RODEL URBANO vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182750 January 20, 2009

Facts:
On September 28, 1993 in the evening, in Barangay Poblacion Municipality of Lingayen, Province
of Pangasinan, a fist fight happened between Brigido Tomelden and Rodel Urbano, the accused. Tomelden
was drunk and started insulting the accused, which turned out into a fistfight that the victim suggested.
The accused was parrying the blows from Tomelden but without control he threw a lucky punch which
knocked Tomelden and rendered him unconscious. Tomelden was immediately brought to the manager’s
office where he spent the night.
Day after such event, Tomelden went home and informed his wife, Rosario of the fight and
complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which impelled Rosario to immediately bring him to the
Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Daisy Arellano examined him and treated his lacerated left index
finger, contusions, and hematoma at the right cerebrum.
Tomelden’s then went to the hospital twice after he received treatment from Dr. Arellano. On
October 8, 2019, ten (10) days after the incident, he was admitted because he was in the state of
drowsiness and constant vomiting. Due to Financial constraints Tomelden , on October 10, 1993, twelve
(12) days after the incident, was discharged despite signs of negating physical condition improvement.
On the same day, at 9:00pm in the evening, Tomelden died due to Cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to
cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the RTC erred after rendering judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.
2. Whether or not RTC erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
on the part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of the petitioner.
Ruling:
It is true that the deceased was suffering from malignant hypertension that this circumstance
greatly engenders doubt as to the proximate cause of the victim’s death. Petitioner, thus, contends that
he could only be adjudged guilty of physical injuries. The petition is partly meritorious.
However, upon the direct autopsy report from Dr. Arellano, per record, testified the fist blow which
landed on Tomelden’s head could have shaken his brain which caused the cerebral concussion; and that
the cause of the victim’s death was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with
resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident." Petitioner’s suggestion that Tomelden succumbed
to heart ailment and/or that his death was the result of his malignant hypertension is untenable, given
that the post-mortem report yields no positive indication that he died from such malady.
Petitioner next contends that the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim ought to be appreciated in petitioner’s favor.
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element
of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting,
inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the
provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede
the act. In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated January 25,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25371 is, in the light of the presence and the appreciation of two mitigating
circumstances in favor of petitioner, hereby MODIFIED by decreasing the term of imprisonment. As thus
modified, petitioner Rod el Urbano is hereby sentenced to serve an indeterminate prison term of from
two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, with whatever imprisonment he has already served fully credited in the
service of this sentence. The rest of the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

MIGUEL DANOFRATA y BAUTISTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 143010 September 30, 2003
Facts:
Miguel Danofrata Y Bautista was armed with a bladed weapon, who then, accused of killing, one
Alfredo Gonzales Y Lacson, hitting the victim on his left chest, thereby inflicting upon the victim stab
wound which caused his immediate death. He was then charged guilty of the crime. Later on, he
petitioned to the higher court.
Before the bloody incident took place, the petitioner was engage in a slugging match with his
wife, Leonor. She threw a plastic chair towards the petitioner. Their neighbors saw the happening. Due
to the surge of emotion he went to their neighbors and threatened them with a bladed weapon. The
circumstances then led to the death of Alfredo. The petitioner denied the charges against him and
pleaded not guilty of the crime.

Issue:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals gravely erred in affirming the decision of the RTC
in spite of the fact that the same does not conform to the evidence on record?

Ruling:
In the absence of any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witness to impute so grave a wrong
against the appellant, the defense of denial hardly deserves probative value.

These events and circumstances prior to the killing of Alfredo could have caused unusual outbursts of
passion and emotion on petitioner's part. These resulted in the tragic stabbing of the victim thus
entitling petitioner to the mitigating circumstance analogous to passion and obfuscation.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

BENJAMIN RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 125867 May 31, 2000
Facts:
The eyewitness of the crime, Jenny Camacho, wife of Renato U. Camacho, testified before the
honorable court of the crime where her husband was killed. On January 18, 1989, between 7’o clock and
8’o clock in the evening, Renato together with other people was playing mahjong in a hovel in front of
the house of a certain Tomasa Rivera at West Poblacion, Natividad, Pangasinan. Suddenly a gun was
fired hitting Camacho on the head. Instantaneously he slumped dead.
One person was suspected as the culprit of the crime, in the name of Benjamin Rivera, who the
witnesses claimed that he is the one who committed crime because he accused the deceased of stealing
his goat. Petitioner Benjamin Rivera was charged with murder for having allegedly shot to death one
Renato U. Camacho with a handgun the killing being qualified by treachery. He voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and posted his bailbond before he could be arrested.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of the RTC that the that the
killing was qualified by treachery?
 2. Whether or not there was a mitigating circumstance?

Ruling:
The trial court correctly ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery. The suddenness of the
shooting without any provocation on the part of the victim who was innocently playing mahjong and
totally unaware of the impending attack upon him who was unarmed, demonstrates the treacherous
nature of the attack.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly appreciated in favor of
petitioner. The records show that when the Information was filed after the preliminary investigation, he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and posted his bailbond before he could
be arrested.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 1996
affirming that of the trial court finding petitioner BENJAMIN RIVERA guilty of Murder qualified by
treachery but mitigated by voluntary surrender.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa

January 15, 2004
G.R No. 135981

Facts:

Ben Genosa and Marivic Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City.
They lived happily for a year. In succeeding years of their marriage, Ben suddenly became a habitual
drinker and had different vices including gambling and being a womanizer. Each time, Ben got drunk,
the married couple always quarrel each other. Then Ben started hitting Marivic causing injuries that
leads her to see a doctor to attend such injuries. Ben became abusive to Marivic as time passed by.

On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary.
They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Without knowing, it would be the last day
Ben seen alive.

On November 18, 1995, Steban Mantiga, owner of the house whom the Genosas rented was the
told by the neighbors of the foul odor coming from the rented house. Without hesitation, he destroyed
the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He also unlocked the house and went in alone. He directly
checked the bedroom, which he found the lifeless body of man on his briefs that later identified as Ben
Genosa by the victim’s mother, Illumida Genosa.

November 14, 1996, a case was filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of
parricide. Appellant accused of parricide, did immediately willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hit and wound Ben Genosa, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon
caused the death of her husband.

On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a judgement finding
Marivic guilty of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance,
thus sentencing her death penalty.

URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was filed, praying that the Honorable Court to allow exhumation of
Ben Genosa to re-examined the cause of his death. And lastly, to allow the examination of Marivic
Genosa by qualified psychologist and psychiatrist. On September 2000, the motion was granted. The
examination proceeded.

Issue:

Whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus.

Whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Rulings:

For the first issue, the Supreme Court held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of
self-defense arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant
and her intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer
must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer
and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to
the accused based on the history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.
For the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance
because the quarrel or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the
assailant’s aggression.

G.R. Nos. 136164-65 April 20, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGAR LEGASPI y LIBAO,
accused-appellant

Facts:
Edgard Legaspi Y Edgar, was charged of rape and robbery in two separate information, both which
he committed on February 11, 1997 against one, Honorata Ong Y Honorata. The act happened inside the
house of the victim, Honorata at nighttime. On the same house was her three children who was in deep
sleep upon the commission of the crime. Honorata was not able to protest, then and there, against her
will, follow the commands of her perpetrator due to the threat he gave her. Edgar was armed with
bladed weapons, which he used to intimidate the victim.
The morning after the crime, Honorata told her sister-in-law of the traumatizing event, Edgar
caused against her. They, together with her husband reported it to the police and the victim undergone
medical examination by the NBI. Despite no evident signs of extra-genital physical injuries, it was then
duly noted that the accused has committed the rape and robbery after he admitted that he was
previously convicted of the crime homicide.

The accused-apellant also stated that he was in the state of insanity at the time of commission of
the offense. That he was then, previously admitted at National Center for Mental Health.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in affirming Honorata’s testimony and worthy of credence at
the case at bar?

Whether or not the trial court erred in charging Edgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
rape.

Ruling:
 The trial court did not err in finding Honorata's testimony to be clear, straightforward, and worthy
of credence, and consequently, in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape. Despite the errors found in the blotter of the police, and the inconsistencies of the statements of
Honorata. It cannot be deemed unreliable and unworthy of credence, because it is

G.R. No. 148877 August 19, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ANGELITO BAGSIT Y BAGSIT, Appellant

Facts:

Angelito Bagsit, appellant, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder he committed against Pepito
Sison by shooting him with an unlicensed gun. Angelito Bagsit was identified by Richard Sison, son of
the deceased, who was at the time of commission of the crime was inside their house watching
television with her sister, Heidi. When Richard looked out of the window, he saw a man whom he
identified as Angelito Bagsit pointing a gun at his father Pepito Sison who was then closing the front
door of their house. The barrel of the gun held by Angelito protruded thru their grilled window. Not for
long, Richard heard a gunshot and almost simultaneously saw his father falling to the cement floor.

