Evidence: Case Digest in

Case Digest in
EVIDENCE
Prepared by:
Karen Kristy B. Ubanan
IV-Arellano
Prepared for:
Judge ALI OMBRA RAIZ BACARAMAN
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASE PAGE
Bank of the Philippine v. SMP, Inc................................................. 3

Capital Shoes Factory, Ltd.v.Traveler Kids, Inc.............................. 6
Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr................................................................. 9
Country Bankers Insurance Corp. v. Lagman................................ 11
Republic v. Spouses Mateo........................................................... 15
Citibank v. Teodoro....................................................................... 18
Bayani Magdayao v. People........................................................... 20
Republic v. Development Resources Corp..................................... 22
Bunagan-Bansig v. Celera ............................................................ 24
Saad Agro Industries, Inc. v. Republic............................................ 26
Cabugao Sison v. People................................................................ 28
Pilipinas Bank v. Court of Appeals.................................................. 30
Eagleridge Development Corp v. Cameron Granville..................... 32
Manila Electric Co. v. Heirs of Spouses Deloy................................ 34
Spouses Paras v. Kimwa Const and Dev. Corp................................ 36
Marquez v. Espejo........................................................................... 38
Spouses Amoncio v. Benedicto....................................................... 40
Spouses Trinidad v. Inson................................................................ 42
Leighton Contractors Phils., Inc v. CNP Industries, Inc. .................. 44
Rosario Textile Mills Corp. v. Home Bankers................................... 46

BPI vs. SMP, INC. G.R. No. 175466 December 23, 2009
Petitioner: BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Respondent: SMP, INC.,
Ponente: NACHURA, J.:
Topic: Admissibility in Evidence / ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1995, Maria Teresa Michaela Ong, as Sales
Executive of SMP, Inc. undertook the acceptance and servicing of a
purchase order of CLOTHESPAK MANUFACTURING PHILS. (Clothespak)
for 4,000 bags or sacks of General purpose (GPS) polystyrene products.
The ordered products were delivered, for which delivery receipts were
issued. The total selling price of the products amounted to U.S.
$118,500.00. As payment, Clothespak issued postdated checks in favor of
plaintiff SMP and delivered the same to Maria Teresa Michaela Ong.
When the same were deposited by SMP Inc. on their maturity dates, the
drawee bank dishonored and returned said checks for the reason
"Account Closed."
In the meantime, a case was filed by herein defendant Far East

Bank and Trust Company against Clothespak for a recovery of sum of
money with prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment. The Pasig
Court granted and issued the writ dated March 14, 1995 in favor of the
plaintiff bank. Real and personal properties of the defendants were levied
and attached.
Thereafter, on March 28, 1995, SMP, Inc. filed an Affidavit of Third

Party Claim in that Civil Case No. 65006, claiming ownership of the 4,000
bags of General Purpose (GPS) polystyrene products taken at Clothespak
factory worth ₱3,096,405.00. With the filing by Far East Bank of the
indemnity bond, the goods claimed were not released and the Pasig Court
directed SMP, Inc. to ventilate its claim of ownership in a vindicatory
action under Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Meanwhile, Far East Bank obtained a favorable judgment against
Clothespak. It has become final and executory which led to the
implementation and enforcement of said decision against Clothespak’s
properties inclusive of the goods earlier attached. Hence, the instant case
is filed by SMP, Inc. to recover from the attaching bank the value of the
goods it claims ownership and for damages.
SMP, Inc. alleges that there was wrongful attachment of the goods
for ownership of the same was never transferred to Clothespak. The
former anchors its claim of ownership over the goods by virtue of the

Provisional Receipt No. 4476 issued by Sales Executive Maria Teresa
Michaela Ong to Clothespak with the words, "Materials belong to SMP
Inc. until your checks clear." She testified during the trial that the above
words were in her own handwriting. The said receipt was allegedly issued
to Alex Tan of Clothespak after the checks, payment for the goods, were
issued to her. It is asserted that despite receipt by Clothespak of the
goods, ownership remained with SMP, Inc. until the postdated checks it
issued were cleared.
Defendant bank, however, claims that the said provisional receipt

was falsified to negate the terms of the Sales Invoices. The phrase,
"materials belong to SMP, Inc. until your checks clear," was only an
insertion of plaintiff’s representative in her own handwriting. It did not
bear the conformity of Clothespak. Further, defendant bank assails the
admissibility of the receipt for it is a mere triplicate copy; the original and
duplicate copies were not presented in court, in violation of the Best
Evidence Rule. Neither was there secondary evidence presented to
conform to the rule.
The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the CA affirmed the
decision in toto. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the receipts presented by the respondent is admissible
in evidence?
HELD:
In order to discredit the claim of ownership by SMP, petitioner

questions the admissibility of the receipt presented by the former,
wherein the ownership was reserved for the buyer until after full
payment of the purchase price. Petitioner claims that the same was
inadmissible in evidence and was in contravention of the best evidence
rule. We beg to disagree.
The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade
of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Although there are
certain recognized exceptions when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself.
However, in the instant case, contrary to petitioner’s contention,

the receipt presented by SMP is deemed as an original, considering that
the triplicate copy of the provisional receipt was executed at the same

time as the other copies of the same receipt involving the same
transaction. Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Original of document. —
(a) The original of the document is one the contents of which are the
subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the

same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded
as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being
copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries
are likewise equally regarded as originals.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for

lack of merit.

Capital Shoes Factory v. Traveler Kids GR No. 200065, Sep 24, 2014
Petitioner: Capital Shoes Factory LTD

Respondent: Traveler Kids Incorporated
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.:
Topic: Admissibility in Evidence / ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
FACTS:
Sometime in 2000, petitioner Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL), a
foreign corporation engaged in the manufacturing and trading of
children's shoes and similar products, and respondent Traveller Kids,
Inc. (TKI), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing, importing and distributing shoes, sandals and other
footware entered into an agreement, wherein they agreed that TKI would
import the shoes and sandals made by CSFL from its China factory. After
TKI placed numerous purchase orders, CSFL began manufacturing the
goods pursuant to the special designs and specifications of TKI. CSFL then
shipped the goods to TKI.
It was their arrangement that TKI would pay thirty (30%) percent
of the purchase price of the goods by way of letters of credit, and the
balance of seventy (70%) percent by way of telegraphic transfer, thirty
(30) days from the date of delivery of the goods.
For the first three years, TKI was able to pay its purchase orders and
the shipments made by CSFL. In 2004, however, TKI started to default in
its payments. CSFL granted numerous concessions and extensions to TKI.
Thereafter, both verbal and written demand letters were made by CSFL
to TKI for the payment of its unpaid accounts, but to no avail.
To protect its interest, CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum

of money and damages against TKI before the RTC. During the trial, CSFL,
through its witness, identified several sales invoices and order slips it
issued as evidence of its transactions with TKI. The latter objected to the
identification pointing out that the documents being presented were
mere photocopies. TKI also objected to the evidence presented by CSFL
to prove the amount of attorney's fees on the ground that it was not an
issue raised during the pre-trial. The RTC noted the objections. On May
13, 2011, the RTC issued the Order[7] admitting all the exhibits offered by
CFSL. Not in conformity, TKI filed a motion for reconsideration[8] arguing
that the exhibits formally offered by CSFL were inadmissible in evidence
for being mere photocopies. The RTC issued the order[9] denying TKI's
motion for reconsideration, ruling that the sales invoices and order slips
could be admitted because the duplicate originals of the invoices were

