Ramos vs People of the Philippines | GR No.

178337 | June 25, 2009

Facts:
In 1993, Felix Biacora went to Saudi Arabia for overseas employment that was facilitated
by one Cynthia Libutan who worked for a recruitment agency. Several years after his return to
the country, Biacora accidentally met Libutan in Baclaran Church sometime in 2000. After they
exchanged pleasantries, the former signified to the latter his desire to seek another overseas
employment. Libutan then gave Biacora the name, address and contact number of her friend, one
Carmen Ritualo, the petitioner herein, who was able to help Libutan’s sister find work in
Australia. Biacora thereafter called petitioner Ritualo to set up a meeting.
On 1 May 2000, accompanied by his wife, Biacora went to the house of petitioner
Ritualo and inquired from her whether she could help him secure overseas employment in
Australia. Petitioner Ritualo answered in the affirmative, and to be convincing, brought out travel
documents of several people she was able to "help," who were then supposedly scheduled to
leave for abroad pretty soon. Biacora was then assured that he could leave for Australia in a
month’s time if he will give petitioner Ritualo a total amount of ₱160,000.00, and his salary
would be US$700.00 per month as a farm worker. Biacora paid petitioner Ritualo the amount of
₱40,000.00 as down payment, with the balance to be completed before he left for Australia.
Upon receipt of the money, petitioner Ritualo issued Biacora a Cash Voucher as evidence of said
payment. To complete their transaction, Biacora left her a copy of his Bio-data.
On 4 May 2000, Biacora again gave petitioner Ritualo ₱20,000.00 as additional payment,
making the total amount received by the latter ₱60,000.00. Again, petitioner Ritualo issued a
Cash Voucher. Subsequently, Biacora was informed by petitioner Ritualo that all he needed in
securing an employment in Australia was his Passport and an endorsement from the
Representative of his district. Accompanied by petitioner Ritualo and one Anita Seraspe, the
assistant of the former, Biacora went to the Batasan Pambansa to secure the necessary
endorsement. Thereafter, all three went to the Australian Embassy to apply for Biacora’s
working visa.
On 1 June 2000, Biacora went to see petitioner Ritualo to follow up the date of his
departure. Petitioner Ritualo asked from Biacora another ₱20,000.00 and told the latter to be
patient. As with the other amounts given, proof of payment was similarly issued to acknowledge
receipt thereof.
Several dates were set for Biacora’s departure, but none pushed through. To top it all, his
Australian Visa application was denied by the Australian Embassy. Consequently, on 9
September 2000, Biacora demanded from petitioner Ritualo the return of the ₱80,000.00. The
latter promised to pay back the money on the 13th of September 2000. None came. Thereafter,
Biacora filed the subject criminal complaints against petitioner Ritualo.
In two Certifications dated 23 October 2000 and 5 November 2003, respectively, both
identified by Belen Blones of the Licensing Division of the POEA, it was confirmed that "per
available records of [its] Office, CARMEN RITUALO, in her personal capacity is not licensed
by this Administration to recruit workers for overseas employment" ; and that "[a]ny recruitment
activity undertaken by [her] is deemed illegal."
In her testimony, Ritualo narrated that it was Libutan and Biacora who asked her to
introduce them to a certain Anita Seraspe, the person responsible for sending petitioner Ritualo’s
own sister to Australia; that she had no agreement with Biacora respecting the latter’s
employment in Australia; that any talk of money was made among Libutan, Biacora and Seraspe
only; that she received a total of ₱80,000.00 from Biacora, but that the same was merely
entrusted to her because Libutan and Biacora had just met Seraspe, and that she turned over all
the payments to Seraspe who acknowledged receipt of the same by writing on pieces of paper
said acceptance; that she accompanied Biacora to Batasan Pambansa at his request; that she did
not earn any money out of her referral and introduction of Libutan and Biacora to Seraspe; that
even if she did not earn any money out of the subject transaction, she returned ₱10,000.00 and
₱31,000.00, or a total of ₱41,000.00, to Biacora out of fear that the latter would file charges
against her; that she tried to find Seraspe, but the latter could not be found at her last known
address; and that she gave Biacora an additional ₱6,000.000 to obviate any more scandal
befalling her family.

RTC convicted accused of Simple Illegal Recruitment and Estafa. Affirmed by CA.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.

