#1 PAMPLONA V MORETO
with said obligation. The petition is affirmed with
FACTS:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega, a husband
and wife, who acquired adjacent lots nos. 1495,
4545, and 1496 containing 781, 544, and 1,021 sq.
m respectively, covered by certificates of title
issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto married to
Monica Maniega. They had 6 children who left
heirs after their death as well as became co-heirs
with respect to the property owned by Flaviano
and Monica. More than 6 yrs after Monica
Maniega’s death, Flaviano sold lot 1495 for P900
to spouses Pamplona without the consent of his
heirs and without any liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. The spouses Pamplona constructed
their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as it was
pointed out by Flaviano which was a mistake on
the part of both seller and buyer.
Flaviano died intestate on August 12, 1956 and in
1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to
vacate the premises where they had their house
and piggery on the ground that Flaviano had no
right to sell the lot which he sold to Pamplona as
the same belongs to the conjugal partnership. The
spouses Pamplona refused to vacate the premises
and this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica
Maniega seeking for the declaration of nullity of
the deed of sale executed in the former’s favor.
The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff declaring
null and void the sale with respect to 390.5 sq.m.
of the total 781 sq.m. of which is rightfully owned
by the plaintiffs. The RTC decision was affirmed
by the CA; hence, this petition was instituted
appealing the decision of the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled
to the full ownership of the property in litigation,
or only ½ of the same?
HELD:
Yes, they are entitled to the full ownership of the
property in litigation because at the time of the
sale, the co-owner (Flaviano) as vendor pointed
out its location and even indicated the boundaries
over which the fences were to be erected without
objection. Despite the fact that at the time of sale,
there was no partition of the subject property
between the co-owners and Flaviano, as vendor,
had ownership of an undetermined portion of the
hereditary estate which he had a perfect and legal
right to dispose of to the Spouse Pamplona.
According to Art. 776, the inheritance which
private respondents may receive from their
deceased parents includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by their parent’s death. In addition,
under Art. 1311 of the NCC, the contract of sale
executed by Flaviano took effect between the
parties, their assigns and heirs which includes the
private respondents; therefore, they must comply
modification with respect to the fact that the sale
executed in favor of Spouses Pamplona is legal
and valid in its entirety.
#2 LEDESMA VS MCLACHLIN
FACTS:
In 1916, Socorro Ledesma and Lorennzo Quitco
lived martially, while the latter was still single, of
which relation, lasting until year 1921, Socorro
born their daughter Ana Quitco Ledesma. Same
year, it seems the relation between Socorro and
Lorenzo came to an end, but he executed a deed
acknowledging Ana Quitco Ledesma as her
natural daughter. On January 21, 1922, he issued
promissory notes in favor of Socorro.
In 1930 Lorenzo Quitco died, leaving defendant
Mclachlin and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana
Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo
Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her as
compulsory heir which the court however denied.
Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died,
and because he left some personal and real
properties without a will, an intestate proceeding
was instituted and a court order declaring his
compulsory heirs, which did not include Ana as
one. Following such court action, the plaintiff
proceeded to collect the sum payable on a
promissory note then issued in favor of her by
Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate
proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the
sum be paid out of the properties inherited by the
defendants represents that of the successional
rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his
father Eusebio.
ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum
promised by her father from her grandfather's
estate?
HELD:
No. The properties inherited by the defendants
from their deceased grandfather by representation
are not subject to the payment of debts and
obligations of their deceased father, who died
without leaving any property. While it is true that
under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the
Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother
who died before him in the properties of his
grandfather or grandmother, this right of
representation does not make the said child
answerable for the obligations contracted by his
deceased father or mother, because, as may be
seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the
inheritance is received with the benefit of
inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with
the properties received from their predecessor. The
herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco,
are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their
father from whom they did not inherit anything.
#3 RABADILLA VS CA
FACTS:
In the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja
Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-
interest of the petitioner, Johnny Rabadilla was
instituted as a devisee to a 511,855 sq. m of land.