already sufficiently established by the testimony of CSFL's officer and
principal witness, Ms. Susan Chiu (Chiu). As there was no injunction order
issued by the CA, the RTC continued the proceedings and directed TKI to
present evidence. TKI refused, citing the petition for certiorari it filed with
the CA. Because of its refusal, the RTC considered TKI's right to adduce
countervailing evidence as waived and ordered CSFL to submit its
memorandum. On October 5, 2011, the CA rendered a decision partially
granting TKI's petition. CSFL filed a motion for partial reconsideration, but
it was denied by the CA in its Resolution, dated January 16, 2012.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether duplicate originals are admissible in evidence?
HELD:
The Court finds merit in the petition. Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4 . Original of document.
xxxx
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about

the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally
regarded as originals.
xxxx
Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL's principal witness, was able to

satisfactorily explain that Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1" were
duplicate originals of invoices and order slips, and not mere photocopies.
The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Chiu
convincingly explained that CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of
invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy to a client and
retaining the other copy. The Court combed through her testimony and
found nothing that would indicate that the documents offered were mere
photocopies. She remained firm and consistent with her statement that
the subject invoices were duplicate originals as they were prepared at the
same time. The Court sees no reason why Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court should not apply. At any rate, those exhibits can be
admitted as part of the testimony of Chiu.

After the admission of CSFL's exhibits as evidence, TKI should have
let trial proceed in due course instead of immediately resorting to
certiorari, by presenting its own testimonial and documentary evidence
and in case of an unfavorable decision, appeal the same in accordance
with law. The pertinent records of the case are hereby ordered remanded
to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, for appropriate
proceedings.

Dantis vs. Maghinang G.R. No. 191696 April 10, 2013
Petitioner: Rogelio Dantis

Respondent: Julio Maghinang
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.:
Topic: Admissibility in Evidence /SECONDARY EVIDENCE
FACTS:
Petitioner Dantis filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery
of possession against Respondent Maghinang. Petitioner alleged that he
was the registered owner of subject land, acquiring such thru an
extrajudicial partition of the estate from his deceased father. That
respondent built a house on a part of his estate; that his demands for
respondent to vacate were unheeded.
Respondent Julio denied the allegations. He said that his father

bought the land from the Petitioner’s father and that he has succeeded
to its ownership. He also claims that he was entitled to a separate
registration of said lot on the basis of the documentary evidence of sale,
and his open and uninterrupted possession of the property. Defendant
presented the ff evidence to prove the sale of land to his father:
1. Exhibit 3 – affidavit executed by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of the

Petitioner of the agreement to sell such land
2. Exhibit 4 – an undated handwritten receipt evidencing

downpayment for said lot
But defendant admitted that the affidavit was not signed by the
alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis, the father of petitioner. Also, he admitted
that the receipt he presented was admittedly a mere photocopy. RTC
rendered its decision in favor of petitioner. RTC found that the documents
would only serve as proofs that the purchase price for the subject lot had
not yet been completely paid and, hence, Rogelio was not duty-bound to
deliver the property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a
mere possessor by tolerance. CA ruled in favor of Defendant Maghinang.
It held that the undated receipt was proof of the sale of the lot. It also
ruled that the partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with the
delivery gave efficacy to the oral sale, and that Petitioner was duty-bound
to convey what had been sold after full payment of the selling price.

ISSUE:
Whether the pieces of evidence (affidavit and photocopy of the
receipt) submitted by the defendant are adequate proofs of the existence
of the alleged oral contract of sale of the lot in dispute
HELD:
No. Exhibit "3," the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidenceand,
thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay
when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of
some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be
produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three
reasons: 1) absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor
evidence; and 3) absence of oath. The affidavit was not identified and its
averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, it must be
excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay
evidence.
Exhibit "4," the undated handwritten receipt, is considered

secondary evidencebeing a mere photocopy which cannot be admitted
to prove the contents of the document. The best evidence rule requires
that the highest available degree of proof must be produced. For
documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by
the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or
substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule

130, Section 5, which states that: when the srcinal has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith
on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.
In the case, Defendant failed to prove the due execution of Exhibit

"4" as well as its subsequent loss. Also, his testimony was riddled with
improbabilities and contradictions which raise doubt on the veracity of
his evidence. Further, Exhibit 4 would not be an adequate proof of the
existence of the alleged oral contract of sale because it failed to provide
a description of the subject lot, including its metes and bounds, as well as
its full price or consideration.
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Country Bankers Ins Corp. vs. Lagman G.R. No. 165487 July 13, 2011
Petitioner: Country Bankers Insurance Corporation

Respondent: ANTONIO LAGMAN
Ponente: PEREZ, J.:
Topic: Admissibility in Evidence / SECONDARY EVIDENCE
FACTS:
Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food
Authority (NFA) to engage in the business of storing not more than 30,000
sacks of palay valued at ₱5,250,000.00 in his warehouse at Barangay
Malacampa, Camiling, Tarlac. Under Act No. 3893 or the General Bonded
Warehouse Act, as amended, the approval for said license was
conditioned upon posting of a cash bond, accordingly, Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) issued Warehouse Bond No.
03304 for ₱1,749,825.00 on 5 November 1989 and Warehouse Bond No.
02355 for ₱749,925.00 on 13 December 1989 (1989 Bonds) through its
agent, Antonio Lagman (Lagman). Santos was the bond principal, Lagman
was the surety and the Republic of the Philippines, through the NFA was
the obligee.
In consideration of these issuances, corresponding Indemnity
Agreements were executed by Santos, as bond principal, together with
Ban Lee Lim Santos (Ban Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine (Reguine) and
Lagman, as co-signors. The latter bound themselves jointly and severally
liable to Country Bankers for any damages, prejudice, losses, costs,
payments, advances and expenses of whatever kind and nature, including
attorney’s fees and legal costs, which it may sustain as a consequence of
the said bond; to reimburse Country Bankers of whatever amount it may
pay or cause to be paid or become liable to pay thereunder; and to pay
interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed and compounded
monthly, as well as to pay attorney’s fees of 20% of the amount due it.
Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as

collateral. When the loan matured, Santos defaulted in his payment. By
virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay.
Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The bond principals,
Santos and Ban Lee Lim, were not served with summons because they
could no longer be found. The case was eventually dismissed against them
without prejudice.The other co-signor, Reguine, was declared in default
for failure to file her answer.
On 21 September 1998, the trial court rendered judgment

declaring Reguine and Lagman jointly and severally liable to pay Country
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Bankers the amount of ₱2,400,499.87. In holding Lagman and Reguine
solidarily liable to Country Bankers, the trial court relied on the express
terms of the Indemnity Agreement that they jointly and severally bound
themselves to indemnify and make good to Country Bankers any liability
which the latter may incur on account of or arising from the execution of
the bonds. The trial court rationalized that the bonds remain in force
unless cancelled by the Administrator of the NFA and cannot be
unilaterally cancelled by Lagman. The trial court emphasized that for the
failure of Lagman to comply with his obligation under the Indemnity
Agreements, he is likewise liable for damages as a consequence of the
breach.
Lagman filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which rendered the

