USPF

Social Legislation Case Digest

R.A. 7277 (Magna Carta for Disabled Persons)
1) Drugstores Association of the Philippines vs. NCDA. GR 194561. September 14, 2016

Facts: On March 24, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7277, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons," was passed into law.

On April 30, 2007, Republic Act No. 9442 was enacted amending R.A. No. 7277. The Title of R.A. No.
7277 was amended to read as "Magna Carta for Persons with Disability" and all references on the law to
"disabled persons" were amended to read as "persons with disability" (PWD). Specifically, R.A. No. 9442
granted the PWDs a twenty (20) percent discount on the purchase of medicine, and a tax deduction
scheme was adopted wherein covered establishments may deduct the discount granted from gross
income based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered.

On April 23, 2008, the National Council on Disability Affairs (NCDA) issued Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 1, Series of 2008, prescribing guidelines which should serve as a mechanism for the issuance of a
PWD Identification Card (IDC) which shall be the basis for providing privileges and discounts to bona
fide PWDs in accordance with R.A. 9442. The A.O. provides, among others, the issuing entity of the IDC,
i.e. for Apparent Disability - the licensed private/government physician, licensed teacher duly signed by
the school principal, head of the business establishment/NGO.

Petitioners aver that Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442 an exercise of eminent
domain rather than of police power; that it is unconstitutional and void for violating the due process
clause of the Constitution.

Issues:

1) WON the mandated PWD Discount is an exercise of police power or of eminent domain? Police
Power. WON it is a valid exercise? YES

2) WON the mode of implementing Sec. 32 of RA No 7277 violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. NO

Ruling:

(1) Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use
of liberty and property. On the other hand, the power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the
state xxx to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. A legislative act
based on the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In more
familiar words, (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
should justify the interference of the state; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
R.A. No. 7277 was enacted primarily to provide full support to the improvement of the total well-being
of PWDs and their integration into the mainstream of society. The priority given to PWDs finds its basis in
the Constitution – Sec. 6, Art. XII (Use of property has a social function); Sec. 11, Art XIII (Health
development and priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled).

Hence, the PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of medicine is supported by a valid objective or
purpose as aforementioned. It has a valid subject considering that the concept of public use is no longer
confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public
benefit, public welfare, and public convenience. As in the case of senior citizens, the discount privilege to
which the PWDs are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens
belong. The means employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to
achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related.

Also, the means employed to provide a fair, just and quality health care to PWDs are reasonably related
to its accomplishment, and are not oppressive, considering that as a form of reimbursement, the
discount extended to PWDs in the purchase of medicine can be claimed by the establishments as
allowable tax deductions pursuant to Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 as implemented in Section 4 of DOF
Revenue Regulations No. 1-2009. Otherwise stated, the discount reduces taxable income upon which the
tax liability of the establishments is computed.

(2) Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277, as amended by R.A. No. 9442, must be read with its IRR xxx. NCDA A.O.
No. 1 provides the reasonable guidelines in the issuance of IDCs to PWDs as proof of their entitlement to
the privileges and incentives under the law and fills the details in the implementation of the law.

As stated in NCDA A.O. No. 1, before an IDC is issued by the city or municipal mayor or the barangay
captain, or the Chairman of the NCDA, the applicant must first secure a medical certificate issued by a
licensed private or government physician that will confirm his medical or disability condition. If an
applicant is an employee with apparent disability, a "certificate of disability" issued by the head of the
business establishment or the head of the non-governmental organization is needed for him to be issued
a PWD-IDC. For a student with apparent disability, the "school assessment" issued by the teacher and
signed by the school principal should be presented to avail of a PWD-ID.

Petitioners' insistence that Part IV (D) of NCDA Administrative Order No. 1 is void because it allows
allegedly non-competent persons like teachers, head of establishments and heads of Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) to confirm the medical condition of the applicant is misplaced. It must be stressed
that only for apparent disabilities can the teacher or head of a business establishment validly issue the
mentioned required document because, obviously, the disability is easily seen or clearly visible. It is,
therefore, not an unqualified grant of authority for the said non-medical persons as it is simply limited to
apparent disabilities. For a non-apparent disability or a disability condition that is not easily seen or
clearly visible, the disability can only be validated by a licensed private or government physician, and a
medical certificate has to be presented in the procurement of an IDC.

