STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

“If there are ten lawyers in a room discussing one and the same law, you can expect eleven different
constructions and interpretations.”

Statutory construction is the act or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention
is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided in the law.

One who interprets makes use of intrinsic aids or those found in the statute itself, while one
who constructs makes use of extrinsic aids or those found outside of the written language of the law.

When the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and
intention of the legislature should be determined from the language employed, and where there is no
ambiguity in the words, there is no room or construction.

In other words, when the language of the law is plain, it is not necessary, and it is not permissible, to
resort to extrinsic aids.

When the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same
according to its clear language.

THE MOST BASIC RULES TO REMEMBER

APPLY THE LAW INTERPRET THE LAW CONSTRUCT THE LAW

When the law When there is ambiguity in the When the intent of the legislature
speaks in clear and language of the statute, ascertain cannot be ascertained by merely
categorical legislative intent by making use making use of intrinsic aids, the
language of intrinsic aids, or those found in court should resort to extrinsic aids,
the law itself. or those found outside the language
of the law

3 CARDINAL RULES WHEN THE WORDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE

SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION

FIRST: VERBA LEGIS

Whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.

SECOND: RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA

In case of ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers.

THIRD: UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT

The Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, but if the plain meaning of the word is not found
to be clear, resort to other aids is available.
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

1. INTRINSIC AIDS
Elements found in the law itself

1.1. TITLE
That which expresses the subject matter of the law.

Ex:
“AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND
AMMUNITION AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF”
(Republic Act No. 10591)

“AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN,

PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (Republic Act No.
9262)

1.2. PREAMBLE
That which states the reasons or the objectives of the law.

People vs. HON. A. PURISIMA, et al.

G.R. Nos. L-420050-66, November 20, 1978

In this case, the Supreme Court Ruled that the intent and spirit of Presidential Decree
No. 9 can be found in the preamble or “whereas” clauses, which enumerate the facts,
or events that justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated
therein.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

1) An Information for violation of PD No. 9 was ordered quashed by Judge Purisima
because said information failed to allege an essential element of the offense: That
the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt
weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

2) On appeal, the Solicitor General raised the argument that the prohibited acts need
not be related to subversion activities and that the preamble of the statute or that
expressed in the “whereas” clauses is not an essential part of an act and cannot
enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute. It was also
argued that the explanatory note merely explains the reasons for issuing the
decree and this cannot prevail over the text itself.

P.D. No. 9
“It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon
such as "fanknife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or
club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to
earn a livelihood and while being sued in connection therewith; and any person
 found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to
ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.”

THE RULING:

The Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor General.

Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of
PD No. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and
this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the
stiff sanction stated therein.

P.D. No. 9

 WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the
Philippines has been placed under a state of martial law;

 WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated
September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have
been promulgated by me;

 WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminally,

chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081
are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly
weapons;

 NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all

the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby
order and decree that:

1.3. WORDS, PHRASES AND SENTENCES, CONTEXT.

The intention of the legislature must primarily be determined from the language of
the statute and such language consists of the words, phrases and sentences used
therein.

The meaning of the law should, however, be taken from the general consideration of
the act as a whole and not from any single part, portion or section or from isolated
words and phrases, clauses or sentences used.
 CECILLEVILLE REALTY AND SERVICE CORPORATION
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL
G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997

FACTS OF THE CASE:

1) In 1976, Sotero Pascual became a tenant of Jose A. Resurreccion, the president of

petitioner Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation, in the latter’s land at
Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. When Sotero died, his wife Ana Pascual succeeded
him in tenancy by operation of law. As such tenant she had a home lot and a
house on the landholding. She was assisted in the cultivation of the land by her
son, private respondent Hermigildo Pascual, who also occupies a portion of the
landholding distinct from that occupied by his mother.

2) Petitioner Cecilleville sought to eject Hermigildo from the portion occupied by

his house but the latter, insisting that he is entitled to occupancy since he is
helping his mother in the cultivation of the land, refused to vacate.

3) Petitioner instituted an ejectment suit against Hermigildo before the MTC of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. Finding no tenancy relationship between petitioner and
Hermigildo, the MTC ordered the latter to vacatethe land and pay attorney’s fees
and the sum of P500.00 monthly from the filing of the complaint.

4) On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC and ordered that the case be
remanded to the DARAB for further adjudication, as the RTC was of the opinion
that Ana Pascual was entitled to the help of her son in the cultivation and
consequently, her son cannot be simply ejected.

5) In this petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, Cecilleville
contends that the appellate court erred in not finding that while private respondent
is entitled to work on the agricultural land of the petitioner in his capacity as
member of the family of tenant Ana Pascual, nonetheless he cannot occupy a
substantial portion thereof and utilize the same for residential purposes..