assailed Decision reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and
ordering the dismissal of the complaint filed against Lagman. The
appellate court held that the 1990 Bond superseded the 1989 Bonds. The
appellate court observed that the 1990 Bond covers 33.3% of the market
value of the palay, thereby manifesting the intention of the parties to
make the latter bond more comprehensive. Lagman was also exonerated
by the appellate court from liability because he was not a signatory to the
alleged Indemnity Agreement of 5 November 1990 covering the 1990
Bond. The appellate court rejected the argument of Country Bankers that
the 1989 bonds were continuing, finding, as reason therefor, that the
receipts issued for the bonds indicate that they were effective for only
one-year. Country Bankers sought reconsideration which was denied in a
Resolution dated 24 September 2004. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the mere photocopy of the 1990 Bond is admissible as

evidence
HELD: No. SC ruled the inadmissibility such copy. Under the best evidence
rule, the original document must be produced whenever its contents are
the subject of inquiry. The rule is encapsulated in Section 3, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, as follow:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the

subject of inquiry is the contents of a documents, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
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(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office.
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless

it is shown that the original is unavailable. Section 5, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court states:
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable. — When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the

contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the
existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of
the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the
part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence, execution, loss, and contents.
In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that
there are actually four (4) duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is
kept by the NFA, the second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac,
the third is with Country Bankers and the fourth was in his possession. A
party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for the non-production of the original instrument. When
more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have
been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without
accounting for the other originals. Despite knowledge of the existence
and whereabouts of these duplicate originals, Lagman merely presented
a photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but he
could no longer produce it because he had already severed his ties with
Country Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by
itself reason enough for the non-availability of his copy of the bond
considering that, as it appears from the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a
bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why he failed to secure the
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original from any of the three other custodians he mentioned in his
testimony. While he apparently was able to find the original with the NFA
Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing its photocopy.
Clearly, Lagman failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the original.
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Republic vs. Spouses Mateo G.R. NO. 148025 August 13, 2004
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondent: Spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed a petition
for the Reconstitution of the Original Copy as well as the Owner‘s
Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-38769 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Bataan on 16 July 1971 in the name of Jose
Tan. The property under the said title was purchased by the spouses
Mateo from Jose Tan, however, the original copy of the said TCT was
deemed lost and cannot be located in the Registry of Deeds.
The RTC of Balanga denied the petition and the Motion for
Reconsideration while the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and
granted the same. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
lodged by the Republic.
ISSUE:
Whether the certified photocopy of the title as basis for the
reconstitution of the original and owner‘s copy of the title is admissible in
evidence
HELD:
As correctly noted by the RTC there is no showing how the parcels
of land in question were transferred to Jose Tan“. The said order and
decree, therefore, establish only the prior existence of OCT No. N-205 but
not that of TCT No. T-38769 in the name of Jose Tan. The CA’s reliance on
the certified photocopy of Judge Tizon’s decision awarding to Donato
Echivarria from whose OCT the TCT subject of reconstitution was
transferred does not lie for, in the first place,”there is no showing how
the parcels of land were transferred to Jose Tan,” the spouses Mateo’s
predecessor-in-interest.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 26, “AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL

PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE LOST OR DESTROYED,” which has been quoted by the trial court in
its decision, enumerates the sources-documents-bases of a
reconstitution of a transfer certificate of title. To repeat, they are, in the
following order:
1. the owner’s duplicate of the title
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2. the co-owner’s mortgagees’, or lessees’ duplicate of the title
3. a certified copy of the title previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian
4. an authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as
the case may be, pursuant to which the OCT was issued
5. a document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the
property . . . is . . . encumbered or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered; and any other
document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed title.
Since, except for the last above-enumerated document, the

Mateos have failed to present any of the other documents, the rule
on secondary evidence under Sec. 5 of Rule 130 applies. Section 5 of the
rule provides that •”when the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith
on its part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.”
As the immediately quoted provision of the Rules directs, the order

of presentation of secondary evidence is: existence, execution, loss,
contents. The order may, however, be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate
for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within the judicial
discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular
case.
Assuming that the existence and execution of the original of the
TCT has been satisfactorily shown and that it was taken in 1973 by the
Department of Justice and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
connection with the investigation of the judge on whose order the OCT
from which the TCT was transferred, which OCT was also taken by said
government agencies, there is no satisfactory showing that the TCT has
been lost.
In fine, the Mateo’s have not satisfactorily shown that the original
of the TCT has been lost or is no longer available. On this score alone, the
Mateo’s petition for reconstitution fails.
In any event, even assuming that the original of the TCT was lost or
is no longer available, not only is the photocopy of the alleged owner’s
duplicate copy thereof . Exh. ”1″ partly illegible. When, where and under
what circumstances the photocopy was taken and where it was kept to
spare it from being also “lost” were not even shown. These, not to
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mention the conduct by the Department of Justice and NBI of an
investigation behind the issuance of the OCT and TCT cautioned and led
the Court to rule against the sufficiency of the Mateos‘ evidence and
propriety of a grant of their petition for reconstitution.
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Citibank vs. Teodoro G.R. No. 150905. September 23, 2003
Petitioner: CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD

Respondent: EFREN S. TEODORO
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:
FACTS:
Efren Teodoro is a Citibank Card credit card holder. But in 1995 his
outstanding obligation ballooned to 191,693.25 inclusive of interest and
service charges. During the trial, Citibank presented several sales invoices
or charge slips, which added up to only P24,388.36. Although mere
photocopies of the originals, the invoices were marked in evidence as
Exhibits F to F-4. Because all these copies appeared to bear the signatures
of respondent, the trial court deemed them sufficient proof of his
purchases with the use of the credit card. MTC decided in favour of
Citibank. Teodoro appealed to RTC and affirmed MTC decision. CA
reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in holding that petitioner failed to prove the

due execution and the cause of the unavailability and non-production of
the charge slips marked in evidence as Exhibits F to F-4
HELD:
No. SC affirmed CA decision. The original copies of the sales

invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged
obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. Before a
party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of
the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the
existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of
the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the
part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
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The loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for
them were conditions that were not met, because the sales invoices
might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that he had
requested the originals from Equitable, failed to show that he had
subsequently followed up the request. When more than one original copy
exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of
any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other
originals. Triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the
sales invoice only once. During the trial, Hernandez explained that an
original copy had gone to respondent, another to the merchant, and still
another to petitioner. Each of these three copies is regarded as an original
in accordance with Section 4 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were unavailable,
and that due diligence had been exercised in the search for them.
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MAGDAYAO VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 152881, AUGUST 17, 2004
Petitioner: ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO

Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ponente: CALLEJO SR., J.:
Doctrine: As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should
not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as
photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing
has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. To warrant
the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is
in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section6 of Rule 130
provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice that he
fails or refuses to produce the same in court
FACTS:
On September 16, 1993, Engr. Magdayao was charged with

violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for having issued to Ricky Olvis a check dates
September 30, 1991, in the amount of P600,000.00, despite not having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, the Philippine National
Bank, Dipolog Branch. Olvis alleged that, upon learning that the check was
dishonored, Magdayao pleaded for time to pay the amount by retrieving
the check and replacing it with two other checks. Magdayao, however,
reneged on his promise. Despite repeated demands by Olvis, Magdayao
failed to make good the check’s value. As evidence for the prosecution, a
photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 was admitted by the court. The trial
court eventually ruled in favor of Olvis.
ISSUE:
Whether the photocopy of the subject check inadmissible in
evidence for failure of the prosecution to produce the original dishonored
check?
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HELD:
No. The law says that “the making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)days from
the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays
the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five
(5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in
evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the
contents thereof, especially the names of the drawer and endorsee, the
date and amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such
dishonor.
Under the Rules on Evidence, when the subject of inquiry is the

contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original thereof. This rule requiring the production of the best
evidence is to prevent fraud. If a party is in possession of such
evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in
its place, the presumption is that the best evidence was withheld from
the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which
its production would expose and defeat. In case the original is in the
custody or control of the adverse party, the latter must be given
reasonable notice, and if he still fails or refuses to produce the original in
court, only then may secondary evidence be presented. In this case,
Magdayao never produced the original of the check, much less offered to
produce the same. He deliberately withheld the original of the check as
a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce
evidence in his defense, which he hailed to do due to numerous
unjustified postponements.
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Republic vs. Development Resources Corp. G.R. No. 180218
December 18, 2009
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondent: Development Resources Corporation represented by
Carlos Chua and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY
Ponente: ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On April 5, 1993 petitioner Republic, acting through the Office of
the Solicitor General, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Davao City for cancellation of TCT 44671 and TCT 44675 and for
the reversion of Lots 1 and 5 of Pcs-16678 to the public domain. The
Republic claimed that no valid title vested in 1922 on Antonio Matute,
respondent DRC's predecessor, because all of Lot 544 from which the two
lots came was still a public forest and inalienable on October 14,
1922. The Republic asserted that only on August 6, 1923 was Lot 544
declared alienable based on LC Map 47. The Republic presented a
certification to this effect from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). DRC, on the other hand, contended that its
two lots could no longer be reverted to the public domain because they
are now private properties held by purchasers in good faith.
On October 25, 2001 the RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that
the Republic failed to prove that the subject lots were still part of the
public domain when the same were adjudicated to Antonio Matute. The
RTC ruled that LC Map 47 has no probative value because: (1) the copy
presented in court was a reproduction and not the original or certified
copy; and (2) it does not show that the land was declared alienable and
disposable only as of August 6, 1923; rather that it was certified on that
date.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial

court, holding that there is nothing in LC Map 47 which states that prior
to August 6, 1923, Lot 544 was not yet alienable and disposable and not
open to private ownership, hence, this recourse by the Republic.
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ISSUE:
Whether the electronic reproduction of LC map is admissible in
evidence to warrant the cancellation of the respondent’s title
HELD:
No. Since a complaint for reversion can upset the stability of
registered titles through the cancellation of the original title and the
others that emanate from it, the State bears a heavy burden of proving
the ground for its action. Here, the Republic fails to discharge such
burden. For one, it failed to present the original or a certified true copy of
LC Map 47 but only its electronic reproduction, which has no probative
value.
The Court held in SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic of the

Philippines that a mere photocopy of an LC Map is not a competent
evidence of the existence of such map. While evidence is admissible when
the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, as in this case, there is a need to present a
certified copy of it issued by the public officer having custody of the
document to prove its contents.
The Republic of course claims that its version of LC Map 47 should

be regarded as the original itself because it was the official copy of the
region furnished by the National Mapping and Resources Inventory
Authority where the original is kept. But, as admitted by Crisanto Galo,
the Land Evaluation Coordinator for DENR Region XI, the copy they
presented was neither marked nor certified as a reproduction of the
original. Hence, it cannot be considered as an official copy, more so an
original copy.
For another, the courts below correctly held that LC Map 47 does
not state on its face that Lot 544 became alienable and disposable only
on the date appearing on that Map, namely, on August 6, 1923, about 10
months after Lots 1 and 5 of Pcs-16678 of the Davao Cadastre were
adjudicated to Antonio Matute. The DENR certification has no additional
value since it was just based on the same map. The courts below,
therefore, correctly dismissed the subject reversion suit for failure of the
Republic to discharge its evidential burden.
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Bunagan-Bansig vs. Celera, A.C No. 5581, January 14, 2014
Complainant: ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG

Respondent: ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA
Ponente: PER CURIAM
FACTS:
Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie

R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced
by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City
Civil Registry of Manila. Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan,
legal wife of respondent. However, notwithstanding respondent's
marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on
January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued
by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and

Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his
second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been
annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority. Bansig alleged that
respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is
still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership
in the Bar.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and

Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Celera be
suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the certified Xerox copy of the certificate of marriage

issued by the City registration Officer is admissible in evidence
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HELD:
Yes. In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that

respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his
first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy
of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan
A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R.
Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the
second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of
the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A.
Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres
Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates

to prove that respondent entered into a second marriage while the
latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second
marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to
Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still
subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with
Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a

public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of
their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. –

When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates,

other than being admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that
respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is
subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates
would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two
marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should
be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For
purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence
to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue
as a member of the Bar.
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Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. Vs. Republic, G.R. No. 152570,
September 27, 2006
Petitioner: SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC.

Respondent: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ponente: TINGA, J.
FACTS:
On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application

for Free Patent for Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an
area of 12.8477 hectares located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu.
Thereafter, on 14 February 1971, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued Free Patent No. 473408 for Lot No. 1434, while the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 0-6667 over the said lot. Subsequently, the subject lot was
sold to SAAD Agro- Industries, Inc. (petitioner) by one of Orcullo's heirs.
Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the

Solicitor General, filed a complaint for annulment of title and reversion of
the lot covered to the mass of the public domain, on the other ground
that the issuance of the said of the timberland and forest reserve of
Sibonga, Cebu. The Trial Court upheld the free patent. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court decision. Invalidated the sale of the lot,
holding the lot to be inalienable. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the mere photocopy is admissible in evidence in the

instant case
HELD:
No. The Court observes that the document adverted to is a mere

photocopy of the purported original, and not the blue print as insisted by
respondent. A mere photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence
of the existence of the L.C. Map. Under the best evidence rule, the original
document must be produced, except:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced

in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
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2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents

which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or

is recorded in a public office
In this case, respondent claims that the presentation of the original

L.C. Map is unnecessary since it is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in the public office. Evidence, indeed, is admissible when the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office. However, to prove its contents, there is a need to
present a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. In
addition, while the L.C. Map may be considered a public document
and prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, the map, to be
admissible for any purpose, must be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the
record.
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Cabugao vs. People G.R. No. 152570 September 27,2006
Petitioner: RAMIL CABUGAO y SISON

Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ponente: PUNO, J.
FACTS:
The information against the petitioner Cabugao reads as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of March, 1999, in the City of

Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, RAMIL CABUGAO y Sison, did
then and there, wil(l)fully, unlawfully and criminally, sell and deliver
to a customer Shabu weighing more or less .5 gram contained in a
small plastic sachet, without authority to do so.
Contrary to Article III, Sec. 15, R.A. 6425, as amended.4
The petitioner pleaded "not guilty" upon arraignment.5
During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO2