[Furthermore, the DOH also provided guidelines to avail of the discount] Therefore, xxx Section 32 of
R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442 complies with the standards of substantive due process.

2) Bernardo vs NLRC. GR 122917

Facts:
Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by
respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded
agreement called ‘Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed.

Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money
sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further
allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from
becoming regular employees.

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as “special workers and
should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.”[12] Rather, they
were “special” workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.

Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.

Held: YES

The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of
one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish
the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time
for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall
automatically expire at the end of the term.

In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should
be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of
the Magna Carta provides:

“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled person shall be denied access to
opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same
terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits,
incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.”

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment
contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-
bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:

“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to
be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, x x x”

“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection
between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of
the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work
performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the
employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous
and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment
is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.”

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and
renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the
renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that
their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were
qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render
them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of
respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more
than six months. Petition granted.

3) Loreca vs. RTC Tuguegarao. Admin Matter RTJ 14-2367

N.B (Walay decision regarding the merits sa social legislation na aspect ani nga case. Ang gi resolve ra jud
ani kay procedural and administrative nga aspect.)

FACTS:

Claire Ann Campos, 17 years old, filed a complaint for violation of RA 7610 (Child Abuse Law) and RA
7277 (the Magna Carta for the Disabled be the RTC of Tuguegarao City against Junio and Lorica, the
President and Dean of St. Paul University of the Philippines, respectively.

Claire alleged that she was refused enrolment by SPUP for the B.S. Nursing course in her sophomore year
because of her cleft palate; she alleged that the refusal was made despite her completion of SPUP’s
College Freshmen Program Curriculum.

After the finding of probable cause, the public prosecutor filed the corresponding information, however,
upon petition by the Junio and Lorica with the DOJ, the resolution of the public prosecutor was reversed
by the Secretary of Justice ordering the public prosecutor to withdraw the information filed.
Notwithstanding the motion by the public prosecutor, Junio, and Lorica to withdraw the information, the
Respondent Judge denied the same. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. They filed this
administrative complaint against Respondent Judge for denying their motion and for delayed resolution
of the same which took four months from the time of filing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for denying their motion to
withdraw the information?

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court ruled that since the information was already filed in court, the Judge is not
bound by the order of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the filing of the information. The settled ruled
in this jurisdiction is that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case (whether it be a dismissal, an acquittal or a conviction of the accused) rests within the exclusive
jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court; it is the best and sole judge of what to do with
the case before it. To do otherwise is to surrender a power constitutionally vested in the Judiciary to the
Executive.

It was likewise found that there was neither undue delay in the resolution of the motion to withdraw nor
bad faith or some ulterior motives. Since this case was handled by the respondent judge only after the
inhibition of the former judge that handle the same, and it was sufficiently found that Respondent Judge
immediately resolved the case after it was brought to his attention, then suspension cannot be
warranted. It was found that admonition is sufficient as recommended by the Office of the Court
Adiministrator.

R.A. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and

Discrimination Act)
1) George Bongalon v. People of the Philippines. GR No. 169533, March 20, 2013

FACTS:

Jayson and Roldan, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño. When the procession
passed in front of petitioner, George’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw
stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; George confronted Jayson and Roldan and uttered derogatory
remarks to the latter’s family and struck the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face.

Petitioner went to the brothers’ house and challenged their father, Rolando to a fight, but he did not
come out of the house. Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station to report the
incident. Jayson underwent medical treatment and the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical
certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular
area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left.

Petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with
Jayson and Roldan after his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at
them and about Jayson’s burning his daughter’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging
Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters.

Petitioner was then charged with child abuse under Sec. 10, RA No. 7610.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was guilty of child abuse under Sec. 10, RA No. 7610.

RULING: NO.

Although petitioner indeed struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, his
acts did not constitute child abuse within the purview of RA No. 7610, which refers to the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child which includes XXX (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being XXX.

The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been
intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have
been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his
fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the
hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in
the crime of child abuse.

Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner
was only liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, with the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation.