A condition was however imposed to the effect
that:
1. The ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. He shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria
Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime of said
Maria Belleza;
3. That in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before
Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall
continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. That the said land may only be encumbered,
mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by
Johnny Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in
order to compel Johnny to reconvey the said land
to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged
that Johnny failed to comply with the terms of the
will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the
fruits; and that the the land was mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of
the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near
descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the
near descendants of Aleja and not to the near
descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja
had no near descendants at the time of his death,
no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to
deliver the fruits of the devised land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not
obliged to comply with the terms of the Will left
by Aleja Belleza.
HELD:
No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft
of merit. The “near descendants” being referred to
in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.
Ownership over the devised property was already
transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died.
Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died,
ownership over the same property was transmitted
to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of
a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had
by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his forced
heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form
part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Will on the deceased
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to
his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear
therefore, that Johnny should have continued
complying with the terms of the Will. His failure
to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him to
reconvey the property to the estate of Aleja.
#4 MARIA VDA DE REYES VS CA
FACTS:
During his lifetime one Gavino Reyes owned a
parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares. He
sought to bring said land under the operation of the
Torrens System of registration of property.
Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title
having been issued to him. The application was
prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was
the administrator of his property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and
subdivided by Gavino's heirs. In the subdivision
plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated
for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears
therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. 1A-
14 ,were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of
Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete,
the children thereafter secured tax declarations for
their respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death
of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the
whole property-OCT No. 255-was issued. It was,
however, kept by Juan Poblete, (son-in-law of
Marcelo Reyes), who was by then already
deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of
this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a
parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square
meters, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola.
According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds
to Lot No.1-A-14 of the subdivision plan
aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did not
specifically mention Lot No. I-A-14. The vendee
immediately took possession of the property and
started paying the land taxes therein.
In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the
subdivision plan created on 1936. They formally
partitioned the property. Therefore, the heirs
received their share of this land. Including Rafael
Reyes, Jr. Son of Rafael Sr. TCTs were issued to
him representing the land which should have been
received by his father.
The heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that
they are the true owners of the land, as shown by
the torrens title over the land.
Gardiola’s defense was that he bought the land
from Rafael Sr. and that Rafael Jr. could not have
inherited this land for it was disposed of by his
father way before he inherited it.
The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.’s heirs.
Stating that there was no evidence that the
Gavino’s children had a written partition
agreement. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not written partition is
necessary in order to Gavino’s children to be
entitled for its inheritance?
Held:
NO. The Court of Appeals correctly held
that the partition made by the children of Gavino
Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and
binding. There is no law that requires partition
among heirs to be in writing to be valid.
In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court,
interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, held that the requirement that a partition be
put in a public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the same
time the protection of the heirs themselves against
tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve
as constructive notice to others. It follows then that
the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with
the prescribed formalities does not come into play
when there are no creditors or the rights of
creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate
to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those
provided by law. There is nothing in said section
from which it can be inferred that a writing or
other formality is an essential requisite to the
validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral
partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra,
provides the reason why oral partition is valid and
why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds:
partition among heirs or renunciation of an
inheritance by some of them is not exactly a
conveyance of real property for the reason that it
does not involve transfer of property from one to
the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification
of title or right of property by the heir renouncing
in favor of another heir accepting and receiving
the inheritance. Additionally, the validity of such
oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained
by this Court.
But even if We are to assume arguendo
that the oral partitio executed in 1936 was not
valid for some reason or another, we would still
arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of
Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically
became co-own, era of his 70-hectare parcel of
land. The rights to the succession. are transmitted
frorn the moment of death of the decedent, The
estate of the decedent would then be held in co-
ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner
may validly dispose of his share or interest in the
property subject to the condition that the portion
disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the
division upon termination of the co-ownership.
#5 NUFABLE VS NUFABLE
FACTS:
Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land
located consisting of 948 square meters. He died
on August 9, 1965 and was survived by his
children, namely: Angel Custodio, Generosa,
Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable. Upon
petition for probate filed by said heirs and after
due publication and hearing, the then Court of
First Instance of Negros Oriental issued an Order
dated March 30, 1966 admitting to probate the last
will and testament executed by the deceased Edras
Nufable.
On June 6, 1966, the same court issued an Order
approving the Settlement of Estate submitted by
the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable.
