THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN

PORT AND POLITY

THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN
PORT AND POLITY
Rise and Demise

Editedbv

J. KATHIRITHAMBY.WELLS
&
JOHN VILLIERS

SINGAPORE UNIVERSITYPRESS
NATIONAL UNIVERSITYOF SINGAPORE
 O 1990 SingaporeUniversitYPress
Kent Ridge, SingaPore0511

All rights reserved.

ISBN 9971-69'129'9(Paper)
9971-69-141-8(Case)

plarcmap c'1685
'
Coverillustration:Ayunhaya'Copper
bt AlainManesson Maltet,1630-1706'

Malaysia'
Tvpeset by: Huruf SediaSdn' Bhd', Kuala Lumpur'
Fii'ni"a bv : Printmart Lithographers(S) Pte' Ltd'
 tt

LONrcWS

'
i:l ry' Maps vii

.",1 ttt'Illtrslrolirtns viii

Ihhti riations ix

I il) l?ncrcS X

-,1
cightsand Measurcs x

..,t ,'I Cctnlribulctrs xi

.',,!err xiii

1. Introduction:An Overview 1
I Kathirithamby-Wells

L CollectingCentres,FeederPointsand Entrepotsin the Malay

P e n i n s u l ac,. 1 0 0 0B . C . - A . D . 1 4 0 0 17
Lcong Sau Hcng

i. Trade and State Formation in the Malay Peninsulaand Sumatra,

3 0 0 B . C . - A . D .7 0 0 39
Jan WissemanChristie

= The Kingdom of Srivijaya as Socio-politicaiand Cultural Entity 61

Nik HassanShuhaimi bin Nik Abdul Rahman

.. The Cash-cropEconomyand State Formation in the

Spice Islands in the Fifteenth and SixteenthCenturies 83
lohn Villiers

"'. Banten:A West IndonesianPort and Polity During the

Sixteenthand SeventeenthCenturies 107
I Kathirithamby Wells
-.
Crown Trade and Court Politics in Ayutthaya During the
Reignof King Narai (1656-88) 127
Dhiramt Na Pombelra

.. \'Iakassar:The Rise and Fall of an East IndonesianMaritime

T r a d i n gS t a t e ,1 5 1 2 - 1 6 6 9 143
John Villiers
 g.LordsoftheGreatRiver:TheMagindanaoPortandPolity
161
During the SeventeenthCenturY
Ruurdje I'aarhouen

in the Sulu Sultanate

10. Trade, Slave Raiding and State Formation t87
in the NineteenthCenturY
fames Francis Warren
the Eighteenthand
11. The Port and Polity of TerengganuDuring 213
NineteenthCenturies:Realizing its Potential
Shaharil Talib
Commercialand Economic
12. Brunei and the Hinterland of Sabah:
Relationswith SpecialReference to the SecondHalf
23r
of the NineteenthCenturY
D.S. Ranjit Sinsh

Glossary
255
Index

1
-

*
=

il
=
=
-

il
 List of Mafs
1. SoutheastAsia during the nineteenthcentury XlV

2. Somearchaeologicalsites in PeninsularMalaysiaand
SouthernThailand 18

Distribution of late metal age finds in PeninsularMalaysia 40

4 . Distribution of tin-ore and gold in PeninsularMalaysia 43

..
. .A.
5 . I he klngclomol srlvuaya 62

6 . The Eastern Archipelagoabout 1600, showingthe principal areas

under the suzeraintyof Ternate and Tidore 84

l 7 . The Banda Islandsin the sixteenthcentury 86

5 8 . The Moluccasin the sixteenthcentury 88

9 . The Lesser SundaIslandsabout 1600 90

1 0 . Banten'ssphereof political and commercialinfluencein the

seventeenthcentury 106

11. The kingdom of Ayutthaya under Narai (1656-88) 126

of Sulawesiabout 1600
12. The Southwestand Southeast'Peninsulas 144

13. The Pulangi River and the MagindanaoSultanate 160

1j. The Sulu Zone 186

15. The Sulu Archipelago 192

16. The State of Terengganu 21'2

17. Sabah,showing major towns and rivers 232

18. Distribution of the indigenouspopulationof Sabahin the 1870s 234

vii

--]_
List of lllustrations

1. Fragmentsof some Kwangtung wares from Teiuk Nipah'

2'
Pulau Tioman, eleventhand twelfth centuries

2. A celadon(greenware)bowl of Lung-ch'tianfrom JenderamHilir'

twelfth to fourteenthcenturies 2

3. Figurine of Hariti from Sungai Emas, Kuala Muda, Bujang Valley'

6
Kedah, seventhto eighth centuries

4. Figurine ol a kala in greenstone,from Site 50, Candi BendangDalam,

Bujang Valley, Kedah, twelfth to fourteenthcenturies 7

5. The Bazaarat Banten, 1596 11

6 . M a k a s s a r1, 7 1 9 14

T..Entranceto Joio town and port in the late 1830s 19

8. Mas Dinar Terengganu,from the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin I

k. t702-20 21

v111
Abbreuiations

AA Artibus Asiae (Ascona)

-{P Asian Perspecllzres(Honolulu)
BKI Bijdragen tot de Taal', Land- en Volkenhunde(The Hague)
BRM Butletin of the Raffles Museum, Series B (Singapore)
BNBH British North BorneoHerald (Jesselton)
FMJ FederationMuseumsJournal (Kuala Lumpur)
IAHA International Associationof Historians of Asia
(Kuala Lumpur)
-\FMSM loumal of the FederatedMalay StatesMuseums
JGIS Journal of the GreaterIndia Society (Calcutta)
JMBRAS lournal of the Malaysittn Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
(Kuala Lumpur)
JSEAH Journalof Southeast Asian History (Singapore)
JSEAS Journalof Southeast Asinn Studies(Singapore)
JSS Journal of Siam Society(Bangkok)
\IBRAS Malaysian Branch of the Royl Asiatic Society(Kuala Lumpur)
\IH Mahysia in History (Kuala Lumpur)
\IJTG Mahyan Journal of Tropical Geography(Singapore)
RIMA Reuiewof Indonesianand Malaysittn Affairs (Sydney)
SMJ SarawakMuseumJournal (Kuching)
SPAFA (SoutheastAsian Ministers of Education organisation)Project in
Archeologt and Fine Arls (Bangkok)
SS/ SabahSocietyJournal (Kota Kinabalu)
TC Tamil Culture(Colombo)
TNI Tijdschrift uoorNederlandschIndid (Batavia)
\-BG Verhandelingenuan het BatauiaaschGenootschap uan Kunsten en
Wetenscha! Pen (Batav ia)
\-KI Verhandelingenuan het Koninklijk Instituut uoor de Taal-, Land- en
Volkenkunde(The Hague)
Currencies

fuang Siameseunit of currency, equalto 600 cowrie shells2 fuang = | salun

(man),4 salung = | baht (tical)

mas The Makassarmns wasreckonedin 1691to be worth half.a rijksdanld

(q.v.) or 30 stuiuers,the Bima mas at twice that value

pard.au Gold coin worth 360 Portuguesereis (6 tangas),silver coin worth 30

reis (5 tangas),also known in India as pagodn

rial Spanishsilver coin worth about2% guildersor 3 shillingsand 8 pent

approximately

rijksdaalderDutch silver coin of approximately the same value as the Spanis

(rixdollar) rial (q.v.)

Weightsand Measwres
bahar Weight varying between141an$ 330 kilogramsbut usuallyabout6(
Portuguesearrateis(1 arratel = 0.459 kilograms)

caixa, caxa Small copperIndian or Chinesecoin. From Tamil: kasu,cf 'Malay:.ka

English: cash; seeficis

hati Malay weight equalto about 625 grams(ust over 1 kilogram in Melak
or 1% Dutch pounds. English: catty; Thai: chang

mas About 1/roof a tael

palmo In Portuguese,a unit of measurementusuallyreckonedto be equivale

to the span of a man's hand; an inch

picis A type of copper cash; 1,000were equal in value to I pikul

pikul 100kati,133% Englishpounds,125 Dutch poundsor 62.5 kilograr

1/roof a &
tael In India a Chineseounce (Chinese li'ang\ equal to about
List of Contribwtors
University,
DHIRAVAT NA POMBEJRA,Departmentof History,Chulalongkorn
Bangkok.

J.KATHIRITHAMBY-WELLS,DepartmentofHistory,UniversityofMalaya,
Kuala Lumpur.
Australian
RUURDJE LAARHOVEN, The ResearchSchoolof Pacific studies,
National UniversitY,Canberra.

LEONGSAUHENG,DepartmentofHistory,UniversityofMalaya,KualaLumpur'
of History'
NIK HASSAN SHUHAIMI BIN NIK ABDUL RAHMAN, Department
The National University, Bangi, Maiaysia'

D.S.RANJITSINGH,DepartmentofHistory,UniversityofMalaya'Kuala
Lumpur.
of Arts and
SHAHARIL TALIB, SoutheastAsian StudiesProgramme,Faculty
SocialSciences,University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur'

London;formerlyDirector,
JOHN VILLIERS, Fellow of the RoyalAsiatic Society,
British Institute in Asia,
Southeast Bangkok'

Inquiry, Murdoch University, Perth,

JAMES FRANCIS WARREN, Schoolof Social
Australia.

Asian Studies,university of Huli'

J. WISSEMAN CHRISTIE, Centrefor Southeast
 Preface

The twelve essayswhich make up this volume originatedin two small seminars
.,nthe developmentof the port and polity in SoutheastAsia held in the Department
,ri History,Universityof Malaya.Of thesetwelve,only six were actuallypresented
at the seminars.The other six vrerecontributedsubsequentlyat the invitation of
:he editors,so that the geographicaiand chronologicaiscopeof the volumemight
le enlargedand the theme,which had only beenpartiallyexploredin the seminars,
:rore completelycovered.
Becauseof the large areaand the extensivetime-scaleinvolved,it has not been
:ossibleto achieveanythingapproachingan exhaustivetreatmentof this complex
. rbject,and the essaysin this volumeconcentrateinsteadon describingthe growth
,j trade and statehoodand the inherentlinks betweenthe two in a few key areas
'','erlimited periods.Sincea number of authoritativepublicationson such major
liirt-polities as Melaka, Aceh and Johor are alreadyavailable,greater emphasis
.. Iaid on recent studiesdealingwith other areasin other periodsthat, although
:r'rhapslesswell known,are no lesssignificant.The surveyfirst tracesthe genesis
: port andpolity in the Straitsof Melakain pre-andprotohistorictimes,thenshifts
: , the centraland easternislandsof the Archipelagoand finally returns to the Straits
:.:d the Malay Peninsula,which acquired a new significancewith the rise of
: ngaporein the early nineteenthcentury.
\\-e gratefullyacknowledgethe help given by Dr. Lee Kam Hing and Mr. Abdul
,\zmi b. Khalid in organizingthe initial seminarsat the University of Malaya,and
:.ke this opportunity of also expressingour appreciationto Dr. Jan Wisseman
J:ristie, Dr. DhiravatNa Pombejra,Ms RuurdjeLaarhovenand Dr. JamesFrancis
',"'arren
for agreeingto join us in this project at a later stage.We would also like
: thank Ms Pauline Lee and Ms Lau Beng Thye of the History Department,
-
:riversityo{ Malaya,for their patienceand co-operation in typing the manuscript,
::.d \{r. Othman b. Abdul Ghani of the GeographyDepartment,University of
i.lala-va,for the skill and enthusiasmwith which he undertookthe preparationof
:'.. maps.For any shortcomingsthat remain we alone are responsible.

THE EDITORS
1989

xiii

F:-=:
 ltl i*f*i', l*
6 )f ol

i \ d.3
;hrtl".l
i
tii
I
ll
|trK/ \j
 Introduction:An Oueruiew

I. KATHIRITHAMBY-WELLS
h

The euolutionof the SoutheastAsian lort polity

The singularlyinternationalorientationof SoutheastAsia throughoutits history

:as beendeterminedby the maritime configurationof the region and the important
: rle it hasplayedin mediatingtrade, first, betweenwest and eastAsia and, later,
:ettveen the west and China. By providing internationalemporia at strategic
.:,cationswhere high value local and imported productswere stocked,Southeast
! .+siabecamethe areaof convergencefor goodsmoving betweenthe orientaland
ccidentalregionsfrom as early as the third century A.D.1
Though local initiatives were significant and the cultures they generatedimpres-
::r-e1yvigorous,stimuli from external influenceswere integral to developments
','"'ithinthe region. In the autochthonousevolution of socialand political formations
::e lowlandareas,as distinct from the highlands,are observedto have acquired
a : greater capacityfor developmentduring later prehistorictimes, particuiarly with
::.e adventof iron technology.ZThe prehistoriccoastalsettlementsof the Malay
?eninsula,for example, acted as intermediariesin intra-regionalcommercial
.rchange,which providedthe materialbasisfor the gradualdevelopmentof inter-
:egionalcontacts.The idea that trade playedthe most importantrole in fostering
:egionalintegrationand the evolutionof politicalstructuresin SoutheastAsia has
:een increasinglysupportedby recent researchinto the prehistory and early history
,: the region.3
From at leastthe first millenniumB.C. into the first millenniumA.D. settlements
.merged as exchangepoints and servicecentresat strategiccoastaland riverine
.:cations.Someof theseenteredthe regionalexchangesystemas ports or entrepfits.
.\s well as commandinga hierarchy of local exchange,they transactedregional
::rd inter-regionaltradeato becomethe foci of commercialwealth and exchange
:rr the zonesof economicactivity that they serviced,whetherthesewere maritime,
:unter-gatherer,or agrarian.The two latter groupswere, to a large degree,self-
.ufficient but, dependingupon the specificnature of the ecosystem,all of them
:elied to a lesseror greater degreeon the local exchangeof salt, food supplies,

E::::':.
 I. Kathirithamby'We

develo
cloth and other necessities.At a more sophisticatedlevel of commercial
and forest produce entered the regional and, ultimately, the lon
ment, metal
for luxury, ceremonial a
distancetrade.The localiommoditieswere exchanged
predominantly cast bronze bells and gonS
prestigegoodsfrom within the region,
Mediten
bongr-ona^ms, and goodsfrom external sourcessuch as India, the
Anlntrep6t such as Oc-eo, Srivijaya or Melaka, located or
ura China.s
"*r] converged' had t
direct international route, on which regional trade routes also
commerce and not merely
addedadvantageof commandingan entire sector of
immediatehinterland.
Asi'a
The releuanceof the bort-folity as a historical mtegoryfor Southeast
phenome
The concentricityof entrep6tand polity was an almostuniversal
when port and polity were located separately, tl
maritime SoutheastAsia. Even
linked, as in the case of Funan and Oc-eo, Majapahit and the ri
were inherently
coa
;; Canggu,6seventeenthcentury Pegu and Syriam, or Al.utthaya and
Bangkok."i
cent
In SoutheastAsia the port-polity, origin.qtingsimply as a redistributive
graduallyassumeda numberof increasingly advanced forms contained within'
growth of sr
f,road siectrum of chiefdom, kingdom and state'7 Central to the 'l
and cultural contacts'
a politv was the entrepotwhich earnedadditionalwealth
..Gi ion bVlo-ca]chidfs of piestige and luxury goodsfrom trade and the redistri
of econo
tion of someof theseamongstclientsprovidedthe basisfor the exercise
authority in southeast Asia. There is now sufficient archa
influenceand political
to sugg6st that Southeast Asian port-polities had achieved so
logical evidence
role, even bef
a&.ee of economicini&ration, expressedin their redistributive
bei
Injianization.8But they awaited ihe accoutrementsof Hindu statecraft
stage of political evolution.e It was at this pt
,.passingon to a more ahvanced influencesv
if,"f pJ.t-polities functionedas venuesfor the synthesisof external
and recipro
locaiand hinterland cultural symbols.loThe rhythm of exchange
by shared cultural mores, wl
betweenthe centreand its hinterlandwas reinforced
- fucilitate<lthe assertion of rulership and authority'
South
The turning away from.,India-wardproclivities,'byWoltersand other
in recent years has resulted in a shift of interest to hithr
Asian scholars
neglectedsub-regionalhisiories. The result has been a more comprehen
of l'
of tire-*evolutiiinof indigenouspolitical institutions in terms
"ooi"i."f Hindu-Buddhist religious concepts brought by comme
iniliatives, nouiished by
of stateh
contacts. wolters rigirtty challenges the conventional attributes
discontinuity betu
identified in Funan and the implication of this for the
he has underscored the vital
prehistory and protohistory; but at the sametime
of "big men"
irltuiion of S"i.,,lt" influence towards enhancingthe "soul stuff
into beings of superior prowess. The latter pro
their gradual transformation
enabledthechiefstoenlargetheirentourageandtheirpowersofmobilizatio
or mand'a
ing them simultaneouslli to expand their sphere of influence
oniy a part of the social system of
territorial terms.1l Thoughlrade iepresents
society,onedistinctly.eglon"rfeaturewhichhasbeenidentifiedbys
importan<
searchof pristine Southeist Asian socio-culturalphenomenais the
 An Oueruieu
Introduction; J

the distribution of material largesseby a chief to sustain his spiritual aura.r2

From as early as our historical records show, as for example in Funan,13the
powerful chief or raja,withaccess to commercialwealth, was quick to assumecon- rflv*-
lrol oveJthe resourcesthrough initiating the organizition and expansionof trade
at the main port where he actually resided or to which he was in close proximity. '-
The port-polity was the most viable manifestation of SoutheastAsian statehood', -
as is demonstratedevenin the caseof agrarian Majapahit and Ayutthaya with their
maritime counter-faces.Conversely,even the Srivijayan emporium could well have
had an agrarian facet;14while in the case of the maritime entrepot of Makassar
we know that it was backedby a rice-richhinterland.The destructionof trade along 2
the Javanesepasisirby Mataram under Sultan Agung (1613-46) was an aberrant i
feature and an outcome of his inability to control and mobilize resources.
In attempting to clarify our perceptionsof SoutheastAsian political and social
structures,lsthe distinction between agrarianand maritime as separatehistorical
categoriesshould,as with the identificationof the former with Wittfogel's'Orien-
tal Despotism'orthe Marxian'Asiatic Mode of Production',be lesssharplydrawn
if we are to achievea more accurateunderstandingof the symbiosisbetweenthese
twin aspectsof economicwealth and power.16This is not to deny that many
SoutheastAsian polities and stateshad either maritime or afoarian leanings.What
is significant is that ports were as important to the agrarian-basedstates of Java,
for finding external markets for their produce,lTas they were for those of maritime
orientations for organizing its importation. Even the Khmer rulers, who derived
a stable income from the wet rice regions of Angkor, sought to augment their
rvealthfrom external trade, which was a vital sourceof fuxury goodssuch as cloth,
spices, gold and silver ornaments and aromatics for ritual and ceremonial
purposes.ls
Agrarian and maritime proclivities should be viewed as complementaryfeatures
'internally'and
of intra-regional cohesionand regional integration rather than as,
'externally'orienteddivergentforces. It must be acceptedthat the geographical
configuration of the SoutheastAsian region dictated that throughout history its
ports assumedthe undisputedrole of'cultural brokers'.Hence,chiefsand rulers
in control of strategicallylocatedmaritime centresfound themselvesin an eminently
favourableposition to administerwealth and exerciseinfluencein accordancewith
the SoutheastAsian mode.

The poh-polity as a socio'culturalphenomenon

Their functions as nodal centresfor communicationand trade in a region which

was primarily jungle-coveredand swamp made the commercial capitals of Southeast
Asia, with their riparian and coastallocations,synonymouswith port-polities.The
rivers were often the only means of communicationwith the interior and, depen-
ding upon the coastal configuration, the presenceof swamps and navigability for
larger vessels,the capital city could in some cases,as with Funan and Ayutthaya,
be locatedseveralmiles upstream. Elsewhere,in small island locationssuch as the
Banda Islands and sulu, or as in the case of western Sabah, where rivers were
short and swift, waterways were negligible. commonly, however, port and capital

F--
 J. Kathirithamby-Welk

city merged into a single urban complex at the river mouth, as for example at
Sr*ij"Vul Mehka, Brunei, Aceh, Banten, Makassar and Jolo. Because of its
strategic location, the port-polity functioned as a "gateway city",le controlling
and political relations with the interior and surrounding regions. When
the royal capital was situated separatelyfrom the port, as with Funan, Majapahit
".onoti.
and Ayutthaya, it was at the former that the main policy decisionsregarding ad-
ministration and trade were made.
In SoutheastAsia, the ruler of the port-polity playeda uniquerole when compared
to rulers elsewhere.In China imperial commercialinterestswere subsumedwithin
thetributarysystem;2oinMughallndiathecommercialventuresoftherulerswe
a strictly private affair; and in Europe the cities of the Hanse, and such Mediterra-
nean statesas Venice and Genoa,were dominatedby the borrrgeoisie'In contrast,
furthermore,with India and china, where the commercialcentreswere far removed
from the imperial capitals,in SoutheastAsia capital city and maritime centre were
interlinked and thrived under the shadow of the ruler.2l Effective administration
was not via a centrally managedbureaucratic structure, but through the ruler's
exercise of patronage and reciprocal relations with the elite' Relations between
the centre and component parts of the state, which were inherently fragile and
fluctuating, were held in balance by the ruler's individual strength and wisdom,
which determined his Power.
The focus of the maritime capital,as in the agrariancapital,was the palace,which
stood in the vicinity of the royil mosqueor temple. Apart from the abundanceof
stonemonumentsfound in the agrariancapitals,the layout of townshipsthroughout
public
the region was generally similar, with the exception of the court, the
buildings, such as the mosqueor temple, and the dwellings of the royalty, nobility
and meichant elite, which were built in stone,the rest of the city was a conglomera-
tion of wooden structures, divided into separatequarters for the different com-
palms,
munities.22characteristically, the city was interspersedwith orchardsand
giving it a rural aspect. Quite apart from the hearryconcentration of population
Io"nJi" the agrarian rice plains, the wban centresalso supported a large population,
so that SoutheastAsian port-polities were demographicallyimportant as well.23
The internationality of port-polities like Srivijaya, Melaka, Brunei, A1'utthaya'
Banten and Ma[a$ai-#is a feafure of their general prosperity, They were not
only political and commercial capitals but the ctltural centres of-qheirrgspective
reaimsr_Under the patronage of the ruler, peop-leof diverse origins and creeds,
irif"aing priests, ambassadors,merchantsand craftsmen, caught up in the urban
milieu, used diplomacy and intrigue for individual advancementand profit. The
variety of linguistic communication, combined with the impressively numerous
community oi merchants and money-changers,facilitated commercial exchange
at these centres. As with the courts of RenaissanceEurope, the maritime capitals
of SoutheastAsia becamealso the "model and style setting centres."2aThe courts
of Hindu-Buddhist srrvijaya and Ayuithaia and the Islamic capitals of the region,
far from being exclusive sanctuariesremote from the daily concernsof the polity,
coordinatedinternal affairs and supervisedexternal relations,dealingdirectly with
every class of foreign agency, including many monks and priests. In this manner,
the ruler oversaw the material as well as the spiritual affairs of the state.
In the SoutheastAsian polity, where the ruler's military power was constrained
 Introduction:An Oueruieu

by his dependenceon the chiefs for manpowerresources,his spiritual mystique

as supremereligious patron served as an important counterweight to potential rivalry
from the elite. At the port-polity especially,his role as the fountainheadof religious
power was enhancedby the opportunities availableto him to mediateand regulate
external cultural influences.Clients and subjectssharedthe spiritual and material
wealth of the ruler so long as he validated his status by bolstering and sustaining
the prosperity of the port through whatever means appearedappropriate at the
time. At Srivijaya the ntahamjamaintaineda maritime basedesignedprimarily for
trade with China; in Melaka, Brunei and Makassarthe Sultansattracted commerce
by the provision of fair and equitable terms; and at Aceh, Ayutthaya and Banten
the monarchspreservedthe economicindependenceof the state by the exercise
of royal monopoliesand discriminatorytrade. The ruler at the helm of a prosperous
port had the full range of strategies availablefor the exercise of despotic power:
the tyranny of Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh (1607-36) and the absolutism
of King Narai of Ayutthaya (1656-88) are outstanding examples.The port-
polity was the pivotal centre for the composite affairs of the realm, with the
ruler as their chief exponent.Commercialsuccesswas dependentupon his skill
at mobilizing the material and human resources.In fact, despite having a regular
councilof advisers,the ruler relied ultimately on his own initiative, resourcefulness
and sagacity in making policy decisions.The splendour and wealth of the court,
the pomp and pageantry of public processions,the bustle of the port and market-
place, the size and variety of foreign communities,the ruler's elite following and
manpowerresourceswere commensuratewith the stability and prosperity of the
realm.
It has been argued that the period from about 1400 witnessed the emergence
of a rich cluster of maritime stateswhich fostered "the developmentof a new type
of SoutheastAsian society."zsThe spreadof Islam and simultaneoustrade expan-
sion did indeedproducea galaxy of prosperousurban centres,especiallyalong the
north coastofJava (Tuban, Gresik, Japara,Jaratan)and the east coast of Sumatra
(Pedir, Pasai, Aceh) which lay athwart the main sea routes. However, sufficient
evidence with reference to Srivijaya and fragmentary evidence on port-polities
beforeher time suggestthat they already displayedthe basic characteristicswhich
Reid has singled out as typical of the post-1400urban scene.26 These included
a dense population; a pluralistic society;27dependence on trade revenues; high
military organization;28a large-scale bulk trade in rice imports which supple-
mented the peddling trade in high value luxury goods;2eand their role as centres
for cultural dissemination.Far from being new characteristics,theseappearto have
been inherent features of the urban centres of the region, which simply became
more pronouncedwith the increasedvolume of trade and the proliferationof wealth
and commercial prosperity.

The rise and demiseof the SoutheastAsinn port-polity

The present volume attempts to trace broadly the evolution of the port-pblity
as a historical phenomenonfrom its nascentstage, from the first millenium 8.C.,
focussing specifically on indigenous, pre-colonial polities. The chronological
representationof the essaysis, therefore, uneven, and only a few individual port-

F=:__
 J. Kathirithamby'W

politiesarediscussedfortheperiodbefore1600'Nonetheless,itishoped
of overall developme
il';;rry examples*ill [;a to a better understanding
and mature forms' were stud
than i{ only the later port-fotitles, in their advanced Asia did not evc
il[upp"i*t that, characteristically,port-polities Southeast
in
declinie was triggered by periodic chan
uniformly and their inOrvidualg"r,".i, and internal fact
trade.as well as local and
in the nature and pattern oiloig-ai.tun.e
the genesisof incipient states in
Thus, though it *^V U" pottiti" to argue for
in mainland SoutheastAsia dul
Peninsulaand their fuUvineAgedcounterparts
process doesnot appearto have occu
;h;;;;it centuriese.l- ttre c=omparable
untit'tiie taie titteenthcentury or, until even later, at the en
irirr",irr"l.lands
centralization' which culminr
the eighteenth century in Sulu' Likewise' economic
inroyalabsolutisminAcehandBantenduringtheseventeenthcentury,fo
onlv during the following century'
;;;;11;i Jevelopment in Terengganu
The rise and demise oi poilpofities in Southeast Asia was a sporadic
it lacn.oved througha cycleof growth' floresc
discontinuousphenomenon. "y
common features but' at the samet:
and decline, in the process,sharing some and.challenge
,*p""ai.g adoptingindepenJently!o:"y opportunities
"nd fusion of the two constituted an ov
maintaining continuityl'o-iit tft"ng"'to This problem of A
i-n cumulative advances' The
evolutionary process t;t;itfi
cultures..dominateduvco.mot*ogiesofstasisorequilibrium',,31within.af
could' at least in part' be resolv
of chronologicaland .p;;i"l ;[;"ttinuities32
the broaderperspectiveof the evol
the region'shistory *.tt ituit*td from
of its commercialcaPitals' of port-p
offera studyof a smallselection
in tiis volume
Thetwelveessays
fromabroadlocationalrange,treated'asfarasthematerialallows'chronolo
trading settlementswhicl
The precursorsof the port:polities were the.nascent
in So"ttt"att Asia' probably by the last centuries
believed to have
"-"'*""J these take a clearer form'33their sizt
But not until the thitd ;;;tttty A'D' did
between their location and
characteristic, a"t"r*in"J lv tn" interrelation
specific commercial functions'
-g";i.ni.g Chineseliterary sources
with evidencefrom archaeologicaland
I-"ong (pp'17-38) postulatesa preliminary I
referenceto the Malav-PenintUu,
have been necessarywithin the prel
of trading setttements which would
regional trade' Based a
geographical and economic framework to service
points'located inland, often dendritically
resourcecentres*"r" ti"-i""der These were I
of mineral and forest resources.
river valleys and in thel/i.rrrrv islandlor
rivermouth' or a convenient
by the river to a'cotteciingt"*tt'at the a superior stri
centres, with
like pulau Tioman. envin" of these collecting in relation to i
a commanding position
positionalongmaritimeirad" routesand an ent
potential to emerge as
points along the surrounding coasts' held-the
with regard to servicing trade at the local' re
The expansionof its utiiuiti-"t
with its overall commercialexpansi
and internationutt"u"i"*ur.oncomit"tit
trade routes'
the ultimate forging of links with international
Regionaltradeasu.ti.*ru'forthedevelopmentof.primary'or.pristine
is emphasizedby WissemanC
in SoutheasteSu, p,"-i"iing inai"ni'"tion'
the interior regions
(pp.39-60). Metals such as gold and copper from
courses the Peninsularrive
of
Sumatran chiefooms,and tin i'rom the lower
 lntroduction:An Oueruiew

',i'ithineasierreach of the coast,are thought to have constitutedimportant commo-

:ities in the developmentof intra-regionalexchange.In the caseof the Peninsula,
,pportunity for direct control by coastalsettlementsover interior suppliesis consi-
:ered to have contributed to the growth around th6 sixth and seventh centuries
,l metal industries at Tanjung Rawa, Kuala Selinsing,for example,involving the
:rocessingof metal and the manufactureof iron and copper implements,gold
'ervellery,beadsand bangles.Economicgrowth and the developmentof a network
: reciprocity,exchangeand redistributionthrough the dendritic movementof com-
:odities, involvingmarket and non-marketeconomieson the Polanyimodel,con-
:ributed to a corresponding hierarchical accumulation of wealth, influence and ;
euthority with the coastalchiefs at the apex._eThe more powerful of thesebecame
:he nuclei of 'pristin-e'' polities and, in time, establishedintra-regionaltrade with
. rhers in the samecategory.In the courseof doing so, they cameto shareelements
: a commonaesthetic,ideologicaland material culture; but as WissemanChristie
:oints out, "Trade with neighbouringcoastsaloneis unlikely to have provideda
.ifficiently substantialeconomicbaseupon which to form a state..."(p.52).Con-
:ectswith organizedstatesoverseasare thought to have providedthe additional
.npetus for the crystallization of authority, a basic ingredient for state formation.
?resent,however,were geographicaland physicalconstraintson the exerciseof
-:rect authority over the riparian and highlandpopulationsof Sumatra,for instance,
:articularly with the increaseddemand for forest produce from the fifth century
-\.D. At this stagethe processof accumulatingprestige,through the redistribution
: luxury goods obtained by long-distancetrade, would have been considerably
:lvanced by the adoptionof imported political and spiritual idioms.
Hindu-Buddhistcosmologicalideas,which inseparablylinked god, ruler and realm,
=r'identlyfostered the clustering of localizedtrading polities or circles of influence
'narydnry), within a larger sphereof authority under an overlord or paramountruler,
:s at Srivijaya. Within this system, the ruler's exercise of direct power did
.-,otextend beyond his immediate area of control.3s
The spiritual and charismatic influence of the Hindu-Buddhist ruler, acknowledged
:rrough a ceremonialoath, ensuredthe tributary servicesof the local ruler or datu
.rd the oranghut for the assemblyof essentialproduce at the entrepdt to service
::ie long distancetrade. Simultaneously,the manpower servicesthey rendered as
:art of the sametributary obligation to the ruler's superior authority were essen-
::al for the mobilization of forces for establishingthe commercial primacy of the
:ort and extendingthe hegemonyof the polity in areaswhere it was not voluntarily
Although a neat categorizationof Srivijaya's subsidiary trading centres
"ccepted.
:s not feasible, it appears,nonetheless,to have brought under its sway a range of
--entres,someof which had previouslyfunctionedindependentlyas coilectingcentres
and entrepOts,with their own network of feeder-points.Thus, upon the gradual
iisintegration of the Srivijayan maritime empire during the eleventh century, its
:omponentparts reverted to their original but still viable independentstatus. The
segmentary'nature of the empire36is further demonstratedby the evident lack
,,f integration or uniformity in the cultural and artistic traditions of the kingdom
\ik HassanSuhaimi,p.74).
Though gaps exist in our knowledge of the contribution of commerce to the
:rocesses of state formation during the early period in the western Archipelago,

lF.::_
 J. KathirithambY'Wells

t h e f u l l s c e n a r i o a s d e s c r i b e d b y V i l l i e r s ( p p ' 8 3 _ 1 0 5 ) ' w a s e nsixteenth

a c t e d i n ecen
as
the fifteenth.a-nd
donesiawith the gr";h ;;ih" .pice trade iuring
developedin responseto the
turies. on the basisof the cash-cropeconomy,which
gowthofthespicet,ua",tt'"'"evolvedintheBandalslandsamerchantoligarc
Maluku' to the north of Banda
of.orang hayacontrottingvili"ge confedetaji-ons'In
.o*mercial and politicat integration brousht abou
the same evolutionary f?o."..lf
rulers of Ternate and Tidore. A
a more advancedr"u"i oi unification under the
dictated the preservationof a higl
Ternate the insular .oniigor"tion of the region
at the centre by the ruler himself whos
degreeof provincial uuinJritv,,oordinated
political influence *"i-.on.ii".ably enhanced by his role as the Islamic spiritua
il;. ;it;;ilSriri:"v"r-*f"r whl was assistedby the orang laut, the sengajio
arm. The measureof his powe
warrior nobles of Tern"te for-ed the Sultan'sstrong
evident in his enforcement of the clove monopolvand the svster
;;;;;i;;as
through kora-kora expeditions' Deriving th
of compulsory collection of t'ibut"
.pi.it""r"'a-materialbasisofhispowerfromlslamandthetrad einclov
very powerful and achievedi
respectively,the Sultan of Ternate was potentially
tti.'p"f itv considerableroyal centralization and control'
the new era of port-politi
with the essayon Banien (pp.106-26) we enter
lv- Burop*n auring the sixteenth and Gveriteenth centurie
".ti"ity age of indigenousempirt
With fhe fall of Melaka to the Ptrtuguese in 1511, the
"'g"J","6
regional powers suc
in maritime SoutheastAsia gave way to contemporaneous
the case of Aceh and Banten' peppe
eift, Banten, Makassar and Johor' In
"t no longer collected in the wild state but was cultivate
lrr" U"ri. trr"
"r ".ono,ny,*as e, I.m:naar Muda (1607-36) demonstrated throug
intensivelyas a cash'Jrop.
in the face of western cor
the extirpation of pepper plantations in the Peninsula wr
surveillance and control over accessible areas
..t.i.r Jrt"ri.nseiz
"ii"titue political hegemony. B.4nten initiated tl
of far gteater i*portun." lrran extensive syste
of a stipulated number of vines as part of its
.on."it of forced .uiii rution
at Banten' By the time of Sult;
' of monopolyand rirrrrrit"n"outly ceniralizedtrade
A b d u l f a t h A b a u r r a t t a h a"su-atra
g""g(1651-82)therelationshipofthecentreto
."u.iJi".y regions in *utt had altered from one of tribute to taxatio
wherebythejennng,asrepresentativesofthemetropolitanpower,wereex male :
i" ."r]"i, tn. rJ chiefs, a minimum.amount of produce from each
"ii p.116).A[trade was centralizedin the handsof the ruler of Bantt
habitant(see the spiritr
;s overlord but as manager both of
who no longer functi"""J;a;"f'
andmaterialaffairsofthestate'Hispowerswereabsolute,thoughmainten
in the exercise of them'
of pro.p"rity at the port dem4ndeddiscretion
I n M a k a s s a r ( s e e p p . 1 4 3 _ 5 9 ) r o y a l s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r t r a d eport's ,essen
helped establishthe co
sisting western ur,".it. at monopoly control'
port capitalized on its strate
mercial pre-eminence in easte.nIndonesia.The
l o c a t i o n a n d t h e . " . . n a i p i t o . ' . u n i o n , i n t e r n a l l y , b e t w e e n t h e r i c e . r i c spi
ha
;;;t,; .;.;;; c"*" ine commerciailyshrewd rallo'. Though rice and
""J
w e r e t h e m a i n s t a y o f i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e t o t h e w e s t , Mpepper a k a s s fr a
an important centre for the collectionof sea produce from Sulu,
B o r n e o f o r e x p o r t t o C h i n a , a n d s l a v e s f r o m a l l o v e r t h e A r c h iprinc pela
islands became the
southern Philippines and the eastern Indonesian
 An Oaeruieu
Introduction: 9

sourcesof supply for slaves,with a significant sector of the trade handled by

\{akassar.38
Internationalexchangeat Makassarprovided a natural stimulus to inter-regional
trade. The importance of pepper and spicesfor the cash-cropeconomiesbrought
a ready circulation of currency, which created expanded markets for Indian
cloth.3eIn addition, Chineseporcelainof the cheaper'kraak'variety, as well as the
'martavan'jarssteadilygained
moreexpensivegrades,suchas the firnctionalbut rare
popularity during the seventeenth century.aoThe expansion of the cash-crop
economyalso meant an increase in the intra-regional rice trade to supply those
areaswhere labour was diverted partly or entirely to the cultivation of export crops.
As with Banten, Makassar's commercial pre-eminenceand its cultural leader-
ship as an Islamic power were closely related, the latter enhancing its friendly
relations with indigenous powers and local elements in the region. The ruler of
\lakassar, though protective of indigenous interests and fiercely guarding the
independenceof his port agairrstthe Dutch was obliged, like the ruler of Banten,
personally to participate in and encourage foreign trade, including that of the
English, the Danes and the Portuguese.International diplomacy became,indeed,
a prominent feature of the mechanicsof the seventeenthcentury port-polity.
Ayutthaya, discussedby Dhirawat na Pombejra(pp.126-42) offers a special
exampleof an agrarian-basedstate dependenton trade for augmentingits wealth.
External trade yielded ltxury goodsfor conspicuousconsumptionand ceremonial
display, essentialfor earning prestige and social standing. Wealth accrued from
erternal trade was alsonecessaryfor the acquisitionand maintenanceof manpower,
commensuratewith socialranking and the obligationto make merit. As in the great
nland agrarian states of central Java, and at Angkor and Pagan, considerablewealth
and manpower resources were expended in Ayutthaya on the building and
naintenance of temples and pagodas. With trade providing the material basis
:or social and political influence, it was in the interests of the ruler to curb the foreign
commercial activity of the khunnang, the Thai officials. Becauseof this and the
iact that the Thais were poor navigators, overseastrade was conductedlargely
cy foreigners and a high proportion of it was reserved as a royal monopoly. The
importanceof external trade as a sourceof wealth, and a heavy reliance on foreigners
ro organizeit, added a complex dimensionto court politics and diplomacy. Here,
rrore than in any other port-polity of the region, politics and trade were inextricably
intertwined. q,..,r,,
In SoutheastAsia the rise and demise of p6rt-polities was determined by the
interplay betwggg-lglernal Jfia- exiern4t.1-q-c-esApart from internal political
dirnamicsand shifts in economic control, there were changesin the direction of
trade routes, the increasein the demandfor sometypes of produce,and the decline
of marketsfor others,which decidedthe fate of individualport:polities.Two factors,
namely,the expansionof trade at the commercialnodesin the central and eastern
fuchipelago at Banten, Makassar and Manila during the seventeenthand eighteenth
centuries,and the expansionof the China trade during the latter century, brought
hitherto'peripheral'areas of trade into the mainstreamof international commerce.
In contrast with the politically sophisticatedstatesof Aceh, Alrrtthaya or Banten,
the polities of Magindanaoand Sulu were simpler in their organizationand were
impressivelyprecociousin their ready responseto economicstimulusand their adap-

F1=_
 [ Kathirithambt-Wells
10
challenge' ,
tation to external competition and
headed by d'atu' the evolution of the
Originating from trilii'cot'f"a"t"tiont
cam€ to full flowering during the seven-
Magindanaopolity in southernMindanao growth
teenthcenh'y. e..o.ou'!io"i--t tpp.160-gb)Magindanao'seconomic
"""r and supply centre for surrounding
was contingent upon its-role as a collecting
trade derived iiom the collection of inland
international entrepots."M"li"a"r""t
and sea produce such as pearls and
forest produce, mainly wax and cinnamon'
fio* Si*oav, in the vicinity of the main polity'
tortoise-shells,wfrictrwere ffirt"A control of
or from zamboanga"";il;;;;i' eu tr'"t" harbours were under the
gain pre-eminenceover the others' In the
the ruler, and none *"' p"t-iIt"d to a single entrepot, its inter-
not f-ocussedon
sameway that Ivruginauniot l.ua" *u. of commerce radiating
integrated network
island trade did not constitute a neatly
point, as *ith';;;;ih"' pottles discussedin this volume' Trade branched
from one
destinations' especially Ternate' Manila and
out in all directions t" "-t"ti"lv "f
external maikets was determined strictly
I Banten. The origin of exports to these
respective'feederpoints'inland,which
, accordingto the availab-iii&of produceat the
' export centres on the coast'
serviced the three main collecting and far
and external commerce at Magindanao
The accelerateagrowth of inteinal of produce,
for the collectionand exportation
outstrippedthe availaulei"uorrr ior."
the Sulu Sultanate a-century later' Attempts to alleviate
as experiencedalso by p*th":" and
ti,ro,,gt'tie a'iqi"ti1"t "itr"tes bvwavof pt"g."tism
theproblem li1Yarfare'
of the rulers
pioof of ttt"
was
the banning of the exportation of slaves,
ofMagindanao.Whilecapableofinnovationandadaptation,theyjealouslyguar
institutional t1"9llt:1r1^,Yoreover' the
their independence and autochthonous
lineagein matters p-ertammgto succes
precedenceof .ognut;kinthip over direct
sionamongsttherulingchiefs'andtheprevale-nceofcorporatedecision-ma
the royal absolutismencounteredin other
and group negotiations-contrastedwith
ways of organizing commercethan through
port-polities. tt e.e *eie evidently other the
autocracy - as indeed would have been
rigid political centratizationand royal period'
case for most of SoutheastAsia -inaduring an earlier
an Islamic
The confederutiorr .ii"i. attu witttin the bioad framework of
"J is ag11nmet with in the eighteenth century
state structure found ffi;;j;;;;"
(pp.ig6 -2r2).The Sulu Archipelago,whic
SuruSultanat"a"..rii"jru-warren Borneo
Mindanao to the northeast coast of
bridges the Sulu S"ul'o-'touthern teeming with trebang
uneven coastline
is sheltered tv .nariow waters and an allowed it to commandtht
p;;;i.. s"i;a sirategic location also
tortoise-shell.
"rd wax and camphor' and birds' nests fron
regional trade in tot"tl p'oaute' mainly
titt" Srivijaya' it was the entrepOtan
the coast and interiii t""""tli'g"*"o'.
a central position within a cluster o
redistributive rrrn.tiors of Jolo, occupying Samz
islands, which uroug;i,h";il;ry
-under ;.;iter"ea ana occupationally divergent
the Taosu
and Iranun (Illanun) the hegemonyof the Taosug. Significantly,
stap
Tapul group (Pataand Siami)' where the
occupiedJolo and tnelsfa"as of tie volcanic soils'
on the rich
rice suppliesof,n" t"giot were.cultivated generic appearto have bee
in S.fuiiuvu]ii"'oraig lautas a broad -group
Earlier, It was tl
able to provide tn" #;;lri t"u ptoaut" tor tne China market'
to Sulus rise an
unprecedenteO of this trade which contributed
"*p""'ion jungle produce which could not be met t
augmentedtn" a"'*nJior marine and
 An Oueruieus
Introduction; 11

the autochthonous population, despite their traditional maritime orientations.