Issue:
1. Whether or not there was an illegal warrantless arrest?
2. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in giving full faith to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.
3. Whether or not the trial court erred in charging the accused with death penalty.

Ruling:
The warrantless arrest was legal. It is long settled that where the accused, by his voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court, as shown by the counsel-assisted plea he entered during the
arraignment and his active participation in the trial thereafter, voluntarily waives his constitutional
protection against illegal arrests and searches
The trial court did not err in giving full faith to the testimonies of the witness. It is dogmatic that
the positive identification of the accused, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of
weight in law.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death pursuant to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal
Code as amended by RA 7659. There being two (2) aggravating circumstances without any mitigating
circumstance to offset the same, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of death. Treachery
qualified the killing to murder. The appellant, who closely positioned himself surreptitiously behind the
window of the house of his unsuspecting victim while the latter had his back turned, and fired his gun
execution style, eliminated any risk from any defense that the victim might put up. As alleged in the
amended Information, the killing was perpetrated with the use of an illegally possessed firearm. With
the passage of RA 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is not a
separate crime but merely a special aggravating circumstance. Dwelling, also alleged in the amended
Information, is likewise aggravating.1âwphi1 The triggerman showed greater perversity when, although
outside the house, he attacked his victim inside the latter’s own house when he could have very well
committed the crime without necessarily transgressing the sanctity of the victim’s home. He who goes to
another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. For the
circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have actually
entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense - it is enough that the victim was attacked
inside his own abode, although the assailant might have devised means to perpetrate the assault from
the outside.

G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SALVADOR ARROJADO, accused-

appellant.

Facts:
On June 1, 1996, the lifeless body of Mary Ann Arrojado was found on her room in their residence
bathed with her own blood. It was Salvador Arrojado, cousin of the deceased, the accused-appellant,
who found the body. Salvador, then immediately went to the house of their cousin, Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo to report that the victim had committed suicide. Upon arriving, they saw the victim, who was
bloodied, was lying on her left side facing the bedroom door with her hands clasped together. On her
bed was a rosary and a cruifix. Near her was a knife. Erlinda recognized it to be the knife kept in the
kitchen. Erlinda also noticed the electric fan was turned on full blast while the windows were all locked.
Without sign of anyone who break in.
Salvador who lived together with the victim helping her in taking care of her invalid father.
Several witnessed testified on the strained relationship between the victim and the accused.
It was also found out that the victim died of multiple stab. The accused-appellant then found
guilty of murder.

Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of the abuse of confidence can be appreciated and
would elevate the penalty of murder from reclusion perpetua to death even though it was not allege in
the said information?

Ruling:
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, however, is present in this case. For this
aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between the parties must
be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to
commit the criminal act. The condifence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crim, the
culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belied that the former would not abuse said confidence.
In this case, while the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for which reason she entrusted
her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, her fears were subsequently allayed as shown
by the fact that she took back her personal effects from Erlinda. Thinking that accused-appellant would
not do her any harm, because he was after all her first cousin, the victim allowed accused-appellant to
sleep in the same room with her father and left the bedroom doors unlocked.

The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993
which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death to reclusion
perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and
in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty
of death on accused-appellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
took effect, requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the
aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled
rule that "statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense
and to that extent." The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not having been alleged in the
information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to raise accused-appellant's sentence to death.

G.R. No. 144975 June 18, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. AMADOR SAPIGAO (At Large); JOSE
SAPIGAO (At Large); SAMUEL SAPIGAO (At Large); ELPIDIO MAMERTO; ARTURO MAMERTO,
SR. (At Large); ROBERT OBILLO (At Large); VERSON MAMERTO (At Large); FRANCIS SAPIGAO
(At Large); and REYNALDO SAPIGAO alias "CALLONG" (At Large), Appellants

Facts:
The unfortunate event happened on Christmas Eve of December 24, 1998, a shooting incident in
front the residence of barangay captain Arturo Mamerto Sr. The Sapigao brothers namely Emmanuel
Sapigao and Gem Sapigao, went to the said residence to collect a "compadre's contribution". Reynaldo
Sapigao and Elpidio Mamerto blocked their path. Minutes later, Reynaldo Sapigao, then holding a
carbine rifle, began firing at them. They were able to hide them self for safety. The commotion lead to
gathering of Elpidio Mamerto, Verson Mamerto, and Robert Obillo, all armed trooping into the house of
the barangay captain obviously in response to Reynaldo’s call. Then they were joined by Arturo, who
was armed with a Caliber .45 pistol.
Momentarily, Emmanuel Sapigao saw from his hidden perch his cousin Lauro Sapigao passed by
in an owner-type jeepney. About half an hour later, Lauro Sapigao, together with George Cabanilla and
Puroy Valdez, returned and stopped near the abandoned motorcycle. Without hesitation, the group
composed Elpidio Mamerto, Arturo Mamerto, Sr., Verson Mamerto, Robert Obillo, Amador Sapigao, Jose
Sapigao, Reynaldo Sapigao, Francis Sapigao and Samuel Sapigao rained fire on Lauro Sapigao. Then
and there Lauro Sapigao was killed. The cause of death was severe intracranial injury and hypovolemic
shock secondary to gunshot wounds. The 39-year old Lauro Sapigao, a member of the Philippine
marines with a rank of corporal, was survived by his wife and two minor children.

Issue:
1. Whether the trial court was justified in finding that treachery attended the killing of Lauro
Sapigao.
2. Whether there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Mamerto participated in the
shooting of Lauro Sapigao with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Ruling:
While the act of one is the act of all in conspiracy as implied by the action of the case, treachery is
not proven when it was shown Lauro Sapigao upon rendering to succor to his cousins was armed at that
time, more likely than not the victim somehow anticipated an armed encounter rendering treachery
doubtful in the case. Thus, the trial court was not justified in finding that treachery attended the killing
of Lauro Sapigao.
Yes, Republic Act No. 8294, which took effect on 06 July 1997, would allow the use of an
unlicensed firearm to be taken as an aggravating circumstance "if homicide or murder was committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm." The use of unlicensed firearms was proved by the testimony of
prosecution witness SPO4 Elmer Dedicatoria, Sr., from the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp
Crame, Quezon City. SPO4 Dedicatoria testified and presented before the court a certification that
appellant was only licensed to carry a pistol, Armscor, caliber .45 with Serial No. 7662248 covered by
computerized license issued on 08 May 1998 with expiration date on December 2000. It was clear from
the testimony of Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao, however, that appellant Elpidio Mamerto shot at Lauro
Sapigao not with a pistol but with an unlicensed armalite.
The killing of Lauro Sapigao, not having been attended by any circumstance qualifying the act to
murder, appellant Elpidio Mamerto can be held liable for the crime of homicide, defined by Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code.

G.R. No. 133438 January 16, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON LAB-EO, accused-appellant.

Facts:
On or about October 21, 1996, at the Barangay Hall, Poblacion, Tadian, Mountain Province, Wilson
Lab-eo accused with intent to kill and with the use of a sharp knife, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike and stab Segundina Cay-no with a well-honed and
pointed knife and thereby inflicting a mortal stab wound upon the victim as reflected in that medico-
legal certificate, to wit: Stab wound infrascapular area left, penetrating with massive hemathorax, which
caused the death of the victim thereafter.
The accused did not deny the stabbing of the deceased. He even voluntarily surrendered to the
Police and admitted the crime.