Held:
Yes. Illegal recruitment is committed when two essential elements concur: (1) that the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers, and (2) that the offender undertakes any activity within
the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
In this case, the first element is, indeed, present. The prosecution established, through
Belen Blones of the Licensing Branch of the POEA, who identified and confirmed the two
Certifications issued by the POEA Licensing Branch, that "per available records of [its]
Office, CARMEN RITUALO, in her personal capacity is not licensed by this Administration to
recruit workers for overseas employment."
As to the second element, it must be shown that the accused gave the private complainant
the distinct impression that he/she had the power or ability to send the private complainant
abroad for work, such that the latter was convinced to part with his/her money in order to be
employed. Thus, to be engaged in illegal recruitment, it is plain that there must at least be a
promise or an offer of employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or
abroad. In the case at bar, the second element is similarly present. As testified to by Biacora,
petitioner Ritualo professed to have the ability to send him overseas to be employed as a farm
worker in Australia with a monthly salary of US$700.00.43 To further wet Biacora’s appetite,
petitioner Ritualo even showed him purported travel documents of other people about to depart,
whose overseas employment she supposedly facilitated. That petitioner Ritualo personally
assisted Biacora in the completion of the alleged requirements, i.e., securing a Letter of Request
and Guarantee from the Representative of his Congressional District in Batangas to ensure the
approval of Biacora’s application for an Australian Visa, even accompanying Biacora to the
Australian Embassy, all clearly point to her efforts to convince Biacora that she (petitioner
Ritualo) had, indeed, the ability and influence to make Biacora’s dream of overseas employment
come true.
The claim of petitioner Ritualo that it was Anita Seraspe who was really the recruiter and
the one who profited from the subject illegal transaction holds no water. Petitioner Ritualo’s act
of receiving payment from Biacora and issuing personal receipts therefor; of personally assisting
Biacora to complete the "necessary" documents; of failing to present evidence to corroborate her
testimony despite several opportunities given her by the trial court; of petitioner Ritualo having
been positively identified as the person who transacted with Biacora and promised the latter an
overseas employment and who personally received money from Biacora, all unhesitatingly point
to petitioner Ritualo as the culprit.
Petitioner Ritualo next tried to impress upon this Court that she received nary a centavo
from the subject illegal transaction; therefore, she should not be held liable. It was rejected this
outright. In the first place, it has been abundantly shown that she really received the monies from
Biacora. Secondly, even without consideration for her services, she still engaged in recruitment
activities, since it was satisfactorily shown that she promised overseas employment to Biacora.
And, more importantly, Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 does not require that the illegal
recruitment be done for profit.
With respect to the criminal charge of estafa, this Court likewise affirms the conviction of
petitioner Ritualo for said crime. The same evidence proving petitioner Ritualo’s criminal
liability for illegal recruitment also established her liability for estafa. It is settled that a person
may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 in
relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Ritualo was similarly
guilty of estafa under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code committed -- by means of any of
the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other
similar deceits.
Both elements of the crime were established in this case, namely, (a) petitioner Ritualo
defrauded complainant by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (b) complainant
Biacora suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation as a result.54 Biacora
parted with his money upon the prodding and enticement of petitioner Ritualo on the false
pretense that she had the capacity to deploy him for employment in Australia. In the end, Biacora
was neither able to leave for work overseas nor did he get his money back, thus causing him
damage and prejudice. Hence, the conviction of petitioner Ritualo of the crime of estafa should
be upheld.
People of the Philippines vs Delos Reyes | GR No. 198795 | June 7, 2017