Creatingand maintaining an efficient mechanismfor the acquisitionof slavesfrom
the Philippines and eastern Indonesia, and deployment of their labour for the
economy,constituted the main preoccupationof the sultanate.When, eventually,
Spanishefforts to halt the slave-raidingactivities of Jolo effectively destroyedthe
economicunderpinnings of the polity, much of its trade was dispersedand some
diverted to the new entrepOtat Singapore.
Terengganu,en routeto China and thus a haven for the English East Indiamen
andprivate vesselscollectingpepper,tin, birds'nestsand camphor,was yet another
port which reachedits political apogeeduring the nineteenth cenhyy (ShaharilTalib,
pp.272-30).As in other areasof cash-cropcultivation,thepopulation increasedand
expandedinland as new lands were openedup for cultivation. Far from losing its
pre-eminenceon the eastcoastwith the decline in the demandfor pepper,Tereng-
ganu proved impressively capableof turning to sugar-caneand coffee cultivation
,.vhilesteppingup its output of tin as demandfor this commodity rose. When faced
'.r'iththe meteoric rise of Singaporein the south, Terengganu ensuredits survival
'ry
making appropriate internal administrative arangements to sustain its role as
a subsidiaryport of the southern entrepOt.Where previously Kuala Terengganu's
unchallengedcommercial role had brought tribute and trade to converge auto-
natically at the capital,the rise of an alternativeentrep6tat Singapore,founded
n 1819,unleashedcentrifugal forces. In an attempt to check the trend and guarantee
rhe survival of Kuala Terengganuthe rulers set about replacingthe original district
chiefs of local lineage with appointeesfrom the capital. The Terengganu case
demonstratesthat political stability and economicprosperity were not necessarily
synonymouswith state integration, though the latter did in a number of instances
prove a prerequisite.
The rising tide of colonial expansionduring the nineteenth cenhry also threatened
rhe survival of other port-polities such as Brunei. Here the sultanate, which still
retained its hierarchically integrated provincial administration in the form of the
.iajahan,with the nobility at the helm, used the system to advantageon the west
:oast of Sabah(Ranjit Singh,pp.231-45). Sglu'sexpansionafter the mid-eighteenth
.entury and the wide dispersalof its maritime peoplecontributed to the shrinking
of Brunei's territories. Large numbers of the Sulu people settled on the fringe of
its once extensive empire in Borneo to establish basesfor slave raiding and sea
producegathering for servicing Jolo'strade. This did, however, bring a new leasb
of life to the economy of the west coast of Sabahby boosting strand and marine
activities. The new prosperity evinced itself in the form of the institution of the
tamu of periodic market. For Brunei, proximity to the west coast of Sabahfacilitated
the perpetuation of traditional commercial links with the area. The relationship
proved vital for its accommodationto the more modest role of servicing the trade
of Singaporein the face of competition from Labuan, which was occupiedby the
British in 1846 and to which it lost its valuable junk trade with China.
The political map of traditional SoutheastAsia was determinednot by peripheral
boundariesbut by the ext_gntof authority radiating from power centres -initially
locatedinland, along navigablestretchesof water and, as of the fifteenth century,
geneiallyiiong the littoral and at river mouths.alThe polity was thus nlore an area
of influence than a unit of territory. In practical terms, authority emanatingfrom

t-=,.-::
 12 J. Kathirithamby-Wells

the centie decreasedwith distance from the capital, so allowing for centrifugal
political tendencieson the outer fringes. But centripetal economicforces, fostered
'
byexchange,reciprocityandredistribution,solongastheyremainedviable,checked
disintegration and lent cohesivenessto the polity.a2 It is the varying tension
between these two opposite trends which largely accountsfor the cyclic rise and
fall of polities in the region.
For most polities in SoutheastAsia there was no separatebureaucraticotganiza
, tion. The administration of the polity and stability within it depended on the
reclp1lfAllg1atio,Is"maintained between the ruler and the elite community. Spiritual
rnvGtiq*l a"ii.t;ed f.otn genealogical, cosmological and relifious beliefs, com-
plemented material wealth in determining leadershipand power. The Southeas
\"o .ir' Asian ruler's capacityto control economicresourcesand accu$ulate wealth for
: j' '
redistribution among the elite chiefs and vassalsconstituted the basic mechanism
' for cementing and sustaining loyalties and thereby guaranteeingthe unity of the
state.
Ideally, the nobility and chiefs, by haying direct accessto.manpower and the
provincial segments of the economy, provided a check on royal despotism
Simultaneousiy,'ur-un"g"rs of the componentparts of the administrative infra-
structure, they determined the realignment of loyalties and resourceswhenever
centres of power declined or collapsedand others emerged in their place. It was,
in fact, the forces of local authority which guaranteedoverall historical continuity
"'-'within a region where power centres shifted at regular and frequent intervals.
The agrarian and maritime polity in SoutheastAsia were alike in their dependenc
on wealth and manpoweras the basisfor political authority. At the sametime, geo
'econoniic
- '' factors dictatedeither a unitary or a complementaryrelationshipbetween
agrarian and maritime activities, expressedin a single or two separatebut related
centres of port and polity. The gradual shift of populations and political centres
from prehistoric
"' generally from the piedmont to coastll and estuarinelocations,a3
into modern times, coincided with the entry of Southeast Asia into the wider circuil
of intra-regional and international trade. The proclivity of the populace to the
consumptionof luxury and prestige goods,stimulated by an insatiable demandir
the world market for the natural produce of the region, with concomitantimplica
tions for internal socio-cultural processes,gave a clear advantage to maritime
polities. The ports of SoutheastAsia were, in this sense,distinctly different fron
for example,which as van Leur noted
, their counterpartsalong the Indian coast,
were "for the most part politically isolated from the great inland areas."aaThc
developmentof port-polities from their preliminary stage as collecting centres tc
their more advancedforms as emporia reachedits apogeeafter c.1400,as tht
region's trade expandedand fused with the world economy. The unprecedente
growth of trade and the new opportunities available for political and diplomati<
manoeuvrings,particularly with increasedEuropeanintrusion after 1600,45strain
ed traditional power dynamics. Royal absolutismswere a significant symptom of this
Drawing upon the concentrationof material resourcesand rich cultural parapher
nalia at its strategic location, the port-polity in SoutheastAsia played an importan
role in initiating major historicalprocessesfrom the dawn of history to the establish
ment of Europeanimperialism in the region. By stimulating the economicpotentia
of its hinterland, it contributed towards regional integration and material and cultura
 An Oueruieu
Introduction: 13

enrichment.None of this could have been managedwithout the political sagacity

of the mlers at the frffi'and their ability to respondto external stimuli and challenge.
In the SoutheastAsian port-polity we find the everlasting model of SoutheastAsian
statehood,which struck an even balance between internal and external orienta-
tions.a6
From the secondhalf of the seventeenthcentury Europeaneconomicand political
intrusions brought about the gradual decline of indigenous port-polities in Southeast
Asia. The loss of their pre-eminencein commercedeterminedtheir political decline.
The conceptof the port-polity, however,found new meaningand renewedstrength
in the European maritime trading stations scatteredthroughout the Archipelago,
at the imperial capitals-cum-emporiaat Manila, Batavia, Singapore' Rangoon,
Bangkok and Saigon.Each serviced its independentsector of administration and
trade but was ultimately locked into the international network of commerceand
inter-state relations. Singapore'srise to pre-eminencewithin the regional system
of commerceand exchangewas, in fact, the nahyal outcome of the overall expansion
of long-distancetrade and the evolution of port-polities in SoutheastAsia. The
indigenousports fell from their positions of eminenceand acquired a reduced but
essen-tial?ole.at lower levels of the commercialhierarchy, dominatedby these
European trading capitals, at strategic positions along the main sea-routes.
ColoniblpolftiCdlinlluencedid little to alter the ecologicalrealitiespertainingto
the traditional characterand function of the polity in SoutheastAsia. Through about
two thousand years of evolution the port-polity witnessed changes in size and
location, shifts in the volume and emphasisof its trade, movement towards new
cultural orientations and the rise and ebb of political fortunes. In spite of this, it
never lost its relevanceas a fundamental feature of SoutheastAsian civilization.

\OTES

1. R.B. Smith & W. Watson(eds.),Earb sor.r.thEastAsia: Essays in Archneologt,Historyand

Historical Geographl(Kuala Lumpur/New York, 1979\,258; J. Miksic, "Archaeology,
Trade and Societyin NortheastSumatra"(PhD dissertation,CornellUniversity, 1979),
12, 59; O.W. Wolters, Eaily IndonesianCommerce:A Study of the Origins of Siuijaya
(Corne11, 1967), 37-42; J.K. Whitmore, "The Opening of SoutheastAsia, Trading
PatternsThrough the Centuries",EconomicExchangeand SocialInteractionin Southeast
Asin; Perspectiuesfrom Prehistory,History and Ethnographl, (ed.) Karl L 'Hutterer,
Michigan Paperson South and SoutheastAsia, No. 13 (Michigan, 1977),177'
2. Smith & Watson,Early Southeast Asia, 13.
3. Ibid.,passim.SeeespeciallyB. Bronson,"The Late Prehistoryand Early History of central
Thailand with Special Reference to Chansen",326, 332; A.H' Christie' "Lin-i,
Fu-nan, Java",ibid.,385. Peter Beliwood, Prehistorl of the Indo-MalaysianArchipelago
(Sydney,1985),136,271-79.
4. B. Bronson,"Exchangeat the upstreamand downstreamends:Notestowardsa functional
model of the coastalstate in SoutheastAsia", in EconomicExchangeand SocialInterac-

l*=:+-'
tA J. Kathirithamby-Wells

tion in Southeast Asia, (ed.)Hutterer, 39-52'

5. Bellwood,Prehistoryof the Indo-MalayianArchipelago,2T9'
(Honolulu,1985)
6. K.R. Hall, Maritime Tradeand StnteDeuelnfmcntin Early Southzast.Aszz
49,235.Majapahit'strade did not convergeon a singlecommercialcentre Although
Conggo."*i."d the hinterlandtrade of the Brantas,the coastaland internationaltrade
was handledby Surabayaand Tuban. Ibid ,329 n82'
7. G. Dalton, "Karl Polanyi: analysisof long-distancetrade and his wider paradigm"
(Albuquer
Ancient ciuilization and Trade,(ed.)J.A. Sabloff & c.c. Lamberg-Karlovskv
que, 1975),91_93;P. Wheatley,..Satyintra in Suvarnadvipa: From Reciprocity to
Redistributionin Ancient SoutheastAsia",ibid', 227-29'
8. See Leong Sau Heng, pp.23-26 and J. wisseman christie, p.42 in this volume.
g. p. Wheatley,The Kings of theMountains;An Indittn'Contibutionto Statecraftin %utheas
.4sra.SecondSri Lanka EndowmentFund Lecture deliveredat the University of Malaya
(KualaLumpur, 1981),5-11.
10. K. Hall "State and statecraft in early Snvijaya", E.xplorationsin Ear\ SoutheastAsian
History,(ed.)K. Hall & J.K. Whitmore, Michiganpaperson Southand SoutheastAsia
No. ti (Mictrigan,Ig76),65; N. Aeusrivongse,"Devarajacult and Khmer kingshipin
Angkor", ibid., 711-38.
(Singapore
11. O.W. Wolters, History, Culture and Regionin SoutheastAsian Perspectiues
1982),6-15; HermanKulke, "The Early and the ImperialKingdomin SoutheastAsia"
(Singapore
southeastAsia in the9th to the l{th c,enturies,(ed.)D.G. Marr & A.C. Milner
1986),2-3.
12. O.W. Wolters, The Fall of siuijay in Malay History(oxford, 1970),14-16; P. Wheat
(Chicago,1983
Iey,Nagdraanl commandery:origins of fuutheastAsian urban Traditbns
ZriS;e.C. Milner, Kemjaan, Malay Political Cultureon the Eueof ColonialRuLe(Arizona
1982\.20-28.
13. Hall, Maritime Trade and StateDeuelopment,53-54'
74. Ibid.,85,AtKaranganyar,tothewestofthemoderncityofPalembang,archaeol
excavationshave revealed"an elaborateand extensivecomplexof canals,tanks an
habitationsites",which could suggestsauah cttltivation.See E Edward McKinnon
,,Earlypolitiesin SouthSumatra:Somepreliminary observationsbasedon archaeoiogic
evidence",Indonesia40 (1985):15-16.
15. J. Wisseman-christie,"Negdra,Mandalaand DespoticState: Imagesof Early Java
T9;J. Stargard
in Marr & Milner (ed..),SoitheastAsia in the9th to the 14th Centuries,
SatingpraI: The Enuironmentaland EconomicArchaeologtof South Thailand, Britisl
ArchieologicalReports,oxford, and Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies,singapor
(1983),213-15;Wheatlev,Nagira and Commandery,278-79'
16. J. Kathirithamby-Wells,"Forces of regional and state integration in the wester
(1986):24-25
Archipelago,c.r'soo-tzo0", Journalof southeastAsian studies13, i
17. J. Wisseman,"Markets and Trade in Pre-MajapahitJava",in EconomicExchangean
SocialInteractionin Southeast Asin, (ed.) Hutterer, I97'212'
18. Hall, Maritime Trade and state Deuelopmentin Early southeastAsia, 177-72.
19. see A.F. Burghardt, "A hypothesisabout gateway cities", Assocrationof Amerim
Geographers'[nnals Gl, ii (1971):266-73: Miksic, "Archaeology,Trade and Societyi
NortheastSumatra",72-79.
20. Though Chinesediplomaticpolicy towardsSoutheastAsia was determinedby commerc
interests,it was wiih the aim of controllingand regulatingoverseascontactand discoura
ing private enterprise.It was less an economicthan a politicalstrategy.Thus, Chir
cto.ea lts ports from time to time for trade with SoutheastAsia. SeeWolters, The Fa
 Introduction:An Oueraieu, 15

o;fSnnijay, chapter5; K. Hall, "Small Asian statesin the shadowof the large: Early
Asian History through the eyes of Southeast Asia",Journal of the Economicand Social
Historyof the Orient 27, i (1983):58.
l1 D. Lombard,"Questionson the contactbetweenEuropeancompaniesand Asian societies",
in Companies and Trade,(ed.)L. Bluss€& F. Gaastra(The Hague, 1981),183.
)2 J. Kathirithamby-Wells,"The Islamiccity: Melakato Jogjakarta,c.1500-1800",Modzrn
Asinn Studies20, ii (1986):335, 340-41.
l3 A. Reid,"The structureof cities in SoutheastAsia, fifteenthto seventeenthcenturies",
/SE45 11, ii (1980):237-43.
N. Elias, StateFormationand Ciuilization(Oxford, 1982),5.
A. Reid, "Trade and state power in 16th and 17th century SoutheastAsia", Pro-
ceedingsof the SeuenthIAHA Conferezcc(Bangkok, 1977),396.
Ibid.. 386-87.
Allowing for the exaggerationof early travel accountsand for a smalleroverallpopulation
in SoutheastAsia at the time, a residentpopulationof 1,000Buddhistpriestsand an
army of 2,000 foot-soldiersis an impressiveone for Srivijaya,which is said to have
shelteredwithin its brick walls a cosmopolitantrading population.SeeHall, Explorations
in Early Southeast Asian History,69,95. Acco-rdingto the Arab writer, Ibn al-Faquih
(902),so cosmopolitanwas the kingdom of Srivijaya that "the parrots there talked
Persian,Arabic, Chinese,Indian and Greek." Even smallertrading ports of the ninth
and tenthcenturiessuchas Takuapa,thepasisirof Javaand LubukTua (west Sumatra)
harboured,amongothers,powerful Tamil merchantcorporationsto boot. Rita Rosedi
Meglio, "Arab Trade with Indonesiaand the Malay Peninsulafrom the 8th to the 16th
Century",Islam and the Tradeof Asia, A Colloquium,(ed.)D.S. Richards(Oxford, 1970),
11; G. Ferrand (ed. & trans.), Relationsde uoyageset textesgiographiquesarabes,Persans
et turcsrdlatifsd I'ExtuAme-Orientdu VIIIe au XVII( siicles,I (Paris, 1973-74),22-24;
Wheatley,"Satydntrain Suvarnadvipa",24l-42; WissemanChristie, "Markets and
Trade in Pre-Majapahitlava",208.
See D.G. McCloud, Systemand Processin SoutheastAsia: The Euolution of a Region
(London,1986),65, for a view on the importanceof milrjary force in the integration
of Funan. For a discussionof the military organizationof Srivijaya, seeNik Hassanbin
Suhaimi,pp.65,67,76 in this volume.
:. For Majapahit see Ha1l,Maritime Trade and StateDeuelofment,245-55
This phenomenonwas not peculiarto SoutheastAsia and hasbeennotedin the history
of the maritime centres of Europe. See Fernand Braudel, Ciuilization and Cafitalism,
1sth-I9th century:Ill, The Perspectiueof the World, translatedfrom the French by SiAn
Reynolds(London,1984),32-35.
I. Mabbett, Patternsof Kingship and Authority in Traditional Asilt (LondonlSydney,
1985),6.
This led Harry Bendato pioneerthe'structural'or genericapproach.See:"The structure
of SoutheastAsian history:Somepreliminaryobservations", JSEAH 3 (1958):106-38.
SeealsoA.H. Johns,"Islam in SoutheastAsia: Problemsof Perspective",Southeast Asinn
Historjtand Historiograpfu,(ed.)C.D. Cowan& O.W. Wolters, Essays Presented
to D.G.E.
Hall (Cornell,1976),306.
SeeWissemanChristie,pp.4l-52,54 in this volume.
Dalton,"Karl Polanyi:Analysisof long-distancetradeand his wider paradigm",Ancient
Ciuilizationand Trade,(ed.)Sabloff and Lamberg-Karlovsky,91. SeealsoBronson,"Ex-
changeat the upstreamand downstreamends:Notestowardsa functionalmodelof the
coastalstate in Southeast Asia",EconomicErchangeand SocialInteractionin Southeast
Asin, (ed.) Hutterer, 39-54.

-
 -
16 J. Kat hirit hambYWell s

as'a federationof trading ports",but in this

35. srivijaya has beendescribedby wolters
merely as a trading centre but a port-
context the term,port,neeJs toie interpreted not
unit'^See Wolters, The FatI of Srtuijaya.in Malay
polity within a ui"lr"
"conomic
History,9'Seealsomr"*i*.uai.o"sionofthe.segmentary'natureoftheSrivijayan
kingdom.
3 6 ' . S e g m e n t a r y , h e r e t s u s e d n o t a s i t p e r t a i n e d s p e c i political
f i c a i l y tunits"'
o t h e Slinked,
t r u c t u loosely
reofth
in South India but ir ti" -"." g...."1."r,r. of;localized recognised by local
,ou"r.igntv might for a time be
and symbolically, t" ki;;";;." south India (Delhi'
peasant State and Society in Medieual
chieftains.,,SeeBurton stein,
1980),44-45.FortheapplicationofthisconcepttosoutheastAsiaseeHermanK
"Early state to.-uti#'unJ ritual policy .in-East Java"' The -E-ighth^Conferen
International n..o.iuiiotioi Hiti"ii*t oi Atiu' Kuala Lumpur ' 25-28 August 1980
7 - 8 .
37.P.A.Tiele,..DeEurope€rsindenMaieischeArchipel'',BKIxxv(|877):245.
38'A'Reid,...Closed,and.open'slavesystemsinPre-colonialsoutheastLsia',,inS
Reid (Queensland'1983)' 170
Bondageana oe|enaei6-'in- ioutieast^Asia'.(ed')
.sruu.".v'"nJ'trr"ii"u" T.rde in South Sulawesi,1660s-1800s",fDid
H. sutherland,
267.
3g.SeeTapanRaychaudhuri,"JanCompanyinCoromandel'1605-1690"'IzK1
Hague, 1962),Passim'
porcelainin the inter-regionaltrade durinl
40. For an accountof the increasingimportanceof
Porcelain and the Dutch East Indies Compan
the seventeentit.."tutlt, tt; i' Vott"t'
in tn, oos;'-"ing;t;s of Batauincastle,... 1602- 1652 (Leiden, 1971\,lassim
as recorded
4 1 . D ' L o m b a r d , . . P o u r u n e h i s t o i r e d e s v i l l e s d u S u d - E s t a"European
s i a t i q u e ' companres
' , A n n a l e san
Ec
Societis-Ciailizattons (Paris, July 1970)' 847-48; Lombard'
Asian societies", 181'
integration in the western Archipelago
42. SeeKathirithamby-wells, "Regionaland state
22-24.
the eighteenthcenturiesonly two interit
43. Lombard has noted that during the fifteenth to
regionse*pe.ienced"n-u't"-nttnulttanceandtheseweretheupperreache
Irrawaddywithtt'".,."oteu",andcentralJava,-withthecapitalsofKartasura,Surak
and Jogjakarta.L";;;;p"u, un" ti.toi." des viiles du Sud-Estasiatique",848'
44.J.C.vanLeur,Ind'onesinnTradeandSociety:EssaysinAsiansocialandEconomic
(The Hasue, L95)' 77-78'
45'AlthoughinternationaltradehadbeenknownearlierduringtheHan-Pathan.Ro
period, the fung-atUlttia p"ti"i the Mongol period' it was the Europeanmaritin
""a
revolutionofthefifteenthandsixteenthcenturies,involvingthemassmoveme
open to the world economy. Phil
consumption go"ai^*i,l.tr uia sorrtrreast.Asia
"t l, world History (cambridge, 1984),105, 119; Bail
D. curtain, crou ciin oi'iroi
of the Portuguese Empire' 1415-15i
W. Diffie S C"org;"D. Wtniis, Foundntions
(Oxford, 1977)' 5-15'
46,seeA.Day,..HowModernModernity,HowTraditionalTraditioninnineteen
tury Java?"RIMA 20, i (1986):1-10'
 2
FeederPoints
CollectingCentres,
and Entrepotsin the Malay Peninsula,
1000B.c.-4.D. 1400

LEONG SAU HENG

Erclution of the eaily Dort-folity

-\ttempts to trace the history of early trade in the Malay Peninsulalhave follow-
:d a number of different lines. The study of foreign literary sources,namely,
Chinese,Greek (Ptolemaic),Indian and Arab writings have contributedlargely
:rrvardsprovidingus with namesof severalearly emporiaand trading politiesin
:he Peninsula.Much informationon the types of trade commoditiesand, at times,
:re trading networksinvolvedcan alsobe gleanedfrom the corpusof Chineseand
Arab texts. Thanks to these literary referenceswe now have a mosaicof place
:ramesof early marts and trading polities. From the Chinesetexts we hear of
:Lacessuch as Tun-sun (Tien-sun),T'ou-chri{i (Chti-li),P'i-tsung,Tan-tan, P'an-
: an, Lang-ya-hsiu, Lo-yrieh,Ko-io,Ko-ku-loand Folo-an and
Ch'ih-t'u,Chieh-ch'a,
Tan-ma{ing.2 From the mid-second century work of Ptolemy, the Geographike
:Iuphegesis,we have referencesto trading emporia in the Golden Khersonese(the
l,lalay Peninsula),namely, Takola, Kole and Sabara(Sabana).3 Indian literary
',','orkscite names such as Takola, Kataha, Kalagam, Kidaram and Tambra-
.::gam,awhile Tamil epigraphy(the 1030A.D. Tanjore Inscription)providesus
:,,'itha list of eleventhcentury A.D. commercialcentres,for exampleIlangasogam,
:alaittakkolam, Madamalingamand Kadaram.sThe writings of the ninth century
.-..D. Arab geographersgive many interestingdescriptionsof trading centressuch
.s Kalah, Qaqullahand Tiyumah.6Indeed.without these toponymsthe study of
.a:l.v trade in the Peninsulawould be quite abstractand characterless,being devoid
--any measureof identity. Here, one cannotresort to archaeologyfor the actual
..ames of these ancient trading centres, except when inscriptions made on
:rperishable (mainly non-organic)materialsare found. Even these may not always
--:,ntainreferencesto the name of the site.
Early Chinesedynastichistories,travel recordsand encyclopaediashave also
.:eatly helpedto throw light on the chronologyof someof the early trading cen-
:es in the Peninsula.From the Chinesedynastichistories,particularlythe Liang-
,,:rrand theSui Shu of.theseventhcenturyA.D., and the Chui Tang'sha(oldannals

t7

F-.-=
 \
)
(
9 \,.
b\
7\,
\P \
f/
I I,
| /l

ifrlnffif,j
x.Q
a\

\Yz
1'o

- , -- -l-)%- =- xuatax
Kueto q\, Terenggan
q\
tr'- \
rnsing tG'

PENfNSULAR "aC
MALAYsIA
PAHANG
lasikCinio
KUALA
.LUMPUR
'Kg. JendcromHilir

Malaysia and Southern Thailand

Some archaeologicalsites tn Peninsular
 FeederPointsandEntrepots
,',,llectingCentres, 19

-'f the Tang dynasty618-906 A.D.), as well as the eighth century A.D. Chinese
-ncyclopaedia,the Tung tien,we learn of the existenceof severaltrading polities
-,.'the third centuryA.D., suchas Tun-sun,Chu-li,and Lang-ya-hsiau. From these
:arly Chinese writings we know exactly when these trading polities entered into
:,'rmaltrade relationswith China,in other words, when they beganto participate
:. rhe tributary trade; P'an-p'anwas alreadysendingtrade embassiesto China in
::.efifth centuryA.D., Liang-ya-hsiuand Tan-tanwere doingthe samein the sixth
--:ntury,followed by Ch'ih-t'uin the early seventhcentury A.D. Chinesetravel
:=cordssuchas thoseby l-Ching likewisegive indubitableevidencefor the existence
: Chieh-Ch'ain the Peninsrtla,T an importantport on the maritime route between
S,,'ltheastAsia and India in the seventhcentury. I-Ching'srecordsalso contain
-.:erencesto Lang-chia-shu (Liang-ya-hsiu)8and Tan-tan.e
The literary records further furnish us with information regarding the types of
:ade commoditiestransactedat the variousancientmarts. At Liang-ya-hsiu,for
s:ance,localproductssuchas ivory, rhinoceroshorns,gharu-woodand camphor
,.-re exchangedfor spirits, rice, silk and porcelainvessels.l0At Tan-ma{ing
ambralinga)foreign merchantscouldobtaingoodssuchas beeswax,laka-wood,
;:-aru-wood,ebony,camphor,ivory and rhinoceroshorns in exchangefor "umbrellas,
..^. wine, rice, salt, sugar,porcelainvessels,earthenwarebowls and similar coarse
.:.: heavywares,togetherwith gold and silver platters."llThe productsof Kalah
::uded aloes-wood,camphor, sandalwood,ivory, tin, ebony and all kinds of
:;es.12It is evident from the examplesquotedabovethat many of the Peninsula's
::,,ducts, except for tin, were perishableand no amount of archaeological work
.: hopeto retrieveany informationon theseitems.If only for this reason,foreign
::ary sourcesassumea singular importancefor this region.
\evertheless, the use of foreign literary sourcematerialsis not without its limita-
:s and pitfalls. Besidesthe enormoustask of collating scrapsof informationfrom
: corpusofforeign texts, scholarsalsofaceconsiderabledifficulty in identifying
: toponymsin thesetexts. In fact, many of them have yet to be identifiedand
:atedwith certainty.For example,much ink hasbeenspilledon varioustheories
:cerning the locationof Kalah.13Scholarsare also vague about the locationof
:.emy'sSabara,while the locationof Takola,somewhereon the northwestcoast
:le Malay Peninsula,has yet to be satisfactorilyidentified.Tan-tan has been
.rtified with Kelantanby Hsu Yun-Ts'iao,rawhile Wheatleyprefers to placeit
:re estuaryregion of a major river in Terengganu.15 Wolters, on the other hand,
=-.suggestedthat Tan-tan was a Javaneserather than a Peninsularkingdom.16
There is also good reasonto exercisecare in the use of information on the
-:xology of the trading politiesfurnishedby the foreignliterary sources,in par-
:lar, the Chinesedynastichistories.All datesmentionedin theserecordsmere-
:efer to particular points in time when the Chinesethemselvescame to know
:re oolitiesor when trade missionsfrom thesepolitiesarrived in China.What
do not thereforeknow is when exactly thesetrading polities cameinto existence
rvhenthev peteredout. The lack of informationhas led somescholarsto believe
:-: many of the SoutheastAsian trading polities were largely ephemeraiin nature:
were established,almost overnight,and vanishedfrom the recordsas sud-
::i1' as they came.While this may be true of the lesseror smaller polities,the
rie may not be the casewith someof the larger polities.It is possiblethat some

r--=.
 LeongSauH
20
much in the Chineserecords' not sim
of these larger polities do not {eature becausetrz
temporarily or permanentlybut
becausethey had ."ur"iio-""i*
m i s s i o n s t o C h i n a f r o m t h e s e l a r g e r p o l i t i e s w e r e i nports
f r e q uhas
e n tled
. some ea
history of local
Lack of evidence on the evolutionary about
th; ieninsula to postulate theories
researchers on anclent ;;#;;
establishmentoftrading"**o.'""na.radingcoloniesthroughforeigninitiative Valle'
at lakuapa17 and in the Bujang
= as, in particular, the l"diJ;;;tants largerv on the basis o{
Kedah.18Arthough thJ^;hJ;; tuu" t""n formulated
one may suspect that much o{
th9
= chaeologicalfinds hastiiy atg ft"* lite;,
is of a deducti" t"itt"t than inductive nature' in short' explorations
= reasoning L
to substantiatepreconceivedtheories'
digs conducteAin searctr'o] Jjects a local development wl
= possibilitiesof
or no attempthasbeen;;;;;:;rider
with areasacrossthe Bav of Ber

E would eventually have il;;;iliua"li"r..

note of the long-standingseafarings
At this point, it tuy b" usefulto take
Asian groups' In the Chinesesout
of various maritime-o'ilirtlt"Jso"ttt"ast
to ocean-goingcraft which were rt
such as theLiang-shu,lt'"'" u" references frizzv-h
be mannedby the dark-skinned'
red to as po'. These *;t; t;td to been identified and are
'Kun-lun'. Both the p''lnaitt"'Kun-lun'have now
Ethnographic data_Jrom.Southea
= sideredto be of Soutfrealiis-ian oiigin.t,
on the seafaringski1lsand maritime 1
can alsofurnish rr. *iti'lrltttt iniot"'Ition
group,the Bajau.z.Recentlv,a u
trading activities
"f ";;;i;.".oori"ntat"d Indonesiahas argued:
commentingon Indian influencein
=
in the IndianOceanandwho expo
It wasnot the Indianswho startedseafaring ratherdo i
to Indonesia;
and architecture
theircultureuta t'p"ti"ifv'i"i' religion
totonistswhosetin motion IndianOce
the
- haveto thinkof f"ao*"i'it""f'-o"-a
World'2l
tradeup to ttt" t'ontiJ" oi ttt" Classical
4
=-

the tr'
chronologyand origin of someof
Therefore,on the questionof the on what ap
politiesin the Malay P;;J"' onecannotplacetoomuch emphasis
- communities wert
ioutheasi Asian trading
in foreign literary .";;;;;. i'h; Pen
tontact witn the regions both east of the Malay
-- bably already in ait"ti long before Chinese' I
and the Indian ocean
- and west of the Bav ;;;;;;;i the existe
their activities or mentioning
or Arab sourcesu.gun ,".J.aing
the more sustainedcommercial rel
SoutheastAsian traoi''tg o"ii'*ftfike intermit
contactswere probabiy conducted
= ships of a iater period, ti"t" ""ttv
and on a small scale. peninsula wr
trading polities in the
=- i*p"tn. for the establishment of
=, and foreigncolonists'Archaeolo
necessarilyprovidedly tot"ign merchants
- cuitural strataat variousso-called'Ind
in fact, be usedt" h"l;i;;;;t;arlier have
iftailand' at Chansen'archaeologists 'J
= sites in the Peninsulafit *tt*f duration pre-dating the
= long
evidence ot t r-un'oi.;;"*; "i-i"i.r1 ctt"nt"n is an inland site and <
influence' o..uputlo#fli"t';; er*t"'.sit
archaeologi
the geographi.u'"t discussionhere' nonethelessthe
"natt that Southeast Asian trading stationsor
ings from the site t ur"-iJr""rrirated dates from the C
Radiocarbon
centres were not
"";t;igh;;;;;;ments'
 FeederPointsandEntrepdts
t'ollectingCentres, 2l

site have also shown us that its inhabitantswere alreadyin commercialcontact

.i'ith India by the first century A.D., at a much earlier time than known from foreign
,:terarysources.This early date for trade betweena SoutheastAsian centre and
India is no surpriseto archaeologists.In fact, there is much to suggestthat the
:nergence of long-distancetrade betweenSoutheastAsia and adjacentregionswas
:.tt a natural courseof development,particularly for those SoutheastAsian centres
',.'hichhad had experienceof intra-regionaltrade during prehistorictimes. Recent
.:udiesin PeninsularMalaysiahave providedmuch evidenceto suggestthat such
.:.:ra-regionaltrade was conductedbetween PeninsularMalaysia and Mainland
:rutheast Asia during the Later Bronze Age of Mainland SoutheastAsia' This
.:ade dealt mostly in metal ores, and prehistoric exchangecentres have been
.,.ated on both the east and west coastsof PeninsularMalaysia'23
Future archaeological work in the Peninsulashouldbe concernedwith locating
.'.':denceof a pre-Indian-influenced cultural stratum.For PeninsularMalaysia,poten-
:.:-1sitesthat may providesuchdataare Guar Kepah immediatelysouthof the Kuala
l.luda areaof Kedah,and Kuala Selinsingat Tanjung Rawa,Perak.Previousexgzlva-
: : recordsat thesesiteshavemadebrief mentionof severalnon-Indianized finds
: :he areas,in particular,cord-markedand rough pottery and stoneaxe headsof
- : neckedvariety recoveredin a 1941 excavationat Guar Kepah.2aThis site,
v -'atednear the banks of an old courseof the River Muda, may have much to offer,
:t ..:ecially as an earlier excavationin the area2shas also yielded extensivepre-
- r:oric materials. The 1955 archaeologicalexcavationsat Kuala Selinsing26
::3wiseyielded some evidenceof a pre-Indiancontact2T occupationalphase.
-: shouldalso be borne in mind that archaeologicalinvestigationsalong these
.-:s is best conductedat both an intensive(vertical)and extensive(horizontal)level.
..-.: complexityof the problemsinvolved is best illustrated by Quaritch Wales'
:,.--a\-ations at Nakhon Si Thammarat in the early 1970s.28 At Nakhon Si Tham-
- ..:at, consideredto be the Tambralinga of the thirteenth century by Wales,
_.:ctsthat long antedatethe late Srivijayanperiodhavebeenreported.Yet trial
rg
: -avationsconductedat a singlesite in the area,at a desertedSivatemple,failed
,.
rS ' ::oduce evidencesfor an earlieroccupationthan that representedby numerous
o-
: -:-g sherds.
1n : ,r evidenceon the terminal datesfor trading politiesin the Peninsulaas weli,
of ,.::- from the local sitesthemselvesbecomeimportant. Here again,archaeology
In- .:. providevital information.If suitablesamplesfor dating are found, radiocar-
ly : rates as well as relative datesmay be established.The latter are usuallybas-
:, ,,n comparative studies of architectural styles of structural remains, of
rot , -,graphy, and typologicalanalysisof ceramics(particularlyChinesetrade wares),
In, .-,:s andglassfragmentsfrom the uppermostlevelsof depositsat the sites.Even
-:a:-tive evidencemay usefully be employedfor relative dating purposes.Here
:d'
nd . -=:er to the absenceof blue-and-whiteporcelainsat most of the Bujang Valley
ln- , :.., particularlyat the entrepOtof PengkalanBujang, which strongly suggests
--.: entrep6ttrade hereprobablycameto an end by the late fourteenthcentury.2e
ide
:rd- --:.othermajor problemin the study of early trade in the Malay Peninsulais the
rng ..s:iicationof the varioustradingcentreswhich featurein foreignliteraryrecords.
'tradingpolities'hasbeenemployedin a generalsenseto denote
len :.:.rer, the term

-
 LeongSauHe
ZZ

c e n t r e s w h e r e S o m e f o r m o f o r g a n i z e d t r a d i n g . s o c i e t i e s e x i s the
t e dtributa
,andw
with china under
included especiallythose whichionducted relations
t r a d e s y s t e m . o n e s h o u l d , h o w e v e r , e x e r c i s e s o m e c a u t iorganized
o n i n d e s cpoliti<
ribin
n_ecessarily evolveas
trading centresas.states,,ior they did not 'states'possess
into the categoryof
communities.In other *orar1t "v aid not fall
political systems'
i"r-"f governmentor highly centralized
political systemsexisted at the tit
This is not to say tt ui,io f,igi,f' organizld
cornit fto* Peninsular Thailand'Recent archa
in the region.A possible
""u-p"ft an extensive netw(
i;;i;;i;";k in ihe Sati'gphri region claims to have traced
links the ancient centre, or the cita
of ancienthydraulic .v.t"'r". i, un""."u which However,in Pen
and Pattani Rivers.30
area,with the headwatJrs'of-it i.ung
"
suiarMalaysiaitselfthereislittlearchaeoiogicalevidenceforconstructio
Aerial photographsof the Ta
on a major scalefor,tr"'p"tlJ"nder discussion. in the ar
some'canal-like'systems
cini areaof centralrairai.,ft "v" alsolocated
butsubstantialarchaeologicalexcavationsremaintobeconducted'The ar
and Kuala
const*ctioi works in the Bujang Valley 'Muda
"."-J.. "i size. Until later archaeological w
of Kedah are all .t*.irr.". of moderate
p r o v i d e s e v i d e n c e , n t t " t b e v a l i d t o v i e w . t h e'chiefdom'
ancienttradingsettlemen
the level of socio-poli
Kedah in the same *uv ;. most polities at
integration.
structures have been located'in
Though, to date, more than fifty ancient
Merbokestuaryanatt'eKualaMudaareas'thesearesmallscalepr
whichneednothaveentailedlarge-scalemobilizationoflabour.Thepres
necessarilysuggesta densepop
iurg. number of these structuresdoesnot the
'rulers" for
large-scale labour by
"
tion and a concomitani .otitiration of
possiblethatthey*"'".o'.*ctedatvariousintervalsoveralongperiodofti
F u r t h e r m o r e , e x c e p t f o r t w o s i t e s , t h e m a t e r i a l s u s e d a t m o s t o f t h eand
ses
laterite bricks, river cobbles I
easily handledmaterlais *.n ". clay bricks, the vie'*
attention to some of
bles. At this point, it *"v t" pertinentto draw
of early civilizations.one ol
scholarson monumentsctnstructed in other areas
has been made tly David Kaplan in his study o1
most interestingobservations
C'J' Erasmus'The latter'sexperi
Maya civilizationand itu. io*Jttt" supportof
many of Kaplan'sconclusi
tal archaeologicatwort<sin lr.lexicohave corroborated

to associatehighlycentralized politic
The traditionaltendencyfor anthropologists assumption i
unwarranted
systemswith imposrng'i."",r.*r,"i ruii, hasinvolved as
because monument buildingmay function
well as circula.a"rl."1ttu'onings "' than as tl
system-maintai"ing -"tiunism" of a weakly organizedpolity rather
one,and because ethnographic evidenceindica
manifestation or u.t.Gv oiganized
1evel in
soc]elies many partsof the worid were capableof mobiliz
that pre-state
Kaplan believesmuch of tl
sizeable*orL p"rtr"s io. .o--unit projects.
Mesoamertcan*onu,*'ntonstructioncouldhavebeenperformedbya
chiefdom..' levelof socio-political integratton'

TheKaplan-ErasmusviewsonmonumentbuildinginMayansocietydoes
offeranalternativeexplanationforthepresenceoflarge-scalearchitec
tures in pre-state .o.lifu such as in ihe Bujang Valley and Kuala.Muda
by further archaeologicalevii
of Kedah,*t i.t, remain,ho*"u.., to be verified
 ,,jilrctingCentres, PointsandEntrep6ts
Feeder 23

Besidesattemptingto clarify the political statusof the trading centresit is also

.nrportantto definetheir statusas placesfor trade. Firstly, the locationof the site
:ased on geographicand ecologicalfactorsthat may have contributedto its com-
:rercial importanceshouldbe thoroughlyinvestigated.One shouldthen attempt
.-functionalanalysisof the site itself basedon archaeologicalinvestigations,rather
:han on Arab, Chineseand other accounts,which are very often exaggerated.To
teterminethe types of trade items exchangedthe study of site contentsis of prime
::r.rportance,although such evidencecan only be fragmentary, as many of the trade
::emswere perishableand cannotbe retrieved.Attention shouldbe paid especial-
.'.'to the type and range of foreign trade objectsthat occur at these sites.

.'tllecting centres'

.{rchaeologicalwork in PeninsularMalaysiahas identifieda numberof prehistoric

::ading centres,datingfrom the first millenniumB'C. to the early firSt millennium
-. D.. in both the coastaland inland riverine areas.Most of thesewere small trading
.::es and may be describedas'collecting centres'.Such collectingcentresfunc-
::rned mainly as outletsfor speciallocal produce.The sitesmay or may not have
-eenlocatedat strategicpointsalonga major trade route.The importanceof these
.::eslay in their locationin or very near importantecozonesfrom which particular
. cal productswere obtained.Notableexamplesof prehistoriccollectingcentres
.:.rhe Peninsulaare KampungSungaiLang and Kelangon the Selangorcoast,and
3aru Bunrk in Terengganu.These sitesare locatedin areasrich in alluvial tin and/or
. ,ld or alongriver routesthat led to suchareas.Finds of prehistoricbronzedrums
: the Dongsontype (Heger Type I), some glassbeads,as well as fragmentsof
. ,cketediron implementsat thesesitessuggestthat they vrerein commercialcon-
:.'-.t with Mainland SoutheastAsia.32
Coilectingcentreswere more commonduring protohistorictimes. This is the
: =:todof Asian maritime trade when oceanshippingin the Bay of Bengaland the
: rth China Sea had becomea regular affair. The Malay Peninsula,which lay
..::ide the internationaltrade routesbetweenthe Arab landsand India to the west
,r: Chinato the east,soonfound itself in a most enviableposition.It was in the
-:rext of this developinginternationaltrade that, from aboutthe secondor third
,::.iur! A.D., severaltradingpolitiesin the Peninsulafirst cameto be documented
. :oreignliterary sources.Many of thesemay be classifiedas collectingcentres
:..r'h,largely owing to their strategiclocations,were able to take full advantage
: :he long-distancecarrying trade passingthrough the Straits of Melaka or via
.. shortoverlandroute acrossthe narrow Isthmianregion.Locatedat convenient
: :rrs alongthis internationaltraderoute,thesecentresservednot only as halfway
, ..::onsfor revictuallingpurposes,but also as local marts where native produce
.:.dbe obtained.Thosewith goodnaturalharbours,excellentlocationsand rich
-.,:erlandssoonbecamegreat regionalemporia,centreswhere goodswere assembl-
'feederpoints'. Although the volume of trade and the variety of goods
- - lrom
S -..:dled at theseregionalemporiawas probablyfar greaterthan that at the smaller
'--alports, they were essentiailycollectingcentreswhere native goodscould be
.- :r'eniently picked up and injectedinto the internationaltrade network. These
..ectingcentresalso imported foreign goods,especiallyfoodstuffsand a small

Gr:j-
t-- .......-..-,.==...==:-::::
 i

l'*ff;:'Jil:iffi l:hY:*ff
xJq'*::i,:$?J:"#'f,
fi#|ffif
i*:ilTT,",i,il#:""ffi,3:Tlif i,1",::l::1Jill;;;;.:;'lton
(Fukien ware' Sung-Yuanperiod)'
of a lead gree" giazedvessel
basefragment

from JenderamHilir, twelfth to

A celadon (greenware)bowl of Lung-ch'tian
fourteenth centunes.
 FeederPointsandEntrep6ts
Centres,
r'Dllecting 25

tmount of manufacturedgoods,mostly of a utilitarian nature, for local consumption

'feederpoints'
:rd redistributionto their lessertrading partners, which were the
,f the interior.
Collecting centres are perhaps less recognizablearchaeologicallythan, for
:stance,entrepots,sincethe greaterportion of the trade commoditiesexchanged
:-: the former were perishablelocal forest produceand foodstuffs'Except for tin
..ndgold, noneof the localproducewould haveleft any trace in the archaeological
:ecord. Imported manufacturedgoods,apart from textiles and iron implements,
::ood a better chanceof survival.However,the volume of suchimports could not
.-.ar-e beenvery large. This is becausea high proportionof them would have been
::distributed into the surroundinghinterland.Relativelyfew remainsof thesegoods
:an. therefore,be expectedto be tracedat the collectingcentres.The only excep-
.:rn here is goodstraded in fairly large quantitiessuchas beads,and mass-produced
. _,ods suchas Chinesetrade ceramics,particularlyfrom the twelfth centuryA.D.
:.r'ards.
Recentdiscoverieson PulauTioman33haveperhapslocatedfor us one suchex-
.:tple of a collectingcentre.The presenceof possibleancienttrading sites in at
-.,t t*o areason the islandis indicatedby finds of a fair amountof Chinesetrade
t::amics from the Sung period.34At the Juara site on the west coast, such
-.arerials were found mixed with local SoutheastAsian earthenwares,including
;;r:tli, anda few fragmentsof tin ingots.Many of the Chinesetrade ceramicsand
.. :erv of the local earthenwaresare comparableto those found at PengkalanBu-
,.:g, Kedah.However,the ceramicsfrom the Tioman sites appearto be less im-
:::ssive both in terms of variety and quantitythan thosefrom PengkalanBujang.
:':,iike
PengkalanBujang, neither beadsnor fragmentsof Middle Easternglass
-.:-.'ebeenreportedfrom thesesites.On the whole,the rangeof tradecommodities
:...rhangedat PulauTioman appearsto be fairly limited. Pendingfurther archaeo-
however,
;:cal work at the Tioman sites, the evidencewe have at hand does,
...n to suggestthat the islandwas once a collectingcentre' Particularlyuseful
-.:e would be informationon the stratigraphicrelationshipsof the varioustypes
. :eramicsand other finds, as well as some quantitativedata pertainingto the
::amic collection.
:r'idence of a collectingcentre at Tioman is corroboratedby Arab writings of
1:: ninth and tenth centuries,which mentionaloes-wood,camphor,rice, sandalwood,
.t:rle birds'nests and coconutsas products that could be obtained from
_,..-umah'.35 Except for coconutsand ediblebirds' nests,36 I suggestthat none of
' .:se productswas nativeto the islanditself. Much of the isiand'sterrain is steep
. .- rocky and the few flat landsare limited mainly to the coastalareas.37 It would
: :oSt unlikely to find rice cultivationin this kind of topography. As for the other
-:, tucts, the forestsof Pulau Tioman are not known to contain plant species from
, _-;h aloes-wood.(Aquilarin spp.) camphor(Dryobalnnops aromntim)or sandalwood
',-,:talumalbum)might have beenobtained.38 Nonetheless, theseforest products
,:: known to occur in the southern portion of the Malay Peninsula: aloes-wood
. ,,,.,idely
distributed,sandalwood occurs in Johor, and camphor in Terengganu,
. .:ang and Johor.3eIt is thus likely that the products found at Tioman camefrom
:. .iinterlandsuppliersin the Peninsula,particularlythe Pahangand Johorareas.
-., ro cassiteriteis known to occur on the island itself,aoTioman'stin supply -

E_-'
 Leong Sau '
zo

at - m
evidencedby finds of tin ingot fragments among the trade wares Juara
also have come from a Peninsular source'
Arab writ
Regardingthe commercial status of Tioman, it is significant that
giue iio-an no importance except as a popular landfall, ten days from Kalah' w
perhaps pick up a fevf local produc
ine could stop foi fresh wateial and
peaks reaching some 3,406 feet'43 was appar
Tioman, with its severallofty
for ships.aaJudging from these Arab accounts, there i
a prominent landmark
shipping routes l
doubt that the island was well located along the international
But it probably did not develop it
about the ninth or tenth century onwards.
major trade centre. This observation is further borne out by the Arab accc
Tic
of ports contemporaneouswith Tioman. The rather bland description of
in the Arab texts contrastssharply with their exuberant description of Kalah's w
and importanceas a commercialcentre.asLater Arab and Chineseaccount
taining to nauticalmattersgive evenlessattentionto Tioman,which receive
very brief mention as a watering place and a prominent landmark for ships i:
soutt china Sea.a6on the basis of literary evidenceand the ceramicfindt
lected so far it is difficult to see Tioman as an entrepot. It can best be clas
as a regional collecting centre for native produce from the southern Malay P
sula, iricluding the neighbouring islands to its_immediatesouth and possibl
Borneanregion facing the South China Sea.n/

