Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations

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Islamophobia: ignorance, imagination, identity

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Douglas Pratt

To cite this article: Douglas Pratt (2011) Islamophobia: ignorance, imagination,

identity and interaction, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 22:4, 379-389, DOI:
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Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations
Vol. 22, No. 4, October 2011, 379–389

Islamophobia: ignorance, imagination, identity and interaction

Douglas Pratt*

Religious Studies, University of Waikato, New Zealand

In much of Western society it remains regrettably the case that contemporary perception – or
the imaging – of Islam is dominated by misrepresentation and distortion that derive, by and
large, from misunderstanding and ignorance. Fear of the ‘other’, when the ‘other’ is
Muslim, is fear of Muslims per se, and also often of their religion, Islam – so Islamophobia.
In this article I shall examine what is meant by and what is the effect of, such ignorance and
outline an analysis of the process of imaging Islam – a process that arguably lies at the heart
of Islamophobia. I shall also address the question of identity, specifically the issue of
‘exclusive identity’ and problems that relate thereto. I shall conclude with a discussion of
dialogical ‘interaction’ as a relational modality that may yet challenge and ameliorate the
rising tide of Islamophobia.
Keywords: Islam; misrepresentation; imagination; exclusivism; dialogue

Introduction
The issue of Western perceptions of Islam, together with concerns about Islamic ideology and
the relation of Islam and Muslims to the West, constitute topics of ongoing concern for both
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Anxiety about the current state of affairs in relationships
with the ‘abode of Islam’ tends to underlie increasing concerns about Islam and the presence
of Muslims within Western societies, and so fuels the reaction of Islamophobia. Such concerns
have come to the fore during this century in a dramatic way with the terrorist attacks upon
America on 11 September 2001, the 2005 bombings in London, and the many allied incidents
between and since those events. In this paper I shall do four things. First, I shall undertake a
critical review of some key dimensions of Western perceptions of Islam, focusing on the
reality of ignorance of things Islamic. Second, I shall discuss an analysis of the way in
which Islam is imaged within the Western world, for it is particularly the combination of
ignorance and imagination that, I contend, lies at the heart of much – if not all – Islamophobia.
Nevertheless, perceptions about the political agenda of Muslims, whether accurate or not, also
tend to fuel anxieties about Islam and so contribute to the phenomenon of Islamophobia. Who
are the Muslims and what do they want? Hence, in third place I shall explore the issue of
Islamic identity. Here, the intention is to begin to address the reaction of Islamophobia by
presenting a concrete focal point that provides a substantial base for comprehending contem-
porary Islam as itself a diverse and complex phenomenon – and so, it is hoped, ameliorating
the fearful sense of Islam being a threatening monolith. I shall end with a discussion of
interaction as a mode of directly addressing the wider relational issues posed by the presence
of Muslim communities which may also, I hope, contribute to the task of countering
Islamophobia.

*Email: dpratt@waikato.ac.nz

ISSN 0959-6410 print/ISSN 1469-9311 online

© 2011 University of Birmingham
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2011.606185
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380 D. Pratt

I. Perception as a matter of ignorance

The Western perception of Islam is dominated by misrepresentation and distorted images, which
derive largely from misunderstanding and ignorance. I contend that ‘ignorance’ may be manifest
in at least three modalities or kinds, namely innocent, blind and culpable. On the one hand, there is
innocent ignorance, or ignorance simpliciter, namely the situation of a naïve ‘not-knowing’, yield-
ing the direct and unequivocal ‘don’t know’ response when a question of knowledge or percep-
tion is posed. However, this form of ignorance may provide opportunity for correction through the
provision of information and the processes of education. It implies no intentional prejudice on the
part of the one who is innocently ignorant. On the other hand, blind ignorance is something else
again. It is ignorance born of an intellectual incapability, or cognitive barrier, that effectively pre-
vents any ‘seeing’ or ‘knowing’ other than what has been dictated by the worldview perspectives
held. It yields a ‘can’t know – it’s beyond our ken’ response. Knowledge, and an image, of the
other are so utterly prescribed by the worldview of the knower that no alternative perspective
or image is admissible. Here the notion of applying a corrective simply through information is
inadequate. Any educational process, if attempted, will require sustained and careful execution
to effect any real change. Yet even if change is unwelcome or resisted, the premise of this
mode is basically that of cognitive inertia, which in principle can be overcome. Indeed it is
this type of ignorance that yields to the great changes in social ordering and cultural life, such
as happened, for instance, in the momentous changes brought about in the USA by the civil
rights movement in the twentieth century.
However, there is yet another kind of ignorance that goes beyond even that occasioned by
the blinding effect of a limited perspective and an intransigently closed mind. This third kind
is culpable ignorance, that is, an active ignoring: the deliberate refusal to know, the avoidance
of the challenge to cognitive change, the reinforcement of a prejudicial perspective by deliberately
ignoring the issue at hand. This is ignorance born of an active dismissal of alternative possibilities,
the out-of-hand rejection of options presented for alternative ways of thinking, understanding and
interpreting. This modality goes hand-in-glove with the attitude and mindset that harbours most
forms of fundamentalism or extremism. It produces an intentional ‘won’t know’ or ‘not wanting
to know’ response. It is resistant to any information contrary to its own; it is inimical to edu-
cational process; it treats cognitive change as effectively, if not actually, treasonable.
As with all conflicts, the first casualty, it is said, is truth. For example, with respect to the so-
called ‘war on terrorism’ – with the unspoken, but generally universally assumed, understanding
that it is ‘Islamic terrorism’ that is in the frame – how much of the media portrayal and the deluge
of analytical articles is the product of propaganda, the machination of so-called political ‘spin-
doctors’, or simply the uncritical reflection of stereotypical image and biased (mis-)perception?
Image distortion derived from ignorance, of whatever kind, continues to impact upon the
world in ways that now make the issue of addressing rising Islamophobia urgent.

