G.R. No.

189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the Decision3
dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.

The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on the ground that respondent
had a previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand, that respondent was not
prevented from contracting a second marriage if the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not
have to await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.

The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding thus and consequentially
reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979,
respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,4 praying that his marriage
to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the
RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they
had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing
officer belonged.5

On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista
was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision
dated 22 January 2003 had become final and executory. 7

On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that the proof adduced by petitioner was
insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his Opposition, 9
petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had
belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered into
marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in
its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.

In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void
ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage between RENATO A.
CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San
Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the
Family Code. 13

The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979,
makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that
she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC
stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said that even
if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first
marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were concerned. 15 His motion,
however, was denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and
Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal.

In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity
of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in
1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law
in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20 Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil
Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.21

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the questioned CA Resolution22 dated
16 September 2009.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in toto,
and that all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the
Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.

OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of
the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve
this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80,26 81,27 82,28 and 83
(first paragraph);29 and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph),30 8531 and 86.32

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is
nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until
annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal
fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment
are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a
voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.33

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and
Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity
of a void marriage. 37
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second marriage was contracted
in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the death of the second
wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and
void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its performance,
hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.

This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual antecedents. In Odayat (
1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon
inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now
expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A
second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void. 39 In
Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement:

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the
nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of
marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying
marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially
significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms
of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract
of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.40 (Emphases
supplied)1âwphi1

However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of Appeals, 42 the requirement of a judicial decree
of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the
children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to
be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:

x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second
marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom
he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since
the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the
effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that
time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void
for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so
would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code
has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of
petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes that
the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the
absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the
second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen
the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and
Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007

LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,

vs.

HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA

M. ARTICULO, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

1
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order, dated 3
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting
2
reconsideration of its Order, dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage.

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli
(Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.
Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo,
3
Cagayan. They begot seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel,
4 5
Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before
6 7
the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.

In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the
8
requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who
have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was
not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required
by said provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter’s
death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore,
petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause,
respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness which made
its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21
years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union
were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991,
respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo,
Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action
on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

9
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order, granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action.
10
It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The
RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:

The Complaint should be dismissed.

1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003
11
provides in Section 2, par. (a) that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a petition may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the
petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such
petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot
12
substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and void. (Emphasis supplied.)

The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED.
13
Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said
14
motion, the RTC rendered an Order dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC
15
reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog, which
was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even
after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where both
16
parties to a void marriage are still living. Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may
file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:

The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the
Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his
marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog
is now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the
Rule) because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an
action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the
death of the parties.

It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In
view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will
have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a
void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,]
the heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it
would be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage
void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a vested right over whatever property left by the
parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure
cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.

If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is
illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at
all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not
be allowed to file the petition after the death of the parent.

For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is
applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party
to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable
17
as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable.

Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this
18
case.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC
19
denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein.

Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the
case law as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.

At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.

We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals
and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or
20
certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court. Instead, they should initially
seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task
of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the
21
competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. However,
it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling
22
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.
Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy
of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.

Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal
which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage after his death.

We grant the Petition.

In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.

While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for
the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court
in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil
23
Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us belongs to a different
milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can
be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004. 1âwphi1

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment
of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
24
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.

Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC with the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The
marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is clear,
no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the
wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage
of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
25
dissolution. (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in
a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita
D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.

ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

1 2
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166, declaring that (1)
Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for
a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual
relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in
lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and
wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
3
City (trial court. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged
4
on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was
facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to
save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not
able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
 5
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father
of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him
to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a
judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the
subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to
undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he
had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to
6
relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible." Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the
affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of
the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare
the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the
State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required
by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is
void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the
instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to
support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
7
respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring
Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage
on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a
8
proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.

9
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown
by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses
that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that
he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted
10
as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license. Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for
the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an
action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court
had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in
11
the instant action for support. Citing several authorities, petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of
a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity
of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence
and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the
12
parties, and would increase the burden of the courts. Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his
marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
13
to file their respective comments on the petition.