EntrePdts

In the Peninsula,true supercentresfor trade, or entrepots,are known only

the first millenniumA.D. onwards.a8 These were great seaportsand foci of
munications, which developedin responseto the increasing volume of sea
trade in SoutheastAsian waters. Convenientlylocatedon the east-westmar
route and possessinggood natural harbours, adequate warehouse facilitit
necessaryftr merchantsawaiting the next monsoon)and plentiful suppliesof
water and food, these ports were popular rendezvousfor traders and merc
engagedin long-distancetrade. Here much of the merchandisefrom the Arab
n [ttJ Near Eait and goodsfrom India, Sri Lanka, and China in the Far East
landed,sold and reshippedto their final destinations.Indeed,many foreign
chants must have found it more economicaland reliable to purchasetheir 1
from such central ports. Apart from being main ports of transhipment,
entrepotswere also major export centresfor local SoutheastAsian produce..
and regular stocksof local producewere suppliedby their numerous'feederp
These entrepdtswere, therefore, leadingcommercialcentres,unsurpassedir
wide range of goodsand large volume of trade handled'
Entrepots, in general, are fairly easy to recognizearchaeologically.I
scale trade conductedover a period of time resulted in the accumula
relatively thick depositsof trade debris in the activity loci. This trade t
is conspicuousnot only from the point of view of the vast quantities encou
but alsothe wide range of trade goodsinvolved. Of thesethe most commonaI
sherdsfrom a great variety of chinesetrade ceramics,while other items includ
ducts from elsewherein SoutheastAsia, the Middle East and India. Th
mopolitan character of these port-settlementsis likewise often reflec
 PointsandEntrep6ts
Feeder
Centres,
Collecting 27

rhe mixed characterof the material culture found in the vicinity of the settle-
nents.49
Archaeologicallyspeaking,one of the best documentedanciententrepotsin the
Peninsulahas been identified in the neighbourhoodof the present village of
PengkalanBujang on the lower reachesof the Bujang River in Kedah.s0Lying in
:he shelteredwaters of the Merbok estuary at the northern entranceto the Straits
,rf Melaka, the port must have been a major landfall for ships coming from the
Ba-vof Bengal.The commercialpre-eminenceof the shippingcentreis demonstrated
roth by the vast amountof trade debrisleft scatteredon the banks of the Bujang
River at PengkalanBujang, and by the numerousancient structures found further
rpstream as well as in adjacentplacesnearby - all within the Merbok estuary
:egion. At PengkalanBujang itself, over 10,000 potsherdsslof Chinesetrade
--eramics of the SouthernSung and Yuan periodshave been found, mixed with a
'.'arietyof Middle Easternglassware,especiailyhundredsof small bottles,large
quantitiesof Middle Easternscrap glass,52 much local SoutheastAsian earthen-
'.\'are,some4,548glassbeadss3 of SoutheastAsian and Indian manufacture,a few
\liddle Easternglazedceramicsand a few fragmentsof glassbangles,possibly
,: Chineseorigin.saOther finds include small fragmentsof metals,rough gems,
:,:okendebris,bits of carvedstonesand a few piecesof dnmar' Indeed,the con-
.iderablequantity and rangeof trade commoditiestracedat the site testify to the
:agnitude of the entrep6t trade handledby this ancientport.
The items listed above form only a small portion of Pengkalan Bujang's total
::ade. Little is known of the types of perishablecommoditiestraded there. Many
: the small giassbottles of Middle Easternorigin were probablycontainersfor
.:omatics.5sSimilarly,the vast quantityof Chinesestonewaresuchas bottles,jars
.rd jarlets probablyservedas storagevesselsand containers,whosecontentswe
- -rnot know.
\\Ie know, nonetheless,that during this time the Peninsula'snatural resources,
:cluding tin, were alreadybeing exploitedand that PengkalanBujangwas a ma-
,: outlet for them.56There is also evidenceto suggestthat other mineral ores
::rm nearbyregionswere traded at this centre.s7The port served,therefore,not
:,11'asan importantplacefor the transhipmentof goodsfrom Chinaand countries
'',est of the Bay of Bengal,but also as the leadingcoliectingcentrefor local pro-
1ce, especiallyforest products and minerals, destinedfor external or foreign
:-.arkets.
PengkalanBujang'slocal, intra-regionaltrade was probably as voluminousas her
::ii€rodl trade. The presenceof huge quantitiesof potsherdsof local Southeast
.r.:ianware in the PengkalanBujang deposits(for example,hundredsof spouts
. - kendi,clearlypointsto her commercialrelationswith other SoutheastAsian cen-
::.s. The port's importanceas a major collectingand distributing centre in this
::_{on is further indicatedby the enormousfinds of beadsand Middle Easternscrap
j r.assimportedfor the localbeadindustry.s8
I -\ncient entrep$t activities have also been recognizedrecently at a site in the
:,-tnityof the mouth of the Muda River, someelevenkilometressouthof the Merbok
::tu?r!. The site has yieldeda great abundanceofbeads, someof Indian origin,
.. rvell as fragmentsof Arab glassand ceramics.Also found in the nearby areas
..:- remainsof laterite brick structures,fragmentsof Buddhistsculpturesin stone
 LeongSauHen
Zg
inscribed Buddhist stone tablet' Tht
and terracotta, clay votive tablets and an pending fur
sculptureshave been to the seventh century A'D'se and'
"titiltl"a in this area, the entrepot can probably be iden
ther archaeorogrcatrnuestiil;.
,chieh crr";'"ii-Crri"g,s recordsof the sameperiod.60The discover
tified with the
very far from that at PengkalanBujan
of an entrep6t in the f<"uf" fvf"au urleanot
intheMerbokestuaryr".u*.rittr"doubtofthe.importanceofthissectionofth
at thts tlme'
Kedah coast as a major focus for shipping
strategi. *'tt'*"tt toJ of ttt" Malay Peninsula'but much furthe
On the same
evidence for the existence of yt
north in Peninsular fituiiurrJ, archaeological Th
another ancient been found it the mouth of the Takuapa River'
fairlv closelv that t
;";-;i i;l;;national g""a. r""ra at this site matches
"ntr.poif,ut
glass and ceramics from the Middl
PengkalanBujang. It includesglassware'scrap
China' as well as earthenwarean
eu.i,.torr"*u." urrdpo,."ttut-oo= wares from
someof i^,rri.r, -"v be of Indian origin and others of local origin. T1
il;;;;a;,
been dated on typological groun
trade debris, especiallythe ceramic finds, have Takual
to betweenthe seventh l"tttt centuries'61Comparativestudiesof the
".a some archaeologists to suggest that tl
and Pengkalan Bulang iinds have led 'Kalah'of the ninth and tenth century Arr
Takuapa entrep0t *"r'p.obuUft the
'Kalah' of the Arab recordsfrom the eleventhcentury onwar
u..orrnt., white the
pi"U"Ufv refers to Kedah in the Merbok estuary'62
Inthelsthmiun."gionofPeninsularThailandthecoastalstretchhaslong
with names.of very ancie
associated,although noi yet verified archaeologically,
and P'an-p'an' and thus may be describedas o
p"ini". fff.L Tun-s'irn,Tiou-chri{i
ofthemostimportantancienttradingpostsborderingtheGrrtfofSiam.Portslo
o n t h i s c o a s t h a d a c c e s s n o t o n l y t o i n t r a - r e g i o n a l t r a d e spoint
u c h a s w i t hofFco
un
the view
ah;;r, but also to foi"ign tradl with-South china. From
mercialexploitationofthePeninsula'sforestproducts,thereisnodoubtth
east coast centres on P*in*l"r Thailand likewise had accessto rich supplies
the same time the narr
gharu-wood,camphor, ivory and rhinoceros horns' At
easy overlandpassagebetwt
Isthmus, traverseduy ie* rivers, affords relatively for anci
Archaeological documentation
theseports and those * tt. *".i coast. of ea
region, however, except for a few.finds
trade centresin this east coast eighth c
times' from about the
Hindu sculptur"r, aut" *ottfv it"It Srivijayan just the pres
for Satingphra' located north of
tury A.D. Even here,
"*."pi to what we have for the west cc
Songktrlatown, the data are scanty compared
entrepotsdiscussedabove'63
since the 1960s has identil
Archaeological work conducted at Satingphra
counterpart of Pengkalan Bujl
it as an entrepOt,and possibly a contemporay
onthewestcoast.StrikingsimilaritiesbetweentheChinesetradecerami
prompted some to suggest
ufSutingpt ru and those aI PengkalanBujang have

I
=
-
possibleexistenceof a trans-Peninsular connection betweenthese centres'64c
parison of site conteni., puttit"f"rly the trade debris
recovered from the
entrepOts,however,doesnotappeartosupportthisassumption'For'wh
few-beadsand Middle Eas
ceramicsof similar typ* ott'iut both sites' very
glass materialshave been discovered at Satingphra'65 . :
otherimportantce.'tresoftradeontheeastcoastwereChaiyaandN
Satingphra' The Chaiya and
Thammarat (Ligor), Uoih situated to the north of
 FeederPointsand Entrepots
- ..tctingCentres, 29

l.a<hon Si Thammarat areas have produceda few finds of fairly early Hindu
.::lptures, which may be viewed as evidencedocumentingthe existencefrom
::=-Srivijayantimes66of long-distancetrade, probably via the trans-Peninsular
- -.:esbetweenthese east coast Isthmian centresand India. During the era of
: .','iiayanhegemony,Chaiya and Nakhon Si Thammarat developedinto major
-::an tentres. At Chaiya in particular the remains of many fine monuments,6T
, : :e and bronzesculpturesServeas evidenceof a prosperousage basedon com-
-..::e. Besidesbeing in a positionto control one of the main trans-Peninsularroutes,
-. Takuapa-chaiyaroute,68chaiya herself possessedgood shelteredharbours in
-. Ba,vof Bandonregion. The latter factor is significantin view of the fact that
- - --r of the east coast of the Malay Peninsulais directly exposedto the northeast
-. .:.soonsduring the monthsof Novemberto March. Foreign trade at chaiya is
:::=stedby finds of quantitiesof Chineseceramicsdating from the Sung period,
.: ,','ellas a smallnumberof blue and yellow beadsreportedto havebeenunearth-
::om a site to the south of this ancienttown.6eAccording to the samereport,
.:e at chaiya probablycommencedbeforethe appearanceof the Sungceramics,
I rr the eleventhcentury her role as an important srivijayan port on the east
::: was taken by Satingphra.To
,:^sa centre for trade, Nakhon Si Thammarat,like Chaiya,was well locatedto
.=:cisecontrol over a trans-Peninsularroute, in this casethe Nakhon-Trangroute.
..:encefor overseascontacthere is basedmainly on finds of Sung ceramicsTl
: : :he presenceof Indian religioussculptures.Smalltrial excavationsconducted
Qlaritch wales in the Nakhon Si Thammarat area have failed to produce any
': -.:pationalstratum predatingthe Sungceramics'This has led Walesto suggest
..e eleventhor early twelfth century date for the founding of the ancienttown,72
- -,I to the disappointmentof thosewho have viewed the town as an important
..:.'.' Srivijayancentre in the Malay Peninsula.T3

: . itr Points'

.- :inal categoryof trading centre found during this period of Asian maritime
.-.-e is the'feeder point'. These centreswere small local supply centresserving
-: :ntr€pQtsand important regionalcollectingcentres.They dealt mainly in special
- : ,: ice of particularecozones.Unlike the entrep6ts,which were locatedat strategic
: =-es in a vast network of long-distancetrade routes,the distribution of the feeder
- .:.:swas determinedby the proximity of thesesitesin immediaterelationto the
':: irc€ areasor supply zones.Such feederpoints may be found on the coastor
- .-andriverineareas.In the inlandareasthe most likely spotswere confluences
: ::','ertributaries draining a large resourcebase.
--.=cent archaeologicalinvestigationsin the LangatValley havelocatedone such
- ,:.1 feederpoint in the midst of alluvial tin fields. This site at JenderamHilir
- : .lth Selangoris situatednearthe confluenceof the Langat and SemenyihRivers.
' '.:s clearly in an excellentpositionto tap the tin resourcesboth of the local fields
.- - :he adjacentareasfurther inland drained by two rivers.TaJenderamHilir's
,,=--:alrole in the exportationof tin is attestedby the actualdiscoveryof ancient
: .rgots at the sites.Ts
-:rderam trade centresare
Hilir's commercialrelationswith contemporaneous

-=
 Leong Sau Hen
30

revealedbyfindsofnonlocalmaterialcomprisingacoupleofSungceramics jar. It i
type ."tudon bowl and i small brown-glazedstoneware
ly, a Lung_ch,uan
clearfromthepaucityofforeigntradegoodsandthemarkedlackofva
of foreign culturz
in them that the site was not a major trading centre.The absence
Hilir also suggests that it ha
influence in the archaeologicalrecords of Jenderam
merchants. The latter would have preferre
little or no direct contactriith fo.eign
conveniently located entrepots. In an earlier pape
to pick up their goodsat more
probably a feeder poir
the presentwriter has suggestedthat JenderamHilir was
for the great west coast entrepOtat PengkalanBujang''o
TheKualaSelinsingsiteonthePerakcoastmayalsobeclassifiedasaf
point. Despite problems surroundingits stratigraphy,TT sometentative conclusio
the overall picture of the types of finds excavated by Evar
l,ay le drawn-from
remains of houseposts of pi
i" ifr" f"t" igZ0s.78The site hai yielded several
local earthenwares, shell artifacts ar
-welings, considerablefood refuse and
excavated from the lowermost levels' High
burials,lncluding a few canoeburials
interestingaretheoccwrencesofsmalltinobjects,apparentlyoflocalmak
includeear-pendants, severalrings from fishing gear' a healrytin rod and a tin i
Some
got. A greai abundanceof stone and glassbeadswere also recovered.
suggesting the existence of a loc
the beadsare found in their hal{-finishedstate,
bead-makingindustryatthesite'Onthewhole,exceptforafewsmallpo
of Indianizedelemen
objects,the i(uala Selinsingsite displaysvery.little evidence
with a SouthIndi
The latter are represent.ity u smalicarneliansealinscribed
motif' From the general picture whi'
scriptTeand a gold ring with an Indianized
one could contend strongly that this was t]
from this Surveyof the site
= ".",g", group which at some stage of the settlement's histo
site olsome local indigenous
in active trade with other contemporary centres of trade'
- at t
=E "ngug"a
irlae Kuala Selinsingis indicated by quantities o{ beads encountered
- "t goods comprising gems' sot
site as well as by finds of i{air amount of imported

il
+
apparentlyimportedbeadssuchasetchedcarnelianbeads'afewpieceso
ceramics,80 and plenty of stone,especiallycarnelianand agate,and
forthelocalbeadindustry.Thepresenceofarelativelylargenumberof
trade goodsand the o..,-"n." of Indianizedobjects
location of this feeder point. Unlike the inland
evidently a more
".."..ibl"
place, but the coastal location
glassmateri

may be explainedby the coa

feeder points, Kuala Selinsingv
of the site cannot alt
factor was-itsproxirr
have accountedfor its role as a feeder point. An important
It is reasonable to assu
io tt u"rv rich alluvial tin depositsof the Larut tin field.
= was probably a feeder pointsl specia
that "Kuala Selinsing,flt J"na"ru,,' Hilir,
" port on the same west coast of the Peninsula
ing in supplying tin to a major 'J
entrepdt at Takuapa'
= is possible that the major port involved here.was the
and Takuapa sites hr
: study by Lamb of U"uJ, o.t"tting at the Kuala Selinsing
at the two sites'82
indicated some similarities in the bead types featured

= Conclusion

Astheforegoingdiscussionshows,theearlycentresoftradeintheMala
sulaaroseexclusivelyforcommodityexchangebasedontheexportofthe
of the region. The prese
,".o,'.."., particularly the metal and forest produce
 FeederPointsandEntrep|ts
, ,ttectingCentres, 31

l so many exchangecentresin the Peninsulawould seemto point to its having

. r'ery specialeconomicimportance.The existenceof prehistoric collectingcentres
r both the west and east coastsof Peninsular Malaysia suggeststhat there was
.-ready some form of intra-regionalexchange,probably in mineral ores like tin,
:erween the trade centresof the Peninsulaand the bronze centresof Mainland
S,rutheast Asia during late prehistorictimes. However,this trade was conducted
.:lv sporadicallyand on a small scale,judging from the few finds recoveredfrom
:rese collecting centres and the occurrenceat these sites of only a single ar-
-raeologicalstratum.
From at least the first millenniumA.D. long-distancetrade assumeda greater
:rportance with the expansionof trade to other regions outside SoutheastAsia
:, includeIndia, China,and the Middle East and was thus of a truly international
,:-aracter.No longer can we view this developmentas extraneous,arising from
:-e arrivalin the Peninsulaof foreignmerchants,particularlyfrom the Indian sub-
::rtinent. It now seemsmore likely that the rise of inter-regionaland international
::ade grew out of a long tradition of intra-regionalcoastaltrading. Trade during
::-rsperiodwas apparentlyof a more sustainedvariety, facilitatedby the many'ports
: trade'which emergedon both the west and east coastsof the Peninsuia,par-
:::ularly in the river mouthsor estuaries.It is alsolikely that at leasta few of these
- :ts were actually located in areaspreviously settled by indigenouscoastalcom-
:.rnities, though this observationremainsto be testedby more systematicarchaeo-
,4cal field investigation.The Guar Kepah areain ProvinceWellesley,immediately
:, ith of the Kuala Muda area can, for example,be usefully investigated.
.\lmost our entire knowledgeof centresof trade in the Peninsuladuring this early
::.aseof maritimetrade up till aboutthe first quarterof the first millenniumA.D.,
. :erived from textual sources,especiallyChineserecords,Indian literary works
.-: the writings of Ptolemy.Despitetheir many limitationsand ambiguities,these
.:rrary recordshavefurnishedtoponymsof trading polities,as well as usefulinfor-
--"rion on the tlpes of commoditiesexchangedat thesecentres.Although archaeo-
;ica1lymany of these early trading centreshave continuedto elude us and, as
:i, v€F! few of the physicalremainsof their activitieshave beentracedwith any
'ports trade' had emergedby at ieast
..::ainty, we can safelyassumethat true of
::.. early centuriesof the first millennium A.D.
-: is only from the last quarter of the first millennium and the early centuries
: :re secondmillenniumA.D. that we begin to havemore substantialarchaeological
:.-:aon the Peninsulartrading centres.This periodapparentlycoincidedwith a phase
. ;eatly intensifiedmaritime commercein SoutheastAsia, during which increasing
t r.: , unts of foreign manufacturedgoodsand materialssuchas Middle Easternglass,
- =:ebeing injectedinto the trade network. Archaeologically,the discoveryof these
- :.-perishable imports,suchas ceramics,glasswareandbeads,providesthe necessary
l
: .r€DC€for the existenceof trading centres. The presence,in fact, of large
.-::mblages of suchvery mixed materialsgives indubitableevidencefor their in-
.'.'ementin overseastrade. In the past, especiailyprior to the 1960s,there had
,::r. too much emphasison the Peninsulaas a mere landfail for shipsengagedin
-: east-westtrade. The Peninsula'scentral locationon the routes of this Asian
- ,::time tradehad undoubtedlyearnedit a specialpositionin the ancientcarrying
TI
' . -e. But to disregardits other equallyimportantassets,suchas its mineralores
.e

F_ ..='=::ql::r;c= lii!ffiffiffi
 Leong Sau Hen
.t,

give rise t
unbalanced picture and may'
and forest products, can create an Although the Ir
role of its trading centres'
misconceptionsabout d;;;i;;tJ Peninsulais now no longe
in the
dianizationtheory for tt'" oAgit of tradingcentres remains to be full
trading centres
plausible, the passive lt*g-" "i Peninsutar
dispelled.
WeshouldnolongercontinuetoviewthemajorPeninsularportssimplyas
Setuptoserviceo.""n-*"".vvesselsandcrews,orevenmerelyasplacesofb trad
the west were transhipped' Ports of
trade where goods from ittt "utt and the physical environmen
context of
especially,should be ul"*"a in the broader tl
particularly the natural '"tou""' of the surrounding region' Most often
hinterlandofaportcandeterminethepatternandvolumeofitstrade.Morea including tl
tion should therefore ;;"; l; the peninsula's forest products,
The Peninsular ports were''in fact' dynarr
distribution of its minerll?*tttt"''
products of their hinterlandsinto internatior
centresactively i"j*ti;;;h; G;ial
as well as locally made beads' the latt
trade. Chinese c"."rniti and imported partne
fashionedfrom importJJutt'*"t" usedin trade with hinterlandtrading
of trading centres found in the Pen
we have seenin our di"scussionof types this period of Asi
centre existed during
surathat more than one type of trading ports: the entrep6ts a
we have the main
maritime trade. At *" *i "f the scale trade featurinl
handled vast volumes of
the regional collecting;;il;.--B;,h
it" besidesfunctioning as major coll
multiplicity of commodities. "nt."pots, whr
ting centres for local S""tit"* etian goods' were ports of transhipment
East' India and China' were
foreign goods from funat' the Middle
""ti"ut - att outsiae SoutheastAsia. The regional <
exported to further a"rii."ti*. goo
such re-export trade. Foreign
lecting centres *"r"--n-J'engaged in and redistributior
home consumption
nonetheless,*"." i*po't-"a,-bu:t inty for
At th;;;;;; ena of it e scale there were the more specializeds
the hinterland..
dealtmostly in the specialproduce of a t
sidiary centreso. i""o"i polnit, *ttitft
from this picture is one of flourish
ticular area. rn" irnp.".ii* that emerges
products. By now the.trade patt
trade in the export of the region's indigenous
it was conductedat a number of cen
also appearsto Uemore s1rult"'"a in that
levels'
op".uilng on different scalesand at different
politically, how".,r"., ii" p"nin.utu trading centres, especiallythose mentio
intheChineserecords,,donotseemtohaveattainedahighlevelofpolitic the concep
tion. There is little to postulatethe existenceof states, if
"uiJ""."
,state,here impriesthe existenceof an elaborate system of government with a r

tralbureaucraticmachinery,alargearmy'sophisticatedurbancentresa
ihe aichaeologicalrecords,especial
ed hierarchicut.o.af ,i*.iu.".. 5o far,
the presenceof-suchfeatures'
PeninsularMalaysia,ao not seemto indicate
in the Merbok estuaryand K
occurrenceof severalmoderate-sizedmonuments
existence of a highly centrarized
Muda area does not n".".ru.itv imply the
be reasonable to regard these tra
organizedtalour torce. il *o"rd therefore
fully fledged states.
;;il;;;"." as chiefdoms and incipient states than
 CollectinsCentres,FeederPoints and Entrep0ts JJ

\OTES

1. The Malay Peninsulareferred to in this paper includesthe Isthmian tract of land south
of latitude 13N.
2. For discussionof theseChineseplace-namesseePaul Wheatley, "The Malay Peninsula
as known to the Chineseof the third cenixy A.D.",JMBRAS 28, i (1955);"ChineseSources
for the Historical Geographyof Malaya before A'D. 1500"'MITG I (1956\; The Golden
Khersonese;Studiesin the Historical Geographyof the Malny Peninsula beforeA D. 1500
(Kuala Lumpur, 1961);Wang Gungwu, "The Nanhai Trade: Study of the Earlv History
of ChineseTrade in the South ChinaSea,"IMBRAS 31, ii (1958);O.W. Wolters, -Earl:r
IndanesianCommerce:A Studl of the Origins of Srlaijaya (Ithaca, 1967);Sir Roland Brad-
dell, The Studl of Ancient Times in theMalay Peninsulnand the Straitsof Malnrca, MBRAS
reprint, MonographNo. 7 (1980).
3. These are discussedin Paul Wheatley,"Takola Emporion: A Study of an Early Malayan
Place-name", MITG 2 (1954)and Wheatley,GoUenKhersonese, 144-47, 151-53.
4. Indian toponymsrelatingto the Malay Peninsulain early times are discussedin K.A.
NilakantaSastri,"Kataha", IGIS 5, ii (1938);Sir RoiandBraddell,"Malayadvipa:A Study
inEarlyIndianization",MITGI(1956)andBraddell,AncientTimesintheMalayPenin-
sula, 337-58; Wheatley, GoldenKhersonese,I77 -203, 278-80.
5. These centreswere said to have beenattackedby Rajendraftla I' See GeorgeCoedes,
The Indinnized Statesof SoutheastAslu, (trans.) S.B. Cowing (Kuala Lumpur, 1968),
142-43. Some scholars,however,questionthe authenticityof the C-olaclaims. See
CoedEs.ibid..324 n.72 andH.G. Quaritch Wa\es, The MahzyPeninsulain Hindu Times
(London,1976),131.
6. SeeG.R. Tibbetts, "The Malay Peninsulaas known to the Arab Geographers",MITG
9 (1956),21-60 and Wheatley,GoldenKhersonese,210-51.
7. Chieh Ch'a is identified with Kedah. See Wheatley, GoUzn Khersonese,46-47 . Some
scholarsalsobelievethat the Indian toponyms'Kataha','Kadaram'and'Kidaram'likewise
refer to Kedah;K.A. NilakantaSastri,"Kataha",IGIS5, ii (1938);28-30; Braddell,.4z-
cient Times in theMalat Peninsula,344, 348-49,380 and Wales, Mahy Peninsula,70.
8. Wheatley, The GoldenKhersonese,255-56.
185.
9. Wolters. Early IndonesianCommerce,
10. Wheatley, GoldenKhersonese,68.
rr, Ibid.,67.
).2. Ibid.,217.
i 3. Braddell, in Ancient Times in the Maby Peninsuln, 386, places Kalah in the Merbok
estuary region, Kedah. A. Lamb, "MiscellaneousPaperson the Early Hindu and Bud-
dhist Settlementin Northern Malaya and SouthernThailand",FM/6 New Series(1961):
34 believesit to be the Arab name for Kedah in the sung-Yiian period. Lamb's view
on this Arab toponym was also discussedin his "Takuapa: The ProbableSite of a Pre-
l Malacca Entrep6t in the Malay Peninsula"in Malnyan and IndonesianStudies Essays
I
Presentedfor Sir Richard Winstedt, (ed.) J. Bastin and R. Roolvink (London, 1964),
76-86. Lamb'sconclusionswere basedon his archaeologicalinvestigationsin Pengkalan
l
Bujang and Takuapa. Wheatley, in GoldenKhersonese,222-24,prefers the Tenassenm
J
coastto Kedah as a iikely location for Kalah. There is also an attempt to identify Kalah
with the Klang region.SeeS.Q.Fatimi, "In Questof Kedah",JSEAH 1, ii (1960):62-101'
l-1. Hsu Yun-Ts'iao,"Notes on Tan-tan",IMBRAS 20, i (1947):47-63.
i5. Wheatley, GoldenKhersonese,55.
16. Wolters, Early IndonesianCommerce,204-06.For commentson Wolter's views, see

F
 LeongSau Hen
34
(ltilization in Moden
and Traders A Study-of Resource
F.L. Dunn, Rain-ForestCollectors
Monograph No 5 (1e75): 106'
;"; ;;;;;;t M"Iava, MBRAS'
Route of Ancient lndian Cultural Expansion
t 7 . H.G. Quaritch Wa1s,"A Newly Exploied
na;oi 'q'rttand l-etters1 (1935):1-35' t
ResearchesonAncient Indian Colonization
1 8 . H.G. QuaritchWales, "Archaeological Quaritch wales' "Further wor
Maiaya",IMBRASTa, t tte;6) ;3 l];'^"^tty::9I-G
i'l"ii"iisii* IMBMS20'i (1e47):1-1r'
in Malava",
, Bull. of School
f::t,th:l:'^'lt:!";3!!l of Uientt
"Anobscure
SeeA.H.Christie,
19.
:l"sriiK'i:lj,*?,l5^I?f":';;;;L,'l;
!q-1c^t
|ii\i,;il'Eill;'^i'n"t"'i#i
iXi#::;:i,:::h""^';''::'';;l':;;;''i*'t?:::ii:*'f
n g'r'1?1 K"#::?";::{
Mich
whitmore' !,
YHIi;:;IT:;;"iiii'* ;i"',i;:i r<"'""ir' l:n'
unJsouir'"u'tAsiaNo' 11'1e76'25-60'
;;;;;il;
20.SeeD.Sopher,TheSellNomads'AStudloftheMaritimeBoatPeopleofSouthea
(Singapore,1965)'
2l.WolfgangMarshali'..IndonesiainlndianoceanCultureHistory,',IndonesianC
(1980): 20.
at'Chansen' Thailand1968and196
2 2 . Bennet Bronson andGeorgeF' Dales'"Excavations
n"p"tt", Asian Perspectiaes 75 (7972\: 15-46'
;-iil#;ffi
..TheLaterPrehistoryof theMalayPeninsula',,in EarlySoutheastAs
23 B'A.V. Peacock, Gneia1hv' (ed')R'B' SmithandW' Wr
Essays in Archaeologt, n"n'l^ (PartOn
""i"ilttiriml ff""g' "Ma-lavsia: Its Prehistory
son(NewYork, 1979),t{olitnt'ie"*S""
In PreParatton'
"FurtherWork on IndianSites"'
24. DorothyandH.G QuaritchWales'
"An Excavation-of'three KitchenMiddensat GuarKep
25. P.V.vanSteinCallenfels, aun. of Rafftes Museum, seriesB'1 (19
provincewellesley,str"nr'$trl;ili;,
2 7- 3 7 .
"RecentArchaeological Discoveries inMdaya,',JMBRAS29' i (19
26. G. deG. Sieveking,
200-11.
contactwith Indianor Indianized centr
27. Meaningtheperiodpriorto thesettlement's Not
and Tambralinga:some archaeological
28. H.Q. QuaritchWales' "Langkasuka
IMBRAS 47' i (1947):15-40' 31
29. SeeLamb,"Miscellaneous Paperson EarlyHinduandBuddhistSettlement"'
o"potits from Pengkalan Bujang"(M'A' th
83;LeongSauHt"g, ";;;il;ib"'u-it
Uniu.ttlty o{ Malava,1973\'246-47'
-southernThaiWalerwav;:Archaeological EvidenceonAgricul
30. SeeJaniceStargardt' Mat? 8' iil1973): 5-29' SeealsoJ
ShippingandTrade * tf*"Sttiit an-i"rnl" '
the Straits of Malacca"'in Econom
Miksic,"e.cha"otosia#"Pli;;GG"phv.in Karl L. Hutterer,MichiganPa
change andsocatniio'ril*-iiio7tn7^ie'ta,(ed.) 16r' Walesis' however's
N;' 13 (Michigan' rs77\'
on Southunaso,ti'qalt ;;;;:
"Lanlkasuka Tambralinga"'29'
and
tical of Starga'at'ttili-t; tt" W"ftt'
S-ome Field Experiments"'in Exferim
"- Charles
31. J. Erasmus,"MonumentBuilding:
-iiL'iiti's,
(New 1e77)'53-54'
(ed')D' i"g"i*tt e/ al' York'
32. LeongSauHeng'"Malaysia: Its Prehistory"'
7
33. Lord Medway,"Archaeoiogical Notesfrom Pulau Tioman' Pahang"'FMJ
Archaeological Discoveriesin P
Series(1962): ss-os-"ii"eain":if"rt"'-1tgnt
luiui-r,Auruv.iu"' IMBMS 56' i (1983):58-59'
34.PersonalcommunicationfromJeanMartin'Seea|soACeramickgaq
Societv'WestMalavsiaChapter'1
Trade(Kttalat-"rnp;':;o;;h;i" eti* Ceramic
35. Seenote42 below'
tollecting Centres,FeederPoints and Entrep6ts 35

36. It is possiblethat this may refer to ediblebirds'nests.SeeMedway'scommentsin "The

Antiquity of Trade in Edible Birds' Nests", FMl 8 New Series (1963):43.
37. A good description of the geography of Pulau Tioman may be found in "The Natural
History of Pulau Tioman", (ed.) D.W. Lee et al. (Kuala Lumpur' 7977),3-4'
38. I have checkedagainst the list of forest trees and plants of Tioman inLee et al., ibid.,
38-68.
39. See F.L. Dunn, Rain'forestCollectors and Traders,8T-89.
i0. Lee et al., The Natural History of Pulau Tioman, 13.
'Akhbar
i.1. The information is found in the ninth century aq'$in wa'l-Hind' See Tibbetts,
"The Malay Peninsulaas known to the Arab Geographers",24 and39;Wheatley, Golden
Khersonese,229.
*2. Arab geographerssuchas Ibn Khurdadhbiband Idrisi appearto havehad someknowledge
of the types of native produce that could be obtained at Pulau Tioman. For their ac-
'Tiyumah' see Tibbetts, "The Malay Peninsula as known to the Arab
counts o1
Geographers",39 and Wheatley,GoldenKhersonese,229.
+3. The heights of the various peaks on Tioman are given inLee et al., The Natural History
of Pula.uTiormn,3.
+1. Wheatley, The GoldenKhersonese,229.
i5. For Arab accountsof Kalah seeTibbetts, "The Malay Peninsulaas known to the Arab
Geographers",24-25 and Wheatley, GoldenKhersonese'216-24'
-i6. It is interesting to note here that, according to wheatley, up to A.D. 1300 the island
of Tioman, although well known to the Arab geographersas a landmark and watering
place,was not mentionedin Chinesemaritime records.SeeWheatley,Goldzn
"ppatently
Khersonese,297. Pulau Tioman is, however, cited in the chinese nautical compendiums
of a later origin such asthe shun Feng Hsiang sung,wntten about 1620,but probably
pertaining to conditions in about 1430. See J.V. Mills, "Arab and ChineseNavigators
in MalaysianWaters in about A.D. 1500",IMBRAS 47, ii (1974):1-82. Tioman was
also cited inthe wu-pei-chi charts(c. 1621).According to Mills, ibid.,4, the information
found in these charts refers to abottt 1422.Although Tioman is featured in the Wu-pei'
cli charts as a placenamein Malayan-Southchina Seawaters, Wheatley has alsodrawn
attention to the fact that only Melaka was marked on the charts as a port of call. Wheatley,
Golilen Khersonese,I03.
+i. Borneo is also noted for its camphor.The geographicalproximity betweenTioman and
Borneo would have, no doubt, promoted someform of trading contactsbetween them.
Seatraffic between Tioman and Borneo is well attested inthe Shun Feng Hsinng Sung.
See Miils, "Arab and ChineseNavigators", 44'
-S. Archaeologically,however,entrep6tshave beentraced only from the last quarter of the
first millennium A.D.
=J. Indian and Indianizedcultural influences,for instance,have been traced in the vicinity
of the entrepotsat Takuapa and PengkalanBujang. SeeLamb, "Miscellaneouspapers".
In the same paper, Lamb has also drawn attention to possible Indonesianand cham
influencesin the architectural styles of someof the Indianized monuments,mostly can-
di, n the Bujang valley. Hindu and Malayanist Buddhist bronzeshave alsobeenrecovered
from the Satingphra area on the east coast of Peninsular Thaiiand. A. Lamb, "Notes
on Satingphra",IMBRAS 37, i (1964): 75-76.
: . It was Alastair Lamb who first recognized the existence of an ancient entrepOt at
PengkalanBujang. His discussionof the latter's entrepdt status is found in "Pengkalan
Bujang:an ancientport in Kedah", MH 7, i (1961):12, 17; "Researchat PengkalanBu-
 36 Leong Sau Het

jang: a preliminary report" and "Kedah and Takuapa: some tentative conclusions"
"Miscellaneouspapers",2l-37 and'69-88; "Takuapathe ProbableSite of a Pre-Mala
Entrepot in the Malay Peninsula",82-86, "Early History", in Malaysin:A Suruey,(e
Wang Gungwu (London,1964),108-10.
5 1 . Lamb, "Pengkalan Bujang: an ancient port in Kedah", 13.
JZ. Evidencefor this is provided by the presenceof numerouspunty capsin the Pengka
Bujang deposits.According to Lamb the presenceof punty caps showed clearly tl
r..up glu.. from Middle Eastern glass factories was imported into PengkalanBuja
as riw material for the local bead manufacture; Lamb, "Some observations on Sto
and GlassBeadsin Early SoutheastAsia", IMBMS 38' ii (1965):107-08'
These include the 4,525 beadscollectedby Lamb (see Lamb, ibid.,lI3\ and 23 bez
excavatedby the presentwriter. Leong, "A Study of CeramicDepositsfrom Pengka
Bujang, Kedah", I09, I22.
Lamb, "SomeObservationson Stoneand GlassBeads"'100-02'
55. Arab glassbottles, many of them containingaromatics,were often featured among1
tributiry gifts brought to China from various SoutheastAsian states like Jiao Zhi
north Vieinam, Champaand Srivijaya. See Grace Wong, "Comment on the Tributi
Trade between china and SoutheastAsia, and the Placeof Porcelain in this Trade, dur
the Period of the Song Dynasty in China",in ChineseCeladonsand OtherRelatedWa
in southeastAsra (Singapore,lg7g\, 74,81 -83. It is also interesting to note that cl
glass beads :
Ju-kua, writing at the beginning of the thirteenth century, described
small glassbottles for carrying perfumes as "regular trade articles" in the chinese-A
trade.lhese were also traded to Borneo and the Phiiippines. chau Ju-kua,(uans.)
Hirth and W.W. Rockhill (Taipei, 1970\,156,228.
56. See Dunn, Rain-ForestCollectorsand Traders,110-14. Apart from the foreign literi
referencesto tin exports from the Peninsula,we have alsosomearchaeologicalevide
suggestingthe exploitation of the Peninsula'stin during the era of early Asian mariti
trad-e.ttrese include finds of six Buddhist bronzesin the tin'rich alluvium of the Ki
valley and Bidor in Perak (reported in wales, "Archaeologicalresearcheson ancr
Indian colonization",50-52) and finds of a few Chinesetrade ceramicsof the late Sr
period at another tin-rich site in the Langat valley in South Selangor.See Leong !
i{eng, "Ancient Finds from Kampung Jenderam Hilit", MH 20' ii (1977): 42-47 '
57. F.E. Treloar, "chemical Anaiysisof SomeMetal objects from chandi Bukit Batu Pal
Kedah: SuggestedOrigin and Date",IMBMS 4f i (1968)'
5g. SeeA. Lamb, "SomeGlassBeadsfrom the Malay Peninsula",Man 65 (1965):36-
,,old Middle Eastern Glassin the Malay Peninsula",in EssaysOfferedto G.H. I
and
(ed.) Ba Shin et al., Artibus Asiae (Ascona'1966)'74-88'
59. Personal communicationfrom Nik Hassan Shuhaimi'
60. For a long time prior to the discoveryof anciententrepottrade at the mouth of the M
= River, miny scholarshaveidentified'chiehcha'with Kedah;Braddell,"AncientTil
in the Malay Peninsulaand the Straits of Ma1acca",379-80, Wheatley, GoldenK
sonese,46-47, and Wolters, F-arlyIndonesinnCommerce,263'
,,Takuapa:the probablesite of a pre-Malaccanentrepot",82-4 andwales, 1L
61. Lamb,
Peninsula.123,hashoweverdatedthe port from the eighthto the tenth centuriesI
62. Lamb..,Takuapa:the probablesite of a pre-Malaccanentrepot",82-4 andwales, ,t4
Peninsula,123and 133. For other views on the locationof Kalah seen. 13 of this pa1
63. Apart from satingphra (seen. 64), relatively little has been published in English in
foim of archaeologicalreports pertaining to trade at these Isthmian centres. A us
general survey oflntiquities, mainly religious objects and a few trade ceramics,:
be found in Piriya Krairiksh, Art in Peninsular Thailnnd prior to thefourteenthcen
 Collecting Centres,Feeder Points and Entrepdts 37

.4.D. (Bangkok,1981).Another early entrep6thas recentlybeenreportedat Klong Thom

(Khuan Luk Pad) in Krabi province, south Thailand. SeeMayuree Veraprasert,"Klong
Thom: an ancient bead manufacturing location and an ancient entrepot", in sPAFA Finnl
Report:&minnr in Prehistoryof southeastAsiafT-wll] SEAMEO Pioject in Archaeology
and Fine Arts (Bangkok, 1987), 323-29.
64. Lamb, "Notes on Satingphra",78-79 and 86. Wales, although recognizingthe entrepOt
status of Satingphra,doesnot share Lamb's views about the trans-Peninsularconnec-
tions betweenSatingphraand PengkalanBujang. Wales, Malay Peninsula,146-48' and
"Langkasuka and Tambralinga", 31 and 33. For further information on archaeological
findings from the Satingphra area see J. Stargardt, "Southern Thai Waterways", and
,,The Sriviiavan Civilization in Southern Thailand", Antiquity 47 (1973):225-29.

65. wales, Molol Peninsuh, pp. 144and 146, recorded no finds of beads or any Middle
Eastern glass in his excavations.Lamb, "Notes on Satingphra",77 reports that beads,
both glasi and stone varieties, are rare at Satingphra.Stargardt'sexcavationsat a site
in the Satingphra area recovered only a handful of beads (less than ten) and a single
glass ring biiieved to be of Arab glass. Stargardt, "Southern Thai Waterways", 14.
c6. For discussionsof early Hindu sculpturesfound in PeninsularThailand see S.J. O'Con-
nor, Hindu Godsof Peninsutarsinm (Ascona, 1972).wales, Makry Peninsula,43-48;
M.C SubhadradisDrskul (ed.\, The Art of Srluiiava(Paris, 1980),2l-23:Pltiva, Art
in Peninsular Thailand.
67. one of the most famouschaiya monuments,a chediat wat Keo, is discussedin M.c.
Subhadradis Diskul, "Chedi at wat Keo, Surathani", IMBRAS 53, ii (1980): 1-4.
Prince Subhadradishas dated this chedi to about the ninth century A'D'
D8. t^amb,"Miscellaneouspapers", 75, notes that archaeologicalevidencefor trans-Peninsular
connections between Takuapa and Chaiya is slight. According to Wales, during
Srivijayan times, the overland routes acrossthe Isthmus region had already ceasedto
be important as main routes for international trade. These routes, however, continued
;used by Indian merchantsand local collectors of produce."wales, Malay Penin-
to be
sula, 194.
a9. Ibid., r12.
;0. Ibid., 142-43 and 194-95.
il. Ibin.,I52-53 and Wales, "Langkasukaand Tambralinga",35'
72. Ibid.,36 and Wales,Malay Peninsula,154 and 176.
i3. The rather later chronologyfor Nakhon Si Thammarat ascribedto it by Wales, based
on the ceramic evidences,has apparently added some strength to the doubts surroun-
ding the provenanceof the famousA.D. 775Ligor inscription.However,it must be stress-
ed fhat Wales'excavationswere small-scaletrial digs and more extensive excavations
are required before this claim can be fully established.For discussionson the problems
of the provenanceof the Ligor inscription, see Wales, ibid., 103-05 and Subhadradis
Diskul, ?7,e Art of Sriuiia*, 25 and "Chedi at Wat Keo, Chaiya, Surathani", 3'
i,1. See Leong Sau Heng, "Ancient Finds from Kampung JenderamHilir", 38-47'
;5. All were recovered from weli over three metres below the present ground surface'
However, the exact stratigraphic position of thesetin ingots (particularly their associa-
tion with the Chineseceramics)remains unclear becausethe items were chancefinds
recently recovered from modern mining operations at the site'
i6. Ibid.,44 and47.

I i7. Sieveking is inclined to see more than one occupationalphase at this site; Sieveking,
,,Recentarchaeologicaldiscoveriesin Malaya", 202-05. see also B.A.V. Peacock,"The
I
v Later Prehistoryof the Malay Peninsula",2I0.

€=*-..
 Leong Sau Het
38

7 8 , For his report, see LH.N. Evans, "Excavationsat Tanjong Rawa, Kuala Selinsing, Peral
JFMSM 15, iii (1932):79-133'
79. An Indianized(rather than Indian) origin has been suggestedfor this carnelian seal
;ilfiilt;matical error found in the name inscribed on the seal' A. Lamb' "l
i (1963).
dianised Insiriptions in North-Western Malaya", Tamil Culture 10'
confined only to the two t
80. According to Evans, chinese wares were rare and were
layers of-his excavations.Evans, "Excavations at Tanjong Rawa"' 102'

8 1 . InanearlierpaperAlastairLambhasalsoviewedKualaSelinsingasasubsidia
for this type of si
tre. Lamb, h|wever, has suggestedthe term "satellite entrepdt"
See A. Lamb, "Early History"' 108-09.
(gold
82. For instance, foill'beadswere notedat both the Takuapaand Kuala Selinsingsit
not have a wi
,q...o.aing to iamb, who made the observation,this type of bead does
in Southeast Asia. Seelamb, "Some observations on Stone and GlassBea
distributio"n
beadswere t
i' B"'rv SoutheastAsia',, 115-16. Moreover, it was found that black
."n1-"'I1 and Kuala Selinsing, while at the later entrepot at PengkalanBuja
the si
such black beadslonstituted some 17.5 per cent of the beadsrecoveredfrom
"rr*"apa
Ibid.. ll4, and Lamb, "Miscellaneouspapers", 82'

=
=
=1
 3
Tradeand StateFormationin the
MalayPeninsulaand Sumatra,
s00B.c.-4.D. 700

JAN WISSEMAN CHRISTIE

Statesand'Indianization'
! ntroduction:'Second.ary'
:n Maritime SoutheastAsia

-{mong the more interestingproblemscurrently under discussionin the study of

:re-colonialSoutheastAsia are thoseconnectedwith the developmentof polities
:r the region sufficiently complex in structure to be consideredtrue states.Indeed,
:here has been during the last decadeor so a minor renaissanceof speculative
:iscussionsconcerningthe originsof the earlieststatesin both hemispheres.The
:arly statesdrawing most attentionat present,Middle Eastern,Chinese,Central
,\merican,and perhapsSouthAsian, however,are thosewhich have someclaim
'primary'or'pristine' states,that is, politieswhich may have been
:, the statusof
:ganizedinto states without outside influence or interference.r Statesformed at
. later period, as the result of any of a variety of external influencesor pressures,
::d under widely differing circumstances,are lumped together under the rubric
.: secondary'state, and are consideredto be, in terms of this debate,of somewhat
,.sser interest.It is into this latter categorythat all the early statesof Southeast
.:^siaappear to fall. Of the latenessof these states relative to their neighboursto
::e north and west there seemslittle doubt. It is clear that the formation of these
::areswas precededby a long period of intermittent contactwith both Southand
!:st Asia. In the light of these two facts, it cannot be assumedthat any of the
:::st SoutheastAsian stateswas totally indigenousin inspiration.
Despitemore than a century of investigation,no consensushas yet beenreached
.. to exactly when these stateswere first formed and by whom, why they did not
.: pearearlier, or what form they first took. Until the SecondWorld War, the most
:nmon assumption - basedperhapsmore uiron extrapolation from the colonial
::.:?eriencethan upon either historical or archaeologicalevidence - was that the
..:liest SoutheastAsian stateswere formed in the first centuriesA.D., either by
.:igrant SouthAsiansor through their agency,and that they tendedto replicate
: a greater or lesser degree early polities in South Asia. Although recent views
::. more diverse,a surprisingnumber of scholarsstill find theseanswerssatisfying.

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v b o a t/ c o f f i nb u r i a t 5
Wooden
Y4

Distribution of late metal age finds in Peninsular Malaysia

:..=*]&
 Tradeand StaleFormation 4I

Coedds'assertionthat "the people of Farther India were still in the midst of late
\eolithic civilizationwhen the Brahmano-Buddhist cr:ltureof India cameinto contact
with them", resulting in the formation of imitative states which were "culturally
cependenton India",2still has its adherents.It has recently been echoedby
\Iabbett3 in his suggestionthat SoutheastAsians were not far removed from a
Hoabinhianlevel of technologyand lifestyle when South Asians finaily arrived in
sufficient numbers to supply not only the ideology and leadership, but also the
agricultural technology which made possiblethe establishmentof the first states
:n the region.
Other historians. have showna more generalwillingnessto assumethat at least
tome localinitiativewas involvedin the formationof the earligststates.However,
:r'en scholarsof this persuasion,on the whole, cling to the idea that the first true
SoutheastAsian states were based entirely upon borrowed models and probably
:crmedwith the aid of importedadvisers.The differencesin emphasislies in their
assumptionthat local peoplemust have largely'Indianized'themselvesin order
:o acquirethe necessarypoliticaland socialskills for statehood.Thus, while states
areseenby this schoolto havebeentailoredlocally,they are still felt to havebeen
:ut originally to Indian patterns.
The generalassumptionmadeby scholarsof both the abovepersuasionshasbeen
:hat the formation of the first statesin SoutheastAsia awaitedthe arrival of Indians
lecausesomeessentialingredientwas lacking in local societies.Suggestionsoffered
as to the nature of this deficiency have included general backwardnessof social
and political culture,4weak and diffuse kin ties,sand an inadequateagricultural
:echnology.6On the basisof these and other generallynegativeviews of Southeast
-\sian societies,it has been argued that the earliest states in the region must have
ceenformed as a consequence of a more generalprocessof'Indianization'of local
societies.
This combinedprocessof Indianizationand state formation is generallyaccepted
:o have produced the first Southeast Asian states between the third and fifth
;enturies A.D. These dates,basedupon Chinesecourt recordsof early contact
accordwell with those assignedon palaeographicgroundsto the earliest Southeast
-\sian inscriptions,all of which are written in Sanskritand are distinctivelyIndian
in character. During the last two decades archaeologicalresearch has added
significantly to the data available for the study of this and earlier periods in the
region.On the basisof the data which have beenassembledto date,there seems
no reasonto doubt that substantialIndian influencewas felt by at least some local
societiesby the fourth or fifth century A.D. It has alsobecomeclear that this period
of real cultural influence must have been precededby a number of centuries of
intermittent trade contactwith the Indian subcontinent.The south Indian rouletted
',r-arebowls found in west JavaTand possiblyin Perlissprobablydate to no later
:han the first or secondcentury A.D. None of thesewares has yet beenreported
'Funanese'periodsites.
:rom any of the somewhatlater Judgingfrom its distribution,
rhis pottery almost certainly came by sea directly acrossthe Bay of Bengal. Still
earlier overlandtrade with north India is evidencedby the carnelianand jasper
readsthoughtto be of Indian manuJacturewhich havebeenfound at sitesin western
Thailand,ealong the west coastof the Peninsula,l0and at a scatteringof other sites
:n South China and SoutheastAsia. From the contexts in which these beadshave

r--=
 lan WissemanChristie

been found it appearsthat some may have been imported as early as the third or
fourth cenhrryBC. Neither thesesites,nor the slightly later onesat which rouletted
goods
ware bowls have been found, have produced any evidencethat these trade
were accompanied by any foreign cultural baggage'
In fact, the archaeologicaldata now suggest that regionaltrade was of much
greater economic and cultural importance to these societies during the period
iletween perhapsthe third century B.C. and the fifth century A.D. The Peninsular
Malaysian sites in which Indian beadshave been found have also brought to light
a number of Dongsondrums and other large items cast in bronze, most, if not all,
of which were apparently imported from the Red River valley of northern viet-
nam,ll as well asiertain high-tin bronze bowls which were apparently manufac-
tured in western Thailand and exportedwestwardsas far as Taxila and southwards
into the Peninsula.l2Long-distancetrade links in the islands were clearly forged
well before the third century B.C.,t3 and by the fifth century A.D. those between
the major river valleys on the mainland were so intensive that they may have
involved the movementof artisansas well as their products.laThat thesemainland
societieshad, long before the developmentof significanttrade ties with SouthAsia'
developedsophisticatedwet rice technologiesseemsnow to havebeenconvincingly
demonstratei.lsThus it seemsthat not only were SoutheastAsians themselves
active and often sophisticatedparticipants in, rather than primitive and passive
recipients of long-distancetrade well before the period of Indianization, but also
thaithe most cufturally significant trade remained regional rather than foreign in
origin into the early centuries A.D.
Evidence for the existence of states on the mainland of SoutheastAsia by the
beginningof the first millenniumA.D. or earlieris alsobeing assembled.16 These
pol-iticaldevelopments,however, did apparently occur within the period of trade
lontact with South and East Asia. There is thus no reasonto believe that any of
'pristine' and that they owed nothing to older statesof neighbouring
these stateswere
'secondary'stateswere either colonial
regions, though this is not to say that these
o. clearly imitative in character. Recent additions to the archaeologicaldata
may enableui not only to detach the processof state formation in SoutheastAsia
"u"n
from that of Indianizaiion,but alsoto indicatethat the former processalmostcer-
tainly preceded the latter. This distinction between impulse and imitation is an
importint one, but one which may be difficult to identify archaeologicallyin the
.ont"*t of the early statesof the SoutheastAsian mainland.These inland, agrarian
statespossessedeconomicinfrastructuresand spatialorganizationsbroadly similar
to those of early statesin South Asia. How many of these parallelswere the conse-
quenceof independentresponsesto broadly similar environmental and economic
conditions, and how manyof consciousimitation, will possibly never be clear in
judge the degree
the absenceof written remains. However, while it is difficult to
of direct dependenceof early agrarian states in Southeast Asia upon borrowed
models,this may not be true of the coastal states of the Peninsula and islands' The
coastaltrading states of the western Archipelago developed under very different
environmental and economic conditions from those with which they were in contact
in South Asia, and coincidentalsimilarities are lesslikely to have arisen. Identifica-
yield
tion of the earliest trading statesand study of their developmentshould thus
some answers to questions of general as well as specific significance' However,
 I
+
0 1 5 0I m

i6 '4 *-
.)/ .r
U , o,,^on'l

^* u%

L a n da b o v e5 0 0m r t r c s

Distribution of tin-ore and gold in Peninsular Malaysia

44 lan WissemanChristie

the available data, while not conclusive,are at least suggestive,and may at the
very least pinpoint areas likely to have been of key importance.

