PROJECT REPORT

ON
INTERPRETATION OF STATUES
Interpretation of Statues – Rules of Interpretation according to
Legislative practice

Submiiteed by-
Harsh Vardhan Dhanik
Roll no: 201245
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. TABLE OF CASES…………………………………………………………...3
2. ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………....4
3. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………...5
4. RULES OF INTERPRETATION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE..................6
5. CARDINAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION…………………………….…7
6. INTERPRETATION OF STATUES SPECIFIC EXPRESSION…………….14

7. RETROSPECTIVELY APPLICATION OF STATUTE AND RULE OF

INTERPRETATION…………………………………………………………17
8. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE ONGOING DEBATE…......................19
9. IMPORTANT CASES…………………………………………………………20
10. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………..25
11. BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………..26

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 TABLE OF CASES

1. Ispat Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, (2006)12 SCC 583.

2. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nagoti Venkataramana1996 (6) SCC 409.
3. M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, 1963 SCR Supl. (2) 724.
4. Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT, 196 ITR 188 (SC).
5. H.S.E.B v. Suresh & Ors Etc 1999 3 SCC 601
6. Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT, 196 ITR 188 (SC).
7. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
8. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597.
9. CIT v. T.V. Sundaram Iyyengar (1975) 101 ITR 764 (SC).
10. Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Co. v Commercial Tax officer AIR 1997 SC 2920.
11. Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company limited
AIR 1987 SC 1023.
12. State of W.B. v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241.
13. Union of India v. R. Vasudeva Murthy, (2010) 9 SCC 30 Union of India v. R.
Vasudeva Murthy, (2010) 9 SCC 30.
14. Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 234.
15. Heydon's Case (1584) 76 ER 637.
16. State of Assam v. R Muhammad AIR 1967 SC 903.
17. The Printers House Private Ltd. v. Misri Lal Dalip Singh and Ors.,AIR 1970.
18. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh 1964 SCR (2) 197.
19. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 60.
20. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011.

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 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

ABSTRACT

It is a well-established fact that the legislature is highest law making body and the court is
merely an interpreter of the law. But actually the fact is by interpreting the law the court can
make comprehensive changes in the actual implementation and overall maneuver of the law.
This can be easily be gathered by analysing the statutory interpretation made by Indian
judiciary and its effect on India and its citizens as a whole.

The living example of such effect is interpretation of Part III (Fundamental Rights) of Indian
Constitution and especially Article 21, wider and liberal interpretation of this article by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has granted many fundamental beneficial rights to the citizens
of the country and even ensured actual execution of these rights by liberally interpreting the
concept of locus standi with further evolution of Public Interest Litigation through which any
public spirited person can file a petition on behalf of those who has no access to Court. Such
evolutions with an important art of interpretation have ensured principles of rule of law and
equal justice or justice at door step in the developing country like India. But here it is important
to mention that the manner and expansion of interpretation by judiciary has been criticized by
many and termed as ‘over judicial activism’ with interference in the field of legislature. This
point has been discussed in detail in the subsequent submission.

Moving further, to understand everything about interpretation which has been gradually
evolved in modern context from ancient Indian rules with the help of follows up of different
rules/doctrines in different situations which has arisen for different statutes. In light of this
evolution, the utmost important aspect to understand for us is the meaning of term ‘statute, the
very first term on which emphasis of the whole submission lies. The main aim of this research
is to highlight the revolutionary doctrines and landmark case laws in the field of interpretation.

CASES REFFERED:
Ispat Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs

State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nagoti Venkataramana

H.S.E.B v. Suresh & Ors Etc.

Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Co. v Commercial Tax officer

Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India

SUBMITTED BY-

HARSH VARDHAN DHANIK

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Interpretation of Statues – rules of interpretation according to Legislative practice

INTRODUCTION

It is a well-established fact that the legislature is highest law making body and the court is
merely an interpreter of the law. But actually the fact is by interpreting the law the court can
make comprehensive changes in the actual implementation and overall maneuver of the law.
This can be easily be gathered by analyzing the statutory interpretation made by Indian
judiciary and its effect on India and its citizens as a whole.

The living example of such effect is interpretation of Part III (Fundamental Rights) of Indian
Constitution and especially Article 2, wider and liberal interpretation of this article by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has granted many fundamental beneficial rights to the citizens
of the country and even ensured actual execution of these rights by liberally interpreting the
concept of locus standi with further evolution of Public Interest Litigation through which any
public spirited person can file a petition on behalf of those who has no access to Court. Such
evolutions with an important art of interpretation have ensured principles of rule of law and
equal justice or justice at door step in the developing country like India. But here it is important
to mention that the manner and expansion of interpretation by judiciary has been criticized by
many and termed as ‘over judicial activism’ with interference in the field of legislature. This
point has been discussed in detail in the subsequent submission1.

Moving further, to understand everything about interpretation which has been gradually
evolved in modern context from ancient Indian rules with the help of follows up of different
rules/doctrines in different situations which has arisen for different statutes. In light of this
evolution, the utmost important aspect to understand for us is the meaning of term ‘statute, the
very first term on which emphasis of the whole submission lies2.

