G.R. No.
112019 January 4, 1995 On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely,
controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is
Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987),
which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance
of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above
provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel
persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have
his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of
First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and
Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows
before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave
birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr.
The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference
by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a
number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of
America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did.
When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where
he underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25
August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow
get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel
filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch
30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of
the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons
was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through
counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact,
been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of
nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would
neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed
the decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-
compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at
the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In
his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years
to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not
care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a
period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the
Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage
or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law,
Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in
sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to
say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand,
Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea
is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment
would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-)
Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make
the marriage null and void and the former only voidable.
Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified
to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in
sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a
ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the
appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground
for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not
refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7),
the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word
"mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with
one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano
said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the
fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family
Code, the Committee used a language which describes a
ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice
Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable
marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable
marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason
why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in
marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is
"insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there
are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase
"even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be
modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the
marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of
the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the
first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not
know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had
known these completely, he might not have consented to the
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making
psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages
since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood
the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to
make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he
did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit
added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which
is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and,
therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is
curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero
inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very
essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it
from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that
his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent
since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the
obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely
different from each other, because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in
contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and
that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which
is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but
there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as
the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul
the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should
be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the
action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised
that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no
longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of
marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated
that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not
be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still
insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that
they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter.
Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a
lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods
when there is an understanding of the consequences of
marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the
ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the
marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice
Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that
in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only
with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa
remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning
in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological
incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft
provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab
initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the
psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in
void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of
marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the
provision is that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues
and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is
possible that after the marriage, one's psychological
incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice
Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this
case is to allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that
the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after
its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to
create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot
argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and
physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that
mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why
it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word
"mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He
explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of
understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last
meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of
"psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate
on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified
it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having
been annulments of marriages arising from psychological
incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law
because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common
provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to
have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that
marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled
in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should
be retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it
is their answer to the problem of church annulments of
marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the
other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned
about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which
the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista
and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive
period of ten years within which the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The
Committee approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision
Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law
as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has
been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit
the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the
judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all
that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an
account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any
doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the
rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of
marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to
the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas
naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological
anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated.
it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that
the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person
should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of
marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity"
defies any precise definition since psychological causes can
be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,"
written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy
Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability
to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality
can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a
farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which
he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself
must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c)
the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon
contemplates a true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John
Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it
must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive
the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of
the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese
of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself,
that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code
and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of
the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to
the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do
not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree
and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing
on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so
that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We
should continue to be reminded that innate in our society,
then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible
in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It
is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the
basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and
they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all,
can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity
of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide
all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied
opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an
extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my
way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no
ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been
shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at
least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and
cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other
hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve
to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term
"psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But,
as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers
of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds
for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in
this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological
incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may
wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are,
however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among
which, is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties
and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established
that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits
specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United
States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract
expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is there
any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for
the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with
Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there
were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years
had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the
petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in
her answer, claimed that it is the former who has been
irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and
submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner
in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there
are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance,
an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or
cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also
be instances when, for economic and practical reasons,
husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital
bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and
respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the
absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the
other to inform the latter of his/her condition and
whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting
with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with
him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want
her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she
any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent,
an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to
comply with her essential marital obligations, although these
indications were made manifest after the celebration of the
marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this
Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife
who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in
the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly
or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into
a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations
with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love
which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family
Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity
to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a
nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the
marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not
entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish
to add some observations. The letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of
then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the
background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had
thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the
draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it
had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof
based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial
decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married
person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in
another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute
divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal
of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family
Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage
as —
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian
traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon
which the family and society are founded, and also realizing
the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our
people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings
did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It
was thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on
grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of
provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions
on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and
those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law,
the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate
the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked
or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article
34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our
country today may already dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar
Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee
was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has
been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions,
would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of
some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a
family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman
who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to
have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee
that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical
violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological
anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the
Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above
intended to add another ground to those already listed in the
Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus
expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion
of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity
based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence,
the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what
constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the
Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the
time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just
like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent
this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the
provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by
"experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken
from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the
family4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope
to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is
not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all
cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the
contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties
are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union
through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have
interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it
easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is
addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the
manner by which some members of the Bench have
implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable,
each being separate and distinct from the other.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied
opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an
extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my
way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no
ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been
shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at
least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and
cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other
hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve
to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term
"psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But,
as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers
of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds
for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in
this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological
incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may
wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are,
however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among
which, is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties
and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established
that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits
specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United
States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract
expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is there
any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for
the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with
Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there
were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years
had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the
petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in
her answer, claimed that it is the former who has been
irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and
submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner
in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there
are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance,
an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or
cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also
be instances when, for economic and practical reasons,
husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital
bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and
respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the
absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the
other to inform the latter of his/her condition and
whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting
with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with
him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want
her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she
any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent,
an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to
comply with her essential marital obligations, although these
indications were made manifest after the celebration of the
marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this
Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife
who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in
the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly
or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into
a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations
with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love
which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family
Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity
to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a
nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the
marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not
entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish
to add some observations. The letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of
then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the
background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had
thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the
draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it
had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof
based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial
decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married
person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in
another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute
divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal
of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family
Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage
as —
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian
traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon
which the family and society are founded, and also realizing
the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our
people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings
did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It
was thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on
grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of
provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions
on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and
those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law,
the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate
the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked
or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article
34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our
country today may already dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar
Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee
was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has
been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions,
would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of
some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a
family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman
who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to
have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee
that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical
violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological
anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the
Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above
intended to add another ground to those already listed in the
Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus
expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion
of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity
based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence,
the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what
constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the
Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the
time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just
like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent
this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the
provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by
"experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken
from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the
family4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope
to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is
not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all
cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the
contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties
are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union
through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have
interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it
easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is
addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the
manner by which some members of the Bench have
implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable,
each being separate and distinct from the other.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an
entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity
of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity."
Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare
marriages void based on this ground. Although this
Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological
incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific
cases. In the present case and in the context of the
herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration —
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in
the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay
down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January
25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina
void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing
by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a
year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred
to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo
was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had
been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October
1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of
which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with
her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually
quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to
be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to
have their marriage declared null and void in order to free
them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage
from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted
that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior
of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's
failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14,
1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three
years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of
the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social
worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring
the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art.
36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed
Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent
Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it
sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize
the application of our civil laws on personal and family
rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of
how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-
destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it
did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings
and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions
of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking
thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor
physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese
of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could nor get along with each other. There
had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither
its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist
based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul
(sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another
woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their
professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While
some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative,
homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond
merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the
Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to
invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of
the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with
written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations,
the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as
the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
"I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36
was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our
law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church — while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have
already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even
more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains
valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.
As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia
Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240
SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there
was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to
discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of
the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a
similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling.
upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing
and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of
Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much
"psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons;
it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result
of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in
the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant
defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage
annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil
Code Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to
understand the essential nature of marriage and focus
strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the
way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft
provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage
or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took
finally produced the following revised provision even before
the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above
has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained
that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a
defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that
there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was
that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a
lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term
"is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered
the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to
the question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was
to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a
ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at
the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid
until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores
and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following
persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those)
who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly
performed and consummated marriage between two living
Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure
with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by
Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the
parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds
for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those
laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite
a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
— freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic
Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage
under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some
persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as
a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in
existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for
consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two
distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of
due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to
give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore
the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the
promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the
1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had
reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity
to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably
not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional
opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life,
both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional opinions
about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These
opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as
decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in
this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church
to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to
all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse
or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body
for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the
community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a
developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973
have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of
an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses
to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a
distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than
just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the
marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity;
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his
or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following:
(1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty
to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where
the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone
who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment
on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of
the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to
assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as
promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using
the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time
the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of
the family almost is of someone's failure out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was
entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities"
of the spouses were not considered equivalent to
psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of
Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure
of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate
with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages
remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said
petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his
wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he
alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife
which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the
indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a
basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the
wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the
marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity
concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in
which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations,
can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage
remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity
(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or
both of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most
helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the
bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive
Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The
term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of
the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of
contracting marriage; (those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law
jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and
construction of the statutory enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us
that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a
congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also
read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the
other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37,
38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons,
render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could
justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed
so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos
vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of
the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do
not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree
and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground
for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not
physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the
inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end
discharge the basic marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual
help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and
the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and
incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has
envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect,
as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would
also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact
still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry
out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed
turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be
good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure.
The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse
language its unequivocal command on how the State should
regard marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The
1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be
significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved
but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would
cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear
to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the
family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one
that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.
As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia
Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240
SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there
was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to
discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of
the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a
similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling.
upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing
and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of
Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much
"psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons;
it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result
of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in
the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant
defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage
annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil
Code Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to
understand the essential nature of marriage and focus
strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the
way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft
provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage
or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took
finally produced the following revised provision even before
the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above
has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained
that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a
defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that
there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was
that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a
lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term
"is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered
the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to
the question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was
to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a
ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at
the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid
until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores
and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following
persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those)
who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly
performed and consummated marriage between two living
Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure
with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by
Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the
parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds
for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those
laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite
a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
— freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic
Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage
under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some
persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as
a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in
existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for
consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two
distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of
due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to
give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore
the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the
promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the
1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had
reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity
to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably
not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional
opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life,
both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional opinions
about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These
opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as
decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in
this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church
to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to
all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse
or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body
for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the
community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a
developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973
have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of
an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses
to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a
distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than
just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the
marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity;
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his
or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following:
(1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty
to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where
the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone
who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment
on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of
the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to
assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as
promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using
the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time
the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of
the family almost is of someone's failure out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was
entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities"
of the spouses were not considered equivalent to
psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of
Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure
of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate
with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages
remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said
petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his
wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he
alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife
which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the
indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a
basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the
wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the
marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity
concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in
which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations,
can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage
remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity
(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or
both of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most
helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the
bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive
Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The
term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of
the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of
contracting marriage; (those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law
jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and
construction of the statutory enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us
that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a
congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also
read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the
other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37,
38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons,
render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could
justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed
so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos
vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of
the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do
not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree
and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground
for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not
physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the
inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end
discharge the basic marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual
help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and
the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and
incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has
envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect,
as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would
also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact
still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry
out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed
turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be
good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure.