Stabletraditions and unstablestates

In order to discussthe evidencefor the origins of coastalstatesin Insular Southeast

Asia, it is first necessarybriefly to delineate the enduring features which these
polities had in common, and in particular those which were reflected in spatial
organizationand distribution of material sufficiently characteristic of such states
to make them archaeologicallyrecognizable.This necessarilysomewhatsynchronic
approachto the description of coastal states should not, however, be taken as an
argument that these polities existed over the centuries in some form of a historic
stasis. They undoubtedly grew and altered over time. Yet there appear to have
been, despite inevitable changes,some continuities in the essentialassumptions
underlying socialand political relations,and in their institutional expressions.The
seventh century state of Srivijaya, as portrayed in its Malay-language inscrip-
'Malay'
tions,17is recognizablythe lineal forbear of the nineteenth century states
of the same coast. The means by which central and regional exercise of political
power was articulated and the ideological underpinnings of authority within
historically documented states of the seventh through the nineteenth centuries
appearto have beenbroadly similar. The sameseems,on the basisof the archaeo-
logical record, to have been true of the physical structure of these states, their
sourcesof income, and their internal economics.Certain aspectsof economicand
geographicalstructure are probably, as this paper seeksto demonstrate,far older.
The majority of the coastaltrading states were located, during the pre-colonial
period, on the east coast of Sumatra, on both coastsof Peninsular Malaysia, and
along large sectionsof the coast of Borneo. The coastal states of Java comprised
a separateclass,which it is beyondthe scopeof this paperto discuss.The economic
'Malay'coastal stateswas largely trade, normally taking the form of a com-
basisof
plex interlinking of internal, regional, and extra-regional networks and circuits.
Few of these states, aside from those in the Kedah-Perlisregion of the Peninsula
and Aceh in northern Sumatra, had either the soil or the terrain to support more
than a dispersedpopulationof subsistencefarmers; nor were their seasrich enough
to support societieson the scaleof coastalPeru. It was thus only by looking beyond
their own borders for trade-generatedincome that most were able to support the
concentrationsof populationand reasonablystableelites which distinguishedthem
in their scale and complexity from neighbouring chiefdoms.
These states resembled one another, despite considerabledisparities in size
amongst them.18All were essentiallyas riparian as they were coastal:they were
focussedupon and geographicallystructured by rivers, either a single moderately
large drainagesystemor a group of smaller systemsentering the seanear the same
point. These rivers provided the major channels of trade and communication;
settlement associatedwith the state was generally located within a kilometre or
so of these waterways. With the exception of a few centres located at interfaces
between the coastalstatesand particularly important interior populations,settlement
size tended to decreasewith distance from the coast and from the major branch
of the river. The resulting pattern of economicand political linkages binding together
Trade and Stale Formalion 45

:he membersof the state, the ra'ayat(rafuat)of later Malay literature,was thus
both dendritic and hierarchical,conformingcloselyto the shapeof the river and
:ts tributaries.The capitalwas usuallylocatedat the point where the river system
lrained into the sea,or at the closestdry and defensiblesite upriver. Secondary
andtertiary centres,which actedas staplingand trading postsfor the port-capital,
'.r'erenormally locatedat the confluencesof major and minor tributaries of the river.
In Sumatra,theselittoraVriparianstatesdrew upon productsof two distinct zones
in their hinterland: the lowland forests inhabited by mobile groups of hunter-
gatherersand swidden farmers, and the highland valleys, which supporteddenser,
nore stable populations organized into often formidable chiefdoms with sophis-
:icated cultures and technologies.Both of these zones lay beyond the effective
political sphere of the coastal/riparianstate. The problem thus faced by states in
:he larger drainagesystemsof Sumatrathroughout their historieswas the fact that
:hey had no direct political control over the populations whose cooperationwas
'.'ital for their economicwell-being. The hunter-gathererswere too mobile within
:reir territories, and too shy of the waterwaysto be coercedinto collectionof forest
txotics for exchange.leThey were, however,less important as trading partners
:han were the interior chiefdoms.Many of the forest products were not of signifi-
_-antcommercialvalue until the middle of the first millennium A.D., when the
Jhinese market for them began to expand dramatically.2oThe products provided
:1' the more organizedpeoplesof the interior were more varied and economically
:nportant. Metals, particularly copper and gold, must have found ready markets
?r a very early date. However, these peopleswere no more amenableto coastal
:ontrol than were the more elusive hunter-gatherers.Their populationswere too
.arge,their traditions far too militaristic, and their distancefrom the coasttoo great
::r them to have been absorbedinto the political structure of the coastal states.
-r addition, they were usually in a position to channel their trade through more
:han one river system, and thus to play one state off against another. This uncer-
:ainty of interior suppliesand the rivalry betweenneighbouringstatesfor the trade
,l rhe same chiefdoms in the interior added to the problems inherent in the fact
::tat most of the states on the same coast offered to the overseasmarket basically
--resame range and quality of products. Since individual states lacked either the
:eans to control the flow of goods from the interior or to attract foreign trade to
:teir port to the exclusion of others, warfare between them was inevitable. The
rjectiveswere either the eliminationor the subjectionof rival ports and the trading
:etworks they represented.2lThis state of affairs was common on the coasts of
Sumatraand Borneo, where the scale of the river systemsand the distribution of
.rportable materials made direct state control of the sourcesof their wealth difficttlt.
In contrast with the early states of Sumatra and Borneo, those of Peninsular
l,la1aysia,which developedin smaller drainagesystems,were facedwith relatively
:.w difficulties. They lacked powerful interior neighbours, and the resourcesof
:..e Peninsulawere redistributed in such a way as to favour the coastal states,
:articularly on the western coast. Gold and forest products were, as in Sumatra
.:d Borneo, derived from the interior, but in the Peninsula the major source of
::ade income was the export of tin, the deposits of which lay within easy reach
: the coastand lower coursesof many rivers. Thus, although in many other respects
:ie early states of the Peninsularesembledthose of Sumatra and Borneo' in the
 lan WissemanChristie

Peninsulathe balanceof economicpower was, from their inception,in favour of

the coastalstates.Becauseof the physicalconstraintsof the landscape,thesestates
were also. on the whole, smaller than those of the large islands.These differences
are important, and the advantagesenjoyed by the Peninsular communities con-
stituted a factor which cannot be overlooked in any study of the origins of the coastal
trading states of maritime SoutheastAsia.
Once these littoraVriparian stateshad developed,however, they appearto have
maintained similar internal and external trade systems, although the significant
differences between the tin-rich states of the western coast of the Peninsulaand
those of other coastsmust be borne in mind. These trade systems,and the relation-
ship between prestige goods and political power common to the traditions of all
states of this class, are as distinctive and recognizablein archaeologicalterms as
are the patterns of settlementof thesestates.Most rulers of thesepolities, because
of the essentialmobility of the majority of the upstream communities,were rarely
in a position to enforceloyalty. They were normally compelledto attract allegiance
and cooperationthrough a variety of strategies.Allegiance of communitieswithin
the political sphere of the state, the rakyat who shared the languageand the cultural
traditions of the coastalcentres,was attracted by a combinationof religio-political
and economicmeans.This commonlymanifesteditself in a form of patronagewhich
involved the redistribution of a significant portion of the ruler's income from trade
amongsthis supporter-clients.In historic times this redistributed wealth took the
form of entertainment, clothing, and personal adornments provided for clients
supported within the royal household or court, and status-enhancingimports
presentedto thosein control of dependentcentres.Those prestigegoods,held in
large quantities by the ruler, and in carefully graded quantitiesby clients, changed
slowly over time, someitems lingering longer in the prestigerepertoirethan others.
While Chineseceramicsremainedexpensive,their distribution was limited to ports
and major dependentcentres.By the Ming period, when a variety of less expensive
wares was available, the patterns of their distribution began to change,and their
placein the prestigehierarchywas taken by other items. Earlier prestige-conferring
imports included goodsfrom South Asia, China, and even Rome. Earlier still, the
trade in valuableswas dominatedby elaborateVietnamesebronzesof the Dongson
tradition.
The inward flow of foreign prestige goodsappearsto have been regulated in recent
centuries largely by this political redistributive network; archaeologicaldata suggest
that this pattern is very old. These goods, however, had to be paid for, and the
only produce from Sumatra, Borneo, and the Peninsula for which there existed
significant overseasmarkets were forest exotics,metals and semi-preciousstones.
Very few of theseitems were collecteddirectly by membersof the rakyatof coastal
states, with the notable exception of the tin of the west coast of the Peninsula.
Since the producers of most of these trade goodswere not members of the state,
and in many casesappear to have calculated prestige in a different manner, the
mechanismswhich drew thesegoodsinto the state'seconomywere to somedegree
distinct from thosewhich carried foreign goodsupriver. In the nineteenthcentury
the processof extracting goods from the interior involved a variety of traditional
economicrelationshipswhich had developedbetweenthe upriver clientsof the ruler,
and neighbouring non-rakyalcommunities. These peoplesoften appear in Malay
Trade and StateFormation

hihnyatliteratureunder the rubic of.sakai.Items offered by a slate to its neighbours

in the interior were almost exclusively products of local industries, goods which
were either manufactured or refined in the port region. These included salt and
salt fish, metal tools, woven cloth, and jewellery. Overseasimports played only
a minor role in these upriver exchanges.
The internal economiesof statesof this classwere complex: these polities were
no mere conduitsthrough which populationsof the interior exchangedtheir produce
for goodsfrom overseas,The selectivebarriers imposedby thesestateseffectively
compartmentalizedexchangeinto three distinct segments,eachof which dealt with
a separateset of goods:raw materialsfrom the interior, seaproductsand manufac-
tures from the coast, and imported valuables. Political and economic systems of
this sort may thus be recognizedarchaeologicallyby the characteristicdistributions
of the abovegoodsbetweensites associatedwith them. The absenceof sucha state
should also be noticeablefrom the archaeological.record.In a statelessregion the
majority of imported valuablesmight be expectedto gravitate to the regions pro-
ducing the exports which paid for them.
The early nineteenth century sultanate of Palembang is a particularly well-
oocumentedexample of a state of the classic type,z2although by that time its
traditional economic system was in decline. It was described just before it suc-
cumbed to the combined pressures of colonial force and competition from the
cheaperproducts of the Industrial Revolution which destroyed most of the port-
based industries. The same pattern can be traced back in time through the
archaeologicalrecords in a number of places in the maritime region. Preliminary
reports on excavationsin the Merbok and Muda River Valleys of Kedah,23at Kota
Cina2aand Muara Jambi2son the east coast of Sumatra, in the Santubongregion
of Sarawak,26 and in someof the hinterland regionsindicatethat this characteristic
pattern of distribution was well establishedon a number of coastsby the end of
the first millennium A.D. Earlier sites are more difficult to find, largely because
the eye-catchingChineseceramicswhich litter sitesfrom the ninth century onwards
compriseda much smallerproportion of the imports of earlier states.In the absence
of these ceramicsand substantialpermanent architecture, settlementsassociated
ri.ith early coastal states, including their port-capitals, are difficult to locate.
However,one mid-first millennium port site, at Tanjung Rawa near Kuala Selinsing
on the west coastof PeninsularMalaysia,hasbeenlocatedand partially excavated.
^\lthough tidal action has made the stratigraphy difficult to interpret, it appears,
on the basis of the artifacts recovered,that major occupationof the site may date
to the sixth and seventhcenturies,2T with one or more phasesof earlier occupation,
as well as possible intermittent occupationin later periods. The reports from the
','ariousexcavators28furnish enough data to identify the site as that of a port at
rhe centre of a relatively small state \Mith an internal economic system closely
resemblingthose of its later, larger counterparts.The port's populationapparently
processedand exported tin from the neighbouring alluvial deposits,and gold and
tree resins from the mountains further inland. They imported (by the seventh
century probably indirectly through Srivijaya) luxury items from abroad:jewellery,
ceramics,and probably textiles from India and China. The port was the major
industrial centre in the catchment region. Judging from the remains, it appears
to have supportedindustrieswhich producediron, bronze,and copperimplements,
48 Jan Wisseman
Christie

beadsand banglesmade from imported glass, shell, and semi-preciousstones,as

well as tin and gold jewellery (some of it rather 'Funanese'in style) from locally
produced metals.2eSome of the implements found indicate that decorated cloth
must also have been produced. The quantities of these goods produced clearly
exceededdemandin the port itself. The local industries almost certainly supplied
interior trading networks very similar to thoseof later states:it was preciselythese
industries which provided the basis of internal trade in coastal states into the
nineteenthcentury.3o
Judging from the material remains, it appears that the port at Tanjung Rawa
formed the centre of an entirely indigenouscoastalsociety. Aside from the quantities
of raw and semi-finishedmaterials used by local industries and a scattering of
imported jewellery, there is no evidenceof contactwith SouthAsia. It seemslikely
that the port's extra-regional contacts were entirely commercial for much of its
history. The port settlement comprised a cluster of pile-built houses similar in
dispositionand sizeto those found in more recent Malay fishing and trading towns.
The structures were built at the river mouth, originally over shallow water, but
later on top of the extensive kitchen and industrial midden which accumulatedbelow
them. As the midden grew, graves were cut into it, apparently within occupied
portions of the settlement.Most of the inhumationsappearto have taken the form
of boat or raft burials3l similar to others known from both the Peninsular and
Sumatran coasts,a burial custom which appearsto be of some considerableantiquity
on these coasts.There is no evidencethat the South Asian tradition of cremation
of the dead had made any early impact upon local customs.In the light of the evident
continuity of local customs,and of the absenceof Indian religiousremains,it seems
unlikely that, as suggestedby Evans,3zthe early populations were Hindu.
The pottery manufacturedat Tanjung Rawa bears a strong family resemblance
to wares produced elsewhereon the coastsof the Peninsulaand of the islands of
western Indonesia.These were paddle-and-anvilmade vessels,often complex in
body form, but with simple rims, many bearing a mixture of incisedand impressed
decoration, others occasionally coated with resin. Although small numbers of
Chineseand perhapsIndian ceramicswere imported, they had no apparentimpact
upon local vesselshapeor techniquesof manufactwe. There is, in fact, no evidence
for either colonization or Indianization of the port during its period of local
prominence. Lamb33has suggestedthat the nature of the site reflects the settle-
ment'spositionas a subsidiaryport dependentupon larger, more Indianizedcentres
elsewherein the Straits region. Tanjung Rawa was clearly a subsidiary or feeder
port for at least part of its history. It must have been the centre, even at its height,
of a relatively small polity. But in its internal and external economicrelationships
it seemsto have conformedto the classiccoastalstate pattern. There is no evidence
so far that larger ports of the mid-first millennium A.D. were significantly more
Indianizedthan Tanjung Rawa, although their trade contactswith South Asia may
have been more direct. Seventh century Srivijaya, when its centre is finally
located,will almost certainly be found to resemblea larger, richer Tanjung Rawa
with the addition of a Buddhist ceremonialsector,which neednot have beentotally
integratedwith the rest of the settlement.
The first five centuriesA.D. are, for the coastal regions, even more of an
archaeologicalblank than is the period of Srivijaya. However, the distribution in
 Trade and StateFonnation 49

the maritime regions of Sanskrit languageinscriptionsconnectedwith what seems

to have been a local variant of Buddhism, thought to date to the later fourth and
fifth centuriesA.D., reflects as much the importanceof local cultural ties as it does
the strength of direct cultural links with India. Inscriptions bearing identical texts
have been found in Kedah, West Kalimantan, and Brunei. These texts, and the
useto which they were apparentlyput, must reflect religious practicesvery similar
'siddhayatra'stones
to those later connected with the and some of the Malay-
languageinscriptions of seventh century Srivijaya, echoesof which continued to
appear in later Cham and Javaneseinscriptions.3aThe cult apparently attracted
seafaringtraders, like the ship's captain Buddhagupta,and once it was introduced
and adaptedto local needsand traditions,it seemsto havespreadwith somerapidity
through an already existing local network, appealingto people of simiiar background
and circumstanceson a number of coasts.Parallels can be found in the spread of
religious customs in the maritime region at both later and earlier periods.3s
Of the fifth century Sanskrit inscriptions in the maritime region, only the group
from Kedah is clearly the work of more than one individual. The most recently
found of these stones,from Kampung Sungai Emas near Kota Kuala Muda, is far
lesscompetently executedthan is the well-known Buddhaguptastone from the same
region. Judging from the hiatus left in the centre of the secondline of the text and
the garbled lettering at its ends, it seems likely that the inscriber, or possibly
inscribers, of the Sungai Emas stone may not have been literate in Sanskrit.
The secondline, at least, of the text appearsto have been copied from a rather
indistinct original by someonewho did not understandits content. It may well be
that this cult, having dependedat its inceptionupon the servicesof a foreigner,
continued to exist for some considerabletime with a purely local membership.
.\spects of its ritual appear to have been absorbedinto that of later states. The
evident participation of an Indian priest in the cult during its early phase should
not be taken as an indication that the societiesin which it flourished were in any
otherrespectIndianized.There is no evidencefor this. Nor doesthe rather abrupt
appearanceduring the late fourth or fifth century of Sanskrit inscriptions in the
regionindicatethat the first stateswere formed at this time under Indian influence.
On the contrary, the mannerin which a rather sophisticated,foreign, temple-based
:ult was apparentlyadaptedto local needs,communicatedfrom one coastto another
rithin a largely homogeneouscultural sphere,and then later absorbed,in part,
into the coastalstate tradition, suggeststhat the cult took root originally in already
existingstatestied into a well-developed regionalnetwork. Had this cult beenone
rf the more common variants of Buddhism in India at the time, then it might be
:ossible to ascribe its introduction at widely scatteredbut environmentallysimilar
roints within the region to the activity of foreigners alone. However, the cult's
:elativeobscurityin India, coupledwith its longevityand wide distributionwithin
a socialand political spherewhich was later so uniform within maritime Southeast
-{sia, would seem to argue againstsuch a possibility.
t
Genesisand conditionsof growth

1 If we may thus assumethat coastal states were not the product of a fourth or
I :rfth century wave of Indianizationin the maritime region, we are then left with

-'_'-
50 Jan WissemanChristie

unanswered questions of.when they were first formed, and where. If the above
argument continues to be supported by new archaeologicaldata, there is indeed
no reason to believe that the first states were not formed by local peoples.Available
data are still scanty. No pre-fifth century locally written sourceshave been found,
and it is unlikely that any will be. Early Chinesenotices on their southern neighbours,
fragments of which are preserved in later encyclopaedias,have lost their context
in many casesand are difficult to interpret. Even those not garbled by later copyists
do not, in most cases,indicate a first-hand knowledge of the islands.Western and
Indian sourcesare even more unclear and unhelpfirl. Archaeological data are slowly
being accumulated,but are still too scatteredto provide a completeiy satisfactory
picture of any period before the late first millennium A.D. However, the evidence,
meagteas it is, suggeststhat coastalstatesmay have begun to coalescewell before
the fifth cenhrryA.D., possiblyas early as the latter part of the first millenniumB.C.
one of the problemsof using archaeologicaldata largely unsupportedby written
sourcesis the lack of any definite means of identifying a polity as a state purely
on the basisof sizeand distribution of population,inequalitiesof status, sophistica
tion of material culture, and differential accessto certain of those material goods.
These are the attributes of a society most susceptibleto archaeolcigicalinvestigation.
Moredver, no precisedefinition of statehoodhas yet beenagreedupon; ranked and
stratified societiesform a continuum within which boundariesmarked between'state'
and 'non-state'are essentiallyarbitrary. In the last analysis,perhapsthe solenecessar
criterion for defining a polity as a tme'state'is the fact that its membersso regard
it, that they view themselvesas members of a political rather than a purely tribal
unity. This essentialinformation is, and probably always will be, unrecoverable
for the very early period in maritime SoutheastAsia. However, on the Peninsula
the distribution of sites and the distribution amongstthem of imported dnd locally
produced goods dating to the last few centuries 8.C.36 are of considerable
importance.The data,althoughstill admittedly limited, do suggestthat one or more
organizedstates had appearedon the Peninsulaby this time. The distribution of
settlements and artifacts in certain areas fall into patterns remarkably similar to
those of remains associatedwith coastal states of later periods.
The sites in questionform severalinterconnectedclusters.The greatestconcen
trations both of sites and of artifacts are found closeto the west coastof Peninsula
Malaysia in the present states of Perak and Selangor.The major groups of sites
in these statesare located in the Kinta region of the Perak-BernamRiver Valleys,
and in the Langat region along the lower coursesof the Klang and Langat Rivers,
both of which enter the sea near Klang. These two watershed regions drain the
richest and most accessibleof Peninsular Malaysia's alluvial tin deposits.A third
group of sites is that strung out along the upper Pahang-TembelingRiver Valley
in the mountainousinterior, a region which in the past produced most of the gold
on the Peninsula. Although the river system drains to the east coast, important
early trade routes appearto have folltwed the river branchesto the western passe
overlooking the upper Selangor and Bernam Valleys.3TAdditional related sites
have been located along the lower coursesof rivers in Perlis, the River Muar in
Johor, and the River Terengganu on the east coast. All of these require further
investigation.
 Tradeand StateFormation 51

The above sites are linked by the presenceof a group of apparently contem-
poraneousand often associatedartifacts,somelocally manufactured,someimported.
The most widely dispersedof these are several types of small-socketediron tools
of distinctive appearanceand hafting angle, evidently unique to the Peninsula.3s
The major concentrationsof thesetools havebeendiscoveredin the tin-rich regions
of Perak and Selangor,with a thinner scattering in the interior valleys.3eSocketed
bronzetools are similarly distributed.aoThe iron implementswere undoubtedlyof
local manufacture, and even some of the bronze items may have been made
locally,arpossibly using Sumatran or Javanesecopper, since the Peninsulalacks
easilyassessiblesources.Distinctivelylocal,also,are the resin-coatedpottery vessels
found in major west coast sites and in very small quantities in the interior.
The distribution of imported items of the same period is very similar. The rich
sitesof Perak and Selangorhave producedlarge numbersof glassand stonebeads,
most thought to have been imported in a finished or semi-finishedcondition from
SouthAsia. Only two or three have so far been found at interior sites, and a small
group has come to light in a grave at Kuala Terengganu. The most spectacular
of theseimports, thosewhich have given their name to this period in the prehistory
of the Peninsula,are the very large cast bronze bells and drums of Dongsontype,
rvhich were apparently imported from northern Vietnam. Six of the ten Dongson
bronzes(three drums and three bells) which have been found so far in Peninsular
\{alaysia come from the region near Klang.a2Of the rest, two drums were iound
near Kuala Terengganu,a3one bell along the Muar River in Johor,a and one drum
along the Tembeling River in the interior.as
All the artifacts, both indigenousand imported, found close to the coastsapparent-
ly came either from graves or hoards. No settlement site of this period has as yet
beenidentified.a6This is unfortunate,sinceit limits severelyour information about
rhe organizationof the societiesinvolved. However, the graves themselves,their
contents,and their distribution provide a good deal of infortrrationabout thosewho
used them. It seemsclear that the graves found in the tin-rich Kinta and Langat
regions of Perak and Selangorwere built for members of local elites. Given the
energywhich must have been diverted into the building of the massivecist or slab
gravesof the Kinta region, and the concentrationof portable wealth in the mound
and boat graves of the lower Klang-Langat estuary, it seemssafe to assumethat
both the Kinta and Klang graves belongedto stratified societiesof moderatesize.
The apparent disparity between elite and non-elite graves in later states on the
samecoastwas no greater than it was at this time, and the evident pattern of burial
of members of the elite in separateburial grounds away from settlementsis also
I reflected in later practices.
In the Peninsulathe stone cist graves are, however, confined to a limited area
1 in the upper reachesof the Perak and Bernam River Valleys, in the tin-rich Kinta
t region.They are set apart from the mound and boat gravesby this limited distribu-
S tion, and by the fact that all are located some distance from the sea. They also
S differ from the mound and boat graves in the manner in which the status of the
n occupantswas expressed.The slab gravesrepresentthe harnessingof a good deal
it of labour, but the grave furnishings which have been found in them are far less
rich and exotic than those found in the downstreamgraves of the samecoast.The
style and location of these graves may indicate that the economy of the society
52 Jan Wisseman
Christie

differed from that of their neighbours around Klang. Their closest parallels are,
in fact, to be found in the slab graves of the interior highlands of Sumatra,
particularly in the high valleys from Lake Kerinci south to Lake Ranau. As with
the Sumatranhighlanders,the Kinta community apparently made little direct use
of the sea,althoughthey, like their Sumatrancounterparts,must havederivedmuch
of their wealth from trade in metals.,It is more likely that the tin trade from Kinta
was mediated by others during the last centuries B.C. The tradition represented
by the slab graves appears on the Peninsulato have been circumscribed both in
time and in space. It is their coastal neighbours whose political and economic
structures were more likely to have been ancestral to those of historic srates.
The sites of the Klang-Langatregion, and perhapsthose of someother estuaries,
are likely to have been connectedwith coastalpolities of more enduring form. The
graves of the Klang and Kuala Terengganu regions appear to have belonged to
similar traditions of burial practices, and they are almost certainly the ancestors
of the boat and raft burials which were later widespread on Peninsular coasts.47
of these sites, those in tlre Klang area are, for present purposes,the most interesting.
They are apparently the remains of a wealthy, stratified society, whose economy
was basedupon the extraction and export of tin, and whoseoikoumealencompass-
ed regions as far to the west as South Asia and as far to the northeast as northern
Vietnam. If their tin enteredthe trade circuits which also carried Dongsonbronzes
through the Archipelago,it certainly reachedJava,and may havebeentraded much
further east. While the compassof the commercial world in which this society
operatedis not in itself an argument for its political sophistication,thesetrade con-
nections,and the income derived from them, were probably necessaryconditions
for the organizationof a trading state of the type which did appearon these coasts.
Contact with organizedstates overseasmust have provided both impetus and, to
a limited extent, models for the political developmentwhich the increasein trade
made economicallyfeap,ibleand even necessary.Trade with neighbouring coasts
alone is unlikely to have provided a sufficiently substantial economic base upon
which to form a state with the internal political economypeculiar to classiccoastal
states.
At the sametime, the distribution of artifacts within the Klang-Langat watersh-
ed region and in the neighbouringupper Pahangand Tembeling Valleys of the in-
terior closelyresemblesthe distributionof goodsachievedby the compartmentalized
internal trade of coastalstatesof later periods. Access to the Tembeling from the
tin-rich Kinta region of the cist graves is less easy. As noted above, however, the
Klang regionjust to the south is not the only one on the Peninsulain which Dongson
imports have beenfound. They have also come to light in smaller numbersat sites
along the lower coursesof the Mtnr and Terengganu Rivers. These sites may repre-
sent the remains of smaller political units of less wealth, and perhaps simpler
organization,than those centred on Klang. In other respects,however, they must
have been rather similar. One of the bronze drums, though, has been found along
the Tembeling River in the far interior. It must have been traded in from one of
the coastalsettlementsof the time. If the trade routes connectingthe Tembeling
with the seaat this time were similar to those in later times, they could have link-
ed this gold-producingregion of the interior with the Klang and SelangorValleys.
Trade at this early period was probably, given the absenceof known sites on the

::::::::::::::::=:=::_:::-::.=::=-::-:::=.::...:::.::=::=:=--.-:
Tradeand SlaleFormalion 53

lower Selangor,mediated by the Klang estuary settlements.If these settlements

already belongedto a state similar in economicstructure to later polities on the
samecoast, then the presenceof such a valuable item so far in the interior might
appear to be anomalous.One would expect to find iittle apart from coastal pro-
ducts reaching the interior, and the majority of the trade goods found in the in-
terior valleys are indeedpreciselythose coastalmanufactures(socketediron tools,
a few locally made bronze ornaments and vessels, a scattering of resin-coated
pottery, and a very small number of possibly locally finished glass beads)which
one would expect to find. The Tembeling drum is the only clear exception to this
rule, and this particular drum is remarkable for being one of the poorestexamples
ever found. Much of the cast decorationfailed to register, and the missingportions
of the pattern were scratchedin crudely with an engraving tool.48It looks, in fact,
like a cut-price reject, and may even have been unacceptableto groups dwelling
nearer to the coast. Its presencedoes not weaken the argument that the trade of
this interior region was probably mediated by at least a rudimentary form of the
classiccoastaltrading state. The distribution both of sites and artifacts conforms
ro later patterns. Small quantities of imported prestige goodswere sent inland by
statesin all periods, but they formed an insignificant trickle when comparedwith
the quantitiesof coastalmanufacturesreachingthe far interior. In this early period,
as in later ones, most of the prestigious and expensive imports were consumed
near the coasts,to a great extent, apparently, by fairly circumscribedelite groups
rvithin the coastal societies.
It seemsprobablethat, as more information about this period becomesavailable,
:his pattern will be confirmed and the present speculativesuggestionthat the Klang-
Langat region supported a nascentstate in the last centuries B.C. will prove justified.
when the early port settlement to which the graves must have been attached is
tinally located, it should resemble in many ways the later site of Tanjung Rawa.
It is even possiblethat smaller artifact clusters elsewhereon the west coast rrere
associatedwith secondaryports, whoseextra-regionalcontactswere mol'e indirect
rhan were those of the Klang port. This may also have been true for the Kinta
.ommunities. If so, it is possible that port hierarchies began to form as early as
stateswere organized.This hlpothesis, given the present dearth of information,
nust also remain frankly speculativeand in need of testing. It would, for instance,
ce useful to know whether the iron tools found along the coast in numerous sites
are the products of many separatebut closely related industries, or whether they
were manufacturedin a small number of industrial centresand dispersedthrough
coastal and internal trade networks.
The pattern of settlement and internal trade of most of the rest of the maritime
:egion at the end of the first millennium B.C. and in the earliestcenturiesA.D.
',rasvery different. In Sumatra most of the Dongsonbronzesand other expensive
,rv€fS€3simports have been found along the upper portions of major rivers and
reyond, principally in the fertile and mineral-rich highland valleys of the Barisan
chain.aeThe pattern of distribution of bronzes in Sumatra seems, in fact, to be
virtually a mirror image of that on the Peninsula. On the island there appear to
rave been few, if any, barriers to the movement of imports directly into the far
:nterior. It must thereforebe assumedeither that on the Sumatrancoastno trading
statesor even major chiefdomshad yet formed with the capacity to provide this
54 Jan Wisseman
Chris

barrier, or that early coastal polities there organized their internal economiesi
a very different manner.
The secondof these possibilitiesseemsthe less likely, for a number of reason
First, there is as yet no archaeologicalevidencethat before the middle of the fin
millennium A.D. Sumatran coastal communities were particularly large, we
organized,or wealthy, especiallywhen comparedwith their inland neighbours.Als
the coastalregion of Sumatrahas none of the natural advantagesof the west coa
of the Peninsula.The island lacks tin and its copper and gold depositsare locatr
someconsiderabledistancefrom the sea,the heaviest concentrationsbeing in tl
highland valleys. The international market for hxury forest products did not devel<
until well into the first millenniumA.D., and when it did, most forest items can
from the interior. coastal populations certainly fished, and may well have four
a place in local trade networks as producers of cloth, boats, tools, and jeweller
Many of these industries, if they had developedby this time, would in any eve
have been dependentupon supplies of raw materials from elsewherewithin tl
region. The coastal populations of Sumatra neither coilected nor manufactur
products which would have attracted trade from further afield. Their dependen
upon local trading networks must have been great and their leverage small. Sin
the coastalregions south of Medan lack substantialtracts o{ arable land, it is unlikt
that at this period coastalpopulationswould have been large or concentratedenou
for these communitiesto have had the opportunity to substitute military force 1
economicstrength in achievinglocal dominance.It is more likely that they remain
relatively weak and politically unfocused middleman suppliers to wealthier a
better organized communities within their trading networks.
These early Sumatran coastalsocietiesmust, in short, have lacked both the t
ports to attract overseastrade in their own right and the military capabilityto cre
a gateway state with an economybased entirely upon middleman activities. T
sameappearsto have been true of the coastalcommunitiesof Borneo at the sa
period. We do not know when the threshold of statehoodwas finally crossed
thesecoasts.However, it seemsmost likely that the purely middlemanstateswhj
did finally appear on Sumatra and Borneo representedrefinements of an alrea
existing political model. The existing archaeologicaldata seemto indicate that sta
on these islands were preceded, perhaps by some centuries, by the more sta
producer-tradingstatesof the Peninsula,which controlledthe sourcesof their wea
more directly.
When and exactly how transmissionand mutation of what was probablyorigina
a Peninsularpolitical form occurred remains obscure.If one acceptsthe author
of early Chinesereports, and the locationsproposedfor the SoutheastAsian sta
mentioned in them, then there is a possibility that coastalstates had appeared
Sumatra by the third or fourth century A.D. This has, however, not yet be
confirmed archaeologically.It is also conceivablethat the early Peninsularsta
providedmore than modelsto be emulatedin the formationof politieson the oppos
shore. There is no reason to believe that early states, like so many of their la
counterparts,might not have been establishedunder the leadershipof breakaw
groupsfrom alreadyexistingstates.Again, this is an hypothesisthe testing of wh:
awaits further data, but it does find support in the tlpes of foundation myl
normally associatedwith coastalstates of the historic period. It is certain that
Tradeand StateFormation

:he late first millennium B.C. coastal communities of the Peninsula and the
-\rchipelagowere in regular contact with one another; they appearto have shared
rot only certain componentsof their material culture, but possibly also an ideological
and aesthetictradition. These highly mobile seafaringgroups, the "forerunnersof
'Pasisir
:he cultures' of recent Indonesianhistory'',s0had alreadybegun to manifest
:he homogeneityof culture which has distinguishedthe coastal societiesof more
:ecentperiods.In sucha socialclimate,the mobility and interchangeabilityof ruling
elites, evident in later history, may already have been possible.
The sameconditionswhich retarded the initial developmentof trading stateson
Sumatraand Borneo may, ironically, have been those which made inevitable the
,aterappearanceof the first multiport statesor coastal'empires'inthe sameregions.
Given the economicand political position of the Sumatrancoastalpolities that did
eventuallyform, which maintaineduneasyand unreliableallianceson the one hand
.vith productive groups beyond their control in the interior, and on the other with
a number of equally fickle overseastrading partners, both essentiallybeyond the
control of any single port-state, the eventual appearanceof a monopolistictrading
'empire'is
not surprising. The gatekeeperstates of Sumatra and Borneo were the
controllers of the flow of goods from the interior. However, given the geography
,rf the interior regions, it was impossiblefor most statesto compel interior popula-
:ions to trade exclusivelywith them. At the sametime, as providers of seaproducts
andlocally manu{acturedgoodsto the peoplesof the interior, none of thesecoastal
stateswas unique. Competition leading to the forceful imposition of some sort of
:radingmonopolywas the inevitableconsequence.sl The later trading'empires'of
Srivijaya and Brunei were the powerful, but relatively unstable,products of these
--ompetingforces.
What, then, did the earliest coastal states owe to Indian political traditions? If
:he abovehypothesisis correct, possiblyvery little, apart from the generalstimulus
'rhich contact with sophisticatedpolitical systems might be expected to create.
If the sites of the lower Klang and Langat Valleys, which date probably to the last
:hreecenturiesor so B.C., do indeedrepresentthe remainsof a polity on the verge
:f statehood,then the political developmentof that coastbeganlong before Indian
:ulture can be shown to have influenced the region. The earliest evidence for
-ndianizationalong that coastis the group of Sanskrit inscriptionsin Kedah, which
late to the fifth century A.D. The Buddhist cult with which they were associated
ippears to have had no closeparallels in India, but did have connectionswith cults
:isewhere in maritime SoutheastAsia. Nowhere in the maritime region have there
reen found the remains of any Indianized city states from which coastal polities
:right later have evolved.Also, judging by the remainsof the last centuriesB.C.,
-ndian states were not the first organized polities to trade with the region. The
?eninsula,like much of the rest of maritime SoutheastAsia at this time, appears
:o have valued the products of northern Vietnam and China above those of India.
The major symbols of rank and wealth found in the early coastalgraves are Dongson
rronzes. There is no clear evidencefor the strengthening of ties with India until
:he middle of the first millenniumA.D. Even then, China,which had by this time
annexed northern Vietnam, appears to have provided the principal market for
SoutheastAsian forest products. It was the ultimate sourceof many of the goods
'.r'hichSoutheastAsians used in their India trade.

.....
56 Jan WissemanChristir

The coastalstates of maritime SoutheastAsia appear,from the old Malay sources

to have shared with distantly related polities in Polynesia a number of tradition
relating to ascription of status, sourcesand political usesof sanctity and charisma
and the highly ceremonial role of the ruler. The historical roots of chieftaincy ir
maritime Southeast Asia, as on the mainland, lie probably somewhere in th,
Neolithic period. The remains around Klang were thus probably the products o
at least severalcenturies of political developmentwithin local traditions. It seem
likely that borrowings from the Indian cultural and political traditions were grafter
on to already relatively sophisticatedlocal systems.The reasonsremain unclea
but may perhapsbe sought in the pressureswhich the suddengrowth in the Chin
trade in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. must have placed upon the still smd
polities of the Melaka Straits. Sincethis trade boom appears,in part, to have bee
the result of the impact which Buddism and associatedaspectsof Indian cultur
had upon China, stimulating pilgrimages and intellectual traffic tlrough the souther
seasbetween them, the connectionbetween growth of trade with China and th
influx of Indian ideas and images is not unexpected. The reason for continue
borrowing by SoutheastAsian societiesfrom Indian political and cultural tradition
'dysfunctional parti;
in subsequent centuries may perhaps be sought in the
structures'which Wheatleys2suggestsmay have resulted from rapid and patch
absorption of foreign ideas and institutions.

NOTES

1. B.J. Price, "SecondaryState Formation: An Explanatory Model", in R. Cohenand E.tr

Service (eds.\, Origins of tlw State: The Anthropolagt of Politirnl Euolution (Philadelphit
1978).
2. G. Coed0s,The IndianizedStatesof Southeasf.4sta (trans. S.B. Cowing)(Honolulu, 1968
7, lr.
'Indianization' of SoutheastAsia: Reflections on the Prehistor
3. I.W. Mabbett, "The
'Indianizatio
Sources",Journal of SoutheastAsinn Studies8, i (1977): 1-14, and "The
of SoutheastAsia: Reflectionson the Historical Sources",ibid.,143-6]
4. The writings of Coeddsand Mabbett noted above representthe more scholarly end t
a broad range of works on the subject.
5. R.L. Winzeler, "Ecology,Culture, SocialOrganizationand State Formation in Southea
Asia", Cunent Anthropoloy17, iv (1976): 623-40; O.W. Wolters, History, Culture,an
Regionin SoutheastAsian Perspectfaes (Singapore,1982), 5.
"The 'lndianization' SoutheastAsia", passim.
6. Mabbett, of
7. M.J. Walker and S. Santoso,"Romano-IndianRoulettedPottery in Indonesia",.Asm
Persfectiaes20, ii (1980): 228-35. Several complete specimens have been foun
associatedwith burials at Buni.
Tradeand StateFormation 57

8. The identity of the Bukit Tengku Lembu black ware sherds has been the subject of
some debate, summarizedrecently in B.A.V. Peacock,"The Kodiang Pottery Cones:
Tripod Pottery in Malaya and Thailand, with a note on the Bukit Tengku Lembu
Blackware",FederationMuseumsJournni 8 (1964):4-20. The sherdsdo not fit comfor-
tably within any of the proposedtraditions, most of which are far too early. Some do,
however,resemblethe rouletted ware sherdsfound at Buni, which date to between 200
B.C. and A.D. 200.
9. I.C. Gl0ver, "Excavations at Ban Don Ta Phet, Kanchanaburi Province, Thailand,
1980-81", South-East Asinn StuiliesNeusletter10 (1983):1-4.
10. Glass,carnelian and agate beads similar to those found in Indian depositshave been
reported from Kuala Selinsing. I.H.N. Evans, "Excavations at Tanjong Rawa, Kuala
selinsing, Perak",Journal of the FedzratedMalay statesMuseum.s15, iii (1982):90-92.
A similar range of beadshas been reported from the slab gtaves of southernPerak and
northern Selangor.LH.N. Evans, "On Slab-built Gravesin PeraT{,lournal of thz Fedzrated
Malay statesMuseums12 (1928):111-19; B.A.V. Peacock,"The Later Prehistoryof
the Malay Peninsula"in R.B. Smith and W. Watson (eds.\,Earll SouthEastAsiar Essays
in Archamlogt, History, and Historical Geography(London, 1979\, 209. These tlpes of
beadshave alsobeenrecoveredfrom Dongsonbronze-bearingsites of both the eastand
west coast of the Peninsuia.B.A.V. Peacock,"Recent ArchaeologicalDiscoveries in
Malaysia, 7964", lournat of theMalaysianBranch of the RoyalAsintic society38, i (1965):
251,253, pl. 12. The majority of these beadsare thought to have been either imported
ready-madefrom South Asia or manufactured locally from imported materials and in
imitation of foreign designs.
11. Peacock,"The Later Prehistory of the Malay Peninsula",206 sqq'
12. Glover,"Excavationsat Ban Ta Phet"; J. Lowenstein,"The Origin of the Malayan Metal
Age", Journal of the Malayan Branch of the RoyalAsintic Society29, ii (1956):48; G' de
,,The Iron Age Collectionsof Malaya",
G. Sieveking, Journal of the Malayn Branch of
the Rolat Asiatic sociely29, ii (1956):126-31; B.C. Batchelor,"Post'Hoabinhian'coastal
settlement indicated by finds in stanniferous Langat River alluvium near Dengkil,
Selangor,PeninsularMalaysia",FedzrationMuseumslournnl 22, n.s. (1977\:28-30, pl.
5, fig. 3.
13. W.R. Ambroseand R.c. Green,"First millenniumB.c. transportof obsidianfrom New
Britain to the Solomon Islands", Nature 237 (1972): 31,.The etched agate bead found
in Talaud probably arrived there through inter-connectinglocal trade networks rather
than through any direct contact with the manufacturing source.
14. L. Maileret, L'Archiologie du Deha du Mekong (Paris, 1959-63); B. Bronson and G.
Dales,'Excavationsat Chansen,Thailand, 1968and 1969:A Preliminary Report",Asian
PerspectiueslS,i(1972):15-46;UAungThaw, ReportontheErmuationsatBeikthano
(Rangoon,1968);J. Boisselier,Nouuellesconnaissances Arch1ologiques de la ville d u
T'ong (Bangkok, 1968). That trade links between the mainland and the Peninsula
continuedto exist into the'Funanese'periodis evidencedby some slight overlap in
material found at such sites as Kuala Selinsingin the Peninsulaand Chansenin central
Thailand.There is, however,no evidenceof mainlandcuitural inlluenceupon or political
domination over the Peninsula at this time.
15. D.T. Bayard, "The Roots of Indochinesecivilization: Recent Developmentsin the
Prehistory of Southeast Asta", Pacific Affairs 53, i (1980): 95.
16. lbid.,106. A more deveioped,but more controversialand less well substantiated
argument for the developmentof states within the Khorat Plateauregion has recently
been advancedby C.F.W. Higham. "The Ban Chiang Culture of North-East Thailand",
Proceedingsof the British Academy, 1983'
 58
lan WissemanChristit

17. G. coedds, "Les In991glions_{alaises de

errvijaya", Builetin de tEmle Frangais
d'Ertuame-orienr30 (1930): 29-g0; J.G. de -asparis, prasasti Indonesin (sekctea
II
Inscriftions from the 7th.n thg (Jakarta, r9s6), 1-46; M. Boechari
!t! .lentury palas
"An old Malay Inscription of Srivijaya !.D.)
at pasemah {souitr rampong),', in pra-
seminarPenclitian Siuijaya (Jakarta, 1979).
18. See B. Bronson, "Exchangeat the upstream and Downstream Ends:
Notes Toward a
Functional Model of the coastar State in southeast Asia', in K.L. Hutterer (ed.),
Econonit
Erchange and Socinl Interaction in SoutheastAs'ia: Perspectiues
from prenistory, History,
and Ethnography (Ann Arbor, lg7?); B. Bronson and J. Wiss"*an, ,,palembang
as
Srlvijaya: the latenessof early cities in southernSoutheait A"ia", asin ferspectiues
lg,
ii (1978):220-39; J
{ _C[st1e, Pattemsof Trade in WestemIndonesia:N;itt tn ougi
ThirteenthQnturizs A.D. (ph.D. dissertation,universify of London, 19g2).The followiig
discussiondraws heavily upon the model developedby Bronson.
19' SeeF.L.Dunn, Rain'forestcollectorsandtradzrs:astudyofresourceutilizationinmo
and ancizntMalaya,Monograph5, MalaysianBranch of ttre Royal Asiatic
Sociefy(1965)
65.
20 grw. wolters, Early Indonesinn commerce;A Study of the origins of
Snlilaya (Ithaca,
7967), 702, rtt.
21. Bronson, "Exchangeat the upstream and DownstreamEnds,,, 42. The
history of
the neighbouring Sumatran states of Jambi, Inderagiri, Kanipar, and Siak,
and their
reiations with the Menangkabauof the interior is a chGc exampft oi trt" riuutti.s
between
such states occasionedby their dependenceupon groups in the interior.
22. c.F.E. Praetorius, "Eenjge Bijzonderhedenomtrent palembang,',in
c.L. Brume (ed.),
De IndischeBii $BaU W.L. de Sturler, proeaeeenerBuchrijilig uinint
Grbnid ,o,
Palembang(Groningen, 1843).
23. Leong, A suruey of ceramic depositsfrom pengkaran Bujang, Kedah (M.A.
9jY. 'Early thesis,
Universiry of Ma.lava,192!!
(London, ! A. t"amb, Histor/, tn Walg dungru @a.),Uotoyd
! Suruey 1964);H.G. QuaritchWales,"Ancient Indian ColorLation in Malaya",
tournnl of the Malayan Branch of the Royr Asintic'socieU 1g, i (19a0): l-gs.
24' E.E. McKinnon, "Res^earch at Kota cina, A Sung-yuan Trading Site in East Sumatra,,,
Archipel 14 (t977): 19-32.
25' E.E. McKinnon, 'A Brief Note on Muara Kumpeh Hilir: An Early port
Site on the Batang
Han?' sPAFA Digest 3, ii (19g2): 37-40. Hasan Ambary, iRecent
Archaeological
Researchesin Sumatra", ConsultatiueWorkshopon Archaeologicatantd
Ena,ironmental
Studieson Srfaiiaya,Final Report(Bangkok, tggZ), appendixif.
26. T. Harrissonand B. Harrisson,"The pre-historic cemetery of ranjong
Kubor,,,&rawak
MuseumJounnl 8, x (1957):lg-50; T. Harrissonand S.J. O,Connorjr.,
Excaaations of
the Prehistmic lron Industry in west Borneo,corneli SoutheastAsia program
Data paper
72 (rthaca,1969);L. chin, "Trade pottery Discoveredin Sarawak troir tgas
b rg76",
SarawahMuseumJournal25 (lgTZ): l-7.
27. Peacock,"The Later prehistory of the Malay peninsula", 210.
28. I.H.N. Evans, "on Ancient Remainsfrom Kuala Selinsing, perar{,
lournal of theFederatcd
Malay statesMuseums12 (192g): L2r-31, and "Excavations at'ianjong
iawa, Kuala
Selinsing,Perak";Sievekils, "The Iron Age collectionsof Malaya,';peacock,iTh.
Lut..
Prehistory of the Malay peninsula,,.
29. Evans, "Excavations at Tanjong Rawa, Kuala Selinsing, perak,,.
30. see, for instance, the very_detailedstudy of port industries and
trade in palembang
published by Praetorius, "Eeninge Bijzonderhedenomtrent palembang".
31. Evans, "Excavations at Tanjong Rawa, Kuala Selinsing, perak,,.

