CaseDig: Panuncillo vs. CAP Phils. Inc.

GR. No. 161305; February 9, 2007

FACTS:

Milagros Panuncillo worked as an Office Senior Clerk of CAP Philippines Inc. (CAP).
Panuncillo procured an educational plan which she had fully paid but which she later sold
to Josefina Pernes for P37,000. Before the actual transfer of the plan could be effected,
however, Panuncillo pledged it for P50,000 to John Chua who, however, sold it to Benito
Bonghanoy. Bonghanoy in turn sold the plan to Gaudioso R. Uy for P60,000. Because of
the subsequent transactions, Josefina informed CAP that Panuncillo had "swindled" her
but that she was willing to settle the case amicably as long as Panuncillo will pay the
amount involved and the interest.

CAP Philippines Inc. terminated the services of Panuncillo. Panuncillo then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, damages and
attorney's fees against CAP Philippines Inc.

The appellate court reversed the NLRC Decision and held that the dismissal was valid and
that CAP Philippines Inc. complied with the procedural requirements of due process.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Milagros Panuncillo has been illegally dismissed?

HELD:

No. In fine, by petitioner's repeated violation of Section 8.4 of respondent's Code of

Discipline, she violated the trust and confidence of respondent and its customers. To
allow her to continue with her employment puts respondent under the risk of being
embroiled in unnecessary lawsuits from customers similarly situated as Josefina, et al.
Clearly, respondent exercised its management prerogative when it dismissed petitioner.

. . . [T]ime and again, this Court has upheld a company's management prerogatives so
long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest
and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements.

Petitioner nevertheless argues that she was not afforded due process before her dismissal
as she was merely required to answer a show-cause memorandum dated April 7, 1999 and
there was no actual investigation conducted in which she could have been heard.
Before terminating the services of an employee, the law requires two written notices: (1)
one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought;
and (2) the other to inform him of his employer's decision to dismiss him. As to the
requirement of a hearing, the essence of due process lies in an opportunity to be heard,
and not always and indispensably in an actual hearing.

There can thus be no doubt that petitioner was given ample opportunity to explain her
side. Parenthetically, when an employee admits the acts complained of, as in petitioner's
case, no formal hearing is even necessary.

94. MT. CARMEL COLLEGE v. JOCELYN RESUENA, et. al.

G.R. No. 173076 October 10, 2007

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

DOCTRINE: An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The
two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible
because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In
effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.

FACTS: Petitioner is a private educational institution administered by the Carmelite Fathers at New
Escalante, Negros Occidental while respondents were the employees of petitioner. On November 1997
respondents, together with several faculty members, non-academic personnel, and other students,
participated in a protest action against petitioner. Because of this, respondents were terminated by
petitioner on 15 May 1998. Thus, petitioner filed separate complaints before Regional Arbitration Branch
VI of the NLRC in Bacolod City, charging petitioner with illegal dismissal and claimed 13th month pay,
separation pay, damages and attorney's fees

ISSUES: 1. WON reinstatement in the instant case is self-executory and does not need a writ of execution
for its enforcement

2. WON the continuing award of backwages is proper

LA RULING: Labor Arbiter Drilon found that they were not illegally dismissed but ordered that they be
awarded 13th month pay, separation pay and attorney’s fees in the amount of P334,875.47.

NLRC RULING: the NLRC reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter ruling that the termination of
respondents was illegal and ordering the payment of back wages of respondents from 15 May 1998 up to
25 May 1999. It further directed the reinstatement of respondents or payment of separation pay, with
back wages.

CA RULING: The CA affirmed NLRC’s decision.

SC RULING:

1. NO. An order for reinstatement must be specifically declared and cannot be presumed; like back wages,
it is a separate and distinct relief given to an illegally dismissed employee. There being no specific order
for reinstatement and the order being for complainant’s separation, there can be no basis for the award
of salaries/back wages during the pendency of appeal. This Court had declared in the aforesaid case that
reinstatement during appeal iswarranted only when the Labor Arbiter himself rules that the dismissed
employee should be reinstated. But this was precisely because on appeal to the NLRC, it found that there
was no illegal dismissal; thus, neither reinstatement nor back wages may be awarded.