The word ‘Statute’ generally is defined as the written will of the legislature solemnly expressed
according to the forms necessary to constitute it the law of the State.[4] Normally, the term
denotes personification of authoritative blueprint and words used in the same constitute part of
law. These blueprints are chief source of law which is known as legislation. The other sources
are precedents and customs. Each of these sources finds its expression in a language or words
used by authorities. Many times the use of language in the legislation even does not carry the

1
Farlex, ‘Statute’ (The Free Dictionary) <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/statute> accessed on 21
August 2012.
2
Avtar Singh, Introduction to Interpretation of Statute (2nd ed., LexisNexis Butterworths, Nagpur 2007) 5.

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clear cut meaning in dictionaries. It contains many alternative meanings applicable in different
contexts and for different purposes so that no clear field for the application of a word becomes
identified. In such a situation, importance of interpretation comes into picture. For proper and
healthy application of law, it is important to have uniform expansion of language or words used
by the authorities/law-makers. In a case, if one judge takes the narrow view and the other the
broad one, the law will connote different things for different persons and soon there will be
race for window shopping for justice. Moreover, we always need to keep in mind that
articulating a law is not equal to the execution of law. For the purpose of execution,

RULES OF INTERPRETATION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Indian historical rules of interpretation of statute have not got the due recognition in the present
study of rules of interpretation. Many few peoples are aware about the existence of such rules
even in India. But in actual, there are many modern rules whose foundation has been laid down
in ancient rules of interpretation. These ancient Indian rules are popularly known as ‘Mimamsa
Rules of Interpretation.’

These rules are primarily for Vedanta and have contributed a lot in formulation and
development of Hindu Law. The basic aim of these rules is to give interpretation of the Vedas,
the earliest scriptures of Hinduism, and to provide a philosophical justification for the
observance of Vedic rituals.

A basic discussion on six important Mimamsa rules is as follow:

1) Upakarma-Upasamhara-

This rule is basically to ensure unity of thought in the beginning as well as in the end and it
further indicates that statute should be read as a whole. There is one basic purpose or intent
which runs through the whole Statute. Moreover, in the very first instant, interpreter should
look into preamble and epilogue at the first;

2) Abhyasa

This rule is an indication of repetitive process, meaning thereby that what has been repeatedly
said is because of legislature’s continuous effort to support his aim;

3) Apurvata,

This rule is an indication of novelty or uncommon nature of the proof. It is to see by this rule
whether there is something novel to be achieved by the legislation;

4) Phala,

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This rule suggests that there is need to go through word to word of the statute because each
word has specific thing to add on or to indicate upon and the result achieved after doing all this
need to be clearly gone through to achieve a correct conclusion;

5) Atharvada,

This rule indicates help of external aids is useful to interpret any statute. This rule is widely
followed in the modern context;

6) Upapatti

This is the last but most important rule which in literal sense is known as logical deduction.
This rule has its importance in case of ambiguity in the enactment.

These rules of interpretation are India’s one of great achievements, but regrettably few people
in our country are aware about the great intellectual achievements of ancestors and the
intellectual treasury they have bequeathed upon India. As rightly stated by Justice
Katju[15] that Maxwell and Craies usually get quoted on issue of Interpretation but Indian
indigenous system of interpretation is not been quoted even by Indian Lawyers in Indian
Courts. Recently one of the Supreme Court judgments, Ispat Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner
of Customs3, has refereed these rules while deciding an appeal under the Customs Tariff Act,
1975.

After submitting a historical perspective, a detailed discussion on modern Indian context upon
interpretation of statute requires much focus for the purpose of present submission. The
following part focuses upon the same while enumerating different aspects of rules of
interpretation applicable in Indian courts for statutory interpretation.

CARDINAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION

The rules of interpretation are soul of arid body of legislation.

With respect to modern principles of interpretation, Indian Courts have evolved number of
rules of interpretation which can help them to resolve any sort of difficulty. These rules have
major role to play in proper and beneficial implementation of law under the garb of different
rule, expressions of interpretation. But before detailed discussion upon rules and expressions,
it is important to keep in mind that to interpret any statute, three basic rules or processes are to
be followed. These processes are:

3
(2006)12 SCC 583.

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1) Primary Rule of Interpretation:

This rule has following steps involved which an interpreter has to follow:

a. Read and analyse a section;

b. Ascertain the primary meaning of the words used;
c. Ascertain the grammatical, literal and plain meaning of the words used in the section.

This rule has further been explained in detail in the name of ‘literal rule of interpretation’ in
the subsequent submission.

2) Secondary Rule of Interpretation:

This rule is basically states about application of internal and external aids to ensure proper
interpretation of statute. Application of Internal and External aids has been explained in the
subsequent submission.

3) Final Rule of Interpretation:

Interpretation of every statute must be based upon the aforesaid primary and secondary rules.
But there may be a situation when conflict may arise on simultaneous application of above
rules, to avoid such conflict, final rule i.e. principle of harmonious construction come into
picture. This rule has further been explained in the subsequent submission. Every effort should
be made to ensure that all the primary and secondary rules are simultaneously satisfied4.

Here, it is also to be focus that certain specific statutes have specific pattern of Interpretation
as enumerated in numerous case laws. To illustrate this point, following submission is
important.

1) For Penal Statute, it is always need to have a strict interpretation5 and with respect to mens
rea it is always presumed that it is required to prove in each case unless the statute specifically
provides for the absence of the same;

In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nagoti Venkataramana6 , it has been held by the
Supreme Court that in the interpretation of penal provisions, strict construction is required to
be adopted and if any real doubt arises, necessarily the reasonable benefit of doubt would be
extended to the accused.