The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse
language its unequivocal command on how the State should
regard marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The
1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be
significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved
but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would
cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear
to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the
family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one
that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
.R. No. 214064
MIRASOL CASTILLO, Petitioner
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE
IMPAS, Respondents
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner Mirasol Castillo (Mirasol) challenging the
Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated March 10, 2014 and August
28, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
ruled against the dissolution and nullity of her marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts of the case follow:
As their parents were good friends and business partners,
Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually,
became sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol
discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former
girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned tumultuous after
the revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they
reconciled. They got married in Bani, Pangasinan on April
22, 1984 and were blessed with two (2) children born in 1992
and in 2001.3
On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint4 for declaration
of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90.
Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was
harmonious prompting her to believe that the same was
made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of
marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Their relatives and
friends saw him with different women. One time, she has just
arrived from a trip and returned home to surprise her family.
But to her consternation, she caught him in a compromising
act with another woman. He did not bother to explain or
apologize. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the
conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with
him.5 Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another
woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting
their children for a period of not less than ten (10) years
without any reason, constitute a severe psychological
disorder.6
In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical
psychologist Sheila Marie Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who,
in her Psychological Evaluation Report,7 concluded that
Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. A portion of the report reads:
x x xx
The personality disorder speaks of antecedence as it has an
early onset, with an enduring pattern and behavior that
deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's
culture. His poor parental and family molding (particularly
lack of parental parenting) caused him to have a defective
superego and he proved to be selfish, immature and
negligent person and followed a pattern of gross
irresponsibility and gross disregard of the feelings of his
partner/wife disregarding the marriage contract and the
commitment he agreed on during the wedding. In other
words, the root cause of respondent's flawed personality
pattern can be in childhood milieu. Respondent's familial
constellation, unreliable parenting style from significant
figures around him, and unfavorable childhood experiences
have greatly affected his perceptions of himself and his
environment in general. The respondent did not grow up
mature enough to cope with his obligations and
responsibilities as married man and father.
It also speaks of gravity as he was not able to carry out the
normative and ordinary duties of marriage and family,
shouldered by any married man, existing in ordinary
circumstances. He just cannot perform his duties and
obligations as a husband, as he entered into marriage for his
own self-satisfaction and gratification, manipulate and
denigrate the petitioner for his own pleasures and
satisfaction. In the process, respondent was unable to
assume his marital duties and responsibilities to his wife. He
failed to render mutual help and support (Article 68, FC).
Additionally, it also speaks of incurability, as respondent has
no psychological insight that he has a character problem. He
would not acknowledge the pain he caused to people around
him. People suffering from this personality disorder are
unmotivated to treatment and impervious to recovery. There
are no medications and laboratory examinations to be taken
for maladaptive behavior such as the NPD (Narcissistic
Personality Disorder).
Otherwise stated, his personality disorder is chronic and
pervasive affecting many aspects of his life, such as social
functioning and close relationships.1âwphi1 Apparently, he
has failed to develop appropriate adjustment methods. He
lacks the intrapersonal and interpersonal integration that
caused him the failure to understand the very nature of that
sharing of life that is directed toward the solidarity and
formation of family.
x x x x8
In a Decision9 dated January 20, 2012, the RTC in Civil Case
No. 4853-11 declared the marriage between Mirasol and
Felipe null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Court hereby declares
the marriage contract by the petitioner MIRASOL CASTILLO
to the respondent FELIPE IMPAS on April 22, 1984 in Bani,
Pangasinan to be NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, the Clerk of Court is directed to enter this
judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment
and to issue the corresponding Entry of Judgment.
Thereupon, the Office of the Civil Registrars in Bani,
Pangasinan and Imus, Cavite, are also mandated to cause the
registration of the said ENTRY OF JUDGMENT in their
respective Book of Marriages.
Likewise, furnish the petitioner and the counsel of the
petitioner, the respondent, the Solicitor General, 3rd
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos and the Civil
Registrar General with copies hereof.
Upon compliance, the Court shall forthwith issue the
DECREE OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
SO ORDERED.10
On February 22, 2012, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an
Order11 dated April 3, 2012.
On appeal, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 99686 reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering
from psychological incapacity, thus, incapable of performing
marital obligations due to some psychological illness existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.12 A pertinent
portion of the decision reads:
x x xx
Based on the records, it appears more likely that Felipe
became unfaithful as a result of unknown factors that
happened during the marriage and not because of his family
background. His tendency to womanize was not shown to be
due to causes of a psychological nature that are grave,
permanent and incurable. In fact, it was only after thirteen
(13) years of marriage that he started to engage in extra-
marital affairs. In the complaint filed by Mirasol, she said
that after they got married, their relationship as husband
and wife went smoothly and that she was of the belief that
she had a marriage made in heaven.
In short, Felipe's marital infidelity does not appear to be
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which
rendered him incapable of performing his spousal
obligations. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof
that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage. Since that situation does not obtain in the case,
Mirasol's claim of psychological incapacity must fail.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned
party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the
psychological incapacity of Felipe, We cannot but rule in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 20, 2012 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.13
Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Mirasol
elevated the case before this Court raising the issue, thus:
[Petitioner] was able to establish that respondent is suffering
from grave psychological condition that rendered him
incognitive of his marital covenants under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Basically, the issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or
not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC
determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter's psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
This Court rules in the negative.
Mirasol alleges that she has sufficiently established that
Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. The conclusions of the trial
court regarding the credibility of the witnesses are entitled to
great respect because of its opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses. Since the court a quo accepted
the veracity of the petitioner's premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of Felipe's psychological incapacity
drawn from the expert witness. She claims that Montefalcon
was correct in interviewing her for it was submitted that it
was only her who knew best whether her husband was
complying with his marital obligations. Moreover, the OSG
admits that personal examination of the respondent by the
clinical psychologist is not an indispensable requisite for a
finding of psychological incapacity.
On the other hand, the OSG argues that Mirasol failed to
establish from the totality of evidence the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of Felipe's alleged Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. The conclusions of the clinical
psychologist that he was psychologically incapacitated and
that such incapacity was present at the inception of the
marriage were not supported by evidence. At most, the
psychologist merely proved his refusal to perform his marital
obligations.14 Moreover, she has no personal knowledge of
the facts from which she based her findings and was working
on pure assumptions and secondhand information related to
her by one side.15
Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity"
has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.16 Psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and
(c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.17
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,18 this Court laid down the more definitive guidelines
in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases, viz.:
x x xx
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. x
xx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. x x x In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. x x x
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. x x x
xxx19
The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall
be based strictly on the facts of each case and not on
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.20
As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of
Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight
to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties
in order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while
highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of
a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in
any other given case presented before it, must
always base its decision not solely on the expert
opinions furnished by the parties but also on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings.22
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological
evidence to show the psychological incapacity, however, did
not mean that the same would have automatically ensured
the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the
other cases they try, must always base their judgments not
solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on
the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.23
Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal
of the records, this Court rules that the totality of the
evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's psychological
incapacity.
Clinical psychologist Montefalcon opined that respondent is
encumbered with a personality disorder classified as
Narcissistic Personality Disorder deeply ingrained in his
personality structure that rendered him incapacitated to
perform his marital duties and obligations. In her direct
testimony, she stated:
ATTY. BAYAUA:
Question: Were you able to interview and conduct
examination on the respondent?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: [W]here did you base your conclusion that
supported your findings that the husband of Mirasol is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage?
Answer: From the interviews I had with the petitioner and
also from my interview of the couple's common friend who
validated all information given to me by the petitioner.
Question: You mean to say you were not able to interview the
respondent?
Answer: No sir. But I sent him an invitation to undergo the
same psychological evaluation I administered with the
petitioner but he did not respond to my invitation.
Question: [W]hat relevant information were you able to
gather from your interview of the friend of the couple?
Answer: She validated every piece of information relayed to
me by the petitioner during the interview.
x x xx
Question: Madam witness, were you able to determine at
what point in time in the life of the respondent did he
acquire this disorder that you mentioned?
Answer: The disorder of the respondent already existed even
at the time of celebration of their marriage, although the
incapacity became manifest only after their marriage. His
disorder seemed to have started during the early
years of his life.
Question: In your expert opinion, what would be the likely
source of the disorder of the respondent?
Answer: The disorder of the respondent seemed to
have developed during the early years of his life due
to his poor parental and family [molding]
particularly lack of parental guidance. [His] parents
separated when he was still young and when [his] mother
had another affair and lived with her common-law husband.
Respondent's familial constellation and [unfavorable]
childhood experiences have greatly affected his perceptions
of himself and his environment. Respondent did not grow up
mature enough to cope with his obligations and
responsibilities as a married man and father.
x x x24
The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the
psychological evaluation by Montefalcon. A perusal of the
RTC's decision would reveal that there was no assessment of
the veracity of such allegations, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight of the pieces of evidence
presented. Also, there were no factual findings which can
serve as bases for its conclusion of Felipe's psychological
incapacity.
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.25 The probative force of the
testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of
her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that
she can render to the courts in showing the facts
that serve as a basis for her criterion and the
reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.26
Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on
the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of Felipe's
personality disorder, it was, however, admitted that she
evaluated respondent's psychological condition indirectly
from the information gathered from Mirasol and her witness.
Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which brought about
his personality disorder as painted in the evaluation was
based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of
petitioner. There was no independent witness knowledgeable
of respondent's upbringing interviewed by the psychologist
or presented before the trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the
couple's common friend, agreed with petitioner's claims in
the interview with the psychologist, confirmed the
information given by petitioner, and alleged that she knew
Felipe as "chick boy" or ''playboy."27 She did not testify
before the court a quo.
As such, there are no other convincing evidence asserted to
establish Felipe's psychological condition and its associations
in his early life. Montefalcon's testimony and psychological
evaluation report do not provide evidentiary support to cure
the doubtful veracity of Mirasol's one-sided assertion. The
said report falls short of the required proof for the Court to
rely on the same as basis to declare petitioner's marriage to
respondent as void.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to
declare him psychologically incapacitated is not required, the
root cause thereof must still be "medically or clinically
identified," and adequately established by evidence.28 We
cannot take the conclusion that Felipe harbors a personality
disorder existing prior to his marriage which purportedly
incapacitated him with the essential marital obligations as
credible proof of juridical antecedence. The manner by which
such conclusion was reached leaves much to be desired in
terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in
determining psychological incapacity. The lack of
corroborative witness and evidence regarding Felipe's
upbringing and family history renders Montefalcon's opinion
on the root cause of his psychological incapacity conjectural
or speculative.
