G.R. No.

203583 October 13, 2014

LEONORA B. RIMANDO, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES WINSTON and ELENITA ALDABA and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated July 25, 2012 and
1 2

the Resolution dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96528,
3

which affirmed the Decision dated October 28, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15
4

(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 04-227211 acquitting petitioner Leonora B. Rimando (Rimando) of the
crime of estafa, but nonetheless, held her civilly liable to respondents-spouses Winston and Elenita
Aldaba (Sps. Aldaba) in the amount of ₱500,000.00. The Facts

An Information dated January 21, 2004 was filed before the RTC charging Rimando of the crime of
estafa through the use of false manifestations and fraudulent representations (estafa
case). According to the prosecution, Rimando enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business under
5

the assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8% monthly interest. Convinced by
6

Rimando’s proposal and taking into consideration their long friendship, Sps. Aldaba gave Rimando a
check in the amount of ₱500,000.00 as investment in her business. In turn, Rimando gave Sps.
Aldaba three (3) postdatedchecks, one for ₱500,000.00 and the other two (2) for ₱40,000.00 each,
and made them sign an investment contract with Multitel International Holding Corporation (Multitel).
Upon maturity of the checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted to encash the same but were dishonored for
being drawn against insufficient funds. This prompted Sps. Aldaba to demand Rimando to make
7

good the said checks, but to no avail. Hence, they were constrained tofile a criminal complaint for
estafa against her. 8

In her defense, Rimando denied her friendship with Sps. Aldaba and that she enticed them to invest
in her own business, as she had none. According to her, she only referred them to Multitel
Investment Manager Jaimelyn Cayaban who handled their investment. She also maintained that
9 10

she only issued the three (3) post dated checks to accommodate them while waiting for the check
from Multitel, but when the latter issued the check, Sps. Aldaba refused to accept it so she can be
held liable in case their investment fails. 11

Meanwhile, Sps. Aldaba also filed a criminal case against Rimando for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch VI, docketed as Crim. Cases
12

Nos. 407191-193 (BP 22 cases). On July 7, 2010, Rimando was acquitted in the BP 22 cases on
13 14

the ground of reasonable doubt, with a declaration that the act or omission from which liability may
arise does not exist.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated October 28, 2010, the RTC acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found
15

her civilly liable to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of ₱500,000.00. It found the absence of the element of
deceit as Sps. Aldaba were fully aware that they would be investing their money in Multitel and not in
Rimando’s purported business. Nevertheless, the RTC ruled that as an accommodation party to one
of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel, Rimando should be heldliable to Sps.
Aldaba for the corresponding amount of ₱500,000.00. Aggrieved, Rimando appealed to the CA. In
16

her Appellant’s Brief dated October 29, 2011, she contended that her acquittal and exoneration from
17
the civil liability in the BP 22 cases should have barred Sps. Aldaba from claiming civil liability from
her in the estafa case. 18

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated July 25, 2012, the CAaffirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that a prosecution for
19

violation of BP 22 is distinct, separate, and independent from a prosecution for estafa, albeit they
may both involve the same parties and transaction. As such, Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent
exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases does not automatically absolve her from civil liability
in the estafa case. 20

Rimando moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated September
21

25, 2012, hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rimando’s
civil liability in the estafa case despite her acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22
cases.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is without merit.

At the outset, the Court notes that Rimando’s acquittal in the estafa case does not necessarily
absolve her from any civil liability to private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-settled that "the
acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect
of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there isa finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him." 22

In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the crime of
estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce
them to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an
accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In lending
her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and assuch, she may be held
directly liable for the value of the issued check. Verily, Rimando’s civil liability to Sps. Aldaba in the
23

amount of ₱500,000.00 does not arise from or is not based upon the crime she is charged with, and
hence, the CA correctly upheld the same despite her acquittal in the estafa case.