II. Perception arising from imagination

So what, then, could be identified as predominant Western images or perceptions of Islam? Or
perhaps, better, what is the predominant perception, at least so far as that can be detected, in
the ‘Western’ mind? In other words, how is the Western imagination formed with respect to
the image of Islam? At the risk of a gross oversimplification of a complex issue, the simple
answer, arguably and sad to say, is a negative one; and I suggest it lies at the root of what we
term Islamophobia. It is best summed up by the word ‘threat’.
The image of Islam is that of a potential if not actual threat – and from threat is born fear. The
image of Islam that is portrayed by the media is all too often a threatening one, and in the uncri-
tical Western imagination the particular and dramatic activities of some specific Muslims is
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 381

generalized: thus the religion, Islam, is perceived as itself a threat. We may see this negative reac-
tion both through media image and report, and, more particularly, in how people in the West may
be observed reacting to such image and reportage. Indeed, it can seem that nearly all news con-
cerning Islam that is reported in our papers or covered on television concerns aggressive Muslim
action of one sort or another. There are undoubtedly many elements that contribute to the image
or, perhaps better, the process of imaging Islam and thereby to the construct of the threatening
Islam of imagination. What I propose here is to reflect upon the question of what constitutes
the imaging process as such: what are the factors that shape and influence the Western perceptions
of Islam? This is a task of image analysis – of attempting to discern and identify critical factors at
play. I suggest the following analytical outline as an appropriate place to start.
First, the portrayal of Islam in the West is first and foremost an imaginative construct shaped
by media images; in other words, Western perceptions are media-shaped. It goes without saying
that Westerners’ primary, and for many their only, exposure to Islam is via television news cover-
age, newspaper reportage and cinematic presentation. All too often, however, these media project
images of Islam that are little more than stereotypes, and it is the stereotypical image that power-
fully influences the formation of imagination, both for the individual and also with respect of the
collective or common communal perception. Of course, the predominance of visual image, in a
video age, hardly needs to be stressed, but the impact of the printed word, whether in newspaper,
news journal, popular book or tract, also contributes significantly to the image-making effect of
the media. However, all this really does not tell us much. What gives form and content to the
image-shaping so conveyed? What constitutes the image held in the imagination? Given the
incontrovertible pervasiveness of the media in the process of image-formation – and even allow-
ing for the recognition that there is more than a grain of truth in the adage that ‘the medium is the
message’ – what gives the image its substance? This brings me to the second point.
Perceptions of Islam are shaped by the forces of political domination. This is the two-edged
sword of the predominance of political material as the source and focus of much media coverage,
and the filtering effect of editorial choice and decision-making by those who control the media.
Whether intentional or not, the selection of material, the way it is presented – the casting of the
news – will at least reflect prior assumptions and agendas of a broadly political nature. Arguably,
all editing, or all redaction, is a political act in the sense that it is not being undertaken in a cog-
nitive vacuum. Rather it is guided, at least, by consideration of desired effects or the dictates of
sub-text message, propaganda and the like. Despite a reporter’s profession of objective neutrality,
and the supposed neutral objectivity of the camera – which ‘never lies’ – the outcome, in terms of
presented image, necessarily yields to the language of the report and the angle of the camera-shot
(the more graphic, stark or dramatic, the more likely it is to be aired or printed). This undoubtedly
implies, even in a broad sense of the term, that there is a dimension of political domination in the
image product, which is then projected through the media. But what does this all mean? We can
begin to construct an answer by turning to the next critical point.
The third element of this analysis has to do with the fact that, for the most part, the image of
Islam projected via the media lacks an authentic framework for interpretation. The portrayed
image of Islam is often contextually loose: it is lacking in situating context; or it is just ‘loose’
in the sense that only a simplistic – often assumed and thus probably false or misleading – con-
textual reference is given. So, what feeds the collective imagination, and in turn holds, embel-
lishes and draws upon the image for a variety of other purposes, lacks appropriate contextual
reference points. Certainly, for the most part at least, it would be true to say that both the projec-
tion and reception of the image of Islam is conducted with minimal, if any, attention paid to proper
contextual factors. Of course good investigative journalists and reputable news reporters will
defend their locating of reportage in context. I am not saying that good contextualizing of the
image does not happen at all – only that the predominant image of Islam in the West does not,
382 D. Pratt

