Illustrative case: Federation of Free Farmers vs. CA, GR 41161.

September 10, 1981 – Intent prevails the

text of the law.
 Sec. 1 of RA 809, Sugar Act of 1952 provides:
“in the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planters and the millers of
sugarcane in any milling district in the Philippines xxx shall be divided upon them”
 Sec. 9 provides:
“the proceeds of any increase in participation granted the planters under this Act and above their
present share shall be divided between the planter and his laborer in the plantation”
Issues:
 What is the meaning of “in the absence of written milling agreements”?
 Does RA 809 apply even if there is written milling agreement different from the sharing proportion
provided for it?
 Does the phrase “any increase in participation granted under this Act” exclude written agreement?
Held:
 RA 809 applies with or without written milling agreements between the planter and the miller, even
if its literal interpretation says otherwise.

Legislative intent in enacting RA 809.

 In the 1950s, planters staged a strike and threatened not to plant sugar cane unless they were given
bigger share in the sugar industry and sugar quota commitment.
 To remedy the problem, Congress enacted RA 809 to force planters to plant, centrals to mill and even
allowing the government to take over planting and milling.
 The evil sought to be avoided by Congress is the exploitation of laborers of “sacada” in terms of wages
and benefits.
 To make the Act operative with or without the written milling agreement.
With or without the meaning of the law, the sacadas must be given their share. Because the problem
there is that the sacadas have been exploited in the sugar industry. During 1950s, they staged a strike.
That is now the legislative intent.
What is the history why this law was passed? Legislative intent
The sacadas were supplying sugar to the united states that time and if they stop it might affect the
economy
Legislative purpose in enacting RA 809.
 To compel continuous sugar production and grant laborer’s share in the increased planter’s
participation in the sugar produce.
Legislative meaning in enacting RA 809.
 Although not clearly disclosed in the language of the Act, it however indicates that the laborers
should receive their share for as long as sugar is produced and planters receive increased
participation.
Conclusion:
If there is no agreement between the laborers and the employer this law will apply.
The sc said the law shall not be construed that way otherwise it shall be dependent upon the will of the
parties. It should be construed as with or without the milling agreements they must be given fair share.
Even if, literally, the law says one thing the sc can construe it the other way to be consistent with legislative
intent.
Note: do not confine yourself to the literal meaning of the language of the law but go back to the intent
and purpose of the law because that is what statutory construction is all about.
Thus, to literally interpret these phrases is to defeat legislative intent and purpose, which is to grant
laborers fair share in sugar produce.

Illustrative case: Canet vs. Decena G.R, 155344, January 20, 2004 – What the law does not include, it
excludes.
Facts: A businessman applied for permit to operate and maintain a cockpit. But mayor refused because
there is no ordinance empowering her to do so.
Issue: Can the municipal mayor be compelled to issue business permit in the absence of ordinance
empowering her to do so?
Held:
 No. While there is no resolution allowing him to operate a cockpit, there is no ordinance giving him
similar authority.
 The municipal tax ordinance contains general provisions for issuance of business permits but it is
short on specifics prescribing reasonable fees for cockpit operation.
 The ordinance providing these specifics was withdrawn by the Sanggunian.
 Otherwise, to compel the mayor to issue permit not only violates Section 447 of the LGC but also
encroaches on the mayor’s administrative prerogatives.
 Since cockpit operation was not enumerated in the ordinance, it is excluded.
 The legislature would not have enumerated those covered if it did not intend to limit.
 Express mention of one thing, person, act, or consequence excludes the others. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
 What is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
 Expressium facit cessare tacitum.
 An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
even if wisdom recommends it.
 If there is a legislative gap caused by omission, the judiciary cannot fill the gap. Otherwise, it results
in judicial legislation.
Note: the sc can always say even if it not ambiguous but we have to dig deep down into the legislative
intent because statutory construction is an art and it does not bind the supreme court.

Illustrative case: Aratea v Comelec, G.R. No. 195229,

Oct. 09, 2012 = If you insist, you write something not found in the law.
Facts: Elected mayor disqualified before elections. Vice mayor and 2nd placer claims vacant position. Vice
mayor succeeds.
Issue: Whether the succession was proper
Held: No. 2nd placer should be elected because candidacy of elected mayor was void ab initio.

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to
valid votes.

Elected Mayor’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional decree on the three-
term limit; and second, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of
Falsification. In other words, on election day, respondent Elected Mayor’s disqualification is notoriously
known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Elected Mayor was never a candidate for the position,
the votes cast for him should be considered stray

Qualifications and Disqualifications

The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 expressly provides, among others:
- The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; x

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Sec. 12.

Disqualification
Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty. x x

False Material Representation

Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is
false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy. Section 74 of the OEC
details the contents of the certificate of candidacy. This included among others a statement that
the person filing it is eligible for said office. The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the
penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being
elected to any public office.
This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before he filed
his certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties
of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification.

Under Article 30 of the RPC, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of
the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The
duration is the same as that of prisión mayor.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the RPC, perpetual special disqualificationmeans that "the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,”
which is perpetually.

Both constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office.

The judgment became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed candidacy on 1 December 2009

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the OEC because this
accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office,
contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of
candidacy. As this Court held infirming v.Commission on Elections, the false material representation may
refer to "qualifications or eligibility.”

One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person
suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that
"he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a
false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. The dissenting opinions
place the violation of the three-term limit rule as disqualification under Section 68 as the violation
allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from running for public office despite
the possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the LGC." In so holding the dissenting
opinions write in the law what is not found in the law.