Two months earlier, or on March 15, 1966,
spouses Angel Custodio and Aquilina Nufable
mortgaged the entire property located at Manjuyod
to the Development Bank of the Philippines
DBP. Said mortgagors became delinquent for
which reason the mortgaged property was
foreclosed by DBP on February 26, 1973.
On January 11, 1980, Nelson Nufable, the son of
Angel Custodio Nufable purchased said property
from DBP.
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed
Nufable filed with the lower court a complaint
dated July 25, 1985 To Annul Fraudulent
Transactions, to Quiet Title and To Recover
Damages against Nelson Nufable, and wife, Silnor
Nufable and his mother Aquilina Nufable.
RTC ruled in their favor, however, defendants
appealed before the Court of Appeals, which later
reversed the decision and declared the plaintiffs as
the rightful owner of the property in question.
Defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration
whicjh was denied by Court of Appeals for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether or not the Last Will and Testament of
Esdras Nufable and its subsequent probate are
pertinent and material to the question of the right
of ownership of petitioner Nelson Nufable who
purchased the land in question from, and as
acquired property of, the DBP?
HELD:
It should likewise be noted that the late Esdras
Nufable died on August 9, 1965. When the entire
property located at Manjuyod was mortgaged on
March 15, 1966 by his son Angel Custodio with
DBP, the other heirs of Esdras had already
acquired successional rights over the said
property. This is so because of the principle
contained in Article 777 of the Civil Code to the
effect that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent. Accordingly, for the purpose of
transmission of rights, it does not matter whether
the Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras
Nufable was admitted on March 30, 1966 or
thereafter or that the Settlement of Estate was
approved on June 6, 1966 or months later. It is to
be noted that the probated will of the late Esdras
Nufable specifically referred to the subject
property in stating that the land situated in the
Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not
be divided because this must remain in common
for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of
them brothers and sisters to construct a house
therein. It was therefore the will of the decedent
that the subject property should remain undivided,
although the restriction should not exceed twenty
(20) years pursuant to Article 870 of the Civil
Code.
Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouse
mortgaged the subject property to DBP on March
15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage the entire
property. Angels right over the subject property
was limited only to pro indiviso share. As co-
owner of the subject property, Angels right to sell,
assign or mortgage is limited to that portion that
may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-
ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-
owner can only alienate his pro indiviso share in
the co-owned property.
#6 FELIPE VS HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON
FACTS:
During the marriage of Maximo Aldon and
Gemina Almorasa, they bought several pieces of
land. The lands were divided into three lots.
Subsequently, Gemina sold the lots to the spouses
Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena Felipe without the
consent of her husband. Maximo died. Afterwhich,
his heirs, namely Gemina and their children Sofia
and Salvador filed a complaint against the Felipes
alleging that they are the owners of the lots. The
Felipes asserted that they had acquired the lots
from the plaintiffs by purchase and subsequent
delivery to them. The trial court sustained the
claim of the defendants. The CA reversed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: WON the sale of the lots by Gemina
without the consent of the husband is defective?
HELD: The sale made by Gemina is certainly a
defective conract, that is, a voidable contract.
According to Article 1390 of the NCC, among the
voidable contracts are “Those where one of the
parties is incapable of giving consent to the
contract.” In the instant case Gemina had no
capacity to give consent to the contract of sale.
The capacity to give consent belonged not even to
the husband alone but to both spouses.
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to
annulment by her husband only during the
marriage because he was the victim who had an
interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the party
responsible for the defect, could not ask for its
annulment. Their children could not likewise seek
the annulment of the contract while the marriage
subsisted because they merely had an inchoate
right to the lands sold. The heirs can only question
the transaction only after the death of Aldon for it
is only that time when their right to the property
becomes choate. Thus, it is only of course, the
heirs may question only insofar as their inherited
share of land is concerned.
#7 SILVERIO SR VS CA
FACTS:
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a
will, survived by her legal heirs, namely:
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband),
Edmundo S. Silverio (son),
Edgardo S. Silverio (son),
Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son),
Nelia S.Silverio-Dee (daughter),
Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter).
Subsequently, an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of her estate was filed by Silverio, Sr.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was
Edgardo Silverio, but by virtue of a Joint
Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the
heirs of Beatriz Silverio,, the motion to withdraw
as administrator filed by Edgardo was approved by
the intestate court and in his stead, Silverio, Sr.
was appointed as the new administrator.
Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to
remove and appoint a new administrator ensued
between Silverio, Sr. and Silverio, Jr.
The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing as
administrator of the estate petitioner and
respondent Silverio, Jr. In an Order in 2005,
Silverio, Sr. was removed as administrator and in
his stead, SILVERIO, JR. was designated as the
new administrator. By virtue of the aforesaid
Order, Silverio, Jr. on 16 October 2007 executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of CITRINE
HOLDINGS, Inc. over the property located
Makati City. CITRINE became the registered
owner thereof. A Deed of Absolute Sale was
likewise executed in favor of Monica P. Ocampo,
subsequently sold to ZEE2 Resources, Inc.
Silverio, Sr.filed an Urgent Application for the
Issuance of TRO restraining and/or preventing
Silverio, Jr., Monica, CITRINE, and their
successors-in-interest from committing any act
that would affect the titles to the three properties.
An Omnibus Order was issued by the intestate
court acting upon pending motions filed by
petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., father and
son, respectively, who are the central figures in the
now decade-old controversy over the Intestate
Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.
On February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null and Void
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September
2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate
the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in
the name of Ricardo C. SilverioSr. and the
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio. The
intestate court rendered the now assailed Orders
granting the preliminary injunction against
Silverio, Jr., and declaring the Deed of Absolute
Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the
Cambridge and Intsia properties as null and void.
The Court of Appeals rendered decision declaring
the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of
Title and all derivative titles over the Cambridge
and Intsia Property valid. Silverio, Sr. contends
that CA committed a reversible error in upholding
the validity of the Intsia and Cambridge properties
on the ground that the intestate court cannot annul
the sales as it has a limited jurisdiction only and
which does not include resolving issues of
ownership.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the Intestate Estate by
the administrator valid.
RULING:
An administrator can validly sell the intestate
estate under his administration only by leave of
court. While it is true that Silverio Sr. was
eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to
the 2008 decision, the permanent injunction issued
by the CA, as explicitly stated in its fallo,
pertained only to the portions of the 2006
Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and taking of an oath of
administration by Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the
CA would have expressly set aside as well the
directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing the
sale of the subject properties.
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the
August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court
annulling the sale of the subject properties
grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine
and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-
flopping appointment of Administrator by the
intestate court, having relied in good faith that the
sale was authorized and with prior approval of the
intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated
October 31, 2006 which remained valid and
subsisting insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.
8. PURA CARREON VS RUFO AGCAOILI
FACTS:
Sps. Bonifacio and Celerina Carreon purchased the
land subject of this case. When Bonifacio died,
Celerina adjudicated to herself the land declaring
herself as the sole heiress of her husband for which
a transfer certificate was issued in her name on
Sept 28, 1946 with an annotation that it was
subject to Sec. 4 Rule 74 of the RoC. She then
borrowed money from the PNB secured by a REM
on ½ of the land. To pay for the loan, ½ was sold
to Rufo Agcaoili hence a new TCT was issued in
his name. In Feb 1955, the children of Celerina
sought to have a deed of sale executed by their
mother be declared as one of mortgage and to
recover the ½ tract of land. The court ruled in
favor of Agcaoli hence this appeal. It was alleged
that Agcaoili was a buyer in bad faith and that a
trust relationship existed.
ISSUE: Whether Agcaoli was a buyer in good
faith
HELD: YES!
There is no clear proof the Agcaoli knew of any
flaw in the title of Celerina. The mere fact of being
a townmate is not a sufficient basis to conclude
that he knew she had children. It was shown that
he rarely came home since he was an enlisted man
in the Phil. Constabulary hence he cannot be
expected to know the relatives and children of this
vendor. Fraud cannot be presumed. It must be
established by clear and sufficient evidence. If
fraud was committed, such was perpetrated by
Celerina. Agcaoli is only charged with notice of
the burdens which are noted on the face of the title
and nothing more.
The lien, established in Sec.4 of Rule 74 of the
Old and Revised Rules of Court, in case of
summary settlement of a decedent’s estate, is
effective only for a period of 2 yrs. After the 2 yr
period, such becomes “functus oficio” and it may
be cancelled at the instance of the transferee of the
land involved.