Even if the testimonies of Mirasol and Montefalcon at issue
are considered since the judge had found them to be credible
enough, this Court cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark
with regard to information on Felipe's pre-marital history
which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case
because we only have petitioner's words to rely on. To make
conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological
condition based on the information fed by only one side, as
in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of
the content of such evidence.29
Anent Felipe's sexual infidelity, Mirasol alleged in her
judicial affidavit, to wit:
x x xx
Question: You said Madam Witness that after several
months you and respondent became sweethearts, what
happened next Madam Witness?
Answer: Sir, while we were already sweethearts, I got
dismayed when respondent was also maintaining another
woman who was his former girlfriend.
Question: What was the reaction of the respondent when you
told him about his relation with his former girlfriend?
Answer: Respondent was shocked and became moody Sir.
This turned our relationship sour and it led to being stormy.
Question: You said Madam Witness that you and
respondent's relationship became sour and stormy, what
happened next, if any?
Answer: Sir, my relationship with respondent should have
been ended had it not been with the timely intervention of
our parents. Respondent and I reconciled.
x x xx
Question: Madam Witness as you said you finally got
married with the respondent as evidenced in fact by a
Marriage Certificate. What happened next after the
marriage?
Answer: After our wedding, our relationship as husband and
wife went on smoothly. I was of the belief that my marriage
was made in heaven and that respondent had already
reformed his ways and had completely deviated from his
relationship with his ex-girlfriend;
x x x30
Question: After giving birth to your first child did respondent
change or become responsible considering that he is already
a father?
Answer: No, Sir. I thought that having our first child would
already change the ways of respondent. The birth of our first
child did not actually help improve respondent's ways
because respondent is really a man who is not contented
with one woman even before we got married;
xxx31
Question: After you gave birth to you[r] second child what
happened next Madam Witness?
Answer: Sir, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, respondent
is back to his old habit where he has been seen having
relationship with a different woman. This was also seen by
our relatives and friends of respondent.
x xx32
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.33 In order for sexual infidelity to
constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's
unfaithfulness must be established as a 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the
manifestation of a disordered personality,
completely preventing the respondent from
discharging the essential obligations of the marital
state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse.34 It
is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.35
As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did
not emanate from a personal interview with the subject
himself. Apart from the psychologist's opinion and
petitioner's allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited
to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a manifestation of
his alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable. We are not persuaded that the natal or
supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his obligation to be faithful to his
wife was medically or clinically established.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations
are not evidence.36 Based on the records, this Court finds
that there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude
that Felipe's sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can be
equated with psychological incapacity as contemplated by
law. We reiterate that there was no other evidence adduced.
Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not present other
witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's infidelity
notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their relatives
saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is
considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the
ruling of the CA against the dissolution and nullity of the
parties' marriage due to insufficiency of the evidence
presented. The policy of the State is to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.37
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review
on certiorari filed by herein petitioner Mirasol Castillo.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the assailed Decision and
Resolution, dated March 10, 2014 and August 28, 2014,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition.
Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws,
has become a clichéd subject of discussion in our
jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with
much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential
doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which
psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated—free
in form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January
reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of
respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their
college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowena’s
close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the
young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January
1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and
respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two
understood one another and developed a certain degree of
closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around
three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward
that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was
young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him
relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month;
he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the
boat ticket.4
However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a month.
Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance
fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996,
they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family
was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him,
threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward
agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court
to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.6 The
two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward
was treated like a prisoner—he was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and
warned the latter not to leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward
was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested
that they should stay at their parents’ home and live with
them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however,
suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they
could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about
this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be
disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s
uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him
from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to
ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved
by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she
said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They
then parted ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage
to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-
39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11,
2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion
between the parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance
and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in
the scheduled hearings.13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation
report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on
the merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found
both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the
following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino
male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at
Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer
College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married
to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation
in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage
against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity.
He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business
and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the
business world by whom he [considers] as generous,
hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be
handed to each of the family member. He generally considers
himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers
himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried
his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as
being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until
1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by
being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from
his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to
read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having
a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not
finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to
petitioner and this became the foundation of their intimate
relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned
to respondent that he is having problems with his family.
Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her
family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives.
From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner
that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated
because he is not prepared as they are both young and
inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow
manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March
1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and
she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu.
Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped
to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a
friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so
petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties
tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was
suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek
help from petitioner’s parents. When the parties arrived at
the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of
the country so respondent decided to go back to her home
for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their
home. After a few days of separation, respondent called
petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him.
Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at
their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he
went home again. Respondent would call by phone every
now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know
what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to
file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the
newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to
make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought
the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,]
agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996,
respondent’s uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and
on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the
Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually
never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house
until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the
parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow
petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many
ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent
even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they
will commission their military friends to harm his family.
Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if
he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his
parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime in June of 1996,
petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his
parents about his predicament and they forgave him and
supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner,
however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage
contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,]
petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered
her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioner’s parents
while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea
and claimed that she would only live with him if they will
have a separate home of their own and be away from his
parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should
already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his
parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded
these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his
differences with his own family. When respondent refused to
live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay,
petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of
his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and
since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to
support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any
money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner
and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to
be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The
break-up was caused by both parties[’] unreadiness to
commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of
finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still
egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally
immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their
marital vows as each of them was motivated by different
notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said
to be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to
marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he
wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not
really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social
interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen
too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and
uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially
to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously
aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid
type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and
spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be
of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be
somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and
glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she
thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good
fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have
her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that
[her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization
that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her
way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know
himself and marry himself before submitting to marital
vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is
profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and
law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,]
(sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively
taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their
own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral
disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely
exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere
and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward
convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave,
severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only
manifested during marriage. Both parties display
psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake
for them to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its
Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null and void
on the ground that both parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely
filed its notice of appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5,
2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set
aside the trial court’s ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed
to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent,
and relied only on the information provided by petitioner.
Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be
attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements
stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina21 needed
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for
rendering the decision without the required certification of
the OSG briefly stating therein the OSG’s reasons for its
agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the
petition.23 The CA later denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004
Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant
petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He
posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only
because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather
due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also
points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist
to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the
OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter
represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished
copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and
notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that
the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no
statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties
failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither
was it medically or clinically identified. The purported
incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in
Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based
on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the
parties is null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and
charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision
Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was
based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in
Santos v. Court of Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I
wish to add some observations. The letter dated April 15,
1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of
the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the
background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had
thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the
draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it
had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof
based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial
decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married
person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in
another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute
divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal
of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family
Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage
as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law.’
With the above definition, and considering the Christian
traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon
which the family and society are founded, and also realizing
the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our
people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings
did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead,
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It
was thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on
grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of
provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions
on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and
those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law,
the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate
the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage
or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article
34.’
‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.’
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our
country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop
Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the
ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other
jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-
age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because
of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support
a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman
who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to
have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee
that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical
violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft
provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took
finally produced the following revised provision even before
the session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above
has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained
that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a
defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that
there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer
to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was
that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a
lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term
"is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered
the inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to
the question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was
to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence, its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a
ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at
the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid
until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores
and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following
persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those)
who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly
performed and consummated marriage between two living
Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure
with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by
Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the
parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds
for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those
laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite
a number of married couples have found themselves in
limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the
Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions,
some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code—and classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to be ‘capable according to law’ in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons ‘be at least not
ignorant’ of the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for
consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two
distinct but related grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due
discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to
give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore,
the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the
promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the
1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had
reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity
to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably
not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970.
Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was
taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so designed as
to allow some resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity"
is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.
It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
expressed by Article 6840 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the
law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with
that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp
conceptual distinction must be made between the second
and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave
lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume
the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge,
explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal,
example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the
assumption that they are capable according to positive law to
enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract,
viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality,
and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was
gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the
hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the
canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the
psychological process of giving consent because it has been
established a priori that both have such a capacity to give
consent, and they both know well the object of their consent
[the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with
the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The
consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient.
The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object
which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this
distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of
consent but with positing the object of consent. The person
may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not
capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a
result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman
Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to
marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has
been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity
different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which
arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample
which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this
rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual
anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher
faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there
sexual anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they arise
from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal
system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact
the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still
capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical
sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a
sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual
activities which are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the
activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However,
these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible
that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so
afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of
what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In
fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is
whether such a person can assume those responsibilities
which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the
incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the
incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually
confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church
courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is
incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object of
consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the
conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible
impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its
judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that
the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the
influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these
circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as
this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is
precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the
intellect is always and continuously under such an
irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and
certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain
cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can
understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what
marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be
juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit
the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be
exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It
would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed
be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he
is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani
seems to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled
mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction
between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and
the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is
his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the
meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its
implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a
free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable
as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent,
experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object
of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the
act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of
a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him,
such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and
understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the
object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of
Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra,
it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus
doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of
consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to
make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature
evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram
Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a
spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the
moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to
the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a
person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the
conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no
difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage
are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same
obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983,
it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence
or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a
specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders
in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties
of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or
psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that
constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084.
Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of
binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent
that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling
the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed
by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile
tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when
either or both of the contractants are not capable of initiating
or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of
those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g.,
a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to
begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and
sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due
to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or
maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the
very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise
when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or
of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum
partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is
capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the
other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be
deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be
the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring
the economic good and the financial security of the other,
but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the
other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for
detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the
concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person
diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He
concluded that while the respondent may have understood,
on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of
marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of
his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the
person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is
determined not only at the moment of decision but also and
especially during the moment of execution of decision. And
when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it
means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations
of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be
factored into the question of whether a person was in a
position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first
place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at
matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at
matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985,
Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to
assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his
irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards
the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal
relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this
personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to
recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A
sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially
favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is
interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken
advantage of in order to achieve one’s ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as
essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to
the communio vitae. This and their corresponding
obligations are basically centered around the good of the
spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies,
which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise
to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of
these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal
relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of
inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include
affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very
clear under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be
invalidating of marriage – that is to say, is homosexuality
invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to
fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume
the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was
able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an
autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so
afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the
object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only
to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The
third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more
adequate juridical structure to account for the complex
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not
necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations
with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a
person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave
lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not
by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties.
Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the
responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this
object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the
invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the
defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be
addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon:
causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the
opinion that the clause is a reference to the personality of the
contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the
psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something
in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person
which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the
person is incapable according to the hypothesis
contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in
this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have
something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes
the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply
engrained in one’s consciousness would not seem to qualify
to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference
being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote,
in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given
one’s psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law
insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is
not the fruit of some degree of freedom.42
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a
case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to
a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower court’s judgment of annulment in
Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the
trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that
its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court,
in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private
respondent testified under oath before the lower court and
was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly,
the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage
tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and
the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow,
been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations,
the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
"I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36
was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our
law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church—while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the
Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V.
Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and
another three—including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took
pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all
fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the
Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much
regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be
treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s
exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world."50 The unintended consequences of
Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live
with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by
little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and
the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the
remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should rather be
alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the
sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the
infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void
from the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses
should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First
and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity
operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the
normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again
marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other
hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated
runs the risk of the latter’s disorder recurring in their
marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that,
as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v.
Reyes,55 there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six
(6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June.
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both
parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral
pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional
opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life,
both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional opinions
about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in
this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church
to the advances made in psychology during the past decades.
There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume
the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are
now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to
all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse
or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body
for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the
community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined
the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according
to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing
and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the
marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity;
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his
or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following:
(1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty
to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where
the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone
who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment
on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of
the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties'
incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is
that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce
and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered
into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance
of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause
of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v.
Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for
emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes
a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it
fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer
the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an
independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological
state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no
experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent
and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however,
does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present
their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological
assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the
findings that both parties are afflicted with personality
disorders—to repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of
Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows—
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are
characteristic of a person’s recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to
isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual
mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal
relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders
are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old
age. An individual may have more than one personality
disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality
disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in
which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality
disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their
behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along
with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life
and often a tendency to blame others for their problems.
Other individuals with personality disorders are not
unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely,
isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal
difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health
viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality
disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors,
neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain
stages of development led to certain personality types. Thus,
some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from
his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and
dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was
thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage.
Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional
aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal
stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to
shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate
relationships.lawphil.net However, later researchers have
found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation
at certain stages of development lead to specific personality
patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a
genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and
borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of
inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal
personality may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline
personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal
fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively
correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of
suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated
with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and
impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph
(EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for many
years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A
study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at
least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent
in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality
disorders are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear
to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic
personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and
passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality
disorder not otherwise specified," that can be used for other
specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do
not qualify as any of the specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually
have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-
term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the
following manner—
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of
dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others’
comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by
others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early
adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable
to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance
from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree
with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own,
volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.65 and antisocial personality disorder described,
as follows—
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that
is intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations
imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a
period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either
through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse
without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is
often a façade of charm and even sophistication that masks
disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the
need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals,
they also may befit some individuals who are prominent in
business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and
disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a
public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was
referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral,
guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments
in reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.
1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four
"dramatic" personality disorders, the others being
borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the
disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive
the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness;
and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and
void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity. We
further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand
view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the same
conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent
personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows
others to make most of his important decisions (such as
where to live), tends to agree with people even when he
believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to
get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around
him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his
identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has
no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of
the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account
her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her
tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is
impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which
they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and
void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and
the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
NORMA CUISON-MELGAR, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) is a
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No.
55538, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City (RTC) nullifying the
marriage of respondents Norma Cuison-Melgar (Norma) and
Eulogio A. Melgar2 (Eulogio) pursuant to Article 363 of the
Family Code.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before
the Catholic Church in Dagupan City. Their union begot five
children, namely, Arneldo, Fermin, Norman, Marion Joy,
and Eulogio III. On August 19, 1996, Norma filed for
declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of
Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations.4 According to Norma, the
manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity are his
immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of
his family since December 27, 1985.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served
by personal service on Eulogio on October 21, 1996 by the
sheriff.5 Eulogio failed to file an answer or to enter his
appearance within the reglementary period.
On November 25, 1996, the RTC ordered the Public
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation on the case to
determine whether or not there exists collusion between the
contending parties.6 On December 18, 1996, Public
Prosecutor Joven M. Maramba submitted his Manifestation
to the effect that no collusion existed between the contending
parties.7 On December 19, 1996, the RTC set the reception of
evidence on January 8, 1997.8
On January 8, 1997, upon motion of Norma’s counsel, the
RTC allowed the presentation of evidence before the Clerk of
Court.9 Norma testified that since the birth of their firstborn,
Eulogio has been a habitual alcoholic; when he is drunk he
(a) sometimes sleeps on the streets, (b) every so often, he
goes to her office, utters unwholesome remarks against her
and drags her home, (c) he usually lays a hand on her, (d) he
often scolds their children without justifiable reason; his
liquor drinking habit has brought shame and embarrassment
on their family; when she would refuse to give him money for
his compulsive drinking habit, he would beat her up and
threaten her; he has not been employed since he was
dismissed from work and he refuses to look for a job; she has
been the one supporting the family, providing for the
education and the basic needs of their children out of her
salary as a government employee; on December 27, 1985,
because of unbearable jealousy to her male officemates,
Eulogio went to her office, dragged her home and then beat
her up; her brothers saw this, came to her rescue and then
told Eulogio to get out of the house; and since then, Eulogio
has not visited or communicated with his family such that
reconciliation is very unlikely.10 The Public Prosecutor
thereafter conducted a brief cross-examination of Norma.11
Twelve days later, or on January 20, 1997, the RTC rendered
its decision nullifying the marriage of Norma and Eulogio.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant
petition for being impressed with merit. As such, pursuant to
Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the marriage
between Norma L. Cuison-Melgar and Eulogio A. Melgar, Jr.
is declared an ABSOLUTE NULLITY.
The Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City is therefore
ordered to cancel the Marriage Contract of the parties
bearing Registry No. 180 in the Marriage Registry of said
Office after payment of the required fees.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the following offices:
The City Prosecution Office, Dagupan City, the Solicitor
General, and the Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC reasoned that:
With the testimony of the petitioner, the Court is convinced
that defendant has been incorrigible in his vices such as
habitual alcoholism, subjecting his family to physical
maltreatment and many times caused them to be
scandalized, his being indolent by not at least trying to look
for a job so that he could also help his wife in supporting his
family, and also his uncalled for display of his jealousy.
These are clear manifestation of his psychological incapacity
to perform his marital obligation to his wife such as showing
respect, understanding and love to her. Defendant also
became indifferent to the needs of his own children who
really longed for a father who is willing to make the sacrifice
in looking for a job so as to support them. Without any
communication to his family since 1985, certaining [sic]
reconciliation and love would be improbable. The attendant
circumstances in this case really point to the fact that
defendant was unprepared to comply with his
responsibilities as a good and responsible husband to his
wife and a loving father to his children x x x.13
Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed an appeal with the CA, contending that the
evidence presented are not sufficient to declare the marriage
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.14
On August 11, 1999, the CA rendered its Decision affirming
the decision of the RTC.15 The CA, quoting extensively
Norma’s testimony, ratiocinated:
[I]t has been adequately established that the decree of
annulment is proper not simply because of defendant’s
habitual alcoholism but likewise because of other causes
amounting to psychological incapacity as a result of which
defendant has failed to perform his obligations under
Articles 68-72, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code x x x.
Contrary to the submission of the appellant Republic, the
grant of annulment is not based merely on defendant’s
habitual alcoholism but also because of his inability to cope
with his other essential marital obligations foremost of which
is his obligation to live together with his wife, observe mutual
love, respect, fidelity and render mutual help and support.
For the whole duration of their marriage, that is, the period
when they actually lived together as husband and wide and
even thereafter, defendant has miserably failed to perform
his obligations for which reason the plaintiff should not be
made to suffer any longer. The contention of the Republic
that plaintiff never showed that she exerted effort to seek
medical help for her husband is stretching the obligations of
the plaintiff beyond its limits. To our mind, it is equivalent to
saying that plaintiff deserves to be punished for all the
inabilities of defendant to perform his concomitant duties as
a husband and a father all of which inabilities in the first
place are in no way attributable to the herein plaintiff.16
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
In its Petition,17 the OSG poses a sole issue for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT IS IN THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE.18
The OSG contends that the law does not contemplate mere
inability to perform the essential marital obligations as
equivalent to or evidence of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code; that such inability must be due
to causes that are psychological in nature; that no
psychiatrist or psychologist testified during the trial that a
psychological disorder is the cause of Eulogio's inability to
look for a job, his resulting drunkenness, unbearable
jealousy and other disagreeable behavior; and that the
decision failed to state the nature, gravity or seriousness, and
incurability of Eulogio’s alleged psychological incapacity.
In her Comment,19 Norma maintains that her testimony
pointing to the facts and circumstances of Eulogio’s
immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, constitutional laziness and indolence are
more than enough proof of Eulogio’s psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations,
which justifies the dissolution of their marriage.
In its Reply,20 the OSG submits that Norma’s comments are
irrelevant and not responsive to the arguments in the
petition. Nonetheless, the OSG reiterates that Norma’s
evidence fell short of the requirements of the law since no
competent evidence was presented during the trial to prove
that Eulogio’s inability to look for a job, his resulting
drunkenness, jealousy and other disagreeable behavior are
manifestations of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.21 Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State
can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break up of families weakens our social and
moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern
alone of the family members.22
In this regard, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates:
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of
Court,23 the rule then applicable, provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation. - If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see
to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Republic v. Molina,24 the Court emphasized the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the OSG to appear as
counsel for the State in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.25 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the
prosecution of the case at the trial level. Other than the
Public Prosecutor’s Manifestation26 that no collusion existed
between the contending parties and the brief cross-
examination27 which had barely scratched the surface, no
pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the Public
Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered.28 Truly, only the active participation
of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.29
Be that as it may, the totality of evidence presented by
Norma is completely insufficient to sustain a finding that
Eulogio is psychologically incapacitated.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.31 It should
refer to "no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."32 The intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.33
Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic of the
Philippines v. Molina34 the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
"I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x.35 (Emphasis
supplied)
Later, the Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos36 that there is
no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration
of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established
by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.37
In the present case, Norma alone testified in support of her
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. She failed to establish the fact
that at the time they were married, Eulogio was already
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived
him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage
and its concomitant responsibilities. In fact, Norma admitted
in her testimony that her marital woes and Eulogio’s
disagreeable behavior started only after the birth of their
firstborn and when Eulogio lost his job.38
Further, no other evidence was presented to show that
Eulogio was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations as
outlined in Articles 68 to 72,39 220,40 221,41 and 22542 of the
Family Code. It was not sufficiently proved that Eulogio was
really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity
of a psychological nature, and not merely
physical.lawphil.net
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact of Eulogio’s immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness,
and abandonment of his family. These circumstances by
themselves cannot be equated with psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make Eulogio completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.43
At best, the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds
for legal separation under Article 5544 of the Family Code. As
the Court ruled in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina,45 it
is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person, it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.46
All told, in order that the allegation of psychological
incapacity may not be considered a mere fabrication,
evidence other than Norma’s lone testimony should have
been adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a
finding of psychological incapacity,47 an expert witness
would have strengthened Norma’s claim of Eulogio’s alleged
psychological incapacity. Norma’s omission to present one is
fatal to her position. There can be no conclusion of
psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no
showing that the "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.48
The Court commiserates with Norma’s marital predicament,
but as a court, even as the highest one, it can only apply the
letter and the spirit of the law; it cannot reinvent or modify
it. Unfortunately, law and jurisprudence are ranged against
Norma’s stance. The Court has no choice but to apply them
accordingly, if it must be true to its mission under the rule of
law. The Court’s first and foremost duty is to apply the law
no matter how harsh it may be.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 11,
1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City in Civil Case
No. CV-96-01061-D, dated January 20, 1997,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of Norma
Cuison-Melgar in Civil Case No. CV-96-01061-D
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173294 February 27, 2008
RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, petitioner,
vs.