in fact, come with an appropriate or authentic hermeneutical guide. Thus, for example, Islam is
too frequently and falsely perceived as a monolithic entity, as an avaricious self-aggrandizing reli-
gious culture, as not self-critical or reflective, as archaic, time-locked and Middle Eastern. So the
image of Islam, for the most part at least, is in reality contextually loose – it is not rooted in sound
contextual appreciation and understanding – as far as the Western imagination is concerned. This
results in the next element of the analysis, namely a religiously skewed image of Islam.
This fourth element refers simply to the fact that Islam is often not portrayed or perceived as
religion as such, or certainly not in a balanced way. That is to say, it is not presented as being, at
heart, a spiritual path, a religious orientation, inherently holistic in its outlook and application.
Rather, the idea of religion that is attached to the term ‘Islam’ is itself often skewed or concep-
tually twisted. It is off-centre, unbalanced so as to reinforce negative, even false, representations
of Islam. For instance, the politico-juristic elements of Islam are over-stressed in comparison with
the theological and pietistic dimensions; the pragmatics of Islamic programmes predominate over
an awareness of Muslim ethical sensibilities and reflections. And the underlying and deeper
raison d’être for any given Islamic action is thereby lost to view. The religious depth is trivialized,
the picture remaining is two-dimensional. And so we are brought to the fifth component of my
critical analysis.
The fifth element is that the image of Islam which predominates in the West is one of an
ideologically oppositional ‘religious other’. Islam is portrayed as the de facto oppositional
religion to Christianity, and vice versa; and, further, Muslims are portrayed as de facto opposi-
tional, religiously and politically, to Jews, often also to Christians, as well as to other religions
and their followers, and vice versa. In the context of a wider and general Western perspective,
Islam is the presumed ideological rival par excellence to the West. Inherent in the image is the
product of the process I have analysed so far. Islam is no friendly rival, like a competing
sports team. Rather, this rival is so completely ‘other’ that the prospect of confrontation is
couched in dramatic terms and fearful expectation. Thus Islam is portrayed as the ‘Great
Threat’, the ultimate opponent in a climactic and apocalyptic clash of civilizations, the historical
antithesis to the West’s thesis. Religious extremists of variant Christian types will transmute the
antithesis to an antichrist image. Islam is then portrayed, ideologically, as the great contemporary
satanic opponent to an idealized Judaeo-Christian West. And, ironically, the reverse also holds: to
many in the Islamic world, it is the West that is the demonic opposition, with America itself ident-
ified as the ‘Great Satan’. But such ideological oppositions are little more than mirror images of
extremely fundamentalist and exclusivist religious postures.
So we come to the sixth element of analysis, namely that Islam gets presented in terms of a
sociologically misrepresented image. Islam is deemed to be, in a variety of ways, sociologically
‘out of control’. It will produce a Saddam Hussein, who for a long time no one seemed able to
curb; an Osama bin Laden, with his network of terrorist jihadis evoking massive retaliatory
and expurgatory action that took a full decade to achieve a decisive result. It will produce a
plethora of countries where political volatility and/or communal violence seem commonplace.
On the one hand, Islam appears to produce much rhetoric concerning peaceful co-existence
and membership in the world community, yet on the other it foments virulent policies of opposi-
tion to the West and to Zionism and, in some cases, to Christianity or at least to Christian churches
and related organizations. Such active opposition may be directed against Israel and may even
produce a negative response to Judaism, qur’anic injunctions to the contrary notwithstanding.
It certainly has produced an overriding and alarmingly growing negative response to Jews as
such. This confused representation will reflect on Islam as having an aura of inner conflict and
lack of concerted direction for its own good, socio-politically speaking.
To be sure, there is great social and political, and even ideological, variety throughout the
world of Islam, and much diversity in localized political expression and difference in the way
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 383