2. YES. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: back wages and reinstatement. The two
reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because
of strained relations between the employee and theemployer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and back wages. The normal consequences of respondents’ illegal
dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of back wages computed
from the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement
is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1)month salary for every year of service
should be awarded as an alternative. Thepayment of separation pay is in addition to payment of back
wages. Concomitantly, it is evident that respondents backwages should not be limited to the period from
15 May 1998 to 25 May 1999. The backwages due respondents must be computed from the time they
were unjustly dismissed until their actual reinstatement to their former position or upon petitioners
payment of separation pay to them if reinstatement is no longer feasible. Thus, until petitioner actually
implements the reinstatement aspect of the NLRC Decision dated 30 October 2001, as affirmed in the
Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80639, its obligation to respondents,
insofar as accrued backwages and other benefits are concerned, continues to accumulate.

JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

G.R. No. 164856 January 20, 2009

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

DOCTRINE: While reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger to the
survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does not contemplate the period
when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a judicially monitored state of being resuscitated in
order to survive.

FACTS: On July 24, 1995, an administrative charge was filed by PAL against its employees-herein
petitioners after they were allegedly caught in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security
personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Center’s Toolroom Section. On October 9, 1995,
after due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline. Petitioners filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages. Prior to the promulgation of the Labor Arbiter’s decision,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed PAL, which was suffering from severe financial
losses, under an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver. January 1999-The Interim Rehabilitation Receiver was
subsequently replaced by a Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver.
LA RULING: The Labor Arbiter found that there was illegal dismissal, ordering PAL to, inter alia,
immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision. On October 5, 2000 (note: after NLRC
reversed LA’s decision), the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution (Writ) respecting the reinstatement
aspect of his January 11, 1999 Decision, and on October 25, 2000, he issued a Notice of Garnishment. PAL
thereupon moved to quash the Writ and to lift the Notice while petitioners moved to release the
garnished amount.

NLRC RULING: The NLRC reversed said decision and dismissed petitioners’ complaint for lack of merit.
However later on it affirmed the validity of the Writ and the Notice issued by the Labor Arbiter but
suspended and referred the action to the Rehabilitation Receiver for appropriate action.

CA RULING: The CA nullified the NLRC Resolutions on two grounds: (1) a subsequent finding of a valid
dismissal removes the basis for implementing the reinstatement aspect of a labor arbiter’s decision (the
first ground), and (2) the impossibility to comply with the reinstatement order due to corporate
rehabilitation provides a reasonable justification for the failure to exercise the options under Article 223
of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners may collect their wages during the period between the Labor Arbiter’s order
of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision overturning that of the Labor Arbiter, now that
PAL has exited from rehabilitation proceedings.

SC RULING: NO. Respondent’s failure to exercise the alternative options of actual reinstatement and
payroll reinstatement was JUSTIFIED. While reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing
threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does not
contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a judicially monitored state
of being resuscitated in order to survive. PAL, during the period material to the case, was effectively
deprived of the alternative choices under Article 223 of the Labor Code, not only by virtue of the statutory
injunction but also in view of the interim relinquishment of management control to give way to the full
exercise of the powers of the rehabilitation receiver. Had there been no need to rehabilitate, respondent
may have opted for actual physical reinstatement pending appeal to optimize the utilization of resources.
Then again, though the management may think this wise, the rehabilitation receiver may decide
otherwise, not to mention the subsistence of the injunction on claims. In sum, the obligation to pay the
employee’s salaries upon the employer’s failure to exercise the alternative options under Article 223 of
the Labor Code is not a hard and fast rule, considering the inherent constraints of corporate rehabilitation.

G.R. No. 172149 February 8, 2010

SESSION DELIGHTS ICE CREAM AND FAST FOODS vs. CA

FACTS:

Adonis Flora filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Session Delights, which was ruled favourably by the Labor
Arbiter. The decision ordered Session Delights to pay Flora back wages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
indemnity and attorney’s fees. Upon appeal, NLRC also ruled in favor of complainant. CA Decision affirmed but
deleted the proportional 13th month pay and the award of indemnity (P5000) for failure to observe due process. In
the course of the execution of the judgement, the Finance Analyst submitted an updated computation of the award
which included the proportionate amount of 13th month pay. This was objected by Session, claiming that this was
not consistent with the decision but the same was denied by NLRC. The CA, however, partially granted the petition
by deleting the awarded proportionate 13th month pay.

ISSUE: WON the updated computation was proper

Held: Yes, the updated computation was proper. The issue in the case at bar is not the correctness of the awards,
the finality of the CA’s judgment, nor the petitioner’s failure to appeal. Rather, it is the propriety of the computation
of the awards made, whether this violated the principle of immutability of final judgments.

The question is whether a re-computation in the course of execution, of the labor arbiter’s original computation of
the awards made pegged as of the time the decision was rendered and confirmed with modification by a final CA
decision, is legally proper.