Issue:
1. The lower court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder.
2. The lower court gravely erred in finding that the qualifying circumstance of treachery is attendant
in the case at bar.
3. The lower court gravely erred in not finding that the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation and sufficient provocation attended the commission of the crime charged.
4. Granting that the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged, the lower court failed to apply
the indeterminate sentence law.
Ruling:
In the first assigned error, the appellant faults the lower court for finding him guilty of murder
even when the Information, as written, could only have charged him with the crime of homicide.
Nothing in the law prohibits the prosecutor from adopting such a form or style. As long as the
requirements of the law are observed, the Information will pass judicial scrutiny.
The Information is not just the first, second or third paragraph of the prosecutor's sworn accusation
taken individually or separately, but all the allegations made therein taken together in their entirety.
Second, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 248 does not use the word "qualifying" or
"aggravating" in enumerating the circumstances that raise a killing to the category of murder.
In the instant case, the Information specifically alleges that evident premeditation, treachery, and abuse
of superior strength "attended the commission of the offense." This is more than sufficient to comply
with the requirements of Article 248.
Four kinds of aggravating circumstances, namely: (1) generic or those that can generally apply to all
crimes; (2) specific or those that apply only to particular crimes; (3) qualifying or those that change the
nature of the crime; and (4) inherent or those that must of necessity accompany the commission of the
crime.
Third, assigned error, the appellant argues for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstances of
passion and obfuscation, as well as of sufficient provocation, in his favor. There is no justification for
this.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following elements
should concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind; (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal
equanimity.
 Fourth, The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable in this case. Section 2 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law states that it shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable by
death or life imprisonment. In the case of People vs. Aquino, this Court held that the appellant could not
avail of the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law because this law does not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 135065 August 8, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENNY CABANGCALA y ABRASIA,
RENATO CABANGCALA y ABRASIA alias "RENE", and DANILO CABANGCALA y ABRASIA alias
"DANNY", accused-appellants.
Facts:
On February 7, 1997, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Rovellano Abrasia, fifteen years
old, testified that he and his first degree cousins, the Cabangcala brothers, Benny, Rene and Danny
(appellants herein), had just finished cutting cogon in the mountains of Barangay Ricos, Umingan,
Pangasinan. Then after, Rovellano accompanied Danny to the barbershop. While having his hair cut,
Danny saw the victim Dionisio "Isio" Pascual drinking gin with Anciong Abrasia and Quisot Camacho in
front of the house of Corazon Morante.
After such, Canbangcala brothers with Rovellano went to the house of Danny, where they drank
gin together with Benny and Rene. There, Rovellano overheard the Cabangcala brothers talking about
the victim. Rovellano recalled that a week before, Mario Cabangcala, appellant's younger brother, told
him that he had a quarrel with the victim's son. At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, that same day,
Benny announced a plan to kill the victim. The four continued drinking until 10:00 o'clock in the evening
during which period Danny would occasionally go out to verify if the victim was still at Morante's place.
The Cabangcala brothers then proceeded to execute their plan and, together with Rovellano, waited for
the victim at a place halfway within the 100 meter distance between the house of Morante and the
Cabangcalas, along a footpath where the expected victim would use in going home. Benny approached
the victim and struck him twice with the bamboo hitting the latter on the left cheek and the neck. The
victim fell, after which Danny and Rene joined Benny in mauling the victim.
When the victim was rendered unconscious, Rene carried him towards the field east of Danny's
house. Using shovels, the Cabangcala brothers dug a pit where they dumped the victim and covered it
with soil.
On March 14, 1997, the victim's brother, Fulgencio, and daughter Jennifer, went to the Umingan
Police Station and reported to the police that the victim had been missing since February 7, 1997.
On March 24, 1997 Fulgencio returned to the station with a certain Danilo Abrasia who disclosed
that he saw the victim sometime in February 1997 in Barangay Pangangaan being mauled by the
Cabangcala brothers. On March 25, 1997, upon being told by Rovellano of the exact place where the
victim was buried went to the said place and recovered a cadaver which was identified as Dionisio. With
the coordination of the said barangay captain, SPO1 Fernandez was able to invite the Cabangcala
brothers to the police station to shed light on the killing of Dionisio Pascual.

Issue:

1. The honorable trial court erred in concluding that the person exhumed on march 26, 1997 , is that
of dionisio pascual.
 2. The honorable court erred in giving credit to the belated testimony of danilo abrasia that witness
saw the incident.

3. The honorable court erred in giving credit to the testimony of rovellano abrasia.

4. The honorable court erred in not accepting the defense of alibi advanced by the accused.

Ruling:
Firstly, accused-appellants heavily bank on the possibility that the body exhumed by the police
authorities upon information disclosed by Rovellano Abrasia on March 25, 1997, is not that of Dionisio
Pascual, whereby in the absence of the corpus delicti they cannot be convicted of the crime charged. Dr.
Busto was stating a general proposition that if a cadaver had been buried for 45 days, it would normally
be in such a state of decomposition making identification difficult. More so, according to Dr. Busto, if the
ground on which the cadaver is buried is wet. The specific finding for this particular cadaver, however, is
that although the cadaver when brought to her was in an advanced state of decomposition, its face was
still "recognizable" because the "skin was still intact". One day before Dr. Busto saw the cadaver, right
at the site where the remains of Dionisio Pascual were exhumed, Fulgencio Pascual (brother of Dionisio),
and Victoria Abrasia (a cousin of Dionisio) positively identified it to be that of Dionisio Pascual.
Secondly, accused-appellants find fault in witness Danilo Abrasia's delay in reporting the incident
to the authorities. Delay of a witness in revealing to the authorities what he knows about a crime does
not render his testimony false, for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people
and their abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case. But more than this, there is always the inherent
fear of reprisal. We cannot discount the possibility that fear develops in the mind of the witness despite
the absence of threat from the accused. This is the reason for enactment of the law on witness
protection.
The testimony of Rovellano Abrasia was given full credit despite being present at the time of
crime and distance himself to his cousin after such incident. It is also in accord with natural experience
for Rovellano to distance himself from his cousins right after the commission of the crime for fear of
being implicated. This will not be taken as flight similar to that of an accused avoiding appropriate
charges and possibly, a conviction. It must likewise be noted that his testimony is not the sole basis for
the conviction of the three accused-appellants. The major points in his narration were corroborated by
other evidence tending to bolster his credibility.
Finally, we find unpersuasive accused-appellants' insistence that the trial court erred in not giving
credence to their defense of alibi. Two eyewitnesses have positively identified the three accused
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
appellant by the prosecution witnesses. No jurisprudence in criminal cases is more settled than that alibi
is the weakest of all defenses, for which reason it should be rejected when the accused is sufficiently
and positively identified by credible eyewitnesses to the crime.

G.R. No. 169246 January 26, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.NICOLAS GUZMAN y BOCBOSILA,
Accused-Appellant
Facts:
On November 25, 2007, Michael Angelo Balber y Castillon (Michael), seventeen years old was
proceeding on his way home alone, after attending a worship service. While Michael was casually
walking along the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, appellant and his two companions, who
were drinking nearby, suddenly approached and surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the
back of Michael while his two companions stood in front of Michael. In an instant, they grabbed the
shoulders of Michael and overpowered the latter. One of the appellant's companions, whom the
prosecution witnesses described as a male with long hair, drew out a knife and repeatedly stabbed
Michael on the stomach. When Michael fell on the ground, appellant kicked him at the body. Upon
noticing that the bloodied Michael was no longer moving, appellant and his two companions fled the
scene. Michael died due to hemorrhage and shock secondary to multiple stab wounds of the trunk.
The appellant was convicted by the trial court with the crime of murder and a punishment of
reclusion perpetua and damages accordingly. On appeal, appellant contends that the lower court erred
in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite the palpable discrepancies and inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite the
discrepancies and inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses.
2. Can treachery be properly appreciated in the instant case?
Ruling:
No. The lower court was correct in its decision. According to People vs. Pateo, a witness testifying
about the same nerve-wracking incident can hardly be expected to be correct in every detail and
consistent with other witnesses in every respect, considering the inevitability of differences in
perception, recollection, viewpoint, or impressions, as well as in their physical, mental, emotional, and
psychological states at the time of the reception and recall of such impressions. Thus, the Court have
followed the rule in accord with human nature and experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and
trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy the credibility of a witness, especially of
witnesses to crimes shocking to conscience and numbing to senses. The inconsistencies cited by
appellant refer to minor and unimportant details which do not adversely affect the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. Their testimonies on material and relevant points are substantially consistent
with each other. They testified that three persons, among who was the appellant, had stabbed Michael.
Their descriptions of the faces, physical attributes, and respective positions of appellant and his two
companions during the attack are compatible. They also stated that appellant was the last person who
stabbed Michael. It should be emphasized that the testimony of one eyewitness would be enough to
support a conviction provided it is positive, credible, clear and straightforward.
Yes. Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the circumstances that renders the
victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack.
In this case, all the essential elements/conditions of treachery were established and proven during the
trial. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of appellant and his two companions rendered
Michael defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape. It appears that Michael, who was a minor,
was unarmed and alone at the time of the attack. In such a helpless situation, it was absolutely
impossible for Michael to escape or to defend himself against the assault of appellant and his two
companions. Being young and weak, Michael is certainly no match against adult persons like appellant
and his two companions. Michael was also outnumbered since he had three assailants. Appellant and his
two companions took advantage of their size, number, and weapon in killing Michael. They also
deliberately adopted means and methods in exacting the cruel death of Michael by first surrounding him,
then grabbing his shoulders and overpowering him. Afterwards, each of them repeatedly stabbed
Michael with a knife at the stomach until the latter fell lifeless to the ground. The fact that the place
where the incident occurred was lighted and many people were walking then in different directions does
not negate treachery. It should be made clear that the essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. This is even
more true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of their
tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a
minor, treachery exists.