5
M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, 1963 SCR Supl. (2) 724
6
1996 (6) SCC 409.

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2) For Beneficial Statute such as Statutes related to Industry/workmen, it is always important
to have beneficial liberal interpretation7. Presently, in the period of social welfare legislation,
beneficial interpretation has become important tool of interpretation of statute.

In the case of Secretary, H.S.E.B v. Suresh & Ors Etc.8 it has been held by the SC that the
Contract Labour Regulation Act being a beneficial piece of legislation as engrafted in the
statute book, ought to receive the widest possible interpretation in regard to the words used and
unless words are taken to their maximum amplitude, it would be a violent injustice to the
framers of the law.

3) For Constitution, the basic spirit in form of social justice, equity fraternity etc. should run
throughout the interpretation9 and the interpretation of the Constitutional provisions should be
harmonious and liberal;

In the Case of Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India10, the Supreme Court widened the protection
of life and liberty contemplated by Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that the mere
existence of an enabling law was not enough to restrain personal liberty. Such a law must also
be just, fair and reasonable. This wider interpretation ensured inclusion of many rights under
Article 21.

4) For Taxing Statute, Statutes imposing taxes or monetary burdens are to strictly construe.
The logic behind this principle is that imposition of taxes is also a kind of imposition of penalty
which can only be imposed if the language of the statute clearly says so11; in many instances,
liberal or beneficial interpretation has an important role to play in taxing statute’s
interpretation.

In the case of, Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Co. v Commercial Tax officer12 the Supreme
Court held that in case of interpreting a taxing statute, one has to look into what is clearly
stated. There is no room of searching the intentions, presumptions.

Apart from above brief submissions on interpretation of different statutes, many types of
Internal and External aids are used for the purpose of interpretation of statute. The term internal
aid is defined as interpretation of statute with those means which are found within the text of
the statutes.13 For example: Preambles, Definitional sections and clauses, Provisos,
Explanations etc.

A concise fact about some of these aids is as below:

7
Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT, 196 ITR 188 (SC).
8
1999 3 SCC 601.
9
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
10
AIR 1978 SC 597.
11
CIT v. T.V. Sundaram Iyyengar (1975) 101 ITR 764 (SC).
12
AIR 1997 SC 2920.
13
Law Commission , A continuum on the General Clauses Act, 1897 with special reference to the admissibility
and codification of external aids to interpretation of statutes {Law Comm. No. 6(3)(79)/2002-LC(LS), 2002}.

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Preamble: It is considered as a part of statute and key source to open the mind of interpreters.
It expresses the scope and object of the Act in a comprehensive manner.

Title: These are of two types:

1. Short Title: It merely identifies the enactment.

2. Long Title: It describes the enactment.

For example, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is a short title and the long title is an
Act to make provisions for the prevention of adulteration of food.

Headings: They are prefixed to sections and treated as Preamble for the section and in case of
ambiguity in the section; such headings can be looked into.

Marginal notes: These notes applied to the section cannot be used for interpreting the section.
However, when words are ambiguous, marginal notes are relevant factor to be taken into
consideration while interpreting the ambit of the Section. However with respect to Constitution,
marginal notes appended to the Articles have been made use of in interpreting the articles.

Definition: When a word is defined as having a particular meaning in the enactment, it is that
meaning alone which must be given to it in interpreting the said section of Act unless there be
anything repugnant in the context. When the definition starts with the term “mean” such and
such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive and it restricts the meaning of the
word to that given in the definition section. But where the definition starts with the term
“include” such and such the definition is prima facie extensive. Again when the word is defined
as “means” and includes such and such, the definition would be exhaustive.

Provisos: The purpose of the proviso is to qualify or create an exception to what is in the
enactment. It is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with
relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. Therefore, it is to be interpreted
harmoniously with the main enactment.

Explanations: The purpose of an Explanation is to understand the Act in the light of the
Explanation. It does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the original section, which it explains,
but only makes the meaning clear beyond dispute. It must be read so as to harmonize with and
clear up any ambiguity in the main section.

With respect to instances of external aids, these are those factors which are external to the text
of the statute but are of great help. These aids are basically to refer examples out of the statutory
presentation. These referral is to ascertain the actual position or meaning in a particular
situation.

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Apart from use of these aids, application of certain doctrines and rules in statutory
interpretation is of great relevance which has been explained as below:

Statute must be read as whole in its context.

This one is the very first rule to start with the interpretation of Statute (as even been mentioned
in historical perspective) in Indian Context. It has been rightly defined in the case of Reserve
Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company limited14 that

The art of interpretation depend on the text and the context. These both are the bases of
interpretation in Indian jurisdiction. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what
gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which
makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we
know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and
then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is
looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute- maker, provided by
such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear
different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With
these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause,
each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire
Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be interpreted in isolation. Statutes have
to be interpreted so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.

Moreover, it has been stated in the case of State of W.B. v. Union of India15 that the court must
ascertain the intention of the Legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clause to
be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law,
and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs.

In light of this observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court, reading/ interpretation of statute is

usually being done in light of following rules.