2) Salera vs. People. G.R. No. 206627. January 18, 2017

Facts:

On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin, Bohol waiting for the
conciliation proceedings to begin when they chanced upon Torres who had just arrived from fishing.
CCC's wife, who was also with them at the barangay hall, persuaded Torres to attend the conciliation
proceedings to answer for his liability. Torres vehemently denied damaging CCC's multicab. In the middle
of the brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres damaged CCC's multicab and accused
him of stealing CCC's fish nets. Torres told AAA not to pry in the affairs of adults. He warned AAA that he
would whip him if he did not stop. However, AAA refused to keep silent and continued to accuse Torres
of damaging his uncle's multicab. Infuriated with AAA's meddling, Torres whipped AAA on the neck using
a wet t-shirt. Torres continued to hit AAA causing the latter to fall down from the stairs. CCC came to his
nephew's defense and punched Torres. They engaged in a fistfight until they were separated by Barangay
Captain Hermilando Miano. Torres hit AAA with a wet t-shirt three (3) times. Based on the physical
examination conducted by Dr. Vicente Manalo, Jr., AAA sustain a contusion.

After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented the following version of the incident: Torres
testified that he had just arrived tired from fishing when CCC badgered him to answer for the damage he
had allegedly caused to CCC's multicab. AAA abruptly interrupted the heated discussion between the
two men. Angered by what AAA had done, Torres told AAA to stop making unfounded accusations or he
would be forced to whip him. AAA called Torres' bluff, which further provoked Torres. Torres attempted
to hit AAA but was thwarted by the timely intervention of CCC, who suddenly attacked. Torres claimed
that CCC filed this case to preempt him from filing a complaint for physical injuries against CCC. He also
claimed that he tried to settle the matter with CCC and CCC's wife. However, the parties failed to reach
an agreement due to the unreasonable demands of the spouses.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

We reject petitioner's contention that his act of whipping AAA is not child abuse but merely slight
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. The victim, AAA, was a child when the incident occurred.
Therefore, AAA is entitled to protection under Republic Act No. 7610, the primary purpose of which has
been defined in Araneta v. People thus:

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive
program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in
keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall
defend the right of the children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."

3) ROSALDES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014

FACTS: On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan
Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom
when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep
on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael
did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh.
Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a
desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and
repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried. His mother and his aunt reported the
incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined
by a doctor.

Rosaldes was charged for violation of Anti-Child Abuse Law (Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610). RTC convicted
petitioner of child abuse and Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by Michael Ryan to
maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes
her maltreatment as an act of discipline that she as a school teacher could reasonably do towards the
development of the child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610 (YES)

HELD: The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit. She is guilty of child abuse, a violation of
R.A. 7610. Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil,
her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted
from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake
of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family
Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority.

Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child, (n)

Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr.
Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who
examined the victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from
the time the boy had sustained his injuries.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly: (b) “Child abuse” refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological
and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or
words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to
immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds
or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner “went overboard in
disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on
the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor; and as the boy fell
down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness but instead of feeling a sense of remorse,
the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor.”

Hence, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of the crime of child abuse punished under RA 7610.

4) Braga. vs. People. 214497. April 18, 2017

FACTS:

THE AMENDED INFORMATION STATED:

That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at Palapas, Ligao City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste
design, through force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, insert
his hand inside the panty of [AAA], 21 a minor of 7 years old and mash her vagina, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS:

1. The accused EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA (a caretaker of the ducks of AAA’s grandfather) was
charged with the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610.

2. On July 18, 2007 at Palapas Ligao City, while AAA and her siblings were sleeping soundly, the accused
inserted his hand inside the panty of AAA, a minor (7 y.o), and mashed her vagina against her will
and consent.

3. The accused stayed with AAA’s house that unfaithful night upon the latter’s request to accompany
them for she and her siblings were afraid for their parents has not yet arrived and since there was no
electricity.

4. AAA did not tell it to anybody until her mother (a household helper in Batangas) asked her what they
were doing while she was away.

5. RTC ruled that petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610.

6. CA affirmed with modification RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: WON the accused may be convicted only of acts of lasciviousness under Art 336 of the RPC and
not in relation to Sec 5(b) of RA 7610 for failure to allege all the elements necessary in committing Acts
of Lasciviousness under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 (victim is "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse")

RULING: Negative. He is guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of RA
7610

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;xxx.

Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is neither
exploited in prostitution nor subjected to "other sexual abuse." In contrast, under Section 5 of RA 7610,
the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or
subjected to "other sexual abuse."

Section 5 of RA 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of lasciviousness are committed on a child
already either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." Clearly, the acts of
lasciviousness committed on the child are separate and distinct from the other circumstance that the
child is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse.

Contrary to the exposition, the very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b) of RA 7610 does not
require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act complained
of. For it refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec. 5(b)
of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse against the child victim only once,
even without a prior sexual affront

Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a
child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
The law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse against children.

And going through senate deliberation, the original wording of Sec. 5 of RA 7610 has been expanded so
as to cover abuses that are not characterized by gain, monetary or otherwise. In the case at bar, the
abuse suffered by AAA squarely falls under this expanded scope as there was no allegation of
consideration or profit in exchange for sexual favor. As stated in the Information, petitioner committed
lascivious conduct through the use of ''force" and "intimidation."

Sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is
some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended
party's free will.
Force and intimidation" is subsumed under "coercion and influence. Black's Law Dictionary defines
"coercion" as "compulsion; force; duress " while "[undue] influence" is defined as ''persuasion carried to
the point of overpowering the will. "

On the other hand, ''force" refers to "constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to an
end " 28 while jurisprudence defines "intimidation" as "unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in
fear. "

As can be gleaned, the terms are used almost synonymously. It is then of no moment that the
terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different. And to dispel any remaining
lingering doubt as to their interchangeability.

Article 336 of the RPC was never repealed by RA 8353. Sec. 4 of RA 8353 did not expressly repeal Article
336 of the RPC for if it were the intent of Congress, it would have expressly done so. Rather, the phrase
in Sec. 4 states: "deemed amended, modified, or repealed accordingly" qualifies "Article 335 of Act No.
3815, as amended, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules
and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of [RA 8353]."

5) Caballo vs. People 198732. June 10, 2013

Facts:

Caballo 23 y.o met the complainant AAA 17.y.o and a sophomore college student in USC. They became
sweethearts and eventually AAA got pregnant.

A complaint was filed against Caballo, stating that Caballo induced AAA to lose her virginity by promises
of marriage and assurance that he would not impregnate her by using the “withdrawal method”. That
upon hearing the news of AAA’s pregnancy, Caballo advised AAA to have an abortion. She heeded
Caballo’s advice; however, her efforts were unsuccessful. When AAA’s mother confronted Caballo, he
assured her that he would marry her daughter.

Caballo on the other hand claimed that AAA was no longer a virgin when they met and that she had
three boyfriends prior to him. He posited that he and AAA were sweethearts who lived-in together, for
one week, but eventually broke up due to the intervention of AAA’s parents, who said that he was not
deserving of their daughter since he was poor. He alleged that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA
but was always rejected because she was still studying.

The RTC found Caballo guilty of violating RA 7610 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for an
indeterminate period ranging from prision correccional, in its maximum period of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day, as minimum, to prision mayor in its minimum period of six (6) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day, as maximum and to pay moral damages for $50,000.00.

Caballo’s appeal was also denied by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not Caballo was guilty of violating RA 7610 "Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act"

Held: Yes.
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:

Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.

As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez), the elements of the foregoing offense are the
following:

(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and

(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

In this case, the existence of the first and third elements remains undisputed. As for the second element,
a child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. The law covers not only a situation in which a
child is abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in
lascivious conduct. Records indicate that Caballo was 6 years older than AAA. The age disparity placed
Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to force his will upon the latter. Caballo's acts
constitute "coercion" and "influence" within the context of the law, and that AAA indulged in sexual
intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, AAA is deemed as a "child exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of the subject offense exists.