Augusto P. Domingo,6 Police Superintendent Theresa Ann B. Cid, and
SPO1 Rolando Lomibao. For his part, the petitioner denied that a buy-
bust operation was conducted against him by the police. His testimony
was buttressed by witnesses Teresa Azurin, Maria Luz Villamil, and Romeo
Cabugao. The Trial court convicted petitioner Cabugao. And the Court of
Appeals affirmed the petitioner’s conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether the uncertified subject documents in the case at bar is
erroneous and should be considered irrelevant.
HELD:
No. SC held that the contention of the respondent that the

subject documents are uncertified is erroneous is without merit. Under
the Rules of Court, when the original of a document is in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. The Rules does not require that the certification should be in a
particular form.
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In the instant case, the four-page Resolution dated December 8,
1997 contains a stamped certification signed by Police Inspector David U.
Ursua of the Legal Service, PNP Regional Office I of Parian, San Fernando,
La Union. The three-page Decision dated February 28, 1997 has the
handwritten authentication of Police Inspector Mario L. Aduan, also from
the same office, on each and every page. They ought to satisfy the
requirement of the Rules on certification. Moreover, the respondent did
not raise the hearsay objection when the subject documents were offered
in evidence by the defense. When the subject documents were marked
as exhibits, the prosecution again did not raise any objection. When the
documents were formally offered in evidence, the respondent once more
did not object on the ground of hearsay. The prosecution objected on the
ground that the documents are "off-tangent to the issue in this case." At
any rate, these documentary pieces of evidence cannot be cavalierly
dismissed as irrelevant. They have a material bearing on the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses, SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao.
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PILIPINAS BANK vs. CA G.R. No. 141060 September 29, 2000
Petitioner: PILIPINAS BANK

Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ELOY R. BELLO, In his capacity
as Presiding Judge, RTC-Manila, Branch 15, And MERIDIAN
ASSURANCE CORPORATION
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.
Topic: Admissibility in Evidence / PAROL EVIDENCE
FACTS:
On January 8, 1995, petitioner obtained from private respondent

Meridian Assurance Corporation a Money Securities and Payroll
Comprehensive Policy which was effective from January 13, 1985 to
January 13, 1986. On November 25, 1985, at about 9:15 a.m., while the
policy was in full force and effect, petitioner's armored vehicle bearing
Plate No. NBT 379 which was on its way to deliver the payroll withdrawal
of its client Luzon Development Bank ACLEM Paper Mills, was robbed by
two armed men wearing police uniforms along Magsaysay Road, San
Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna. Petitioner's driver, authorized teller and two
private armed guards were on board the armored vehicle when the same
was robbed. The loss suffered by petitioner as a result of the heist
amounted to P545,301.40.
Petitioner filed a formal notice of claim under its insurance policy

with private respondent on December 3, 1985, invoking Section II of the
Policy. Private respondent denied petitioner's claim and averred that the
insurance does not cover the deliveries of the withdrawals to petitioner's
clients. Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint against private respondent
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila which was later on dismissed by
said court. The appellate court granted the petition and remanded the
case to the RTC for further proceedings. SC affirmed.
After the case was remanded to the RTC and the latter set the case
for pre-trial, petitioner filed its Pre-Trial Brief. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Recall Witness, praying that it be allowed to recall Tubianosa to testify on
the negotiations pertaining to the terms and conditions of the policy
before its issuance to determine the intention of the parties regarding the
said terms and conditions. Private respondent objected thereto, on the
ground that the same would violate the parol evidence rule. The RTC
issued an order denying petitioners motion to recall Tubianosa to the
witness stand, ruling that the same would violate the parol evidence rule.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied by the lower
court.
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The appellate court dismissed the petition and held that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge. It held that
there is no ambiguity in the provisions of the Policy which would
necessitate the presentation of extrinsic evidence to clarify the meaning
thereof. The Court of Appeals also stated that petitioner failed to set forth
in its Complaint a specific allegation that there is an intrinsic ambiguity in
the insurance policy which would warrant the presentation of further
evidence to clarify the intent of the contracting parties. Hence, the
present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether recalling Tubianosa would violate the parol evidence rule.
HELD:
NO. SC finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Court

of Appeals. Petitioners Complaint merely alleged that under the
provisions of the Policy, it was entitled to recover from private
respondent the amount it lost during the heist. It did not allege therein
that the Policys terms were ambiguous or failed to express the true
agreement between itself and private respondent. Such being the case,
petitioner has no right to insist that it be allowed to present Tubianosas
testimony to shed light on the alleged true agreement of the parties,
notwithstanding its statement in its Pre-Trial Brief that it was presenting
said witness for that purpose.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly requires

that for parol evidence to be admissible to vary the terms of the written
agreement, the mistake or imperfection thereof or its failure to express
the true agreement of the parties should be put in issue by the pleadings.
As correctly noted by the appellate court, petitioner failed to raise

the issue of an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the terms
of the Policy, or of the failure of said contract to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties thereto in its Complaint. There was
therefore no error on the part of the appellate court when it affirmed the
RTCs Order disallowing the recall of Tubianosa to the witness stand, for
such disallowance is in accord with the rule that when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors-in-interest, no evidence of such other terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
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EAGLERIDGE DEVT vs. CAMERON G.R. No. 204700 Nov. 24, 2014
Petitioners: EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N.

NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN
Respondent: CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC
Ponente: LEONEN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC), and

sureties Marcelo N. Naval (Naval) and Crispin I. Oben (Oben) are the
defendants in a collection suit initiated by Export and Industry Bank (EIB)
through a Complaint dated February 9, 2005, and currently pending
proceedings before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Makati City.
By virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated August 9, 2006, EIB
transferred EDC's outstanding loan obligations respondent Cameron
Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (Cameron). Thereafter, Cameron filed
its Motion to Substitute/Join EIB which was granted by the trial court.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale and
Purchase Agreement (LSPA) referred to in the Deed referred to in the
Deed of Assignment. Respondent Cameron filed its Comment dated
March 14, 2012 alleging that petitioners have not shown "good cause" for
the production of the LSPA and that the same is allegedly irrelevant to the
case a quo.
As petitioners' alleged loan obligations may be reimbursed up to
the extent of the amount paid by Cameron in the acquisition thereof, it
becomes necessary to verify the amount of the consideration from the
LSPA, considering that the Deed of Assignment was silent on this matter.
The trial court denied petitioners' motion for production for being utterly
devoid of merit. It ruled that there was failure to show "good cause" for
the production of the LSPA and failure to show that the LSPA is material
or contains evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action. The trial
court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. CA dismissed the
petition subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in
the CA. Hence, this petition.
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ISSUE:
Whether the production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence
rule under Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court
HELD:
No. the Supreme Court held that the parol evidence rule does not
apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of assignment and
do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking
evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment.
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements.—When the terms of an

agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents
of the written agreement.
Even assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception

to the rule under the second paragraph is when the party puts in issue
the validity of the written agreement, as in the case a quo. What is
forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or
extrinsic evidence, not those expressly referred to in the written
agreement. "[D]ocuments can be read together when one refers to the
other." By the express terms of the deed of assignment, it is clear that the
deed of assignment was meant to be read in conjunction with the LSPA.
As we have stated in our decision, Rule 132, Section 17 of the Rules

of Court allows a party to inquire into the whole of the writing or record
when a part of it is given in evidence by the other party. Since the deed
of assignment was produced in court by respondent and marked as one
of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by
explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding may also
be inquired into by petitioners.
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MERALCO. vs. Hrs. of SPS. DELOY G.R. No. 192893 June 5, 2013
Petitioner: MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