Statute is Effective and Workable

The Courts while pronouncing upon the constitutionality must prefer an interpretation which
keeps the statute within the competence of the Legislature. The importance of the rule of ut res
magis valeat quam pereaf has an effective application in this regard. The importance of this
rule lay in the fact that courts must lean against an interpretation which reduces a statute to a
nullity.16 Here, it is important to analyse that in Indian Context, there is hardly any example
where a statute have been declared void for sheer vagueness, although theoretically it may be
possible to reach such a conclusion in case of absolute intractability of the language used or

14
AIR 1987 SC 1023.
15
AIR 1963 SC 1241.
16
Union of India v. R. Vasudeva Murthy, (2010) 9 SCC 30.

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when the language is absolutely meaningless but application of this pattern of interpretation
with the following list of rules prevent redundancy of a statute.

This principle has further been defined by the Court itself as if the choice is between two
interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the
legislation, we should avoid an interpretation which would reduce the legislation to futility and
should rather accept the bolder interpretation based on the view that Parliament would legislate
only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. At last, Statute should be interpreted
as effective as workable as is possible while lining with following rules.

Rule of literal interpretation

The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation. In other
words, we should read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language. This rule
is the most widely used Rule of Interpretation for the statutes to ascertain the legislative
intention behind the framing of the enactment.

The rule governs and regulates the meaning of the law in as much as the rule provides that the
meaning has to be ascertained from the text of the law itself. In M/s. Hiralal Ratanlal v.
STO17, this Court observed that in interpreting a statutory provision the first and foremost rule
of interpretation is the literally construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is
what does the provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the
legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of
statutes. The other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is
not clear. That the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it.The
departure from this rule is allowed in few cases and in those cases where following rules
supplement the literal rule of interpretation. This departure has beautifully been stated by the
court in the following words:

When the astuteness of the legislature results in manifest ludicrousness or discrimination the
courts have wide powers to substitute their own astuteness.The substitution of astuteness is
been done with the appliance of following rules in the requisite state of affairs.

Doctrine of ‘reading down’

The application of doctrine of reading down is done where a legal provision; read literally,
seems to offend the Constitutional provisions concerning fundamental rights or in case of other
statutory enactment, it is found to be outside the competence of the particular
Legislature18. This doctrine has application if the statute is silent, ambiguous or allows more

17
AIR 1973 SC 1034.
KPC
18
Rao,‘The Income Tax Act and the Constitution of India (kpcraoindia)
<http://kpcraoindi.blogspot.in/2015/03/income-tax-act-and-constitution-of.html> accessed on 3 September 2015

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than one interpretation. In the case of Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of
India19 Krishna Iyer, J. held that this doctrine is basically evolved in line of doctrine of
purposive construction of Statute which has been discussed in detail in the following.

Mischief rule or Hyde’s Rule /Doctrine of Purposive Interpretation/Rule of Beneficial

Interpretation

The Mischief Rule in Heydon’20s case decided in the year 1589 has now acquired the status
of a classic rule and is applied very widely in the countries wherein the British common law
has taken its roots21.Every enactment has a purpose, every enactment is enacted for the benefit
of someone and every enactment has mischief to take care of.

Such rule simply work on the principle that legislature enacts numbers of laws for some definite
reason and interpretation of these legislations should be made in such a way that the basic
reasons for which law is enacted should get compliance. Thus, law should be interpreted in
such a way so that it suppresses the mischief, if any and advances the requisite remedy. It
further requires the Court to interpret legislative provision in such a manner, which ensures the
proper exercise of a right by the person on whom such right is given and in consonance with
the object with which a provision is enacted.

This rule carries an importance in instances of ambiguity. Thus where a law is clear and can
have only one meaning, this rule generally has no application. But in some instances, where
the customary meaning of the language falls short of the basic purpose of the enactment, a more
comprehensive meaning may be ascribed to the words used, provided they are fairly inclined
of it.

For the application of this rule four things are considered in the first instance22 –

i) What was the common law before the making of the Act?
ii) What was the Mischief and defect for which law did not provide?
iii) What remedy are available to cure damages?
iv)The true reason of the remedy.

Applicability of this rule, resolves difficulty of interpretation in number of instances. For

example, if the object of any enactment is public safety, then its working must be interpreted
widely to give effect to that object. Thus in the case of Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923
the main object being provision of compensation to workmen, it was held that the Act ought to
be so interpreted, as far as possible, so as to give effect to its primary provisions.

19
AIR 1981 SC 234.
20
Heydon's Case (1584) 76 ER 637.
21
G.P. Singh, ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ (9th ed., LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur 2004)
133.
22
CIT v. Sodra Devi, (1957) 32 ITR 615 (SC).

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Apart from this, there are other rules as well which are equally important for the purpose of
statutory interpretation. So Denning L.J. once said
“It would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be drafted with divine prescience and
perfect clarity”. In backdrop of this statement, it is to keep in focus the importance of other
rules of interpretation simultaneously.

Rule of harmonious construction

This rule is the final and the most important rule of interpretation. As submitted earlier, Judicial
believe is every statute with every provision has some reason of enactment so the courts while
interpreting must try to avoid a conflict between the provisions of Statute. It may be possible
that different sections may appear to mean contrary to each other or contradicting each
other. Under such circumstances, an attempt should be made to reconcile the provisions of the
Act and an effect should be made to give the effect to both the apparently contradictory
provisions. Thereby a head on clash between sections of the Act is avoided. This is known as
harmonious construction. The rule of reconciliation on the Entries was propounded for the first
time in the case of In re C.P. and Bera Act23.

Along with these rules, there are certain maxims and terms whose expressions play an
important role in interpretation of statute. A brief discussion about some of these maxims as
well as terms is as follows.