Facts:
On January 15, 2003, Suratos went to an office in Cubao, Quezon City where she met the
accused-appellant, who promised her a job in Cyprus as a caretaker. She returned to the accused-
appellant's office a month later. The accused-appellant gave her a machine copy of her visa to
prove that there was a good job waiting for her in Cyprus and that she would leave in three
months upon payment. Suratos gave the accused-appellant an amount totaling to PhP55,000,
inclusive of her passport and medical examination report. After three months, Suratos became
suspicious. She demanded the return of her money, but the accused-appellant simply told her to
wait. A month later, Suratos learned that the accused-appellant was already detained and could
no longer deploy her abroad. She filed a complaint for illegal recruitment docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-03-119663. Suratos identified the accused-appellant in open court as well as the
entry permit and receipts she had issued her.
Sometime in the third week of March 2003, Alayon met the accusedappellant at the All
Care Travel Agency located at 302 Escueta Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City. Accused-appellant
offered her a job in Cyprus as a part of the laundry staff and asked her to pay the total amount of
PhP55,000, to submit her resume and transcript of records, among others, and promised to
deploy her abroad by June. On April 10, 2003, Alayon initially paid PhP15,000 to the accused-
appellant. When she returned to accusedappellant's office to pay the balance, she learned that
accused- appellant had been picked up by the police. Alayon proceeded to the police station and
demanded from the accused-appellant the return of her money. She filed a complaint against
accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119665.
During the first week of December 2012, Duldulao, through his wife's friend, was
introduced to the accused-appellant. When Duldulao mentioned that she had a sister working in
Spain, accused-appellant promised a tourist visa for him in exchange for PhP 45,000. In the first
week of January 2003, he gave the accused-appellant PhP l 1,000 as partial payment for the
processing of his documents. The accused-appellant only took PhP l0,000 and gave back
PhPl,000 for him to open an account with Land Bank, Cubao branch. Upon the request of
accused-appellant, Duldulao deposited the amount of PhP 8,000 to the BPI account of accused-
appellant. When he was required by the accused-appellant to complete the payment of PhP
45,000 for his tourist visa, Duldulao obtained a bank loan of PhP l1,000 and gave it to the
accused-appellant. Altogether, Duldulao paid the accused-appellant a total of PhP 29,000. When
he discovered that accused-appellant was arrested in April 2003, Duldulao went to Camp
Panopio and demanded that accusedappellant return his money but to no avail. He subsequently
filed a complaint against accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119668.
Bagay, Jr. went to the office of the accused-appellant who offered him a job as a dentist
in London. Accused-appellant assured him that with an initial payment of PhP30,000, he would
leave in three months. After paying the said amount, Bagay, Jr. gave the accused-appellant his
resume, transcript of records, diploma, passport, and I.D. pictures. Unfortunately, he was not
able to leave for London because in less than three months, Bagay, Jr. learned that accused-
appellant was detained at Camp Panopio for illegal recruitment. Despite her promise to Bagay,
Jr., accused-appellant failed to return the amount to him. The complaint filed by Bagay, Jr.
against the accused-appellant was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119666.
Sometime in the third week of March 2003, Guillarte went to the office of the accused-
appellant who promised her work as a hotel staff member in Cyprus. She gave accused-appellant
an amount totaling PhP 55,000 as full payment for her deployment abroad. But the promise of
deployment never materialized. Guillarte's demand for the return of her money from the accused-
appellant went unheeded. She filed a complaint against accused-appellant docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-03-119664.
Private complainant Doria, however, did not testify.
For her part, the accused-appellant admitted that she was the Overseas Marketing
Director of All Care Travel & Consultancy (Hongkong), with All Care Travel & Consultancy
(Philippines) as its affiliate. She said that sometime in 1990, she was issued a professional
license as an Electronics Communication Engineer. She left the country in 2003 and was not in
the Philippines from January 2003 to February 2003. She returned to the country on June 4, 2003
and left the country in the same month. She claimed that she did not know Suratos, Guillarte,
Alayon, Bagay, Jr., and Gloria. Although she knew Duldulao, she did not promise him any job.
She likewise claimed that she neither signed nor issued any receipt using the name "Manzie
delos Reyes" in favor of the complainants. She further claimed that she was not engaged in any
recruitment and placement activities. During the pre-trial, she admitted that she had no license to
recruit workers for overseas employment.
On rebuttal, prosecution witness Perla D. Sayana, Chief, Registration Division of the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), testified that the name of accused-appellant,
"Merceditas Matheus" does not appear in the books of PRC's database. She issued a certification
to the effect that "Merceditas Matheus" is not a Licensed Electronics Communication Engineer.
Confidential agent of the Bureau of Immigration (BOI), Rustico B. Romero, whose main task
was to verify travel records, also appeared for the prosecution. He testified that based on the
BOI's database, the name "Merceditas Matheus" did not leave the country from January 31, 2003
to June 18, 2003.
On November 26, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision, convicting accused-appellant of
the crime of large scale illegal recruitment and five counts of Estafa. On appeal before the CA,
the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue: WON the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.