14
In her Comment, respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy
of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically
brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and
straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual
encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
15
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare
16
null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,
it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from
petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in
the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage
license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage
17
between petitioner and respondent is not valid. In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that
18
the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter
of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
19
between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog, we held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises,
a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
20
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

21
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the
Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
22
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
23
initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it
is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than
 24
five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
cross-examination, thus—

ATTY. CARPIO:

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five years on
or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?

25
A Yes, sir.

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for
26
a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
27
children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means
28
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

29
The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving
additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living,
30
Parañaque, Metro Manila;

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter,
but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his
former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they
would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately
led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo
the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and
"C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In
one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and
31
in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No.
4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.

CONSUELO TAN, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."

The Case

1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed
the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein
petitioner of bigamy as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime
of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
[the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen
(15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.

2
Costs against accused."

The Facts

The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s judgment, as follows: "From the evidence adduced
by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married
on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract
was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was ‘single’. There
is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married
man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by
Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which
matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart
Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a
church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City.
Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children,
while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.

"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor
of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused,
Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.

"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused
filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a
Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null
and void.

"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second
marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in
lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been
legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are
present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x

"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous marriage
ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of
accused.

"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991,
accused’s prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of
the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a
married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time
3
validly married to his first wife."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:

"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment
declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after,
when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the
act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally
4
dissolved."

5
Hence, this Petition.

The Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

"A

Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.

"B

Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy,
in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.

"C
 6
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt."

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage

Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."

The elements of this crime are as follows:

"1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

7
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity."

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that
petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he
contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint
for bigamy.

Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set
8
aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus, he
9
concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries of former Justice Luis
Reyes that "it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But
if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense."

Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the
crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage
must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.

We agree with the respondent.

To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been
10 11
characterized as "conflicting." In People v. Mendoza, a bigamy case involving an accused who married three
times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second
marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife
then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it
had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and
illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit
12
bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon, which
involved substantially the same facts.

But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v.
13
GSIS, Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death,
the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second
wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: "And with respect to the
right of the second wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio
as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity."

14
In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not
necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving
spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of
the first wife, holding that "the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the
first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish
the invalidity of a void marriage."

15
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an
action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing
marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first
husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the
Court ruled: "x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court,
a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman
at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."

16
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA, the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need
for such declaration of nullity.

17
In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery
and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family Code
has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
18
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy."

Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the
basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation of Mendoza
and Aragon.

In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
"Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as
contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court."

The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary
19
to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages."

The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the
Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:

"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."

In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary. Verily,
the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil
Code Revision Commitee has observed:

"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null
and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS,
37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
20
1033)."

In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there is no need for a judicial declaration
of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary
before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and
convicted of bigamy.

21
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre, which involved an administrative
Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s argument that he was free to enter into a
second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential." The Court further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family
Code." Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."

Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view
on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial
22
declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage:
"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the
second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x."

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of
his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had
filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting,
he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the
crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of
bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency
of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

Damages

In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied
23
her claim of damages and attorney’s fees.

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative
24
relief from this Court. In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this
point, which we quote hereunder:

"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim
that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted matrimony
with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said
testimonies.

xxx xxx xxx

"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially
as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge anyway,
relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with
another man.

"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the consequences of
her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in
this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they
25
are of her own willful making."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000

ARTHUR TE, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth
1 2
Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178 and the Resolution dated
October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did
not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent
3
gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage
4
with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about
petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court
5 6
(RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990. This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to
private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her
pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
7
essential marital obligations.

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the
ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their
knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to
petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with
8
Santella that he was still single.
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave
of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel
during the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the
same could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the
9 10
accused. The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel;
(2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to
evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for
judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient
11
for conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for
the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the
pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in
12
Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. When the Board denied the said motion in its Order
13
dated July 16, 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the
Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the
outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the
administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy
against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing
the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before
the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same respondent
14
involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated petitions.
The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any concrete
evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of
15
petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law. The
Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set
forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing
16
the existence of the elements of bigamy.