G.R. No. 137497 February 5, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee vs. CHARLES JOY FLORES alias "Pok-Pok", appellant.

Facts:
On May 30, 1998, Nathaniel dela Cruz went to Imelda District, Cabanatuan City to attend his
brother Henry’s birthday party. On his way home at around 7 o’clock in the evening, he passed by a
store. Appellant and one Reggie Malubay were there. Suddenly, appellant accosted Nathaniel and put his
arm on the latter’s shoulders, at the same time poking a knife at him. Reggie immediately apprised
Marissa dela Cruz, Nathaniel’s sister-in-law, of the incident. She pleaded with appellant to spare
Nathaniel’s life. In turn, appellant proposed that her husband take the place of Nathaniel. Pretending she
was acceding to appellant’s demand, she promised to fetch her husband Henry. At this point, Nathaniel
and appellant struggled for the possession of the knife. As they were grappling for the weapon,
appellant stabbed Nathaniel. Marissa rushed home to call her husband. Meantime, Nathaniel fought back
and was able to run away4 but he accidentally tripped and fell to the ground. At that moment, appellant
who was chasing Nathaniel, repeatedly stabbed him.

Dr. Jun Concepcion, Medico-Legal Officer in the City Health Office of Cabanatuan City, testified
that the cause of death of Nathaniel was hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds.
Several witnesses testified the involvement of Flores of the stabbing incident and that the entries
in the barangay’s logbook or blotter show several derogatory reports and complaints lodged by the
barangay residents against appellant.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds, and so holds, the accused CHARLES JOY
FLORES alias "POK-POK," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of DEATH.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred:

1. In relying on the testimony of marissa dela cruz in the conviction of the accused for murder.
2. In not considering the testimony of Dr. Jun Concepcion in its determination of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
3. In convicting the accused of the offense of murder.

Ruling:
On the first assigned error, while witness Marissa is the victim’s sister-in-law, such relationship
does not necessarily impair her credibility as a witness. This is especially so when the witness was
present at the scene of the crime, as in this case. To be sure, there is no proof or any indication that she
was animated by improper motive in testifying against him. Thus the credibility of Marissa whom the
trial court found to have positively identified appellant as the one who stabbed Nathaniel dela Cruz is
sustained.
The second and third assignments of error will be discussed jointly.
Appellant seeks refuge in the defense of alibi such defense cannot prevail over the positive
identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Furthermore, the defense failed to establish that it was physically impossible for the appellant to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. For its part, the prosecution has
proved that the place where the crime took place was only 100 to 150 meters, more or less, away from
the house where appellant and his companions had a drinking spree. Clearly, it was possible for him to
be at such place when the crime was committed. It is well settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper,
accused must not only prove his presence at another place at the time of the commission of the offense,
but he must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at
the time of the commission of the crime.
Appellant’s protestation is further belied by his admission that upon learning of Nathaniel’s death,
he went to Bulacan and thereafter proceeded to Palawan where he was apprehended. There is no doubt
that he fled because of a guilty conscience. The rule is settled that flight evidences guilt.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Two
(2) conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely: (a) the employment of means of execution
that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or
method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.
The trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery on the ground that appellant
suddenly attacked the victim. However, it does not always follow that because the attack is sudden and
unexpected, it is tainted with treachery. In treachery, the mode of attack must be consciously adopted.
This means that the accused must make some preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to
insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend
himself or to retaliate.
In view of the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, appellant can only be
convicted of homicide punishable by reclusion temporal.25 There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the
medium period of reclusion temporal.26 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant should be
meted out the indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
Further, appellant should be made to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages. The purpose for making such an award is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to
compensate them for injuries to their feelings.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City in
Criminal Case No. 8374 is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that appellant CHARLES JOY FLORES alias
"Pok-Pok" is found guilty of homicide and is hereby meted an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Nathaniel dela Cruz
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.

G.R. No. 182551 July 27, 2011

People of the Philippines vs. Rosendo Rebucan

Facts:
On November 6, 2002 in Carigara, Leyte, Rosendo Rebucan was accused of assaulting 65 year-old
Felipe Lagera and his 1 year-old grandson Ranil Lagera Tagpis. Felipe suffered hypovolemic shock and
massive blood loss due to the the three hacking wounds while Ranil had a skull fracture due to the
hacking wound at the fronto- temporal area. Which led to instantaneous death of both Felipe and Ranil.
 Punong Barangay and Human Rights Officer Renerio Arminal testified that the accused- appellant
surrendered to him on November 6, 2002 stating that he fought with a certain Felipe Lagera. The said act
was to avenge his wife's sexual molestation by Felipe and his son, Timboy.
Accused- applellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder
charged under the information and was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death. It was found
that the killing was a premeditated one and executed with treachery. Appellant then filed a Notice of
Appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense must be
appreciated.
Ruling:
No, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated.
It is required in Article 13(5) of the Revised Penal Code that the act be committed in immediate vindication
of a grave offense to the one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree.
A period of four days was already sufficient, within which Rebucan could have regained his composure
and self-control.
Therefore, the said mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication cannot be credited in this case.

People vs Alejandro Atop

GR No. 124303-05

FACTS:
Regina, since early childhood, has lived with grandmother Trinidad and Trinidad’s common-law
husband, Alejandro Atop, in Leyte.
Alejandro, the accused, with the use of a knife and against the will of Regina, mashed her breasts,
embraced her, kissed her and inserted his penis on the victim’s genital organs to accomplish his lewd
desire, to her damage and prejudice.
Alejandro threatened to kill Regina should she tell anyone of the incidents. Regina reported the
incidents of rape that happened in 1992, 1993 and 1994 only in January 1995. It took her so long to
report the said incidents because she was afraid. The accused threatened to kill her should she tell anybody
about the incidents. She was accompanied by Fe and Rosena in reporting to the police. The accused
appealed on the penalty of death imposed upon him.

ISSUE:

1. The trial court erred in appreciating the circumstances of nighttime and relationship as aggravating
the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed on October 9, 1992, in 1993 and on
December 26, 1994.
2. Whether or not the accused-appellant be imposed the penalty of death in violation of Sec. 11 of RA
7659.

RULING:
The appeal is partly meritorious. We find that the alleged aggravating circumstances were not duly
proved.
The time-settled rule is that nocturnity, as an aggravating circumstance, must have been
deliberately sought by the offender to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or
facilitate his escape. The prosecution failed to prove that nighttime was deliberately sought by appellant
to facilitate this dastardly acts. In fact, the prosecution failed to show that appellant consummated his
carnal designs at night, except only for the December 26, 1994 incident which the victim said occurred at
11:00 p.m. Much less is there any evidence substantiating the trial court's conclusion that appellant
intentionally sought the darkness to advance his criminal exploits.
Neither can we appreciate relationship as an aggravating circumstance The scope of relationship as
defined by law encompasses (1) the spouse; (2) an ascendant; (3) a descendant; (4) a legitimate, natural
or adopted brother or sister; or (5) a relative by affinity in the same degree.17 Relationship by affinity
refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage.
The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by common-law relations. Here, there is
no blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus, the modifying circumstance
of relationship cannot be considered against him.
Undisputed is the fact that appellant is not the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. He
is the common-law husband of the girl's grandmother. Needless to state, neither is appellant the victim's
"parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree." Hence, he is not encompassed in any of the relationships expressly enumerated the aforecited
provision.

G.R. No. 172324 April 4, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CELINO NABONG y OSENAR (a.k.a.
Salvador Abaquita), ALVIN LAGUIT y BRENDO and NOLFE LADIAO (a.k.a. Roel Salutario),
Accused-Appellants.