In this relation, the CA is also correct in holding that Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent
exoneration in the BP 22 cases had no effect in the estafa case, even if both cases were founded on
the same factual circumstances. In Nierras v. Judge Dacuycuy, the Court laid down the fundamental
24

differences between BP 22 and estafa, to wit:

What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential
elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang
22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption
1âwphi1

of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence
punishable which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include
the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 even if he had issued the same for a preexisting obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the
Revised Penal Code, such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties
are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury
to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se,
while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita. 25

Owing to such differences, jurisprudence in People v. Reyes even instructs that the simultaneous
26

filing of BP 22 and estafa cases do not amount to double jeopardy:

While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts
committed by the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a
single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or
differences between the elements of an offense is one law and another law as in the case at bar
there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity
of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.
What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of
information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy.
27

Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they
nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered "separate,
distinct, and independent" from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final
adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double
recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the
28

accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa
case, as in this instance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 25, 2012 and the
Resolution dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96528 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 7-23.

2
Id. at 77-92. Penned by Associate Justice Arny C. Lazaro-Javier with Associate Justices
Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring.

3
Id. at 93.

4
Id. at 26-43. Penned by Pairing Judge Carmelita S. Manahan.

5
Id. at 78-79.

6
Id. at 79-80. See also id. at 28-32.

7
Id.

8
Id. at 11.

9
Jaymilyn in some parts of the record.

10
Rollo, pp. 33-34.

11
Id. at 33-34. See also id. at 35-36.

Entitled "AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A

12

CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

13
See rollo, p. 112.

14
See MeTC Decision; id. at 112-129.

15
Id. at 26-43.

16
Id. at 42-43.
 17
Id. at 44-53.

18
Id. at 50-52.

19
Id. at 77-92.

20
Id. at 89.

21
Id. at 93.

22
Dayap v. Sendiong, 597 Phil 127, 141 (2009).

23
"The relation between an accommodation party and the party accommodated is, in effect,
one of principal and surety – the accommodation party being the surety. It is a settled rule
that a surety is bound equally and absolutely with the principal and is deemed an original
promisor and debtor from the beginning. The liability is immediate and direct. It is not a valid
defense that the accommodation party did not receive any valuable consideration whenhe
executed the instrument; nor is it correct to say that the holder for value is not a holder in due
course merely because at the time he acquired the instrument, he knew that the indorser
was only an accommodation party." (Aglibot v. Santia, G.R. No. 185945, December 5, 2012,
687 SCRA283, 297-298; citations omitted.)

24
260 Phil 6 (1990).

25
Id. at 10-11; citations omitted.

26
G.R. Nos. 101127-31, November 18, 1993, 228 SCRA 13.

27
Id. at 17-18; citation omitted.

28
See Lim v. Kou Co Ping, G.R. No. 175256, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 114, 131.

G.R. Nos. 146921-22 January 31, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARY GRACE CAROL FLORES, accused-appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision, dated August 15, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 50,
1

Manila, finding accused-appellant Mary Grace Carol Flores guilty of estafa, for which it sentenced
her to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, and of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for which it sentenced her to an additional prison term of one
(1) year. In its decision, dated April 13, 1999, the Court of Appeals, while affirming the findings of the
2

trial court, held that the appropriate penalty for estafa, considering that the amount is more than
₱22,000.00, should be 30 years of reclusion perpetua and accordingly certified this case to this
Court for review pursuant to Rule 124, §13 of the Rules of Court.
The information for estafa against accused-appellant alleged:

That on or about October 19, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud PACITA G. DEL ROSARIO in the following manner,
to wit: the said accused, well knowing that she did not have sufficient funds in the bank, drew, made
Out and issued post dated PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK Check No. 558574
dated October 20, 1992 in the amount of ₱662,250.00 payable to PACITA G. DEL ROSARIO in
payment of one (1) man’s ring with a 5.8 ct. diamond purchased and received by the said accused
on the same date; that upon presentation of said check to the bank for payment, the same was
dishonored and payment thereof refused for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and the said
accused, notwithstanding due notice to her by said Pacita G. del Rosario of such dishonor of said
check, failed and refused to deposit the necessary amount of said check, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Pacita G. del Rosario in the total amount of ₱662,250.00, Philippine Currency. 3

On the other hand, the information for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against accused-appellant charged:

That on or about October 19, 199[2], in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully and feloniously make or draw and issued to PACITA G. DEL ROSARIO to apply on
account or for value PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INT’L BANK Check No. 558574 dated October 20,
1992 payable to PACITA G. DEL ROSARIO in the amount of ₱662,250.00 said accused well
knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
"ACCOUNT CLOSED" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said
PACITA G. DEL ROSARIO the amount of the check or to make arrangement for payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving such notice.
4

A warrant of arrest was issued on August 26, 1993 against accused-appellant, but it was only on
November 13, 1994 when she was finally arrested.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged and thereafter she
was tried.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: complainant Pacita del Rosario and Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCIB) employee Librado Manzano.