In this case, more than 2 yrs had elapsed, from
Sept. 28, 1946 to Sept. 8, 1949 when the deed of
sale in favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered.
9. ARUEGO VS CA
FACTS:
On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory
recognition and enforcement of successional rights
was filed before RTC Manila by the minors
Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister Evelyn
Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian.
The complaint was opposed by the legitimate
children of Jose Aruego Jr.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia
Aruego. A petition for certiorari was then filed
alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines
which took effect on August 3, 1988 shall have a
retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of
prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code may be
given a retroactive effect so as to deprive private
respondent of her right to institute the case for
compulsory recognition
RULING:
No. The action brought by private
respondent Antonia Aruego for
compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights which was filed prior to
the advent of the Family Code, must be governed
by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by
Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The
present law cannot be given retroactive
effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as
its application will prejudice the vested right of
private respondent to have her case decided under
Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was
vested to her by the fact that she filed her action
under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding
from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the
action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact
that it was brought when the putative father was
already deceased, since private respondent was
then still a minor when it was filed,
an exception to the general rule provided under
Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial
court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by
the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction
over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209,
also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
10. ACAP VS CA, EDY DE LOS REYES
FACTS:
Felixberto Oruma sold his inherited land to Cosme
Pido, which land is rented by petitioner Teodoro
Acap. When Cosme died intestate, his heirs
executed a “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights” in favor of private respondent Edy delos
Reyes. Respondent informed petitioner of his
claim over the land, and petitioner paid the rental
to him in 1982. However in subsequent years,
petitioner refused to pay the rental, which
prompted respondent to file a complaint for the
recovery of possession and damages. Petitioner
averred that he continues to recognize Pido as the
owner of the land, and that he will pay the
accumulated rentals to Pido’s widow upon her
return from abroad. The lower court ruled in favor
of private respondent.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the “Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights” is a recognized mode of
acquiring ownership by private respondent
(2) Whether the said document can be considered
a deed of sale in favor of private respondent
HELD:
An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real
right over a thing arising from a juridical act,
however justified, is not per sesufficient to give
rise to ownership over the res. That right or title
must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions
imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights
are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or
process. While title is the juridical justification,
mode is the actual process of acquisition or
transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and
to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party
to pay a price certain in money or its
equivalent. Upon the other hand, a declaration of
heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public
instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds
whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide
the estate left by the decedent among themselves
as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial
settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court. Hence, there is a marked
difference between a sale of hereditary rights and
a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes
the existence of a contract or deed of sale between
the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a
mode of extinction of ownership where there is an
abdication or intentional relinquishment of a
known right with knowledge of its existence and
intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons
who are co-heirs in the succession. Private
respondent, being then a stranger to the succession
of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim
ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of
the waiver document which neither recites the
elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any
other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice
of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the
validity of which is yet to be established in court at
some future date, and is no better than a notice
of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already
pending in court. It is to be noted that while the
existence of said adverse claim was duly proven,
there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale
was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and
private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's
heirs to the land in favor of private respondent.
Private respondent's right or interest therefore in
the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which
cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to
the land and title the same in private respondent's
name. Consequently, while the transaction
between Pido's heirs and private respondent may
be binding on both parties, the right of petitioner
as a registered tenant to the land cannot be
perfunctorily forfeited on a mere allegation of
private respondent's ownership without the
corresponding proof thereof.
11. ROXAS VS DE JESUS, JR
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of
respondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco, Presiding Judge Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the
probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus. After the death of spouses Andres G.
de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special
Proceeding No. 81503 case was filed by petitioner Simeon
R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus.On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was
appointed administrator. He then delivered to the lower
court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of
the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. Judge Jose Colayco
set the hearing of the probate of the holographic Win on
July 21, 1973.Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after
his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook
belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on
pages 21, 22, 23 and24 thereof, a letter-will addressed to her
children and entirely written and signed in the handwriting
of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is
dated "FEB./61 "and states: "This is my will which I want to
be respected although it is not written by a lawyer.
Testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the
testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel Roxas de
Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 "
is the holographic Will of their deceased mother They
further testified that their deceased mother understood
English, the language in which the holographic Will is
written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when said
Will was executed by their mother Respondent Luz R.
Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to
probate" assailing the purported holographic Will of
Bibiana R. de Jesus because (a) it was not executed in
accordance with law, (b) it was executed through force,
intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and
improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix acted by
mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended the
said Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its
execution. August 24, 1973 - Judge Jose C. Colayco
issued an order allowing the probate of the
holographic w/c he found to have been duly executed in
accordance with law Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed
a MR stating that the will was not dated as required by
Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law
requires that the Will should contain the day, month and
year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied
with.December 10, 1973 – Judge disallowed the probate of
the holographic Will on the ground that the word "dated"
has generally been held to include the month, day, and year
ISSUE: WON the date "FEB./61” on the will is a valid
compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code
HELD:
We agree with the petitioner.
The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the
Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old Civil Code
require the testator to state in his holographic Win the "year,
month, and day of its execution," the present Civil Code
omitted the phrase Año mes y dia and simply requires that
the holographic Will should be dated. The petitioners
submit that the liberal construction of the holographic Will
should prevail. Respondent Luz Henson says the will is
void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil
Code in that the date must contain the year, month, and day
of its execution. The respondent further contends that the
petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article810 of
the Civil Code because statutes prescribing the formalities to
be observed in the execution of holographic Wills are
strictly construed. RULING OF SC:the prevailing policy is
to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to
guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or
unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege. If a Will
has been executed in substantial compliance with the
formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and
fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win should be
admitted to probate Court found no evidence of bad faith
and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of
Wills and Testaments As a general rule, the "date"
in a holographic Will should include the day,
month, and year of its execution. However, when as in
the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith,
undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the
Will is established the Will should be allowed under the
principle of substantial compliance WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the
probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.
12. CODOY VS CALUGAY
FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine
Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and
legatees of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for
probate of the said will. They attested to the
genuineness and due execution of the will on 30
August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal
filed their opposition claiming that the will was a
forgery and that the same is even illegible. They
raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on
the will after every disposition, calling the same
out of the ordinary. If the will was in the
handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly
procured.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses
and various documentary evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the
probate court who produced and identified the
records of the case bearing the signature of the
deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was
made to produce and identify the voter’s affidavit,
but failed to as the same was already destroyed
and no longer available.
The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she
had acquired familiarity with the deceased’s
signature and handwriting as she used to
accompany her in collecting rentals from her
various tenants of commercial buildings and the
deceased always issued receipts. The niece also
testified that the deceased left a holographic will
entirely written, dated and signed by said
deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the
deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late
husband, who said that the signature on the will
was similar to that of the deceased but that he can
not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who
testified that she was familiar with the signature of
the deceased which appeared in the
latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth,
respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she
had lived with the deceased since birth where she
had become familiar with her signature and that
the one appearing on the will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was
granted by the lower court. It was reversed on
appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted
the probate.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing
that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the
signature in a contested will as the genuine
signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently
establish the authenticity and due execution of the
deceased’s holographic will.
HELD:
1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a
mandatory order, an imperative obligation and
is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and
that the presumption is that the word “shall”,
when used in a statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the
law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased
and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present
petition is to determine the true intent of the
deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the
holographic will was in the handwriting of the
deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to declare
explicitly that the signature appearing in the
holographic will was that of the deceased.
The election registrar was not able to produce the
voter’s affidavit for verification as it was no longer
available.
The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts
and letters of the deceased and did not declare that
she saw the deceased sign a document or write a
note.
The will was not found in the personal belongings
of the deceased but was in the possession of the
said niece, who kept the fact about the will from
the children of the deceased, putting in issue her
motive.
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw
the decreased write a note or sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased expressed
doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the
holographic will.
(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness
requirement was not complied with.)
A visual examination of the holographic will
convinces that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the
testator.
The records are remanded to allow the oppositors
to adduce evidence in support of their opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth
and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to
attain these primordial ends. But, on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it
is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a
false document being adjudged as the will of the
testator, which is why if the holographic will
is contested, the law requires three witnesses to
declare that the will was in the handwriting of the
deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate
of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and
signature of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three of
such witnesses shall be required.”