Respondents: HEIRS OF SPOUSES DIONISIO DELOY and PRAXEDES
MARTONITO, represented by POLICARPIO DELOY
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Respondents are the owners, by way of succession, of a parcel of

land consisting of 8,550 square meters located in Trece Martires City
(Trece Martires property). On November 12, 1965, Dionisio, respondents’
predecessor-in-interest, donated a 680-square meter portion (subject
land) of the 8,550 square meter property to the Communications and
Electricity Development Authority (CEDA) for the latter to provide cheap
and affordable electric supply to the province of Cavite. A deed of
donation was executed to reflect and formalize the transfer.
Sometime in 1985, CEDA offered for sale to MERALCO, its electric

distribution system. This was embodied in a memorandum of agreement
(MOA), dated June 28, 1985, signed by the parties. Thereafter, MERALCO
occupied the subject land. MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice President
and Head of the Legal Department, wrote a letter to Dionsio requested
the latter’s permission for the continued use of the subject land as a
substation site which the parties failed to reach an agreement. Not long
after, respondents offered to sell the subject land to MERALCO, but their
offer was rejected.
Respondents demanded that MERALCO vacate the subject. Despite

the written demand, MERALCO did not move out of the subject land.
Thus, on July 8, 2003, respondents were constrained to file the complaint
for unlawful detainer. The MTCC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the
case because it would require an interpretation of the deed of donation
making it one not capable of pecuniary estimation. Nevertheless, it
opined that MERALCO was entitled to the possession of the subject land.
the RTC sustained the MTCC decision. The CA partially granted the appeal
and held that by seeking Dionisio’s permission to continuously occupy
the subject land, MERALCO expressly acknowledged his paramount right
of possession. Hence this, petition.
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ISSUE:
Whether the evidence aliunde, such as the letters dated 11 october

1985 of petitioner’s assistant vice president and head of legal
department, l.d. torres and internal memorandum dated 6 december
1985 of petitioner’s l.g. dela paz which purportedly recognized
respondents’ ownership of the property can prevail over the deed of
absolute sale.
HELD:
Yes. Evidently, by these two documents, MERALCO acknowledged

that the owners of the subject land were the Deloys. It is clear as daylight.
The first letter was written barely four (4) months after the deed of sale
was accomplished. As observed by the CA, MERALCO never disputed the
declarations contained in these letters which were even marked as its
own exhibits. Pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence,
these admissions and/or declarations are admissible against MERALCO.
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party – The act, declaration, or omission of a

party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
In Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v. Ducat,24 it was written, thus:
x x x Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best

evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The
rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would
declare anything against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus,
it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and
it is his fault if it does not.
Guided by the foregoing rules and jurisprudence, the Court holds

that the letter and the internal memorandum presented, offered and
properly admitted as part of the evidence on record by MERALCO itself,
constitute an admission against its own interest. Hence, MERALCO should
appropriately be bound by the contents of the documents.
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SPS. PARAS vs. KIMWA CONSG.R. No. 171601 April 8, 2015
Petitioners: SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS

Respondents: KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Ponente: LEONEN, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners entered into an agreement for the supply of

aggregates with the respondent. Such agreement said that the petitioner
shall be the supplier for the respondent and the latter may take the supply
from the petitioner’s allotted lot for the supply. The respondent assured
the petitioners that the respondent will purchase 40,000 cubic meters
from the petitioners before the petitioner’s special permit expired which
was on or before May 15, 1995. However, the petitioners alleged that
after the respondent hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates as
provided by the agreement but after sometime, the respondent stopped
and moved on to another supplier. Such action was alleged to be a
violation of the contract agreed between the petitioners and the
respondent. Thus, the petitioners filed an action against the respondent
for the breach of contract.
In its answer, the respondents denied such allegation that it

agreed to buy 40,000 cubic meters from the petitioners. They asserted
that the 40,000 cubic meters was merely a maximum limit of what they
can buy, not the amount itself. The respondent further asserted that
they have never agreed on a deadline with regards to the hauling
agreement. The respondent then invoked the Parol Evidence rule and it
insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from introducing evidence
which would show that the parties had agreed differently.The RTC rules
in favor of the petitioners. The CA denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Parol Evidence Rule is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
No. The parol evidence" forbids any addition to or contradiction of

the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that,
at or before the signing of the document, other terms were orally agreed
on by the parties. However, such rule is not absolute and has few
3
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
6
exceptions. However, for a parol evidence to be admitted, it must comply
with two requisites. First, that the existence of any of the four (4)
exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been
objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence
sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion
proposed by the presenting party.
The court found the CA committed a serious error on ruling that the parol
evidence rule has been violated as the petitioners “showed no evidence
or proof wherein an exception existed”. With regards to the exception,
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rule of Court specifically states that
“However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written

agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.”
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, petitioners Spouses

Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake
or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure to
express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa,
through its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras’
pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing
admission of parol evidence.
Therefore, the Parol Evidence Rule was not violated as the

petitioner were able to plead successfully under the exceptions provided.
3
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
7
MARQUEZ VS. ESPEJO G.R. No. 168387 August 25, 2010
Petitioners: SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ

Respondents: ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO,
OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO,
OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ
Ponente: LEONEN, J.
FACTS:
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two

parcels of agricultural land, with an area of two hectares each. One is
located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap
property) while the other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya (the Murong property). There is no dispute among the parties
that the Lantap property is tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez
(Nemi)6 (who is the husband7 of respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita),
while the Murong property is tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez
(Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).8
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of

Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay
the loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI.
After sometime, the respondent was able to repurchase one of the
properties but it was not indicated which property. The RBBI then issued
a TCT in favor of the Respondent.
Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20and

21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, executed separate Deeds of Voluntary
Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the
tenants of the Murong property. Both VLTs described the subject
thereof as an agricultural land located in Barangay Murong and covered
by TCT No. T-62836 (which, however, is the title corresponding to the
Lantap property).
Seven years from the execution of the VLT, the respondent filed a
complaint against the petitioners before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD)for the cancellation of the petitioner’s Certificate of
Land Ownership award (CLOA) as they alleged that the property they
bought was owned by the former, not the latter. The OIC-RARAD ruled in
favor of the respondents and stated that the VLT covered the Lantap
property and since the petitioners were not the tillers of the Lantap
3
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
8
property, the petitioner’s CLOA were cancelled. Upon appeal filed by
petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD Decision. It ruled that in
assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to petitioners as bona fide
tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the respondents. The CA
agreed with the respondents. Both the petitioners and RBBI filed for a
motion for reconsideration but was later denied. Hence, this instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the parole evidence is applicable in the instant case and
not the best evidence rule
HELD:
Yes. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document
itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral
evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because
it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.
In the case at bar, the best evidence room cannot be applied as

the real issue of the case relates to the content of the documents
admitted, not the document itself. While the court found that the VLT
document suffered intrinsic ambiguity, It is noted by the court that both
the TCT and VLT presented clearly indicate the intention of the parties at
the time it was agreed upon. The TCT document clearly describes that
Lantap property based on the description written in the TCT. The VLT
document also clearly described and awarded the Murong property to
the petitioners. Both documents showed the true intentions of the
parties negotiated with RBBI.
3
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
9
SPS. AMONCIO VS. BENEDICTO G.R. No. 171707 July 28, 2008
Petitioners: SPOUSES WILFREDO and ANGELA AMONCIO