-
Tradeand StateFormation

s2. Ibid.,84.
33. Lamb, "Early History'', 108-09.
34. For the Srivijayan stonesseeCasparis,PrasastiIntbnesiLII,l-2. For the Buddhagupta
and Cham occurrencesseeB. Ch. Chlnbra, Exfunsion of Indo-Aryan Culfureduing Palhw
Rule,aseuidmrcdbl bLstriqtions(Delhi, 1965),24, and Casparis,hasasti In&ttrcsiaII,ll3.
35. Not only the later rapid spread of Islam, but also the widespreadand often scattered
occurrencesof certain types of slab graves, urn and boat or raft burials in the region
during the millennium preceding the first inscriptions indicate that ideas as well as goods
circulated within local trade networks. See I.C. Glover, "The Late Prehistoric Period
in Indonesia",in R.B. Smith and W. Watson (eds.),Eaily South East Asia: Essaysin
Archaeologt, History, and Historical Geography(London, 1979), 183-84; H.R. van
Heekeren, The Bronn-Iron Age of Inlonesin Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut
voor Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde,22 (1958):80-85.
36. Peacock,"The Later Prehistory of the Malay Peninsula",212.
37. Ibid.,200; Loewenstein,"The Origin of the Malayan Metal Age", 68-69.
38. I.H.N. Evans, "An Attempted Classificationof Iron Age Implements",Journal of the
FederatedMahy StatesMuseums15 (1931):71-76 W . Linehan, "Some Discoverieson
the Tembeling", Iournal of the Malryan Branch of the RoyalAsiatic Socicty6, iv (1928):
66-77 and "Traces of a Bronze Age Culture Associatedwith Iron Age Implements in
the Regions of Klang and the Tembeling, Malaya", lournal of the Malayan Branch of
the Royal Asintic Society24, iii (1951): 1-59; Peacock, "The Later Prehistory of the
Malay Peninsula",204.
'An Attempted Classificationof Iron Age Implements";Loewenstein,"The Origin
39. Evans,
of the Malayan Metal Age", 68.
40. Peacock,"The Later Prehistoryof the Malay Peninsila," 205;Loewenstein,"The Origin
of the Malayan Metal Age", 68.
41. Loewenstein,"The Origin of the Malayan Metal Age", 8-13.
12. B.A.V. Peacock,"A Preliminary Note on the Dong-sonBronze Drums from Kampong
Sungei Lang", FederationMuseumsJournal 8 (1964): 1-3 and "Recent Archaeological
Discoveriesin Malaysia, 1964",Iournal of theMakzysianBranrh of thz Royl Asiatir Socicty
38, i (1965):248-55 and "The Later Prehistory of the Malav Peninsula",206-08;
Loewenstein,"The Origin of the Malayan Metai Age", 15-19.
.13. B.A.V. Peacock, "Recent Archaeological Discoveries in Malaysia", Journal of the
Malaysinn Branch of the Royal Asintic Society39, i (1966): 198-207; "The Later
Prehistory of the Malay Peninsula", 208.
14. Adi bin Haji Taha, "Recent Archaeoiogical Discoveries in Peninsular Malaysia,
1976-1982", Jounnl of thz MalnysinnBranchof thc RoyalAsiatic %cizA 56, i (1983):61.
,15. Peacock,"The Later Prehistoryof the Malay Peninsula", 206; Loewenstein,"The Origin
of the Malayan Metal Age", 15; Linehan, "Some Discoverieson the Tembelingl'.
.16. Someof the cavesites of the interior were clearly both habitationand burial sites.There
is no reasonto believethat the populationusing them were connectedeither poiitically
or cuiturally with those of the coastsat that time to any greater degreethan they were
at the time of the first Europeanrecords.The thin scatteringof remainsalong the banks
of the lower Tembeling is mostly redeposited,having been washed down from as yet
unlocatedriverside sites further upstream.It is possiblethat the inhabitantsof the early
openriversidesettlementsalongthe Tembelingmay havehad closerties with the coastal
communitiesthan did the hunter-gatherersin the sameregion, as has been the casein
more recent times.
47. Peacock,"The Later Prehistory of the Malay Peninsula",207.
60 Jan WissemanChristie

48. Ibid.,206.
49. Heekeren, The Bronze-IronAge of Indnnesi^a;
A.N.J. Th. a Th. van der Hoop, Megalithic
Remainsin South-Sumatra (Zutphen,1932).Massivecist or slabgraves,Dongsondrums,
other cast bronze items, stone and glass beads, and boulder scuiptures representing
warriors with metal armour, weapons,beadjewellery, and in two casesDongsondrums
are confined to the far interior of Sumatra. This distribution of remains evidencingthe
existencein the interior of large, stratified societies,who had substantialoverseastrade
connections,contrastssharply with the distributions of trade goodsof the sameperiod
in the Peninsula.
50. Glover, "The Late Prehistoric Period in Indonesia", 183.
5 1 . For a full discussion,seeBronson,"Exchangeat the Upstreamand DownstreamEnds".
52. P. Wheatley, "Satyanrta in Suvargadvipa: From Reciprocity to Redistribution in Ancient
SoutheastAsia", in J. Sabloff and C.C. Lamberg-Karlovsky (eds.),Ancient Ciuilization
and Trade (Albuquerque, 1975), 238 and N-agara and Comnnndery: Origins of the
SoutheastAsinn Urban Traditions, University of Chicago, Department of Geography
ResearchPapers(Chicago,1983),207-08. Wheatley,howeveremphasizes the role of
Indians in the state-forming process.
4
The Kingdom of Siuijaya as Socio-political
and CulturalEntitv

NIK HASSAN SHUHAIMI BIN NIK ABD. RAHMAN

Identity and location

Georgecoedbs,the first scholarto recognizethe existenceof srivijaya and to

rransiiteratesuccessfullythe T'ang place name Shihli-fo-shih as Srivijaya in 1918,
implied that the growth of that kingdom on the southeastcoast of Sumatra was
due to the increasedknowledge of the importance of the area gained by Indian,
Chineseand Arab travellers and traders.l Information concerning the southeast
coastof Sumatrahad been increasedas a result of voyagesby chinese pilgrims
and the increasingly frequent exchangesof embassiesbetween China and the
countriesto the south, and also the developmentof navigationby Arab merchants.
Other circumstanceshave also been attributed to the growth of the kingdom. For
instance,scholarshave consideredthat the location of the coast, equidistant from
the Sunda Straits and the Straits of Melaka, the natural barriers formed by the
\'Ialay Peninsulaand Indonesia,made it a normal landfall for boats coming from
china during the northeast monsoon. The fall during the sixth century of the
kingdom of Funan, an important dominant maritime power in the southern seas
rvould have enabledthe inhabitants around the Sumatran estuariesand harbours
io acquirecontrol of the commercebetweenIndia and China.
There are, however, those who do not entirely agreewith Coedbs.They believe
in the existence of srivijaya but they question the validity of the arguments
concerningthe location of the capital of the kingdom. Scholarssuclr as Quaritch
\Yales and some Thais have argued that, on the evidence of the "Srivijayan art
rype" and the geographyof the easterncoast of PeninsularThailand, that area is
more likely to have been the capital of the kingdom than Palembang.2In their
opinion,the Palembangareawhich Coedbssuggestedas the probablelocationof
the capital of Srivijaya was not suitable becauseit was situated too far south of
rhe Straits of Melaka and becauseits hinterland would not have producedenough
rice to sustaina kingdom. The absenceof monumentalremains significant enough
to match the importance of Palembangas the centre of a kingdom that grew into
a maritime empire has also cast doubt on the location of srivijaya in Palembang.

61
 ovinrvrri\Y , l.

Coasts and wate - Sr sr idvoi jm

a yi na,
by the lleet of

0 200 400
#
MILES

Prcsent= day
Palembang

,",")
^\$ rr"

( H o n o l u l u , 1 9 8 5) p . 5 6 .

I ne Klngdom ot srlvuaya
Siuijaya as Socio-politicaland Cultural Entity 63

In 1936,Coeddsonceagaincritically reviewedthe argumentsagainstthe location

of Palembangas the seat of the kingdom, and reconfirmed his earlier belief that
the capitalof the kingdom could not be anywhereelsebut Palembang.3 His view
was strongly supportedby Nilakanta Sastri in 1949.4Despite contrary views
concerningthe location of the centre of the kingdom, the discoveriesof Srivijayan
inscriptionsin Palembangand other parts of southeastSumatra,includingthe Palas
Pasemah,Lampung inscription, the Talang Tuwo inscription, the Kota Kapur
inscription, the Kedukan Bukit inscription and the Telaga Batu inscription, have
convincedmany scholarsthat the capital of Srivijaya after 683 A.D. must have
beenin Palembang.The generalimpressionwhich most historianshaveaboutthe
nature of the empire, derived from the political framework establishedfor it by
CoedBsin 1918, is that the term 'Srivijaya'implies a socio-politicaland cultural
entity. They envisageSrivijaya as culturally equivalent to Angkor or Borobudur,
and hope that extensive fieldwork in Sumatra may unearth sites with large
monumentalcomplexesor more inscriptions.In 1973,a very intensivesurvey of
Sumatra was conducted jointly by the Centre of Archaeological Research of
Indonesiaand the University Museum of the University of Pennsylvaniabut failed
to make any new discoveriesas far as Srivijaya was concerned.sNo new siteswith
vast monumental complexesof the kind that were standard features in the rich
rice plainsof SoutheastAsia were discovered.Consequently,the great disparity
between archaeologicallyand historically derived evidenceled certain scholarsto
make generalizedcommentssuch asi "Srivijaya,though not entirely a myth, will
prove to have been quite different from what we have imagined."6The failure to
establishconclusivearchaeologicalevidenceconcerningPalembangas the capital
of Srivijaya may have arisen out of several reasons,among the most imponant
beingthe lack of any systematicsearchfor evidenceother than monumentalremains.
These have only come to light during the 1980sin Palembangin the form of trade
ceramicsof the T'ang and Sung periods,Tand a GaneSaimage of the seventh
century A.D.8 It has been reported also that an archaeologicalsite near Palembang
was discoveredrecently which might well be the site of the kraton of Srivijaya.e
Scepticismamongstsomescholarsabout Srivijaya'slocationin Palembangstems
mainly from variance with current views about the nature of the kingdom. If we
acceptthe fact that Srivijaya was a trade-orientatedcoastalstate, like the Melaka
Sultanate,we would not expectto find at its capital locationgreat monumentalcom-
plexeson the Khmer model. Growing from a small coastalsettlement,which relied
heavily on fishing and trade with the hinterland and exterior, Srivijaya would have
evolved into a kingdom controlling a number of basesthat were relatively imper-
manent.Commensuratewith the growth and expansionof its trade and political
influencewould have been the increaseof populationat the capital, sustainedpro-
bablyto a large extentby externalsourcesof food supplies,like the Melaka Sultanate
later during the fifteenth century. In fact, it was noted by Chao Ju-kua that
Srivijayaimportedrice.10The extensionof its political influenceover the already
existingPeninsularkingdomsof Chieh-ch'a(Old Kedah),P'an-P'an(in the Chaiya
area),Langkasuka(in the area betweenRanot in Satingphraand Pattani),11 and
Tambralinga(in the area betweenChaiyaand Nakhon Si Thammarat),was aim-
ed at controllingtradeand possibly,also,sourcesof foodsupply,which would have
includedrice. Tan-ma-lingor Tambralingawas amongthe kindgomsin the Penin-
64 Nik HassanShuhaimi bin Nik Abdul Rahman

sula known to have produced food in excess of its own needs.12

It has also been pointed out by certain scholarsthat, like its later counterpart
Melaka, the seventh century kingdom seemsto have emergedboth suddenlyand
late. It rose more than 400 years after substantial city stateswith Indian and Chinese
connectionsare known to have existed in other parts of SoutheastAsia. These
scholarsarguethat, sincethe main early trade routesmust havepassedby Sumatra,
in theory Sumatra should have been Indianized long before the seventh century.
There is, in fact, a possibility that Srivijaya was in existenceeven before I Ching
recordedit in 671 A.D. while travellingas a Buddhistpilgrim from Chinato India.
The date671 A.D. cannot,therefore,be consideredas the beginningof the existence
of the kingdom. When I Ching stoppedat Srivijaya, he found that it was already
an establishedcentre of Buddhist learning:l3

In thefortifiedcity ol Fo-che,Buddhistpriestsnumbermorethanonethousand, whose

mindsarebent on learningandgoodpractices.They investigateandstudyall sub-
jectsthat existjust asin Madhyadesa [India];the rulesandceremoniesarenot at all
different.If a Chinesepriestwishesto go to the westin orderto hear[lectures]and
read[the originalBuddhisttexts]he hadbetterstayat Fo-chefor oneor two years
and practiceproperrules,then proceedto CentralIndia.

Epigraphicevidence,though covering no more than 25 years of Srivijayan history,

also suggests that, like the Melaka Sultanate, Srivijaya did not take long to
organizeitself into a maritime kingdom. However, the fact that the Srivijayan
polity was well organizedand centralizedby 683 A.D. is attestedby the various
inscriptions from Palembang.Those who believe in continuity and changein the
history of the maritime polities of SoutheastAsia will recognizethat such a level
of organization could not have been attained overnight. It must have had deep
historical roots, the origin of which may be traced to the earliest kingdoms in
SoutheastAsia. It must have taken centuries of adaptation and change for it to
have reachedsuch an advancedstageof developmentby the seventhcentury. This
developmentmay be attributed in some measureto the trading activities of the
SoutheastAsian rulers and chieftainsthat led to contactswith India, Arabia,
Persia,and China. Pilgrims travelling betweenChina and India may also have con-
tributed to the knowledge of Indian religion and statecraft among the Southeast
Asian kingdomswhich led thesekingdomsto introducethem to their territories.
Indian religiousand political ideas,whether introducedby Indian traders or brought
back by SoutheastAsian visitors to India, must have contributed to the growth
of these SoutheastAsian kingdoms, which strove to expand at one another'sex-
pense. But the variety of contacts and influences was reflected in local cultural
differences. It is a recognized fact that the rise of kingdoms in SoutheastAsia
resultedfrom increasedtrading activitiesas a consequence of which someof the
prehistoricsettlementsachievedprosperityand attained'kingdom'status.From
the third century onwards,Chineseliterary sourcesbegin to recordthe existence
of kingdoms known to them in SoutheastAsia.
Sn:uijayaas Socio-politbal and Cultural Entity 65

Consolid.ation and expansion

The information elicited from Chineserecords seemsto suggestthat these early

kingdoms of SoutheastAsia did not normally remain independentvery long and
rvere,during the courseof time, absorbedby one of the more powerful centralized
statesthat emerged in the region. In the third century, for instance,some of the
early ports in SoutheastAsia becamevassalsof Funan, the first great maritime
power in SoutheastAsia. With the decline of Funan in the middle of the sixth
century, the ports experienceda short period of prosperity, as is indicated by the
brisk pace of tribute missions sent to China. However, by the end of the seventh
century, these kingdoms again declined, coming this time under the influence of
the maritime power of Srivijaya,which held sway over them for more than 400
vearsuntil its maritime traditions were, in turn, inherited by the Melaka Sultanate.
In order to establishcontrol over the polities on the Malay Peninsulaand Sumatra,
Srivijayahad first to strengthenitself militarily. By 683 A.D., the ruler of Srivijaya
roastedan armed force of 20,000followersand soldiers,ramany of whom would
have been the Malay sea people, referred to generally as the'orang Inuf .In
establishingits power Srivijaya had first to consolidateits position in southeast
Sumatra,which consistedof a number of quasi-independent powers,beforebringing
rew territories under its control. According to the Telaga Batu inscription from
Palembang,the ruler was obligedto pacify a variety of chiefs who had control over
armedfo11owers.15 Among these were the datu. The power of Srivijaya, therefore,
:ested largely on the ability of the ruler to make use of the available manpower
:esources,namely the ancestorsof the orang laut or seanomads,who lived in the
:solatedparts of the coastof southeastSumatraand especiallyin the offshoreislands
south of the Straits of Melaka. Their descendantswere the Celatesmentionedby
Tom6 Pires, and the orang lnut of the nineteenth century. These groups of people
:ravebeen describedas'sea nomads'by David Sopherl6and as'aquatic populations'
ry the Centre d'Ethno-technologieen Milieux Aquatiques in Paris.l7 The orang
:elat or Celateswere describedby Tom6 Pires as "men who lived near Singapore
and also near Palembang"and who "carry blowpipes with their small arrows of
rlack helleborewhich, as they touch blood, kill, as they often did to our Portuguese
r the enterpriseand destructionof the famouscity of Melaka [in tSlt1."ta The rela-
:ronshipestablishedby the ruler of Srivijaya with these aquaticpeoplewould have
leen comparableto that establishedby ParameSwara. According to Tom6 Pires,
CelatesaccompaniedParameSwara in his journey from Palembangto Singapore,
and having settled him there they themselveswent to live on Karimun Island. During
ris subsequentflight from Singapore they followed him to Muar and then to
\Ielaka.le They lent their support on the understandingthat he would bestow upon
:hem and their wives and children royal awards or anugerah(anugrahn),which wottld
elevatethem to noble rank or to a status equivalent to that of the orang besarin
:he traditionalMalay polity. As a result of that belief,they willingly accompanied
ParameSwaraand served him with great faith and loyalty. In return for their
'.vholeheartedsupport, ParameSwarafulfilled their expectations.A similar pattern
rf events may have occurred during the founding of Srivijaya. It is probable that
:he ruler of Srivijaya had used his allies for seafaringexpeditionsand encouraged
:hem to settle down on land in areaswhere their serviceswere needed.The suc-
66 Nih HassanShuhaimibin Nik AbdulRahman

cessof the ruler dependedupon his ability to {orge together the scatteredpopula-
tions who made up his subjectsand to use the nautical skills of the orang laut dur-
ing his expeditions.Besideshaving those skills, the none too docileoranglautwere
known for their great fighting abilities both on land and on sea. In the case of
Srivijaya, Chou Ch'u-fei noted that "none surpassesthe [inhabitants of Srivijaya]
in impetuosity of attack."zo
A very siglificant pieceof evidencewhich might throw somelight on the link bet-
ween the ruler of Srvijaya and the zrang lnut is the Telaga Batu inscription,which
was discoverednear a well, of unknown date, in the western corner of the square-
shapedisland of Sabukingking, about 300 metres from Geding Suro. This inscrip-
tion gives an insight into the way the kingdom was organizedand order and unity
maintainedwithin it. Wolters suggeststhat its presenceat the site is an indication
of a royal centre.21The inscription, which is in two parts, contains an elaborate
formula of imprecation in Old Malay and a shorter imprecation, the first part of
which is in what is known as LanguageB. This LanguageB, accordingto Obdeijn,
might be Old Minangkabau; Damais recognized its similarities with Malagasy,
Javaneseand Cham, while Van Naerssenproposesthat it was an orang laut
language.22If we assumethat the followers of the ruler of Srivijaya were Malays
from the east coast of Sumatra and.orang lnut, then it would be logical to accept
Van Naerssen'sconclusionand to assumethat the TelagaBatu inscriptionwas ad-
dressedto thesetwo groups.All the three imprecationinscriptions,the Telaga Batu,
the Kota Kapur and the Palas Pasemah,are in both Old Malay and LanguageB.
The contents of the inscriptions can be divided into three main parts: the first part
is an invocationto all divinities; the secondpart is a curse on all evildoers,including
thosewho plotted againstthe king and the kingdom; the third is a blessingon those
who submit to the rule of Srivijaya. The shapeof the stone on which the Telaga
Batu inscription was carved and the seven-headednaga cawed in relief abovethe
inscriptionindicatethat it had an additionalfunction.Sinceit was discoverednear
a well, it is believedthat it must have beenusedfor oath-takingceremonies.Water
must have been poured over the stone and collected in the depressionbelow the
inscription. The water would then have beendrunk by the oath-takers,presumably
the dntu,chiefs,and governorsmentionedin the inscriptions.This oath ceremony
must havelived on in the memoriesof the MalaysanCis retold inthe *jarah Mel.ayu,
though in a different form. The latter ref_ersto the oath between Sang Sapurba,
representingthe ruler, and DemangLebar Daun, representinghis subjects,who
might have included the orang laut.23
It seems that before the rise of Palembang as the centre of Srivijaya, the
Mela1u-Jambipolity was the most powerfi.rlin southeastSumatra.The last recorded
missionto China from Melayu-Jambiwas in 644 A.D.24The power of Melayu-
Jambi must have been dimmed by the rising power of Srivijaya, as is attested by
I Ching, who said that "Mala1"u",which may have been Jambi, became a part of
Srivijaya.2sThe struggle between Melayu-Jambiand Srivijaya-Palembangfor the
control of southeastSumatra did not end there. because.with the decline of
Srivijaya'spower at Palembang,Jambi becameprominent again. Wolters has sug-
gestedthat between1079and 1082A.D., the capitalof Srivijayawas transferred
to Jambi.26
Snlijaya as Socio-politicaland Cultural Entity 67

To end oppositionto the consolidationof his positionin southeastSumatra,the

ruler of Srivijaya had to fight rebellions, and much blood was shed, as can be
inferred from the fragmentary inscriptionsdescribingbattles.2TAn expeditionwas
iaunchedagainstBumi Jawa,which Boecharihas locatedin the Lampungdistrict
and was apparently not Java as suggestedby other scholars.2sPresumablyby the
r-ear684 A.D. the power of Srivijaya was safely establishedin southeastSumatra
:or, accordingto the Talang Tuwo inscription, the ruler now diverted his attention
:rom warfare to peaceful activities, such as the establishment of a park named
Sriksetra,which he dedicatedto all creatures,2e and the constructionof a uihdra.
After establishing itself in southeast Sumatra, Srivijaya attempted to achieve
political hegemonyover large areas of SoutheastAsia. It establishedits rule on
:he coastsalongthe Straits of Melaka. The Chineserecordssay that in 742 A.D.
Srivijaya was a double kingdom, eachpart having a separateadministration,with
Barusin northwest Sumatra belonging to "the western half of the kingdom."3oBy
:re last quarter of the eighth century, Srivijaya'spresencewas felt as far as Chaiya
:n southern Thailand. The limit of the Srivijayan sphere of influence on the west
--oastof the Malay Peninsula can be ascertainedfrom Arab records of the ninth
a,rdtenth centuries.The merchant, Sulyman,records that Kalah-bar (Kalah) was part
,,f Srivijaya.3l Although scholarsdo not agree on the exact location of Kalah-bar,
:rere is strong achaeologicalevidenceto suggest that the entrep6t describedby
:re Arabs in their recordsas lying on the westernside of the Kra Isthmus,'inthe
lakuapa area, would have been Kalah-bar.Ignoring the fluctuations of Srivijayan
: rntrol over its territories,the maximum limit of its sphereof political influence
-eemsto have beenas far north as Chaiyaon the eastcoastof the Peninsulaand
lakuapa on the west coast, as far south as the Sunda Straits, as attested by the
-ampung inscription of.Palas Pasemah,and as far west as Barus and Lamuri on
::.e west and northwest coasts of Sumatra. Within this general sphere of its
-:gemony, Srivijaya would have controlled the numerousislands south of the
I'lalay Peninsulaand off the shore of the east coast of Sumatra.An idea of the
::{tent of Srivijayan territory during the tenth century can be gainedfrom Mas'ldi
','hosaid that it neededtwo years in a fast sailing boat to visit all its dependent
:-ands.32
''faritime
fower

From the end of the seventh century, Srivijaya possessedthe necessaryre-

: 'rrces to becomethe most important maritime power in SoutheastAsia and to
- .:rtrol the east-westtrade of the region. Under Srivijaya excellent conditionsfor
:-3 safepassageof ships through the Straits of Melaka and along the east coast
: the Malay Peninsulawere created.The subjugationof Kataha(Chieh-ch'a), Chaiya
::.: many other ports helped to promote Srivijaya as the dominant trading centre
-. SoutheastAsia. Srivijaya was able to serve as an entreBot and to regulate and
. :,trol the trading activities of other ports of trade. If we are to believethe archaeo-
u-rcalevidence,other port-states,such as Chieh-ch'aand Kalah, seemto havebeen
.:.:rep6tsbefore Srivijaya becamethe main entrepOtin the area. It is apparent
:,.at Srivijaya,by establishingcontrol over thesecentres,divertedtheir entrep6t
::ade to Palembang.These entrepOtsthus becamesecondaryto the principal

:
 Muda, Bujang valiey, Kedah, seventhto eigh
Figurine of Hariti from SungaiEmas, Kuala
centuries.
 and CulturalEntity
as Socio-political
Srfuijaya 69

entrep6t, Srivijaya-Palembang,and contributed to the growth of its trading ac-

iivities,It is uncertainwhat sort of relationshipexistedbetweenthe main entrepot
rf Srivijaya and the secondaryor sub-regionalentrepOts.It is likely, as Wolters
ras suggested,that this was on a patron-client basis in much the sameway as the
rndividualharbour-principalitiesrelated to the produce-yieldingpirate lairs.33The
local entrepOtswould have been allowed to retain a substantial part of their
:ndependentstatus as long as they paid homage and rendered the commercial
servicesrequired of them by Srivijaya.
Archaeologicalinvestigationsin the Malay Peninsulaand Sumatrahave revealed
lhat the Takuapa area and the Sungai Emas area in the Muda River Valley were
sub-regionalentrepdts,where merchantsfrom India, the Middle East and China
rret to exchangegoodsduring the period of the T'ang dynasty.The Middle Eastern
evidenceincludes Sassanian-Iraq-Irantypes of ceramics and a large quantity of
\Iiddle Eastern glass and beads.3aThese probably came fi:om the seaportof Siraf.
Chinesetrading contacts are representedby assemblagesof artifacts comprising
large quantities of stoneware and porcelain sherds and glass of T'ang type' In
Sumatraitself , in the Palembang area,Chinesetrade ceramicsdating to the T'ang
dynasty have been found.3sOther archaeologicalsites in Sumatra, such as Jambi,
the Lampung area,and Kota Cina have revealedT'ang types of ceramics,although
not in such quantities as those found in the Takuapa and Sungai Emas areas.36
In PeninsularThailand, besidesthe Takuapa area, severalareason the east coast,
such as Satingphra, Si Chon, Chaiya and Nakhon Si Thammarat have yielded
artifacts which indicate that they were in existenceeven prior to the seventh century,
although there is no definite evidence of the discovery of T'ang ceramics.3T
In additionto Srivijaya,the main entrepOt,and the local entrepOts,there were
other nascentport-polities functioning as collecting centresand feeder points. On
the Malay Peninsula,there are two sites that may have belongedto one or other
of thesecategories.Theseare the archaeological sitesat JenderamHilir in south
Selangorand Kuala Selinsingin Perak.38These siteshave yieldedarchaeological
evidencewhich suggeststhat they were ports involved in active trade during the
Srivijayanperiod, and probably earlier. They appearto have conductedtrade with
non-Indianizedpeoplesliving along the coastsand river estuariesof the Melaka
Straits and also with Indianized settlementsalong the Straits, such as Chieh-ch'a
and Kalah. One piece of evidencewhich suggeststhat Kuala Selinsinghad indirect
contactswith India was obtainedfrom the discoverythere of a crude manufactured
Indianizedobject in the form of a carnelianseal.3e Although there is no evidence
of direct commercebetweenthe JenderamHilir areaand either India or the Middle
East, the discovery of only a few Sung types of ceramicsindicatesthat trade with
China would have been via a sub-regionalentrepOtsuch as Chieh-ch'a during the
latter part of the Srivijayan period. Tin ingots found at Jenderam Hilir suggest
that the area supplied tin to the main entrepOt.
In Sumatra,ports suchas Barus, Panai,Kampar and Kota Cina may be classified
as sub-regionalentrepQtsand collectingcentresas opposedto feederpointsservicing
rh the inland peoples.They were not on the east-westtraffic route, but were in con-
tact with Indians, with the non-Indianizedpeoplesin the interior, and with the
Srivijayan entrep6t on the east-lvestroute. Evidencefor suggestingthat they were
 70 Nih HassanShuhaimibin Nik AbttutRahman

in contact with the Indians is provided by the discovery of the Lubuk rua Tamil
inscriptionsof 1088 A.D.,'0 which states among other things that there was a
Tamil trading corporationof 1500peoplethere. The inscriptionis reminiscentof
the Tamil inscription from the Takuapa area, which recordsthe presenceof a mer-
chant communiLy(uanik-grantan)from South India in the late Pallava period or about
the ninth century A.D.al
It seemsthat Srivijaya imposed its hegemony over some settlements that had
alreadydevelopedtheir own artistic, cultural and religious traditions and their own
trading patterns. These polities and settlements had evolved as the result of an
increasein shipping activities along the coastsboth of the Malay peninsula and
of east Sumatra. Presumably,some of these polities started as ports of call. They
were located on almost every major river estuary and island. They were chosen
by virtue of their having prominent landmarksand watering places,shelteredbays
and sandy beaches.The main indicator of the presenceof such ports of call is the
discovery of ceramics.Severalsites on the east coast of peninsular Malaysia have
producedtrade ceramicsof Sungand Ytian types.Among thesesitesare Kemaman,
in Terengganu, and the Sungai Mulong areas, an old delta arm of the Kelantan
River that continuestowards the seathrough Sungai PengkalanDatu. Then there
is Pulau Tioman. According to Paul Wheatley.a2

In theSouthchinaSea,Tiomanwasanimportantlandmark
andwateringplace,whence
Arab seamenset coursenorth-eastwards
for champaandcambodia,but the island
wasapparently unnoticedin Chinese
maritimerecords.

Nevertheless,the discovery of trade ceramics of Sung and yrian tlpes from the
islandindicatesthat there were trading contactswith China,directly or indirectly.
Besidesthe river valleysand islands,cavesitesin PeninsularThailand and Malaysia
were also inhabitedduring the Srivijayanperiod.Mahayanavotive tablets,which
can be dated to betweenthe tenth and twelfth centuries,have beenrecoveredfrom
Gua Berhala, Gua Kurong Batang, Gua Tampaq and several other cave sites in
the Pun Pin, Nakhon Si rhammarat, Songkhla and patthalung areas.The votive
tablets from Gua Tampaq were discoveredin the Neolithic layer of occupation.
But other sites were already culturally at the protohistoric stage. The discovery
of the votive tablet at GuaTampaq indicatesthat the inland inhabitantsof the Malay
Peninsula,even though culturally lagging behind those living in the coastalareas,
had establishedcontactsabroad,either directly or through intermediaries.
The establishmentof Srivijayan authority over thesevarious types of settlement
and people does not appear to have disrupted traditional trading activities in the
Malay Peninsulaand Sumatra,which had been going on for hundredsof years.
It would appearto have superimposedits authority upon prevailing trade patterns.
The significanceof severalprimary or main entrepOtssuchas chieh-ch'aand Kalah
was reducedby the tenth century.To judge by the densityof ceramicfinds, Kalah
was.nolonger an entrep6t,althoughchieh-ch'amanagedto sustainitself despite
trading restrictionsthat Srivijaya may have imposedon ports in the Straits. Again,
judging from the archaeologicalevidence,it seemschieh-ch'aroseto pre-eminence
only in the eleventh century. Similarly, Kota cina becamean important entrepot
Siuiiayaas Socio-political
and CulturalEntity Tl

during the twelth and thirteenth centuries. Presumably, from the seventh to the
tenth or eleventh centuries, Srivilaya was the dominant entrepOt in Southeast
Asia, althoughother entrepOtswere allowedto exist as long as they did not challenge
Srivijaya'ssupremacy.It is apparentfrom I Ching'sstatementthat Srivijaya made
useof its shipsto transporttravellers,includingpilgrims and traders,to India and
China.These shipsstoppedat ports suchas Melayu and Chieh-ch'a,which indicates
that these ports were allowed to continueto exist.a3
Srivijaya, as the chief entrep6t in the Malay Peninsulaand Sumatraregion, func-
tioned as a major entrepOtfor SoutheastAsian products. It also acted as a tran-
shipment centre both for local SoutheastAsian products and for foreign products
from the Middle East, India and china. The southeastSumatranareasbecamethe
focalpoint for trade in westernBorneo,Java,the easternislands,the northernMalay
Peninsulaand its hinterland,and the Irrawaddy River systems.The whole area
becamewhat Woltersaahas called a "favoured coast",which helped in the flow of
trade, as well as in the marketing of products collected from various areas in
SoutheastAsia, providing ships and crews to connect indigenous exchangenet-
rvorkswith the international routes. The other entrepOts,which had beenreduced
:o secondarystatus, continued to exist as collecting centres for indigenous pro-
ducts,which they receivedfrom the hinterlandvia feeder points. They did not
rhemselvesengagein the re-exporting of foreign goods or products, which were
mported solelyfor their own consumptionand for redistributionto their hinterlands.
Wolters has singled out three types of forest products that became the key
stimulusto Srivijaya's trade with China.asThese products were benzoin,camphor
and a resin known asju. The resinju was used in medicineand also as an incense.
In fact, trade in theseproducts createdforeign trade interest in the whole of insular
SoutheastAsia, from any part of which they could have come. F.L. Dunn, who
:as examined the botanical evidence,believes that these forest products are
:ndigenousthroughoutSoutheastAsia, and not only in northern Sumatra,as wolters
seemsto think.a6The presenceof these products in SoutheastAsia and their
significancein the China trade as a whole would have induced Srivijaya to try to
:stablish control over the centreswhere they were collected.
Besidesthesethree major forest products,SoutheastAsia was known for a wide
:ange of exotic products,found in mangroveswamps,forestsand cave habitats.
jhese includedkingtishers'feathers,pearls,corals,sea-slugsand variousseaweeds,
:irds'nests, mangrovebark and wood, dye-yieldingroots of strand forest plants,
:oney, beeswax,eaglewoodand daman Wang Gungwu has identified the trade
:roducts of SoutheastAsia for the period 960-1126 A.D. He classifiesthem as
'drugs
and spiceproducts".Among the variousother productswhich he mentions
are ebony,gharu-wood,laka-wood,pand.anmatting, ivory, rhinoceroshorns and
.ac.a7 Another list of SoutheastAsian productshas beencompiledby Paul wheatley.
The productsthat he lists include tin, parrots, gold and tortoise-shell.a8 While,
accordingto F.L. Dunn, tin, but not gold, was carried to China during the Sung
reriod,aeboth productshad enteredthe Arab trade between850 and 1000A.D.
Goldartifacts have beenfound at severalarchaeologicalsites in Malaysia,including
:ne Kuala Muda area, Kuala Selinsing,the PengkalanBujang areaand Santubung.
fhere is also evidenceof tin trade in the JenderamHilir area.
The demandsof international markets for SoutheastAsian products encourag-
 Kedah'
Figurine ol a kala in greenstone,from Site 50, Candi BendangDalam' Bujang Valley'
twetfth to fourteenthcenturies.
irfilijaya as Socio-politiml and Cultural Entity IJ

=d Srivijaya to maintain the establishedarrangementsfor procurement of these

rroducts. According to current hypothetical models, the procurement of forest
lroduce was through a network of collectors: primary, secondaryand tertiary.s0
.n theory, the collectorsof inland forest productswere the hinterland communities
:.ndthe indigenouspeoples,while sea and coastalproducts were collectedby the
--oastalMalays or orang l.aut,who were familiar with the habitats. Sometimesthe
,-oilectorswere also the primary traders, who mediateddirectly with traders at the
:oastaicentresof various categories,dependingupon their proximity to them. Ter-
:rary traders were essentiallythe chiefs and rulers at the various-ports involved
rr export and import. The traders at the main entrep6ts like Srivijaya would
:.ormally be only secondaryand tertiary traders.
The tremendoussignificanceof the role of the orang lnut inthe procurement of
:ssentialtrade productshasbeenemphasizedby severalscholars.They were the
:armers of the sea,coastalareasand mangroveswamps.The products which they
--,tllectedwere in great demandespecially,if not exclusively,for the Chinamarket.
lhey were able to fulfil this role becauseof their familiarity with the numerous
:eefs and shoalswhich abound in their aquatic environment. They were equally
:: home on the forbidding coastline or in the many practically invisible rivulets
''.'hich dissect the mangrove forests fringing the southern part of the Malay
?eninsulaand Sumatra.
Srivijaya'sposition in this international trade was essentiallyto ensurea steady
:.ow of SoutheastAsian productsinto internationalmarkets,especiallythe South
- rina ports. As part of this function it provided servicing facilities for ships voyaging
'lrough the Straits of Melaka,and actedboth as a centrefor trade alongthe east-
':,est trade routesand alsoas a placeof sojournfor traderswaiting for the monsoon.
-: rvasalso responsiblefor controlling piracy in the Straits of Melaka and providing
. rmmercialfacilities, and in particular a well organizedsystem of port control.
3ecauseSrivijaya fulfilled its role as the main trading centre in SoutheastAsia
.--)successfully,China had granted it'preferential status'.srThis meant that its
.1ips and tradersreceivedspecialtreatmentat Chineseports. The rhythm of change
.. rhe history of Srivijaya very much dependedon the political fortunes of China.
rs is evident from Arab and Indian literature, it was Srivijaya's trade partnership
'.':thChinaand its positionin internationaltrade that madeit strong and prosperous.

:.; lations with subsidinrypolities

-Vchaeologicalevidencerevealsthat there were many sitesin the Malay Peninsula

.rd Sumatrawhich could have been the site of minor polities,locatedeither on
::.e coast or in the river valleys and functioning as subsidiary ports of Srivijaya.
- re capitalsof thesepolitiesappearto havebeenimpermanent.In the caseof Chieh-
,:. a, its capitalwas locatedin the SungaiEmas area during the periodbeforethe
:.:rh century. During the period in which Chieh-ch'awas an important entrepOt,
::,m the eleventhto the thirteenth centuries,the capitalappearsto have shifted
PengkalanBujang, also in the Bujang Valley, Kedah. The Hikalat MerongMaha
-.;,':lfllsa
(KedahAnnals) mentionsa similar tradition of a shifting capital. Other
- iities in the Batang Hari and Kampar River Valleys and PadangLawas areaseem
have developedin the same waY.
74 Nik HassanShuhaimi bin Nik Abdul Rahma

Another feature which is apparent in some of the polities that came under
Sriviiayan influence is the divison of the area within the capital city into different
quarters for different activities. In the case of chieh-cha and Kalah, separate
quarters have been id,entitied,for the re\igious and commercia\ communities. ln thr
capital of Srivijaya, the kraton occupiedthe most important area.b2 According tr
the Telaga Batu inscription, the kratonhousedwithinits interior "a treasury of gol<
and property". Besidestheseseparatequarters in the capital there must have bee
smallercentresoutsidethe capital,presumablyvillages.In the Bujang River valley
the distribution of the various sites over a very large area in the valley tends t<
confirm this. The Padang Lawas area has produced several sites of templr
complexes,as havethe Musi, Kampar and BatangHari River valleys. The kingdom
of Langkasuka and rambralinga must also have shared this feature, to judge bj
the discovery of several sites in the area between Nakhon Si Thammarat and pat
tani at Patthalung, satingphra and Songkhla.There are also similar sites betwee
Chaiya and Nakhon Si Thammarat: Wieng Sa, Srivijaya Hill and Si Chon. Thr
foreign merchantsat Takuapa and Lubuk rua during the ninth century (Takuapa
and eleventh century Gubuk Tua) had their own separarequarrers.
Apart from its political control, it is uncertain how strong an influence Srivijaya
exercisedover the polities of the Malay Peninsulaand Sumatra. Culturally, however
Srivijaya appearsto have had no significant influence over them. All the polities
known to have been under her control appear to have continued to produce their
own stylesof Hindu and Buddhistsculpture;nor is there any evidenceof any clearly
defined architectural style from her capital at palembang having been adoptedin
the subordinatekingdoms. The only subject that appearsto be common to the art
of Palembangis the Avalokitesvara image with a tiger symbol, although even here
the distribution of this particular iconography and art style seems to have been
limited to Palembang,the Lampungs, chaiya, Satingphra and the Kinta valley.
Thus it may be assumedthat Srivijaya gained political hegemonyover kingdoms
that were already establishedand continued to exist with varying degreesoi potiticat
and cultural independencethereafter. chieh-ch'a and Kalah were already well
establishedentrepOtswhen Srivijaya imposed its political influence, while all the
polities in Sumatra and the Malay Peninsulawhich came under Srivijayan control
possessedwell developedcultural and religious traditions.
In PeninsularThailand, during the period from the seventhto the ninth century,
the dominant cult appears to have been vaisnavite. This is evident from the
discoveryof ViSnuimagesin almostall the archaeologicalsitesthat havebeendated
to this period.But this doesnot meanthat other cults were non-existent.Saivism
and Buddhismwere also practised.But Kalah has providedevidenceof only one
cult, vaisnavism. From about the end of the seventhcentury to the ninth cenrury,
the cult of Avalokitesvara',)rasas prominentas that of visnu. From the tenth centur).
onwards,Buddhismappearsto have becomepredominant.But other Hindu and
Buddhist deities were worshipped too. In Peninsular Malaysia and Sumatra, the
dominantreligion in the two areasfollowed two main trends. In Sumatra,the trend
was mainly towards the development of rantric Buddhism, while peninsular
Malaysia (Kedah)developedSaivism.
Srtuiiaya as Socio-politiml and Cultural Entity

Political and cultural organization

An insight into the political organization of the srivijayan realm and other
polities within its sphere may be obtained from the information contained in the
literary sourcesand inscriptions.But thesesourcestell us about someof the polities
only. The inscriptions giu" ur details of the political organization of Srivijaya,
while Chinesesogrcesinform us about Ch'ih-t'uand P'an-p'an.Since Srivijaya was
the dominant polity in the region from the seventh century, we would expect the
political organizationof that polity to be the most complex and to provide a model,
the general form of which lesser polities would follow, varying only in detail. It
may be inferred that information about srivijaya, ch'iht'u and P'an-p'anreflects
to a certain degree the political and also the social framework of other polities
elsewherein the Peninsula and Sumatra.
Descriptionsof the political organizationof thesethree polities suggestthat each
poiity had a central administrative structure, while the provinces or other polities
subjectedto its political control had another structure. As in the caseof P'an-p'an53
and Ch'ih-t'u,sathey show variations in their internal structure which do not
A-..
repllcate5rrvuaya.

Table 1. The administrative structure of P'an-p'an.

King

Court Officials Provincial officials

II
II Na-yen

I (4)
Ministers

Po-l.ang-so-lnn K un-lun-ti-yeh K un-lun-po'ho K un-lun'po-ti'so'kan

(Basedon Wheatley, The GoldenKhersonese,49.)

76 Nih HassanShuhaimt bin Nih Abdul Rahman

Table 2. The administrative structure of Ch'ih-t'u.

