Property Compilation # 2

Property Case Digests

Republic (PRA) v City of Parañaque
Facts:
● Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) is a government corporation primarily responsible
for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation, administration and operation of
lands belonging to the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and
hastening their development consistent with the public interest
● By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay, including those located in Parañaque City.
● Parañaque City Treasurer Carabeo issued Warrants of Levy on PRA's reclaimed
properties (Central Business Park and Barangay San Dionisio) located in Parañaque City
based on the assessment for delinquent real property taxes for tax years 2001 and 2002.
Issue/s:
● WON reclaimed portions of the foreshore and offshore areas are exempt from real
property tax for being properties of public dominion
Ruling:
● Yes, Foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belongs to the public domain and are
inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition and further
declared no longer needed for public service.
● Section 234 (a) of the LGC, in relation to its Section 133 (o), exempts PRA from paying
realty taxes and protects it from the taxing powers of local government units

SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. — The following are exempted from payment of
the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. — Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units.
● PRA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing an
essential public service pursuant to Section 2 (10) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code. Being an incorporated government instrumentality, it is exempt from
payment of real property tax.
● Real property owned by the Republic is exempt from real property tax unless the
beneficial use thereof has been granted to a taxable person. In this case, there is no proof
that PRA granted the beneficial use of the subject reclaimed lands to a taxable entity.
EH 409 Digestive System 2019-2020

There is no showing on record either that PRA leased the subject reclaimed properties to
a private taxable entity.
● Local governments cannot tax the national government, they may only exercise such
power “subject to such guidelines and limitation as the Congress may provide.
● The subject lands are still part of public dominion, and are therefore, exempt from
payment of real estate taxes.

Woodridge School vs ARB Construction
Facts:
● ARB Construction is the developer of the Soldiers Hills Subdivision. Composed of 4
phases, there was a need for ARB to construct a road to link Phases 1 and 2. The
properties which Woodridge was a usufructuary and co-petitioner is an owner of sat right
in the middle of these estates.
● Initially, the petitioner offered an indemnity for the use of the road but ARB refused and
fenced the road, blocking the petitioners' access to the highway.
● Petitioner filed a complaint to enjoin ARB from depriving them of the - use of the road and
to seek compulsory right of way.
● Trial court ruled in favor of petitioner:
○ The government automatically becomes the owner of the subdivisions' roads the
moment the subdivision plan is approved even if the titles are still registered in the
name of the subdivision owners and the roads are not yet donated to the
government. Thus, the subdivision owner can no longer sell or alienate the roads
for they are already owned by the government. Accordingly ARB cannot
prevent/prohibit plaintiffs from using the road as the same belongs to the
Government
● ARB elevated the case to the CA. CA reversed the decision of the trial court:
○ A compulsory right of way exists in favor of petitioners as there is no other existing
adequate outlet to and from petitioners' properties to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue
other than the subject existing road
○ Awarded 50,000 indemnity to ARB for the petitioners' use thereof
● Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari claiming that the road is property of public
dominion falling under the category "other similar character" as found in Art 420 of the
Civil Code
Issue/s: WON disputed road lot is property of public dominion
Ruling: (refer to Khyz’s PDF that stupid bitch HAHA)

Francisco Chaves vs Public Estates Authority (to be added)
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:


Chavez vs NHA
Facts:
● This was a case involving the reclamation of foreshore lands through the Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP) which aimed to provide
housing to the less fortunate families occupying the Smokey Mountain Dump Site.
● President Arroyo issued MO 161 thereby ordering the implementation of the
Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan.
Subsequently, she issued MO 415 which approved and directed the implementation of the
SMDRP. This was to be undertaken in a joint venture agreement between the National
Housing Authority and the R-II Builders Inc. (In case Atty. asks, this was a Build Operate
Transfer agreement or BOT)
● One of the plans for the implementation of the SMDRP involved the reclamation of 40
hectares of foreshore land in the Manila Bay area. This land reclamation was further
increased to 79 hectares by President Ramos through Proclamation No. 39 due to some
material changes in the implementation of the project
● On Aug. 5, 2004, former solicitor general Francisco Chavez filed the instant petition
directly with the Supreme Court alleging that the land was inalienable and that the
transfer and reclamation thereof by the NHA was invalid
Issues:
● Francisco Chavez raised the following (property related) issues in his petition:
● That the respondents had no power and authority to carry out the reclamation project
● That there was no authorization by the DENR given to the NHA and RBI to reclaim the
foreshore and submerged lands
● That the respondents cannot acquire the foreshore lands since these were inalienable
public lands which were beyond the commerce of man
Ruling:
● The Court stated in its decision that the contention of Chavez was incorrect and denied
his claim of unconstitutionality. (Chavez also filed for injunction and the same was denied
by the SC)
● Regarding the first issue, the Court states that there are three requisites for a valid
reclamation project namely:
○ Approval by the President
○ Favorable recommendation by the Philippine Estate Authority (the government
agency in charge of land reclamation)
○ The reclamation is undertaken by:
■ The PEA
■ Any person pursuant to a contract it entered into with the PEA
■ By the National Government agency or entity authorized under its charter
to reclaim lands subject to consultation with PEA
● SC ruled that the NHA had complied with all three requirements. It is clear that the
President had approved the project (actually 2 presidents approved it). Additionally, there
is presumed favorable recommendation by the PEA due to the fact that the PEA was
made a member of the Executive Committee that was tasked to oversee the