MA. LOURDES A. BIER and THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the
March 20, 2006 decision2 and July 3, 2006 resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66952.
Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier met respondent Ma.
Lourdes A. Bier through his sister. Their courtship, which
blossomed as a result of the exchange of long distance calls
between them, lasted six months. Back then, petitioner
observed respondent to be a very sweet and thoughtful
person. This, he said, made him fall in love with her.
On July 26, 1992, six months after their first meeting, they
were married at the UST Santissimo Rosario Parish Church.
Everything went well for the first three years of their
marriage. Respondent was everything petitioner could hope
for in a wife — sweet, loving and caring. She also took good
care of the house. As petitioner was based in Saudi Arabia as
an electronics technician at Saudia Airlines, the parties
decided to maintain two residences, one in the Philippines
and another in Saudi Arabia. They took turns shuttling
between the two countries just so they could spend time
together.
The couple started experiencing marital problems after three
years of marriage. According to petitioner, respondent
ceased to be the person he knew and married. She started
becoming aloof towards him and began to spend more time
with her friends than with him, refusing even to have sexual
relations with him for no apparent reason. She became an
alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also started neglecting her
husband's needs and the upkeep of their home, and became
an absentee wife. After being gone from their home for days
on end, she would return without bothering to account for
her absence. As a result, they frequently quarreled. Finally,
on April 10, 1997, respondent suddenly left for the United
States. Petitioner has not heard from her since.
On April 1, 1998, petitioner instituted in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89, a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations to petitioner. It was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-98-33993.
Per sheriff's return, summons was served through
substituted service as personal service proved futile.
Respondent, however, did not file an answer.
Thereafter, the RTC ordered Assistant City Prosecutor
Edgardo T. Paragua to investigate if there was collusion
between the parties and to intervene for the State to see to it
that evidence was not fabricated. Assistant City Prosecutor
Paragua manifested that, since both parties failed to appear
before him, he was unable to make a ruling on the issue of
collusion and determine if the evidence was fabricated.
After petitioner filed his pre-trial brief, Prosecutor Paragua
filed a second manifestation stating that petitioner had
appeared before him and that, after investigation, he was
convinced that there was no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence was not fabricated.
At pre-trial, only petitioner appeared. As respondent failed to
attend the same, the RTC declared her to have waived the
pre-trial. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Again,
respondent did not take part in the proceedings.
Petitioner filed a written offer of exhibits which was admitted
by the trial court.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a certification
and manifested its disfavor towards declaring the marriage
null and void. It argued that no persuasive evidence was
presented warranting the grant of the petition, specially
since petitioner failed to comply with the guidelines laid
down in Republic v. CA and Molina4 (Molina).
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment5 granting the
petition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring as VOID, based upon the respondent's
psychological incapacity, the marriage contracted on July 26,
1992 between Renne Enrique E. Bier and Ma. Lourdes A.
Bier. As such, their property relations shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership pursuant to Article 147 of the
Family Code. Henceforth, their property relations shall be
governed by the regime of complete separation of property.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General, National Census and Statistics Office and the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila, ordering them to attach a copy of
this Decision to the Marriage Contract of herein petitioner
and respondent on file with respective office.
With costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG,
appealed the decision of the RTC to the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 66952. The CA held that petitioner failed to
comply with the guidelines laid down in Molina as the root
cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was not
medically or clinically identified. Worse, the same was not
even alleged in the petition filed in the court a quo. As such,
it granted the appeal and reversed the decision of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision6 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is GRANTED. The Decision dated 06 March 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case
No. Q-98-33993, which declared as void the marriage
between appellee and respondent, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Renne Enrique E. Bier and
respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier remains valid and
subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA decision. The
same was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner contends that the guidelines enunciated in Molina,
specifically its directive that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained, and that it must be proven to be existing at the
inception of the marriage, need not be strictly complied with
as Molina itself stated the guidelines were merely "handed
down for the guidance of the bench and bar" and were not
meant to be a checklist of requirements in deciding cases
involving psychological incapacity. Furthermore, even
assuming arguendo that the Molina doctrine should be
applied, the RTC erred in ruling that he failed to comply
therewith.
The petition must fail.
Preliminarily, we must pass upon petitioner’s argument that
the finding of the trial court on the existence or non-
existence of psychological incapacity is final and binding on
us absent any showing that its factual findings and
evaluation of the evidence were clearly and manifestly
erroneous.7 Petitioner’s position is of course the general rule.
In the instant case, however, it is the exception to the general
rule which must be applied; the court a quo clearly erred in
granting the petition. It stated in the body of its decision
that:
While this Court agrees with the observation of the
Office of the Solicitor General that the juridical
antecedence of the psychological disorder and its
root cause were not established, the same will not
serve as a hindrance for the Court to declare that
respondent is indeed suffering from a psychological
incapacity. The failure of the Psychological Report to
identify the root cause of respondent's psychological
incapacity is not a fatal flaw that will prevent the Court from
declaring a marriage a nullity based on psychological
incapacity. (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that this Court
has been consistent in holding that if a petition for nullity
based on psychological incapacity is to be given due course,
its gravity, root cause, incurability and the fact that it existed
prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage must
always be proved.8 As early as Santos v. CA, et al.,9 we
already held that:
[P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
xxx This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
These must be strictly complied with as the granting of a
petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.10 This is specially so since the Family Code
does not define psychological incapacity. The determination
thereof is left solely to the discretion of the courts and must
be made on a case-to-case basis.11
Also, even if Molina was never meant to be a checklist of the
requirements in deciding cases involving Article 36
(psychological incapacity) of the Family Code, a showing of
the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the
party's psychological incapacity and its existence at the
inception of the marriage cannot be dispensed with.
In Marcos v. Marcos (Marcos),12 a case cited by petitioner to
support his argument that the totality of evidence presented
was enough to prove the existence of respondent's
psychological incapacity, this Court reiterated that:
The [Molina] guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be "medically
or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to.
xxx xxx xxx
[t]he totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely
no showing that his "defects" were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the 2005 case of Republic v. Iyoy 13 held that
even if Marcos (2000) relaxed the rules such that the
personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
the totality of evidence must still prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Failure in this regard will spell the failure of the
petition.
From the foregoing, one can conclude that petitioner's
insistence that Marcos effectively overturned the need to
present evidence on the aforesaid requirements has no merit.
Thus, unless the law itself or the Court provides otherwise,
these requirements must be established before a petition for
nullity of the marriage based on psychological incapacity can
be granted.
We hold that the trial court's decision to declare the parties'
marriage void ab initio by reason of respondent's
psychological incapacity was clearly and manifestly
erroneous as it overlooked the need to show the gravity, root
cause and incurability of respondent's psychological
incapacity and that it was already present at the inception of
the marriage.
Be that as it may, the main question that begs to be answered
in the instant case is whether the totality of the evidence
presented was enough to establish that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations. We rule in the negative.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his
marriage with respondent.14 He failed to discharge it.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony
and that of his brother, Roderico Bier. He also presented as
evidence a psychological report written by Dr. Nedy Tayag, a
clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters
contained therein.
Dr. Tayag's report, which found respondent to be suffering
from psychological incapacity, particularly a narcissistic
personality disorder, relied only on the information fed by
petitioner. This was admitted by petitioner in his petition for
review on certiorari and memorandum filed in this Court. In
both instances, petitioner reasoned out that the personal
examination of respondent was impossible as her
whereabouts were unknown despite diligent efforts on his
part to find her. Consequently, Dr. Tayag's report was really
hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the
alleged facts she was testifying on. Her testimony should
have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and
unreliable.15
Furthermore, as already stated, the report also failed to
identify the root cause of respondent's narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. It merely concluded that:
This extremely egocentric attitude manifest a person
suffering Narcissistic Personality Disorder that is considered
to be severe, incurable and deeply rooted with her
functioning. Thus, making herself psychologically
incapacitated so as to comply with the essential marital
functions.
Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined
by a physician or a psychologist (as a condition sine qua
non), there is nevertheless still a need to prove the
psychological incapacity
through independent evidence adduced by the person
alleging said disorder.16
In the case at bar, petitioner was able to establish that
respondent was remiss in her duties as a wife and had
become a happy-go-lucky woman who failed to attend to her
husband's needs and who eventually abandoned him.
However, the totality of her acts, as testified to by petitioner
and his brother, was not tantamount to a psychological
incapacity, as petitioner would have us believe. Habitual
alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or refusal to meet one's
duties and responsibilities as a married person and eventual
abandonment of a spouse do not suffice to nullify a marriage
on the basis of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be
due to some psychological (as opposed to physical) illness.17
The undeniable fact is that the marriage, according to
petitioner's own evidence, was off to a good start. According
to him, respondent used to be a sweet, loving and caring wife
who took good care of him and their home. She even
willingly consented to the difficult living arrangement of
taking turns in going back and forth between the Philippines
and Saudi Arabia just so they could be together. Perhaps it
was this unusual arrangement which took a heavy toll on
their relationship. They barely saw and spent time with each
other. Respondent could have gotten used to petitioner’s
absence. And although absence can indeed make the heart
grow fonder, the opposite can just as well be true: out of
sight, out of mind. The couple drifted apart and respondent
obviously fell out of love with petitioner.