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: SPECIFIC EXPRESSIONS

Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant:

This expression specifies that general words or things do not derogate from the special. The
Courts have held that this expression is to mean that when there is a conflict between a general
and special provision, the latter shall prevail. This has been held in number of case laws and
out of which one of the case laws in UOI v. Indian Fisheries (P.) Ltd24.

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

This expression specifies that express mention of one thing implies exclusion of other. For
example, a statute granting certain rights to municipal employees, fire office employees,
government hospital employee would be interpreted to exclude other public employees not
enumerated in the legislation.

23
AIR 1939 FC 1.
24
AIR 1966 SC 35.

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Ejusdem Generis
This expression specifies that all the general word contain in the statute may be interpreted
with reference to the predecessor matter and the interpretation may be narrowed down by
treating them as applying to the things of the same kind as those previously mentioned.

The literal meaning of the term ejusdem generic is “of the same kind or species”25. The rule
requires that where specific words are all of one genius, meaning of the general words shall be
restricted to that genus only unless there is something to show that a wider meaning was
intended.

For example, If a man tells his wife to go to the market to buy vegetables, fruits, groceries and
anything else she needs, the ‘anything else’ would be taken to mean food and grocery items
due to the rule of ejusdem generis and not cosmetics or other feminine accessories.

This rule has its application when the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The statute contains an enumeration of specific words;

b. The members of enumeration constitute a class or category;
c. The class is not exhausted by the enumeration;
d. The general term follows the enumeration;
e. There is no indication of different legislative intent.

Noscitur a Sociis

Noscere means to ‘know’ and sociis means ‘association’. Thus, Noscitur a Sociis means
knowing from association. Thus, under the doctrine of “noscitur a sociis” the questionable
meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its association with other words
within the context of the phrase. This means that where two or more words which are
susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together they are understood to be used in their
cognate sense. They take, as it were, their color from each other, the meaning of the more
general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general.

This doctrine is broader than the doctrine of ejusdem generis because this rule puts the words
in context of the whole phrase and not just in relation to the nearby words.

In State of Assam v. R Muhammad26, Supreme Court made use of this rule to arrive at the
meaning of the word “posting” used in Article 233 (1) of the Constitution. It held that since the
word “posting” occurs in association with the words “appointment” and “promotion”, it took

25
The Printers House Private Ltd. v. Misri Lal Dalip Singh and Ors.,AIR 1970.
26
AIR 1967 SC 903.

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its colour from them and so it means assignment of an appointee or a promote to a position"
and does not mean transfer of a person from one station to another. Apart from these
expressions, there are certain words such as notwithstanding, subject to etc. whose presence in
the statute requires specific interpretation. The use of or in a statute means disjunctive and use
of and is normally conjunctive and a departure from the same is not available unless the very
aim and purpose of the Statute so requires. Apart from these words, it is very important to
know about the nature of the statute or provision. This aspect is easy to understand when we
know the provision stated or statute enacted is a mandatory or directory enactment. As such,
no general rule can be laid down to reach at the conclusion whether any particular provision on
a statue is mandatory or directory. The conclusion, in each case lies upon the actual word used
and also upon the intention of the legislatures for enactment. In the same context, use of words
such as ‘may’, ‘shall’ and ‘must’ can play an important part.

The use of word may signifies permission and implies that authority has discretion but in the
case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh27, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court that there is no doubt that the word ‘may’ generally does not mean ‘must’ or ‘shall’. But
it is well settled that the word ‘may’ is capable of meaning ‘must’ or ‘shall’ in the light of the
context. It is also clear that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled
with an obligation, the word ‘may’ which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a
command.

The use of word must undoubtedly stand for mandatory enactment but with respect to use
of shall position is as same of ‘may’. It signifies mandate but it is well settled principle that use
of the word ‘shall’ does not always mean that the enactment is obligatory or mandatory. It
depends upon the context in which the word ‘shall’ occurs and the other relevant circumstances.

Apart from textual interpretation, it is always important to know that in general, application of
statute is prospectively which means applying the laws in future or at least from the date of
commencement of the statute but in some instances, it may have retrospective (back date)
application also. The following part deals with retrospective application and rule of
interpretation.

27
1964 SCR (2) 197.

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RETROSPECTIVELY APPLICATION OF STATUTE AND RULE OF
INTERPRETATION

In Indian jurisdiction, it is of general believe that a new statute should affect the future not the
past because in general, first and strong presumptions of any law enacted for the first time or
amending the enacted law, is its prospective applicability. The power of retrospective
legislation does exist which is not only subject to the question of competence but is also subject
to several judicially recognized limitation. In order to determine the validity of retrospective
law the court has to take into account all relevant surrounding facts and circumstances. It has
been held that a law will be retrospective only if the words used must expressly provide or
necessarily imply retrospective operation. Retrospective operation is not taken to be intended
unless that intention is manifested by express words or necessary implication; there is a
subordinate rule to the effect that a statute or a section in it is not to be construed so as to have
larger retrospective operation than its language renders necessary.

In the case of, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra28, the Indian position with
respect to retroactivity operation is summarized in the following points:

1) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless

made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which
merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be
retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly
confined to its clearly defined limits;

2) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature and a procedural statute should
not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new
disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already
accomplished;

In other words close attention must be paid to the language of the statutory provision for
determining the scope of the retroactivity intended by Parliament. Such expressions are
manifested for Constitutional and Taxing statute but with respect to penal statute, a strict
prohibition on retrospective application is imposed. A general canon of interpretation of penal
legislation does not permit penal provisions to have retrospective effect. The reasons for the
same are simple.