implementation of the program. Lastly, the reclamation was implemented by the NHA, a
national government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with
PEA is derived from its charter.
● Regarding the second issue, the Court held that there was indeed authorization given to
the NHA and RBI. The DENR is a department under the executive branch therefore it is
merely an alter ego of the president. Given the fact that two presidents had issued orders
for the implementation of the project, it cannot be said that there is no authorization given
to the NHA and RBI. Even though the authorization did not come from the DENR itself, the
same is valid since it came from the president. "To still require a DENR authorization on
the Smokey Mountain when the President has already authorized and ordered the
implementation of the Project would be a derogation of the powers of the President as
the head of the executive branch."
● Regarding the third issue, the Court states that there had been three presidential
proclamations classifying the land as alienable and disposable. In addition to this, special
patents were issued by the DENR in favor of the respondents. Combining the two
instances together, this without a doubt constitutes a positive act by the government
classifying the subject property into alienable and disposable. As quoted from the case:
● "MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly taken together with
Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the requirement in P E A that
"[t]here must be a law or presidential proclamation presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession"
● "From the foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has been
declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it
has been reclassified as patrimonial property."

Highlighted Legal Principles:
● I think the most important thing that is to be noted in this case is that the authority to
declare land as A&D rests with the DENR AND the President given the fact that the DENR
is merely a branch under the executive

Notes:
● Locus standi was discussed in this case and it was held that the petitioner had standing
as a taxpayer given the fact that this was a multi billion peso project

Land Bank of the PH vs Republic of the Philippines [G.R. No. 150824. February 4, 2008.]
Facts:
● Forest lands are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of private
appropriation. OCT No. P-2823 was issued on September 26, 1969 in favor of one
Angelito C. Bugayon, located in Davao City, which is described as marshy and under
water during high tide, as it used to be a portion of a dry river bed near the mouth of
Davao River. This land was subdivided into four lots, approved by the Commissioner of

Land Registration on April 23, 1971. Consequently, Bugayong sold the four lots to four
different persons. The validity of which remained undisturbed until some residents of the
land specifically those along Bolton road, filed a formal petition, before the Bureau of
Lands (BL) to check the legitimacy of OCT. They found out that, at the time of the sale by
Bugayong, the land was still within the forest zone, and was released as alienable and
disposable only on 1981 and that Bugayong was never in possession of said land.
● BL declared that the sales patent in favour of Bugayong was illegally issued and that the
Director of Lands had no jurisdiction.
● The Republic is now represented by the DL, thru the OSG, where they instituted a
complaint for the cancellation of the title patent and reversion of the land to the public
domain. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), the mortgagee of the land, countered this
saying that they are mortgagee in good faith, and for value.
● RTC: The mother title, was issued at the time when the area was not yet released by the
Bureau of Forestry to the BL. This was not yet declared as alienable and disposable. They
further ordered the CT of Bugayong as null and void.
● LBP appealed to CA saying that it vaidly acquired mortgage interest on the property, and
emphasized that they are government financial institution. CA ruled against LBP. CA
confirmed that the "evidence for the plaintiff clearly established that the land covered by
OCT No. P-2823 issued pursuant to a sales patent granted to defendant Angelito C.
Bugayong was still within the forestal zone at the time of the grant of the said patent."
● Forest lands or forest reserves, are incapable of private appropriation and possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private properties. cases. It has also
been held that whatever possession of the land prior to the date of release of forested
land as alienable and disposable cannot be credited to the 30-year requirement (now,
since June 12, 1945) under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. It is only from that date
that the period of occupancy for purposes of confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
may be counted. Since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable only on
March 25, 1981, appellants and their predecessors-in-interest could not claim any vested
right thereon prior to its release from public forest zone.
● Thus, notwithstanding the issuance of a sales patent over the subject parcel of land, the
State may still take action to have the same land reverted to the mass of public domain
Issue/s:
● Whether LBP is an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith? (NO)
Ruling::
● At the time OCT No. P-2823 was issued to Bugayong on September 26, 1969, the land it
covered was still within the forest zone. It was declared as alienable and disposable only
on March 25, 1981.
● LBP cites cases where the Court ruled that a party is not required to explore further than
what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest of any hidden defect of an inchoate
right that may subsequently defeat his right to it; and that a bank is not required before
accepting a mortgage to make an investigation of the title of the property being given as
security. LBP submits that its right as a mortgagee is binding against the whole world and
may not be disregarded.