Nevertheless, we agree with the CA that the change in
respondent's feelings towards petitioner could hardly be
described as a psychological illness. It was not enough that
respondent, the party adverted to as psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations, had
difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral
element in respondent's personality structure that effectively
incapacitated her from complying with her essential marital
obligations,18 had to be shown. This petitioner failed to do.
Consequently, we are unconvinced that respondent's
condition was rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating
disorder.
Even if we assume the correctness of petitioner's contention
that the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, there is still
no reason to disavow the same as the facts and
circumstances in this case do not warrant a deviation
therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
March 20, 2006 decision and July 3, 2006 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66952 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T.
SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the
judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper
remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has
never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J.
Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated
November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial
court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City
declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo
T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of
absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage
on June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September 17,
2008.2chanrobleslaw
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive
death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an
apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they
had gotten married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year, they
moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell
business.4chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As a
result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a
domestic helper in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but
because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to work
abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in
Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two
months after and was never heard from
again.8chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate
Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon
City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's
whereabouts.10 He also inquired about her from other
relatives and friends, but no one gave him any
information.11chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of
his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He
believed that she had passed away.12chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition
only sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer
avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or
other appropriate remedies.13chanrobleslaw
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for
annulment of judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She
argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo,
despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented
to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac
City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in
Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon
City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal
dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a
result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of
any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition
declaring her presumptively dead.18chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also
never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad.20 Neither
did she go to an employment agency in February 1995.21 She
also claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for
12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal
dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the conjugal
dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another
woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by
their children to support her contention that Ricardo made
false allegations in his petition.24chanrobleslaw
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been
published in a newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were
not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November
28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to
the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn
statement before the civil registry, declaring her
reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family
Code.28chanrobleslaw
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals' resolution dated November 28, 2008.29 The Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the
resolution dated March 5, 2009.30chanrobleslaw
Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently
obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under
Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the
spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the
declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded
belief of the spouse's death.31 She added that it would be
inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did
not disappear in the first place.32 She insisted that an action
for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of
presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of
reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not
be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal
effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive
death.34chanrobleslaw
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for
annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it
cannot be availed when there are other remedies available.
Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to
terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the
Court of Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina
under Article 42 of the Family Code is the appropriate
remedy.
The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional
Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become
final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic fraud
in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it
has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original
action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a
litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a
parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of
his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment
that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false
allegations in the court with respect to her
residence.40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent
for 12 years. There was also no publication of the notice of
hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general
circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she was
deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's
petition to declare her presumptively dead.42chanrobleslaw
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's
petition for declaration of presumptive death were
false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given
copies of Ricardo's petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of
Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on
November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from the
July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and
about a month from her discovery of the decision in October
2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year
period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before
the action is barred by laches, which is the period allowed in
case of lack of jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to
Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated
on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry
with them certain admissions, presumptions, and
conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a
spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-
founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse
is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second
marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in
danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead
spouse when he or she reappears.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case
such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively
dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent
marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on
the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the
present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared
absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that
the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance
is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it
void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the
sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance;
(3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of
the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance
must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance
does not always immediately cause the subsequent
marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or
presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the
subsequent marriage only when all the conditions
enumerated in the Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the
absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if
the first marriage has already been annulled or has been
declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the
subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the
subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is
disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet
rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that
the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage
is legal. This presumption should prevail over the
continuance of the marital relations with the first
spouse.48 The second marriage, as with all marriages, is
presumed valid.49 The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person
assailing the validity of the second marriage.50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance
as a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage in Social
Security System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that
mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent
marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were
notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of
reappearance] or by court action[.]"53 "Since the second
marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that
the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction
of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as
provided by law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for
purposes of determining the status of the second marriage
and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed
that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first
subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be
considered valid when the following are
present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse.55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was
contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death,
lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the
spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be
considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior
to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are
generally considered bigamous and void.57 Only a
subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by
law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent
marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to
declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous.
The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of
another marriage still applies.58chanrobleslaw
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he
filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when
he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would
be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the
element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the
Family Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule
against bigamous marriages to apply.59chanrobleslaw
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a
remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage
does not preclude the spouse who was declared
presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in
law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent
marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court
to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent
marriage."60chanrobleslaw
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks
not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but
also the nullification of its effects. She contends that
reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects
of the declaration of her presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent
marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until
terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be
considered legitimate, and the property relations of the
spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid
marriages."61 If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the
children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate.62 Moreover,
a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against
prosecution for bigamy.63chanrobleslaw
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of
the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the
subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of
children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for
bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or
wife."64 This means that even if Celerina is a real party in
interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the
outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage,65 this
remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the
subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the
declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would
not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment
of judgment will, therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud,
grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the
merits of the petition.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 150677 June 5, 2009
RENATO REYES SO, Petitioner,
vs.
LORNA VALERA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For our review is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed
by petitioner Renato Reyes So (petitioner) against the
Decision dated July 4, 20012 and the Resolution dated
October 18, 20013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 65273. The challenged decision reversed the
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 143,
Makati City declaring the marriage of the petitioner and
respondent Lorna Valera (respondent) null and void on the
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code. The assailed resolution denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The petitioner and the respondent first met at a party in 1973
after being introduced to each other by a common friend.
The petitioner at that time was a 17-year old high school
student; the respondent was a 21-year old college student.
Their meeting led to courtship and to a 19-year common-law
relationship,5 culminating in the exchange of marital vows at
the Caloocan City Hall on December 10, 1991.6 They had
three (3) children (Jeffrey, Renelee, and Loni)7 in their
relationship and subsequent marriage.
On May 14, 1996, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition
for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with the
respondent.8 The case was docketed as JDRC Case No. 96-
674. He alleged that their marriage was null and void for
want of the essential and formal requisites. He also claimed
that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as shown by
the following circumstances: the respondent failed and
refused to cohabit and make love with him; did not love and
respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him
emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological help and
support; failed and refused to have a family domicile; and
failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and
establish conjugal and family life with him.9
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to substantiate his charges.
The petitioner testified that he and the respondent eloped
two (2) months after meeting at a party.10 Thereafter, they
lived at the house of his mother’s friend in Bulacan, and then
transferred to his parents’ house in Caloocan City. They
stayed there for two (2) months before transferring to
Muntinlupa City.11
The petitioner likewise related that respondent asked him to
sign a blank marriage application form and marriage
contract sometime in 1986. He signed these documents on
the condition that these documents would only be used if
they decide to get married. He admitted not knowing what
happened to these documents, and maintained that no
marriage ceremony took place in 1991.12 As noted below, the
petitioner, however, submitted a certified true copy of their
marriage contract as part of his documentary evidence.
The petitioner further alleged that the respondent did not
want to practice her profession after passing the dental
board exam; and that she sold the dental equipment he
bought for her.13 He also claimed that when he started his
own communication company, the respondent disagreed
with many of his business decisions; her interference
eventually led to many failed transactions with prospective
clients.14
The petitioner narrated that he often slept in the car because
the respondent locked him out of the house when he came
home late. He felt embarrassed when his employees would
wake him up inside the car. When he confronted the
respondent the next morning, she simply ignored him. He
also claimed that respondent did not care for their children,
and was very strict with clients. Moreover, the respondent
went out with his employees to gamble whenever there were
no clients.
Lastly, he testified that sometime in 1990, he found all his
things outside their house when he came home late after
closing a deal with a client. He left their house and stayed at
a friend’s house for two (2) months. He tried to go back to
their house, but the respondent prevented him from
entering. The respondent also told him she did not love him
anymore. He attempted to reconcile with her for the sake of
their children, but she refused to accept him back.15
Summons was served on the respondent on July 17, 1996,
but she failed to file an answer. The RTC ordered the public
prosecutor to investigate if there had been collusion between
the parties and to intervene for the State to see to it that
evidence was not fabricated. Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos
manifested that he was unable to make a ruling on the issue
of collusion since the respondent failed to appear before
him. 16
Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented
certified true copies of the birth certificate of their three
children;17 certified true copy of their marriage
contract;18 and the testimony, original curriculum
vitae,19 and psychological report20 of clinical psychologist Dr.
Cristina Rosello-Gates (Dr. Gates).
In her Psychological Report, Dr. Gates noted as follows:
xxx
PARTICULARS
- Parties met in a party when Petitioner was 17 years and
Respondent was 21 years old; both were studying but
Petitioner was also working in his father’s business;
- During the first time they met, Respondent hugged
Petitioner and stayed close to him; she also taught him how
to smoke marijuana; after their first meeting, Respondent
would fetch petitioner from school, and they would go out
together;
- Within the next two months, Respondent dropped out of
school without informing her parents; she applied for a job
and was purportedly raped by her employer;
- When Respondent’s parents found out that she quit school,
she sought petitioner’s help to look for a place to stay;
Renato brought her to his friend’s house in Bulacan but her
hosts did not like her frequent outings and parties;
Respondent then asked Petitioner to live with her in a rented
apartment; she told him to execute an Affidavit of Loss so he
can withdraw his savings with a new bankbook without the
knowledge of his father;
- Parties were fetched by Petitioner’s parents to live with
them in Caloocan; petitioner sent Respondent to school to
wean her away from her friends; when she passed the
Dentistry Board Examinations, he put up a dental clinic for
her; after 2 months, she quit her dental practice and joined
Petitioner in his communications business;
- Respondent had problems dealing with Petitioner’s clients;
she interfered with his decisions, and resented his dealings
with clients which would, at times, last till late at night; one
incident in 1990, Respondent locked Petitioner out of house
prompting the latter to sleep in the car; other similar
incidents followed where employees would wake up
Petitioner when they report for work; one night, Petitioner
found all his things thrown out of the house by Respondent;
- Respondent was not the one who took care of their
children; the second child, for instance, cries whenever said
child sees Respondent as the latter is not familiar with the
former;
- While parties lived together since 1973, they applied for a
marriage license only in 1986; Respondent asked Petitioner
to sign both license and marriage contract without any public
appearance at City Hall; their marriage was registered in
1991 after the couple separated.21
and concluded that:
An examination of the parties’ respective family background
and upbringing, as well as the events prior to their marriage
point to psychological impairment on the part of Respondent
Lorna Valera.