Facts:
The victim, AAA was a 22-year old accountant employed as junior auditor at the Alba and Romeo
Auditing Firm. On the fateful night of 23 March 1999, at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Reynaldo
Patenio, Rogelio Amit, Lilia and Ariel Cortez, Celino Nabong (Nabong), Alvin Laguit (Laguit), Nolfe Ladiao
(Ladiao) and Arnel Miraflor (Miraflor decided to have a drinking spree. And went to the nearby videoke
bar in Amorsolo Street in Makati City.
By 11:30 p.m., they stopped drinking when the videoke bar closed for the night. At about the
same time, AAA was walking towards the center island near the corner of Buendia Avenue and Ayala
Avenue with her officemate Minerva Arguelles Frias. Laguit and Ladiao, who were then standing by the
corner of Ayala Avenue and Buendia Avenue, spotted the two women. Therefrom, Laguit and Ladiao
crossed the street and waited at the island for the two women. Minerva Arguelles Frias then boarded a
bus, leaving AAA alone with Laguit and Ladiao. Nabong suddenly stabbed AAA on the right thigh using
the pointed metal bar. Simultaneously, Ladiao jumped at AAA and covered her mouth. The victim
slumped on the pavement while Ladiao, Laguit, Nabong and Miraflor crowded around the woman. AAA
was then sexually attacked and was silent by the three accused. And eventually killed her with six stabs.

Issue:

Whether or not there is sufficient basis on record to justify the appreciation of intoxication and low
degree of instruction as mitigating circumstances in favor of accused.

Ruling:

For intoxication to be considered as mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the

intoxication impaired the will power of the accused and that he did not know what he was doing or could
not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took
such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. This,
the appellants failed to do. The records are bereft of any evidence that the quantity of liquor they had
taken was of such quantity as to affect their mental faculties. On the contrary, the fact that appellants
could recall details of what had transpired after their drinking session is the best proof that they knew
what they were doing during that occasion. The deception, the device, the place and manner of
perpetrating the crime all point to the fact that appellants had complete control of their minds.

Neither can appellant Nabong’s alleged lack of instruction be appreciated in his favor. Illiteracy
alone will not constitute such circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and
knowledge of the full significance of one’s act. Besides, one does not have to be educated or intelligent
to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another person.

G.R No. 74048

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

VS.

ROLANDO CRUZ, alias "Tikboy" and RADING SASON (at large), Accused, ROLANDO CRUZ,
alias "Tikboy", Accused-Appellant.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

That on the afternoon of November 15, 1983, the victim, Jesus Baang yielded three gunshot wounds
on the back, chest and head causing his ultimate death, and that the gun-man was identified as Rading
Sason, but according to a statement made by one eye-witness, before the shooting began, he was able
to see Rolando Cruz and Rading Sason having a conversation when the appellant uttered “Andiyan na” to
Sason when he saw Baang was around, and that after uttering the said phrase, Sason left and the eye
witness heard three gunshots thereafter. Thus, the appellant was implicated as a co-conspirator and a
principal by inducement on the said offense on the basis of the emitted phrase.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether the appellant should be held liable as an accomplice based on the statement given by the
eye-witnesses?

RULING OF THE CASE:

No, the appellant is not held liable. As observed by the appellant’s counsel, the phrase "Andiyan
na" reportedly uttered by the appellant minutes before the actual shooting may lend some
semblance of conspiracy. But semblance is still a semblance, and it cannot take the place of facts.
It is a well-established rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish a finding of
criminal conspiracy, and that it must be proved as sufficiently as the crime itself through clear and
convincing evidence, not by mere conjectures.
 It must also be taken into context that the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance,
which is knowingly or intentionally given, and which is not possible without previous knowledge of
the criminal purpose. In the case at bar, there is absence of conclusive proof indicating a prior plan
or agreement between appellant Rolando Cruz and Rading Sason to kill the victim.

G.R. No. 80130, August 19, 1991

BENJAMIN ABEJUELA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

FACTS:
Sometime in April or May 1978, petitioner was befriended by Glicerio Balo, Jr., an employee of
Banco Filipino in the same Tacloban Branch. Petitioner Benjamin Abejuela, a businessman engaged in
the manufacture and fabrication of hand tractors and other agricultural equipment, had a savings
deposit with Banco Filipino, Tacloban Branch.
On August 3, 1978, Balo went to Abejuela's welding shop to borrow the latter's passbook.
Abejuela was surprised and thought that it was not possible for Balo to use his passbook. Balo showed
Abejuela some checks purporting to be the proceeds of his father's insurance policy. After Abejuela
made several suggestion to Balo regarding opening an account in Banco Filipino or in another bank. But
with constant explanations and assurances of Balo, Abejuela entrusted his passbook to Balo. During the
month of August 1978, the account of Abejuela with Banco Filipino reflected a total deposits of
P176,145.00 and a total withdrawal of P175,607.96.But feeling apprehensive over Balo's constant use of
his passbook, Abejuela closed his account with Banco Filipino by surrendering his passbook and
withdrawing the balance of his deposit.
Thereafter, the bank's accountant and interest bookkeeper discovered a discrepancy between the
interest reconciliation balance and the subsidiary ledger balance. The interest bookkeeper also notice
that Account No. 6701-0160 in the name of Benjamin Abejuela reflected four (4) large deposits on
various dates from August 3, 1978 to August 23, 1978, totaling P176,145.25, but the deposits slips
thereof could not be located.

Issue:
Whether or not Benamin Abejuela has the knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal Glicerio
Balo, Jr.) for him to be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial
document.

RULING:
On reasonable doubt, Benjamin Abejuela is hereby ACQUITTED of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents. However, the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Leyte on May 29, 1979 against petitioner's properties and those of his co-accused
Glicerio Balo, Jr. to satisfy their civil obligation in the amount of P176,145.25 and which was
subsequently made permanent by the said court stands. No pronouncement as to costs.

We decree the acquittal of Abejuela because we seriously doubt whether he had knowledge of the plan
of Balo to defraud Banco Filipino by means of posting false deposits and withdrawing these later.
Because of this doubt, however, his exoneration will not extinguish his civil liability. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the same is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases, or where the court has expressly declared that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature.
 G.R. No. 133254-55 April 19, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO,
accused-appellant.

Facts:
SPO1 Edmund Badua saw that the shabu was taken by the accused-appellant from a cabinet
inside his room upon his purchased. After finding probable cause, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a search
warrant at the RTC, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite and such application was granted.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one
civilian informer went to the residence of accused-appellant at Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City to
serve the search warrant. They found heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves
which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant
refused to sign it.
Charges were made against the accused, hence, he contended that the evidence against him was
inadmissible because the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
2. Whether or not marijuana may be included as evidence in accordance with the plain view
doctrine.

Ruling:
1. Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 21 provides that a search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia."
Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the
application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search
warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the
police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore,
the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is
valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented
showing probable cause as to its existence.

With respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant's residence, Search Warrant No.160
was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the
judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
2. Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence.35 For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.36 The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing
the marijuana in this case.
 In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form
of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in
newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the
time or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove
that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain
view doctrine," the court held that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.

[G.R. NO. 168050, September 19, 2008]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNARDINO GAFFUD, JR., Accused-

Appellant.

Facts:

On the night of May 10, 1994, Orly Salvador, while on his way to the house of his uncle Manuel
Salvador, heard two gunshots and thereafter saw the house of his uncle burning. He saw three persons
within the vicinity of the burning house, one of whom he identified as appellant Gaffud, Jr.

Dan Dangpal, neighbor of the deceased, at about 8:00 PM that evening, heard successive gunshots and
saw the deceased’s house burning. Prior the incident, Barangay Captain Potado Ballang saw the
appellant a few meters away from the house of the deceased.

Earlier that day, Dominga Salvador, common-law wife of Manuel Salvador and mother of Analyn
Salvador, went to the house of the appellant to inquire about her husband’s share in the construction of
the barangay hall. Dominga also related that had earlier filed a complaint against the appellant and his
brother for slaughtering her pig.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.

2) Whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2) separate counts of murder or for
the complex crime of double murder.

Ruling:

1) Conspiracy, in this case, is not essential. The rule is that in the absence of evidence showing the
direct participation of the accused in the commission of the crime, conspiracy must be established by
clear and convincing evidence in order to convict the accused. In the case at bar, however, direct
participation of accused-appellant in the killing of the victims was established beyond doubt by the
evidence of the prosecution. Thus, a finding of conspiracy is no longer essential for the conviction of
accused-appellant.