Complainant Pacita del Rosario testified that on October 19, 1992, she sold to accused-appellant a
5-karat diamond ring with a cluster of about 10 small diamonds for ₱662,000.00. As payment
therefor, accused-appellant issued to her PCIB Check No. 558574, postdated October 20, 1992, for
the amount of ₱662,250.00, the check also covering the amount of ₱250.00 which accused-
appellant also received from complainant. On October 20, 1992, complainant deposited the check in
her account at the Far East Bank branch in Greenhills, San Juan. Three days later, however, she
was notified by the bank that the check had been dishonored because accused-appellant’s account
had been closed. Pacita del Rosario looked for accused-appellant, who then promised to pay the
value of the check. However, despite several extensions granted to her within which to make
payment, accused-appellant failed to do so. 5

Librado Manzano, a cashier of the PCIB, testified that, according to bank records, accused-appellant
opened her account in September 1992, but closed the same on October 20, 1992, which was also
the date of the check issued to complainant. Manzano testified that other checks amounting to
₱5,000.00 and ₱2,000.00 which had been drawn against the said account were also returned for
insufficiency of funds.
6
Accused-appellant was the lone witness in her behalf. She said she came to know complainant
through her friend, Aida Gaerlan, who was the niece of complainant. She denied that the check was
in payment of a ring which she bought from complainant. Rather, she claimed that complainant
invested in her drapery business. She said that in September 1992, she borrowed ₱50,000.00 from
complainant, for which she issued the check in question in the amount of ₱662,250.00. According to
her, she did not receive the entire amount of ₱662,250.00 but only the amount of ₱50,000.00 as a
loan and ₱250.00 as transportation fare. The loan was payable in one year and the excess amount
on the check represents the interest.7

On August 15, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused MARY GRACE CAROL FLORES is hereby found
guilty of the charges of estafa and violation of BP 22 and is hereby sentenced applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8) years and One (1)
day to Ten (10) years for estafa and an additional One (1) year of imprisonment and a fine of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00) PESOS, for violation of BP 22 and to pay the complainant
the amount of ₱662,250.00.

No costs.

SO ORDERED. 8

Accused-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a decision, dated April 13,
1999, affirming the conviction of accused-appellant for the crimes of estafa and of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 with the modification that accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30)
years of reclusion perpetua. Hence, this appeal.
9

Accused-appellant contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of the trial
court and in modifying the assailed judgment by increasing the penalty to thirty (30) years
of reclusion perpetua.

We affirm the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty of
the crimes of estafa, defined and penalized under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, and
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. However, we hold that the appellate court erred in ruling that the
Indeterminate Sentence Law was not applicable to accused-appellant because the penalty
imposable on the latter was reclusion perpetua.

First. The elements of estafa, as defined under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code and
amended by Republic Act No. 4885, are: (1) that the offender postdated or issued a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) that at the time of
the issuance of the check, the offender had no funds in the bank or the funds deposited were
insufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) that the payee has been defrauded. 10

These elements are present in this case. Accused-appellant admitted that she issued PCIB Check
No. 558574, dated October 20, 1992, for ₱662,250.00 to Pacita G. Del Rosario. The check was
11

issued as payment for a ring and the ₱250.00 transportation fare which accused-appellant received
from complainant. Accused-appellant testified during direct examination that the check was issued
merely as a security for the loan, which was payable within one year. During cross-examination,
however, accused-appellant contradicted her statement by testifying that the excess amount
indicated in the check represented interest for the whole year. According to her testimony:
q Now, where did you obtain the loan of ₱662,250.00 from the private complainant if this check was
really issued in a cash loan?

a The ₱50,000.00 on September.

q Do you mean to tell this Court you did not actually receive the amount of ₱662,250.00 as indicated
in this check

a No, sir. It was supposed to be the capital interest for the whole year na gagamitin ko ang pera niya.