Held:
Yes. The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (l) the
person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042(2)
accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of
workers; and, (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a
group. These elements are obtaining in this case.
First, the RTC found accused-appellant to have undertaken recruitment activity when she
promised the private complainants overseas employment for a fee.1avvphi1 This factual finding
was affirmed by the CA. As correctly pointed out by the CA, appellant, in fact, had stipulated at
pre-trial that not only did she know private complainants, she also received money from them for
their deployment abroad, as she even issued receipts to them. At any rate, absence of receipts
cannot defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment. Private complainants positively
identified appellant as the person who asked money from them in consideration for their
deployment abroad. She impressed on complainants that she had the power or ability to send
them abroad for employment so much so that the latter got convinced to part with their money in
exchange therefor. Illegal recruiters need not even expressly represent themselves to the victims
as persons who have the ability to send workers abroad. It is enough that these recruiters give the
impression that they have the ability to enlist workers for job placement abroad in order to
induce the latter to tender payment of fees. 21
Second, the March 1, 2004 Certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration unmistakably reveals that the accused-appellant neither had a license nor
authority to recruit workers for overseas employment. Notably, instead of assailing the
certification, she admitted during the pre-trial that she did not have a license or authority to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers.
Third, it was established that there were five complainants, i.e., Suratos, Guillarte,
Alayon, Bagay, Jr., and Duldulao. The CA observed that rivate complainants' individual
testimonies were so replete with details on how appellant convincingly, albeit deceptively,
enticed them to pay all her demands in case, how she provided for their fake documents, and
how she manipulated their thoughts and dreams for a better life, ending up in the cruel
realization that she was nothing but a fraud.
Indeed, the existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved
by the prosecution.
Furthermore, it is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately of
illegal recruitment under RA 8042 or the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the
RPC.
The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or
by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation.
Here, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant deceived
private complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them abroad
for employment, despite her not being licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas
employment.1âwphi1 Because of the assurances given by accused-appellant, the private
complainants parted with their hard-earned money for the payment of the agreed placement fee,
for which accused-appellant issued petty cash vouchers and used fictitious names evidencing her
receipt of the payments.In this case, appellant committed estafa by using fictitious names, i.e.,
'Manzie Delos Reyes', 'Manzie Matheus' in her transactions with private complainants, falsely
pretending that she possessed power, influence, capacity to employ abroad or procure visas for
them, making it appear that she had made transactions to acquire their entry permits and visas,
thus, successfully inducing them to part with their money, albeit, knowing full [sic] well she had
no authority or license to do so.
Clearly, these acts of accused-appellant constitute estafa punishable under Article 315
(2)(a) of the RPC.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs Cabiles | GR No. 170139 | August 5, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application
for a quality control job in Taiwan. Joy’s application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a
one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer
Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of ₱70,000.00 when she signed the
employment contract.
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. on June 26, 1997. She alleged
that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan,
she was asked to work as a cutter. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14,
1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was
terminated and that "she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport."
She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. She
claimed that she was illegally dismissed. She asked for the return of her placement fee, the
withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and
exemplary damages. She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign
principal.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her
inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements [of]
her foreign [employer]." The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of
₱70,000.00. As evidence, it showed Official Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10, 1997, bearing the
amount of ₱20,360.00. Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already
been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6,
1997. Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it. It alleged that
there was no employer-employee relationship between them. Therefore, the claims against it
were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Pacific Manpower argued that the employment
contract should first be presented so that the employer’s contractual obligations might be
identified. It further denied that it assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal acts.
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint. Joy appealed to NLRC,
which declared that Joy was illegally dismissed. However, the NLRC did not rule on the issue of
reimbursement of placement fees for lack of jurisdiction. It refused to entertain the issue of the
alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific. It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision not to rule on
the matter.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor Relations
Commission’s resolutions. The CA affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the equivalent of
three months’ worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s
fees. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the National Labor Relations Commission to
address the validity of petitioner's allegations against Pacific. Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency filed this petition.

Issue: WON respondent was illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary,
the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees despite the alleged
existence of just causes of termination.

Held:
Yes. Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution. Employees are not
stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction. With
respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of lex loci contractus
(the law of the place where the contract is made). There is no question that the contract of
employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its
implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or
authorized cause and after compliance with procedural due process requirements. Article 282 of
the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her
duties may, therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if
petitioner was able to prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer.
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign
employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to
support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not
met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted
inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards
against which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as to the
position held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just cause for
termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees and
reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.
However, in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,
this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive
due process.
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the
reinstatement of the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of
respondent’s termination from work in 1997. Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended by
Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case. The law passed incorporates the exact clause already
declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.
Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the
government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless
of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by
any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent
with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No.
10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well
as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that
would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract,
in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month
equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on
June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July
15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs,
and would,in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning
agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and
actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law."