5. Sec.
241
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST v. GUERRERO
February 19, 2003 | Carpio, J. | Petition for Review under Rule 45| Judicial Notice
PETITIONER: Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., and/or Chemical Bank
RESPONDENT: Rafael Ma. Guerrero
SUMMARY: Respondent Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner Bank regarding his bank account. The Bank claimed that his account is
governed by New York law which does not permit any claim except actual
damages. The Bank moved for a partial summary judgment which was supported
by an affidavit by a NY Atty. claiming that the governing law is New York law
as stipulated by Guerrero’s bank account. SC ruled that there is a need for a trial
as the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and allegations were disputed.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice and must be alleged and proven.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
1. Respondent Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Bank
for allegedly: (a) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his
checking account with the Bank; (b) a returned check worth USS18,000.99
due to signature verification problems; and (c) unauthorized conversion of
his account.
2. The Bank claimed that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by
New York and this law does not permit any claim except actual damages.
The Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss
the claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary
damages.
3. The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s
claim that Guerrero’s bank account stipulated that the governing law is New
York law and that this law bars all of the claims except actual damages. The
Philippine Consular Office in NY authenticated the Walden affidavit.
4. CA: Even if the Walden affidavit is used for purpose of summary judgment,
the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rule 132,
ISSUE: WoN there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial—YES.
RULING: Petition DENIED. There being substanstial triable issues, motion for
partial summary judgment is denied.
RATIO:
1. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as
not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Walden affidavit shows that the
facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and
there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
Resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual
damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proven. The conflicting allegations as to whether New
York law or Philippine law applies to Guerreros claims present a clear
dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the
merits. The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law
on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not
state the specific New York law on damages.
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Banks motion
for partial summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just because he failed
to file an opposing affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New
1
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office.
 York law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an opposing
affidavit.
ISSUE:
 WON the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York law and
jurisprudence relied upon by the Bank in its Motion for PSJ? – NO.
HELD:
 NO. The Walden Affidavit failed to prove New York law and jurisprudence. The
SC denied the Bank’s petition for lack of merit.
 The CA considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents
defined in Rule 132 Sec 19 and 24 of the Rules of Evidence, which should be
followed in proving foreign law.
 SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
 SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Walden Affidavit Failed to Prove New York Law and Jurisprudence
 The Bank’s motion for PSJ as supported by the Walden Affidavit does not
demonstrate that Guerrero’s claims are sham, fictitious or contrived. On the
contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as
pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are substantial triable issues
necessitating a formal trial.
 Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York
law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear dispute on
material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
 The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v.
Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its cause. These
cases involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines
and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be established. On the other
hand, the Walden Affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never
testified in open court. The Walden Affidavit cannot be considered as proof of
New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it
does not state the specific New York law on damages.
 The Walden Affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation
and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence
without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden Affidavit of various
U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of
the U.S. courts.
 While the Bank attached copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the
Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on
proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.
 The Bank failed to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign
law and decisions of foreign courts. The Walden Affidavit did not prove the
current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only
alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the
matters at issue.
It Was Not Mandatory for Guerrero to Submit an Opposing Affidavit to the Walden
Affidavit
 Next, the Bank makes much of Guerrero’s failure to submit an opposing affidavit
to the Walden Affidavit. However, the pertinent provision of Rule 35 Sec 3 of the
old Rules of Court did not make the submission of an opposing affidavit
mandatory. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit
because his complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Bank’s motion
and the Walden affidavit. A party should not be made to deny matters already
averred in his complaint.
 There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a
quo correctly denied the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment. There is a
need to determine by presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is
guilty of any wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages under the applicable laws.