But, in case of reduction in punishment by the subsequent enactment, the rule of beneficial
construction requires that ex-post facto law should be applied to reduce the rigorous sentence
of the previous law on the same subject. Such a law is not affected by Article 20(1) and other
reasons for non-application of retrospective application will also not be applicable.

28
(1994) 4 SCC 60.

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After discussing various important aspects of interpretation, it is equally important to discuss
the on-going controversy with respect to widened scope of statutory interpretation by the
judiciary. The general arguments of the debate along with judicial stand are as follows:

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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE: ONGOING DEBATE

In the modern decade, it has generally argued that the extent of statutory interpretation has been
greatly widened by the Indian judiciary in the light of public interest litigation, in its endeavour
of protecting individual rights and social justice, judiciary has expanded its functioning from a
mere interpreter of law or adjudicator of disputes to law maker for the state.

In the case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan29 the Court stated that it is the duty of the
executive to fill the vacuum by executive orders because its field is coterminous with that of
the legislature. In the absence of any enacted law or an executive order, the judiciary must step
in, in exercise of its constitutional obligations under Article 32 to provide a solution till the
legislature acts to perform its role by enacting a proper legislation to cover the field. Thus the
court issued guidelines for enforcement of basic human rights and guarantee against sexual
harassment to be observed in all work places until suitable legislation is enacted to occupy the
field. In lieu of this observation, in numerous instances, judiciary has ordered some sort of
legislative directions. Such judicial directions on regular basis boost the very question of
limit/boundary of statutory interpretation and even led to direct attack by jurists and legislatures
upon the ambit of judicial interpretation. Some political leaders, including the Prime Minister,
had argued that the apex court overstepped the limits of judicial powers.

In behest of all such arguments, this question itself was entertained by court in the case
of University of Kerala v. Council for Principles of College where the Court stated that there
is a broad separation of power between the three organs and hence one organ of the State should
not encroach into the domain of another organ. The judiciary should not therefore seek to
perform legislative or executive functions. The Court expressed doubts on the judgment
of Vishaka Case and raised the concerns as to whether the Court can convert itself into an
interim Parliament and make law until Parliament makes a law on the subject.

In lieu of this observation by the Court itself, it is submitted that for smooth and proper
governance of the country, it is necessary to study the Indian Constitution between the lines.
Judgments of the courts should be based on constitutional principles and not on the personal or
political views of judiciary. It should be ensured at every cost that doctrine of separation as
enshrined in Indian Constitution should prevail. For Judiciary, it is very important to know the
limits of its wings otherwise legislatures will cut these wings and judiciary will leave with
nothing to fly. It has to be firm on the stand that if the legislature has decided to enact a
particular law then the judiciary must not abrogation such enactment depending on its whims
and fancies.

A simple restrain or correctives on matters of political import with due chariness by judiciary
will ensure overwhelming and peaceful operation of enactments which have been enacted for
some definite purposes.

29
AIR 1997 SC 3011.

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 IMPORTANT CASES

1. Ispat Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs

FACTS: The facts of the case are that the appellant is a regular importer of iron ore pellets
falling under Chapter Sub-heading No. 2601.12 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The present
appeal relates to 14 consignments of iron ore pellets imported between 14.2.1996 to 21.2.1998.
In all these cases, the mother vessel coming from abroad and carrying the cargo anchored at
Bombay Floating Light (in short 'BFL'). The cargo on board the mother vessel was then
examined by the custom authorities and provisionally assessed to duty. After payment of this
duty, the out of charge order was passed on the Bills of Entry permitting clearing of such goods
for home consumption. After obtaining the out of charge order, the cargo was discharged at
BFL from the mother vessel to the barges which then ferried the cargo to the Dharamtar Jetty.

ISSUES: Dispute regarding Customs Act.

JUDGEMENT: The Tribunal has based its decision on its conclusion that the place of import
was the Dharamtar Jetty and not the BFL (vide paragraphs 9 to 18 of The Tribunal's order).
Without commenting on the correctness or otherwise of this view, we are of the opinion that
whether we treat the place of import as BFL or the Dharamtar jetty it will make no difference
to the conclusion we have reached viz. that charges for transport of the goods by barges from
BFL to Dharamtar jetty cannot be included in the valuation of the goods.

2. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nagoti Venkataramana ,

FACTS: The facts as found and not in dispute are that the respondent had kept in his shop by
name Video City, various cassettes numbering 90 in Telugu, English and Hindu cinematograph
films exhibiting the same either for hire or sale to the customers. The question, therefore, is
whether the respondent has committed infringement of a copy right of deemed infringement
thereof.

ISSUES: Whether the respondent has committed infringement of a copy right of deemed
infringement.

JUDGEMENT: It has been held by the Supreme Court that in the interpretation of penal
provisions, strict construction is required to be adopted and if any real doubt arises, necessarily
the reasonable benefit of doubt would be extended to the accused.