specific issues and agendas occupy the energies of Muslims. This diversity does not mean Islam is
a threat by virtue of being, in some vague sense, out of control as a sociological entity. Indeed, the
countervailing impetus to unity within the worldwide Islamic community, which acts as an
internal check and corrective upon some of the more volatile elements, is not to be misread as
suggesting the possibility that Islam may yet become the monolith it is already feared to be.
Rather, it suggests that the dialectic implied in the tension between the ideal of an overarching
unity of the Islamic community and its variegated reality in practice only reflects the fact of
Islam being an authentic and complex religio-political entity. Nevertheless, fear and hostility
toward Islam are today rampant and require our attention. As one of many lines of approach,
or elements to be considered, I have suggested that Islamophobia is a product, in part at least,
of the twin correlated forces of ignorance and misinformed imagination. If perfect love casts
out fear, what is required today is a love of knowledge that counters ignorance and love of
truth that informs authentic image. And this means gaining a right appreciation of the identity
of the other who is so misunderstood and feared.

III. Islam and the quest for identity: the issue of exclusivism
Islam is found across some four dozen nations where Muslims form the majority of the populace
and throughout many other lands where Muslims are in the minority. Ideologically speaking, the
Islamic nations and countries constitute one vast notional socio-geographic and religious entity –
dār al-Islām – with which minority Muslim communities elsewhere are associated to form a
single overarching religious community, the umma. But, in contrast to the ideal and ideology
of the one worldwide Islamic community, there have in fact been – and indeed are today –
many Muslim ‘worlds’, or particular major communities and cultures. The diversity of these
Muslim worlds reflects varieties of contemporary political orientation and regional geography.
Against any notional unity of the Islamic community (umma), undergirded by a religious ideo-
logy of unity (tawh.īd), there is the concrete reality of a multiplicity of national Islamic entities
and identities. So an internal plural reality co-exists in tension with the ideology of a global com-
munal unity. This tension between the reality of socio-political diversity and the ideals of religious
unity is an inherent problematic within the world of Islam. One Muslim commentator has noted
that:
whereas in the early centuries of development of social institutions in Islam, Islam started from a clean
slate, as it were, and had to carve out ab initio a social fabric … now, when Muslims have to face a
situation of fundamental rethinking and reconstruction, their acute problem is precisely to determine
how far to render the slate clean again and on what principles and by what methods, in order to create a
new set of institutions. (Rahman 2002, 214)
An ethic of radical, even revolutionary, change and disruption as being valid, even needful, has
predominated throughout the history of Islam. But such change was intended to effect a return to
the pristine forms of the original Islamic institutional structure and religious life, not to engender
further novel development of the religion. This leads to a deep inherent tension between conser-
vative tendencies (the maintenance of the received tradition of religion) and radical tendencies
(the return to the roots of religion). Each can engender change, yet each can resist further
novelty: it all depends on context and circumstance. The conservative may call for revitalization
of institutions and the revival of religious sensibilities and in the process be labelled a ‘fundamen-
talist’. But this could apply equally to the radical who critiques the socio-political status quo and
advocates revolutionary change in order to regain true values and the realignment of the insti-
tutional expression of Islam.
It is as a response to the exigencies of the modern world, and the struggle to find identity and a
place within it, or in distinction from it, that contemporary Islamic ideology needs to be
384 D. Pratt