q And by the way, what is your highest educational attainment?

a Third year college, sir.

q And you know the implication considering your educational attainment, third year college and I also
notice your proficiency testifying in English. You know the implication of issuing a check amounting
to ₱662,250,00 when in fact you stated that you were extended a loan of ₱50,000.00?

a I knew its implication, I notice it in the first place, sir.

q And you also testified that the [o]ther account or the excess of the loan will correspond to the
alleged interest for the time for all the time you are going to use that money?

a Yes, sir.

q And you testified you obtained the loan on September 1992?

a Yes, sir. Me and my mother at that time.

q And the date of your check October 2[0], 1992?

a Yes, sir.

q Do you mean to tell this Court and you want this court to believe that for a month period the
₱50,000.00 will earn an interest of more than ₱600,000.00?

a The agreement is for a year period, sir.

q Even assuming you agreed on one year term loan, do you want the court to believe you that for a
one year period, the ₱50,000.00 loan extended to you earn more than ₱6,000.00?

a By September, she went Out of the country around that time, she went back.

q And considering that the alleged loan that you obtained is around ₱50,000.00, how did you
arrive[d] at this figure of ₱662,250.00?

a She was the one who gave that amount, she was the one who required me to place that amount of
₱662,250.00.

q And you place and wrote this amount as you said required, asked by her?
a Yes, sir.

q Is it not true madam witness that this amount of ₱662,250.00 is the prize or the amount
corresponding payment of a diamond ring that you obtained from the complainant?

a I never bought a jewelry because my husband used to buy all our jewelry.

q Is it not true that as indicated in the check there is an additional ₱250.00 because at the time that
you issued the check, the private complainant you informed her that you have no money for
transportation is it not?

a That is true, sir.

q So that the complainant loaned to you gave you ₱250.00 and for said amount you added this in
this check, is it not?

a Yes, sir.

q And at the time that you are transacting business with the complainant, the complainant is a labor
arbiter at NLRC department of labor and employees, is it not?

a Yes, sir.

q And do you want to impress this Court that a person like the private complainant occupying a very
dignified position of labor arbiter which correspond to this position of a judge in civil court will force
you to issue something or will force you to do something which is illegal?

a I don’t consider that as illegal because the money was for my use for a period of a year because
that was a loan with her. I consented, I agreed to that. I don’t consider anything against her
regarding that money because I fully consented to that.

q How did you and complainant arrived to this amount of ₱662,250.00?

a She was the one who made the computation.

q In your presence?

a Yes, your Honor.

q What was the basis?

a I actually do not know how she compute.

q This is for one year?

a Yes, your Honor. 12

It is improbable for a businesswoman like accused-appellant to agree to pay an interest of more than
₱600,000.00 for a loan of ₱50,000.00. Indeed, if the loan, which she incurred in September 1992,
was payable in one year, the check should have been postdated a year later, in September 1993,
and not on October 20, 1992. These glaring contradictions and improbabilities make accused-
appellant’s claim implausible.

The testimony of complainant that the check represented payment for a ring which she sold to
accused-appellant must be given credence. Complainant would not have given the ring to accused-
appellant had the latter not issued the check and assured complainant that it was fully funded. Nor
13

has it been shown that complainant had ill motive in filing this case against accused-appellant.
Complainant, it appears, was a labor arbiter in the Department of Labor and Employment. It is hard
to believe she would fabricate the charges against accused-appellant. Indeed, accused-appellant
herself admitted that she had a good relationship with complainant prior to the filing of the case. 14

The fraudulent intent of accused-appellant had been proven to exist at the time of the issuance of
the check. She misrepresented to complainant that she was financially stable and that her business
was flourishing. In reality, however, accused-appellant had no funds sufficient to cover the check
15

she issued to complainant. It is thus clear that she obtained the amounts of ₱662,000.00 and
16

₱250.00 through deceit. As already stated, the account was closed on the very date of the postdated
check issued to complainant.

Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that the failure of the drawer of
the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that the said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretenses or
fraudulent act. In this case, accused-appellant received two demand letters, dated November 10,
1992, from complainant for the payment of the value of the check. She never contested the contents
of the letters. Despite extensions granted to her, she failed to pay the value of the check. Her refusal
17

to make good her obligation is indicative not only of her inability to pay but also that she employed
false pretenses in incurring her obligation in the first place.