THE RULING:

As clearly provided by Section 22, paragraph 3, RA No. 1199, as amended by

RA No. 2263, only a tenant is granted the right to a home lot and the right to
construct and maintain a house thereon. Private respondent is not entitled to a home
lot. As the Court sees it, the issue lies on the interpretation of Sec. 22, paragraph 3 of
RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263.

”The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable for
dwelling with an area of not more than 3 per cent of the area of his landholding
provided that it does not exceed one thousand square meters and that it shall be
located at a convenient and suitable place within the land of the landholder to be
designated by the latter where the tenant shall construct his dwelling and may raise
 vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals and engage in minor industries, the
products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively.”

The law is unambiguous and clear. Consequently, it must be applied

according to its plain and obvious meaning, according to its express terms. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the word, only a tenant is granted the right to have
a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a house thereon. And here, private
respondent does not dispute that he is a mere of Ana Pascual’s immediate farm
household. Under the law, therefore, We find the private respondent not entitled to a
home lot. Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to continue
maintaining the same within the very small landholding of petitioner.

1.4. PUNCTUATION
It is an aid of low degree in interpreting the language of the of a statute and can
never control against the intelligible meaning of the written word.

However, if the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning that is reasonable and in
apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument
for adopting the literal meaning of the words thus punctuated.

U.S. vs. HART, et al.

26 PHIL. 149, G.R. No. 8848, November 21, 1913

FACTS OF THE CASE:

1) Accused-Appellants Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were charged in the Court of

First Instance of Pampanga with vagrancy under Section 1 of RA No. 519. This
section enumerates certain classes of persons who are to be considered as vagrants
such as those “found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or
tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support.”

2) Accused-Appellants were prosecuted and convicted for “loitering about saloons

or dram shops or gambling houses”, which is the first part of said Section 1.

The second part, it will be noticed, is worded as follows: “or tramping or

straying through the country without visible means of support.”

3) It turned out, however, as shown by the evidence, that accused-appellants had

visible means of support, but the Attorney general argued that “without visible
means of support” as used in the second part, does not apply to “every person
found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses”, but only to
“tramping or straying through the country”.
It was contended that if “without visible means of support” is intended for the
first part, either the comma after “gambling houses” would have been omitted, or
else the comma after “country” would have been inserted.
 THE RULING:

When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the

courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that
construction of the statute which will give it effect.

The construction should be based upon something more substantial than the
mere punctuation found in the printed act. If the punctuation in the statute gives it a
meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may
be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the
statute as thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation is not conclusive,
and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give to
the Act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect
punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.

The accused-appellants were acquitted.

1.5. LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION

It the legislature has defined the words used in the statute and has declared the
construction to be placed thereon, such definition or construction should be followed
by the courts.

The rules are as follows:

(a) If a law provides that in case of doubt it should be construed or interpreted in a
certain manner, the courts should follow such instruction;

(b) In case of conflict between the interpretation clauses and the legislative meaning,
as revealed by the statute considered in iits totality, the latter shall prevail;

(c) A term is used throughout the statute in the same sense in which it is first
defined;

(d) Legislative definition of similar terms in other statutes may be resorted to except
where a particular law expressly declares that its definition therein is limited in
application to the statutes in which they appear.
2. EXTRINSIC AIDS
Facts or matters not found in the law

USE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS: Extrinsic aids are entitled to respect, consideration and weight,
but the courts are at liberty to decide whether they are applicable or not to the case brought
to it for decision.

2.1. CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES

(a) History of the times and conditions existing at the time the law was enacted
(b) Previous state of the law
(c) The evils sought to be remedied or corrected by the law; and
(d) The customs usages of the people

2.2. POLICY

The general policy of the law or the settled policy of the State may enlighten the
interpreter of the law as to the intention of the legislature in enacting the same.

2.3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE

The history of a law may be found in:

(a) reports of the legislative committees;
(b) transcript of stenographic notes taken
(c) during a hearing;
(d) legislative investigation;
(e) legislative debates

2.4. CONTEMPORANEOUS OR PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION

Those who lived at or near the time when the law was passed were more acquainted
of the conditions and the reasons why a particular law was enacted.

Their understanding and application of the law, especially if the same has been
continued and agreed to by the judicial tribunals and the legal profession, deserve to
be considered by the courts.

2.5. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION

(a) Congress is deemed to have been aware of the construction made by the officers
charged with the administration and enforcement of the law;
(b) The courts should respect that construction except if it is clearly erroneous;
(c) Executive construction has more weight if it is rendered by the Chief Legal
Adviser of the government who can issue opinions to assist various departments
of the government charged with the duty to administer the law;
(d) The opinion, however, of the Chief Legal Adviser is subservient to the ruling of
the judiciary, which is in charge of applying and interpreting laws.
2.6. LEGISLATIVE CONSTRUCTION

Legislative construction is entitled to consideration and great weight but it cannot

control as against the court’s prerogative to decide on what is the right or wrong
interpretation.

