that can be applied by manag-
ers to different acquisitions. Still, complete competitor passivity to acquisitions is
unlikely for acquisitions motivated by strategic benefits. Therefore, developing an
acquisition capability requires channeling competitor retaliation—both potential
and realized—into manageable risks. Acquisition strategy then needs to consider
which risks of specific competitive moves can be managed, and which remaining
risks are acceptable. Additionally, implementation also needs to consider what rea-
sonably can be achieved given typically strained managerial resources during an
acquisition.91 This leads us to offer managers two sets of balancing recommendations
that, if managed properly, will increase the likelihood of acquisition success:
§ Balance the effects of different tactics to avoid competitor retaliation. When combined,
the effects of different tactics can be symbiotic or antagonistic. Forming a coherent
competitive acquisition strategy can reduce the risk of competitive retaliation,
prepare responses to unavoidable competitive moves, and increases manager
overall awareness of risks surrounding an acquisition. When successful, this

120 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

balance reduces the risk of competitive retaliation and improves acquisition

performance.
§ Balance consideration of the internal characteristics of combining firms with attention
on external competitive dynamics. Attention to internal processes should be
considered in tandem with competitive dynamics. For example, a target
might offer smooth integration through a high level of cultural fit, but dis-
play increased risk of competitor motivation to retaliate. Competitor retali-
ation can help to explain the reasons that the anticipated benefits of an
acquisition that only considers internal characteristics are not consistently
successful. Adding consideration of external competitive dynamics around
an acquisition will improve acquisition performance in a way that comple-
ments the existing internal considerations of the combining firms.

Notes
1. Jerayr Haleblian, Cynthia E. Devers, Gerry McNamara, Mason A. Carpenter, and Robert
B. Davison, “Taking Stock of What We Know about Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review
and Research Agenda,” Journal of Management, 35/3 (June 2009): 469-502.
2. Gwendolyn K. Lee and Marvin B. Lieberman, “Acquisition vs. Internal Development as Modes
of Market Entry,” Strategic Management Journal, 31/2 (February 2010): 140-158.
3. Marianna Makri, Michael Hitt, and Peter Lane, “Complementary Technologies, Knowledge
Relatedness, and Invention Outcomes in High Technology Mergers and Acquisitions,” Strategic
Management Journal, 31/6 (June 2010): 602-628.
4. Eero Vaara, Riikka Sarala, Günter Stahl, and Ingmar Björkman, “The Impact of Organizational
and National Cultural Differences on Social Conflict and Knowledge Transfer in International
Acquisitions,” Journal of Management, Studies, 49/1 (January 2012): 1-27.
5. Christine Meyer, “Value Leakages in Mergers and Acquisitions: Why They Occur and How
They Can Be Addressed,” Long Range Planning, 41/2 (April 2008): 197-224.
6. Junichi Kato and Richard Schoenberg, “The Impact of Post-Merger Integration on the Customer-
Supplier Relationship,” Industrial Marketing Management, 43/2 (February 2014): 335-345.
7. Helén Anderson, Virpi Havila, and Asta Salmi, “Can You Buy a Business Relationship?” Indus-
trial Marketing Management, 30/7 (October 2001): 575-586.
8. Florian Bauer and Kurt Matzler, “Antecedents of M&A Success: The Role of Strategic Com-
plementarity, Cultural Fit, and Degree of Speed of Integration,” Strategic Management Journal,
35/2 (February 2014): 269-291.
9. Colin Haley, “Sprint Pays $1.3B for US Unwired,” IT BusinessEdge, July 11, 2005, <www.
internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3519011>.
10. Pankaj Ghemawat and Fariborz Ghadar, “The Dubious Logic of Global Megamergers,” Harvard
Business School, October 2, 2000, <http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/1718.html>.
11. Andrew Leonard, “Be Very Afraid of AT&T Merger,” Chicago Sun-Times, May 19, 2014, <http://
chicago.suntimes.com/uncategorized/7/71/213536/be-very-afraid-of-att-merger/>.
12. Thomas Keil, Tomi Laamanen, and Rita McGrath, “Is a Counterattack the Best Defense? Com-
petitive Dynamics through Acquisitions,” Long Range Planning, 46/3 (June 2013): 195-215.
13. Rikard Larsson and Sydney Finkelstein, “Integrating Strategic, Organizational, and Human
Resource Perspectives on Mergers and Acquisitions: A Case Survey of Synergy Realization,”
Organization Science, 10/1 (January/February 1999): 1-26.
14. Paul R. La Monica, “Wireless War: Consumers Win, Investors Lose,” CNN Money, December 12,
2014, <http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/12/investing/wireless-carrier-price-wars/>.
15. <www.youtube.com/watch?v=iaZjiUA1Uco>.
16. Fred Vogelstein, “Bad Connection: Inside the iPhone Network Meltdown,” Wired, July 19,
2010, <www.wired.com/2010/07/ff_att_fail/>.
17. <www.youtube.com/watch?v=f23zk8CmB9E >.
18. Giovanni Valentini, “The Impact of M&A on Rivals’ Innovation Strategy,” Long Range Planning
(in press, online March 19, 2015), <www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002463011
5000175>.

CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 121
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

19. “AT&T Ends Bid To Add Network Capacity Through T-Mobile USA Purchase,” AT&T press
release, December 19, 2011, <www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=22146&cdvn=news&new-
sarticleid=33560&mapcode=corporate%7Cwireless-networks-general>.
20. “Sprint and T-Mobile USA Agree to $2 Billion Break-Up Fee if Merger Fails,” Cellular News,
June 15, 2014, <www.cellular-news.com/story/Business/66322.php>.
21. Keil, Laamanen, and McGrath, op. cit.
22. Ming-Jer Chen, “Competitor Analysis and Interfirm Rivalry: Toward a Theoretical Integration,”
Academy of Management Review, 21/1 (January 1996): 100-134.
23. Rita Gunther McGrath, Ming-Jer Chen, and Ian C. McMillan, “Multimarket Maneuvering in
Uncertain Spheres Of Influence: Resource Diversion Strategies,” Academy of Management
Review, 23/4 (October 1998): 724-740.
24. Harry Barkema and Mario Schijven, “Toward Unlocking the Full Potential of Acquisitions: The
Role of Organizational Restructuring,” Academy of Management Journal, 51/4 (August 2008):
696-722.
25. Ming-Jer Chen and Danny Miller, “Competitive Attack, Retaliation and Performance:
An Expectancy-Valence Framework,” Strategic Management Journal, 15/2 (February 1994):
85-102.
26. Ming-Jer Chen and Danny Miller, “Reconceptualizing Competitive Dynamics: A Multidimen-
sional Framework,” Strategic Management Journal, 36/5 (May 2015): 758-775.
27. Margaret A. Peteraf and Mark E. Bergen, “Scanning Dynamic Competitive Landscapes: A Market
Based and Resource Based Framework,” Strategic Management Journal, 24/10 (October 2003):
1027-1041.
28. Henock Louis and Amy Sun, “Investor Inattention and the Market Reaction to Merger
Announcements,” Management Science, 56/10 (October 2010): 1781-1793.
29. Chen (1996), op. cit.
30. Tieying Yu and Albert Cannella, “A Comprehensive Review of Multimarket Competition
Research,” Journal of Management, 39/1 (January 2013): 76-109.
31. Edward I. Zaiac and Max H. Bazerman, “Blind Spots in Industry and Competitor Analysis:
Implications of Interfirm (Mis)Perceptions for Strategic Decisions,” Academy of Management
Review, 16/1 (January 1991): 37-56.
32. Chen (1996), op. cit.
33. Phillipe Haspeslagh and David Jemison, Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value through Corporate
Renewal (New York, NY: Free Press, 1991).
34. Ken Smith, Curtiss Grimm, Martin Gannon, and Ming-Jer Chen, “Organizational Information
Processing, Competitive Responses, and Performance in the U.S. Domestic Airline Industry,”
Academy of Management Journal, 34/1 (March 1991): 60-85.
35. Tomi Laamanen and Thomas Keil, “Performance of Serial Acquirers: Toward an Acquisition
Program Perspective,” Strategic Management Journal, 29/6 (June 2008): 663-672.
36. Chen (1996), op. cit.
37. Paul Shrivastava, “Postmerger Integration,” Journal of Business Strategy, 7/1 (Summer 1986):
65-76.
38. Meyer, op. cit.
39. Stewart Myers and Nicholas Majluf, “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When
Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial Economics, 13/2 (June
1984): 187-121.
40. David Mayer and Martin Kenney, “Economic Action Does Not Take Place in a Vacuum:
Understanding Cisco’s Acquisition and Development Strategy,” Industry and Innovation, 11/4
(2004): 299-325.
41. Eric Eisenberg, “Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational Communication,” Communication
Monographs, 51/3 (1984): 227-242.
42. James Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1993).
43. Ming-Jer Chen, Kuo-Hsien Su, and Wenpin Tsai, “Competitive Tension: The Awareness-Motiva-
tion-Capability Perspective,” Academy of Management Journal, 50/1 (February 2007): 101-118.
44. Bauer and Matzler, op. cit.
45. Robert Grant, “Strategic Planning in a Turbulent Environment: Evidence from the Oil Majors,”
Strategic Management Journal, 24/6 (June 2003): 491-517.
46. Srinivasan Balakrishnan, “The Prognostics of Diversifying Acquisitions,” Strategic Management
Journal, 9/2 (March/April 1988): 185-196.