From a simple existence in the province, Lorna Valera was
thrust in the big city for her college education. It was in
Sampaloc, Manila where she lived and groped, and
eventually found herself in bad company. Thus, her so-called
"culture shock" was abated by pot sessions lasting several
days at a time – making her temporarily forget the harsh
reality in the metropolis. Her escapist and regressive
tendencies stunted her psychological growth and prevented
her from fully functioning as a responsible adult.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV),
the international standards of psychological disorders,
Respondent Lorna Valera is plagued with an Adjustment
Disorder as manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of
restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the
conduct of her life. Compulsive Behavior Patterns are also
evident in her marijuana habit, gambling and habitual
squandering of Petitioner’s money. Lorna Valera’s
Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior Patterns
were already existing prior to her marriage to Petitioner
Renato So. Continuing up to the present, the same appears
to be irreversible.22
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the marriage of petitioner and respondent
in its decision of November 8, 1999. The decision, a relatively
short one at four (4) pages, single-spaced, including the
heading and the signature pages, made a short summary of
the "testimonies of the witness" with the statements that –
Petitioner and respondent became common law husband
and wife from 1973 to 1991. Out of this relationship were
born three children, namely Jeffrey, Renelee and Lino all
surnamed Varela.
Sometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by respondent to
sign a blank Marriage Contract and a blank application for
marriage license. The petitioner freely signed the documents
with the belief that the documents will be signed only when
they get married.23
Thereafter, the RTC decision wholly dwelt on the question of
the respondent’s psychological incapacity based on the
testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Gates, his expert witness.
The decision’s concluding
paragraphs stated:
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that
respondent Lorna Valera is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage,
which incapacity existed at the time of the celebration
thereof (Art. 36 F.C.).
It should be borne in mind that marriage is a special contract
of permanent union and the foundation of the Family. The
husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual help and support (Art. 68 F.C.). It includes the giving
of love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship
and understanding (Art. 230 F.C.). Respondent failed to
observe all these things.24
The dispositive portion of the decision that immediately
followed reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
petitioner and against respondent:
1. Declaring respondent psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations under Art. 36
of the Family Code;
2. Declaring the marriage contracted by Renato Reyes So and
Lorna Valero on December 10, 1991, null and void ab initio;
3. Dissolving the conjugal partnership between the spouses
in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family
Code;
4. Awarding the custody of the minor children to petitioner.
xxx
SO ORDERED.25
The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to
the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. The CA, in its
Decision dated July 4, 2001, reversed and set aside the RTC
decision and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.26
The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to prove the
respondent’s psychological incapacity. According to the CA,
the respondent’s character, faults, and defects did not
constitute psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of
the parties’ marriage. The CA reasoned out that "while
respondent appears to be a less than ideal mother to her
children, and loving wife to her husband," these flaws were
not physical manifestations of psychological illness. The CA
further added that although the respondent’s condition was
clinically identified by an expert witness to be an
"Adjustment Disorder," it was not established that such
disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The prosecution also failed to
establish that respondent’s disorder was incurable and
permanent in such a way as to disable and/or incapacitate
respondent from complying with obligations essential to
marriage.
The CA likewise held that the respondent’s hostile attitude
towards the petitioner when the latter came home late was "a
normal reaction of an ordinary housewife under a similar
situation"; and her subsequent refusal to cohabit with him
was not due to any psychological condition, but due to the
fact that she no longer loved him.
Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a
marriage was not proper when the psychological disorder
does not meet the guidelines set forth in the case of Molina.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA
denied his motion in its resolution27 dated October 18, 2001.
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that the CA
seriously erred28 –
1. in reversing the RTC decision without ruling on the trial
court’s factual and conclusive finding that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was null and void ab
initio;
2. in departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings that factual findings of the trial courts are
entitled to great weight and respect and are not disturbed on
appeal; and
3. in totally disregarding the undisputed fact that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.29
The Republic, as intervenor-appellee, alleged in its comment
that: (a) the trial court never made a definitive ruling on the
issue of the absence of the formal and essential requisites of
the parties’ marriage; and (b) petitioner was not able to
discharge the burden of evidence required in Molina.30
The petitioner filed a reply;31 thereafter, both parties filed
their respective memoranda reiterating their arguments.
Other than the issue of the absence of the essential and
formal requisites of marriage, the basic issue before us is
whether there exists sufficient ground to declare the
marriage of petitioner and respondent null and void.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no
sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code. No case of lack of essential and
formal requisites of marriage has been proven or validly
ruled upon by the trial court.
1. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack
of the essential and formal requisites of marriage
The petitioner cites as ground for this appeal the position
that the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision without
touching on the trial court’s ruling that there was absence of
the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
We find this argument baseless and misplaced for three basic
reasons.
First. The argument stems from the mistaken premise that
the RTC definitively ruled that petitioner’s marriage to
respondent was null and void due to the absence of the
essential and formal requisites of marriage.
A careful examination of the RTC decision shows that the
trial court did not discuss, much less rule on, the absence of
the formal and essential requisites of marriage; it simply
recited the claim that "[S]ometime in 1987 petitioner was
induced by respondent to sign a blank Marriage Contract
and a blank application for marriage license. The petitioner
freely signed the documents with the belief that the
documents will be signed only when they get married." The
trial court did not even mention the certified true copy of the
Marriage Contract signed by the officiating minister and
registered in the Civil Registry of Kalookan City. The
petitioner introduced and marked this copy as his Exhibit
"D" to prove that there is a marriage contract registered in
the Civil Registry of Kalookan City between petitioner and
respondent.32
Out of this void came the dispositive portion "[D]eclaring the
marriage contracted by Renato Reyes So and Lorna Valera
on December 10, 1991 null and void."33 Faced with an RTC
decision of this tenor, the CA could not have ruled on the
validity of the marriage for essential and formal deficiencies,
since there was no evidence and no RTC ruling on this point
to evaluate and rule upon on appeal. Even if it had been a
valid issue before the CA, the RTC’s declaration of nullity
should be void for violation of the constitutional rule that
"[No] decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based."34
Second. The same examination of the RTC decision shows
that it concerned itself wholly with the declaration of the
nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. After its recital of the "testimonies of witnesses," part
of which are the facts relied upon to support the claimed
psychological incapacity, the decision dwelt on the evidence
of Dr. Gates, the expert witness, and, from there, proceeded
to its conclusion that psychological incapacity existed. In this
light, the dispositive portion declaring "the marriage...on
December 10, 1991, [is] null and void," must be based on
psychological incapacity as found by the trial court, not on
the absence of the essential and formal requisites of
marriage.
Third. We note that the petitioner himself offered the
Marriage Contract as evidence that it is registered with the
Civil Registry of Kalookan City.35 As a duly registered
document, it is a public document, and is prima facie
evidence of the facts it contains, namely, the marriage of the
petitioner with the respondent. To contradict these facts and
the presumption of regularity in the document’s favor, the
petitioner’s contrary evidence must be clear, convincing, and
more than merely preponderant.36 To be sure, a married
couple cannot simply nullify their marriage through the non-
appearance of one spouse and the uncorroborated
declaration by the other spouse that the marriage did not
really take place. If the biased and interested testimony of a
witness is deemed sufficient to overcome a public
instrument, drawn up with all the formalities prescribed by
the law, then there will have been established a very
dangerous doctrine that would throw the door wide open to
fraud.37 At the very least, the declaration that the marriage
did not take place must be supported by independent
evidence showing a physical impossibility, a forgery, or the
disavowal by the supposed participants, to name a few
possible reasons.
2. Petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity
As the CA did, we hold that the totality of evidence presented
by petitioner failed to establish the respondent’s
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides
that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization." In Santos v. Court of
Appeals,38 the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage."39
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v.
Court of Appeals40 (the Molina case) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
"I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,41 further clarified that there
is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration
of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if
the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability
can be duly established.42
The factual background of this case covers at least 18 years.
The petitioner and the respondent first met in 1973 and lived
together as husband and wife, without the benefit of
marriage, before they got married in 1991. In the course of
their relationship, they had three (3) children; established a
business, and even incurred indebtedness amounting to ₱4
million; had differences due to what the CA described as
"character faults and defects"; and had a well-described
quarrel which the CA observed to be the "common reaction
of an ordinary housewife in a similar situation." Thus, unlike
the usual Article 36 cases this Court encountered in the past,
where marriage, cohabitation, and perception of
psychological incapacity took place in that order, the present
case poses a situation where there had been a lengthy period
of cohabitation before the marriage took place. To be sure,
this factual unique situation does not change the
requirement that psychological incapacity must be present at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. It does, however,
raise novel and unavoidable questions because of the lapse of
time the couple has been together and their intimate
knowledge of each other at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Specifically, how do these factors affect the claim
of psychological incapacity that should exist at the time of
the marriage, considering that marriage came near or at the
end of the parties’ relationship?
Ideally, the best results in the determination of psychological
incapacity are achieved if the respondent herself is actually
examined. This opportunity, however, did not arise in the
present case because the respondent simply failed to respond
to the court summons and to cooperate in the proceedings.
Thus, only an indirect psychological examination took place
through the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings
and clinical interviews of the petitioner which lasted for
about three (3) hours.43 In light of the differences in the
appreciation of the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions
between the trial court and the appellate court, we deem it
necessary to examine the records ourselves, as the factual
allegations and the expert opinion vitally affect the issues
submitted for resolution.
Our own examination of the psychologist’s testimony and
conclusions leads us to conclude that they are not sufficiently
in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented the
respondent from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts on which
the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from
statements by the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause
cannot be doubted. It does not appear to us that the
psychologist read and interpreted the facts related to her
with the awareness that these facts could be slanted. In this
sense, we say her reading may not at all be completely fair in
its assessment. We say this while fully aware that the
psychologist appeared at the petitioner’s bidding and the
arrangement between them was not pro bono.44 While this
circumstance does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons
of bias, her reading of the facts, her testimony, and her
conclusions must be read carefully with this circumstance
and the source of the facts in mind.
In examining the psychologist’s Report, we find the
"Particulars" and the "Psychological Conclusions"
disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appear to
be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from
isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The
"particulars" are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a running
account of the respondent’s life from which her whole life is
totally judged. Thus, we do not see her psychological
assessment to be comprehensive enough to be reliable.
For example, the psychologist’s statements about the parties’
sexual relationship appear to us to be rash, given that no
parallel examination of the petitioner’s own pattern of sexual
behavior has been made. Sex with a partner is a two-way
affair and while one partner can be more aggressive than the
other, aggressiveness is not per se an aberrant behavior and
may depend on the dynamics of the partners’ relationship.
To infer prior sexual experience because the respondent
allegedly initiated intimate behavior, and to cite an
unverified incident of a previous rape to characterize the
respondent’s sexual behavior, are totally uncalled for. That
the respondent did pass her Dental Board Exam was glossed
over and unverified unsavory incidents related to her exam
were highlighted. Her alleged failure to practice was stressed,
without emphasizing, however, that "she quit her dental
practice and joined petitioner in his communications
business."