understood. A range of Islamic ideological responses, or options, have arisen. These include, at
one end of the spectrum, the call of the radical Islamist for total Islamization, that is, that Islamic
law (sharīʿa) should govern every part of life. At the other end of the spectrum, Muslim moder-
nists have advocated the abandonment of early Islamic politico-religious ideals in favour of the
privatization of religion. This is the model of Western secularism and, of course, it is anathema
to the dedicated Islamist. But between modernist reform at one end, and Islamist revivalism at
the other, there are many variant positions on the spectrum of ideological options that may be
– and often are – taken. And, arguably, the force or ideological power lying behind any given
ideological option has to do with the question of identity – and in the Muslim case, in particular,
the presupposition of an exclusive ‘oneness’ of identity, even in the face of a manifold history and
contemporary reality of diversity. There are many varieties of Islam, some more open to their reli-
gious and cultural neighbour, some less so. Very often Islam gets tarred with the label of funda-
mentalism, especially with respect to a pejorative presupposition that fundamentalism denotes the
likelihood of extremism and so of terrorism.
However, recent analytical and reflective work into the phenomenon of contemporary reli-
giously driven terrorism shows the presence of a distinctive and rigid form of exclusivity inherent
to the paradigm of religious fundamentalism (Pratt 2006, 11; 2007). Such exclusivity can cer-
tainly be understood as a variant of the paradigm of religious exclusivism, and exclusivism is
itself an element of fundamentalist ideologies, whether religious or otherwise. A fundamentalist
perspective, for example, is inherently absolutist: all other relevant phenomena are simply
explained on its terms, or viewed in a relativizing, even negating, way with reference to it. Fun-
damentalism, as a mindset, is a mentality that expresses the modern quest for universality and
coherence writ large: only one truth; one authority; one authentic narrative that accounts for
all; one right way to be. Fundamentalism typically excludes nuanced and variant readings of
whatever is its authoritative text or guiding source. This is sometimes understood in terms of ‘lit-
eralism’, but for a fundamentalist the key issue is that the source authority is such that no inter-
mediary interpretive framework is required – the text itself provides clear expression of truth,
whether in terms of an abstract universal, or with respect to a pragmatic or programmatic articu-
lation of the values and views espoused by the fundamentalist as ‘The Truth’. Fundamentalism,
on the one hand, may do little more than express an exclusive religious identity and worldview.
On the other hand, it may also tend toward an extremism that, in certain circumstances, may itself
lead to violence and terrorism.
In today’s world, a rather sharp question can be posed: Is there a proper way of speaking of
exclusive religion, or of religion in terms of exclusive identity, without necessarily falling into the
pit of exclusivist extremism? It seems that, if religious identity is not to succumb to syncretistic
blurring or relativist reduction, some measure of exclusivity must necessarily apply. Religious
identity, in being discrete, must – as with any discrete identity – incorporate a measure of the
‘exclusive’ if only as a marker of, or a synonym for, being ‘unique’; for uniqueness is a necessary
element of identity per se. In which case, the paradigm of exclusivism, so long virtually automati-
cally eschewed by all except, supposedly, fundamentalists, needs to be rehabilitated – or at least
given a more nuanced attention so as to admit the distinction between exclusion (qua the beha-
viours of ‘excluding’) and exclusive (qua the mark of distinctiveness). What interests me, in par-
ticular, is the fact that, on the one hand, a measure of exclusivity is logically required for clarity of
identity, and that clarity of identity is a necessary prerequisite for dialogical engagement, while,
on the other hand, when taken to an extreme, exclusivity of identity militates against any sort of
dialogical rapport by becoming exclusionary – and that is a hallmark of extreme religious funda-
mentalism. So, the distinctive contemporary challenge is to clarify the exclusivity that adheres to
proper religious identity as something distinct from the exclusion of religious exclusivism that is
inimical of any validation of the ‘other’.
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 385

As a response to plurality as such, the paradigm of exclusivism may be formally defined as the
material identity of particular and universal. That is to say, religious exclusivism involves the
identification of a particular religion (or form of that religion) as being, in fact, the essence and
substance of true universal religion as such, thereby excluding all other possibilities. From this
viewpoint the exclusivist’s religion is the ‘Only One Right One’ because there can be only
One that is right or true. That is to say, given the assertion that, from a religious viewpoint,
truth and salvation are universal values, for example, the exclusivist position holds that this uni-
versality is materially identified with but one religion, namely that of the exclusivist.
I suggest that exclusivism comes in at least three variants: open, closed and extreme or ‘hard-
line rejectionist’. An open exclusivism, while maintaining cognitive and salvific superiority, may
at least be amenably disposed toward the other, if only to allow for – even encourage – the capi-
tulation (by way of conversion, for example) of the other. By contrast, closed exclusivism simply
dismisses the ‘other’ out of hand. Relationship to the ‘other’, especially the religious ‘other’, is
effectively ruled out. The ‘other’ may be acknowledged as having its rightful place, but that
place is inherently inferior to that of the closed exclusivist who inter alia prefers to remain
wholly apart from the other. On the other hand, extreme exclusivism expresses hard-line rejection-
ist exclusivity, the viewpoint that asserts an exclusive identity to the extent that the fact and pres-
ence of an ‘other’ is actively resisted, even to the point of taking steps to eliminate the other. This
marks a distinct shift from the closed form of exclusivism understood more simply as the exercise
of a right to withdraw into itself, as it were. This is where what might be otherwise denoted as
‘fundamentalism’ reveals itself to be a distinctly different kind of phenomenon. The distinguish-
ing feature denoting extreme exclusivism is the negative valorizing of the ‘other’ – howsoever
defined – with concomitant harsh sanctions and limitations imposed upon the other. It is this
level of exclusive religion which, in its hostility to variety or ‘otherness’ per se, inherently inva-
lidates alterity. It is this level or version of religious exclusivism which lies at the heart of so much
religious strife, not to mention terrorism and insurgency, and thus poses an acute challenge to
those who would advocate religious freedoms, toleration and peaceful co-existence. Here, exclu-
sivism denotes active exclusion.
The exclusivism inherent in extreme fundamentalism involves the negation of otherness, or
alterity as such, and the corresponding assertion of self-superiority over all opponents, real and
putative. The negation of otherness is perhaps critical, for it involves a devaluing and dismissal
of the ‘other’, whether in terms of rival community or competing alterities, ideological or other-
wise. In the process of negating the other, the self is asserted as inherently superior. My God is
greater than your god. My Truth reigns over your ignorance. And so on. Indeed, such alterities
may be – and in fact often are – demonized. The religiously ‘other’ on this view is often cast
as ‘satanic’, or at least seriously and significantly labelled as a hostile opponent, and so hostilely
regarded. However expressed or referenced, it will be clear enough that the exclusivist fundamen-
talist is applying the key value set of negativity to otherness per se, and concomitantly asserting
self-superiority. The sanctioning of the imposition of an exclusivist programme may lead to the
legitimizing of extremist action, for once there is in place a sense of transcendent sanction for pro-
grammatic action, the way to viewing extreme behaviours as legitimate in order to achieve requi-
site outcomes is eased.
Sanctioned imposition and legitimated extremism are two sides of the same coin in the cur-
rency of contemporary religious terrorism. Submission to the dictates of the extreme exclusivist is
a matter of necessary imposition – as Afghani women found to their cost, for example, at the
hands of one form of extremist Islam. And the alternative to even an involuntary submission is
outright destruction: hence, from the Taliban’s fundamentalist perspective, the Buddha ‘idols’
had to be destroyed. How else does the fundamentalist extremist ensure that the imposition
that has been sanctioned can actually be effected? In a nutshell, at the extremity of exclusive
386 D. Pratt