Court Officials Provincial or City-State Officials

I
Na-ya-chia
(probably a Prince)
I
Po-ti (70)
Ministers (4)

Sa-l'o-chin-lo(l) Tb-na-la-yu(2) ChiaJi-mi-chia(3) Chil-lo-moti(l)

(Basedon Wheatley, The GoldenKhersonese,2S-29.\

According to De Casparis' reading of the Telaga Batu inscription, ked'atunn

Srivijaya or its directly administeredterritories were divided into severalmandnln
(administrative provinces) and each mandala or province was administered by a
datu.ssThe datu might be appointedfrom among the royal princes or the nobility.
Under the datu was a parauanda,who was responsiblefor military affairs.
In the social and administrative hierarchy, four classesof prince existed. The
first was yuuaraja. His function was that of a crown prince. Below him was a
prince entitled pratiyuuarZjo, wtro migtrt on occasions be ctrosen to trecome
yuuaraja. The third class of prince was called rajakumara. The king might be
chosenfrom any of theseprincely classes,despitethe apparentdifferencesof grade
and seniority between them. The fourth class was called rajaputra, who had no
claim to the throne, but were the children of junior wives and concubinesof the
king or vassalprinces.
In this socialand political organization,it is clear that two classeswere dominant.
The first was composedof those of royal rank. To this class belonged the royal
family and all those related to it, including titled princes and princesses;it was
roughly equivalent to the kaum kerabatdiraja in traditional Malay society. The
relative rank of membersof this classdependedon the hierarchy establishedwithin
it. This conditionis confirmedby the inscriptions.
The secondclass comprised the various ministers: senapati,nayaka,pratyaya,
haji fratyaya and,dnndnnayaka.The senapatiwas the commander of the armed
forces(hulubalnng)andpresumablyhad the samefunction as the laksamanatnder
the Melaka Sultanate. The nayakawas the head of the treasury (penghulubend.a'
harfl, the haji pratyayawas the royal sheriff (temenggung),and the dandanayaka
was the chief iustice.
 and CulturalEntity
Sriaiiay as Socio-political 77

Besidesthese, there were other nobles who may be included among the royal
officials and administrative heads. They were the murdhahn (headmanor fienghulu),
tuha an uatakuurah(or syahbandnrin charge of trade and craft and'adhyaksa
nicauarna(headmanof the low caste group). There were alsokumaramatya (non-
royal ministerc or orang haya).Then there were the members of the professional
and artisan classes,such as the kayastha(clerks), sthapaka(architects),puhauam
(shippers),uaryiyaga(merchants or traders), pratisara (commanders),uasikarana
(cutlers),marsi haji (washersand cleanersin the palace)and.hulun haii (toyal
slavesl.""
According to the Telaga Batu inscription there were more than four classes,but
this is difficult to reconcile with the caturaarnapattern, which includes, besides
the royalty, nobility, free personsand slaves,a fifth category of priests' The ex-
istenceof a class of free personsand of slavesis clearly evident from the inscrip-
tion. There is no clear evidence,however, in the Telaga Batu inscription to sug-
gestthe existenceof types of slavesother than royal slaves,though the inscription
suggeststhat free personscould own slaves.s7The very existenceof a slave class
rvas significant in traditional society, becauseit helped to strengthen the system
rhroughits economicand socialactivities.The trading communitymay haveformed
another class, as is implied by the Telaga Batu inscription. The members of this
group were iuha an iatakuurah (inspectorsof trade), puhauam (shippers)and
-ra4iyaga
(merchants or traders). The existence of a trading class confirms
Srivijaya'simportant commercialrole.
In addition to headingthe administration,the ruler of Srivijaya was also a patron
of culture and religion, which were used as additional means of attracting trade
and overseaspatronage,especiallyfrom India and China.In775 A.D., the ruler of
Srivijaya orderedhis royal monk, Jayanatato construct three temples for the wor-
ship of Sakyamuni,Padmapaniand Vajrapani in the area where the town of
Chaiya is located today.58According to the inscription of Nalanda composedin
350/860A.D. during the reign of King Devapaladeva,a temple was built at
NSlandaat the requestof King Balaputiadevaof suvarnadvipa(i.e. Sumatra).se
It is very likely that the king referred to was the king of Srivijaya. Besides
establishingfriendly links with the Pala rulers, the Srivijayan rulers also establish-
ed cultural links with the Cola dynasty. A uihara was built at the request of King
Sri Maravijayattungavarmanof Srivijaya in 1006A.D. at Negapattinamon a piece
of land ptouia"a by the Cola king, Rajaraja.60Since it is known that during the
tenth and eleventh centuries Srivijayan relations with the Cola were sometimes
belligerent, the uihara was perhaps constructed in an attempt by the Srivijayan
ruleito appeasethe Colarulers. The monopolistictrading tendelcies of Srivijaya
createdproblems in relationswith the cola. Evidently, by 1079 srivijaya was try-
rngto gain the patronageof the emperorof Chinathrough cultural contactsin order
to counteract the new commercial autonomy developing among some Southeast
-{sian polities.6lThe Srivijayan ruler, Diwakara, had a Taoist temple-atCanton
:epaired,to which the emperor of China donatedsome bronze bells'62
The high position held by srivijaya as the centre of Buddhist learning in the
Peninsulaand Sumatra apparently continued until the beginning of the twelfth
century. This assumption is based on the fact that Atisa, who as Dipankara
Srijnana,reformed Tibetan Buddhism early in the eleventh century, spent twelve
 78 Nik HassanShuhaimibin Nik AbdulRahman

years (1011-23) studying at Srivijaya under DharmaKrti, chief of the sangha,

and receiveda book as a presentfrom the ruler, Dharmapala.There is also an
inscriptiondating to about the tenth or early eleventhcentury which was discovered
in Nepal and mentions'suvarnapureSri-vijayapure Lokanathah'.Nilakanta Sastri
believed that 'Suvarnapure' stands for 'suvarnadvipa' and this represents
Srivijaya.63
In Srivijayathe relationshipbetweenthe ruler and his peoplewas basedon the
conceptof the king as a supernaturalbeing,to whom were ascribedsupernatural
powers(daubt) and who was lookedupon as the incarnationof a particulardeity.
wolters believes that in the sejarah Melayu the rulers of Srivijaya were repre-
sented as being incarnations of Avalokitesvara.oaThe cults of Amoghapasa,
Bhairavaand Heruka may be relatedto this concept,and may thus havestrengthen-
ed the belief that the rulers possessed divine attributes.In the Telaga Batu, Kota
Kapur, Karang Brahi and PalasPasemahinscriptions,there are referencesto the
eventualfate of peoplewho were disloyalor disobedient.They were liable to die
in unfortunate circumstances.In the Telaga Batu inscription, various forms of
disobediencewere listed: spying for the king's enemies, stealing, collabora-
tion with the king's enemies,cruelty to others by meansof black magic, spying
on the king's palace, and friendship with the officials of the royal treasury. But
those who were obedient and loyal were promised rewards in the form of.tantrd-
mala, prosperity and freedom from punishmentafter death. In order to ensurethat
all subjectsin all classesobeyedthe king, the inscriptionswere set up as a warning.

Centrifuga I tendencies

Srivijaya'scontrol over many areasin the Malay peninsulaand Sumatraappears

to haveweakenedfrom the eleventhcentury onwards.First, its capital had shifted
to Melayu-Jambiby 1082A.D. In the early eleventh century, Srivijaya was at war
both with the cola and the Javanese. The trade monopory of Srivijaya was
challengedby Kedah in 1068 and Pansur (Barus)in 1088.65It is evident also from
Indian and chinese sourcesthat by about that time Kedah had achievedin-
dependencefrom Srivijaya. wolters notes that from the end of the tenth century
Srivijaya was forced to resist the tendencytowards independenttrading and tried
to compel shipping to frequent its port, and that by that time harbours such as
Lamuri and Kedah were alreadyable to handle internationaltrade goods.
The end of the eleventh century marked the end of Srivijaya as a maritime
empirewith its capitalat Palembang.By then variouspolitiesin the peninsulaand
Sumatra appear to have assumedindependentstatus, and the capital of Srivijaya
had shiftedto Jambi.By the twelfth centuryat the latest,chieh-ch'aand the kingdom
located in the Kota cina area were two flourishing entrepots. Archaeological
evidencealso shows that among the other kingdoms then enjoying a period of
independenceand prosperity were Panai and Kampar. Tambralinga wa. definit"-
ly an independentkingdom by 1230.66 At chaiya, the evidenceof the inscription
from the Grahi Buddha indicates that a kingdom by the name of Grahi was in
existenceby about 1183.67From the twelfth century onwardsthe kingdoms on the
Peninsulawere more exposedto cultural influencesfrom acrossthe Gulf of Thailand
and the basin of the chaophrayathan from the Melaka Straits, while the Sumatran

-
Srluijaya as Socio-politicaland Cultural Entity 79

xingdoms were in close contact both politically and culturally with Java. On the
evidenceof the Adityavarman inscriptions found all over southern Sumatra and
:he sculpturebelongingto the east Javaneseschool,the most powerful kingdom
:n the area by the fourteenth century was Melayu, the capital of which appears
:o have been located in the valley of the Batang Hari River. By the beginning of
:he fifteenth century, however, trading activities in the region were coming to be
jominated by Melaka, the successorof Srivijaya.

\OTES

l O.W. Wolters considersthat Coeddsmadea decisivecontributionwhen he examined

the Srivijayan inscription of Ligor and establishedthat the T'ang transcription Shih-li-
fo-shihwas Srivijaya and not'sribhoja'. SeeO.W. Wolters, F,arlyIndonesinnCommerce,
CornellUniversityModern IndonesianProject(Ithaca,New York, 1967\,22 and n. 32.
coedOsalso estabiished that the most important factor contributing to the growth
of knowledge of the east coast of Sumatra was the developmentof navigation by the
Arabs. GeorgeCoedBs,Thz Indianized Statesof &wthzastAsta (Kuala Lumpur, 1968),31.
l. H.G. Quaritch-Wales, "A newly exploredroute of ancientIndian cuitural expansion",
lndian Art and l*tters 9 (n.s.)(1935):1-35; M.C. Chand."Backgroundro the Srivijaya
Story", Journal of the SitzmSociety62, i (1974): 2 10- 11.
:, GeorgeCoedEs,"A propos d'une nouvelleth6orie sur le site de Srlvijaya",JMBRAS 14,
iii (1936):1-9.
- Nilakanta Sasti, Historyof Srtuiiaya(Madras, 1949),36. In giving his supportto Coed0s,
he points olt the weaknessesof other opposing views concerningthe location of the
capitalof Srivijaya.He anaiysesthe views of H.G. Quaritch-Waiesand N.J. Krom.
i B.Bronson,Basoeki,Machi Suhadi,J. Wisseman,I-aforanPenelitinnArheologidi Sumntra,
20 Mei-8 lulai, 1973, Pusat Penelitian Purbakala dan PeninggalanNasional (pppN)
jakarta, 1974\.
: Unpublishedarticle, Bennet Bronson, "The Prehistory and Early History of Sumatra"
(Chicago,1973).
- 'Indonesia
Wolters, "Restudying Some Chinese Writings on Srivijaya", 42 (1986):
2; E. EdwardsMcKinnon, "Early Politiesin SouthernSumatra:SomePreliminaryObser-
vationsBasedon ArchaeologicalEvidence",Indonesia42 (1986):1-35.
: Robert L. Brown, "A Note on the Recently DiscoveredGanesaImage from Palembang,
Sumatra",Indonesia43 (1987):95-101; For a discussionon the Avalokite6varaimage
discoveredin Palembangin the 1960ssee Nik HassanShuhaimibin Abdul Rahman,
"The Mitred AvalokiteSvarafrom Palembang:Its significanceto the origin and develop-
ment of Srivijayan Art", Ahademika13 (1978):45-46.
: Wolters, "RestudyingSomeChineseWritings on Srivijaya",1-41.
J. Hirth and W.W. Rockhill (trans.), ChauJu-Kua; His norh on the Chineseand Arab
Trade in the Tnelfth an"dThirteenth Centuries,Entitbd Chufan-chi (SL.Petersburg, 1911),
63n. 1.
- For informationon ancientrice cultivationin Satingphraduring the Srivijayanperioci,
seeJanice Stargardt, "Southern Thai Waterways, Archaeologial Evidence on Agriculture,
Shippingand Trade in the Srivijayan Period",Man 8(l) (March, lg73\: S-29.

tti
80 Nih HassanShuhaimi bin Nih Abdul Rahman

12. Paui Wheatley, The GoldenKhersonese(Kuala Lumpur, 196l), 77.

13. J. Takakust, A Recordof the Buddhist Religion as Practisedin India and the Malay
Archipelago(671-695 A.D.) bl I. Tsing (Oxford, 1896), xxxiv.
14. GeorgeCoedbs,"A PossibleInterpretation of the Kedukan Bukit.(Palembang)Inscrip-
tion", in Malayanand IndonesinnStudies,(ed.)J. Bastin and R. Roolvink (London, 1964),
24-32; Nilakanta Sastri, History of Sriuijaya, lI3.
15. O.W. Wolters, The Fatt o7 iltaijaya in Malay History (Kuala Lumpur, 1970), 13.
16. David E. Sopher, The SeaNomads,A Studybasedon the Literature of the Maritime Boat
Peofle of Southeast.Asta(Singapore, 1965); see also Wolters, The Fall of Sr'iuijaya
in Malny History,13n. 40.
17. Christian Pelras,"Notes sur quelquespopulationsaquatiquesde I' archipelNusantarien",
Archipel 3(1972):134.
18. ArmandoCortesdo(trans.and ed.), Thz SumaOrizntalof TomisPires,ll (l,ondon:Haklult
'Celated
Society, lg4),233. konard Andaya has highlighted Tom€ Pires' descriptionsof in
his essay"Historical links between the Aquatic Populationsand the CoastalPeoplesin the
Malay World and Celebes",in Historin, (ed.)Muhammad Abu Bakar, Amarjit Kaur and
Abdullah Zakaria (The Malayan Historical Society, Kuala Lumpur, 1984),45. Seealso
Wolters, The Falt of Siuijaya in Malay History, 12. Professor Wolters recognized
in the samework the significanceof the orang laut to polriticsin the Straits of Melaka.
Seepp. 12-13.
19. Cortesdo,The SumaOriental,230-35; Andaya,"Historical Links", 42-43.
20. Wolters, The Fall of Sriuijaya in Malay History, 13.
21. O.W. Wolters, "Land Fall on the PalembangCoastin MedievalTimes", Indonesin20,
i (1975):54.
22. Boechari,"An Old Malay Inscriptionof Srlvijayaat PalasPasemah,SouthLampung",
in Pra-seminar Penelitian Siuiiaya, PPPN \Jakarta, 1979), 25.
23. The assumptionis basedon the belief that traditions concerningthe princely houseof
Melaka preservedin the SejarahMelnyu may contain a Malay perspectivefor what we
call the history of Srlvijaya. ProfessorWolters, who has advancedthis view, has shown
the methodso{ extracting verifiable happeningsfrom the SejarahMelayuto reconstruct
events leading to the fa1l of Srivijaya as envisaged by the Malays. See Wolters,
The Fall of Sriuijayain Malny History,1-7; For the oath see,W.G. Shellabear(ed.),
SejarahMelayu (Kuala Lumpur, 1984), 20.
24. Wolters, Early IndonesianCommerce,234, 237.
25. Takakusu, A Recordof the Buddhist Religion...,xxix-xxx.
26. O.W. Wolters, "A Note on the Capital of Srivijaya in the Eleventh Century'', Artibus
Asine, Supp.23, i (1969):225-39.
2 7 . The discussionon the significanceof the inscriptions can be extracted from J.G. de
Casparis,PrasastiIndonesiaII (Bandung, 1954), 15.
28. Boechari,"An Old Malay Inscription",19-24.
29. This assumptionis basedon the Ligor "A" inscriptiondated775 A.D., SeeNilakanta
Sastri, History of Sriuijaya, 79-21.
30. Wolters, Early IndonesianCommerce,17.
?1
For the descriptionof Kalah-l,iar,seeWheatley,The GoldenKhersonese,218;
Wolters.
Early IndonesianCommerce,16.
Ja. Wolters, Early IndonesianCommerce,17.
A - ,,
Siuijaya as Socio-polilicaland Cullural Entily 81

ProfessorWolters has given severalexamplesof various methods usedby Srivijaya to

ensurethe undividedloyalty and supportof its officials.Wolters, The Fatl of Snnijaya
in Malay History, 13-17; See also Andaya, "HistoricalLinks", 42-43.
Since 1980 a large amount of Middle Eastern ceramics has been found in the Sungai
Emas area. The ceramic deposits were accidently unearthed by workers digging an
irrigation canalthrough the village. The significanceof the discoveryhasbeendiscussed
by Nik Hassan Shuhaimi bin Nik Abdul Rahman, in "Art, Archaeology and the Early
Kingdomsin the Malay Peninsulaand Sumatra,c. 400-1400A.D." (Ph.D.dissertation,
University of London, 1984),Chapter2.
Severalreports pertainingto the discoveryof T'ang types of ceramicshavebeenpublish-
ed. I refer to the work of Abu Ridho, "Daftar keramik asing yang didapati di Sumatra
mengikut kartu de Flines" in Pra-SeminnrPenelitianSrtuilaya.PPPN (lakarta, 1979),
105-18; Bennet Bronsonand J. Wisseman,"Palembangas Srrvijaya:The Lateness
of Early Cities in Southern Southeast Asia", Asian Perspectiues i (1976): 220-39. The
most recent discovery of Yueh type sherds at Bukit Seguntanghas been reported by
E.E. McKinnon, "A Note on the Discovery of SpurmarkedYueh Type Sherdsat Bukit
SeguntangPalembang",IMBRAS 52, ii (1979): 4l-48.
Discoveriesof ceramic depositsand other archaeologicalfinds have been reported by
McKinnon in "Kota Tjina, a site with T'ang and Sung period associations:some
preliminary notes",Berita Kajian Sumatra3 (1973):46-52; "Orientalceramicsexcavated
in North Sumatra", Transactionsof the Oriental Ceramic Society4l (1977): 59-81.
Although T'ang t1'peof ceramicshas beendiscovered,no Middle Eastern types are known
to have been found at Kota Cina. Perhapsit was not as important a trading centre as
Sungai Emas.
For a report on the various Hindu and Buddhist images from Peninsular Thailand
see Piriya Krairiksh, Art in Peninsular Thailand Prior to the FourteenthCenturyA.D.
(Bangkok,1980).
SeeIrong Sau Heng, "Ancient Finds from Kampong JenderamHilir2, Malaysia in History
20 (2) (1977): 38-47, and Brian C. Batchelor, "Post-Hoabinhiancoastal settlements
indicated by finds in stanniferous Langat River alluvium near Dengkil, Selangor,
PeninsularMalaysia",FMI22 n.s. (1977):1-55. On Kuala SelinsingseeI.H.N. Evans,
"On Ancient Remains from Kuala Selinsing",IFMSM 12 (1928): 128-32.
I.H.N. Evans,"A Further Note on the Kuala SelinsingSettlement",/FMSM 15 (1929):
139-42; "Notes on Recent Finds at Kuala Selinsing",IFMSM 15 (1930):97-I34.
Nilakanta Sastri,"A Note on an InscribedSeal from Perak",IMBRAS 14, iii (1936):
282-83.
Nilakanta Sastri,"A Tamil Merchant Guild in Sumatra",TBG 72 (7932):314-27.
Nilakanta Sastri, "Takuapa and its Tamil Inscription", JMBRAS 22, I (1949\: 25-30.
Wheatley, The GoldenKhersonese,297.
According to Professor Wolters, the existenceof entrepot facilities at Paiembangdid
not mean that Indian Oceanmerchants never went to other Indonesianharbours. He
doesnot believe that the maha-rajaof Srivijaya-Palembang sought to impose a perma-
nent blockadeon ports in the Archipelagooutsidetheir own dependencies.SeeWolters,
The Fatt of Sriuijaya in Matny History, 19.
Wolters, Earfu IndonesianCommerce,197-228.
Ibid.,95-It0.
F.L. Dunn, Rain-forest Collectorsand Traders:A Study of ResourceUtilization in Modern
and Anciznt Mahya,Monographs of the MBRAS, No. 5 (Kuala Lumpur, 1975),104-14.
Wang Gungwu, "The Nanhai Trade, A Study of the Early History of ChineseTrade
 82 Nih HassanShuhaimi bin Nih Abdul Rahman

in the South China Sea",IMBRAS 21, ii (1958):113.

48. Paul Wheatley, "GeographicalNotes on some commodities involved in Sung Maritime
Trade",IMBRAS 32, ii (1959):1-140.
49. Drnn, Rain Forest Collectors,I09.
50. For the hypotheticalmodels see ibid.,99-708, Bennet Bronson,"Exchangeat the
upstream and downstreamends: Notes toward a functional model of the CoastalState
in Southeast Asia", in EconomicExchangeand Social Interaction: Persfectiaesfrom
Prehistory,History and Ethnography,(ed.) Kari L. Hutterer, Michigan Paperson South
and SoutheastAsia, No. 13 (Michigan, 1977),39-52,
5 1 . Wolters, The Fall of Srluijaya in Malay History,39-48.
52. De Casparis,PrasastiIndonesin. II,39,39 n.29.
5 3 . See Table 1.
trA
See Table 2.
5 5 . De Casparis,PrasastiIndonesinII,18.
56. Ibid.,19. These occupationalclassesmay be comparedwith thosecurrent during the
Melaka Sultanate.
57. The translated
- ..
version of the Talang Tuwo inscription is in Nilakanta Sastri, fftslory
. A
oJ JnuuaJa,rrJ-rD.
58. Ibid.,I2O-21. According to the Ligor "A" inscription,"the Lord of Srrvijayawhose
sovereigntyis recognizedand whosecommandsare obeyedby the neighbouringkings
has erectedthree excellentbrick houses,the abodeof Padmapani,of Mara-slayer[i.e.,
Sakyamuniland of Vajrapani."
59. Ibid., t27.
60. Ibid.,125-28.
61. The hostility between the Cola and Srivijaya has been discussedin detail by S.
Paranavitana,"Ceylonand Srivijaya", Eswysofferedto G.H. Luce,Artibus Asiae 1 (1966):
205-12.
62. Tan Yeok Seong,"The SrivijayaInscriptionof Canton(A.D. 1079)",/SE4tl ii (1965):
18-19. According to this inscription,no less than 600,000piecesof gold cash were
donated by the maharQa of San Fosi.
63. Nilakanta Sastri, Hislory of Srtuijaya, 78.
64. Wolters, The Fall of Snlijaya in Malay History, 128-35. He notes the similarities
between Sri Tri Buana and the attributes of Avalokite6vara.
6 5 . This assumptionhas beenmadeon the basisof the informationextractedfrom the Lubuk
Tua inscription that a Tamil merchantguild was establishedat Lubuk Tua in 1088A.D.
Also, accordingto another Tamil inscription, a revolt broke out in Kedah in 1068. See
Nilakanta Sastri, The CoTas(Madras, 1955),271-72.
66. Wolters, Early IndonesianCommerce,25I -52.
6 7 . This assumptionis basedon the Chandrabhanu inscription(A.D. 1230).SeeNilakanta
Sastri, flrsfory of Sriuijay, 133-34. Presumably the kingdom of Grahi was successor
to the kingdom known to the Chineseas P'an-p'anand believed to have been located
from about the secondcentury A.D. in the Chaiyaarea. SeeStanleyJ. O'Connor,"Hindu
Godsof PeninsularSiam",Artibus Asiae(1972),28and 40. This inscriptionis in Nilakanta
Sastri, History of *luijaya, 133.

:=--
5
The Cash-crop Economyand StateFormation
in the Sfice Islandsin the Fifteenth
and SixteenthCentwries

JOHN VILLIERS

Lconomrcgenesxs

For many yearsbeforethe adventof the Europeans,the spiceislandshad formed

part of a highly organizedregionalsystemof localtradeamongthe easternislands
of the IndonesianArchipelago.This trade was primarily in the various goods
producedin those islands,which includedcloves,nutmeg and other spices,sago
and other staplefoodstuffs,forest productssuch as timber, resin and medicinal
barks, parrots and birds of paradisefrom the Kei and Aru Islandsand other islands
to the east,marine produce - fish, trepang,ambergris,tortoise-shelland pearls
- gold, plaited mats and locally woven textiles, iron axesand weaponsfrom the
BanggaiIslands.A wide variety of goodswas also brought from outsidethe area
by foreign merchants,including rice, silk and cotton cloth, metal wares, ivory,
quicksilver,vermilion. Javanesegongsand copperbasins,Chineseporcelainand
other ceramics,and the Chinesecoppercoins known to the Portugueseas cclias
or mxas(from Tamil: kasa).Manyof theseimportedgoodswere kept by the islanders
tor ceremonialpurposesand were treasuredas heirlooms,which they stored in
iargeearthenwarejars in their mountainretreats.This trade systembasedon the
exchange of locally produced goods and valuable imported commodities had a
rumber of centresor focal points.Someof thesecentresgainedprominencebecause
ihey were major producersand exportersof someof the goodstraded within the
maritime areaand beyond(as,for example,Ternatan clovesand Bandanesenutmeg
and mace)and so were able to exchangethem for imported goodsfor their own
use or for reshipment.Others owed their importanceto their geographicalposi-
tion on one of the principal trade routes betweenthe islands,the excellenceof their
harboursand safety of their anchorages,or to the navigationaland shipbuilding
skills of their populations,which gave them the wherewithalto developan inter-
nediary role as entrep6tsfor the exchangeand reshipmentof those goods.In a
few instancesall thesefactors - productionof exportablegoods,entrep6ttrade,
shippingand navigationwere combinedand, where this happened,the ensuing
economicdeveloomentresultedin the transformationof local tribal economiesinto

83
O
N

ts

3F

;:
'4,
. :=

6
C

F
SottzIslaruk:Cash-crop
EcnnomlandStateFormation 85

::ade economiescharacterizedby the growing of commercialcrops, especially

:pices,and increasingrelianceon the import of manufacturedgoodsand of certain
:oodstuffs, in particular, rice from the western Archipelago and sago from the
.astern islands.lThis in turn aided the formation of maritime politiesin a single
:slandor group of islands,which sometimesacquiredpolitical and commercial
rt1uencefar beyond their own shores.2
One such early trading state in the eastern islands that achieveda high degree
,f prosperity and political cohesionby combiningall thesefunctionswas the Banda
islands under the rule of their mercantile oligarchy of elders or orang kaya.3The
tsandaIslands were the only known source of nutmeg and mace which, like the
:loves of the Moluccas* and the sandalwoodof Timor, were very highly prized
lecauseof their rarity. But whereasin the Moluccasthe populationharvestedthe
--lovesbut left the task of exporting them to visiting merchants, the Bandanese
:remselvesnot only shippedtheir nutmeg and maceto other islands,where they
,.oldthem to foreign traders,but alsoconductedan extensivecarrying trade in other
=oods,includingMoluccancloves.a
A Portuguesesource of.1529saysthe Bandanesehad many junks in which they
:,roktheir merchandiseto Java and Melaka. They would buy small quantitiesof
:iovesin the Moluccasand in Ambon in exchangefor Indian cloth and the gold
.nd ivory they obtainedfrom other islands.The clovesthey resoldin the Banda
^slands,together with their own nutmeg and mace, to visiting merchants -
,'avanese,Malays and, later, Portuguese.Tom6 Pires tnhis Suma Uiental tells
:s that the voyage from the Moluccas to Banda by way of Ambon took twelve to
:ifteen days in the monsoon.sMany traders sailing from the west would buy
-'loves,as well as nutmeg and macein Banda,rather than in the Moluccas,because
:re voyage from Melaka to the Moluccas and back took almost twice as long as
:he return voyage to Banda. They would leave Melaka in January or February of
=achyear and, having completedtheir businessand loadedtheir ships in Banda
:r' the beginningof July, would set sail back to Melaka, which they would reach
.r August. If they went on to the Moluccasthey neededto leaveBandabeforethe
=ndof May and, becauseof the northeastmonsoon,were obligedto remain at their
:astern destinationuntil the following January,when favourablewinds wor:ld enable
:hem to return to Melaka. The round voyagewould thus take almost a year, as
,gainst only six months for the Bandavoyage.6
PiresmentionsBandaneseshipscallingat Melaka and saysthat one of the four
''.ahbandnr(Ivrbow-masters) there looked after Bandaneseinterests,along with those
, r the Javanese,and tradersfrom the Moluccas,Palembang,Borneoand Luzon.T
Antonio de Brito wrote from Ternate in February 1523that at Gresik in Java,from
','"'heremany junks, includingPortuguese,sailedto Timor, Bandaand the Moluccas,
..e had found Bandanesejunks.s Successfulvoyages to such distant ports as
\lelaka and Gresik were doubtlessrather infrequent,since Bandanesevessels,
:houghusedwidely within the IndonesianArchipelago,were not notablyseaworthy.

'The term 'Moluccas'is used in this essay,as it was generallyused in the sixteenth century,
:o designateonly the five clove-producingislands of Ternate, Tidore, Makian, Moti and
Bacan, together with the kingdom of Jailolo in Halmahera.
 z
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>DiceIslands: Cash-cropEconoml and StateFormation 87

They were furnished with wooden anchors and were manned chiefly by slaves,
'*'ho had a regrettable tendency to abandon ship at the first sign of danger.
Bandanesevoyagesto Melaka and back often took two or three years and many
'unks were iost.eThey were alsodeterredfrom going to Melaka after 1511by the
rresenceof the Portuguese.lo
There is someevidenceto suggestthat, when regular commercialrelationsbegan
:o develop between Melaka and Makassar in the late sixteenth century, the
Bandanesewith other Indonesiantraders participated in this growing commerce
:v bringing spicesto Makassar.By the early seventeenthcentury the Makassarese
:remselveswere activelyengagedin this trade. The accountof Van der Hagen's
'.'oyagein 1607 says that Matoaya, king of Tallo' and co-ruler of Makassar with
:re king of Gowa,kept an agent in Banda,who was furnishedwith suppliesof "rice,
:loth and everything wanted there" to exchange for mace and "to attract some
::aders."lr In 1613 John Jourdainreported that, though Makassaritself yielded
rothing but rice, there was much trade in goodsfrom the Moluccas,Bandaand
-tohorl2
fromwhence thereis yearlybroughtstoreof cloves,
mace,nutmegs andsanderswood
whichtheybarterfor riceandgold,whichcommodities
[sandalwood] theyhavein former
timessoldto the Portuguese [from Melaka]in truck of their clothingof Coromandel
and Gujerat.
For their part, Javaneseand Melakan traders would, accordingto Pires, sail
annuallyto the Moluccas and the Banda Islands taking with them cotton and silk
:loths from Cambay, Coromandeland Bengal. The best of this cloth they would
.ell in the north Javaneseports for caxasand other goods of inferior quality (de
:airu sorte)and then sail to Sumbawaand Bima, in the east of that island,where
:rey would take on water and food suppliesand buy rice and coarsecotton cloth
:rr.the caxas.Thisrice and cloth they in turn exchangedfor nutmeg, mace and
:loves when they reachedthe spice islands.l3They also purchasedhorses in
Sumbawaand Timor, sappanwoodin Sumbawa,sulphurand rattan in Solor,and
'.avesin all the LesserSundaIslandsfor salein the east.Accordingto Piresthere
'.i'assometrade in the reversedirection:slaves,horses,timber and other Sumbawan
:roducts were taken to Java by the islanders,who possessedmanyperahu.laThey
:lso seemedto have sailedto the east.The rulers of Sumbawaand Bima were said
:,r have harbour facilities and stores of provisionsin Timor and Banda,lsand
)uarte Barbosalists amongthe trade goodsbrought by their merchantsto the spice
:slandscopper,quicksilver,vermilion, tin, lead and "certain hairy capsfrom the
-evant."16
Most of the Javanesetraders,and probablysomeof the Chineseas well, came
::om the ports on the north coast of Java such as Tuban, Jaratan, Gresik and
Surabaya.It was their habit to spend several months in the islands waiting for
-avourablewinds to take them back, and many of them would take a temporary
'*'ife from among the local women.17This would no doubt accountfor the descrip-
::ons of the Bandaneseby Pires and other European writers of the period as fair-
i'inned and straight-hairedlike the Moluccansbut unlike their darker, fizzy-haired
..eighboursin Seram and Ambon.18A Dutch sourceof 1609 says there were as
:lany as 1500Javanesetraders in the BandaIslandsat that time, when the total
:rdigenouspopulationwas probably less than 15,000.le
The Bandanesewere almost whollv dependenton imports for all the necessities
 6"/1ii"","'tl"-a,'

JAltOt0 tobo
( H A L M A H E R )A

BAY OF WEOA

v' r- TAPAT-- J0R0NGA

\-. \t

The Moluccas in the sixteenth century

----
Spice
Islands; andStatcFormntion
Economy
Cash-crop 89

of life because,apart from spices,coconutpalmsand fruit, their tiny islandsproduced

virtually no ag::iculturalcrops.They had to import sagofrom the Aru and Kei Islands
and from Seram, Sula and Banggai in exchangefor the cloth that they purchased
ior spicesfrom Javaneseand Malay merchants,and rice brought from Java and
Bima and exchangedlikewisefor spices.The Surut Orientalrecordsthat sagoplayed
so important a part in the economyof the Banda Islandsthat it was frequently used
as currency for making payments.It was extracted from the pith of the sagopalm
andshippedin the form of small loaves,the shapeof a brick and bakedvery hard.
in this form it was reputed to last for 20 years.20Thomas Forrest, writing in the
2l
-770s,saysit was known locally as roti Papun The growth in the demandfor
:utmeg and maceand the rise in the pricesthey fetchedled to an increasein the
:mount of land devotedto the growing of spice-bearingtrees, with a consequent
:iminution in the alreadyvery limited cultivationof sagoand other cropsand even
:reater dependenceon the import of essential foodstuffs from neighbouring
:slands.22
From the Aru and Kei Islands there also came gold to Banda, "though not
:ruch."23Gabriel Rebelo inhis InformaEaodas clusasde Maluco of 1559 describes
:n island30 leaguesor less to the east of Banda(possiblyOnin on the mainland
f New Guineanear Fakfak) inhabitedby pagansonly four palmos(spans)in height
'r'herethere was much gold, of which the Bandanesehad a "good treasure."24 In
.ddition to gold, the islandsto the east of Bandayielded dried lories and parrots
inown to the Portugueseas n7ires,nuresor mires and in Malay as nurD and birds
: paradise,which, like sago,were bartered for cloth and sold eventually, through
::re intermediaryof Bengali traders, to Turks and Persians,who used them as
::umes for their head-dresses.
It is probablethat by the late fifteenth centurythe peopleof the Gorongand Seram
.-aut Islandsto the southeastof seram also played a part in this trade, as they
:,xtinued to do until the presentcentury.As well as going to Ternate,Tidore and
.:e BandaIslands,they would visit the Tanimbar, Kei and Aru groups,Waigeo,
lrlisooland the northwestcoastsof New Guineaand there purchasetrepang,massoia
:ark, wild nutmegsand tortoise-shellto sell to the roving Bugis traders.Their perahu
..i.eremadeby the Kei islanders,whoseboatswere noted throughoutthe eastern
,art of the Archipelagofor the excellenceand beauty of their workmanship.2s
-\ccording to the Suma Oriental, within the Banda group the nutmeg trees grew
,'rly on Lontor, Neira, Ai, Run and Rozengain.26 The island of Lontor produced
:re most mace and had four harbours: Calamon (Celamme, Selamon),Olutatam,
3omtar (Lontor)and Comber(Combir).Neira, separatedfrom Lontor by lessthan
. mile of water, was alsoimportant, as it was much frequentedby Javanesetraders.
lhe other islands had no harbours and so transported their products to Lontor,
,,'nichprovided the best and safest anchorage.2T The rocky islet of Lanacaque
\eijalakka) produced sago,28 and Barros tells us that on the volcanic island of
,unung Api grew other trees used by the Bandanesefor timber and firewood.2e
Already by the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Portuguesesources
::r-e us our earliestfirst hand informationon the Banda Islands,the Bandanese
:.adcreatedthere an emporiumbasedon the export of nutmeg and mace,and an
::ttrep6t for trade in commodities brought from neighbouring islands and from
::rther afield. By this means, as well as by taking part in the carrying trade in
(!
a

a
q

F
Slicekhnds: Cash-crop
Economy
andStateFormation 91

the IndonesianArchipelago,they had evidentlyacquireda degreeof commercial

prosperity sufficient to allow an autonomousmaritime polity to develop, with a
relativelyadvanced,albeit somewhatidiosyncratic,systemof oligarchicgovernment
and administration.
In other maritime statesin the IndonesianArchipelagoand the Malay Peninsula,
such as Aceh, Johor, Pattani, Melaka, Brunei and Ternate, the orang haya also
developedinto a powerfirl elite, whosestatusdependedon the wealth they acquired
through their dominationof trade (hencethe term orangkayaor rich man). In some
cases,theseorangkayalater cameto form a new nobility which couldon occasions
challengethe authority of the ruler.3oBut the Banda Islandswere unique in insular
SoutheastAsia in being a kingless state actually ruled by orang haya.
Castanhedasaysthat eachvillage had a governor (regedor), whom the inhabitants
only obeyedout of friendship and respect.He states,incorrectly, that these gover-
nors were calledsyahband.ar (xaband.ar).31In fact, the orang kaya and syahbandnr
exercisedcomplementarybut distinct functions. The frequent referencesin
Portuguese,Dutch and English sourcesto dealingsby foreign merchantswith both
swhbandar and notables indicate that the control of the orang kaya over the
commercialactivities of the various communitieswas sharedwith the syahbandar.
The latter were generally Muslim merchants from other parts of Asia who had
settled in the Banda Islands and were not accorded the status of orang haya.
The power of.theoranghaya derivednot only from their monopoly of the export
of spices and a large share in the profits from the import trade but also from
possession of retinuesof slavesand dependents,who worked the land and harvested
:he crops for them. It is not clear from the Portuguese sourceswhat proportion
,rf the slavesof the oranghaydwere debt slavesor how many were purchased,but
it seemsthat, as in Timor at the sameperiod, both types of slavery or bondage
rvereknown, and it is evident that the Bandanesenot only traded in the slaves
rvhom they purchasedin other islands but also acquired them for their own use.
Portuguesesourcesare also vague and contradictory on the question of exactly
who ownedthe land and the cropsanylvherein the spiceislands.It seemsprobable,
however,that in the BandaIslandsownershipwas vestedin the whole community,
as in parts of the Philippines before the Spanishconquestwhere the title to land
'*'asheld collectively by the people of each barangayor village community.32The
ri'ealth,and in consequence the power, of eachorangknyawas thus partly determined
by the number of people whom he had at his commandto cultivate the communal
iand and harvestthe crop on his behalf.As commercialactivity in the BandaIslands
increasedduring the fifteenth century and the price of nutmeg and mace rose in
rverseas markets, so the orang haya consolidatedtheir position as a mercantile
aristocracyacting in concertto control a group of very smali but prosperouscoastal
;ommunities.33
The processof political evolutionwherebythesecommunitiesgraduallycoalesced
rntomore or lesscentralizedand stratified politiesseemsto havebegunin the Banda
Islands,as elsewherein Indonesiaand the Philippines,with the formation of a loose
;onfederationof villagesor clans,under a singlechief or group of chiefs.3a These
:onfederationswere definedvariouslyas soain the Moluccas, uli in Ambon and
?arangayin the Philippines.After a time a dominantchiefdomwould emergewhich,
:n someof the islandsof the Moluccasand in Manila and Cebufor example,became
92 John Viltie

the nucleusfor a more highly organizedpolity with a single, often hereditary rule
an administration directed from the royal court, and a hierarchical society wil
clearly definedranks and classesof subjects,from a ruling aristocracyusuallymac
up of clan chiefs at the top, down to various gradations of bondageand slave
at the base. We know, for example, that at the time the Spanish first arrived r
the Philippines, each barangaywas ruled over by a council of elders headedby
dstu or raha andthat in Manila and Cebugroups of.barangayhad formed confeder
tions under a singleraha, who ruled amonghis fellow-chiefsas primus inter pares
In Ambon a rather similar developmentoccurred,with the clan units or uli evolvir
into territorial confederationsand the elected chiefs of eachuli taking it in tun
to be spokesmanfor his fellow-chiefs.In the Ulilima, a confederationof five clan
and the Uli Helawan, which was made up of seven clans, there was a council ,
four electedclan leaders,known asthePerdanaEm\at (Fow Perdana),one of who
was chosento act as spokesman.36 An echo of this system may be found in tl
'kings'who
Banda Islands where, we are told, there were originally four we
identified by the names of the villages or islands of which they were chiefs
Labetaka, Salamme,Wayer and Rosengain.3T According to Galvio's Treatiset
theMolurcas,written about 1M4, originally eachcommunity had its own headsh
territory and boundaries(seusenhorio,czm.orqun e demarqtngdo)in which the peop
lived in common, each of his own free will, and governedthemselvesby the votr
of the elders (osmais uelhos),none of whom was consideredsuperior to the other
In consequence,there were frequent dissensions,factions and wars among ther
Gradually, some of these petty chiefs gained power over the others, more oftt
by seizing it than through lawful succession(seuierdoalg'tns a leuantarha duqu
maispor tiranin quceramga),and so chiefdomscameinto existencethat were strol
enoughand large enoughto acquiresomeof the essentialinstitutions of a soverei
state,suchas ajudicial systemand a military and naval organization,and eventua
to exercise authority over their neighbours.38At this stage in the development
the polity, the direct control of the ruler would extendonly over the district of whir
he was chief. He would sometimesseekto expandhis authority by conquest,b
more usually by a variety of indirect means,one of which, in the spice islands
elsewhere,was the assertion of monopolistic control over trade and the lelryiI
of taxesand dues.This accountsfor the developmentof thesepolitiesat economic
ly strategicpoints on coastsand on trade routes, at river mouthsand in areaswhe
valuable trade goods were produced or marketed. Increasedopportunitiesf
economicactivity, suchas we have seenoccurredin the BandaIslands,thus play
a crucial role in the political evolutionand geographicalexpansionof theserudime
tary states.3e
The network of inter-island trade of which the Moluccas formed a focal poi
was, broadly speaking, the same as that in which the Bandaneseparticipate
Javanese,Malays and Chinesemerchantshad, accordingto Galvdo,first come
the Moluccas from Melaka, following the so-calledBorneo route to Brunei al
through the CelebesSea.They had concentratedfirst on Makian, where they four
the population cultured and friendly (gentedomestiqune comuergauel e de bem
Makian also had, accordingto Pires, the best harbour in the Moluccasand w
the largestproducerof cloves.It soonbecamethe chief meetingplacefor the forei
merchants,and cloveswere brought there from other islands.arOutsideMakir
 Islnnds:Cash-crop
Spice andStateFornntim
Econorny 93

:here were few good ports in the Moluccas. Castanhedasays that it was difficult
:or foreign shipsto enter the harboursbecausethey had man-mademoles(arrecifes
litos a mao). The port at Ternate was on the east coast at Talangame, "a good
.eague"from the Portuguesefortress at Kastela, and it was there that ships would
.:e awaiting the change of the monsoon.A further league away was the port of
Toloco where ships could go only if they had gangplanks (branchas),since there
',\'ereno docks. Tidore had very poor harbour facilities owing to the low swampy
groundaround its port. Moti had a smali harbour, which local kora'koracould enter
tut not larger trading vessels.42
By the end of the fifteenth century the trade with the Moluccasas with the Banda
Islandshad come to be dominatedby merchantsfrom Melaka and Java. The
Chinese,who were said in somelocal traditionsto havefrequentedthe islandsearlier
:han the Javanese,a3 had ceasedto play any part by the middle of the century,
.argely as a result of the isolationist policies of the Ming emperors and their
:rohibition of overseastrade. In Melaka, which was the first destination of most
of the cloves produced in the Moluccas, the trade at the time of the Portuguese
conquestin 1511 was chiefly in the hands of the Keling (Coromandel)merchant
Nina Suria Dewa, who sent eight junks a year to the Moluccas and Banda, and
of Pate Jusuf, a merchantfrom Gresik, who sent three or four. Both continued
to trade independently in cloves after the Portuguese conquest.44
From Melaka the traders would sail to the Moluccas by way of Java, Sumbawa,
Banda and Ambon, doing much valuable trade on the way, selling their Indian
textiles at Gresik and Panarukanin exchangefor cams,with which they purchased
rice and cotton cloth of inferior quality at Bima in Sumbawa.The cloveswere bought
in Banda or the Moluccaschiefly in exchangefor this rice and inferior cotton cloth
and also for caxasand Chineseporcelain.The Borneo route, which the Portuguese
discoveredfor themselvesabout 1525,had evidentlybeenmore or lessabandoned
by the early sixteenth century in favour of this Java-LesserSundasroute, and even
the Portugueseseldommade use of it, except when speedwas essential.Trade
at the numerousports on the north coast of Java, in the Lesser SundaIslands and
Bandaappearsto have been more lucrative than the purchaseof gold and camphor
in Borneo' This system of coastalnavigation, known in Portugueseas cabotagem'
which involved buying and selling goodsalong the way, naturally led to an increase
in the price of the goods each time they changedhands. Consequently,cloves
sometimesfetchedin Melaka thirty times their cost in the Moluccas,and in India
one hundred times, while in Lisbon during periods of scarcity they were sold for
as much as 240 times their original price.as
It was these commercial links with Melaka and the Javaneseport-states that
enabledthe Moluccan islands, like the Banda Islands, to develop from the level
of a virtually subsistenceeconomy,with only a limited trade in foodstuffsand other
locally producedcommoditieswith their nearestneighbours,to a highly specialized
economybasedon the production and export of spices.The growth in Ternate',s
naval power and the establishmentof Ternatan suzerainty over part of Makian,
probably by conquest, in the late fifteenth century undoubtedly hastened this
developmentand may also have been responsiblefor the replacementof Makian
by Ternate as the chief centre for the clove trade. As with nutmeg production in
the BandaIslands,increasedtrading opportunitiesled to a greaterdemandfor cloves
94 John Villiers

and the allocationof more land to planting clove trees. This led in turn to a diminu-
tion in the local production of other crops (though not necessarilyof sago, which
did not compete for land with cloves), more of which had therefore to be im-
ported.46By the early sixteenth century, though most of the cloves were still
harvested from wild trees, cultivation had begun in Bacan, Ternate, Tidore and
probably in Jailolo.aTAs Galvio puts it, the islandershad formerly led a primitive
existence,taking from the seaand the forests what they neededfor their daily sub-
sistenceand plundering each other, without taking advantageof the cloveswhich
grew wild in their islands in such abundance,becausethere was nobody to buy
them.asOnce they had acquired overseasmarket for their cloves, the economyof
the Moluccan islanderswas rapidly transformed, and with it the organization of
their society.
By the time the Portuguesearrived, only Ternate produced cloves for export
and it is difficult to say with certainty whether this was a causeor a result of its
rise to predominanceover its neighbours. It would certainly help to account for
its position as the chief emporium in the Moluccas, in spite of its having less good
harbour facilities and a lower productionof clovesthan Makian.aeNor is it possible
to estimate accurately the volume of trade in cloves in the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries.However, it is evident from contemporaryPortuguesesources
that the production was very large and continuedto grow for most of the sixteenth
century, though after about 1620 as a result of Dutch intervention the centres of
production shifted southwardsto Seramand Ambon and the local Indonesiantrade
in cloves as well as nutmeg was ruthlessly eliminated.so
Though, according to Pires, Ternate was "abundant in foodstuffs from the
land",sl it was neverthelesslargely dependent,like the Banda Islands, on imports
from other islands for essentialsupplies,particularly of sago, on which the bulk
of the population subsisted.This food was imported chiefly from Moti, the Moro
region (Morotia in northwest Halmahera, and the islands of Rau and Morotai), Seram
and Ambon. Rice was grown in negligible quantities anwvhere in the region, and
Javaand Bima furnishedTernate with most of its suppliesof rice, the consumption
of which was probably confined to the ruling class and the foreign settlers.
According to Galvio, the ruler (kolano)and the nobility (sengajfiderived almost
all their revenuefrom the export of clovesand were dependentupon their vassals
for all their essentialsupplies - sago,meat, fish, areca-nut,betel and firewood. He
tells us that Kaicil Hairun, later to become Sultan, posssessedrural properties
(quimtns),whichwere cdtedgtrah anddusunand were tilledby the alifuru (peasants,
autochthonouspeople) and ngofangare(slaves).The land was sown one year and
left fallow for two, and amongthe crops grown were sago,rice, beans,peas,lentils,
sesame,peppers,Indian corn, yams,ginger, bananasand sugarcane.S2 It is probable
that by the time Galvio wrote, when the clove had already begun to be cultivated
in the Moluccas, Hairun and other members of the ruling class also owned some
clove orchards. It is certain that the alifuru were charged with harvesting the cloves,
whether wild or cultivated, on behalf of their lords, to whom they delivered the
crops as tribute, in apparently much the same way as the nutmeg harvest was
organized in the Banda Islands.
Though someclovesseemto havebeenavailablefor foreign merchantseachyear,
it was only every third or fourth year, when rainfall was high in what the Portuguese
,<picc Econom!andStateFomation
Islands.Cash-crop 95

,-al1edthe'great monsoon',that they were harvestedin very large quantities,with

eachtree yielding up to 70 pounds.s3
We have seenthat the Bandanesewere the only peoplein easternIndonesiato
:raveany merchant shipping of their own. Ternate and the other Moluccan states
usedtheir fleets(hongflofoar-drivenkora-koraand joangaexclusivelyforwarfare
and had no junks or highsided ships suitable for carrying cargo. Castanhedasays
ihere were no merchantsamongthe Ternatans and they did not themselvesexport
:he cloves,which were their only trade goods,becausethey had no shipsin which
:o transportthem.saIt is not clear, however,whether there were no native mer-
.-hantsbecausethey lacked ships or whether the Ternatans built no trading vessels
lecausethere were no merchantsto use them. Whatever the reasonfor this failure
:o engagein direct trading activity, the result was that the trade was left entirely
:r the handsof foreigners.