3. H.S.E.B v. Suresh & Ors Etc.

FACTS: he Haryana State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as `Appellant Board') is a
statutory Board with one of its primary functions being the supply of power to urban and
rural areas in the State of Haryana through its various plants and stations. In order to keep the

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said plants and stations clean and hygienic, the Appellant Board, upon tenders being floated,
awards contracts to contractors who undertake the work of keeping the same clean and
hygienic. One such contract was awarded to one Kashmir Singh, for "proper, complete and
hygienic cleaning, sweeping and removal of garbage from the Main Plant Building" at
Panipat, at the rate of Rs.33, 000 per month with a stipulation to engage minimum 42 safai
karamcharis with effect from 15th May, 1987 for a period of one year and in terms therewith
the Contractor took over the work and performed the said work through the above-stated Safai
Karamcharis. Subsequently by reason however of a dispute raised by the Safai Karamcharis,
as regards their entitlement to be absorbed permanently on completion of 240 days in the year
with the Board, the matters were referred to the Conciliation Officer, Panipat culminating
however in an order of reference by the State Government on 27.12.1988 to the Labour Court,
Ambala which was subsequently transferred to Panipat. On the further factual score, it appears
that the Labour Court upon consideration of the facts and the evidence taken on record passed
the impugned award inter alia recording therein that the workmen are otherwise entitled to
reinstatement with continuity of service along with 10% back wages. We shall revert to the
order of the Labour Court for further consideration shortly hereafter, but to complete the basic
factual backdrop in the matter it ought to be noted that as against the order of the Labour Court,
the appellant moved 37 Writ Petitions in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which were
however, disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 24th January, 1995, inter alia,
recording that there existed a relationship of employer and workmen between the Appellant
Board and the respondents and by reason wherefore, the High Court directed reinstatement of
the respondents with continuity of service though however, without back wages.

ISSUES: whether there was a employer and workmen relationship.

JUDGEMENT : it has been held by the SC that the Contract Labour Regulation Act being a
beneficial piece of legislation as engrafted in the statute book, ought to receive the widest
possible interpretation in regard to the words used and unless words are taken to their maximum
amplitude, it would be a violent injustice to the framers of the law.

4. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India30

FACTS: The petitioner was issued a passport on June 1, 1976 under the Passport Act, 1967.
On the 4th of July 1977,the petitioner received a letter dated 2nd July, 1977, from the Regional
Passport Officer Delhi intimating to her that it was decided by the Government of India to
impound her passport under s. 10(3)(c) of the Act "in public interest". The petitioner was
required to surrender her passport within 7 days from the receipt of that letter. The petitioner
immediately addressed a letter to the Regional Passport Officer requesting him to furnish a
copy of the statement of reasons for making the order as provided in s.10(5). A reply was sent

30
AIR 1978 SC 597.

20 | P a g e
by the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs on 6th July 1977 stating inter alia
that the Government decided "in the interest of the general public “not to furnish her copy of
the statement of reasons for the making of the order. The petitioner there upon filed the present
Writ Petition challenging action of the Government.

ISSUES: Personal Liberty discussed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

JUDGEMENT: the Supreme Court widened the protection of life and liberty contemplated by
Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that the mere existence of an enabling law was
not enough to restrain personal liberty. Such a law must also be just, fair and reasonable. This
wider interpretation ensured inclusion of many rights under Article 21.

5. State of W.B. v. Union of India

FACTS: Under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Develop. ment) Act, 1957, enacted
by Parliament, the Union of India proposed to acquire certain coal bearing areas in the State
of West Bengal. The State filed a suit contending that the Act did not apply to lands vested in
or owned by the State and that if it applied to such lands the Act was beyond the legislative
competence of Parliament.

ISSUES: Scope of the Act applies to state or not.

JUDGEMENT: that the court must ascertain the intention of the Legislature by directing its
attention not merely to the clause to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the
clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted
occurs.

6. Heydon’s case

FACTS: This is a construction of leases, life estates, and statutes. Ottery, a religious college,
gave a tenancy in a manor also called “Ottery” to a man (named in the case report simply as
"Ware") and his son, also referred to as Ware. The tenancy was established by copyhold, an
ancient device for giving a parcel of a manor to a tenant, usually in return for agricultural
services, which was something like a long-running lease with special privileges for each party.
Ware and his son held their copyhold to have for their lives, subject to the will of the lord and
the custom particular to that manor. The Wares’ copyhold was in a parcel also occupied by
some tenants at will. Later, the college then leased the same parcel to another man, named
Heydon, for a period of eighty years in return for rents equal to the traditional rent for the
components of the parcel. Less than a year after the parcel had been leased to Heydon,
Parliament enacted the Act of Dissolution. The statute had the effect of dissolving many
religious colleges, including Ottery College, which lost its lands and rents to Henry VIII.

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However, a provision the Act kept in force, for a term of life, any grants made more than a year
prior to the enactment of the statute.

ISSUES: Mischief rule was discussed.

JUDGEMENT: The Court of Exchequer found that the grant to the Wares was protected by
the relevant provision of the Act of Dissolution, but that the lease to Heydon was void.

7.State of Assam v. R Muhammad

FACTS: The respondent, filed petitions under Art. 226 and 227 in the Assam High Court
asking that notifications by the State Government of the transfer of one District & Sessions
Judge and the appointment and posting of another be quashed on the ground that the High
Court alone could make the transfers and In any event, the High Court was to be consulted and
was not consulted before the impugned orders were made. The High Court held that there was
no consultation with regard to the posting of one of the District Judges and that his transfer
was irregular as the High Court alone could have ordered it and furthermore that the transfer
of the other. District Judge was for a like reason also irregular. Holding, however, that none
of the District Judges could be said to occupy wrongly the office of District & Sessions judge,
the High Court declined the writ of quo warranto and Dismissed the petition, but without costs
to the State Government. One of the learned Judges of the High Court who comprised the
Division Bench that heard the petitions, in a separate but concurring judgment, passed some
scathing remarks on the action of the Government which he described as mala fide and actuated
by some ulterior motive.

