1st case

WILLIAM DAYAG, EDUARDO CORTON, EDGARDO CORTON, LEOPOLDO

NAGMA, ALOY FLORES, ROMEO PUNAY and EDWIN DAYAG, Petitioners, v. HON.
POTENCIANO S. CANIZARES, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and YOUNGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Respondents.

G. R. No. 124193. March 6, 1998

Facts: On March 11, 1993, petitioners William Dayag, Edwin Dayag, Eduardo
Corton, Edgardo Corton, Leopoldo Nagma, Aloy Flores, and Romeo Punay filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages, overtime pay, premium pay,
holiday pay, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, and actual, moral and exemplary
damages against Alfredo Young, a building contractor doing business under the firm
name Youngs Construction. They filed the complaint with the National Capital
Region Arbitration Branch of the NLRC which docketed the same as NLRC-NCR-
Case No. 00-03-01891-93. The case was subsequently assigned to Labor Arbiter
Potenciano Canizares, Jr. They were hired in 1990 by Young to work as tower crane
operators at the latters construction site.

In November 1991, they were transferred to Cebu City to work at the construction of
his Shoemart Cebu project.

On January 30, 1993, William Dayag asked for permission to go to Manila to attend
to family matters. He was allowed to do so but was not paid for the period January 23-
30, 1993, allegedly due to his accountability for the loss of certain construction tools.
Eduardo Corton had earlier left on January 16, 1993, purportedly due to harassment
by Young. In February 1993, Edgardo Corton, Aloy Flores and Edwin Dayag also left.

Instead of attending the initial hearings set by the labor arbiter, Young filed, on July 6,
1993, a motion to transfer the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Region VII of
the NLRC. He claimed that the workplace where petitioners were regularly assigned
was in Cebu City and that, in consonance with Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,1 the case should have been filed in Cebu City.
Young submitted in evidence a certificate of registration of business name showing
his companys address as Corner SudlonEspaa Streets, Pari-an, Cebu City;

Petitioners opposed the same, arguing that all of them, except for Punay, were, by that
time, residents of Metro Manila and that they could not afford trips to Cebu City.
Besides, they claimed that respondent had its main office at Corinthian Gardens in
Quezon City. Young, in reply, declared that the Corinthian Gardens address was not
his principal place of business, but actually his residence, which he also used as a
correspondent office for his construction firm.

petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the January 31, 1995 resolution of the
Commission. Acting favorably on said motion, the Commission, on August 25, 1995,
annulled and set aside its resolution of January 31, 1995, and remanded the case to the
original arbitration branch of the National Capital Region for further proceedings.
This prompted Young, in turn, to file his own motion for reconsideration seeking the
reversal of the August 25, 1995 resolution of the Commission. Finding the two above-
cited cases to be inapplicable to instant case, the Commission made a volte-face and
reconsidered its August 25, 1995 resolution. It reinstated the resolution of January 31,
1995, directing the transfer of the case to Cebu City.
Agreeing that petitioners workplace when the cause of action accrued was Cebu City,
the labor arbiter, on September 8, 1993, granted Youngs motion and ordered the
transmittal of the case to the regional arbitration branch of Region VII. Petitioners
promptly appealed said order to the NLRC, which, however, dismissed the same on
January 31, 1995, for lack of merit.

Issue:

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

WORKPLACE OF THE COMPLAINANTS IS AT CEBU CITY AND IN
DECLARING THAT THE PROPER VENUE IS AT CEBU CITY.

Ruling: No

In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC12 this Court held that the
question of venue essentially pertains to the trial and relates more to the convenience
of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits of the case. It underscored the
fact that the permissive rules underlying provisions on venue are intended to assure
convenience for the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice.
With more reason does the principle find applicability in cases involving labor and
management because of the doctrine well-entrenched in our jurisdiction that the State
shall afford full protection to labor.

The rationale for the rule is obvious. The worker, being the economically-
disadvantaged party whether as complainant/petitioner or as respondent, as the case
may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his
immediate disposal, and the other party is not to be given the choice of another
competent agency sitting in another place as this will unduly burden the former.13 In
fact, even in cases where venue has been stipulated by the parties, this Court has not
hesitated to set aside the same if it would lead to a situation so grossly inconvenient to
one party as to virtually negate his claim.

In the case at hand, the ruling specifying the National Capital Region Arbitration
Branch as the venue of the present action cannot be considered oppressive to Young.
His residence in Corinthian Gardens also serves as his correspondent office. Certainly,
the filing of the suit in the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch in Manila will
not cause him as much inconvenience as it would the petitioners, who are now
residents of Metro Manila, if the same was heard in Cebu. Hearing the case in Manila
would clearly expedite proceedings and bring about the speedy resolution of instant
case.

VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROGELIO BISULA
RUBEN ARROZA JUAN GACUTNO LEONILO ATOK, NILO CRUZ,
ALVARO ANDRADA, NEMESIO ADUG SIMPLICIO BAUTISTA, ROMEO
ACOSTA, and JOSE ENCABO respondents.

G.R. No. L-58011 & L-58012 November 18, 1983

Facts: On 10 January 1919, the master of the vessel complainant Rogelio H. Bisula,
received a cable from the Company advising him of the possibility that the vessel
might be directed to call at ITF-controlled ports said at the same time informing him
of the procedure to be followed in the computation of the special or additional
compensation of crew members while in said ports. ITF is the acronym for the
International Transport Workers Federation, a militant international labor organization
with affiliates in different ports of the world, which reputedly can tie down a vessel in
a port by preventing its loading or unloading, This is a sanction resorted to by ITF to
enforce the payment of its wages rates for seafarers the so-called ITF rates, if the
wages of the crew members of a vessel who have affiliated with it are below its
prescribed rates.) In the same cable of the Company, the expressed its regrets for hot
clarifying earlier the procedure in computing the special compensation as it thought
that the vessel would 'trade in Caribbean ports only.

On 22 March 1979, the Company sent another cable to complainant Bisula, this time
informing him of the respective amounts each of the officers and crew members
would receive as special compensation when the vessel called at the port of Kwinana
Australia, an ITF-controlled port. This was followed by another cable on 23 March
1979, informing him that the officers and crew members had been enrolled as
members of the ITF in Sidney, Australia,

In answer to the Company's cable last mentioned, complainant Bisula, in

representation of the other officers and crew members, sent on 24 March 1979 a cable
informing the Company that the officers and crew members were not agreeable to its
'suggestion'; that they were not contented with their present salaries 'based on the
volume of works, type of ship with hazardous cargo and registered in a world wide
trade': that the 'officers and crew (were) not interested in ITF membership if not
actually paid with ITF rate that their 'demand is only 50% increase based on present
basic salary and that the proposed wage increase is the 'best and only solution to solve
ITF problem'

Subsequently, the Company sought authority from the NSB to cancel the contracts of
employment of the Seamen, claiming that its principals had terminated their manning
agreement because of the actuations of the Seamen. The request was granted by the
NSB Executive Director in a letter dated 10 April 1979. Soon thereafter, the Company
cabled the Seamen informing them that their contracts would be terminated upon the
vessel's arrival in Japan. On 19 April 1979 they Arere asked to disembark from the
vessel, their contracts were terminated, and they were repatriated to Manila.

The seamen (private respondents) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
National Seamen Board. The NSB rendered a decision declaring that the seamen
breached their employment contracts when they demanded and received from Vir-Jen
Shipping wages over and above their contracted rates.
The NSB decision was appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the NSB
and required the petitioner to pay wages and other monetary benefits corresponding to
the unexpired portion of the manning contract on the ground that the termination of
the seamen was without a valid cause.

Two motions for reconsideration filed with Second Division were denied by said
Division. Another motion for reconsideration was filed with the Supreme Court en
banc which gave its due course, after finding that there was a need to reconcile the
decision of the Second Division with that of the First Division with the Wallem
Decision (an earlier case having the same facts). In that decision, the First Division
had ruled that the termination of the seamen was illegal.

Issue: THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT FIND PETITIONER
VIRJEN LIABLE FOR HAVING TERMINATED BEFORE EXPIRY DATE THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO
LEGAL AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUND FOR SUCH TERMINATION.

Ruling:

Yes, the Supreme Court en banc found the termination of the seamen’s contract
illegal. The contention that the manning industries in the Philippines would not
survive if the instant case is not decided in favor of the petitioner and would in effect
“kill the hen that lays the golden egg” is not supported by evidence. Filipino seamen
are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any other country in the
world. It is competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen so
greatly in demand. Certainly the seamen are entitled to government protection when
they ask fair and decent treatment by their employers and when they exercise the right
to petition for improved terms of employment, especially when they fell that these are
substandard or are capable of improvement according to internationally accepted
rules.

The seamen did not violate their contracts of employment. The form contracts
approved by the National Seamen Board (now POEA) are designed to protect
Filipinos, not foreign shipowners who can take care of themselves. The standard
forms embody the basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the
employment contract. To state, therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition
their employer for higher salaries during the 12-month duration of the contract runs
counter to the established principles of labor legislation.