● The Court does not agree. The contention that LBP has an interest over the subject land
as a mortgagee has no merit. The mortgagor, Lourdes Farms, Inc. from which LBP
supposedly obtained its alleged interest has never been the owner of the mortgaged
land. Acquisition of the subject land by Lourdes Farms, Inc. is legally impossible as the
land was released as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981.
● Even assuming that LBP was able to obtain its own TCT by means of mortgage, the title
must also be cancelled as it was derived from an invalidly issued OCT by Bugayong. It is
well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain
classified as forest or timber or mineral lands. Any title issued covering non-disposable
lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled.

ESTATE OF YUJUICO VS. REPUBLIC (GR NO. 168661)
Facts:
● Land in question was originally owned by a certain Fermina Castro which she sought to
register on 1973 which was opposed by the OSG but was then dismissed and as such
attaining finality (Dir. Of lands did not appeal) then an OCT was subsequently issued in
Castro’s favor.
● The said land was then sold to Jesus Yujuico (Y) which then was subdivided into two, one
for him and the other portion sold to a certain Carpio (C) (also petitioner in said case).
● Pub. Estates Authority (PEA) was established for reclamation purposes pursuant to PD
1085 and then was tasked to create the Manila Coastal Road. Both Y and C discovered
that in the plan, it overlapped their land and a portion of their lands were sold by PEA to
Manila Bay Dev Corp (MDBC).
● Y and C filed a petition for quieting title with damages but in 1998, parties entered into a
Compromise Agreement approved by the RTC. A deed of exchange of property
transpired where a 1.4 hectares of PEA land will be conveyed to Y and C in exchange for a
combined property of 1.7 hectares.
● Subsequently, a new PEA General Manager was appointed, new GM held in abeyance the
compromise agreement which led to the filing of a petition for relief which reached the
SC, and then was dismissed for being filed out of time.
● In 2001, however, the OSG filed a petition for annulment and cancellation was filed
claiming that the land surveyed for Fermina Castro in 1973 was part of the Manila Bay thus
claiming further that Castro had no registrable rights on said land because it forms part of
public dominion.
● RTC held that action was barred by res judicata however, it was overturned by the CA
claiming that res judicata does not apply to lands of Public Domain.
Issue/s:
1. Is a reversion suit proper in this case?
2. Is the present petition estopped by laches?
3. Did the CA erroneously apply the principle of res judicata?
Held:
1. Is a reversion suit proper in this case?

a. No. The Republic misled the reversion suit with the Parañaque RTC. It should have
been led with the CA as required by Rule 47. Evidently, the Parañaque RTC had
no jurisdiction over the instant reversion case. Assuming that the Parañaque RTC
has jurisdiction over the reversion case, still the lapse of almost three decades in
filing the instant case, the inexplicable lack of action of the Republic and the injury
this would cause constrain us to rule for petitioners.
i. An action for reversion seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded
and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public
domain. This remedy is provided under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141
(Public Land Act). Said law recognized the power of the state to recover
lands of public domain.
ii. While CA No. 141 did not specify whether judicial confirmation of titles by a
land registration court can be subject of a reversion suit, the government
availed of such remedy by filing actions with the RTC to cancel titles and
decrees granted in land registration application. The situation changed on
August 14, 1981 upon effectivity of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 which
gave the Intermediate Appellate Court the exclusive original jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs.
2. Is the present petition estopped by laches?
a. Yes. General rule is that Estoppel does not operate against the state, certain
deviation has been allowed citing Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. CA: Estoppels against
the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and
unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to
defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. SC said
Equitable Estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when said land was
already alienated to innocent purchasers of value.
i. Not only was the land barred by estoppel but by laches as well because
Yujuico acquired the land from Castro in 1974 or more than 27 years have
lapsed until the case for reversion was filed in 2001.
ii. Sec. 32 of PD 1529 recognizes the rights of innocent purchasers for value,
it states “but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court
where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest
therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.”
iii. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled thereto has either abandoned or declined to assert it.
3. Did the CA erroneously apply the principle of res judicata?
a. Yes. For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a nal judgment or order; (2) the
court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;

(3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between
the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
i. Requisites 1, 3 and 4 are clearly present. As for the 2nd requisite, firm is
the principle that jurisdiction is conferred by law. Sec. 14 of PD 1529 states
that applicants for registration of title of lands may file in the proper Court
of First Instance (RTC now). Requisite 2 is complied with.