The structureof gouernment

The introduction of conceptsof monarchicalgovernmentseemsto have followed

-'loselyupon the rise of a commercialruling classin most of the maritime states
:n the easternArchipelago,with the notableexceptionof the Banda Islands.In
:his process,Islamic influencesas well as economicdevelopmentwere important
:actors.
The spread of Islam into the eastern islands was directly linked with the com-
nercial activitiesof the Muslim Malays and Javanesein the area.Both Pires and
Galvaostate that Islam first reachedthe Moluccas in the third quarter of the fifteenth
-'enturyand it is clear that it was carried thither by Muslim traders.ssThose
:slandswhich had no produceof commercialinterest to them were either never
-'onvertedto Islam or only later when they had becomeimportant trading centres
rr their own right, as for instanceMakassar'sconversionduring 1603-05. By the
.ame token, the Banda Islands and Ambon were much frequentedby Muslim
:rerchantsand so convertedto Islam at about the sametime as the spice-producing
:slandsof the Moluccas.In this work of conversionthe eastJavanesewere especially
:ctive. They establisheda numberof permanentsettlementsin the area,of which
:he most important was the Tubanese settlement at Hitu on Ambon. Hitu soon
recamea centre of Muslim influence,from where Islam was disseminatedthrough-
,,utthe islandswith which the Javanesehad commercialrelations.The new religion
:ounda ready acceptanceamongthe ruling elitesof the islands,not least in those
:laces where the transition to a monarchical system of government had already
reenmade.While the authority of the leadingBandaneseorangkayaandtheperdnnn
-'f Ambon remaineddependentupon electionby their peers and their mode of
iovernment continuedto be basedessentiallyon consensus,Islamic conceptsof
ronarchy gaveto thoserulers who were convertedto Islam a meansof legitimizing
:heir positionand thereby of enhancingtheir claim to hereditary,absoluterule.
Local tradition, as recorded by Galvio, had it that the first ruler of Ternate to
:dopt Islam was King Tidore Vongi (Vongue),as a result of his marriageto a Muslim
-avanese
chiefs daughterwho had cometo Ternate. This presumablywas Zainal
-\bidin, who reignedfrom 1486 to 1500.Another version of the story says that
Tidore Vongi went to Melaka in about 1460 and returned home by way of Java,
 96 John Villiers

where he met and married a Javanesenoblewoman.56The genealogiesof the

Hikayat Tanah Hitu (which may be later accretionsadded by transcribers to the
original text) state that Sultan Ludin of Pasaileft Pasaito spreadthe Muslim faith
in Aceh, whence his grandson Mahadum travelled by way of Melaka and Giri to
the Moluccas,where he convertedthe rulers of Jailolo,Tidore and Ternate (Jusup,
Ismail and ZainalAbidin). The genealogiesalsotell of an allianceconcludedin Java
between Zainal Abidin and Pati Tuban, the representative of the Uli Hitu and
presumablya Javanesefrom Tuban, who may have been the father or a kinsman
of the princess whom Zainal Abidin married.sTAll these stories indicate that by
the late fifteenth century links between Melaka and Java and the Moluccas had
developedbeyondmere trading connectionsto ties maintainedby formal alliances
and dynastic marriages.
Conversionsto Islam seemat the time the Portuguesefirst arrived to have been
still largely confinedto the rulers and not to have penetratedfar beyondthe coastal
areas.However, many of the conversionswere evidently superficialand the version
of Islam practisedin the islandsdecidedlyheterodox.Pires informs us that the
kings of the islandswere Muslims but "not very deeply involved in the sect. Many
are Muslims without being circumcised,and there are not many Muslims."s8
Argensola says that the islanders had adopted the rites of Islam so confusedly
(indistintarnente)that they retained with them much of their ancient idolatry and
intermixed the rituals (y confundznhs ceremonins).se Among most of the population
paganbeliefs and practices survived. Galvdo mentions ancestorcults, worship of
the sun, the moon and other heavenlybodiesand a great variety of animistic beliefs
as still widely current in the mid-sixteenthcentury,60and the reports of the Jesuit
missionariesin the islandsconfirm that this was so.61It was the reluctanceof so
many of the Moluccanislandersto abandontheir ancientbeliefsand adopt Islam
that gave the first Portuguese missionaries high hopes of mass conversionsto
Christianity. Some rulers, notably Tabarija of Ternate and Dom Joao of Bacan,
did indeedbecomeChristians,thoughdoubtlessas much from motivesof political
expediencyand in order to win Portuguesefavour as out of religious conviction.
For the samereasonSultan Hairun of Ternate, who was to becomea formidable
adversaryof the Portuguese,occasionallyflirted with the idea of abandoningIslam
in favour of Christianity. But in spite of this, the rulers of the four Moluccan
sultanatesultimately dependedupon their adherenceto Islam for the legitimization
and maintenanceof their royal power and the effective functioning of their monar-
chical governments.
With Islam came the Malay language,which by the late fifteenth century and
possiblyearlier had becomea lingm franca in most of the IndonesianArchipelago.
Pigafetta'sfamousvocabulary of Malay words he collected in the Moluccas is one
of the earliest written specimensof Malay in existence.62 Galvio says that.
althoughthe peopleof the Moluccashad many different languages,so that the
islands were like Babel, yet Malay had recently come into fashion among them
and most people spoke it throughout the region, where it was used like Latin in
Europe.63 As Jorge de Albuquerquereportedin 1515,the rulers of the Moluccas
all wrote to the king of Portugal in Malay.6aAt the sametime, the Arabic script
and Arabic numerals were introduced, which gave a considerableimpetus to the
developmentof a peoplewho had hitherto,accordingto Galv6o,beenilliterateanc

--
 .>pice
Ishnds:Cash-crof
Econmny
andStateFnrmation 97

rad had no indigenoussystem of weights and measures.65 Malay dress was

adoptedat the royal courts and among the nobility, who, Castanhedatells us, wore
-acketsof rich silk with goldenbuttonsandjewels on the fronts and sleeves,earrings
and gold collars around their necks and bracelets of cane (rota de Bengaln\.They
shavedtheir whole bodies,anointedthemselveswith fragrant oils and lived in great
srate.66Galvdorelates that the Moluccans took the royal and noble titles of kaicil
zndnnicil (andalso the title of.sengajil"from the Javanesewho madethem Muslims
.nd introducedcoinageinto their country, as well as the gong, the serunaila reeded
'.i'ind instrument], ivory, the keris, the law and all the other good things they
iave. "'
By the early sixteenth century, when the Portugueseand Spaniardsfirst sailed
:nto Indonesianwaters, Ternate appearsalready to have becomethe most power-
--.rlof the Moluccan maritime states, dominating the trade in cloves and wielding
'.arying degreesof swerainty and influenceover considerableareasof the easternpart
,,f the Archipelago. Pires describedthe ruler of Ternate as "powerful among his
:eighbours" and accordedto him alone the title of Sultan, thereby implying that
.-.ewas dominant over the rulers of Tidore, Jailolo and Bacan, for whom he used
:he traditional title of raja.68Pigafetta, writing only five or six years after Pires,
:eclared that the ruler of Ternate was "master of nearly all the others."6eLater
Portugueseaccountsusually refer to him as "king of Maluco", thereby indicating
:.is supremacyover neighbouringrulers, and the JesuitAntonio Marta in his report
:r his visitation of Tidore in 1588 declared that not only was Ternate the most
:owerful and renownedof the four sultanatesof Ternate, Jailolo,Tidore and Bacan
'rut
would have ruled over "all the Moluccas" had not the Portugueseprevented
.-.rm.7o
Ternate certainly claimed, if it did not always exercise, suzerainty over many
:slands,includingAmbon, westernSeram,Buru, northernHalmahera(Moro), Lease,
:ne BandaIslands,as well as Bacanand half of Moti. It also, accordingto some
:ccounts,sharedsuzeraintywith its chief rival Tidore over the islandof Makian.
The extent of Tidore's authority was more limited, covering only the other half
.,i Moti, most of Halmahera,the western coastsof New Guineaand someof the
.asternmostislandsof the IndonesianArchipelago.Argensola,writing at the end
,'f the sixteenth century, maintainsthat the "dominions"of Ternate then consisted
,f 72 islands,from Mindanaoin the north to Bima in the south and Papuain the
:ast. All of these paid tribute in gold, ambergrisand birds of paradiseand had
teen "usurped from other kings." From the ruin of these kings, wrote Argensola,
:he ruler of Ternate's pride had grown so great that he styled himself emperor of
:he Archipelago.TlIn time of war, Ternate could lelry suppliesand armed men
:rom all over this immensearea,from Moti, Jailolo,Makian and Kayoa, the Sula
-slandsand Buru, Seram(which Argensolasaid could supply 50,000men),Boano
and Manipa, the SangiheIslands,Gebeand New Guineaand a great number of
; iingdoms in Sulawesi(Tolitoli and Buol, Tomini, Manado,Dondo and Gorontalo
n ?mongthem).72
S It is difficult to establishhow far, if at all, this suzeraintyof Ternate and Tidore
It :,verother islands went beyond the exaction of tribute, the levying of armed men
e and war fleets and the collection of tolls by agents (kimelaha),who dealt in some
d -.f the spices and other goods and had some control over the ports.73Duarte
98 John Villiers

suzerainty
Barbosa,for examplesuggeststhat Bandaneserecognition of Ternatan
-th"y u." subject none," he says, "but sometimesthey
*"s enti.etv voluniary. _to
of P" Francisco
submit to tie king of Maluquo [Ternate]."7aThe l-abor euangelica
Bacan had its own king, "who pays tribute
b"in, p"lfi.nea in f OOS,.".otd. that
which is a form of reverence and self-abasement, to the
and performs the suba,
but in all other respects was a fully independent sovereign'7s
ting'oi Ternate",
The Ternatans
Gitvao informs us that tribute had often to be levied by force.
and occupy a harbour and take from the
would send a fleet of kora-korato seize
was known as buah. Furthermore, every community
inhabitants a tribute, which
(soa)was obliged to keep one or more vessels in readiness according to the size
people'76 Colin gives the
of ii. poputution, which could be anything up to 2( 10
muster eight kora-kora and a large
example-of Sabugo,near Jailolo, which could
numberofsmalleru",."l..''Thesenavalwarsseem,likemostwarfarein
quick raids conducted
SoutheastAsia at the time, to have been little more than
tribute and capture booty and prisoners ("escrauos") and not for the
onrv to letry
over-mighty subject'7E
extension of direct territorial rule or even to subdue an
Castanheda, Pigafetta and other early
It is evident from the descriptions of
the rulers of the four Moluccan sultanates were
sixteenth century accountsthat
pomp and ceremonial, possessed of rich regalia, and
surroundedwith considerable
mere chieftain or the
accordeda degree of reverence far beyond that shown to a
relateshow at his first meeting
electedheadof a village clan. Pigafetta,for example,
rulerTe
with King Almansur of Tidore aboard the royal perahu he found the
him
.''seatedbeneatha canopyof silk, whichgavehim shadeall round,andbefore
andtwo menbearing golden for
vessels
stoodoneof his sons*itlh'the royalsceptre,
washingofhishands,andtwoothermenholdinggoldenvesselsfullofbe

wealth arising
We are told by Castanhedathat, in spite of their lack of material
their subjects for their revenue and even
from their almost total dependenceupon
court, they were held in as much awe as if they were divine
for the provisionsof the
bythecommonpeople,whowouldcovertheireyesandcrawlalongthegrou
namedafter
when passingin front oi th"- for fear of seeingtheir faces.They were
to be very important" (presumably the
the sun, th"Loon or "things they believed
cults).io All this suggests that a form of monarchy had
objects of their animistic
its origins to the
developedin the Moluccan sultanateswhich, if it did not owe
influenie of Islam, showed a number of features derived from Islamic concepts
was no longer a primus interpares.
of monarchyand introducedfrom Java.The ruler
more or less equal chiefs, tiit-Ilalff|jrT a1
supremechief among a number of
with all the trappings of royaltv and placed al ol
auiocrat, hedgedabout lhggpe-x
apyramidofgovernment,symboloftheunityofthestateandJountainheadofth
power was distii6iil6d'8r
rank and authority of the chiefs among whom executive
This hierarchical structure of government seems nevertheless to have allowed
a considerabledevolutionof authority in the provinces and overseaq {-gpains"where
Moreover.
the control of the sultan and his court was only exercised indirgptly.
important class oi
although the ruler wielded supreme authority, there was an
control of the export of cloves and
*u.rioi iobles (sengajl)with whom he shared
the import of foreign goods for which the cloves were exchanged'
:ttceIslands:Cash-crop andStateFomntinn
Ecmromy 99

The Treatiseon theMolutcasinforms us that the principal personagein Ternate

:.fter the ruler was the kolnnomngugu@ogugrt)or "he who holds the king and the
lngdom in his hand." llb appearsto have been a kind of grand vizier, majordomo
.nd adviser to the ruler, and his tutor (ayl during a minority.s2Galvio maintains
-.'ntthe goguguwas more fearedand obeyedthan the king himself. Another palace
,,tficialwas thepirwte, who acted as master of ceremoniesat the court and superinten-
:ant (mestresah e ueador\.83 His task was to levy from every town the amount of
:todstuffs each was designated to provide for the court and to collect and order
:he preparation of food for the palace banquets. Gabriel Rebelo says he was,8a
a leadingpersonage andof greatpre-eminence, whois obligedto maintainthe Sultan
and makeavailablewhat is lackingfor his household, and whenas a result he is
impoverished anotheris created.
Van Fraassenin a recent work on the Ternatan-c.oultand state in the eighteenth
:nd nineteenthcenturieshas equatedthegogr'tilwith the Javaneseranks of.sadahn-
qadaton(hofgouuemeuren hofmeester)and the pinate with the sadaha-lnml(clm-
,;issaris deskonings,schatmeesterand grootkassier)oI the Dutch sources.ss
Beneath the pinnte were the kalaudi (caloadzs), who acted as royal collectors of
:,rod supplies in the Ternatan dependenciesoverseasand possibly also in the
:ommunitieson Ternate itself that were outsidethe direct ambit of the court. The
)utch called these officials collectors of tribute (tribuut'outuanger)and' royal
rerchants or factors (conincxcoofman).86 Galvio says they were drawn from the
:anks of the lesser nobility (escudeiros\, so they were probably sengajiwith minor
:riefdoms in outlying areas of the Ternatan realm.87Likewise, the offices of
: dministratorsand magistrates(hukum,Portuguese:uton4 uquio\ were held in Ter-
rate by noblemen,who generally remained at court, where they gave audiences
:nd heard disputes, and in the provinces and overseasdomains by local sengaji.
lalvdo statesthat in the provinces (tenas e senhorios)the sengajiwere feared and
-beyed as though they were independentrulers, and were named rajaby the
:eople"88Their authority in each province appears to have replicated in many
:espectsthat of the Sultan and his court at the centre. Argensola writes that in
:re Moro region, which was under Ternatan suzerainty and on which Ternate
:epended for the bulk of its food supplies, a magistrate (su|erior) was elected in
=achcommunity by the people, who did not pay him any tribute but had respect
:rr his noble descent(miran en su decendencia).8s Here again, the sengajiwho had
:esponsibility for the local administration of justice seem to have mirrored on a
.nall scalein eachprovince the authority of the hukum at the ruler's court. Rebelo
:,rtes that each community, which, perhaps significantly, he calls reino or
..ingdom,e0had both a regedordns causasand an ucomgeral.e\ The kol.anooften
:arried his daughters to leading sengajiand one at least in the sixteenth century
:arried a sengajls daughter himself, rather than the daughter of another king; in
::is way the families of the ruling elite were linked to each other and to the royal
:amily by ties of kinship.e2
The sengajiseemto have formed a very small as well as tightly knit aristocratic
:-ass.Tristdo de Ataide reported that Moti and Makian, neither of which had a
:-rng,were ruledby goaernadarw,presunrablykimelaha appointed by their Tidorese
.:rd Ternatan suzerains,and that Moti had ten or twelve chiefs, and 200 warriors,
.'hile Makian, although larger, only possessedsevenor eight chiefs and 400 war-
r00 John Villiers

riors.e3Antonio Marta says there were only 17 sengaji altogether in the four
sultanates,"who are like counts and dukes in Europe."eaThomas Forrest, writing
almost 200 years later in !774, saysthere were five "nigris" (negeri - village) on
Ternate itsel{, over which were five "synagees"(sengajfi.Forrest mentions among
the principal personagesof the court, ttre kapita laut,"who commandsthe Sultan's
prows", and the gogugu,ss

anofficerwhosuperintends otherpartsof hisduty,it is hisbusiness

thepolice;amongst
keepthefencesof theirgardensin repair,againstthewild
to seethat the inhabitants
hogsanddeer;andthat housesbe providedwith potsof sandto extinguishfire.

The king had a council composedof 20 aged counsellors(menteri,Portuguese:

mandarins),whosemeetings,as elsewherein the Archipelago, were known by the
Malay term bicara(discussion).According both to Galvio and to Castanheda,these
bicara could only be held when the counsellorswere drunk. Castanhedasays that
wheneverdecisionsneededto be taken on matters of importance(sustdncin),"man
of them gather together and feast until they are drunk and, once drunk, they agree
on what should be done and the most intoxicated is accordedthe most honour.'e
In the eighteenthcentury and probably earlier, the kapita laut,the gzguguand the
two chief huhum (hukum soasia and hukum sengajl were the four principal members
of the council of state and were known in Malay as the komisi ampat (commission
of four).e7
As in most of the trading states of the Archipelago at the time, the office oi
syahband.arwas of considerable importance, since it was the syahbandnrwho
provided the chief contact between the Sultan and the foreign merchantsand who
conductednegotiationsfor the fixing of prices at which to sell the cloves and to
purchasethe importedgoods.The syahbandarwas alsoresponsiblefor the collection
of tolls and harbour dues.As we have seenwas also the casein the Banda Islands.
the syahbandarin Ternate was generally, if not invariably a foreigner. At least b]-
the end of the sixteenth century, he was assisted by a number of other lesser
functionaries,known to the Portugueseas ouuidores(auditors),and it may be that
the morinyo(meiinhos or bailiffs) were alsooriginally subordinatetothe stahbandar
though later they came to fulfil the functions of a police force, maintaining public
order and securing the supply of goods and services to the court.e8
The internal organizationof the Ternatan state seemsin essenceto have been
little different from that of any other of the contemporarymonarchiesin Southeas
Asia, whether inland agrarian states or maritime port-states or a combination of
both. The business of government was conducted by members of the royal
household,and thus court and government were largely synonymous.The func-
tions of the most powerful men in the kingdom, suchas thegogltglt,were technicalll
confinedto the court and to serving the ruler's personand all the chief functionaries
were appointedby the kobno and.were his ngofangare(servantsor bondsmen).At
the same time, there was a high degree of devolution of authority to members o:
the nobility, who retained much of their autonomy and chiefly status as seaga/ within
the areasunder their jurisdiction. In the Moluccan Sultanates,as in most other
traditional.SoutheastAsian kingdoms, the principle of replication of the centrai
government was followed, for practical as much as for cosmologicalreasons,it:
 SpiceIslands:Cash-cropEumomyanl StateFormatimt 101

satellite provinces and chiefdoms,which possessedon a smaller and more limited

"he
scalemost of the administrative, military and judicial organs of state that were
ro be found at the royal court. The governmentalestablishmentsbasedon the court
and in the provincial centres were alike maintained by an elaborate system of
tributes, corvfes and military services,which in turn presupposeda clearly defined
scaleof degreesof vassalageand bondage. Here again there are close parallels
with other monarchicalstatesin SoutheastAsia, where the socialpyramid of which
:he king formed the apex was kept in being by the rendering of servicesand the
extraction of goodsfrom thoselower in the social scaleto those above.In Ternate,
as in other triditional SoutheastAsian polities, the collection and transmissionof
revenue(in this case spices)upwards by functionaries at successivelevels of the
administration enabledthese firnctionaries to appropriate dues and fines and demand
rorvee servicesfor themselvesas well as for the king. The king thus had to rely
:or much of his revenue on his own royal domain and not on the provinces and
satellite chiefdoms, over which he had often only nominal suzerainty.ee
The importance of trade in providing the rulers in the spice islands with the
'.rherewithalfor their government can scarcely be exaggerated.The Bandanese
:ever evolvedpolitically beyondthe stageof forming a looseconfederationof petty
--riefdomsgovernedby an electiveoligarchyof orangkaya,whileTernate and Tidore
:thieved a much greater degreeof cohesionand centralizationunder a patrimonial
I :i-stem of hereditary monarchical government, with a central, royal domain
:\ercising varying degreesof authority over a number of satellite provinces and
f
:rincipaliiies. Bui oranghayaand Sultanswere alike in dependingfor the material
:asis of their power on the monopolistic control they could maintain over the
-
0 ::oduction and export of a singlecommodity spices.once the Dutch had wrested
o ::lis control over their sourceof revenuefrom them, by outright conquestin Banda
n .nd by economicmeasuresin the Moluccas, they had no other resourceson which
:r call and their power and prosperity vanished as quickly as it had arisen.
ry
lr
dL

en
rst \OTES
of
1. Roy P. Ellen and I.C. Giover, "Pottery manufactureand trade in the central Moluccas,
/a\ Indonesia:the modernsituationand the historicalimplications",Maz (N.S.),9, p.367.
:tc-
2. M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asinn Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian
llv Archifetngo between1500and about 1630 (The Hague, 1962)' 93-100'
ies
3. SeeJohn Villiers, "Trade and society in the Banda Islands in the Sixteenth century",
At Modern Asinn Stu.dies15, iv (1981): 723-50.
iof -1. Descriqaosumdriadas Molucase de Banda,December1529,in A.B. de36"Docamentagaa
hin para a historia dns miss'esdo Pad.roadoPortuguasdo uiente, IV (Lisbon, 1956), 17.
her
5. Armando Cortesio (trans. and ed.),The SumaOriental of TomdPires,Hakluyt Society'
lral 2nd seriesLXXXX, Vol. I (London,7944),207'
,in
102 John Villiers

6. Fernio Lopes de castanheda, Hist6ri4 do descobrbnento e conquistada India belos

Portuguzzes,3rd edn., V (Coimbra, 1929)' 155-56'
7. Cortesao,Swna Uiental, II, 265.
8. Ant6nio de Brito to the King. Ternate, 11 February 1523,in 56, DocumentaEdn'I (1954)'
155.
9. Cortesio, Suma Oriental,I,212.
10. "Descrigio sumiiria das Molucas e da Banda"' in SA' Documentagto'I\tr, 17'
lI. Begin ende uoortgangh uan de VereenigdeNederlandscheGeoctroyeerdeOost-Indische
Comfagnie...,(ed.)Isaac Commelin,II (Amsterdam,1646)'82'
12. Sir William Foster (ed.), The Journalof Johntourdnin 1608-1617, Hakluyt Society,
secondseries,XVI (London,1905),294-95'
13. Cortesio, Suma Uiental, I,202.
14. Ibid.,203.
15. Afonsq Lopes da Costa to the King, Malacca, 20 August 1518, in 56, Docamentagdo'
I,103-04.
16. M.L. Dames (trans. and ed.), The Book of Duarte Barbosa,An accountof the countries
bordzing nn theIndian Oceanand their inhabitants,Haklult Society,secondseries,XLIV,
Voi. II (London,1918),118, 196-98.
t 7 . Cortesio, Suma Aiental, I, 207.
1 8 . Ibid.,206.
1 9 . B. Schrieke, IndonesianSociologicalStudies| (The Hague, 1955)24.
20. Cortesdo,Surn Oriental,I, 268.
2 1 . See C.R. Boxer and P.Y. Manguin, "Miguel Roxo de Brito's narrative of his voyage to
the Raja Empat, May 1581-November1582",Archipel 18 (1979):178' n. 13.
22. See Roy F. Ellen, "Sago Subsistenceand the Trade in Spices:A Provisional Model of
Ecological successionand Imbalance in Moluccan Histoqy'" in social and Emlogi.cal
Systems, P. Burnhamand R. Ellen (London,1979),67-69.
2 3 . Sir clements Markham (trans. and ed.), Narratiue of the voyageto Malucosor spice
Islandsby thefleet under the orders of the comendttdorGarciaJofre de l-oaysain Earll
spanish volages to the straits of Magellan, Haklul't Society, second series, xxvIII
(1911),85.
,A
GabrielRebelo,"Informagaodascousasde Maluco, 1559",in sd, Documentnqan, III (1955),
395.
25. A.R. Wallace, The Malny Archi\elngo,(London,1880),549-53.
26. lo1odeBarros, DaAsia,dosfeitosqueosPortuguezesfizeramnod.escobrimentodast
e maresdo Oriznte,(ed.) N. Pagliarini,III (Lisbon, 1777-78)' 5, 6.
27. Cortesio, Suma Oriental,I,205.
28. Ibid.,206.
29. Barros,Da Asia, l[l, 5, 6.
30. Anthony Reid, "Trade and State Power in 16th and 17th Century SoutheastAsia", in
Proceedingsof the VIIth IAHA Conference,2 vols. (Bangkok, 1979), I' 400-08'
3 1 . Castanheda,Historia do descobrimenio, V, 156.
SeeJ.L. PheLan,Thz Hisfunizationof thePhilippinzs:SfunishAins and Fili?bn Resfunses
(University of WisconsinPress,1959),9, 15-1'8' 22.
22
Schrieke, IndonesfunSociologicalStudies,Pt. l,228.
 :::e Islands:CashcropEcowmy and StateFotmation 103

See,forexample,theagreementsbetweenAnt6niodeBritoandtheBatdaneseorang
and mace' Brito to the King'
h;;;;;d ;;"i:b"ndar filins the price of cloves, nutmeg
i"tn"t., 1i February 1523, in 56, Documentaqdo' l' 153'
of Hispanic.Urbanism^andProcess
See Robert R. Reed, CotonialManila. The Contert Press' 1977)'
;i M;;;;t;;gs,- i"tricationt in Geograptrvz2 (universitv of california
3-6.
Stuctuur van de Ambonse
Z.J. Manusama,"Hikayat Tanah Hitu: Historie en Sociale
eilandensinhetalgemeenenvanUliHituinhetbijzondertothetmiddenderzeven-
1977)'5-11'
iiende eeuw" (Ph.D dissertation,University of Leiden'
van de eylanden Banda' soo die geregeert sijn.in de javen
A. Gijsels, "Beschryuinge
ende hoe deselvenu besethsijn'',
dal onsescheependaer eest begonnente negotijeren
BKI 3 (1855):78-79.
(c. 1544) probably the
Hubert Th. Th. M. Jacobs, S.J., A Treatiseon the Moluccas (Rome
lostHistoria das Molucas and st. Louis,
eiil*i*rl ,rrri* o7Antira-cot ao',
r97ll. 77 -78.
SeeStanleyJ'Tambiah,.,Thegalacticpolity:TheStructureoftraditionalkingdomsin
(1976),85-88' Tambiah-givesa
Sorttr"rrt Aiia", ennnb N)i-firn e*ap*i of Sciznces
model for the Jesign of traditional Southeast Asian kingdoms, which he
theoretical
galactic poritiesl in aiscussing the politico-economic basis of the galactic
;;;;;;;;;, ,,the ruler's attempt to monopolizeforeign trade..."
p"iriv, rr" uau""n... the view that
,'the twin motors in the engineroom" (the other being the rice-plainseconomy)'
is one of
Iacobs, Treatiseon the Moluccas,Sl'
-18'
Cortesio, Suma Oriental,l, 277
- XI, 1i8' Seealso1*"1"' "I'tf:try::-"^:lli
Historirtdodescobrimenlo,
Castanheda,
, ln Ja,
hadridge-sof rocks
A.g"".oru saysthat Talangameand-Toloco
noi*r"ngno,Il1,gzg.
close to shore (pegados a
which acted a. bre"t*ateis and enailed ships to ride safely
tierracontnchas).The.o.t.*"."formedofcoral,fromwhichlimewasmadeandused
f. Argensola,Conquistaile las Islns
tl to strengthentt e tre"r,*a1"... BartolomeLeonardode
Matucal al rey Felipe III N? S?' (Madrid' 1609)' 55'

:e =3, Jacobs, Treatiseon the Molucms, 3L'

11 =-1. Cortesio, Suma Uiental, I' 214'
II ="S , L u i s F i l i p e F ' R . T h o m a s , . . M a l u c o e M a l a c a , ' j n A u i a g e m d e F e r n l g d e M agalhdesea
Ultramarina(Lisbon'
;;fir ri; Molrcas.n.t", ao il coloquioLuseEspanholde Histdria
\975), 43-44.
53-64'
ia. See Ellen, "Sagoand the Moiuccanspice trade"'
=i.Cortesio,Suma(hiental,|'2|3.2I.Accordingtolocaltradition,in1345apact,known
astheMotip".t,*"."on"tudedbetweenthenrlersofJailolo,Ternate,Tidore-andBacan'
bywhichitwasagreedthatTernateandTidoreshouldbegiventhesolerighttoexport
cloves-Ternatetot}rewestandTidoretotheeast'Atthesametim ecertainislands
were designatea,o ,u*i, r"nd ilth. production of cloves and others for foodstuffs,
labour, thus making all the
while others ug"in *"i"'.'rru.geJ*itt, the task of supplying
islands economically interdependent'
know',however' that traders from Srivijaya
;8. Jacobs, Treatiseon the Moluccas,TT' We
.-""aMajapahitnaaireq.'ent"atheeasternislandsoftheArchipelagoandthatatleast
to the ports of.eastJava.
as early as the fourteerith ."nt rry cloveswere being exported
there ttrey were srripped tt china, where.there was a small but steady demand
From
of westernAsia and Europe.
for them, and acrossthe inii* o."- to supplythe markets
of the twelfth century have
It is even possibie thal iernate nluy u, *tly as the end
had commerciar."rutiin, iitt, tr," fii;r. kingdom of Kediri. SeeO.W. Wo\ters,Earll
Orisinsof"Srluilaya (Cornell, 1967)'248' Thefour-
Indones,ianCo**n rniiSi"itiiin
ln,t John Villiers

teenth century I{agarakdrtngamalists the Moluccas among the dependenciesof Ma-

japahit. Though this probably means no more than that the islands recognized the
rupremecyof the great Javanesekingdom and perhapspaid somekind of tribute, it sug'
trade. See D.G.E'
'Hall, thaithe Javanesewere already involved directly in the clove
gests
A History of south-EastAsia (London, 1968),360 and George Coedds,I*s dtats
hindouisCs et d'Indonisie (Pans,1948),398-99. Luis Filipe Thomaz has sug-
d.'Indachinc
gested that one of the reasonsfor this eastward expansion of the Javanesewas their
Iesire to disposeof their excessrice production in the Moluccas and other islands in
the area where the cultivation of rice was difficult and the staple food was sago. See
"Maluco e Malaca",30.
49. See Ellen, "Sago subsistenceand the trade in spices", 55'
50. Ibid., 57.
51. Cortesio, Sunn Oriental, l' 214'
52. Iacobs, Treatise on the Moluccas, 133.
53. 378'
Rebelo,"Informagio", in 56, DocumentaA'to,lII,
54. castanheda,Historia d.odescobrimento, v, 168-69. The Ternatan war fleet of kora'hora
*..-lrt" i"ti.rt in the Moluccas and this partly accountsfor Ternate's supremacy in
"Rebelo
trre tegion. informs us that the Moro region was well endowedwith timber for
rrriptliiralng und it is probablethat the Ternatan vesselswere built with wood imported
from there. See"Informa96o",in Sii, Documentapdo, III' 401-02'
55. Cortesio, Sunw Oriental, I,213, and Jacobs, Treatise on the Moluccas,33'
56. Ibid.,83-85.
57. Manusama,"Hikayat Tanah Hitu", 6-7.
58. Cortesio, SumaOriental,I,213.
59. Argensola, Conquista,80.
60. Jacobs,Treatiseon the Moluccas,76-77.
61. See,for example,Nicolau Nunes to Martim da Silva, Goa, 4 January 1576' in Jacobs'
DocumentaMalucensia,I (Rome, 1974)'687-89.
62. R.A. Skelton (trans. and ed,.),Magellan'suorage:a narratiaeaccountof thefirst nauiga-
tion (London'.The Folio Societv,1975)' 136-43.
63. Jacobs, Treatiseon the Molucms,75.
Documentngno'1,80.
64. Jorge de Albuquerqueto the King, Malacca,8 January1515,in SA,
65. Jacobs, Treatiseon the Moluran,77.
66. XI, 169; Iacobs,Treatiseon theMolucus' 107-09.
castanheda, Historia rtadescobrimento,
67. Ibid., r05.
68. Cortesio, Suma Oriental,1,214.
69. Pigafetta, Magellnn'saopge, ll8.
70. Jacobs,DocamentaMalucensia,ll' 245-46'
71. Argensola,Conquistn,82.
at Talangame
72. Ibid. Argensola also related that Ant6nio de Miranda built a wooden fortress
and Tidore
on Ternlateand another on Makian at the request of the kings of Ternate
'satisfyingthe requestof both" (see lbid.,13). This suggeststhat Ternate and Tidore
ihus
shared suzerainty of Makian between them'
73. See Villiers, "Trade and Society",730'
74. Dames,An Accountof the Countries,II, 118' 196-98'
75. p" Francisco Colin,Labor euangelica, ministeriosapostolicos Compania
de losobr_eros.de.la
dc lesus,funilnciony progressos-ilesu prouinciaen las IslasFiliplzas (Madrid, 1663),107'

__-===--
Spiceklands; Cash-cropEmnomyand StateFormation 105

,6. Jacobs, Treatiseon the Molucms, I05'

i7. Colin, l,abor eaangelica,t07.
"The galacticpolity"' 81'
ig. Jacobs,Treatiseon theMoluccas,167-69.SeealsoTambiah,
;9. Skelton, Magellan'suoyage,L16.
on the
castanheda, Historia dn descobimento,xl, 169-70. See also Jacobs, Treatise
"q0. as Sun or Moon,
Moluccas,12S-ZS,whereCalvao recordsthat the king was add-ressed
name of God'"
since to utter th" royrt nuln" *u. consideredmore injuribus than "we do the
31. SeeTambiah, "The galactic politv"' 83'
Ternate, acted
- Argensola writes that Kaicil Daroes, a naturai son of King Boleife-of
32.
irTito, y gouernad.oy' to Boleife's young sons, Abu Bayat and Dayolo, who succeeded
(Con4uista'2l)'
him. Daroesshared the iegency witit got.if"t *iaow, a princessof Tidore
s3. Jacobs,Treatiseon the Molucca.s,113. On the loc3tion of the Ternatancourt(kednton)
pr6liminaire sur les
in the sixteenth ."nt1rf una latei see Hasan M. Ambary, "Rapport
maruscritsancienset Iesvestibes€pigraphiques de Ternate et Tidore"' Archi^el 23 (7982):
140-42.
S'1. Rebelo,"Informa96o",in S5',Documentaqao,Ill,355'
presentedto the Seminar
35. Ch. I. van Fraassen,"Courtand Statein Ternatansociety''.Paper
Halmahera dan Raja Ampat, Jakarta (June 1981)' 11'
i 6 . rbid.
: ; , Jacobs,Treatiseon the Moluccas,ll8'
aE. IbM., \05.
1 9 . Argensola,Conquista,7l'
r 0 . Portuguesesourcesalsouse the word reipo to translatg.rai, the petty kingdoms or chief-
a;;:; T;;;, eactr of which was ruled by a liurai (portuguese: rdgulo,kinglet).
Rebelo,"Informag6o",in S5, Documentugao, IIl, 355'
Argensola tells the story of Ceiicaya, daughter of the sengaji of Moti' who was very
the
bea'utifuland sought after by all the "Indian kings." she was finally betrothed to
he was "the greatest, most powerful and most respected"(Coz-
king of Ternate bJcause
quita,2g6\. It is likely, however, that she was not the king,s principal queen,,asthese
were generallychose.rirom among the daughtersof fellow sovereignsin the Moluccas.
priists and preachers(qunsys-mor
ttre c--hief comoPaPae Preguador)in each-reinowere
.
also,accoriing to Galvdo,relationsof ihe king. SeeJacobs,Treatiseon theMolucms,ST
Docamentaqan, l,
Tristio de Ataide to the King, Moluccas, 20 Febraury 1534, in 56,
3r2-22.
I acobs,DocamentaMalucensia' Il, 245.
capt. Thomas Forrest, A Voyge to New Guineaand the Moluccasfrom Balambangan'
(Dublin, l7?g\,39. Forrest met iome sengajion Salawat,one of the Raja Ampat islands,
"who heid their title" from the Sultan of Tidore' Ibid'' 64'
r5 castanheda,Historia do descobrimenfo, XI, 168. Jacobs, Treatiseon the Molucus,ll3.
)7 Van Fraassen,"Court and society",7.
:8 Ibid., 12.on the office of stahbantlarin Indonesianport statesseePurnadi Purbatjaraka,
,,shairbandarsin the Archipe1ago",ISEAH 2, ii (1969): 1-9. In Ambon the office of
meirinhoseemstraditionallyto havebeenfilled by a Japanese. SeeHubert Jacobs,S'J'
: In-
The Po.tuguesetown of Ambon, 1576- 1605".Paper presentedto the II Seminiirio
ternationalde Hist6rio Indo-Portuguesa, Lisbon, October 1980, 5-6'
r9 See Tambiah, "The galacticpolity", 85-86'

4
 N
G
--- 8ound.ry vith
th: Dutch

eng i__
S U N D AS \ P A t t s - L ; a-
-
_a-:a

Banten's sphere of political and commercial influence in the seventeenthcentury

--.-
Banten:A WestIndonesianPort and
Polity During the Sixteenthand
Seuenteenth Centwries

J. KATHIRITHAMBY.WELLS

Banten'scapturein about 1527of SundaKalapa,the harbour of the Hindu kingdom

,tf Pajajaran,may be deemedthe first dramaticeventin the embryonicbeginnings
tf this commercialstate.l Superficially,Banten as a commercialentrep6t bears
,-omparisonwith its maritime predecessorsof sfr-vijayaand Melaka. But, in actual
lact, the gradualaccelerationof trade, with an increaseboth in the total volume
andcompositionof exports,forceda major shift from regionalprimacy,as known
bv SrTvijayaand Melaka, to local supremacy, established during the sixteenth
;entury by Banten,Aceh and Makassar.
The main genericdifferencein the two categoriesof port-politiesas mentioned
aboveemanatedfrom fundamentaldifferencesin the type of trade they handled.
Srivijayahad been engagedmainly in the servicingof Chinesejunks with jungle
and seaproduce.The collectionof theseby the oranglaut andupriver collectors,
as well as the total volume of naturai yields, was irrevocably determinedby
ecologicalrhythms. During the subsequentage of commercialprosperitybrought
ry'Islamic influence,which linked the China trade with the west, the scopeand
'.'olumeof trade expanded,with spicesconstitutingthe most important and valuable
:ommodity.Initially, the finer spicesand pepperwere collectedin the wild state
rut, gradually,the demandfor them brought about cash-cropcuitivation.In the
--aseof pepper,by the fifteenth century the producebeganto be cultivatedin the
:oothills of north Sumatrafor export through Samudra-Pasaiand Pedir. A century
.ater,cultivationof pepperhad expandedalongthe west coastof Sumatraand into
Sunda.2
Although Pedir and Pasaiwere eventuallyeclipsedby Melaka, their specialization
r:1peppergavethem somedegreeof politicaland economicviability independent
tf the Melaka-controlled network. Concerningitself during the fourteenthcentury
.,r-itha variety of produce,includingpepper,Pasaiwas forcedthroughcompetition
'.r'ithMelaka to changefrom a generaltrade centre to a staplingport for pepper
:,rtil its absorptionby Aceh in1524. By the samemeansPedir achievedevengreater
:rosperity at the beginningof the sixteenthcentury.3
The rise of these pepperports elsewherein west Sumatraand Sundamarked

107
 agradualbutsignificanttransitionfromasystemofcasualtributarytradetocash.
prosperity' Symptoms
.roo ,n..Lit"ii", tt u".1, io. poiiti.ut una economic
". " the collapse of Melaka, the linchpin
of the new order were already^oo"*"lr"i"re
to forge potiticat alliancesafter 1511
of the old maritime order. Portu#."'"ir"". on a
though unsuc.cessful,were based
at pedir, pasai and srrnaa r<aLpa,4 alliances with the producers
pragmatic ttre adv'J;ges of Jeeking
"r.*r*"", ii." "i the prime coirmodity of export cultivation in the western
or *nat *lal bv itll

rather than the actualfall of Melaka

commoditiesdemandedro. nt".n'uiion"r-trade,
from locally controlled tributary trade
to the portuguese, effected th" ;;;;;il;; production'5"f1: o:itT]tl":t*
to more rigidlv organi'"a '"gio"lj^t"tft-trop
pepperu."]".iothetraderoutesfurtherencourageddirectcollectiononthepart
o f t h e W e s t A s i a n t r a d e r s , a n d t h e i r c o n s e q u e n t p r o swith
p e r ithe
t y p fall
r o v iof
d eMelaki
dsufficien
indlpendence'
rationale for their political "na ".ono*i.
inl5llthestrategicallylocatedu,"u.ofnorthSumatraandSundabecamepivota
which began as harbour polities fo
points for the pepper trade' Aceh and Banten' peripheries o
.
the o";;;;;i;io,-t,"i, hinterlands, gradually expandedtheir
tilne as thev fulfilled the rol
control to establish pepper o*gi"i"J*?it;t1;
ports along the main sea route' 7
of international entrepots and stapling cdastalstri
Dominatedby the
priangun -o,rioin-r,'and possessingonly a nalrow
was divided Jrom the Javaneseterritorie
along the Java Sea, the sunda;;-;
t o t h e e a s t b y t h e P e m a l i n * " . ? . U n r i t e J a v a , w htheo ' scomplex
e w i d e rHindu-Buddhit
ivervalleyswer
that spawned
ideally suitedior thesawah..,rrtiuutlon in 115
unimportant until its subjugation
civilization, the Sunda ,.gion 1-"rnuin"d
b y a J a v a n e s e p r i n c e R a d e n p " n . u , * t ' o e s t a b l i s hinto
e d hthe
i m sregion'7
e l f a t P aalthough
j a j a r a na
,Itish
ri." litiuution
who is believed to have introaulla
Iargepercentageofituntiltheseventeenthcenturyremaineddryrice(ladn'ngor
cacaland'g
saiah) with only a little
A c c o r d i n g t o a n a c c o u n t u v | t ' a o J u - k u a , w r i t t e n d uinr iSunda,
n g ^ t h emainly
l a t t e r pon
a rthe
to{the
in the wild state
twelfth century, pepper *". uiu-ituui"
hill-slopes'Tuban'too'producJ;;;;t'butitwasthesmallerandheavierSunda
althoughbrigandagerenderedSunda
variety, which was consideredi" i" iiot.,.,
i- ,."J"...t 'y;h"1ir"; of the arrivil of the Portuguese'however'
K"r"J';;;
effectivelyservicingthe trade of Pajajaran
S'nda Kalapa,which was still rrinJ", *ur
which it supplied with horses from
and conducting a brisk t."d. ;i;;'M"l"ka,
producedrice and pepper' reputedly
Priaman, slavesfrom the Maroivesand.ldcaly Kalapa'soutput of pepper'
in Coct'in'6uoda
oi u uJt", q.'ality than.t,u. p.oa*"J
.|i, 66tt tv w"tt Asiansand bvchinese'
estimatedat 1,000aoto, unnultv,;;;;G;
Banten,thoughsecondini,npo,tunc"utthi."tl."toSundaKalapa,wasanimportant west
conductedtrade with the ports of
source of rice, foodstufi. una'i"p"p'".if the west Asians to avoid
Sunda route used by
Sumatraand the Maldives,1ouia tite
the Portuguese in the Straits of Melaka'
coastalprincipalities during the last
with the emergenceoi tt " n"ortnJarr".r"."
of the Sunda area attained further
quarrer of the sixteentt centri ih" r"ro.r..".
p,o-in""t"'Akeadylvtf'"*ginittg-"ttf*iif""illcenturyDemak'inthedistrict
ofCirebon,hademergedtoctra"mpionthecauseofthelslamiccoastalprincipa
Banten:A WestIndonesinnPort and Polity 109

against Majapahit under the inspiration of the wali sanga (the nine walD. A
significant feature of the new rulers of the harbour towns of north Java was their
middle-classorigins and their more commercialorientationsas comparedto the
aristocratic orilins and agrarian roots of tlie rulers of Majapahit. An example of
this is the founderof the ruling houseof Demak,RadenPatah(RadenFattah)who
according to legend was born in Palembangto a Chinesewoman from the king
of Majapahit'szenana.Symbolically,it representedthe fusion of the tradition of
the Malay trading port with the Javaneseagrarian interior which Demak came to
serve.11 A successor,PangeranTranggana,wrested the regalia from Majapahit
in 1527,the sameyear that his son-inlaw, SunanGunungJati, known as Falatehan
by the Portuglese, capturedSunda Kalapa.r2By taking possessionof the port,
which he renamedlayaKarta, SunanGunungJati effectively cut off Pajajaranwith
its capitalat Dayo from its coastaloutlet,and underminedrts 1522treaty with the
Portuguese.l3
Further west at Banten,SunanGunungJati had foundeda Muslim community
in 1525.While Demak itself experienceda chequeredhistory during the sixteenth
centurybeforeit enteredthe realm of Mataram during the following centuryrSunan
GunungJati consolidatedhis control'ofthe Sundaregion so that BantenImerged
as the major power in west Java,no longereludingbut challengingeastJavanese
power.r4Little is known about the early history of Bantenuntil it emergedas an
inaepYndentpolity after the death in 1570of SunanGunungJati. This event saw
the divisionof the kingdom amongsthis sons,with the eldestgainingcontrolover
Cirebon,the secondover Bantenand the last over the Jakartalands.15 The second
son,Hasanuddin,appearsto havebeenalreadyactingas the ruler'srepresentative
at Banten from as early as 1552.16
When Hasanuddinestablishedhimselfas the first independentsovereignat Banten
with the title of PanembahanSurasewan,he was fully equippedwith the highest
credentialsfor legitimate rulership. Not only was he descendedfrom the illustrious
line o{ wali sangabased in Demak, but he also subscribedto the Javanesebelief
in genealogicaldescentthrough the femaleline by marrying a princessfrom Demak,
which claimedspiritual successionto Majapahit.lTTutored by his father in the
Muslim sciencesand the rudiments of tapa(pertapaan)for accumulating spiritual
power,he beganproselytizationof the inland,therebyfulfilling his role as Muslim
ruler.18
The commercialorientationsof Banten were reflected even in the original layout
of the township plannedby SunanGunungJati, who had decided where the drtlam
(palace)and,alun-alun(public square)were to be locatedin their important relation-
ship with the pasar(market).1e By the time his son Hasanuddinsucceededto the
throne,the ruler was assistedby a group of loyal ministers(menterDand non-royal
officials (penggawa),amongst whom the laksamanaand syahbandnr,at the time a
Keling, figured prominently.While the last two conductedBanten'smaritime affairs,
the inclusionof a senopati,or military commanderwithin the retinue of court officials
indicatedBanten'sexpansionisttendencies.In addition,there was the hnhdi,Molana
Judah,who lent spiritual inspirationto Hasanuddin'smilitary campaigns,which
followed the pattern of jihad.zo
In expandingits influenceas a port-polity Bantenappearsto haveadopteda multi-
facetedpolicy. With other Muslim powers,such as Demak and Inderapura,ties
-