The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the
idea of discretion and that the presumption is that
the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.
13. GABUCAN VS MANTA
Facts:
A petition for the probate of a notarial will was
dismissed on the ground that it does not bear a 30-
centavo documentary stamp. According to the R
Judge, the notarial will was not admissible in
evidence. Despite P’s manifestation that he had
already attached the documentary stamp, the R
Judge refused to reconsider the dismissal.
Issue: Whether the lower court erred I holding
that because no documentary stamp was affixed
to the will, there was “no will and testament to
probate”?
HELD:
We hold that the lower court manifestly erred in
declaring that, because no documentary stamp was
affixed to the will, there was “no will and
testament to probate” and, consequently, the
alleged “action must of necessity be dismissed”.
What the probate court should have done was to
require the petitioner or proponent to affix the
requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the
notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the
taxable portion of that document.
That procedure may be implied from the provision
of section 238 that the non-admissibility of the
document, which does not bear the requisite
documentary stamp, subsists only “until the
requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed
thereto and cancelled.”
Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may
be affixed at the time the taxable document is
presented in evidence (Del Castillo vs.
Madrilena, 49 Phil. 749). If the promissory note
does not bear a documentary stamp, the court
should have allowed plaintiff’s tender of a stamp
to supply the deficiency. (Rodriguez vs. Martinez,
5 Phil. 67, 71. Note the holding in Azarraga vs.
Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 637, that the lack of the
documentary stamp on a document does not
invalidate such document. See Cia. General de
Tabacos vs. Jeanjaquet, 12 Phil. 195, 201-2
and Delgado and Figueroa vs. Amenabar, 16 Phil.
403, 405-6.)
14. DOROTHEO VS CA
FACTS:
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without
her estate being settled. Thereafter, her husband
Alejandro also died. In 1977, Lourdes Dorotheo
filed a special proceeding for the probate of
Alejandro’s last will and testament. The children
of spouses filed their opposition. The RTC ruled
that Lourdes being not the wife of Alejandro the
will is intrinsically void; the oppositors are the
only heir entitled to the estate. Lourdes filed a
Motion for Consideration arguing that she is
entitled to some compensation since she took care
of Alejandro prior to his death although they were
not legally married to each other. This was denied
by the trial court. The CA dismissed her appeal for
her failure to wile the same within the extended
period.
ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate
but declared intrinsically void in an order that has
become final and executor still be given effect?
RULING:
No. A final and executor decision or order can no
longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of
Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof are void.
Alejandro gave all the property to the concubine.
Such is invalid because one cannot dispose what
he does not own. In this case, the whole property
is the conjugal property of Alejandro and Aniceta.
Such has become final and executor. The only
instance where a party interested in probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside
is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence with
circumstances do not concur herein.
15. CAÑIZA VS CA
FACTS:
Being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen
Caniza was declared incompetent by judgment in a
guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece,
Amparo A. Evangelista. Caniza was the owner of
a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo Evangelista
commenced a suit to eject the spouses Pedro and
Leonora Estrada from said premises.

The complaint was later amended to identify the

incompetent Caniza as plaintiff, suing through her
legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista. The amended
Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caniza
was the absolute owner of the property in
question; that out of kindness, she had allowed the
Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren, and
sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house,
rent-free; that Caniza already had urgent need of
the house on account of her advanced age and
failing health, “so funds could be raised to meet
her expenses for support, maintenance and medical
treatment;” among others.

The defendants declared that they had been living

in Caniza’s house since the 1960’s; that in
consideration of their faithful service they had
been considered by Caniza as her own family, and
the latter had in fact executed a holographic will
by which she “bequeathed” to the Estradas the
house and lot in question. The Estradas insist that
the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly
denotes her intention that they remain in
possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her
judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from
evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would
be inconsistent with the ward’s will. Such will has
not been submitted for probate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged will may be given
effect

HELD:
No. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time
prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no
effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: “No will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court” An owner’s intention to confer
title in the future to persons possessing property by
his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former’s
taking back possession in the meantime for any
reason deemed sufficient. And that, in this case,
there was sufficient cause for the owner’s
resumption of possession is apparent: she needed
to generate income from the house on account of
the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from
her extreme age.