ISSUES: Who is to order transfer of a District Judge-the State Government or the High Court;
(b) is the provision regarding consultation in Art. 233 mandatory or directory and if the former,
whether the High Court was not in fact consulted; and (c) whether the remarks complained
of about the State Government made by the learned Judge should be expunged.

JUDGEMENT: Supreme Court made use of this rule to arrive at the meaning of the word
“posting” used in Article 233 (1) of the Constitution. It held that since the word “posting”
occurs in association with the words “appointment” and “promotion”, it took its colour from
them and so it means assignment of an appointee or a promote to a position" and does not mean
transfer of a person from one station to another.

8. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh

FACTS: The respondent was appointed a Naib Tehsildar under the appellant, in the year
1937.On August 4, 1952, he was suspended on complaints received against him and his case
was referred for investigation to the Administrative Tribunal appointed under the Rules.

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While the proceedings were pending, additional complaints were received by the appellant
against his conduct and they were communicated to the Tribunal with an intimation that the
appellant proposed to send those further charges against the respondent for enquiry. The
Tribunal did not wait for receipt of the said additional charges and on enquiry exonerated him
from the charges framed against him, in August, 1952. On October 28, 1956, the respondent
was again suspended and the charges framed on the additional complaints were delivered to
him. The respondent submitted his explanation and pleaded that the enquiry might be entrusted
to the Administrative Tribunal in accordance with the Rules; but his request was rejected and
the case was entrusted to the Commissioner with directions to take disciplinary proceeding-,
against him. The High Court allowed the writ petition of the respondent and the order directing
the enquiry to be held by the appointed authority under r. 55 of the said Civil Services Rules
was quashed.

ISSUES: The question for decision in this Court was, whether like the word "may" which
confers the discretion on the Governor, the word "may" confers discretion on him, or does
the word "may" in really mean "shall" or "must".

JUDGEMENT: It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there is no doubt that the
word ‘may’ generally does not mean ‘must’ or ‘shall’. But it is well settled that the word ‘may’
is capable of meaning ‘must’ or ‘shall’ in the light of the context. It is also clear that where a
discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word ‘may’
which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command.

9.Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan

FACTS: Immediate cause for the filing of this writ petition is an incident of alleged brutal
gang rape of social worker in a village of Rajasthan
ISSUES: The fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade or profession depends on the
availability of a "safe" working environment. Right to life means life with dignity. The primary
responsibility for ensuring such safety and dignity through suitable legislation, and the creation
of a mechanism for its enforcement, is of the legislature and the executive. When, however,
instances of sexual harassment resulting in violation of fundamental rights of women workers
under Articles 14, 19 and 21 were brought before the court to redress under Article 32, an
effective redressal requires that some guidelines should be laid down for the protection of these
rights to fill the legislative vacuum.

JUDGEMENT: The Court stated that it is the duty of the executive to fill the vacuum by
executive orders because its field is coterminous with that of the legislature. In the absence of
any enacted law or an executive order, the judiciary must step in, in exercise of its constitutional
obligations under Article 32 to provide a solution till the legislature acts to perform its role by
enacting a proper legislation to cover the field. Thus the court issued guidelines for enforcement
of basic human rights and guarantee against sexual harassment to be observed in all work places

23 | P a g e
until suitable legislation is enacted to occupy the field. In lieu of this observation, in numerous
instances, judiciary has ordered some sort of legislative directions. Such judicial directions on
regular basis boost the very question of limit/boundary of statutory interpretation and even led
to direct attack by jurists and legislatures upon the ambit of judicial interpretation. Some
political leaders, including the Prime Minister, had argued that the apex court overstepped the
limits of judicial powers.

10. Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India.

FACTS: The case is about family dispute regarding land.

ISSUES: Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976 is valid or not. And validity of
Section 27(1).

JUDGEMENT: Krishna Iyer, J., has observed: - “. . . reading down meanings of words with
loose lexical amplitude is permissible as part of the judicial process. To sustain a law by
interpretation is the rule. Courts can and must interpret words and read their meanings so that
public good is promoted and power misuse is interdicted. As Lord Denning said: ‘A judge
should not be a servant of the words used. He should not be a mere mechanic in the power
house of semantics’’. . . .”

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 CONCLUSION

The degree of strictness and literal construction applied by the Courts swung like the proverbial
pendulum to extremes. The above is a very basic overview of the rules of interpretation and is
intended to give an insight into the various methods employed by the Courts to ascertain the
meaning of legal provisions.
To conclude, one must strive hard to read between the lines by using the interpretative
techniques, since one must bear in mind the words of LJ. Denning who stated, thus -

“it would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be drafted with divine prescience
and perfect clarity”.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

WEB SOURCES

1. http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/article/interpretation-of-statutes-1152-
1.html
2. http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Interpretation-of-Statute-
5430.asp#.Vh9e4fmqpBf
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smith_v_Hughes
4. http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/CARDINAL-RULES-FOR-
INTERPRETATION-OF-TAX-STATUTES-2730.asp#.Vh9gXPmqpBd
5. www.westlawindia.com

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