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v Republic
Facts:
● Mario Malabanan applied for the registration of a parcel of land located in Cavite. He
claims that he purchased the subject land from Eduardo Velazco and that his
predecessors-in-interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years.
● Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s
death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited
by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena,
their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A,
which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold
by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
● They presented a certificate issued by CENRO, DENR, dated June 1, 2001 verifying that
the said land was within the alienable and disposable land per Land Classification Map
No. 3013.
● Subject and was declared A&D in 1982. Tax declarations presented is from year 1948.
Issue/s:
● WON Malabanan can register the subject land under Sec 14 (2) of PD 1529.
Ruling:
● No, to acquire ownership through acquisitive prescription, the land must first be classified
as A&D and express declaration of the State that the subject property is no longer
intended for the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial property for the period of prescription to run.
● The subject land was declared A&D in 1982 BUT there is no competent evidence that it is
no longer intended for public use. (Art 422 of the Civil Code.)
● The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2)
of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription
● Under Art 1113 of the Civil Code, all things within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription. However, properties of the state or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.

● Public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable, there must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And
only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
a. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled
to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
b. There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

DENR vs Mayor Yap (refer to Khyz’s PDF that stupid bitch HAHA)
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

Republic of the Phils. vs. Emmanuel Cortez
Facts:
● Emmanuel Cortez filed with the RTC an application for judicial confirmation of title over a
parcel of land located at (Poblacion), Aguho, P. Herrera Street, Pateros, Metro Manila. He
asserts that the subject land is not part of the reservation of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and is, in fact, classified as alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development. He claims that this land was inherited
by her mother from her parents in 1946, and that his family had been in possession of the
land since time immemorial. After his parents died, he and his siblings executed an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate over the properties of their deceased parents and one
of the properties allocated to him was the subject property.
● To Support his application, he submitted the following: (1) tax declarations for various
years from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the
property is classified as alienable and disposable; (3) technical description of the property,
with a certification issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance certificate; (5)
extrajudicial settlement of estate dated March 21, 1998, conveying the subject property to
Cortez, and (6) escritura de particion extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the
subject property to Felicisima Cotas — Cortez' mother.

● Since there was no opposition, RTC ruled in Favor of Cortez, stating that there is sufficient
basis to grant the relief prayed for. It having been established by competent evidence that
the possession of the land being applied for by the applicant and his predecessor in
interest have been in open, actual, uninterrupted, and adverse possession, under claim of
title and in the concept of owners, all within the time prescribed by law. CA affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
Issue/s:
● Whether or not the CA made a mistake in affirming the decision of the lower court.
Ruling:
● The court found that Cortez failed to comply with the legal requirements for the
registration of the subject property under PD 1529, Sec. 14 (1) and (2).
● Under Sec. 14 (1), applicants for registration of titles must establish the ff: first, that the
subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain;
second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third,
that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."
● To support hi claim under section 14 (1) Cortez only relied only on the survey plan
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Oscar B. Fernandez and certified by the Lands
Management Bureau of the DENR, which classified the land as alienable and disposable.
SC affirmed that, to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and
a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the act or
statute.
● He also cannot register the land under Sec. 14 (2) since he was unable to show proof that
his family had own the property since time immemorial, other than his bare claim that his
mother inherited the land since 1946, the earliest tax declaration he could produced was
only for 1966. The court also ruled that they could not own the property thru prescription
since the land was still a public dominion.

Republic of the Philippines vs Rosario De Guzman Vda de Joson
Facts:
● Rosario in this case claimed ownership of a land that she had inherited from her mother
and possessed openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, against the whole world in the concept
of owner since 1963. Furthermore, her predecessors had possessed the land (by virtue of
a deed of sale conveyed to them) since 1926. It is to be noted that the respondent had
also been paying the taxes levied against the property

● The land was located in Paombong, Bulacan and Rosario filed an application for land
registration in the CFI in that area
● The Department of Lands and the Director of Forest Development contested the
registration on the ground that the land fell under the unclassified region in Paombong,
Bulacan and such unclassified region was denominated as forest land. They contend that:
○ The land is beyond the commerce of man
○ Payment of taxes vests no title to the respondent
● The CFI ruled in favor of the respondent and granted her petition to register the land
● The CA affirmed the ruling of the CFI, hence this appeal to the Supreme Court
Issue/s:
● Whether or not the CFI and the CA were correct in ordering the registration of the land in
favor of Rosario
Ruling:
● The Court in this case REVERSED the decision of the CFI and the CA
● The applicable law in the current case is Section 14 (1) and (2) of the property registration
decree (PD 1529) which provides the persons who may file an application for the
registration of land with the CFI:
○ Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier
○ Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws. (Ordinary prescription - 10 years // Extraordinary
prescription - 30 years)
● Under Section 14(1) Rosario had to prove that:
○ The land was alienable and disposable
○ She, by herself, or through her predecessors in interest have been in possession
of the land under a bona fide claim from June 12, 1945 or earlier
● Furthermore, the one who files for the application for registration is the one who has the
burden of proving that all the requisites have been met
● As clearly stated in the facts of the case, Rosario had proven that the land had been
occupied by her predecessors as early as 1926. HOWEVER, she failed to prove that there
was a positive act by the government that declared the land as alienable and disposable
● Additionally, herein respondent tried to introduce into evidence a the certification dated
March 8, 2000 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) which declared
the land as Alienable and Disposable. The Court ruled however, that "a survey conducted
by a geodetic engineer that included a certification on the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land
still formed part of the inalienable public domain"
● In addition to this, the application for registration of the land took place in 1976. The land
was declared alienable and disposable in 1980. The Court stated that the period of

possession prior to the reclassification of the land, no matter how long, is irrelevant
because prescription does not operate against the State until such reclassification