The Court held that under the terms of the decision under execution, no essential change is made by a re-
computation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared
in that decision. A re-computation (or an original computation, if no previous computation has been made) is a part
of the law – specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this provision – that is
read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction,
as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon
execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented.
The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of the monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected
and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.

Assailed decision is AFFIRMED. Labor Arbiter is asked to conduct another RE-COMPUTATION to determine actual
award based on Court’s directives.

Sunday, June 10, 2018

CASE DIGEST: JAVELLANA, JR. V. BELEN

G.R. No. 181913 : March 5, 2010

DANIEL P. JAVELLANA, JR., Petitioner, v. ALBINO BELEN,

Respondent.

FACTS:

On May 9, 2000 petitioner filed a complaint against respondents for illegal

dismissal and underpayment or non-payment of salaries, overtime pay, holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay (SILP), 13thmonth pay, premium pay for holiday,
and rest day as well as for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Petitioner Belen alleged that respondent Javellana hired him as company driver
on January 31, 1994 and assigned him the tasks of picking up and delivering live
hogs, feeds, and lime stones used for cleaning the pigpens. On August 19, 1999
Javellana gave him instructions to (a) pick up lime stones in Tayabas, Quezon;
(b) deliver live hogs at Barrio Quiling, Talisay, Batangas; (c) have the delivery
truck repaired; and (d) pick up a boar at Joliza Farms in Norzagaray, Bulacan.

Respondent Javellana claimed, on the other hand, that he hired petitioner Belen
in 1995, not as a company driver, but as family driver.Belen did not do work for
his farm on a regular basis, but picked up feeds or delivered livestock only on rare
occasions when the farm driver and vehicle were unavailable.

Regarding petitioner Belens dismissal from work, respondent Javellana insisted

that he did it for a reason.Belen intentionally failed to report for work on August
20, 1999 and this warranted his dismissal.

On November 25, 2002, the LA found petitioner Belen to be a company driver as

evidenced by the pay slips that the farm issued to him and held that his abrupt
dismissal was illegal. The LA awarded him backwages, separation pay, 13thmonth
pay, SILP, holiday pay, salary differential, and attorneys fees.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the decision of the LA. The NLRC found Belen to
have been illegally dismissed.But since he was but a family driver, the NLRC
deleted the award of backwages and separation pay and instead ordered
Javellana to pay him 15 days salary by way of indemnity pursuant to Article 149
of the Labor Code.Belen moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied his
motion.

On appeal, the CA held that Javellanas abrupt dismissal of Belen for an isolated
case of neglect of duty was unjustified. It however, modified the award of
backwages and separation pay.

Both respondent Javellana and petitioner Belen moved for reconsideration of the
decision but the CA denied them. The Court consolidated the two cases.
Javellanas petition was denied, hence he moved for reconsideration but the Court
denied it with finality on September 22, 2008.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter correctly computed petitioner Belens

backwages and separation pay?

Whether or not the monetary award in his favor should run until the finality
of the decision in his case?
HELD:

The petition is granted.

LABOR LAW

Records show that the LA's approved computation gave the period as from August
20, 1999 to November 19,2000 when the proper period was from August 20, 1999,
the date he was dismissed from work, to November 25,2002, the date the Labor
Arbiter rendered his decision in the case.

It is obvious from a reading of the Labor Arbiters decision that the date November
19,2000 stated in the computation was mere typographical error.Somewhere in
the body of the decision is the categorical statement that petitioner Belen is entitled
to backwages from August 20, 1999 up to the date of this decision. Since the Labor
Arbiter actually rendered his decision on November 25,2002, it would be safe to
assume that he caused the computation of the amount of backwages close to that
date or on November 19, 2002.The same could be said of the computation of
petitioner Belens separation pay.

LABOR LAW

Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 34 of Republic Act 6715
clearly intends that the award of backwages and similar benefits to accumulate past
the date of the LA's decision until the dismissed employee is actually reinstated.But
if, as in this case, reinstatement is no longer possible, this Court has consistently
ruled that backwages shall be computed from the time of illegal dismissal until the
date the decision becomes final.

As it happens, the parties filed separate petitions before this Court.The petition in
G.R. 181913, filed by respondent Javellana, questioned the CA's finding of illegality
of dismissal while the petition in G.R. 182158, filed by petitioner Belen, challenged
the amounts of money claims awarded to him.The Court denied the first with
finality in its resolution of September 22, 2008; the second is the subject of the
present case.Consequently, Belen should be entitled to backwages from August 20,
1999, when he was dismissed, to September 22, 2008, when the judgment for
unjust dismissal in G.R. 181913 became final.