Thus, Caballo was guilty of violating RA 7610 "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act"

6) People vs. Abella. G.R. No. 220718. June 21, 2017

FACTS:

At the time of the incident, HGE was only 13 years old and was living with AAA, the person who adopted
her. On February 1, 2006, at around 10 PM in the evening, HGE was sleeping at home alone, while AAA
was working as a beautician at the salon. She was awakened when Tubillo, her neighbour, entered their
house by breaking the padlock of the door. Tubillo went directly to HGE then removed her clothes and
his own. He forcibly inserted his penis in her vagina by pushing his body towards her. HGE felt pain, but
she did not resist as Tubillo was poking a knife at her neck. HGE revealed her ordeal at the hands of
Tubillo to her aunt, leading to the filing of the subject complaint. Dr. Ortiz testified that she had a shallow
healed laceration in the hymen. The findings were suggestive of the use of a blunt force or penetrating
trauma to the hymen. Tubillo denied the accusations against him and claimed that the complaint was
filed simply because HGE’s aunt was angry at him when he tried to collect some money from her. The
RTC found Tubillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape, the RTC found that Tubillo
sexually violated HGE and it appreciated HGE’s consistent testimony and the medical report presented to
establish the carnal knowledge committed against her will. Tubillo elevated an appeal before the CA. The
CA affirmed Tubillo’s conviction with modifications. It was of the view that HGE candidly testified about
the sexual violation committed by Tubillo against her and that the inconsistencies in her testimony were
trivial. The CA however, opined that as HGE was more than 12 years old, Tubillo could be charged either
rape under the RPC or Child Abuse under RA. No. 7610. The CA modified the penalty by reducing it to 14
years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court gravely erred in finding that the accused-appellant’s guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt?

HELD:

No. The CA found that Tubillo committed the crime of rape against HGE, then a 13 year old minor.
Nevertheless, it opined that he must be convicted under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 because it was the
crime alleged in the information. To reiterate, the elements of rape under Section 266-A of the RPC are:
1. the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and 2. such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is
under 12 years of age. In the present case, the RTC convicted Tubillo for the crime of rape because the
prosecution proved that there was a carnal knowledge against HGE by means of force or intimidation,
particularly, with the bladed weapon. On the other hand, the CA convicted Tubillo with violation of
Section 5 (b) of RA. No. 7610 because the charge of rape under the information was in relation to RA. No
7610. After a judicious study of the records, the court ruleD that Tubillo should be convicted of rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC. Tubillo should be found guilty of rape with a prescribed penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

7) People vs. Sanico. G.R. No. 208469

FACTS:

Plaintiff filed two separate Informations were filed against the accused-appellant before the RTC, In
Criminal Case No. 12021 for Acts of Lasciviousness:

That at more or less 1:00 P.M. of April 19, 2006 the accused, with lewd design, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a twelve (12)
year [old] minor, by touching her breast against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
such amount as may be proven in Court.

In Criminal Case No. 12022 for Rape

That sometime in the year 2005 the accused, by means of force, threat or intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA, a twelve (12) year old
minor, against her will. AAA alleged that she was again raped for six or seven times.

The accused-appellant testified that he had never inserted his penis in AAA’s vagina. He admitted
touching AAA on April 19, 2006 but he did so only because the latter initiated it. The accused-appellant
woke up from slumber when AAA touched the former’s pocket to search for money. She got some coins
and bills. The accused-appellant, in turn, touched AAA’s chest and asked the latter to remove her short
pants. AAA complied. As the accused-appellant was touching AAA’s breast, CCC, the father, woke up. The
accused-appellant then fled and went on hiding.
ISSUE:

WON the provisions for rape and acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610 shall be applied

HELD:

Yes, Article III, Section 5, of RA 7610 reads:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.- Children, whether male or female, who for money
or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution
and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:

(a) x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution orsubject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of
Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be;
Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period. X X X.

After having admitted the lascivious conduct he made with AAA. It is undisputed that AAA was still 12
years old when the crime happened and as admitted by [the] accused-appellant himself, hewas touching
AAA because AAA was looking for money inside his pocket and he told AAA to remove her short pants
for him to see her private part.

It is important to note however that a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child
indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.

The accused-appellant’s acts were covered by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct
under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases promulgated to implement the provisions of RA 7610, particularly on child abuse:

(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a
child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;

(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or [pubic] area of a person.

================================================
Sec. 5, Art. III of RA 7610

Elements of sexual abuse

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Art. 335 of RPC

Elements of rape

1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim.

2) that said act was accomplished

(a) through the use of force or intimidation, or

(b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or

(c) when the victim is twelve years of age, or is demented.