Second. Accused-appellant was likewise guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of this
1âwphi1

crime are: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply to account or for value; (2)
the accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment. 18

These elements are present in this case. Accused-appellant issued PCIB Check No. 558574, dated
October 20, 1992, in the amount of ₱662,250.00 payable to Pacita G. Del Rosario as payment for
the diamond ring sold to her. Accused-appellant admitted she did not have sufficient funds to cover
the check at the time she issued it. The check, which was deposited on the date indicated therein,
was subsequently dishonored because the account from which the money should have been drawn
against was closed by her on the same date. Despite demands made on her by complainant to pay
the value of the check, accused-appellant failed to pay. Nor did she make arrangements for payment
in full of the checks by the bank within five banking days after notice of dishonor so as to absolve her
of any liability for issuing a bouncing check.
19

Third. The Court of Appeals held that the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply because the
amount defrauded was ₱662,250.00 and the consequent penalty imposable on accused-appellant
for the crime of estafa is imprisonment of thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua. This is based on
20

Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 818, which provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts
as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4885, shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall be no case exceed thirty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;

We have recently ruled that the term reclusion perpetua, as used in the above quoted provision, is
not the penalty prescribed for the offense but a mere description of the penalty imposed where the
amount defrauded exceeds ₱22,000.00. Rather, the prescribed penalty under §1, par. 1 of P.D. No.
21

818 is reclusion temporal. Thus, even if the amount of fraud involved exceeds ₱22,000.00, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable in determining the imposable penalty.

Now, the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if an offense is punished by the Revised Penal
Code or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, can be properly
imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, while the minimum term of which shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
22

Hence, as the amount involved (₱662,250.00) exceeds ₱22,000.00, accused-appellant should be

sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be reclusion
temporal, to be imposed in its maximum period, plus one year for each additional P10,000.00 of the
amount of fraud in excess of ₱22,000.00. The total penalty, however, shall not exceed thirty (30)
years. The minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of penalty next lower
to that prescribed by law for the offense, without considering in the meantime the modifying
circumstance, which in this case refers to the incremental penalty for the amount of fraud in excess
of ₱22,000.00. Such penalty is prision mayor, with a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to
23

twelve (12) years. In line with this Court’s rulings, the minimum term shall be fixed in this case at
24 25

twelve (12) years.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting accused-appellant for estafa under
Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that in the case of estafa, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years
of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Per Judge Urbano C. Victorio, Sr.
Per Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and concurred in by Justices Corona Ibay-Somera and Eloy
2

R. Bello, Jr.

3
Records, p.2.

4
Id., p. 12.

5
TSN, pp. 2-6, April 20, 1995; TSN, pp. 2-5, 13-14, June 18, 1995.

6
TSN, pp. 2-5, July 11, 1995; Exhs. A, D, E, and F.

7
TSN, pp. 2-11, Jan. 9, 1996.

8
RTC Decision, p. 13; Records, p. 112.

9
CA Decision, p.9; CA Rollo, p. 74.

People v. Holzer, 336 SCRA 319 (2000); People v. Panganiban, 335 SCRA 354
10

(2000); Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 595 (1999).

11
TSN, pp. 6-8, Jan. 9, 1996.

12
Id., pp. 8-11 (emphasis added).

13
TSN, p. 4, April 20, 1995; TSN, pp. 8-9, June 8, 1995.

14
TSN, p. 13, Jan. 9,1996.

15
TSN, p. 4, April 20, 1995; TSN, p. 3, June 8,1995.

16
TSN, p. 6, Jan. 9, 1996.

17
Id., pp. 11-12.

18
King v. People, 319 SCRA 654 (1999); Nieva v. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 1 (1997).

19
See B.P. 22, §2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.— The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit
unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

20
CA Decision, p.9; CA Rollo, p. 74.

21
People v. Panganiban, 335 SCRA 354 (2000); People v. Hernando, 317 SCRA 617 (1999).

22
Art. 4103, §1, as amended by Act No. 4225.
23
People v. Hernando, supra.

24
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 27.

25
People v. Panganiban, supra; People v. Hernando, supra.