G.R. No.
183871
February 18, 2010 LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN
RUBRICO APRUEBO vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS:
The petition for the writ of amparo dated
October 25, 2007 was originally filed before this
Court. After issuing the desired writ and directing the
respondents to file a verified written return, the Court
referred the petition to the CA for summary hearing
and appropriate action. The petition and its
attachments contained, in substance, the following
allegations:
1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to
the 301st Air Intelligence and Security
Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando
Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D.
Rubrico (Lourdes), then attending a Lenten
pabasa in Bagong Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite,
and brought to, and detained at, the air base
without charges. Following a week of
relentless interrogation - conducted
alternately by hooded individuals - and what
amounts to verbal abuse and mental
harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan
ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was
released at Dasmariñas, Cavite, her
hometown, but only after being made to sign
a statement that she would be a military
asset.
After Lourdes' release, the
harassment, coming in the form of being
tailed on at least two occasions at different
places, i.e., Dasmariñas, Cavite and Baclaran
in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in
bonnets, continued;
2. During the time Lourdes was
missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp.
Gomez), then sub-station commander of
Bagong Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, kept
sending text messages to Lourdes' daughter,
Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing
her to beaches and asking her questions
about Karapatan, an alliance of human rights
organizations. He, however, failed to make
1|C ONSTI 315 - 320
an investigation even after Lourdes'
disappearance had been made known to
him;
3. A week after Lourdes' release,
another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean),
was constrained to leave their house
because of the presence of men watching
them;
4. Lourdes has filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
kidnapping and arbitrary detention and
administrative complaint for gross abuse of
authority and grave misconduct against
Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben
Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and
a certain Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st
AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes
with address at No. 09 Amsterdam Ext.,
Merville Subd., Parañaque City, but nothing
has happened; and the threats and
harassment incidents have been reported to
the Dasmariñas municipal and Cavite
provincial police stations, but nothing
eventful resulted from their respective
investigations.
Two of the four witnesses to
Lourdes' abduction went into hiding after
being visited by government agents in
civilian clothes; and
5. Karapatan conducted an
investigation on the incidents. The
investigation would indicate that men
belonging to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of
the Philippine Air Force (PAF), Alfaro,
Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin
Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes; that
unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able
to pilfer a "mission order" which was
addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by
Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo
issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist
from performing any threatening act against the
security of the petitioners and for the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an
information for kidnapping qualified with the
aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended
party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents
to produce documents submitted to any of them on
the case of Lourdes.
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff,
Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon,
then Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police
Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez,
now retired, and the OMB (answering respondents,
collectively) filed, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically
denying the material inculpatory averments against
them. The OSG also denied the allegations against the
following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma,
Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the allegations' truth. And by way of general
affirmative defenses, answering respondents
interposed the following defenses:
(1) the President may not be sued during her
incumbency; and
(2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the
matters required by Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo
Rule.
Rule:
In Affirming the dropping of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of
amparo, the Court held;
“The presidential immunity from suit
remains preserved under our system of government,
albeit not expressly reserved in the present
constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members
in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the
absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already
understood in jurisprudence that the President may
not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court
subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the
umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the
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President enjoys immunity during her incumbency,
and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is
no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It
will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it
is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties
and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch
and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government.
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is
simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific
presidential act or omission violated or threatened to
violate petitioners’ protected rights.
TIDBITS:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is
envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the
rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free
from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this
life.[42] It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and
adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence
of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances.[43] Accordingly, the remedy ought
to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the
ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo
petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure
amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations.
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006 PROF.
RANDOLF S. DAVID vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Subject:
Moot and Academic, Locus Standi, Political
Question(Calling-out Power), Emergency Powers of
the President, Facial Challenge (Overbreadth
Doctrine), Facial Challenge (Vagueness), Section 17,
Article VII (Take Care Power or Control Power of the
President), Section 17, Article XII (Take Over Power
of the President), 'As Applied' Challenge,Acts of
Terrorism, Right to Peacably Assemble,
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation
celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) 'declaring a state of
national emergency'. On the same day, the President
also issued General Order No. 5 implementing PP
1017 and directing the AFP and PNP to take
appropriate actions 'to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence'
Thereafter, during the dispersal of the
rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant)
Randolf S. David, a UP professor and newspaper
columnist, and Ronald Llamas, president of party-list
Akbayan.
Also, in the early morning of February 25,
2006,operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP,on the basis of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices
in Manila.
One week after the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO No. 5, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1021 declaring that the state of national emergency
has ceased to exist.
Petitions were filed challenging the
constitutionality of and G.O. No. 5 and PP 1017.
The factual basis cited by the Arroyo camp
for the executive issuances was the alleged existence
of plot attempts from the political opposition and
NPA to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. The
plot attempts were a clear and present danger that
justified the orders.
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Rule:
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have
locus standi. Incidentally, it is not proper to implead
President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the
doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office
or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in
the Constitution or law.
It will degrade the dignity of the high office
of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to
enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and
judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive
branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in
the discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government.
However, this does not mean that the President is not
accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he
remains accountable to the people but he may be
removed from office only in the mode provided by
law and that is by impeachment. From the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the
intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
President from suit is concurrent only with his tenure
and not his term. (De Leon, Philippine Constitutional
Law, Vol. 2, 2004 Ed., p. 302).
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001 JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO
FACTS:
FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic
of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit”
Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that
he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from
jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose
Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game.
Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across
the nation, which culminated in the House of
Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case
against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House
Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment
complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the
Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer.
Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of
rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and
left-wing organizations. Activists from the group
Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television
for the first time since the beginning of the protests
and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he
wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing
that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television,
calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections
on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared
that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of
the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA,
becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had
“strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”,
but saying he would give up his office to avoid being
an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his
family later left Malacañang Palace.
4|C ONSTI 315 - 320
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s
leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a
peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any
further proceedings in cases filed against him not until
his term as president ends. He also prayed for
judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken
her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.”
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity
from suits.
Rule:
We reject his argument that he cannot be
prosecuted for the reason that he must first be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted
by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events
that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate
Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."1 Since, the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for petitioner to demand that he should
first be impeached and then convicted before he can
be prosecuted.
The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against
his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to
commend itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not
been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet
can be the object of a criminal prosecution.
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino
Bermudezthat 'INCUMBENT Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the
period of their incumbency and tenure" but not
beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that
the impeachment process against the petitioner has
been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency,
petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine
qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be
claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The
cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president.
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court
licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is
an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the
same footing as any trespasser.
G.R.
No. L-32723 October 15, 1930 THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs.
HERMENEGILDO TRIA
Facts:
In view of the importance of the fundamental point
raised by counsel for the appellant, who in their
motion of September 24, 1930, contend —
That four justices, who composed the divisional court,
that passed upon this case, have no jurisdiction to
decide it, because they do not constitute the required
quorum of this Honorable Court, the division in
question determined to refer it to the full court.
Section 163 of Act No. 2657 (the former
Administrative Code) is invoked, which, among other
things, provides that —
xxx xxx xxx
5|C ONSTI 315 - 320
Five of the judges of the Supreme court, lawfully
convened, shall form a quorum for the transaction of
any business of the court. . . . and it is alleged that this
provision was held constitutional when the Jones Law
(1916) confirmed the jurisdiction of this court.
1awph!l.net
It is true that section 26 of the aforesaid Jones Law
reaffirmed the jurisdiction hitherto exercised by this
court and by the Courts of First Instance, and
anticipated recognition of any increase of jurisdiction
thereafter conferred upon them by law; but this
provision refers to the jurisdiction and not to the
procedure to be followed in exercising it. And the
change in the number of justices prescribed by
section 138 of the present Administrative Code is not
a matter of jurisdiction, but of procedure. It has been
so held in United States vs. Limsiongco (41Phil., 94),
and in Buenviaje vs. Director of Lands (49 Phil., 939).
Therefore, it may well be stated that what the Jones
Law confirmed in Act No. 2657 was not the number of
justices or the quorum prescribed in this Act, which
are details relating to procedure, but the jurisdiction
which this court and Courts of First Instance already
had at that time.
Rule:
There is but ONE SUPREME COURT of the Philippine
Islands. It is the jurisdiction of this Supreme Court
which cannot be diminished. The Supreme Court
remains a unit notwithstanding it works in divisions.
Although it may have two divisions, it is but a single
court. Actions considered in any one of these divisions
and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the
same Tribunal.
G.R. No. 188376
December 14, 2011 LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO SUNTAY
BERSAMIN, J.:
In Land Bank v. Suntay,1 the Court has declared that
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine
just compensation under Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL)
pertains to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as a Special
Agrarian Court; that any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and to
convert the original jurisdiction of the RTC into
appellate jurisdiction is void for being contrary to the
CARL; and that what DARAB adjudicators are
empowered to do is only to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to
be paid to the landowners, leaving to the courts the
ultimate power to decide this question.
Bearing this pronouncement in mind, we
grant the petition for review on certiorari and reverse
the decision promulgated on June 5, 2009 by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106104
entitled Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Conchita
C. Miñas, Regional Agrarian Adjudicaor of Region IV,
and Federico Suntay, as represented by his Assignee,
Josefina Lubrica, dismissing the petition for certiorari
of Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) on the
ground of its being moot and academic.
ANTECEDENTS
Respondent Federico Suntay (Suntay)
owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro with a total area of 3,682.0285
hectares. In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) expropriated 948.1911 hectares of Suntay's
land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.2
Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the
expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total
valuation of P4,251,141.68.3 Rejecting the valuation,
however, Suntay filed a petition for determination of
just compensation in the Office of the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Region IV,
DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-
00; his petition was assigned to RARAD Conchita
Miñas (RARAD Miñas).
On January 24, 2001, after summary
administrative proceeding in DARAB Case No. V-0405-
6|C ONSTI 315 - 320
0001-00, RARAD Miñas rendered a decision fixing the
total just compensation for the expropriated portion
at P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for a
reconsideration, but RARAD Miñas denied its motion
on March 14, 2001. It received the denial on March
26, 2001.
On April 20, 2001, Land Bank brought a
petition for the judicial determination of just
compensation in the RTC (Branch 46) in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian Court,
impleading Suntay and RARAD Miñas. The petition,
docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1241, essentially
prayed that the total just compensation for the
expropriated portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67.6
Rule:
Although Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the Constitution
gives the Court the discretion to sit either en banc or
in divisions of three, five, or seven Members, the
divisions are not considered separate and distinct
courts. Nor is a hierarchy of courts thereby
established within the Supreme Court, which remains
a unit notwithstanding that it also works in divisions.
The actions taken and the decisions rendered by any
of the divisions are those of the Court itself,
considering that the divisions are not considered
separate and distinct courts but as divisions of one
and the same court
G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745 September 17, 2009
CITY GOVENMENT OF TAGAYTAY vs. HON.
ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO
Facts:
Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation
(TTTDC) is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
T-98163 and T-98174 of the Registry of Deeds of
Tagaytay City. TTTDC incurred real estate tax liabilities
on the said properties for the tax years 1976 to 1983.5
On November 28, 1983, for failure of TTTDC to settle Meanwhile, on July 21, 1991, during the pendency of
its delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City CA-G.R. CV No. 24933, TTTDC filed a petition for
Government of Tagaytay (City of Tagaytay) offered nullification of the public auction involving the
the properties for sale at public auction. Being the disputed properties on the ground that the properties
only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor were not within the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay
of the City of Tagaytay and was correspondingly and, thus, beyond its taxing authority.
inscribed on the titles of the properties on November
20, 1984.6
Despite the fact that the Melencios had already
purchased the subject properties, they were not
On July 14, 1989, the City of Tagaytay filed an impleaded in Civil Case No. TG-1196. Thus, on June
unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of 23, 1994, they filed a Motion to Intervene.19 On
title in its favor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) October 5, 1994, the RTC issued an Order denying the
of Cavite, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City. The case was motion.
entitled, "In re: Petition for Entry of New Certificate
of Title, City of Tagaytay, Petitioner." On December 5,
1989, the RTC granted the petition. The dispositive Rule:
portion of the Decision7 reads:
Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court en
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious
banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed
and sufficiently sustained with preponderant, legal
except by the Court sitting en banc. Reasons of public
and factual basis, this Court hereby gives its
policy, judicial orderliness, economy, judicial time,
imprimatur to it and grants the same, dismissing in
and interests of litigants, as well as the peace and
the process, the Opposition filed by Tagaytay-Taal
order of society, all require that stability be accorded
Tourist Development Corporation. Accordingly, the
the solemn and final judgments of the courts or
Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City is hereby ordered
tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no
to allow the City to consolidate the titles covering the
question that such reasons apply with greater force to
properties in question (TCT Nos. T-9816 and T-9817),
final judgments of the highest Court of the land.
by issuing in its favor, and under its name, new
Transfer Certificates of Titles and canceling as basis
thereof, the said TCT Nos. 9816 and 9817 in the name
of Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation,
all of which, being hereby declared null and void,
G.R. No. 138965 March 5, 2007 PUBLIC INTEREST
henceforth.
CENTER, INC. vs.