CRESCENT PETROLEUM,
6.
LTD., Petitioner, vs. M/V
"LOK MAHESHWARI," THE
SHIPPING CORPORATION
OF INDIA, and PORTSERV
LIMITED
G.R. No. 155014 November 11,
2005
FACTS:
Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an
oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is owned by
respondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of
India and principally owned by the Government of India. It
was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant
Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean company. Halla, in
turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to
Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further
sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv).
Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized
and existing under the laws of Canada.
On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested
petitioner Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Canada that is engaged in the business of selling
petroleum and oil products for the use and operation of
oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker
fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and
confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile
dated November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of
the bunker fuels and related services, petitioner Crescent
received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00
and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted
with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine
Petrobulk), another Canadian corporation, for the
physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.
On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk
delivered the bunker fuels amounting to US$103,544
inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to the Vessel
at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The
Chief Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged
and received the delivery receipt. Marine Petrobulk
issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for the
US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner
Crescent issued a check for the same amount in favor of
Marine Petrobulk, which check was duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent
issued a revised invoice dated November 21, 1995 to
"Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners,
and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V ‘Lok
Maheshwari’" in the amount of US$103,544.00 with
instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1,
1995. The period lapsed and several demands were made
but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to
petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the
bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred
additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking
fees, and legal fees.
On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the
port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent instituted before
the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a sum of money with
prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and
SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of
attachment against the Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00.
Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer for a temporary
restraining order and posted the required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to
respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv and/or
Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28,
1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer
Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer), filed an
urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneer’s letter of
undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and to
discharge the attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court
granted the motion; thus, the letter of undertaking was
approved as counter-bond to discharge the attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise
jurisdiction and entitled to maritime lien under our laws
on foreign vessel docked on Philippine port and supplies
furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?
RULING:
In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for
supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, whether
such lien exists, or whether the court has or will exercise
jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the
supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and
proved.
The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases,
which replaced such single-factor methodologies as the
law of the place of supply. The multiple-contact test to
determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional
directive as to the statute’s reach, which jurisdiction’s
law should be applied. The following factors were
considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the
flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4)
allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of
contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law
of the forum. This is applicable not only to personal injury
claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters
arising under maritime law in general
The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescent’s
insistence on the application of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship
Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien
exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of
Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one – the law of
the forum. All other elements are foreign – Canada is the
place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of
the injured and the place of contract; India is the law of
the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner.
Applying P.D. No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not
promote the public policy behind the enactment of the
law to develop the domestic shipping industry. Opening
up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a
maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled
to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum
shopping. In light of the interests of the various foreign
elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most
significant interest in this dispute. The injured party is a
Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the
orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which
physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the
place of contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the
supplies were delivered in Canada.
Second. P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 is
inapplicable following the factors under Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws. Like the Federal Maritime Lien Act of the U.S., P.D. No.
1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 was enacted primarily to
protect Filipino suppliers and was not intended to create a lien from a
contract for supplies between foreign entities delivered in a foreign port.
Third. Applying P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and
rule that a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy
behind the enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping
industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a
maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime
lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping.
Finally. The submission of petitioner is not in keeping with the
reasonable expectation of the parties to the contract. Indeed, when the
parties entered into a contract for supplies in Canada, they could not
have intended the laws of a remote country like the Philippines to
determine the creation of a lien by the mere accident of the Vessel's
being in Philippine territory.
7. Edi-Staffbuilders Inc. (EDI) v. NLRC and Eleazar Gran
G. R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007, J. Velasco, Jr.
FACTS:
Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI (another
recruitment agency) to work for OAB, in Riyadh, KSA. After Gran had been
working for about five months for OAB, his employment was terminated through
OAB's letter, based on: (1) non-compliance to contract requirements by the
recruitment agency primarily on the salary and contract duration; (2) Non-compliance
to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment agency, OAB; and (3)
insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or instructions (i.e.
non-submittal of daily activity reports despite several instructions). Gran received
from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 representing his final pay, and thereafter,
executed a declaration releasing OAB from any financial obligation.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, against
ESI/EDI and OAB inter alia, with the NLRC - NCR, Quezon City, for
underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gran's dismissal is justifiable by reason of incompetence,
insubordination, and disobedience.
RULING:
EDI failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to
incompetence, insubordination, or willful disobedience. In illegal dismissal cases, it
has been established by Philippine law and jurisprudence that the employer should
prove that the dismissal of employees or personnel is legal and just.
 In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between
the OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed
by the employment contract. A contract freely entered into is considered law between
the parties hence, should be respected. The employment contract signed by Gran
specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the
contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the
law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor
Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of
Gran.

However, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact
to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial
notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for EDI, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus,
the doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, Philippine labor laws was
applied in this case.

According to Philippine laws, incompetence may be shown by weighing it against a

standard, benchmark, or criterion. However, EDI failed to establish any such bases
to show how EDI found Gran incompetent. Likewise, in order to justify willful
disobedience, it must be determined whether the order violated by the employee is
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and pertains to the duties which he
had been engaged to discharge. In the case at bar, EDI failed to show that the order
of the company which was violated—the submission of "Daily Activity Reports"—
was part of Gran's duties as a Computer Specialist. An allegation of incompetence
should have a factual foundation.

Hence, petition is denied.