2) No. The Court ruled that in a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed,
they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The
burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main objective of killing the latter and his daughter,
resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime of double murder. Hence, there is only one
penalty imposed for the commission of a complex crime.
 LEONILA BATULANON vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G. R. No. 139857, September 15, 2006
Facts:
Leonila Batulanon was employed as cashier/manager of Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incoporated
(PCCI). She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the
cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of
loans were discovered.
Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing varying amounts to four different individuals.
Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against
Batulanon and were docketed as follows:

Criminal Case No. 3625. On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 30A for P4,160.00 was released to
Erlinda Omadlao;

Criminal Case No. 3626. On September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 237A for P4,000.00 was
released to Gonafreda Oracion;

Criminal Case No. 3453. P3,500.00 thru Cash Voucher No. 276A was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on
October 16, 1982; and

Criminal Case No. 3627. On December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru
Cash Voucher No.

Issue:
Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents.

Ruling:
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three counts of
falsification of private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, for each
count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the amount of
P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this
judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its
satisfaction; and

In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative
Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994
until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this
judgment until its satisfaction.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is important to
ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If
the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be
charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document,
the proper crime to be charged is estafa.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis
Batulanons signature in the cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the name of
her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner
Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: by: lbatulanon to indicate
that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the
modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used
the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from
PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not
attendant in this case

People of the Philippines vs. Jenny Likiran alias “Loloy”, GR

No. 201858, June 04, 2014

Facts:
On March 19, 2000, during the eve of town fiesta in Barangay Bugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon, a
dance was held in a basketball court where Jerome Likiran, brother of Jenny Likiran, suddenly punched
Prescado Mercado in the mouth. Constancio Goloceno, the friend of the latter, tried to assist him,
however the former and his brother, Jenny Likiran, were armed by short firearm and a hunting knife so
he backed off.
The other colleagues of Mercado, who are Rolando Sareno, Sr. and Celso Dagangon, were outside
the dance area heard the commotion. Dagangon saw Jerome Likiran approached Sareno and shot him
several times. As Sareno tumbled, Jenny Likiran stabbed him at the back. He brought Sareno to the
hospital but he was already dead. He suffered multiple shots and a stab wound at the left scapular area.
Jenny Likiran was convicted for the crime of Murder in the Regional Trial Court, Malaybalay, City
Branch 8. Jerome was not impleaded in the Information and the Court did not acquire any jurisdiction
over him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of RTC. The accused-appellant insisted his
innocence.

Issue:
Whether or not treachery is attendant to the crime committed.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court (SC) held that treachery is not appreciated in this case as the prosecution
failed to establish all elements in the qualifying circumstances.
The treachery is appreciated if the following elements are shown: a) the malefactor employed means,
method or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and b) the means, manner and execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender. Treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where the sudden attack is
not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of
the accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the
moment.
As such, in this case, it appears that the incident of shooting and stabbing of Sareno was a spur
or moment incident and a result of brawl during the dance. Undeniably, the prosecution failed to show
that the accused-appellant and his brother deliberately planned the means by which they would harm
Sareno.
Thus, the crime of Murder against accused-appellant Jenny Likiro was modified in a lesser crime
of Homicide and the latter was thereby found guilty of the same. With this, the conviction of homicide
was hereby imposed to accused.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- Appellee

VS.

REYNALDO TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, and RONNIE
TORRES, Accused,

BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, Accused- Appellant

G.R. NO. 189850

SEPTEMBER 22, 2014

FACTS:
On September 21, 2001, Jaime M. Espino was driving his car along C.M. Recto Avenue in Divisoria
when Ronnie suddenly blocked his path. Espino alighted from his vehicle and approached Ronnie, who
tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the possession of his belt-bag
but the latter’s brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified companion suddenly appeared. With all
of them brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and his brothers took turns in stabbing Espino in
different parts of his body while the unidentified companion held him by the neck. When Espino was
already dead and sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet and jewelries and immediately
fled. Only appellant was arrested. The other siblings remain at-large to date.

The Regional Trial Court held that appellant can only be liable for the killing of the victim. Thus,
the trial court decided that the appellant is guilty of murder. The appellant appealed to the Court of
Appeals, and the appellate court modified the trial court decision and found the appellant guilty of
robbery with homicide instead of murder. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused- appellant is guilty with the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.

RULING:

Yes. Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.

"Robbery with homicide exists ‘when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of
the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery,
the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that
the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to
the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery’."

It is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Had
they primarily intended to kill Espino, they would have immediately stabbed him to death. This intention
was confirmed by the accused’s taking of Espino’s belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and jewelries after he
was stabbed to death. The killing was therefore merely incidental, resulting by reason or on occasion of
the robbery.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EUGENE SAMUYA
G.R. No. 213214, April 20, 2015

FACTS:
Eugene and Rudy Samuya (Rudy) were charged with the crime of Murder, the accused on
November 19, 2006, conspired together to kill Gabriel S. Samonte at Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Municipality of
Ibajay, Aklan that as a direct consequence of the illegal act of the accused, the victim died due to the
damage. The prosecution alleged that in the evening of November 19, 2006, Florenio Castro (Florenio),
Anthony Dumalaog (Anthony), Jonel Samuya (Jonel), and the victim, Gabriel Samonte (Gabriel), were
sitting outside Florenio's house in Sta. Cruz, Aklan when Rudy arrived and asked where "Nat-Nat" was.
When Anthony replied that "Nat-Nat" wasn't there, Rudy approached Anthony and cocked a gun at him.
At that point, Eugene arrived and, without any warning, shot Gabriel in the chest. Gabriel was able to
run away, and as Eugene was chasing him, Florenio heard another gunshot. Moments later, Eugene
returned alone and left together with Rudy. Florenio tried to contact Gabriel and when the latter did not
respond, Florenio went to look for him. Eventually, Gabriel was found dead in a kangkong swamp. Dr.
Antonio S. Maagma, Jr. who conducted a post-mortem examination on Gabriel's body confirmed that
Gabriel sustained a laceration on his right shoulder and a gunshot wound on his chest that caused
massive bleeding and resulted to his death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Eugene's conviction for murder.

HELD:
The Court of Appeals correctly convicted the accused for Murder. It was proven that the accused
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The accused reasoned that he just acted out of self-defense as he
the victim approached him with a knife but the testimonies said otherwise, thereby not supporting the
claim of the accused. It was also proven that the accused committed an act of treachery as it was
proven that the victim was attack without the slightest provocation, that the attack of the accuse was so
sudden and so unexpected that the victim has no time to prepare for his or her defense.
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove the felony committed by the accused, thus sentencing
Eugene Samuya to reclusion perpetua and shall not be eligible for parole and finding the accused guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC.

G.R. Nos. 106083-84 March 29, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDMUNDO SOTTO y PIEDAD, QUINTIN
GARRAEZ y TAN, accused. QUINTIN GARRAEZ y TAN, accused-appellant

Facts:
In the year 1985, Aida Marasigan, a businesswoman, entrusted Josephine Galvez to purchase rice
in Coron, Palawan. She handed down the amount of P33,015.00. Herein, Silveriano Pangilinan and
Fernando Marasigan, nephews of Josephine, accompanied her and took the pumpboat JOJO IRA II
operated by Rosauro Wenceslao.
When headed to their destination, the pumpboat labelled MI ANN blocked them and told them
that the engine busted and asked to tow towards Coron. However, Garaez was identifeid. The group
having acceded to their request, Fernando caught the rope and thrown from the banca and tied it to the
banca. Once succeeded, Sotto transferred and once he got there, he pulled up his gun and directed
Rosauro to maneuver the pumpboat.
 Josephine, having known that there was a trouble, pleaded Snot to harmed and offered the
money. But, Sotto tied her to the trunk of the tree and commanded the three men to walk inland
towards the mountain range. Once they got there, Sotto shot them- the two died and Fernando
survived.

The trial court ruled that appellant were equally liable with Sotto.

ISSUE:
Whether an accused- appellant acted as principal or as an accomplice in the perpetration of the
offense.

HELD:
No, Garraez was an accomplice. The appellant’s community of criminal design with Sotto could be
inferred from his act of blocking the victims’ pumpboat with the banca he was operating, of pretending
that the banca needed to be towed and of conducting Sotto on board the pumpboat. Although not
indispensable, in the commission of the crimes charged considering that Sotto could have well solicited
the help of anyone else other than appellant in ferrying him to the pumpboat, appellant’s assistance,
nonetheless, was undoubtedly one of help and cooperation.