122 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

47. Christopher Bingham, Kathleen Eisenhardt, and Nathan Furr, “What Makes a Process a Capability?
Heuristics, Strategy, and Effective Capture of Opportunities,” Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal,
1/1-2 (2007): 27-47.
48. Mark Sharfman and James Dean, “Conceptualizing and Measuring the Organizational Environ-
ment: A Multidimensional Approach,” Journal of Management, 17/4 (December 1991): 681-700.
49. Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors
(New York, NY: The Free Press, 1980), p. 18.
50. Jun Mizutani, “Airline Merger and Competition in Japan: A Conduct Parameter and Theoretical
Price Approach,” Journal of Air Transport Management, 17/2 (March 2011): 120-124.
51. Joel Baum and Helaine Korn, “Competitive Dynamics of Interfirm Rivalry,” Academy of Management
Journal, 39/2 (April 1996), 255-291.
52. Chen (1996), op. cit.
53. McGrath, Chen, and MacMillan, op. cit.
54. David King and John Driessnack, “Analysis of Competition in the Defense Industrial Base: An
F/A 22 Case Study,” Contemporary Economic Policy, 25/1 (2007): 57-66.
55. Pankaj Ghemawat and Fariborz Ghadar, “The Dubious Logic of Global Megamergers,” Harvard
Business Review, 78/4 (July/August 2000): 65-72.
56. Kenneth Carow, Randall Heron, and Todd Saxton, “Do Early Birds Get the Returns? An Empirical
Investigation of Early Mover Advantages in Acquisitions,” Strategic Management Journal, 25/6
(June 2004): 563-585.
57. Joseph Clougherty and Tomaso Duso, “Using Rival Effects to Identify Synergies and Improve
Merger Typologies,” Strategic Organization, 9/4 (November 2011): 310-335.
58. Jaideep Anand and Harbir Singh, “Asset Redeployment, Acquisitions and Corporate Strategy
in Declining Industries,” Strategic Management Journal, 18 (Summer 1997): 99-118.
59. Dana Cimilluca, Dana Mattioli, and Liz Hoffman, “Anthem Goes Public with its Bid for Cigna,”
Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2015, p. B1.
60. Sven-Olaf Fridolfsson and Johan Stennek, “Industry Concentration and Welfare: On the Use
of Stock Market Evidence from Horizontal Mergers,” Economica, 77/308 (October 2010):
734-750.
61. Keil, Laamanen, and McGrath, op. cit.
62. Paige Ouimet, “What Motivates Minority Acquisitions? The Trade-Offs Between a Partial Equity
Stake and Complete Integration,” Review of Financial Studies, 26/4 (April 2013): 1021-1047.
63. Kevin Boeh, “Contracting Costs and Information Asymmetry Reduction in Cross-Border
M&A,” Journal of Management Studies, 48/3 (May 2011): 567-590.
64. For associated press coverage, see <http://business.financialpost.com/2013/06/19/google-
inc-deals/?__lsa=197a-bd71>.
65. Boeh, op. cit.
66. Michael Hitt, Jeffrey Harrison, R. Duane Ireland, and Aleta Best, “Attributes of Successful and
Unsuccessful Acquisition of U.S. Firms,” British Journal of Management, 9/2 (June 1998): 91-114.
67. Nikhil Varaiya and Kenneth Ferris, “Overpaying in Corporate Takeovers: The Winner’s
Curse,” Financial Analysts Journal, 43/3 (May/June 1987): 64-70.
68. William Schneper and Mauro Guillen, “Stakeholder Rights and Corporate Governance:
A Cross-National Study of Hostile Takeovers,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 49/2 (June
2004): 263-295.
69. Mitchell Marks and Phillip Mirvis, “Making Mergers and Acquisitions Work: Strategic and
Psychological Preparation,” Academy of Management Executive, 15/2 (May 2001): 80-94.
70. Melissa Graebner, “Momentum and Serendipity: How Acquired Leaders Create Value in the
Integration of Technology Firms,” Strategic Management Journal, 25/8-9 (August/September
2004): 751-777.
71. Junichi Kato and Richard Schoenberg, “Customer and Competitor Responses to Mergers and
Acquisitions: An Empirical Investigation in the Logistics Industry,” in Sydney Finkelstein and
Cary L. Cooper, eds., Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions, 11 (Bingley, England: Emerald Group
Publishing Limited, 2012), pp. 155-180.
72. Dennis Gioia, Rajiv Nag, and Kevin Corley, “Visionary Ambiguity and Strategic Change: The
Virtue of Vagueness in Launching Major Organizational Change,” Journal of Management
Inquiry, 21/4 (October 2012): 364-375.
73. Shawn Clark, Dennis Gioia, David Ketchen, and James Thomas, “Transitional Identity as a
Facilitator of Organizational Identity Change During a Merger,” Administrative Science Quarterly,
55/3 (September 2010): 397-438.

CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 123
 Addressing Competitive Responses to Acquisitions

74. Laamanen and Keil, op. cit.

75. Constance Helfat and Margaret Peteraf, “The Dynamic Resource-Based View: Capability
Lifecycles,” Strategic Management Journal, 24/10 (October 2003): 997-1010.
76. Katrin Muehlfeld, Padma Sahib, and Arjen Van Wittleloostuijn, “A Contextual Theory of
Organizational Learning from Failures and Successes: A Study of Acquisition Completion in
the Global Newspaper Industry, 1981-2008,” Strategic Management Journal, 33/8 (August
2012): 938-964.
77. Asli Arikan and Anita McGahan, “The Development of Capabilities in New Firms,” Strategic
Management Journal, 31/1 (January 2010): 1-18.
78. Richard DiGeorgio, “Making Mergers and Acquisitions Work: What We Know and Don’t
Know—Part I,” Journal of Change Management, 3/2 (2002): 134-148.
79. Norm Augustine, “Reshaping an Industry: Lockheed Martin’s Survival Story,” Harvard Business
Review, 75/3 (May/June 1997): 83-94.
80. Bauer and Matzler, op. cit.
81. C. Edward Fee and Shawn Thomas, “Sources of Gains in Horizontal Mergers: Evidence from
Customer, Supplier, and Rival Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics, 74/3 (December 2004):
423-460.
82. Duncan Angwin, “Speed in M&A Integration: The First 100 Days,” European Management Journal,
22/4 (August 2004): 418-430.
83. Bruce Clark and David Montgomery, “Deterrence, Reputations, and Competitive Cognition,”
Management Science, 44/1 (January 1998): 62-82.
84. Laurence Capron and Will Mitchell, “Bilateral Resource Redeployment and Capabilities Improve-
ment Following Horizontal Acquisitions,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 7/3 (September 1998):
453-484.
85. Svante Schriber, “Managing the Influence of External Competitive Change During Integration,” in
H. Anderson, V. Havila, and F. Nilsson, eds., Mergers and Acquisitions. The Critical Role of Stakeholders
(New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), pp. 149-167.
86. Koen Heimeriks, Mario Schijven, and Stephen Gates, “Manifestations of Higher-Order Routines:
The Underlying Mechanisms of Deliberate Learning in the Context of Postacquisition Integra-
tion,” Academy of Management Journal, 55/3 (June 2012): 703-726.
87. Joseph L. Bower, “Not All M&As Are Alike–and That Matters,” Harvard Business Review, 79/3
(March 2001): 93-101.
88. Francisco Mas-Ruiz, Felipe Ruiz-Moreno, and Antonio Ladrón de Guevara Martínez, “Asymmetric
Rivalry Within and Between Strategic Groups,” Strategic Management Journal, 35/3 (March 2014):
419-439.
89. Ming-Jer Chen and Donald Hambrick, “Speed, Stealth, and Selective Attack: How Small Firms
Differ from Large Firms in Competitive Behavior,” Academy of Management Journal, 38/2 (April
1995): 453-482.
90. David King, Dan Dalton, Catherine Daily, and Jeff Covin, “Meta-Analyses of Post-Acquisition
Performance: Indications of Unidentified Moderators,” Strategic Management Journal, 25/2
(February 2004): 187-200.
91. Larsson and Finkelstein, op. cit.

California Management Review, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 109–124. ISSN 0008-1256, eISSN 2162-8564. © 2016 by
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Request permission to photocopy or
reproduce article content at the University of California Press’s Reprints and Permissions web page,
http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p=reprints. DOI: 10.1525/cmr.2016.58.3.109.

124 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY VOL. 58, NO. 3 SPRING 2016 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
Copyright of California Management Review is the property of California Management
Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv
without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print,
download, or email articles for individual use.