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s
motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court
held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the
17
other action involved is a civil case.

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was
18
denied.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A
19
QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has
rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot
and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling
20
precepts and rules.

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
21
the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in
22
view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal
case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
23
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case
before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
24
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza and People vs.
25
Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void
ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect
at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
26 27
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In Landicho vs. Relova, we held that:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
28
long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists.

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid
and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings
before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case.
29
We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the
PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding
the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative
case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body
against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be
filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed
independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final
decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to
the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with
immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to
30
their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. The existence of these other charges
justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence
in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and
second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him
and private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no
showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the
marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was
adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by him
31
ever took place.

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
32
and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. In this case,
the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of
the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner;
and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held
that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in
 33
advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce
34
evidence in his defense.

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in
view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he
is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer
was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to
35
determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case. The RTC’s observation that
there was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to
sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence
36
to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion. Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a
pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer,
in order that petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the
evidence adduced by both parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have
been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner
manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in
said case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration
had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and
was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required
said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was
going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny
the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing
instances justified the grant of his motion to inhibit.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively
37 38
show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a
judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough.
39
There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned
in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of
Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child,
is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil
law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.
This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test
40
for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial.
The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel
did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to
suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was
there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his
claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed
upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified
41
delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision of
2
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with
Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on
January 12, 1999.

Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.

The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon.
Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated
November 17, 2000).

On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before
Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital
union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).

Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City
Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1,
pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).

On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh.
E).

In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.

xxxx

Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.

Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.

This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accused’s bigamous
marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.

Costs against the accused.

3
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because
Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her
marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had
prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that
petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her
marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is,
her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack
of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that
Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring
petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological
incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner
invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July
4
8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent
declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without
5
legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy."

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that:

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE
CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS
CASE.

V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE

CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF
THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY
FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH
38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE
LICENSE.

V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND
THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.

The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right after the
presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the
pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved
a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy,
initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension,
6
while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court categorically stated that:

x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x

xxxx

x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted
his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
7
question. x x x

8
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People, where it was held thus:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution
of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise
in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was
void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
9
annulled.

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must
be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered
a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of
the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void
by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity
10
of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference. As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
11
subsistence of a valid marriage."

Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article
25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties
shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run
from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant
or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains
12
self-serving. Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence
that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.

A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to
support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already
married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court
correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous
marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the
13
latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.

14
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only
from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as
15
opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. Since petitioner failed to prove
with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi 1

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code.
Again, petitioner is mistaken.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court
to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
16
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which
ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore,
correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8
years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared
17
by final judgment to be void ab initio on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner
was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts.
Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in
all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four
(4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners,
vs.

THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN
TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR,
Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad Braza,"
1 2 3
were married on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef and Janelle Ann on
4
May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo on June 4, 1980.

5
Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.

During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began
introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina
6
thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:

Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR

Date of Birth : 01 January 1996

Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular

Father : Pablito S. Braza

Date Received at the January 13, 1997

Local Civil Registrar :

Annotation : "Late Registration"

Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January

13, 1997"

Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on

April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
 7
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April
22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of
8
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil
Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said
marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners
prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the
father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all
surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and
filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

9
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order of September 6, 2007, dismissed the
petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting
as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be
ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

10
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order of November 29, 2007, they filed the present
petition for review.

Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in
11 12
an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. Citing Cariño v. Cariño, Lee v. Court of Appeals and Republic v.
13
Kho, they contend that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be
14
the subject of a petition under Rule 108.

The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

15
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the
civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to
correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
16
which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage
between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which
they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.

17
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records and that the
rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.

Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by
18
Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code,
respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. 1avvphi1
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before
the court a quo.

Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.

Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the death
benefits received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the
husband while the latter’s marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two
marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.

In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein petitioners
before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are
illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are not the latter’s
children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all between

the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng
as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the
collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.

In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their respective birth
records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents
were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely
innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court’s
grant of the petition.

It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.