Respondent: AARON GO BENEDICTO
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Wilfredo and Angela Amoncio entered into a contract

of lease with a certain Ernesto Garcia over a 120 sq. m. portion of their
600 sq. m. property in Quezon City. After a month, petitioners entered
into another contract of lease, this time with respondent Aaron Go
Benedicto over a 240 sq. m. portion of the same property. Both lessors
took possession of the land soon after. Garcia, pre-terminated his
contract and vacated the property he occupied. Soon after, the petitioner
claimed that the respondent stopped paying his monthly rentals and
discovered that the respondent made improvements in the lot with their
permission and even occupied the area vacated by Garcia. Petitioners
asked respondent to pay his arrears and desist from continuing with his
construction but he took no heed. Because of respondent’s failure to
meet petitioners’ demands, they asked him to vacate the property. They
rescinded the lease contract.
Petitioners filed in the RTC of Quezon City a case for recovery of

possession of real property against respondent. They demanded that the
respondent should be held liable for the payment of the monthly rentals
owed to the petitioners as well as the monthly payments for the period
remaining in cases of failure to complete the term of his lease. In his
answer with counterclaim, respondent denied petitioners’ accusations
and alleged that it was them who owed him money and further alleged
that the petitioners contracted his services to construct buildings and the
petitioners agreed to fund his construction with the condition that such
buildings will be turned over after the end of his lease.
After trial, the RTC gave credence to respondent’s version and

dismissed petitioners’ case for lack of factual and legal basis. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC. After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, the case was filed before Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the parol evidence rule is applicable in the instant case.
4
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
0
HELD:
NO. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of the

agreement have been reduced in writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in
his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The present case does not appear to fall under any of the given
exceptions. However, a party to a contract may prove the existence of
any separate oral agreement as to any matter which is not inconsistent
with its terms. This may be done if, from the circumstances of the case,
the court believes that the document does not convey entirely the whole
of the parties’ transaction.
In the case at bar, the court found that while the additional
agreements made between parties did not appear in the contract, the
court cannot ignore circumstances surrounding the issue led the court to
believe that such agreements were validly accepted by both parties. It
was clear that the spouse, Wilfredo, agreed and even showed signs of
acceptance of agreements made after the contract of lease was executed.
Such actions would have estopped the petitioners from claiming
otherwise.
The court also noted that petitioners failed to make a timely

objection against respondent’s assertion of their prior agreement on the
construction of the buildings. Where a party entitled to the benefit of the
parol evidence rule allows such evidence to be received without
objection, he cannot, after the trial has closed and the case has been
decided against him, invoke the rule in order to secure a reversal of the
judgment.
Hence, by failing to object to respondent’s testimony in the trial

court, petitioners waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.
4
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
1
SPS. TRINIDAD VS. IMSON G.R. No. 197728, September 16, 2015
Petitioners: SPOUSES ARMANDO AND LORNA TRINIDAD

Respondent: DONA* MARIE GLENN IMSON
Ponente: PERALTA, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners claimed that they are the owners of the
condominium where the respondent is On August 17, 2007, herein
petitioners filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City a
Complaint4 for ejectment against herein respondent. Petitioners alleged
that: they are the owners of a condominium unit that they purchased the
condominum unit from three (3) Indian nationals who originally
contracted to buy the said property from the developer, AIC Realty
Corporation (AIC), but had not fully paid for it yet; petitioners' purchase
was evidenced by a Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights6 dated
June 13, 2002 and, later on, a Deed of Absolute Sale7 dated July 13, 2007
in the name of petitioner Armando; at the time of petitioners' purchase
of the subject condominium unit, the same was being leased by
respondent from the original owners; the period of lease was from April
1, 2002 to March 1, 2003; petitioners respected the contract of lease
between respondent and the original owners; however, since June 2002
up to the time of the filing of the complaint for ejectment, respondent
neither remitted nor consigned the monthly rentals due to petitioners for
her continued use of the condominium unit; the rental arrears amounted
to a total of P2,130,000.00; petitioners sent a letter of demand to
respondent requiring that she, together with any and all persons using
the said unit with her approval, vacate the premises and pay her arrears;
respondent ignored petitioners' demand letter; petitioners tried to settle
the case amicably but no agreement was reached.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims,8 respondent

countered that she requested Armando Trinidad, who was her
confidante, to purchase the unit and register it under his name with the
understanding that the said property would actually be owned by
respondent; Armando agreed without objection, which led to the
execution of the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights in his name;
payments for the purchase price were made by respondent through cash
and checks paid to the original owners who acknowledged said payments;
aside from paying the purchase price, respondent also paid the real
property taxes due on the condominium unit as well as the association
dues, water bills, common area real estate tax, building insurance and
other charges billed by the developer; having full trust in Armando,
4
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
2
coupled with her hectic schedule, respondent did not bother to transfer
ownership of the subject unit in her name; since April 2002 up to the time
of filing her Answer, respondent has been in open and public possession
of the subject property; in 2007, while respondent was out of the country,
Armando, without respondent's knowledge, annotated his claim on the
condominium certificate of title; he also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
in his favor on July 13, 2007; as a result, respondent was surprised to
receive a copy of petitioners' demand letter and complaint.
The MeTC found that respondent is the true owner of the subject
property and that the true intention of the parties is for Armando to hold
the condominium unit in behalf of respondent until the property could be
placed in the latter's name. The RTC of Pasig City, Branch 155, rendered
its Decision which reversed the MeTC Decision. The CA promulgated its
assailed Decision setting aside the RTC judgment and ordering petitioners
to return possession of the subject condominium unit to respondent.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Parol Evidence rule is applicable.
HELD:
No. The Parol evidence rule prohibits any additional information
and modification which may lead the terms in the written document to
be interpreted differently from has been intended by both parties in the
document. However, such rule is not absolute. Under Section 9 of Rule
130, the Parol Evidence Rule may not be applicable when such
document does not express the true intent of the agreement of the
parties thereto.
In the case at bar, what is being asserted by respondent is that the

above documents do not embody the true intent and agreement of the
parties. The respondent submitted sufficient proof to refute the
contents of the aforementioned documents and to establish the real
intent of the parties. As such, the petitioner cannot claim the protection
of the Parol Evidence Rule.
The court noted that while it is true that the subject Deed of
Assignment and Transfer of Rights and Deed of Absolute Sale are
notarized and It is well settled that a document acknowledged before a
notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of
regularity, Such presumption is merely prima facie and it can easily be
overcome with clear and convincing evidence.
4
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
3
LEIGHTON CONS VS. CNP INDUSTRIES G.R. No. 160972 March 9, 2010
Petitioner: LEIGHTON CONTRACTORS PHILIPPINES, INC