Highlighted legal principles:
REMEMBER: it does not matter how long you occupied the land. If it is not declared Alienable and
Disposable, you can never acquire it through prescription no matter how long you have stayed.

PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT VS CFI MANILA BRANCH X, and V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates (GR
NO. L-32162)
Facts:
● In August 1964, VD Isip and Sons, (“VDIS”) represented by Vicente Isip, entered into a
“Contract and Agreement” with the Pasay City Gov’t (“Pasay”), represented by Mayor
Pablo Cuneta, to construct a new Pasay City Hall. The said contract contemplated
construction by stages where VDIS shall advance the amount needed for the construction
and shall only proceed on the succeeding stage upon reimbursement of Pasay.
● VDIS accomplished about Php1.7M of the total contract price of Php 4.9M, representing
various stages of work. Pasay City only paid Php 1.1M leaving a balance of Php 600k,
which prompted VDIS to file an action for specific performance.
● During the litigation, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement where VDIS shall
be paid the balance, subject to VDIS furnishing Pasay “…a new performance bond in
proportion… to the remaining value of the unfinished construction…” as provided in
sub-paragraph B of paragraph 1.
● Thereafter, VDIS applied for garnishment on the PNB funds of Pasay, which the latter is
now assailing the validity. In its motion to set aside the garnishment, Pasay is questioning
the order of the court on the submission of the performance bond furnished by VDIS.
● VDIS submitted a performance bond of Php60k which VDIS increased subsequently to
Php100k which pertains to the 20% of the cost of the next stage of the construction to be
undertaken. The court found the same reasonable and substantially compliant for the
court deems it unreasonable to compel VDIS to submit a performance bond for the
remaining cost of the project.
Issue/s:
1. Are the funds of the Pasay City Government which were garnished by the City Sheriff
exempt from execution and/or garnishment?
2. Should the amount of the performance bond cover the whole unfinished project or only
the next stage of work to be done?
3. How should the parties go about the Compromise Agreement?
Held:
1. Are the funds of the Pasay City Government which were garnished by the City Sheriff
exempt from execution and/or garnishment?
a. No. All government funds deposited with the PNB by any agency or
instrumentality of the government, whether by way of general or special deposit,
remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy. But,

inasmuch as an ordinance has already been enacted expressly appropriating the
amount of P613,096.00 of payment to Isip, then the funds may be garnished.
b. Stated in the case of Republic vs. Palacio (L-20322, 23 SCRA 899 [May 29,1968]),
to wit: Judgments against a State in cases where it has consented to be sued,
generally operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's claim in the absence
of express provision; otherwise they cannot be enforced by processes of the law;
and it is for the legislature to provide for the payment in such manner as it sees fit.
2. Should the amount of the performance bond cover the whole unfinished project or only
the next stage of work to be done?
a. Yes. Sub-paragraph B of paragraph 1 of the Compromise Agreement
contemplated a DIVISIBLE OBLIGATION. Therefore, the performance bond should
be “in proportion” to the uncompleted work.
i. What is crucial in sub-paragraph B of paragraph 1 of the compromise
agreement are the words "in proportion." If the parties really intended the
performance bond to refer to the whole unfinished work, then the
provision should have required the plaintiff contractor to submit and file a
new performance bond to cover the remaining value cost of the unfinished
work of the construction. Using the words in proportion then significantly
changed the meaning of the paragraph to ultimately mean a performance
bond equal to 20% of the next stage of work to be done.
3. How should the parties go about the Compromise Agreement?
a. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but
there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise. A
judgment on a compromise is a final and executory. It is immediately executory in
the absence of a motion to set the same aside on the ground of fraud, mistake or
duress. In fact, in the herein case before Us, execution has already been issued.
Considering this in the light of Article 2041 of the New Civil Code, to wit: Art. 2041.
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party
may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand.
i. It is obvious that the respondent-appellee did not only succeed in
enforcing the compromise but said plaintiff-appellee likewise wants to
rescind the said compromise. The respondent-appellee in the case herein
before Us wants to avail of both options. This cannot be done. The
respondent-appellee cannot ask for rescission of the compromise
agreement after it has already enjoyed the first option of enforcing the
compromise by asking for a writ of execution resulting thereby in the
garnishment of the Pasay City funds deposited with the Philippine National
Bank which eventually was delivered to the respondent-appellee.