The respondent’s business behavior is a matter that needed
full inquiry, as there could be reasons for her interference.
With respect to employees, while the petitioner charged the
respondent with being strict, he, at the same time, alleged
that she gambled with the employees when there were no
clients. The psychologist did not pursue these lines and,
significantly, the petitioner’s testimonies on this point are
uncorroborated. The respondent’s reaction to her husband’s
nights out was singled out and slanted to indicate negative
traits. It took the CA to observe that her hostile attitude
when the petitioner stayed out late at night "is merely a usual
common reaction of an ordinary housewife in a similar
situation." To further quote the CA citing the transcripts,
"[I]n fact, petitioner-appellee admitted that the reason
respondent got angry and threw his things outside is because
he came home late and drunk, which petitioner-appellee had
done several times already on the pretext of closing business
deals, which sometimes included going out night-clubbing
with clients."45 Why and how the couple incurred
indebtedness of about ₱4 million may be usual in the
communications business, but is certainly a matter that the
psychologist should have further inquired into in relation
with her alleged strictness in business affairs.1avvphi1
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note
that she lived with the petitioner for 18 years and begot
children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 –
developments that show a fair level of stability in the
relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the
parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry
and joined her husband in the communications business –
traits that do not at all indicate an irresponsible attitude,
especially when read with the comment that she had been
strict with employees and in business affairs. The petitioner’s
Memorandum46 itself is very revealing when, in arguing that
the Marriage Contract was a sham, the petitioner
interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) "[S]ince at that
time, the relationship between the petitioner and respondent
was going well, and future marriage between the two was not
an impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents."
More than all these, the psychologist’s testimony itself
glaringly failed to show that the respondent’s behavioral
disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable
as established jurisprudence requires. Neither did the
psychologist testify that the disorder was grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RODOLFO BRITANICO
Q: All right, what was basically your conclusion in your
qualitative research with regards to the psychological
incapacity of the respondent to comply with the marital
obligation?
DR. CRISTINA R. GATES
A: There is a strong indication that the respondent was not
able to carry out her marital obligation – her marital duties
and responsibilities. And going through the TSN, it is evident
that in their conjugal relation, it was petitioner who was
responsible, but he in fact gave her opportunity to develop
and to become responsible herself. [sic]
For instance, he sent her back to school to take Dentistry, he
supported her during that time and during the exam and
after that he built her a clinic. In all these, the respondent
proved to be irresponsible. [sic]
When she was taking pre-dental, most of the time she was
out of the house, and in one instance petitioner discovered
that respondent was having an extra-marital affair with her
classmate. And in her board exam she failed the first time.
And even if it is questionable, petitioner approached one of
the commissioners and through his efforts the respondent
was able to pass the second time around. [sic]
And in the matter of dental clinic, after merely two months
respondent refused to practice, she not only refused and
without the knowledge of the petitioner sold all the dental
equipments at a loss. [sic]
Q: How about their relationship?
A: From the start respondent is older, she had, like, prior
sexual experience, and she was the one who introduced to
him the use of marijuana. x x x x
Q: How about respondent. How would the respondent
compliment the responsibility?
A: There is no mutuality, because if she run away and asked
for petitioner to rent an apartment for them to live together,
petitioner continued to work and study and went home to
her in the evening, but respondent on the other hand she
quit schooling and she did push through with working, and
worst she allowed her friend to live with them, allegedly in
that apartment, and respondent and friend would engage in
pot sessions. [sic]
Q: What did you find out with regards to the duty of
respondent to live together with the petitioner? [sic]
A: She was frequently out, in [sic] her friends. .
Q: How about love and respect?
A: Love is rather complicated. Because she made love to him
in her own will. [sic]
Q: But did they show respect?
A: No, because she had extra-marital affair, and demanding
lot of money.
Q: How about to render emotional, spiritual and physical
help? How would respondent comply?
A: She was not able to comply, except maybe for the sexual
obligation, but in terms of physical and emotional support
she was not there for him. When she quit, she hang out with
him on their business, but instead of helping him, she would
quarrel him, interfere in his decisions, she would embarrass
petitioner in front of his clients and employees, and if
petitioner would have a deal with his clients and sometimes
would come home late, she would refuse to listen to his
explanation and would lock him out and shout at him. [sic]
Q: And in your Psychological findings, when did this
[incapacity] of the respondent start, her incapacity to comply
with the marriage obligation?
A: In the testimony of the petitioner, I think he did mention
that she came to Manila for her studies, and during the
interview I found out that upon arrival in Manila she was
alone, by herself, she had difficulty adjusting to city life,
because all her life were spent in the province with her
parents and siblings, and she lived in Sampaloc where she
got herself in the company of bad friends like going into
marijuana and frequent parties and pot sessions, [which]
would last for 3 to 4 days, and in effect disallowed her from
going to school regularly.
Q: In clinical psychologist [sic], what is the effect?
A: It is traumatic for her, because there is a separation of her
parents, and not only that she was thrown to a situation of
her being alone, at that time she had no guidance, it would
assume that she would just study…[sic]
Q: In your conclusion of your Psychological Report, you
stated here and I quote: "Based on the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM IV), the international standards of
psychological disorders, Respondent Lorna is plagued with
an Adjustment Disorder as manifested in her impulsiveness,
lack of restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the
conduct of her life." Can you please explain to us.
A: Lorna Valera is like a person who is not in control of
herself, impulsive. x x x
Q: How about lack of restraint?
A: Impulses. Like for example, when the husband comes
home late, instead of looking means and ways to rationalize,
she would just shout and lock him out.
Q: And what about lack of civility, what is your basis?
A: She did not consider the welfare of her children, her
frequent outings, like she would conduct her extra marital
affairs through phone calls. When they separated, I
understand that she was always out of the house, gambling at
night. In fact, petitioner in one of his visits to respondent
and children intercepted the letter of a younger child asking
for an appointment to see the mother because the child’s
report is that he hardly sees the mother.
xxxx
Q: You mentioned also in your psychological conclusion that
Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior of Lorna
Valera existed prior and continuous up to the present, can
you please explain?
A: If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a
sudden, then the psychological incapacity is not obtaining
but in mal-adopting behavior, like you remove the stimulus
of the petitioner in her life. Then the same behavior pattern
as I learned from the children, then the incapacity is
irreversible because it is there.47 [sic]
These statements, lopsided as they are as we observed above,
merely testify to the respondent’s impulsiveness, lack of
restraint, and lack of civility and decency in the conduct of
her life. The psychologist, however, failed to sufficiently
prove that all these emanated from a behavioral disorder so
grave and serious that the respondent would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; that
it was rooted in the respondent’s medical or psychological
history before her marriage; and that a cure was beyond the
respondent’s capacity to achieve.
Speaking of the root of the alleged disorder, the psychologist
could only trace this to the time the respondent came to
Manila; the psychologist concluded that the disorder was due
to her separation from her parents and lack of guidance. Will
common human experience, available through the thousands
of students who over the years trooped from the provinces to
Manila, accept the conclusion that this experience alone can
lead to a disorder that can affect their capacity to marry?
In terms of incurability, the psychologist could only
cryptically say -
A. If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a
sudden, then the psychological incapacity is not obtaining
but in mal-adopting behavior, like you remove the stimulus
of the petitioner in her life. Then the same behavior pattern
as I learned from the children, then the incapacity is
irreversible because it is there.48
Does this convoluted statement mean that Lorna Valera can
still change, and that change can happen if the "stimulus of
the petitioner" is removed from her life? In other words, is
the incapacity relative and reversible?
In Molina, we ruled that "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological
incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage." In the present case, the psychologist simply
narrated adverse "snapshots" of the respondent’s life
showing her alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but
did not convincingly prove her permanent incapacity to meet
her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or
psychological illness that gave rise to this incapacity; and
that this psychological illness and consequent incapacity
existed at the time the marriage was celebrated.
In light of the wide gaps in the facts the psychologist
considered and of the patent deficiencies of her testimony
tested under the standards of established jurisprudence, we
cannot accord full credence and accept the psychologist’s
Report as basis for the declaration of annulment of the
parties’ marriage under Article 36. In the absence of any
contradictory statements from the respondent, the fairer
approach is to read between the lines of this Report and
discern what indeed happened between the parties based on
common human experience between married couples who
have lived together in the way the parties did. From this
perspective, we have no problem in accepting the CA
decision as a fairer assessment of the respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity, and for being a more realistic
appreciation of the evidence adduced in light of the
requirements of Article 36:
Such character faults and defects, We believe, do not
constitute psychological incapacity as a ground for the
declaration of marriage between petitioner-appellee and
respondent. While she appears to be less than ideal mother
to her children and loving wife to her husband, herein
petitioner-appellee, the same are not physical manifestations
of a psychological illness as described in Molina. Although
the expert witness had clinically identified respondent’s
condition as "Adjustment Disorder," allegedly resulting from
respondent’s separation from her parents when she studied
in Manila before she met petitioner-appellee, it was not
established that such disorder or illness allegedly manifested
in her carefree and outgoing behavior as a means of coping
with her emotional and psychological stresses, was the root
cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Moreover, such alleged disorder was not shown
to be of a serious nature, "a supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effective incapacitates" the respondent from
"really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage." The clinical findings on respondent’s
alleged Adjustment Disorder have not established such
illness to be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. And,
as pointed out by the Solicitor General, although the
Psychological Report stated that respondent’s condition
"appears to be irreversible," the expert witness did not
substantiate her conclusion that respondent’s condition was
indeed incurable or permanent. Nowhere in the testimony of
petitioner-appellee was it shown that respondent’s allegedly
carefree ways (and smoking of marijuana) while she was
younger and had no children yet, continued throughout their
marriage until their separation in 1990. On the contrary, her
strict attitude towards the clients and employees is a clear
indication that she takes their business concerns seriously,
such attitude being a reflection of a mature and responsible
personality.49

Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we

have a case here of parties who have very human faults and
frailties; who have been together for some time; and who are
now tired of each other. If in fact the respondent does not
want to provide the support expected of a wife, the cause is
not necessarily a grave and incurable psychological malady
whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide
marital support promised and expected when the marital
knot was tied. To be tired and to give up on one’s situation
and on one’s husband are not necessarily signs of
psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so
labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut
the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate
ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us
under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that addresses
only a very specific situation – a relationship where no
marriage could have validly been concluded because the
parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable
psychological illness existing when the marriage was
celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life
and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.
Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide
any permanent remedy. To use the words of Navales v.
Navales:501avvphi1

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to

take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations.
Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is
different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule.51 [Emphasis ours]

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the

petition and AFFIRM the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated July 4, 2001 and October 18, 2001,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.