religion lies an inherent, and inevitably enacted, invalidation of otherness and variety as the
necessary corollary of an unyielding religious exclusivism.
Exclusive religion as a matter of identity articulation is one thing; religious exclusivism as a
governing ideological set is another. Exclusive religion is not a cipher for religious exclusivism;
the one validates the variety of religious otherness, while the other is intent on invalidating such
otherness. Religious exclusivism plays into the hands of ideological extremism; exclusive reli-
gious identity allows for the integrity of difference and otherness and thereby the possibility of
interfaith relations. Thus the paradigm of exclusive religion that nevertheless upholds the vali-
dation of religious variety may be asserted as applicable to religious identity as such, and in con-
trast to the paradigm of religious exclusivism as a specific marker of highly conservative or
fundamentalist religion. The affirmation of a particular, unique, and so exclusive, religious iden-
tity does not necessarily entail, or require, a denial of alterity.
Religious exclusivity is not the same as religious exclusivism: the one refers to identity
uniqueness; the other to an excluding attitude and ideology. The former can be positively, or at
least neutrally, disposed toward the fact of religious diversity and plurality, and indeed to engage-
ment with the ‘other’; the latter quite clearly is not. This, then, is the interpretive lens that needs to
be applied to the matter of Islamic identity. Not all Muslims are exclusionary exclusivists; that is
the province of extremist ideologically driven identity, but, for the most part, Muslims own the
label of ‘fundamentalist’ insofar as that term denotes the modality of their believing. It denotes
exclusive identity in the sense of uniqueness – and that can, and does, find expression in many
forms and variants, for uniqueness also implies particularity as opposed to some generic and
abstract universality. Thus, despite the notion of identifying with a universalized reality (the
one Muslim community, or umma), Muslims for the most part construe their Islamic identity
with respect to the particularities of race, culture, location and upbringing – much like any
other religious person. And so, despite the universalizing assumptions of religious labels, the
fact remains that the concrete reality that attaches to Islam is one of significantly nuanced differ-
entiation and diversity. There are many forms of being Muslim; many Muslim interpretations and
understandings – and so lived applications – of Islam. They are all exclusive in the sense of being
unique, but it is only some – arguably a relative minority – who are exclusive in the sense of being
exclusionary of, or in opposition to, others per se. For the vast majority of Muslims, then, the pro-
spect of upholding identity in the context of interaction with their religious, and other, neighbour
is valid and real. Islamic identity in this sense is by no means exclusive of the other.

IV. Islam in interaction: ameliorating Islamophobia

One major arena of interaction is that which obtains between Islam and Christianity or, more
specifically, between Muslims and Christians. It has come to the fore most recently with the
issuing of the ‘Common Word’ letter of invitation from the Muslim world to the Christian
world, calling for a renewed interreligious dialogue for the sake of the future of the world at
large (bin Muhammad 2007). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the predominant Chris-
tian attitude towards people of other faiths could be described as, at best, paternalistic. Muslims, if
viewed in a positive light at all, would most likely be seen as religious ‘cousins’: distantly related,
part of the wider religious ‘family’, but definitely poor relations theologically. Dialogue, as we
might think of it today, was not part of the ecclesial vocabulary. Yet, in the course of the
last century, there have been considerable advances in the field of Christian–Muslim dialogue
(cf. Sperber 2000; Jukko 2007; Pratt 2010). The future is open.
Muslim–Christian interaction is nothing if not a great challenge. And the first item of that
challenge from the Christian side is that of understanding Islam, of allaying anxiety and fear
through proper knowledge and sympathetic investigation. This is the task of ongoing educational
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 387