Espiritu v Municipal Council of Pozorrubio
Facts:
● During the last world war, the market building of the town of Pozorrubio was destroyed,
and after Liberation, the market vendors began constructing temporary and make- shift
stalls, even small residences, on a portion of the town plaza.
● The Municipal Treasurer collected from these stall owners fees at the rate of P.25 per
square meter a month. In time, the whole municipal market was rehabilitated, but the
owners of the structures on the plaza failed and refused to transfer to said market place.
Issue/s:
● WON reclaimed portions of the foreshore and offshore areas are exempt from real
property tax for being properties of public dominion
Ruling:
● Yes, Foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belongs to the public domain and are
inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition and further
declared no longer needed for public service.
● Section 234 (a) of the LGC, in relation to its Section 133 (o), exempts PRA from paying
realty taxes and protects it from the taxing powers of local government units

SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. — The following are exempted from payment of
the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person.
xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. — Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units.
● PRA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing an
essential public service pursuant to Section 2 (10) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code. Being an incorporated government instrumentality, it is exempt from
payment of real property tax.
● Real property owned by the Republic is exempt from real property tax unless the
beneficial use thereof has been granted to a taxable person. In this case, there is no proof
that PRA granted the beneficial use of the subject reclaimed lands to a taxable entity.
There is no showing on record either that PRA leased the subject reclaimed properties to
a private taxable entity.

● Local governments cannot tax the national government, they may only exercise such
power “subject to such guidelines and limitation as the Congress may provide.
● The subject lands are still part of public dominion, and are therefore, exempt from
payment of real estate taxes.

Province of Zamboanga vs City of Zamboanga (refer to Khyz’s PDF that stupid bitch HAHA)
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

Salas vs. Jarencio
Facts:
● City of Manila – owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 557 of
Cadastral Survey of City of Manila, containing an area of 9689.80 sqm. On various dates
in 1927, City of Manila sold portions of the parcel of land. When the last sale was effected
August 1924, Transfer Certificate of Title 22547 covering the residue of the land 7490.10
sam was issued in the name of City of Manila.
● On September 1960, Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requesting the
President to consider the feasibility of declaring the land under Transfer Certificate of Title
25545-25547 as patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of selling these lots to the
actual occupants thereof. The resolution was then transmitted to the Congress. The bill
was then passed by Congress and approved by President, and became Republic Act 4118,
converting the land from communal property to disposable and alienable land of State.
● To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested City of Manila to deliver the City’s TCT
22547 in order to obtain title thereto in the name of Land Authority. The request was
granted with the knowledge and consent of City mayor, cancelling TCT 22547 and issuing
TCT 80876 in the name of Land Authority.
● For reasons that do not appear in record, City of Manila brought an action to restrain,
prohibit, and enjoin Land Authority and Register of Deeds from implementing RA 4118,
and praying for the declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional.
● Trial court declared RA 4118 to be unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it
deprived City of its property without due process of law and payment of just
compensation.
● Land Authority and Register of Deeds argued that the land is a communal land, or a
portion of public domain owned by State; that the land has not been used by City of
Manila for any public purpose; that it was originally a communal land not because it was
needed in connection with its organization as a municipality but rather for the common
use of its inhabitants; that the City mayor merely enjoys the usufruct over said land and its
exercise of acts of ownership by selling parts thereof did not necessarily convert the land
into a patrimonial property of City of Manila nor divert the State of its paramount title.
Issue/s:
● Whether the aforementioned land is a private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

Ruling:
● The land is public property.
● As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of the land in the possession
of municipality, excepting those which it acquired in its own funds in its private or
corporate capacity, such property is held for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants,
whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. The legal situation is the same if
the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use.
● When it comes to property of municipality which it did not acquire in its private or
corporate capacity with its own funds (the land was originally given to City by Spain), the
legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of the National
Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to
the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of the people.
● The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or
proprietary capacity. The land was part of the territory of City of Manila granted by
sovereign in its creation. Furthermore, City expressly recognized the paramount title of
the State over its land when it requested the President to consider the feasibility of
declaring the lot as patrimonial property for selling.
● There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State
and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. But since
the City did not actually use said land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to
remain idle and unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no
presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be acquiesced
in to justify the claim that it is its own private or patrimonial property.