2.7. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION

It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had in mind the judicial
construction of former statutes on the subject.

It is also presumed that the statute was enacted in the light of the judicial construction
that the prior enactment has received.

With respect to a statute adopted from another State, it is presumed that it was
adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that State.

2.8. CONSTRUCTION BY THE BAR AND LEGAL COMMENTATORS

It is presumed that the meaning publicly given in a statute by the members of the
legal profession is a true one and regarded as one of that should not be lightly
changed.

The opinion and commentaries of text writers and legal commentators, whether they
are Filipinos or foreigners, may also be consulted as, in fact, they are oftentimes cited
or made as references in court decisions.
3. PRESUMPTIONS
Based on logic or established provisions of law

3.1. PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY

Every statute passed by the legislature is presumed to be valid because in approving

it, the legislature is supposed to have considered the question of its validity.

The question of validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative

department of the government itself, and the court should resolve every presumption
in favor of its validity.

Statutes should not be presumed to be invalid unless it clearly appears that they are
within some of the inhibitions of the fundamental law of the State.

3.2. PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

Every statute passed by the legislature is presumed to be constitutional.

The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality.

To doubt is to sustain. However, when the statute is really unconstitutional, the courts
are authorized to declare its invalidity.

3.3. PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH

In the interpretation of statutes, it is presumed that the legislature had good motives in
having considered and adopted a particular law.

It is presumed that the legislature acted in good faith, and that it acted from patriotic
and just motives.

3.4. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the

lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
-Article 10, New Civil Code of the Philippines

This presumption is meant to strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an

injustice, which may apparently be authorized if the law is interpreted otherwise.

3.5. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INCONSISTENCY

The mind of the lawmaking body is presumed to be consistent. In case of doubt

therefore, such a construction should be adopted as will make all the provisions of the
statute consistent with one another and with the entire law.

A word or phrase repeated in a statute will have the same meaning all throughout the
statute, unless a different intention clearly appears.
3.6. PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY

It is presumed that the legislature does not intent that absurdity will flow from its
enactment of the statute. The courts therefore have the duty to interpret the law in
such a way as to avoid absurd results.

Whenever possible, a legal provision must not be construed to be a useless

surplusage, and accordingly meaningless, in the sense that it adds nothing to the law
or having no effect thereon whatsoever.

3.7. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS

It is presumed that the lawmaking body does not intend to adopt laws which are
unnecessary and ineffective.

It is presumed that the lawmaking body intends to impart in its enactments such a
meaning as will render them operative and effective.

3.8. PRESUMPTION AGAINST IRREPEALABLE LAWS

It is presumed that the lawmaking body does not intend that its laws shall be
irrepealable.

The legislature cannot enact irrepealable laws, and the reason is obvious—the needs
of today or the situations obtaining now will not most likely be the same in the years
to come.

3.9. PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS

Repeals by implication is not favored.

There are two (2) requirements before a statute can be considered to have repealed a
prior statute by implication:
(a) That the statute touches the same subject matter; and
(b) That the latter statute is repugnant to the earlier one.

THREE BASIC RULES ON THE MATTER OF REPEAL

(1) Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
- Article 7, New Civil Code of the Philippines
-
(2) When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first
repealed shall not be thereby revived, unless expressly so provided. However, when a
law repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication only, its repeal revives the
prior law unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise.

(3) A general law does not repeal a special law unless it is so expressly provided,
or they are incompatible.
3.10. PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

It is presumed that the legislature designs to favor and foster rather than to contravene
that public policy which is based upon the principles of natural justice, good morals,
and the settled wisdom of the law as applied to the ordinary affairs of life.

3.11. PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTING LAWS

In enacting a law, the lawmaking body is presumed to have full knowledge of all
existing laws on the subject.

Hence, if there are two laws on the same subject enacted on different dates, the latter
law cannot be held to have abrogated the former law, unless the repugnancy is clear,
convincing and irreconcilable.

3.12. PRESUMPTION OF ACQUIESCENCE TO JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION

When the court has construed a statute in a particular manner, and the lawmaking
body made no move to alter or amend the said statute, it is presumed that the
legislature has acquiesced to the said construction.

3.13. PRESUMPTION OF JURISDICTION

A statute will not be construed in such a manner as to oust or restrict the jurisdiction
of a court, or to vest a new jurisdiction in the said court, unless there are express
words or a necessary implication to that effect.

3.14. PRESUMPTION OF ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY

It is presumed that the legislature acted within the scope of its authority.

Hence, if a statute admits of more than one interpretation, one that places the said
statute outside of legislative competence, and the another that places the said statute
within the limits of legislative competence, the court should adopt the latter
interpretation.

3.15. PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

It is presumed that s statute is in conformity with the rules and principles of

international laws or with treaties, in line with Section 2, Article II of 1987
Constitution, which provides:

“Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as instrument of national policy, adopts

the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations.”