Respondent: CNP INDUSTRIES, INC.
Ponente: CORONA, J.
FACTS:
In 1997, Hardie Jardin, Inc. (HJI) awarded the contract for site
preparation, building foundation and structural steel works of its fibre
cement plant project in Barangay Tatalon in San Isidro, Cabuyao, Laguna
to petitioner Leighton Contractors Philippines, Inc. Respondent CNP
Industries, Inc. submitted to petitioner a proposal to undertake, as
subcontractor, the construction of the structural steelworks of HJI’s fibre
cement plant project. Petitioner accepted the proposal.
On July 28, 1997, petitioner and respondent signed a sub-contract

providing: this Sub-contract is on a Fixed Lump Sum basis and is not
subject to re-measurement. Moreover, the contract required respondent
to finish the project within 20 weeks from the time petitioner was allowed
access to the site on June 20, 1997, that is, on or before November 6,
1997.
On July 29, 1997, petitioner paid respondent 10% of the project

cost. Thereafter, respondent informed petitioner that, due to the
revisions in the designs of the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams, it
incurred “additional costs”. Respondent submitted its weekly progress
report including the progress billing. Petitioner, on the other hand, paid
the billings. Because respondent was unable to meet the project
schedule, petitioner took over the project on April 27, 1998. At the time
of the takeover, respondent had already accomplished 86% of the
project.
Thereafter, respondent again asked petitioner to settle the

“outstanding balance” asserting that the roof ridge ventilation and crane
beams were excluded from the project cost. Petitioner refused to pay.
The parties submitted the matter to the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC) for arbitration.
CIAC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. CA dismissed the

petition and affirmed the CIAC decision in toto. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this recourse.
4
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
4
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is liable to pay for the increase in cost due to
the adjustments made in the design of the roof ridge ventilation and
crane beams
HELD:
NO. The parties entered into a contract for a piece of work whereby
petitioner engaged respondent as contractor to build and provide the
necessary materials for the construction of the structural steel works of
HJI’s fiber cement plant for a fixed lump-sum price of P44,223,909.
The parol evidence rule, embodied in Section 9, Rule 130 of the

Rules of Court holds that when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement. It, however, admits of exceptions such as when the parties
subsequently modify the terms of their original agreement.
The scope of work was defined in the subcontract as the

completion of the structural steel works according to the main drawing,
technical specifications and the main contract. Thus, to determine
whether the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams were included in the
scope of work, reference to the main drawing, technical specifications
and main contract is necessary. The main contract stated that the
structural steel works included Drawing Nos. P302-6200-S-405 and P302-
6200-S-402. This, according to petitioner and respondent, referred to the
roof ridge ventilation and crane beams. Hence, the said works were
clearly included in the sub-contract works.
4
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
5
ROSARIO TEXTILE VS. HOME BANKERS G.R. No. 137232 June 29, 2005
Petitioners: ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS CORPORATION and EDILBERTO

YUJUICO
Respondent: HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY
Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J
FACTS:
Sometime in 1989, Rosario Textile Mills Corporation (RTMC)
applied from Home Bankers Savings & Trust Co. for an Omnibus Credit
Line for P10 million. The bank approved credit line but for only P8 million.
The bank notified RTMC of the grant of the said loan thru a letter which
contains terms and conditions conformed by RTMC thru Edilberto V.
Yujuico. On March 3, 1989, Yujuico signed a Surety Agreement in favor of
the bank, in which he bound himself jointly and severally with RTMC for
the payment of all RTMC’s indebtedness to the bank from 1989 to 1990.
RTMC availed of the credit line by making numerous drawdowns, each
drawdown being covered by a separate promissory note and trust
receipt. RTMC, represented by Yujuico, executed in favor of the bank a
total of eleven (11) promissory notes.
Despite the lapse of the respective due dates under the promissory
notes and notwithstanding the bank’s demand letters, RTMC failed to pay
its loans. Hence, on January 22, 1993, the bank filed a complaint for sum
of money against RTMC and Yujuico.
In their answer, RTMC and Yujuico contend that they should be absolved
from liability. They claimed that although the grant of the credit line and
the execution of the suretyship agreement are admitted, the bank gave
assurance that the suretyship agreement was merely a formality under
which Yujuico will not be personally liable. They argue that the
importation of raw materials under the credit line was with a grant of
option to them to turn-over to the bank the imported raw materials
should these fail to meet their manufacturing requirements. RTMC
offered to make such turn-over since the imported materials did not
conform to the required specifications. However, the bank refused to
accept the same, until the materials were destroyed by a fire which
gutted down RTMC’s premises.
4
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
6
RTC ruled in favor of the bank. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s judgment, holding that the bank is merely the holder of the
security for its advance payments to petitioners; and that the goods they
purchased, through the credit line extended by the bank, belong to them
and hold said goods at their own risk. Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Yujuico is bound by the suretyship agreement
HELD:
YES. First, there is no record to support his allegation that the

surety agreement is a “mere formality;” Second, as correctly held by the
CA, the Suretyship Agreement signed by petitioner Yujuico binds him. The
terms clearly show that he agreed to pay the bank jointly and severally
with RTMC.
The parol evidence rule under Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court is in point, thus:
“SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced in writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents
of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add

to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written
agreement;
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
xxx xxx xxx.”
4
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
7
Under this Rule, the terms of a contract are rendered conclusive
upon the parties and evidence aliunde is not admissible to vary or
contradict a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a
document. We have carefully examined the Suretyship Agreement signed
by Yujuico and found no ambiguity therein. Documents must be taken as
explaining all the terms of the agreement between the parties when there
appears to be no ambiguity in the language of said documents nor any
failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.
4
KAREN KRISTY UBANAN
8

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Judge ALI OMBRA RAIZ BACARAMAN

KAREN KRISTY UBANAN 1

Bank of the Philippine v. SMP, Inc................................................. 3

KAREN KRISTY UBANAN 2

Petitioner: BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

In the meantime, a case was filed by herein defendant Far East

Thereafter, on March 28, 1995, SMP, Inc. filed an Affidavit of Third

KAREN KRISTY UBANAN 3

Defendant bank, however, claims that the said provisional receipt

In order to discredit the claim of ownership by SMP, petitioner

However, in the instant case, contrary to petitioner’s contention,

KAREN KRISTY UBANAN 4

Sec. 4. Original of document. —

(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for

KAREN KRISTY UBANAN 5

Petitioner: Capital Shoes Factory LTD

To protect its interest, CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum

KAREN KRISTY UBANAN 6

Hence, this petition.

Sec. 4 . Original of document.

(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about

Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL's principal witness, was able to

KAREN KRISTY UBANAN 7

KAREN KRISTY UBANAN 8

Petitioner: Rogelio Dantis

Respondent Julio denied the allegations. He said that his father

1. Exhibit 3 – affidavit executed by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of the

2. Exhibit 4 – an undated handwritten receipt evidencing

KAREN KRISTY UBANAN 9

Exhibit "4," the undated handwritten receipt, is considered

A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule

In the case, Defendant failed to prove the due execution of Exhibit

Petitioner: Country Bankers Insurance Corporation

Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as

On 21 September 1998, the trial court rendered judgment

Lagman filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which rendered the

Whether the mere photocopy of the 1990 Bond is admissible as

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the

A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Section 3 of R.A. No. 26, “AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL

Since, except for the last above-enumerated document, the

As the immediately quoted provision of the Rules directs, the order

Petitioner: CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD

Whether CA erred in holding that petitioner failed to prove the

No. SC affirmed CA decision. The original copies of the sales

Petitioner: ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO

On September 16, 1993, Engr. Magdayao was charged with

Under the Rules on Evidence, when the subject of inquiry is the

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial

The Court held in SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic of the

The Republic of course claims that its version of LC Map 47 should

Complainant: ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG

Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie

Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and

On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and

Whether the certified Xerox copy of the certificate of marriage

Yes. In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that