engagement: mutual understanding and empathetic knowledge of the other is the first goal of
interfaith dialogue. For there to be any hope of countering misperception, correcting false
image and combating mischievous prejudice, learning for the sake of genuine, critical, and yet
at the same time empathetic, understanding constitutes a prime challenge. And in the case of
Islam and the West, in terms of a cultural and social dialogue as well as Islam and Christianity
as related religions, it is certainly the primary challenge that needs constantly to be addressed.
The second element to the challenge is to engage actively in dialogue or, as I prefer to think of
it, in ‘dialogical conversation’. It is one thing to gain knowledge from afar, to construct a
mode of understanding at a distance, to pursue an intellectual encounter in abstraction. The
deeper challenge is that of taking the plunge of face-to-face encounter, whereby we expose our-
selves to the scrutiny and response of each other. This is the challenge of engaging in conversation
with one another, and seeking avenues of cooperation. And it is a great challenge because the
shared history of mutual competition and the presumption of conversion as the goal of interaction
– with its inherent assumption that in order for my faith to be true, yours must be false, and there-
fore, in order for you to have access to the truth, you should convert to my religion, my viewpoint.
Furthermore, I believe it is only as we take the plunge to engage in conversation that we are
prompted to deeper self-reflection and so to further growth in understanding and learning. Self-
critical reflection in the cause of dialogue that strengthens the dynamics of positive interaction
requires us to be alert to the formative processes of our respective religious traditions, and to
what that may teach us. What might we have in common? What constitutes variations on a
theme as it were, and where do we radically differ? On what basis may we, as Christians and
as Muslims, seek to forge genuine and friendly relationship? Do our religious tenets and convic-
tions allow for détente? Or are we doomed to a perennial competitive context?
Although the foundations of belief lie in the respective scriptures – Qur’an and Bible – the
articulation of them into definitive doctrines emerged, broadly speaking, out of each religion’s
historical development. Each religious community, in its formative years, took the witness of
its scripture and the witness of faith-experience – for Christians tradition, for Muslims sunna –
and moulded its respective orthodoxies. Yet for both religions the tasks of conceptual re-interpret-
ation and formulaic articulation – if not development and change in particular beliefs, or at least in
the understanding of them – have continued through the processes of scholarly debate and discus-
sion. And these processes continue. Christians might refer to this as theological rethinking;
Muslims might call it a task of ijtihād. And the reason this can happen without a collapse into
contextual relativism is because of a simple principle that is common to both religions. I call it
the akbar principle, from the Arabic phrase allāhu akbar (God is most great). Theologically,
in both traditions, God is understood to be greater than any speaking, thinking or writing
about God. Hence, theological thinkers are free to be adventurous, even daring, in thinking
about God and the things of God, because there is nothing in thought that diminishes the
reality of God. God is Greater. The task, therefore, of improving the understanding of God, of
God’s Will, of God’s Way, is never-ending. This is the exciting dimension of the faith journey
for the Muslim as well as the Christian. This is a basis for hoping that the inheritance of hostility
can be transcended so that, in true submission to the God whose Will is revealed in the Word that
has come, as it were, in personal form (Jesus) on the one hand, and in an uttered form (Qur’an) on
the other, we may, perhaps, find common ground and common cause on which to build relation-
ships of friendship, trust, respect for difference and openness to expanding our horizons of mutual
understanding.
Elsewhere, in an historical review, I have suggested some key terms that describe dominant
motifs of Christian–Muslim interaction. Historical epochs of encounter may be denoted by key
terms such as ‘expansion’, ‘equilibrium’, ‘exhortation’, ‘enmity’, and ‘exploration’ (Pratt
1995). But these terms are to be understood as not denoting historical phases as such: they
388 D. Pratt

