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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Aids of Legislation) Case: Senate V Ermita Facts
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Aids of Legislation) Case: Senate V Ermita Facts
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Aids of Legislation) Case: Senate V Ermita Facts
FACTS:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as
well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
ISSUES
HELD
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric
of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is
recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They
are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
official may be exempted from this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) should secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view
thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be
present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress
that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has
determined that the requested information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not
explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these
officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it
expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under
E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the
invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive
privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive
considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely
declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined
that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section
2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of
providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O.
464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her
consent.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464
are declared void. Section 1(a) are however valid.