MAGDANGAL B. ELMA (Third Division Decision)

On June 29, 1990, Atty. Donato T. Faylona, acting as
agent of Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera and Emilina
Melencio-Fernando (Melencios), purchased the
subject properties pursuant to Section 8111 in
relation to Section 7812 of P.D. No. 464.13 The
Melencios bought the subject properties for Three
Million Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱3,550,000.00) representing the total amount of
taxes and penalties due on the same.14
FACTS:
For consideration is the Omnibus Motion,
dated 14 August 2006, where respondent Magdangal
B. Elma sought:
(1) the reconsideration of the Decision in the
case of Public Interest Center, Inc., et al. v. Magdangal
B. Elma, et al. (G.R. No. 138965), promulgated on 30
June 2006;

7|C ONSTI 315 - 320

 (2) the clarification of the dispositive part of
the Decision; and

(3) the elevation of the case to the Court en

banc.

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the

respondents, filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 11
August 2006, with substantially the same allegations.

Respondent Elma was appointed as

Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter,
during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was
appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC).
He accepted the second appointment, but waived any
renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioners sought to have both appointments
declared as unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void.

Rule: There also is no merit in the respondents’

motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. What
is in question in the present case is the
constitutionality of respondent Elma’s concurrent
appointments, and not the constitutionality of any
treaty, law or agreement Section 4 (par. 2), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that: (2) All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all
other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of
a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.

It should be noted that Section 3 of Supreme Court

Circular No. 2-89, dated 7 February 1989 clearly
provides that the Court en banc is not an Appellate
Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division
may be appealed.

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