Separation pay, on the other hand, is equivalent to one month pay for every year
of service, a fraction of six months to be considered as one whole year.Here that
would begin from January 31, 1994 when petitioner Belen began his service.
Technically the computation of his separation pay would end on the day he was
dismissed on August 20, 1999 when he supposedly ceased to render service and
his wages ended.But, since Belen was entitled to collect backwages until the
judgment for illegal dismissal in his favor became final, here on September 22,
2008, the computation of his separation pay should also end on that date.

Further, since the monetary awards remained unpaid even after it became final on
September 22, 2008 because of issues raised respecting the correct computation
of such awards, it is but fair that respondent Javellana be required to pay 12%
interestper annum on those awards from September 22, 2008 until they are
paid.The 12% interest is proper because the Court treats monetary claims in labor
cases the equivalent of a forbearance of credit.It matters not that the amounts of
the claims were still in question on September 22, 2008.What is decisive is that
the issue of illegal dismissal from which the order to pay monetary awards to
petitioner Belen stemmed had been long terminated.

CA SET ASIDE.

Sarona vs NLRC 2012

Facts:

 Petitioner, a security guard in Sceptre since April 1976, was asked by Sceptre’s operations manager on
June 2003, to submit a resignation letter as a requirement for an application in Royale and to fill up an
employment application form for the said company. He was then assigned at Highlight Metal Craft Inc.
from July 29 to August 8, 2003 and was later transferred to Wide Wide World Express Inc. On September
2003, he was informed that his assignment at WWWE Inc. was withdrawn because Royale has been
allegedly replaced by another security agency which he later discovered to be untrue. Nevertheless, he
was once again assigned at Highlight Metal sometime in September 2003 and when he reported at
Royale’s office on October 1, 2003, he was informed that he would no longer be given any assignment as
instructed by Sceptre’s general manager. He thus filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal. The LA ruled
in petitioner’s favor as he found him illegally dismissed and was not convinced by the respondent’s
claim on petitioner’s abandonment.

 Respondents were ordered to pay back wages computed from the day he was dismissed
up to the promulgation of his decision on May 11, 2005.The LA also ordered for the payment of
separation pay but refused to pierce Royale’s corporate veil.

 Respondents appealed to the NLRC claiming that the LA acted with grave abuse of discretion upon ruling
on the illegal dismissal of petitioner. NLRC partially affirmed the LA’s decision with regard to petitioner’s
illegal dismissal and separation pay but modified the amount of backwages and limited it to only 3 months
of his last month salary reducing P95, 600 to P15, 600 since he worked for Royale for only 1 month and 3
days. Petitioner did not appeal to LA but raised the validity of LA’s findings on piercing Royale’s corporate
personality and computation of his separation pay and such petition was dismissed by the NLRC.
Petitioner elevated NLRC’s decision to the CA on a petition for certiorari, and the CA disagreed with the
NLRC’s decision of not proceeding to review the evidence for determining if Royale is Sceptre’s
alter ego that would warrant the piercing of its corporate veil.

Issue:

 Whether or not petitioner’s back wages should be limited to his salary for 3 month

Ruling:

 The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is applicable on alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely
a

farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized
and

controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or
adjunct

of another corporation.

 The respondents’ scheme reeks of bad faith and fraud and compassionate justice dictates that Royale
and

Sceptre be merged as a single entity, compelling Royale to credit and recognize the petitioner’s length of

service with Sceptre. The respondents cannot use the legal fiction of a separate corporate personality for
ends

subversive of the policy and purpose behind its creation or which could not have been intended by law to

which it owed its being.

 Also, Sceptre and Royale have the same principal place of business. As early as October 14, 1994, Aida
and

Wilfredo became the owners of the property used by Sceptre as its principal place of business by virtue
of a

Deed of Absolute Sale they executed with Roso. Royale, shortly after its incorporation, started to hold
office in

the same property. These, the respondents failed to dispute.

 Royale also claimed a right to the cash bond which the petitioner posted when he was still with Sceptre.
If

Sceptre and Royale are indeed separate entities, Sceptre should have released the petitioner’s cash bond

when he resigned and Royale would have required the petitioner to post a new cash bond in its favor.
 The way on how petitioner was made to resign from Sceptre then later on made an employee of Royale,

reflects the use of the legal fiction of the separate corporate personality and is an implication of continued

employment. Royale is a continuation or successor or Sceptre since the employees of Sceptre and of
Royale

are the same and said companies have the same principal place of business.