also indicate aspects or dimensions of the contemporary relationship. Expansion can be seen to be
indicative of the ‘expansiveness of self-confidence’ – religion in the expansion mode is deter-
mined and assertive, and this is a contemporary feature of both Islam and Christianity. But the
sense of ‘equilibrium’, which refers to a hesitancy to be overly self-assertive, and an inclination
to humility and a measure of openness to the religious ‘other’, is also arguably a component
element of the contemporary relationship, at least in some quarters. So, too, is the contemporary
reality of mutual exhortation: criticism and judgement, proclamation and witness which, in more
extreme forms, seek to declare an exclusive truth and engage with the ‘other’ only in order to win,
certainly abound. This is the continuing element of competitive praxis, of seeking victory through
conversion, which, in the cause of a God-given challenge to honour the Divine Will by fostering
friendship, needs to be urgently challenged. Likewise, propensities toward dismissive, derogatory
and deprecatory prejudice that mark a climate of enmity are abroad still today and are manifest in
various situations and contexts.
However, these negative elements notwithstanding – and they by no means give the whole
picture – perhaps the motif of ‘exploration’ in the sense of mutual positive engagement, which
now appears to be gaining as a feature or mark of contemporary Christian–Muslim interaction,
needs to be affirmed and fostered further. For here we are returned to the fundamental challenge
of a sincere, tentative, open and honest quest to know and befriend the religious and cultural
‘other’ – for Christian to know Muslim, and for Muslim to know Christian – and to do so in a
climate of mutual recognition of integrity and validity, even as there is recognition of difference
and diversity.
How might we proceed? What might be grounds for justifying and pursuing a dynamic of
interactive friendship between Muslim and Christian – at least from the Christian side? For
one thing, I suggest there are statements that, at least in their English equivalent, would
appear, in principle, not to be problematic as far as Christianity is concerned. The use of
expressions of honour and respect, such as the phrase peace be upon him, for example, springs
to mind. Although not part of the usual language of Christian piety, or normal Christian
expression, it would not be inappropriate for a Christian to utter such a phrase in respect of hon-
oured and venerated figures, and this may certainly be done as an expression of politeness and an
acknowledgment of the context of our discourse, such as when in an Islamic environment and to a
Muslim audience. Furthermore, there are, I believe, statements and articulations of Islam that
Christians may indeed utter in good faith yet without either giving offence or compromising
their own integrity. For instance, there are Islamic locutions which, although most often
uttered in their Arabic form, in another language could just as easily be Christian statements.
For example, phrases such as: ‘there is only one God’; ‘in the name of God’; ‘thanks be to
God’; ‘God willing’, and so on, come to mind. Statements such as ‘Muhammad (peace be
upon him) is a Prophet of God’, or ‘Muhammad (peace be upon him) is the Seal of the Prophets’
might also come into this category.
Second, and briefly, there is the matter of the conceptual or interpretive element to dialogue,
especially with respect to the place and function of theological reflection in the dialogical, or con-
versational, process. Here the analogy of light and prism might be useful. Each of these faiths
proclaims the oneness of God and the oneness of the ‘Truth of God’. Yet, to a greater or lesser
degree, great complexes of concept, doctrine and intellectual debate have been produced by thin-
kers seeking to fathom and express the truth of divine revelation on either side. As a consequence,
the heritage of theological encounter is largely one of competing claim, counterclaim and, in the
end, mutual dismissal of the other’s viewpoint. In effect, the assumption has been that each reli-
gion is talking about the ‘incoming light’ on the basis that only it has the right prism of conceptual
construct or interpretive framework whereby to refract the light and thus perceive it in its true full
glory.
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 389

The analogy is based, of course, on a presumption of one light of Truth, one Divine Reality,
wherein different religions – or at least the religions of revelation – are, in effect, different prisms
held up to that light. Thus the diverse theologies, explications, practices and perspectives of these
religions are the product of the different prisms and the way they are held, as it were. Religions
often argue on the basis of their different refractions of the light of truth, assuming that their par-
ticular refraction equates to the original light itself. To recognize, in the process of conversational
dialogue, that what we offer to each other is a refracted perspective, unique, distinctive and valu-
able as such, and potentially open to complementarity from the perspective of another’s refrac-
tion, may constitute no bad starting point. Arguably, for instance, the doctrine of the Trinity is
a refraction of the truth of the oneness of God through the particular prism of historically
bounded experience and language, and a historical set of concerns and conceptual tools for
dealing with these.
The point of the analogy is both to help set the context for conversation and to help unlock the
process whereby dialogical conversation tends to end where it begins – the agreement to disagree
– because, among other reasons for such an outcome, there has been no recognition of the prism
effect. Without such a recognition of what is really the interrelationship of the absolute and rela-
tive dimensions to all religious discourse, there is no prospect of a perspectival shift such that
might allow for, in the context of dialogical encounter, the upholding of novel interpretation
on the grounds that it is just that: interpretation – a new, possibly combined, refraction of that ulti-
mate truth which in and of itself changes not, nor can it be changed.
In today’s world it is imperative to affirm the integrity of the process of dialogical engagement
– of conversation at depth – and to respect the uniqueness and integrity of our dialogical partner as
the one to whom we are called and challenged to relate. The way of dialogue is the way of the
acceptance of the other and openness to the presence of the Divine in and through the other.
So it is that the dialogical dynamic of Christian–Muslim interaction may yet produce the required
shift from a history of competition to a future of cooperation; from being dominated by quests for
conversion to being open to the possibilities of conversation. Such relationship of dialogical
‘interaction’ may yet work to challenge and ameliorate the rising tide of Islamophobia.

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