Manila Lodge 761 vs CA
Facts:
● This case involved Act No. 1360 (as amended by Act No 1657) which granted authority to
the City of Manila to a tract of reclaimed land and provided that a portion of the reclaimed
land (at the north end) shall be reserved for either the sale or lease of the subject portion
to a hotel
○ note that there was an annotation in the title of the land providing for the right of
the City of Manila to repurchase the property
● The lot was sold to Manila Lodge 761. Subsequently, the Manila Lodge filed a petition for
the cancellation of the right to repurchase which was granted by the CFI. They then sold it
to the Tarlac Development Corporation
● The City of Manila filed for the reannotation of the right to repurchase which was granted
by the RTC. Manila Lodge and Tarlac Development Corp. appealed the decision but the
CA confirmed it
● As a consequence of the reannotation of the right to repurchase, TDC filed a complaint
against the City of Manila and the Manila Lodge. They declared that they were purchasers
for value and that they purchased the land in good faith

● City of Manila answered that they could not have been purchasers in good faith because
they should have been aware of the right to repurchase as well as the fact that the
property is a part of the luneta extension
● The Lower court then ruled that the subject land was part of the "public park or plaza" and
therefore part of public domain thus the sale was null and void
● Petitioners argue that the property could not have been part of the "public park or plaza"
since the character of property for public use can only attach to roads and squares that
have already been constructed or at least laid out as such, which conditions did not
obtain regarding the subject land since there was no constructed park on the site yet
Issue/s:
● Whether or not the parcel of land was patrimonial property or public domain
Ruling:
● The Court ruled that first there has to be an examination of the legislative intent of the
pertinent Acts in order to identify the nature of the property
● The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a
"public" nature
● The reclaimed area, an extension to the Luneta, is declared to be property of the City of
Manila. Property, however, is either of public dominion or of private ownership. In this
case the Court ruled that this was property of public dominion, intended for public use
● Essentially, one of the characteristics of patrimonial property is that it can be disposed
without need for authorization to do so from a lawmaking body. Act No. 1360, as
amended, however, provides by necessary implication, that the City of Manila could not
dispose of the reclaimed area without being authorized by the lawmaking body
● The Court stated that "without the authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360, the City
of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern portion; much less could it dispose of
the whole reclaimed area."
● Furthermore, the Court states that before the land was reclaimed, it was part of the Manila
Bay. Bays are parts of national domain open to public use and the Court ruled that when
the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being property
for public use. "when the lots became a part of the shore. As they remained in that
condition until reclaimed by the filling done by the Government, they belonged to the
public domain for public use. Hence, a part of the shore, and for that purpose, a part of
the bay, did not lose its character of being for public use after it was reclaimed."
● Lastly, the petitioners argue that there was no park yet constructed on the subject land
therefore it could not be considered as "for public use". The Court however decreed that
it is not necessary that a plaza be already construed or laid out as a plaza in order that it
be considered property for public use. It is sufficient that it be intended to be such
● Petitions were dismissed. Court declared that the land was not the patrimonial property of
the City of Manila but property of public domain granted to it for public use. The titles
were ordered to be reverted back to the City of Manila

Highlighted legal principles:

● Essential characteristic of patrimonial property is that it no longer requires authorization
for its disposition
● No matter how valid the sale or good the faith was in the purchase of the land, if it is land
of public dominion, it is void since this is beyond the commerce of man

The Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego [G.R. No. L-30098. February 18, 1970.]
Facts:
● On November 20, 1940, the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint for eminent
domain in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the expropriation of a parcel of land
belonging to N.T. Hashim needed to construct EDSA. In 1940, the Government took
possession of the property upon deposit with the City Treasurer of the sum of P23,413.64
The records of the expropriation case were destroyed and lost during the second world
war, and neither party took any step thereafter to reconstitute the proceedings.
● 1958, the estate of N.T. Hashim, deceased, through its Judicial Administrator, Tomas N.
Hashim, filed a money claim with the Quezon City Engineer's Office for the FMV of the
property now converted into a public highway. The parties entered into a compromise
agreement - P14.00 per sqm for the 14,934 sqm land (total of P209,076).such was
approved and the Commissioner of Public Highways was ordered to pay the amount due.
Commissioner of Public Highways failed to pay and the respondent filed an issuance of a
writ of execution. The sheriff served the writ with a Notice of Garnishment to PNB against
the Bureau’s funds. Hashim further filed a motion for issuance of an order ordering the
release of the amount. PNB, through Benjamin Coruna’s discretion, released the amount
without notice to the petitioner.
● Commissioner of Public Highways filed the present action seeking the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction for the immediate reimbursement of the garnished
sum of P209,076 The respondent estate has not reimbursed PNB either as to this last
amount, and the bank has complacently not taken any steps in the lower court to require
such reimbursement.