Appellant Garraez is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of being an accomplice in the
commission of robbery with homicide for which he shall suffer indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years
and one day of prision mayor medium as the minimum penalty to fifteen years to reclusion temporal
medium as the maximu penalty. He shall pay half of the civil indemnity imposed by the trial court in the
amount of P50,000.00 to the respective heirs of each of the slain victims Josephine Galvez, Silveriano
Pangilinan, and Rosauro Wenceslao or a total amount of P75,000.00, as well as P15,000.00 by way of
indemnity in favor survivor Fernando Marasign. The PNP and the NBI are directed to exert all efforts for
the arrest of Edmundo Sotto y Piedad in order that he might serve the penalty imposed upon him by the
court.

GR No. 95753 February 13, 1992

(People of the Philippines vs. Ruben Lim)

Facts:
The accused, Ruben Lim, allegedly raped his cousin, Delailah Lim on December 5, 1986 in his
residence where the victim was temporarily staying due to the request of the accused to have
someone take care of his house as he was supposed to depart to Lucena City on the said date to
attend the wake of their dead relative. The accused succeeded in raping the victim as he was armed
with a .38 caliber revolver which he poked at the neck of the victim while threatening to kill her and
her family. He repeated the said threat for during his frequent visits to the victim which included the
time when it was found that the victim was pregnant. The accused insisted on the abortion and was
successful despite the refusal of the victim. The threat was believed by the victim to be true on the
ground that the accused had been previously charged with frustrated murder and was capable of
carrying out his threat. On October 8, 1987, private complainant filed her complaint for rape against
the accused.
On November 23, 1987, complainant filed another case against the accused this time on
intentional abortion with one "Aling Maring", the abortionist as co-accused. Ruben Lim warned Atty.
Lim, his uncle, that he would spray the lawyer's house with armalite (sic) if he could not convince
Delailah to withdraw the cases filed against him. Atty. Lim yielded and called Delailah and her sister,
Karen, to execute an affidavit of desistance. With great reservation Delailah executed on March 1,
1988, an affidavit of desistance on the rape case and on March 8, 1988, a separate affidavit of
desistance for the case of intentional abortion. On April 28, 1988, complainant executed a
 "Sinumpaang Salaysay" explaining that the affidavit of desistance was involuntary and executed
under duress and meant to hasten the capture of the accused who would have believed that the case
against him would be dropped.

Issue:

Whether or not the appeal of the accused challenging the decision of the RTC in finding him guilty of
the crime of rape should be sustained.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court has arrived at a conclusion that the present appeal must fail.

The appellant's primary defense is alibi with his wife and sister corroborating his testimony. It has
long been recognized that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused.
The entire records of the case show that the appellant is a violence prone ex-soldier and it is
understandable why the victim should be afraid of him. The affidavit of desistance itself is a product of
fear. Delailah Lim's testimony established that she has a well-founded belief that the appellant is
capable of carrying out his threats. She knows that the appellant owns a .38 caliber gun and an
armalite.
This Court takes note that the tender of voluntary surrender by the accused was on April 22, 1988
for several days after the affidavits of desistance on rape and intentional abortion were executed. From
the facts adduced, inference may be drawn that Ruben Lim had occasion to force the filing of the
affidavits as alleged by Delailah Lim and came out of hiding when the case against him would not
prosper due to the retraction.
All the foregoing discussions clearly show the strength of the prosecution's case. The appeal is
dismissed. The decision of the RTC must stand.

G.R. No. 117407 April 15, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IRVIN TADULAN, accused-appellant.

Facts:

Complainant Estela Santos owns a house at No. 6 Dr. Garcia St., in Barangay Sumilang, Pasig, she resides with her
common-law husband and their minor daughter, Maristel Cruz. Behind the said house, complainant also owns a three-
door apartment building, one unit of which was rented and occupied by accused Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan
and their three children name Dianne, Angie and Bochoy who were aged 10, 9 and 5, respectively. In 1992 complainant’s
daughter, Maristel Cruz was about nine (9) year old and was in grade school. She often played with the accused’s children
in the vicinity of their house and the apartment building.

That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1992 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, armed with a knife, with lewd design and by means of force, threats and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Maristel Cruz, a minor, nine (9)
years old, without her consent and against her will.
Estela Santos immediately informed the wife of Irvin Tadulan that her husband has raped her daughter. She
further informed Adefa Tadulan that she would not take action against the latter’s husband if they would vacate the
apartment unit right away. Adefa Tadulan later on met with Estela Santos and told her that she had driven away Irvin
Tadulan, but requested that she and her children be allowed to stay until Saturday, April 11, 1992. Estela Santos
thereafter noted, however, that Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to the apartment unit every night despite the
promise of his wife that she herself would call the police should he ever come back to the place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in disregarding the defense of pardon and alibi of the accused?

Ruling:
It has been held time and again that for alibi to prosper as a defense the accused must show that
he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA 266). In this case,
however, it is not so situated, for according to him he was at the plant of the Republic Asahi Glass
Corporation in Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, —which is but a few kilometers from Barangay Sumilang
of the same municipality where the crime was committed.
It is clear to the mind of this Court that the complainant has not expressly pardoned the said
accused. Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by the parents of
an offended minor but also by the minor herself in order to be effective as an express pardon under Art.
344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we find
the following words: ‘Neither must we be understood as supporting the view that the parents alone can
extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the belief that the pardon by the parents, standing
alone, is inefficacious.’ It was also held in another case, that ‘The express pardon of a person guilty of
attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter’s parents, is not sufficient to remove criminal
responsibility, but must be accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself.’ (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil.
360).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO DELA CERNA, accused-

appellant.
G.R. Nos. 136899-904 October 9, 2002

Facts:
In the City of Cebu, the 15-year old Irene dela Cerna charged six (6) separate complaints of rape
against her father Ernesto dela Cerna which he began when his own daughter Irene was 7 years old.
All those incidents were done by the accused when Irene’s mother was out of their house. After
each commission of rape, the accused warned Irene to not report to anybody about what happened. The
victim didn’t attempt to cry for help because of fear for herself and her family as she believed appellant
is capable of killing her and her siblings because she once saw him in possession of a gun.
Irene eventually revealed the rapes to her two (2) best friends in school, namely, Cheryl Quano
and Bernadette Comita. Bernadette, in turn, told her own mother what Irene divulged. Bernadette's
mother talked with Irene regarding the rape incidents after which the former brought her to the office of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) at the City Hall where she was interviewed
by a social worker Emma Patalinghug on March 21, 1997.
Dra. Aster Khusravibabadi of the Cebu City Medical Center examined the victim on March 21,
1997 and found "old healed hymenal lacerations at 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock positions, and the introitus
admits two fingers with ease."
On September 15, 1998, the defense presented private complainant to prove that she voluntarily
executed an affidavit of desistance dated July 3, 1998. Private complainant explained that she decided
to forgive her father for the sake of her mother and her younger siblings who experienced pain and
difficulty in sustaining their daily needs as their whole family was dependent upon their father for
support.
On November 29, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant Ernesto dela
Cerna guilty of six counts of rape.
 Accused-appellant assails said decision and contends that the trial court erred in convicting him
despite the insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of Irene’s
execution of the affidavit of desistance which created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

Issue:

1. Whether or not an affidavit of desistance by the private complainant Irene created a reasonable
doubt as to Ernesto’s guilt;
2. Whether or not Ernesto’s conviction of the crime of rape would subject him to the extreme penalty of
death.

Ruling:
An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement, executed by a complainant in a criminal or
administrative case, that he or she is discontinuing or disavowing the action filed upon his or her
complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the court
attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought, which was in
this case. Moreover, the affidavit of desistance, in this case, revealed that private complainant never
retracted her allegation that she was raped by her father.
Thus, the accused-appellant cannot capitalize on Irene's affidavit of desistance. Further, the Court
has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable.