 Because petitioner’s rights were violated and his employer has not changed, he is entitled to separation
pay

which must be computed from the time he was hired until the finality of this decision. Royale is also
ordered to

pay him backwages from his dismissal on October 1, 2003 until the finality of this decision.

 However, the amount already received by petitioner from the respondents shall be deducted.
He is

also awarded moral and exemplary damages amounting to P 25, 000.00 each for his dismissal which was

tainted with bad faith and fraud. Petition is granted. CA’s decision is reversed and set aside.

G.R. No.170904 November 13, 2013

BANI RURAL BANK INC. ENOC THEATER I AND II and/or RAFAEL

DE GUZMAN, Petitioners, v. TERESA DE GUZMAN, EDGAR C. TAN
and TERESA G. TAN, Respondents.

BRION,J.:

FACTS:

The respondents were employees of Bani Rural Bank, Inc. and ENOC Theatre I
and II who filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners. The
complaint was initially dismissed by the LA but the NLRC reversed LAs decision.
The NLRC, in its resolution dated March 17, 1995, ordered that respondents be
reinstated with payment of backwages from the time of their dismissal until their
actual reinstatement. Such decision has become final and executory.
Computation of backwages was referred to Labor Arbiter Gambito.

Petitioners appealed the computation of the backwages with the NLRC. In a

decision dated July 31, 1998, the NLRC modified the terms of the March 17, 1995
resolution insofar as it clarified the phrase less earnings elsewhere. The NLRC
additionally awarded the payment of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement on
account of the strained relations between the parties.
As explained in the assailed Decision, what is controlling for purposes of the
backwages is the NLRC s Resolution dated 17 March 1995 which decreed that
private respondents are entitled to backwages from the time of their dismissal
(constructive) until their actual reinstatement; and considering that the award of
reinstatement was set aside by the NLRC in its final and executory Decision dated
3 July 1998 which ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
to be computed up to the finality on 29 January 1999 of said Decision dated 3
July 1998, then the computation of the backwages should also end on said date,
which is 29 January 1999

ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC erred in ruling how the backwages are to be
computed

HELD: No. CA decision affirming NLRC ruling sustained.

Labor Law - The computation of backwages depends on the final

awards adjudged as a consequence of illegal dismissal.

First, when reinstatement is ordered, the general concept under Article 279 of the
Labor Code, as amended, computes the backwages from the time of dismissal until
the employees reinstatement. The computation of backwages (and similar benefits
considered part of the backwages) can even continue beyond the decision of the
labor arbiter or NLRC and ends only when the employee is actually reinstated.

Second, when separation pay is ordered in lieu of reinstatement (in the event that
this aspect of the case is disputed) or reinstatement is waived by the employee (in
the event that the payment of separation pay, in lieu, is not disputed), backwages
is computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering
separation pay.

Third, when separation pay is ordered after the finality of the decision ordering the
reinstatement by reason of a supervening event that makes the award of
reinstatement no longer possible (as in the case), backwages is computed from the
time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.

As the records show, the contending parties did not dispute the NLRC s order of
separation pay that replaced the award of reinstatement on the ground of the
supervening event arising from the newly-discovered strained relations between
the parties. The parties allowed the NLRC s July 31, 1998 decision to lapse into
finality and recognized, by their active participation in the second computation of
the awards, the validity and binding effect on them of the terms of the July 31, 1998
decision.

Under these circumstances, while there was no express modification on the period
for computing backwages stated in the dispositive portion of the July 31, 1998
decision of the NLRC, it is nevertheless clear that the award of reinstatement under
the March 17, 1995 resolution (to which the respondents backwages was initially
supposed to have been computed) was substituted by an award of separation pay.
As earlier stated, the awards of reinstatement and separation pay are exclusive
remedies; the change of awards (from reinstatement to separation pay) under the
NLRC s July 31, 1998 not only modified the awards granted, but also changed the
manner the respondents backwages is to be computed. The respondents
backwages can no longer be computed up to the point of reinstatement as there is
no longer any award of reinstatement to speak of.

Thus, the computation of the respondents' backwages must be from the time of the
illegal dismissal from employment until the finality of the decision ordering the
payment of separation pay. It is only when the NLRC rendered its July 31, 1998
decision ordering the payment of separation pay (which both parties no longer
questioned and which thereafter became final) that the issue of the respondents'
employment with the petitioners was decided with finality, effectively terminating
it. The respondents' backwages, therefore, must be computed from the time of their
illegal dismissal until January 29, 1999, the date of finality of the NLRC's July 31,
1998 Decision.