ISSUES
1. Whether the petitioners can invoke the State’s immunity from suit?
a. No. The State may not invoke the State’s immunity from suit. The expropriation of
the property, which now forms part of EDSA, is a fait accompli and is not
questioned by the state. The only question at issue was the amount of the just
compensation due to respondent estate in payment of the expropriated property.
It is elementary that in expropriation proceedings, the State precisely submits to
the Court's jurisdiction and asks the Court to affirm its lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated for the public use or purpose described in its
complaint and to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid therefor.
2. Whether the State can impugn the validity of the compromise agreement executed by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the State?

a. No. The State may not impugn the validity of the compromise agreement. The
Compromise Agreement was executed only by the lawyer of respondent estate,
without any showing of having been specially authorized to bind the estate
thereby, because such alleged lack of authority may be questioned only by the
principal or client, and respondent estate as such principal has on the contrary
confirmed and ratified the compromise agreement. As a matter of fact, the
Solicitor General, in representation of the State, makes no prayer for the
annulment of the compromise agreement or of the respondent court's decision
approving the same.
3. Whether the orders from the Court (i.e., issuance of writ of execution, delivery of
garnished amount) are valid?
a. The Court holds that respondent court’s orders are null and void on the ground
that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment. The Court
held that although the Government, as plaintiff in expropriation proceedings,
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the Court and thereby waives its immunity from
suit, the judgment requiring payment for the condemned property cannot be
realized upon execution. The Court there added that it is incumbent upon the
legislature to appropriate any additional amount, over and above the provisional
deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award determined in the judgment,
since the Government cannot keep the land and dishonor the judgment.
RULING
ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted. The respondent court's
questioned Orders of are declared null and void, and all further proceedings abated. The writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction heretofore issued is made permanent, except as to respondent
judge who is excluded therefrom, without prejudice to any cause of action that private
respondents may have, inter se. Respondent estate and respondent Tomas N. Hashim as prayed
for by respondent Philippine National Bank in its Answer, are ordered jointly and severally to
reimburse said respondent bank in the amount of P209,076.00 with legal interest until the date
of actual reimbursement. Respondents Estate of N. T. Hashim, Philippine National Bank and
Benjamin Coruña are ordered jointly to pay treble costs.

PROFESSIONAL VIDEO INC. VS. TESDA (GR NO. 155504)
Facts:
● PROVI was an entity engaged in the sale of high technology equipment, information
technology products and broadcast devices, including the supply of plastic card printing
and security facilities.
● TESDA is a subsidiary branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
established under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994) to “develop and
establish a national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the
country.”
● To fulfil this mandate^, it sought to issue security-printed certification and/or identification
polyvinyl (PVC) cards to trainees who have passed the certification process.

● TESDA’s Pre-Qualification Bids Award Committee (PBAC) conducted two (2) public
biddings on June 25, 1999 and July 22, 1999 for the printing and encoding of PVC cards.
Due to the failed bidding, the PBAC recommended that TESDA enter into a negotiated
contract with PROVI. On December 29, 1999, TESDA and PROVI signed and executed
their “Contract Agreement” for the provision of goods and services in the printing and
encoding of PVC cards.
● Under the Contract Agreement, PROVI will supply TESDA with the contracted goods and
services that would comply with the specifications defined in the Technical Proposal and
in turn, TESDA would pay PROVI the amount of Thirty-Nine Million Four Hundred and
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P39,475,000) within fifteen (15) days after TESDA’s
acceptance of the contracted goods and services.
● TESDA failed to pay an outstanding balance of P35M which led PROVI to file a complaint
with RTC for sum of money with damages against TESDA which also prayed for a Writ of
Attachment/garnishment against TESDA. RTC granted the PROVI’s Writ against the
properties of TESDA amounting to P35M.
● The CA reversed the RTC which stated that TESDA’s funds are public in nature thus
exempt from garnishment and second, purchase of PVC Cards was a necessary incident
of its gov’t function.
Issue/s:
1. Is the writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds, to cover PROVI's claim against
TESDA, valid?
2. Is PROVI entitled to such writ of attachment?
Held:
1. Is the writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds, to cover PROVI's claim against
TESDA, valid?
a. No. SC upheld CA. First, TESDA as an unincorporated instrumentality of the
government operating under a specific charter and performing governmental
functions, STATE IMMUNITY applies to it. By reason of Public Policy, performance
of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these
suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performance of
governmental functions. Second, selling of the PVC cards does not characterize
such transaction as industrial or business but rather part of TESDA’s general
governmental function as they are undertaken to discharge such functions. Third,
TESDA's funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a
writ of garnishment or attachment. Under Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA
budget for the implementation of the Act shall be included in the annual General
Appropriation Act; hence, TESDA funds, being sourced from the Treasury, are
moneys belonging to the government, or any of its departments, in the hands of
public officials. As reiterated in many cases, public funds cannot be the object of
garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously
granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus, there should be a specific
appropriation covering such payment for PROVI to be able to garnish
2. Is PROVI entitled to such writ of attachment?

a. No. PROVI has not shown that it is entitled to the writ of attachment. It failed to
comply with the two grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court to which attachment may issue: (b) In an action for money or property
embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his use by a public officer,
or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in the
course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity,
or for a willful violation of duty; (d) In an action against a party who has been guilty
of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is
brought, or in concealing or disposing of the property for the taking, detention or
conversion of which the action is brought;


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