With respect to the four other incidents of rape which were committed after the effectivity of RA
7659 and in each of which the trial court imposed the extreme penalty of death, which Article 335
provides that (Art. 335 of the RPC):
“The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.”
In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving the minority of the
victim beyond reasonable doubt. No single independent proof was offered in court to establish the fact
that complainant was below 18 years old at the time of the incidents. Irene merely stated during her
direct examination that she was born on August 26, 1982. We find Irene's casual testimony as to her
age insufficient.
In sum, the Court upholds the decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant of the crime
of rape in the latter four instances but must reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua on
account of the prosecution's failure to satisfactorily prove the qualifying circumstance of minority of the
victim.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOLI NOVIO y AYASO

G.R. No. 139332 June 20, 2003

Facts:

The appellant Noli Novio who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Tacloban City sentencing him to thirty years of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay
P50,000 to the victim, as civil indemnity for the the crime of rape against Maricel Talisay daughter of
Wilberto and Nenita Talisay. The spouses owned a sari-sari store located at Barangay 88, Costa Brava,
in San Jose, Tacloban City. Their young daughter, Maricel, tended the store whenever she was free from
school. Noli was the younger brother of the husband of Maricel’s older sister. In the evening of
September 23, 1994, Maricel, together with her brothers Jun and Joey slept side by side in the store
while their parents slept in the beach house. The next day, at about 3:00 a.m., Maricel felt some ticklish
sensation, as if somebody was kissing her. But she also felt stabs of pain in her vagina. She opened her
eyes and was horrified to see Noli completely naked on top of her. Immediately, Noli covered her mouth
with his right hand and held both her hands with his left. She struggled, but to no avail. In the
meanwhile, Wilberto and Nenita were awakened by a male neighbor who reported to them that he had
heard the voice of a man inside their store. Nenita got a flashlight and bolo while Wilberto and their
neighbor sought help from other neighbors. She frantically knocked at the door, called out to Maricel
and asked who was inside the store. When she received no response from Maricel, Nenita tried but failed
to open the door of the store. Exasperated, Nenita forcefully pushed the door open and beamed the
flashlight inside. She was aghast when she saw Noli completely naked on top of Maricel, with his right
hand over the girl’s mouth. He was raping Maricel. Noli denied having raped Maricel. He insisted that he
and Maricel were sweethearts and they were having consensual sexual intercourse.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies
of private complainant and that of her mother and in not considering the defense interposed by accused-
appellant.
2. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape
despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
1. The contention of the appellant does not persuade. It is stressed that when the credibility of the
witness is in issue, the trial court’s assessment is accorded great weight because it has a unique
opportunity to hear the testimony of witnesses and observe their deportment and manner of
testifying. It has the unique advantage of monitoring and observing at close range the demeanor,
deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they regale the trial court with their testimonies. In
this case, the Court is convinced beyond cavil, as the trial court was, that Nenita and her
daughter Maricel were credible witnesses and their collective testimonies entitled to full probative
weight.

2. In reviewing rape cases, this Court had always been guided by three (3) well-entrenched
principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult
to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering
that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense. This Court agrees with the trial court that when a
woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to prove that rape was committed.
 RAMOS v. GONONG, G.R. No. L-42010, August 31, 1976

Facts:

On September 21, 1972, petitioner Odelon Ramos was charged with the crime of Damage to
Property with Multiple Physical Injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence. After the reading of RTC’s decision,
the accused, through counsel, manifested in open court his intention to appeal and prayed, at the same
time, that the bail bond for his provisional liberty be fixed, which the court a quo thereupon set at
P16,500.00. On the following day, petitioner filed a written manifestation “withdrawing his intention to
appeal the decision” and praying that the decision be executed. Fiscal recommended the amendment of
information:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Odelon Ramos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Damages with Multiple Slight Physical Injuries as defined and penalized
in Art. 365, par. 3, and Art. 266, par. 2, Rev. Penal Code, in relation to Art. 26 and 48, having also in
mind Art. 66 and 75 of the same code, sentencing him to a 'fine' of double the amount of P7,425.95 or a
total of P14,851.95; 'to pay Mariano Nalupta Sr., the said amount of P14,861.95 as damages and to
suffer a subsidiary personal imprisonment of not more than six (6) months in case of insolvency (Art.
39, par. 2, R.P.C.), to pay P2,000.00 as moral damages, and finally, to pay the statutory costs.

Respondent court, asserting its power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice before the judgment becomes final and executory, granted the
motion for reconsideration.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner on November 5, 1975 and was denied by respondent
court "for want of merit" on November 19, 1975. Hence the instance petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not the amendment of a judgment of conviction is valid after the withdrawal of appeal?

Held:

NO. Under section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court, “A judgment in a criminal case becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
Thereafter, upon its finality, the trial court is divested of all authority to amend or alter the afore¬said
judgment, except to correct clerical errors.

It is clear that the judgment became final and executory upon the filing of the written manifestation by
the accused, withdrawing his appeal, with prayer that the judgment in said case be executed, coupled
with the approval by the court of such withdrawal and thus, demonstrates the conformity of the accused
to the sentence of conviction within the intendment of the afore-quoted section 7 of the Rule and,
therefore, after its approval by the Court, should have the legal effect of rendering the decision final.
Hence, the order of the court accepting such waiver and ordering defendant's confinement therein, bring
the trial court's jurisdiction to an end, and the Supreme Court cannot order said judge, by mandamus,
to reinstate defendant's right to appeal.

In the case at bar, the judgment had already become final, prior to the Order of October 27, 1975. It
was, therefore, beyond the authority of the trial court to amend the penalty imposed in the aforesaid
judgment.
However, it does not necessarily follow that the trial court, on October 27, 1975, could not order the
defendant to indemnify the offended party because civil liability is not part of the penalty for the crime
committed. Before the expiration of the fifteen-day period provided for appeal, the trial court can order
the defendant to indemnify the offended party, notwithstanding that the judgment has become final
because the accused has commenced the service of his sentence.

With respect to the damages to be paid to the offended party, the latter is only entitled to the actual or
compensatory damages proven at the trial. It appears that the respondent court should not have
doubled the amount of damages because the value of the damages sustained is limited to the actual
amount of damage amounting to P7,425.90.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The respondent Judge is hereby directed to issue an
Order, modifying its questioned Order of October 27, 1975, in accordance with the observation of this
Court as herein above indica¬ted. Costs against private respondent.

PP v Edna Malngan y Mayo

G.R. No. 170470
September 26, 2006

Facts:
Accused- appellant EDNA, a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., hurriedly leaving the house of her
employer at Tondo, Manila. She was boarded to a pedicab, instructed to be brought to Nipa Street but
she changed her mind and instead brought to Balasan Street.
When Barangay Chairman returned to the Barangay Hall, he received a report from pedicab driver
Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, he saw a woman coming out of the house at Tondo, Manila and
suspiciously brought on Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman and group went to Balasan Street, found
the woman, and the pedicab driver positively identified the woman as the same person who left in
Tondo, Manila. Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his group apprehended her and brought her to the
Barangay Hall for investigation. Thereafter, accused confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo that she
set her employer's house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year.
And when Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr., asked accused- appellant EDNA how she
burned the house, accused-appellant EDNA told her that she crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a
disposable lighter and threw them on top of the table inside the house. The said burning of fire caused
death of six (6) family members.
When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network, accused-appellant while under
detention was heard by SFO4 Danilo Talusan as having admitted the crime and even narrated the
manner how she accomplished it. The officer was able to hear the same confession, this time at his
home, while watching the television program 'True Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABS-CBN
Network.
On 9 January 2001, an Information was filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 41, charging accused-
appellant with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide.
The RTC denied Demurrer to Evidence and judgment is rendered that accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six (6)
people and sentencing her penalty of death and pay damages to the injured parties.
In view of automatic review when penalty is held for Death Penalty, the case be referred to Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirms the judgment by the trial court but amount of the damages were
modified. No entry of judgment is made as it elevates the case to the Supreme Court considering its
decided penalty.

Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court erred in ruling that circumstantial evidence presented to convict
the accused

Held:

The Trial Court did not erred in ruling from circumstantial evidence presented to convict the
accused.
The Supreme Court quoted the decision of the Trial Court, “obviously it is never normal to leave
the house in such a disturbed, nervous and agitated manner, demeanor and condition. The timing of her
hurried departure and nervous demeanor immediately before the fire when she left the house and rode
a pedicab and her same demeanor, physical and mental condition when found and apprehended at the
same place where she alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter in her bag thereafter
when investigated indisputably show her guilt as charged.” Remarkably, accused never denied this
observation.
While the prosecution witnesses did not see accused-appellant actually starting the fire that
burned several houses and killed the Separa family, her guilt may still be established through
circumstantial evidence provided that:
(1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and,
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as the guilty person.