110 Wells
J' KathirithambY

were strengthenedthrough marriage alliances;Hasanuddinmarried a princessof

Demak2rai well as the daughterof the Sultan of Inderapura.According to the
SejarahBantdn,the ru]er receivedas dowry the whole of the west coastof Sumatra
southof Inderapura,which was tantamountto a surrenderto Bantenof Inderapura's
pepper outlets through Silebar and Bengkulu (Benkulen)'22
Hisanuddin is believedto havevisited the still paganLampr:ngon the samenuptial
mission to west Sumatra. There is no indicatiori of the use of aggressionor
compulsionin the disseminationof Islam in this region.on the contrary,a policy
of pacificationseemsto have beenadoptedin Lampung.Dissentientchiefsin the
district of Tulangbawang offered Hasanuddin their submission,which the ruler
would not acceptuntil the chiefsresoivedtheir internaldisputes.Thesechiefsare
believedto have embracedIslam in Banten and, on subsequentlyreturning from
the pilgrimageto Mecca, helped spreadthe new religion in Lampung'23
During the period of Demak'spolitical declineHasanuddinconsideredit prudent
to rally hir fo..". againstPajangwith a view to securingfor Banten the territories
west of Pakuwati and Krawang.2aIt was left, however,to Hasanuddin'sson and
successor,Molana Yusof (1570-80), to add to Banten the last remnantsof Pa-
jajaran through the capture in 1579of its capital, Pakuwan (now Bogor). Banten',s
inh,t".t." by this time over Lampung is evident in the help rendered by the local
chief, the raja of RatuBalau, forMolana Yusofs expedition against Palernbang.23
The lands incorporated from Pajajaran, previously a rice exporter to Melaka.
providedMolanaYusof with an opportunityto extendagriculturalactivity in Sunda.
In preparationfor the openingup of new rice lands he supervisedthe construction
of villages,canalsand dams'26
Molana Yusof, reputedly a man of great physical strength, did not live long after
his triumph over Pakuwan and was succeededby his son, thepangeranmas(crown
prince) Molana Muhammed, a minor. This event brought Banten under the
domination of the first of a series of prime ministers or mangkubumi.The yotng
ruler was placed under the guardianshipof a council of court officials headedb1'
the kadhi. Under the influence of the latter, who had rallied support for the
enthronement of the infant ruler, and that of Kiai Duku, Molana Muhammed
(r. 1582-96) grew up to be o{ a religious disposition and took a personal interest
in the growth of the wahaf. At the instigation of a santanafrom the ruling house
of Demik, PangeranMas decidedto launch a jihad againstthe kafir in Palembang
with the backing of Islamic elements in Lampung' Though the ruler could have
beensincerein his religiousaims,there was probablyalsoa strongeconomicmotiva-
tion for the court's endorsementof the war policy. Palembangwas already an
important area f.or pepper cultivated by Minangkabau immigrants and was, in
addition a source of gold, which found its way to Banten through Tulangbawang.
.../ Molana Mohammed,then barely 25 yearsof age,died in action,but till about the
t
: mid-seventeenthcentury Banten persisted, in competition with Mataram, in
t.-
assertingits hegemonyover Palembangand Jambi, both of which were important
sourcesof pepper.27..
Under MolanaMuhammed'sinfant son,PangeranRatu (laterSultanAbdulmafakir
Mahmud Abdulkadir (1596-1651)Banteneseaffairsoncemore fell firmly into the
hands of Mangkubumi Jajanagara,who acted as regent.28When the latter died
some time during 1601-02 he was succeededby his brother, whose accumula
 Banten:A WestIndones'ianPort and Politlt 111

:ion of powerbecamea matter of concernin coun circles.Taking personalcharge

rver the tutelageof the young r-uier,he claimedroyal honourand powers,sitting
rn a stool in the centreof the audiencehall, flankedby guns. A plot involvingthe
rarga (royalty) and kadhi ended in his murder2ebut left the influential office of
,nanghubumi unaffected. The next incumbent, ( -
.p'19*;gg $glal.nan ggala 1608 *
24),a great-uncleof the young ruler, married thE latt-ei'swidowed mother, Nyai
GedeWangri, to wield unprecedentedpower.3o
While up till this time the rulers of Banten had been concernedlargely with
establishingBanten'sviability as an Islamic state and a staplingport for pepper,
lnder the firm leadershipof PangeranRanamanggala, Bantenentereda new era
'rf ascendancyas an internationalentrepot.Already, the strategiclocationof Banten
alongthe trade route betweenthe spiceislandsand the west made it is a convenient
assemblypoint along the main sea-route.A variety of West Asian traders,including - - ,.-,
Turks, Arabs, Persians,Bengalis,SouthAsiansand Gujaratis3lpicked up pepper
'
andspicesand exchangedother commoditieswith the Chineseat Banten,Further, a ' ".j..
rhe strategiclocationof Banten along the trade route betweenthe spYe islands 1_,,
and the west had made it a popular assemblypoint for producefrom the Moluccas, ;','
'shich Indian and Chinesetraders addedto their export of pepper.In exchange,j '
:hey broughtgoodsfrom their respectivesectors,suchas cloth from India and silk,
andporcelainfrom China,which led to the convergencenot only of inter-regional
rut also of internationaltrade at Banten.3)
Up till the beginningof the seventeenthcentury,owing probablyto Banten'spreoc-
iupation with its territorial and'internaleconomicgrowth and to the absenceof
anyseriousthreat to its trade from the Portuguese,its more prosperouswholesale
:rade was in the hands of Indian and Chineseresidentsin the city. West Asian
:radewas mainly in the handsof the Keling from the CoromandelCoast,who traded
:n cloth - a prime commodity of import into SoutheastAsia.33Like the prominent
Chetty Maluku,3amany ownedvesselsand took an active part in the inter-island
:radeas well, exchangingcloth for producefrom the spiceislands,which they re- -
exportedwith foodstuffsand pepper to Melaka.rSoimportant, in fact, was the ; .,
uoromandeltrade at the time of PangeranRanXmanggala that the leading porl r t'
'rfficers, the syahbandarand lahsamanawere both Kelings ,
)he syahbandar,who
:ose from small beginnings, stood high in the favour of ilte pangerazland was a
nember of the royal counci/Ihe ruler's indispensablePortugueseinterpreter,
QuillinPanjan"(KelingPanjairg)from Mylapore,the sonof a renegadeItalianfrom
San Thom€, attested to the internationality of the trade which convergedat
Banten.pThe head of the Turkish and Arab merchant community at Banten,
KojahYayoanfrom Constantinople,who had sailedthe entire route from Venice
:o the East Indies,36was representativeof this classof Asian wholesalemerchants,
',r'ithin whose network of international commercial activity Banten figured pro-
minently.
The arrival of the Dutch and the British in the Banten market by the turn of ..
:he century and the pressurefrom them for commercialconcessionsforced the I
t.
r )angeranto take a personaland direct role in trade.37The trend was not peculiar r -- +i'
'Pt i
:o Banten and was a significant feature of the policy of Sultan Iskandar Muda !
j 1607-36)of Aceh under comparablecircumstances.Rantmanggalasuccessfully"
:hwarted Dutch and English efforts to corner the pepper market at Banten. He
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 Banten:A WestIndonesian
PortandPolitl, ' 113

was in collusion with the syahbandnrf6g tvtytapore,with whom he exercisedthe

right of pre-emptingthe purchaseand Yaleof the pepperthat he bought cheapfrom
"
the Chineseand sold dear to the north Europeans.3s To derive the maximum I
benefit from Banten'spopularity, high tolls were imposedand these includedruba-
ruba or anchorageand bunh or import and export duties, of which the syahbandar
took a share.By 1603,the toll and anchoragefees had risen to as much as 1500
rixdollarsper Dutch vessel.3e
A significant trend initiated by the coming of the north Europeans,particularly
by the establishment of the Dutch in 1619 at Iaya Karta (Jakarta), which they
renamedBatavia, was the emgr.genceof the Chineseas an integral element in the
Banten market and its inter-regional trade. For most of the sixteenth century the
pepperwas collectedfrom south and west Sumatransources,either directly by
West Asians, *ho popularly used the Sunda route, or else by Banteneseand
Javanese,who suppliedtheseareaswith provisions.By the beginningof the seven-
teenthcentury the increaseddemandfor pepperat Banten brought the Chinese,
(: rvith ready cashavailable,in the form of picis. This, combinedwith their organiza-
tional ability, enabledthem to excel as the main collectorsof pepperfor the Banten
market from Jambi and from various supply points within the kingdom. Dutch and
British attempts to seek cheaperand readier suppliesfrom sourcessuch as In-
derapura,Silebarand Jambiwere foiled by competitionfrom the Chinese.These
s
traders would happily venture up the Jambi and other rivers to pre-emptpurchase
by advancingcashto the cultivators.At Bantenitself the Chinesecommunityshifted
its original settlement south of the capital to an area further inland to facilitate
pre-emptionof suppliescoming downstreamat the end of the rainy season.So
lucrative.in fact. was the trade that the actual labour of collectionwas often en-
trustedby Chinesemerchantsat Bataviato their slaves,whom they employedas
commercialagents.ao
The commercialchallengepresentedby Bataviaand the coercivemethodsused
ri
by the Dutch governor-general, Jan PieterszoonCoen,to draw the Chineseaway
irom Bantenwas an additionalreasonfor the pangeranto forge closerlinks with
rhem.The steadyincreasein the importanceof the Chinesein Banten'strade after
1610was manifestedin their larger representationon the ruler's council.Several
of them embracedthe Islamic faith that was then being actively promotedin the
kingdom.The most prominentChinese,'LimLacco',known as PangeranCina,was
the brain behind PangeranRanamanggala's monopolypolicy.alMany of them were
alsoemployedin the king's administrationas writers, accountants,brokers,inter-
pretersand weighers.a2 By the mid-century,'Caitson',the captainof the Chinese,
rvhowas a Muslim with the name of Abdul Gafur and a kini to boot, was syahban-
,Iar at Banten.a3
The Chinese,besidesdealingin pepper,handledimportsof sandalwood,indigo, I
lacquer,elephants'tusks,and nutmeg,which were then exportedto China.Many,
LikeSim Suan,who maintainedimportant connectionswith the Dutch at Batavia
and from time to time acted as intermediariesin negotiationsbetweenthem and
Banten,aa ownedshipsand rice{ands and accruedsubstantialwealth from trade.
The wealthy and influential core of Chinesemerchantslived in stone housesin
a prominent quarter of the city, owning slaves,sugar-millsand warehouses.as
The importanceof the Chineseto the Bantenesetrade did not declineeven in
 114 J. Kathirithamby-Wel::

the faceof Coen'scoerciveattemptsto draw them to Bataviaand the sporadicDutcL

blockadesof Bantenbetween1619and 1645.Although during theseyears man"-
Chineseshifted their trade to Batavia, those who remainedmade a significan:
contribution to the survival of Banten by revamping its agricultural base. When
Dutch commericalcompetitionand the belligerentpostureadoptedby Mataran
after 1625threatenedtrade at Banten,the Banteneseabandonedpeppercultivatior
for over twelve yearsin favour of rice growing and weaving.Accordingto an Englisi:
report,a6

[T]hepeople[Bantenese]... applythemselveswholieto tillageof Riceandsettlingof

SugarCanes... andit is almostincredible
whatwatercourses theyhadCuttandwhat
a goodlyCompass of groundthey havethese2 yearspastmanuredto the purpose
of the aforesaid.

The Chineselikewisepromptly accommodated themselvesto this changeand turnec

to the cultivation of sugar and ginger, growing sufficient quantities of the former
to supplementpepper exports to China.a,Tpanten's need to attain self-sufficiency
during these years,inducedby a generaldeclinein its internationaltrade, is at-
testedby the poor market for Coromandelcloth imported by the English.zWhar
pepperit exportedduring the lean yearswas collectedby the Chinese,mainly fron:
traditionalsourcesin Sumatra,includingSilebar.The producehad to be paid for
in cash by the English, as the local market for imported cloth had declined.+i
Banten'sheavierrelianceon its Sumatrandependenciesduring this economiccrisis
at the centre was evident in Pangeran Ranamanggala'simposition of new taxes
on the inhabitantsof Lampung.ae
Though Banten witnessedan alarming declinein its trade during the latter years
of PangeranRanamanggala's administrationand the early years of SultanAbdur
Kadir's independentreign (1625-51), the capital showed a remarkable capa-
city for survival. The latter, as well as his successor,Sultan Abdulfath Abdul
Fattah Agung (1651-82)saw the wisdom of adoptinga more conciliatorypolicl-.
especiallys0 towards the Dutch, and a friendly policy towards their rivals, the
English and the Danes.siThe role of the Danesduring the 1670sin mediating
trade betweenTranquebar,on the CoromandelCoast,and Banten is attestedbr-
the six or so vesselswhich were especiallyset asidefor freight betweenthe twc'
ports. On eachof thesevesselssailedas many as 150 Chulia and Hindu merchants.
The English were also known to freight goodsbelonging to the Coromandelmer-
chantsto Banten when they had insufficientcapital to load a ship.52In 1671al-
craft and vesselseither belongingto or hired by the English,though liable to duties
and taxes at the regionalports, were exemptedfrom paying tolls and duties,as
well as the customary presents, to the ruler at the capital, a move evidentlr-
calculatedto centralizetrade. By the sametreaty the English agreedto reserve
the sale of all ammunitionand gunpowderat current prices exclusivelyfor the
ruler.53
] .t. ttte nature of English and Danish commercialparticipationin the trade of
\ Bantensuggests,SouthAsian trade at Bantengainedrenewedvigour during the
!new period of prosper--y.Coibmandeltrade with almost the whole of Southeast
lAsia convergedat Banten. Through factors stationedat Banten, Coromandel

,1
 PortandPolity
Banten:A WestIndonesinn 115

nerchants conducted trade throughout the Archipelago, as far as Manila and

.\yutthaya. Many of thesevoyageswere conductedin partnership.not only with
\{alays and Javanese,but also with the Portugueseand the British.il
While adopting a friendly policy towards the European powers, Banten at the
sametime reinforced its Islamic foundationsin order to strengthen internai unity
againstexternalchallenges.Missionswere sentto Mecca,the first of which returned
'Sultan'for Abdulmafakir Mahmud
in 1638,bearingfrom the GrandMufti the title of
Abdulkadir (1596-1651),which subsequentrulers then adopted.ssThe son of
Sultan Agung, Prince Haji, made the pilgrimage twice, during 1669-71 and
1674-76, and through contact maintainedwith the Muslim world via Surat,
'Moorish popes'were regularly receivedat court.56Banten's
:eligious scholarsand i
tutstandingachievementin combininga staunchIslamic policy with a pragmatism I "
which did not exclude Europeanalliance assistedin bringing it during the middle I
lecades of the century to the zenith of its glory.
A revision of Batavia'spolicy towards Banten was an additional factor favouring I
:he trade revival. In the face of the growing power of Mataram under SultanAgung l
r1613-46).Bataviacalculatedthat it would be in its intereststo toleratea modest'j
:neasureof prosperity in Banten.57The latter was quick to take full advantageof
:his softeningof the Dutch attitude. Bantenesevesselsboldly venturedto Seram
:n contraventionof the Dutch spice monopoly.This precipitatedhostilitiesand,
..vhenthe Dutch attemptedpeacenegotiationsthrough the chinesetrader, Sim Suan,
Banten stoutly defended its claim to free navigation in Seram, Ambon and
5anoa.""
Despite Banten's initially aggresive policy towards Batavia, it soon discovered ;,;,. i.
:he importance-ofwg$iag within the framework of Dutch treaty negotiations.Thef , , i (' ,
u
lnglish couldiot be relieduponto bolsterBanten'stradebecauseof their inability'1
:o pay in rials when Indian cloth failed to have much attraction for the locals,who I
'.r'ereby now accustomedto the home-produced variety. The politicalpressureofJ
\lataram on the peripheral areas of the Bantenesekingdom was an additionalfactor
..vhichdictated a more conciliatorypolicy towards the Dutch. Mataram'sclaims
,ver Jambi and Palembang,seand its expansioninto the Priangan, directly
:hallenged Banteneseambitions in these iieas.60 Not surprisingly, Banten
:ccepteda treaty with the Dutch in 1636,by which it nominallywithdrew its trade
::om Makassar.6l I
under the Dutch-Bantenese tmce, which after somedelay becameeffectivein
^639,and a renewedtreaty in 1645,Bantenbuilt up a new commercialstructure.
The Sundaregionneverrecoveredas a major producerof pepperand pursuedthe
:iversified subsistenceeconomywhich it had adoptedduring the Dutch blockades.
.n the sphereof trade,however,Bantenadopteda more forward policy.Although
3anten was officially prohibitedfrom trading in the spice islan{s, in practiceit
recamea stagingpoint for the smugglingtrade with Makassar.'TheEnglishand
:he Danes, who collected cloth from the CoromandelCoast and Tranquebar
:espectively,used Banten as an intermediateport.62Further, once the Dutch total-
f. .; removedthe blockade,some oJ the Chinesemoved back to Banten to escape
:he oppressivetaxes at Bataviaf Now uneasily at peacewith the Dutch, Banten
; nce again began to prosper.f,h
rl The peppertrade itself apfears to have been totally reorganizedand brought
rro J KathirithambY-We

the chinesggronopoly
under direct Bantenesesurveillanceaimedat eliminating
stemmed from the increased exportation of pepper by the
This move apparently
of them, like Sim Suan, struck
Ct in"." to liaiavia and the alliance which some
after the middle of the century of a rigid royal
with the Dutch. The implementation
monopolyovertheexportationofpepperwasaSerioussetbacktotheChine
pepper at vast profits to them-
middilmln, who had dealt in the export trade of
selves.6a
which gavethe Sultan
It is evident that in the implementation of the monopoly'
p"pp"t, the nobility came to play a significant role'
the sole right over the sale of
pepper cultivation,remained was
In the Sunda territories of Banlen whatever
priungan highlands and was largely in the hands of
restricted to the west oi th"
in the city. To supervisethe
the nobles and other p.o*i.,"nt iniividuals resident
cultivationtheyemployedmandor,whosetaskmusthavebecome.morediffic
with the introduction citivation. The regulations pertaining to forcec
"ii".."a for the first time in the western
cultivation, which appearsto have been introduced
to plant 500 peppervines'
er.tipAugo, requiredeachmale of 16 yearsand above
manilnr received half a Spanish dollar
and non-compliancewas punishabte.irre
plantation owners' who' besides making a profit
for each bahar deliveredio the
ofbetweenthreeandt"u'sp*l.t'dollarsperbaharoneachbahartheydeliverec
totheking,alsoprofitedfromthesaleofprovisionsandessentialgoodstot
planters.65Theconditionsofthisforcedcultivationcontainedtherudiments
Priangan' but also by the British
system later adopted,nol onfv by the Dutch.in
inBengkulu.Althoughtheexactdateoftheimplementationofforcedcultivati
know that the systemwas extendec
in the Sunda."gion."nnoi be estallished,we
in the form of a proclamatiot:
to Lampung in 1663. Buia"n." of this is available
Lampung,stipulating
oni"*ji"J""d on 13 r."l*".v of that year Redjep1073)for
(3
ih""."-. regulationsfor compulsory cultivation'66
gunt"n".L control over the area had slackeneddtrring
In the caseof I_urnprrng,
there of a rebellion in 164i
the years of the Dutch tiockade, but the outbreak
arms'67 After this evi:irt the
was successfntty..u.hJ *itt' ttt" aid of British
direct control over Lampungpepper'
Banteneseruler is believedto haveestablished
convertedsomeof the pepperlands
In reaction,cuttivatorsin Lu-p"ng and Silebar
pepper output to Batavia.6sIt was
to rice cultivution uni ai*.t"a tt'"i. reduced
presumablytochecktt'eut'f"uou'abletrendthatthe1663edictrequiredallad
In the interestsof cultivation' opiurn
malesto cultivate a strpurateanumber of vines.
and of{enders were liable to transhipmen
smoking and gamblin! were protriuited
wittr ttreir families to Banten'oe in Lampunt
"il;;"."i."p"*r.r", of the monopolysystemand forcedc'ltivation
/
\wasentrustedtomembersoftheBantenesenobilityappointedasjennng(the
i centresof Menggala (Tulang Bawans)and Semangka
-Betung.
-j ;il#;*,;ffi;;ain Teluk administrat
The internal
;.fr ;;;.,bly "ra who ha-dgradually bee
"il".Ji;;;i.h
however, remalneo,n it i r'unat of the locai marga chiefs'
.i
through gifts of high-soundingtitles as incentives
i' il".J ft,.iu.;;1,]|";3";ten ableto deliver' they were accorde
Dependingupon the urnot-t of peppeithey *"'e
which were enhancedby symbo
titles suchaspangeran,hini, arin andtemenggrlzg'
keris pinganr
and, or patentsetchedin copperor silve
of office suchas pil."., i"ag". ,
SuchwasthearxietyoftheBantenesegovernmenttopromotethepeppermono

-.*---5
 Banten:A WestIndonesian
PortandPolitl Il7
| n,
lr
:hat titles were madeavailableevenfor petty chiefsin return for their cooperation f
n implementingthe monopoly.TlIven as late as the early eighteenthcentury. a '
\Iinangkabau trader, Nakhoda-fiIudaearnedthe title of Kiai DemangPurwasidana
:or his efficiencyas the ruler of Banten'sagent at Semangka.Tl
In the Silebararea, though there is no evidenceof a forced cultivationsystem
raving been implemented,a syahbandarwas permanentlystationed,T2 presumably '-," I .
:o supervisethe collectionand exportation of pepper.In addition, a jenang visited !
:he coastannuallyto superintendadministrativeaffairs, make new appointments t t
x behalf of the ruler, and settle tnter-margadisputes.T3
Under the monopoly,all pepper collectedin Silebar and Lampung was to be first
-'onveyedto Banten,where the ruler reservedthe right to sell the produceat his
iiscretion.TaThe English gained permissionfrom time to time to make direct
,'ollectionsat Silebar,but by and large only Chineseand Javanesecraft were engaged
:or the licensedconveyanceof pepper to Banten.ZsAt the capital itself all com-
:rercial activities were strictly supervised.For instance,during the reign of Sultan
-\bdul Kadir all commercialtransactionswere controlledby the'Protector',Patih
\langkubumi Kay Wangsadipa,who succeededRanamanggala.He kept a close
'.vatchover the activitiesof the Chinesemerchantsin town on behalfof the ruler,
iemandedvaluablepresentsin exchangefor trade privilegesand engrossedthe
:urchase of spicesbrought in by local vessels.T6
SultanAbdulfath Abdul Fattah Agung, during whosereign the revolutionaryforc-
ed cultivationsystemwas introduced,appearsto have played a more direct role
:hanhis predecessorin the promotionof internationaltrade at Banten.To this end
re fostereda new generationof Chinesemiddlemenunder his patronageat Banten ,'
:o replacethe original population,who had either moved to Batavia or had lost l
:heir economicstandingunder the monopolysystem.?7
The ruler personallykept a weathereye on the generaltrade scene.According r
'-othe SejarahBant7n, whenever the court met, the Sultan, having inquired after
:he welfare of the palacecircle, would then ask about the state of trade at thepasar
andports. He showedparticularinterestin thoseslateswhich most affectedBanten's
--ommercialaffairs such as Makassar,Jambi, Palembang,Johor, Melaka and Aceh.
-\ specialenvoy,Astraraja,was sent on a missionto maintaingood relationswith
t :heseareasT8 which, accordingto Dutch records,sharedclosefriendship with each
t rther at the time.zfrith SouthAsia as well trade continuedto flourish and Muslim r ' , -.
':
1 :radersvisited F'antenwith cotton goods,which they exchangedfor eaglewood.Td)| ".:
t ','' '
Jragon'sblood8oand raw cotton.8lSultanAbdulfatahhimself licensedBantenese ":
:radersto sail as far as Persia,Arabia and India (mainly Surat, Coromandeland
v Bengal).The Sultanof Banten'sextensivetrade on the CoromandelCoast,especially . j
S Porto Novo, Paleacatand Nagapatnam,was helpedby his diplomatic contactswith
l. Golcondaand duty-free concessionsat Masulipatnam.The international character
l. rf his commercialpartnershipsare evidentin his employmentof Chuliamerchants i
n ashis agentsfor trade with the CoromandeiCoast.82 Through his Chineseagentshe
s. :radedwith Tonkin, Manila, Canton,Taiwan and Japan.83 The extent of the ruler's
d ::ade is borne out by a report of 1675,accordingto which he suffered an estimatedloss
ls rf 60,000rials when three shipsen route to Chinawere lost in a storm.] Another
r. shipof the Sultan,sailingunderthe Englishflag in 1679and boundforJapan,was
lv .r'reckedoff the coastof Java with a cargo estimatedat 10,000rixdollars.s5The
 118 J. KathirithambY'Well:

partly to the difficulty which

ruler's anxiety to fit out trading expeditionswas due
pepper in Banten. Their problem.
the Europeansfaced in iaisinicast, to pay for
inturn,wasevidentlyugg'uu.-ut"abytherefusalo{theBantenesetosettledeb
payments for all transactionsin-cash'86
in anything uut pepper,-ihile demanding
market from the middle of the
In the caseoi ttre Bngtist', u tt"rnp in the London
to purchase pepper at Banten'87This forced
century onwardsli*it;; iit;;uputitv
.rrips, ofien iitot"a by English o{{icers on loan from
the ruler to fit out rri. pepper in Manila and
"*r guni""'tt fitd markets for
the English Cornpunylt !9 initiative was such that.
elsewhere.8e The sutjanis commercial independenceand
supplies of gunpowder and amunition,
despite his reliance on th" co.npany for at Banten, where
dictated prices
guaranteedbv tire treatv oi razi, t" arbitrarily pepper was sold
,.,or.,it. he raised ihe price at which
within the spaceof il;;;
tothem{rom16,ialstolgrialsperbahar.goApart{romhismonopolyoverpep
commoditieslike ground ginger' In 1664
the ruler traded in otheriocaity produced grounr
for instance,tne p.,grist *"re obligedto purchase.1,000iars of
"ri"g"a,n"v from us those things he had grante
ginger from him "lest he should take away
notwithst;;j;glt ui.i..itodes o{ trade at Banten, royal control c
us.,,el Thus, {or the Sultan'
;'"1ot" 'o""" of wealth and influence
,it was firm and nd;;'; Sultan Asung continued to dej
,i In his aggres.yg nt"rn"1# "i n;ii11t-i-trade' and east Java bt
in Ambon, Makassar
Dutch commercrarrestrictions, not only Peninsula' from whe
Ceylon) in the Malay
also in Perak u"a Ul""g i"f""g tJo"t
br""gh,;f;;'."r? i"'ir." English at the Banten market'lfhe rule
his vessels
*;l;;-th; of thetqlJid not heh his uneasilelations w'
appropriation
"t " precipi\d a decisivecivil war's2The reimpc
. his son, Prince H"ii, ti'ftitft r"ter ruIt
iti fOS\d not effect.a.chalee in the
tion of a Dutch Uri.f."l" "" e"^i"r his claimt
*ttittt followed'\ ft": ylltil]ng
attitude. In ttre nffi"i*t
n.-i*i.t"a on the exemption of\antenese vesselsfrom tolls i
free navigation, Makas
l'il;;;;t'"it t'o'n Binten continued to trade with
restrictionse3 with the region is attes
""d commerciallinks
The importan." oi potiti."t as well as two armed lerahu car4
Makassarin 1657 of
by the ruler B"t;;;[ ;;;patch to for arms and assista
"f TJ;;;i;; he appealed to Makassar
ambassadors'
against Batavia'eo
Agung wageda pro-Islamicpoli?'-1]
Though SultanAbdulfath Abdul Fattah
he did this without compromr
later crystalli'"a into an anti-kafir movement' attitudeto'
his commerci",dil;;il. H" *", aafueratelyambiguousin his
to supplementcloth imports fron
ficking in opium' *:hith b"gun increasingly bannedand sternlyput
conscientiously
dia. At the sametime as SultanAgung
edtheconsumptionofopiumandalcoholthroughouthiskingdom'ostens
compunctionthe smugglingof both r
religious ,.uron.,ii t'" condonedwithout
the situation drew a bitter comment l
modities into gatavJ' ihe gravity of
a port of Batavia. The export of opium
the Dutch that Banten had become Thougl
s"1t"t's trade with east Java'e6
stituted also an;;;;;;;;trt."i indigenous power in the
posedto the Dutch, who presente.d-a major threat to
Portuguese and French' He relir
Sultan Agung *"it"'""aitt" British' Danes'
supplies of arms,and.gunpowder and ft
the British, *;ii;; the French' for
with his son' P
".
an alliance*ith ill;;;;i' wrt"" {acedwith an open rupture
guns and ammunition was couched in int:
Haji, his appeal'tbCharlesII for
 Port andPolity
funten:A WestIndonesian 119

:erms "as between... Father & ... Child, and as between... Husbandand '.. Wife;
so that ... our country [Banten] & the country of the christiane way be taken as
,)necountry...."e7 i ,.
'' The Sultan of Banten'sfinal rupture with the Dutch was precipitatedby the
\'.O.C.'sincreasedstrengthvis-2t-visMataram,particularlyduring the reign of Sultan :,
.\mangkuratII(7677-7703).?The closure by Amangkurat I (1646-77) of the
northJavaneseports of Sura'6aya, Tuban, Gresikand Japaraduring 1655-57 and
againin 1660in order to gain authority over the coastand control over supplies
ro the Dutch had entirely misfired.eeThe weak and impoverishedJavanesecoastal
:ownsbecame,as a result, a havenfor dissentientelements,including roving bands
--,fMakassareseunder Gowa'sex-navalcommander,Karaeng Bontomarannu.After
:he fall of their capital to the Dutch in 1669 the Makassarese,their vast fleets
:esembling"floatingcities",begana westwardmigration,towardsJava,Sumatraand
:he Malay Peninsulain searchof fortune and adventure.10o Locked in isolation
:rom the coast,Amangkurat II was forced to renew, in 1677,the 1646treaty of
:riendshipwith the V.O.C. which, together with the treaty of 1678,gave the Dutch
substantialconcessions, includinga monopolyover the importationof cotton and
rpium1011items which had formed a major shareof Banten'sexportsto the east
-'oast.By moving closertowards the Dutch and, by showinghimself unsympathetic
l'ith the pro-Islamic elements, Sultan Amangkurat inadvertently provoked an
:.llianceamongst the coastalrulers and princes who were the original champions
-,fthe Islamic faftIi. The wheel had comefu}l circle and SultanAgung found himself
.-t the helm of a grand anti-kafir movement,which won the support of the illustrious
:igUreof RadenKajoran or PanembahanRama,his son-in{aw,the MaduresePrince
Trunajaya, as well as the sunan giri.102It was Sultan Agung's plan, upon suc-
, :essfulcompletionof the rebellion,to carve up the Matarameseempire amongst
I :.is supporters,allowing himself all the lands in west Java, includingcirebon.103
As eventsturned out, the grand anti-Dutchallianceaimed at guaranteeingthe
1 .ecurity of Bantenseriouslyjeopardizedthis pian. By the end of 1680all the rebel
t
.eaders,exceptSultanAgung himself, had died and what forcesremainedwithdrew
:t Banten.104 Here the movementtemporarilyrevived under the spiritual leader-
'the
.hip of veneratedSyeik Yusuf of Makassar,whosemarriagewith the ruler's t
h :aughter effectively stiengthenedexisting alliances.105 Banteneseforces made
g ::equentmilitary and naval attacks around Batavia and the north coast,thus posing
E
: serious threat to Dutch shipping.106 In a desperate bid to check the mounting
t- :ower of the Dutch in the westernArchipelago,SultanAgung lent supportto the
l-
-677 rebellionof the PeninsularMinangkabauagainstthe Dutch in Melaka, plotted
)r -r.ithKecili Siberi,the ruler of Ternate,in the 1680insurrectionagainstthe Dutch
t- .: Ambon, and suppliedarms in 1681 to PanglimaDatuk Gedang,leaderof the
m .nti-Dutch revolt in west Sumatra.1o7 These rebellionswere all successfullyfoiled
n- :r-Dutch forcesand their failure left SuitanAgung enfeebledand dispirited.The
p' ::it in 1680with his son, Prince Haji, merely hastenedthe collapseof Bantenese
a, -egemonyin west Javaand resultedin the establishmentof full Dutch protection
)n :rere in 1684.108
rd In its origins, functions and internal organization,Banten superficially shared
ce :rany featureswith Aceh. It was not merely the availabilityof pepperat both capitals
te :ut their strategiclocationon the main trade route, as well as the political and
r20 J. Kathirithambl-Welt

administrative talents of their rulers, which accounted for their supremacy anc
internationalimportance.Both were staunchlyIslamic, but Banten, perhapsb1'
virtue of its more central position in the Archipelago, engagedin greater politica-
interactionwith local powersand, under SultanAgung, championeda commonanti-
Dutch cause.Though Banten did not succeedin maintaining its independencefor
as long as Aceh, it displayedunprecedentedimaginationand initiative in imple-
menting the cash-crop monopoly. It went much further than Aceh ever did in
organizing actual cultivation in the dependentterritories and in integrating com-
ponent parts of the kingdom with the capital. Perhaps through the successfu
assimilationof autochthonouschiefsinto the administrativecorps,Bantensucceedec
in avoiding the undue accumulation of power by provincial governors and roya-
representativesin the peripheralregionsand their consequentcomrption which
was a sore problem in Aceh.loe
In the tradition of the seventeenthcenhrrymaritime statesof Aceh, Johor,Ternate
and Makassar, Banten'spre-eminencedid not derive from the relative security ot
regional trade as known during the earlier age of Srlvijaya and Melaka. The
foremost task of the new generation of port-states was to keep the indigenous
network of trade alive in the face of Europeanchallenges.Moreover, the maritime
capital no longer functioned exclusively as an international entrep6t or a regionai
commercialcentre,but found it essentialto combinethis with the complementan
role of cash-cropproduction in the hinterland and surroundingregions.As a centre
for complex internationaland inter-regionalactivity, the capital city of Banten was
the administrative and commercialfocus for a relatively well defined, closely knir
territorial sphere, which bore the features of a commercial state rather than a
maritime kingdom. The power of the ruler lay in his control over the sourceso:
productionrather than in tributary and commercialalliances.In this sensethe struc-
tural and functionalaspectsof administrationwhich relatedto the cash-cropeconomt
had, during the courseof time, developedmore fully in Banten than in seventeenth
century Aceh.
As the momentum of Europeanactivity in the Archipelago intensified,the struc-
ture and workings of port and polity became proportionately more complex anc
integrated.Rapidlychangingeventsin the areaand the needfor appropriateinterna-
modificationsalso meant that greater initiative was demandedof the ruler. His role
as head of state was far from static and symbolic and, when spurred by externa-
challenge,could prove bold and innovative,not unlike that of the rulers of sixteentl:
cenhry westernEuropeduring the emergenceof nationstates.Seventeenthcenhl-r'
Banten exemplifiedthe new genre of SoutheastAsian centralizedstateswhich
succeededthe earliergenerationof shifting city-statesand looselyknit kingdoms
and empires.As at the capitalcity of Banten,it was the port-polityat the core of
the political mnndalawhich playeda seminalrole in generatingchangeand develop-
ment elsewherein the region.
3anten: A WestIndonesianPort and Polity 12l

\OTES

1. H.J. De Graaf & Th. G. Th. Pigeaud,De EersteMoslimse Vorstendommen ofiJaua, VKI
69 (1974):118.
2. Pepper(Pifer nigrum, Linn.), whoseoriginal home in India was the Western Ghats,was
most probably introduced into Java during the period of Indian influence and later into
Pedir and Pasai,some time before the fourteenth century, probably by Muslim traders
from Malabar.First recordedin Javaby ChouCh'ri-feiin 1178,pepperwas exportedto
Chinaduring the period of the SouthernSung,with the best quality comingfrom Sunda,
and Tuban'ssuppliesrankingnext. Marco Polo(1280)recordsspiceexportsfrom Sumatra,
but pepperis not listed separately.Accordingto Wolters, in 1371 and 1377Malaru-
Jambipresentedaromaticsas tribute to Chinaand, on the latter occasion,pepperwas
includedbut, like clovesand cardamonssent on the sameoccasion,could haveoriginated
from elsewherein the Archipelago. In fact, Java continuedto export large amounts of
pepperto China and the 1382missionaloneis saidto have carried 75,000kati of pepper.
Even by the mid-fourteenth century Ibn Battuta doesnot list pepper among Samudra-
Pasai'sexports. However, by the early fifteenth century its role as a collecting centre
for pepper was firmly established.According to Ma-Huan (1425-32), pepper was
intensivelycultivatedon the hill-slopes,presumablyas a cash-crop.By the early six-
teenth centuryTom€ Pires estimatesSamudra-Pasai's exportsat 8-10,000 bahar an-
nually. Paul Wheatley, "GeographicalNotes on some commodities involved in Sung
Maritime Trade",IMBRAS 32, ii (1959):100-101; The Trauelsof MarcoPolo (trans.
& ed.) RonaldLatham (Middlesex,1974),251-52;Ibn Battuta, (trans.)H.A.R. Gibb,
Trauelsin Asia and Africa. 1325-1354 (London 1957),235-37; O.W. Wolters, ?fte
Fall of Srluijayain Maiay History (Kuala Lumpur, 1970),61; Armando Cortesio (trans.
and.ed.),TheSumaAientalof Tomi Pires(London,1944),144; KennethR. Hall, "Trade
and Statecraft in the Western Archipelago at the dawn of the EuropeanEra",JMBRAS
54, i (1981):33, 35; W.P. Groeneveldt,"Noteson the Malay Archipelagoand Malacca",
compiledfrom ChineseSources",VBG 39 (1880):86.
3. M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofszhasdrawn attentionto the importanceof Muslim trade in Pasai,
involving the exportation of pepper cultivated locally and spices imported from Java.
Owing to the importanceof its own trade with Majapahit,Melaka is believedto have
adopteda cautiouspolicy towards Pasai,preferring to lure Javaneseand Chinesetraders
away from the port rather than engagein open aggression.Thus, on gradually losing
their internationaltrade,Pedir and Pasaibecameindispensable as feederports' M.A'P.
Meilink-Roelofsz,"Trade and Islam in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelagoprior to the
arrival of the Europeans",Islam and the Tradeof Asia, A Colloquium,Paperson Islamic
History, V (Oxford, 7970), 147-48; Kenneth Hall, Maritime Trade and StateDeuelop-
ment in Earfu Southeast Asia (Honohtlu,1985),227-28.
1. P.A. Tiele, "De Europeersin de MaleischeArchipel",BKI25 (1877):366-68, 384-85,
397-99.
5. This thesisis supportedby KennethHall's accountof the developmentof Samudra-Pasai.
See"Trade and Statecraft",35. 37.
6. B. Schrieke,IndonesianSociologicalStudies:SelectedWritings,II (The Hague, Bandung,
I957't. 102.
, . ChauJu-kua,(trans.)F. Hirth & W.W. Rockhill (New York, 1966),71 n. 4.
8. R. Mohammed Ali, SedjarahDjawa-Barat,Suatu Tanggapaz(U.P. PemerintahDaerah,
Jawa Barat, 7972),146-47. Cam is the traditional measureof land considerednecessary
to supporta singlefamily and was reckoned,therefore,not accordingto sizebut pro-
ductivity.The absenceof cacalandthus indicatedthat the areawas of litt1eproductive
value.
9. Hirth & Rockhill,ChauJu-kua,70-7I,222.
t22 J. Kathirithambl-Wel ls

10. Cortesio, Suma Oriental,167-73; Meilink-Roelofsz,Asian Trad.e,82-83.

11. T.G. Th. Pigeaud& H.J. de Graal,IslamicStatesin Jaua,1500-1700, VKI 70 (19761
4-7; De Graaf & Pigeaud,De EersteMoslimseVorstendommen, 35-41.
12. Pigeaud& De Graaf, IslamicStatesin Jaua,7 -8, 12; Joio de Barros,Da ,4sta(Lisbon.
1777),ly,86; HoeseinDjajadiningrat,"Local Traditionsand the Study of Indonesian
History", (ed.)Soedjatmokoand MuhammadAli, G.J. Resinkand G.McT. Kahin, ,4r
Introduction to IndonesianHistoriography(Ithaca, New York, 1965), 79.
13. De Graaf & Pigeaud,De EersteMoslimseVorstendommen, 118-19.
14. H.J. de Graaf, Geschiedenis uan Indonesi| (The Hague, 1962), ll4.
15. T.S. Raffles,Tfu Historyof Jarra,II (intro. J. Bastin)Oxford Universify HistoricalReprints
(Kuala Lumpur, 1965),139.
16. HoeseinDjajadiningrat,CritischeBeschouwinguande fudjarah-Baziiz (Haarlem, 1913).
32.
17. Schrieke, IndonesianSociologicalStudies,II, 13-14; Djajadiningrat, Sad.jarah-BanEn.
283. For more on the Javanesetradition of tracing royal descent through the female
line seeJ. Kathirithamby-Wells, "The Role of Women in JavaneseHistory with Speciai
Referenceto Early Nineteenth Century Jogjakarta", Proceedings of the SeuenthIAHA
Conference (Bangkok,1977),1006-13.
18. Djajadiningrat,Sadjarah-Banttn, 32 -33.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.,34-35.
21.,De Graaf & Pigeaud, De EersteMoslimse Vorstend.ommen,
719-20.
22. Djajadiningrat,Sadjarah-Bantin,32. For further on Inderapuraa4{ its-pepperexports
to BantenseeJ. Kathirithamby-Wells,"The InderapuraSultanate:the foundationsof
its rise and declinefrom the sixteenth to the eighteenthcenturies",Indonesia2I (1976\:
66-68.
23. Djajadiningrat. Sadjarah-Bantin, 778- 19.
24. Ibid.,35; De Graaf & Pigeaud, De EersteMoslimse Vorstendommen,
l2l.
25. Djajadiningrar. Sadjarah-Banti n.36.
26. Djajadiningrat,fudjarah-Banin,119 De Graaf& Pigeaud,De EersteMoslimseVorsten.
dommen,'1.22.
27. Ibid.,37-39; l. Hagemal, "Geschiedenis van Bantam !q!_-1_6_87",
Koninklijk Instituut
voor Taal-, Land-enVolkenkunde,Hliz, ft. 194-1t5:B. Schrieke,"Prolegomenatot
eenesociologische studie over de Volken van SumatraI", 65-( I9%):'153, 165.
"8G
28. G.P. Rouffaer en J.W. ljzerman, De EersteSchi\uaartder Nederlanders naar Oost-Indii
onderCornelisde Houtman,1695-97, I (The Hague, 1915),72-73, n.9.
29. Djajadiningrar. Sadjarah-Banti n, | 53- 55.
30. Ibid., 4r-42.
31. Rouffaer& Ijzerman,De EersteSchipuaart,I,74.
32. J.C. van Leur, IndonesianTrade and Society,159; Meilink-Roelofsz,Asian Trafu.
239-46.
33. See Tapan Raychaudhrx| Jan Companyin Coromandel,1605-1690, Iz1{138 (The
Hague,1966):12-74.passim.
gehoudenint CasteelBatauiauantpasserende
34. Dagh-Register dnerter plaetseals ouergehet,
1624-1682 (Batavia/TheHague, 1887-1931),18 March 1626,p. 261
NedBrlandts-India,
Chetty Maluku was most likely the "Malay Chetty" or Astrappa Chetty from the
CoromandelCoast.SeeW.Ph. Coolhaas,GeneraleMissiuenuan Gouuerneurs-General er.
Radenaan HerenXVII der VerenigdeOostindischt&vnfognb,I (The Hague, 1960-79), 29E
 Banten:A WestIndonesinnPort and Politv 1,23

Asinn Trade,240 Rouffaer& Ijzerman,De EersteSchifuanrt,1,75

35. Meilink-Roelof.sz,
n.20,78.
36. Van I-err,Indonesinn Tradz,3-4; Rouffaer& Ijzerman,De Eerste*hipuaart,I, 83 n. 18.
37. Dagh-Register,18 March 1626,241'-42.
38. Meilink-Roelofsz,Asian Trade,247 -48; Rouffaer & Ijzerman, De EersteSchipuaart,I,
74-5n. 20,86-87, 104-05.Dagh-Register, 16 March 1626,24I.
39. Spilbergen,De ReisaanJoris uan Spilbergenwar Cellon, Atjeh en Banten, 1601-1604
(The Hague,1933),83,86.
10. H.T. Colenbrander,I P. Caen,Bescheiden ontrentzijn bedift in India (The Hague, 1909-
23)I, 240,II, 215,258-59,III, 633,762;L. Bluss6,"Trojan Horseof Lead;The picisin
eariy 17th century Java', &tween Pafb ann gafistics, Esvys on IndmesianHbtmy Presented
taP. Crzutzberg(ed.),F. uanAnrmij (The Hague, 1970),40 Van kur, Indmesian Trafu, 138.
11. L. Bluss6,"Western Impact on ChineseCommunitiesin West Java at the beginning
of the 17th century", Nampo-Bunka, Tenri Bulletin of SoutheastAsian Studies,
No. 2 (1975):33.
12. Meilink-Roelofz,Asian Trade,246-47, 250.
13. Coolhaas,GeneraleMissiaen,III, 6 January1658,207, n. 3.
11. Dagh-Register,26 March 1624, 36-37.
+5. Bluss€,"BetweenPeopleand Statistics",35-36; Van Leur, IndonesianTradc,138-39,
,fi2,".r20 & r2r.
46. D.K. Bassett,"The Factory of the English East India Companyat Bantam, 1602-1682"
(Ph.D.dissertation, London,1955)91, 97, 99-100.
17. D.K.J. de Jonge,De Ofkomstuan hetNederlandsch Gezag,V (The Hague,1870),cxiv-
cxv,227,40.
+8. Ibid.,150- 52. The Javaneseon the wholewere using more of their own manufactures.
See Raychaudhuri,Jan Companyin Coromandel,758.
{9. De Jonge,Ophomst,V, lxv-ixvi.
27 May 1636,102; 22 December1638,7)'2.
50. Dagh-Register,
51. Bassett,"The Factory of the English East India Company",246,255,265.
52. SinnappahArasaratnam,Merchants,Companies and Commerce on the CuramandB.l
Coast,
1650-1700 (Delhi, 1986),127.
53. HomeMiscellaneous Serics(HMS) India Office Library (IOL), 628 no. XXV, "The Written
Contract of Sultan Abdul Fatahel and Sultan Abel Nazre of Bantam", 29 March 1671
(H. 1081),f. 46.
5'1..'Arasaratnam,Merchants,Companiesand Commerce,127.
J5. Djajadiningrat,SadjarahBantbn, 49-51, 725-26; De Jonge,Opkomst,V, cxtv.
Studies,II,242.
56. Schrieke, IndonesianSocirtlogical
V, cxiv.
57. De Jonge.Ophomsl.
c8. Dagh-Register,26 March 1624, 32-36; De Jonge, Ophomst,V, cvii, cxii-cxiii.
Studies,I,56-58; De Jonge,Opkomst,V, cxxii; H.J.
59. Schrieke,IndonesianSociological
de Graaf, De Regeringuan Sultan Agung, Vorst uan Mataram, 1613-1645, VKI, 23
1958\.274-78.
00. De Jonge, Opkomst,V, xciii, cxxi-cxxii; F. de Haan, Priangan, De Preanger-
7l
Regentschepfenonderhet NederlandschBestuurtot 1811,I (Batavia,1910-12), 15-18.
t.
.c oI. De Jonge,Opkomsl.
V. cxiii-cxiv.

8.
t24 J. Kathirithamby Wells

62. Bassett,"The Factory of the English East India Company",109.

63. B1uss6,"Western Impact on ChineseCommunities",43.
64. Bassett,"The Factory of the English East India Company",226-27.
65. J.J. de Roverevan Breugel,"Beschrijvingvan Bantamen de Lampongs",B1{15 (1g56):
342.
66. J.J. Meinsma,"EeneProklamatievan een Sultanvan Bantam",BKI20 (1873):152-57.
67. On this occasionthe English sold 185 muskets and cannonsto Banten. Dagh-Register,
27 September164I,448;12 October1641,470.
68. Bassett,"The Factory of the English East India Company",151, 250-51.
69. Meinsma,"Eene Proklamatie",154.
70. H.D. Canne,"Bijdragetot de Geschiedenis
der Lampongs",TBG XI (1862):507-16.
71. W. Marsden, Memoirs of a Malay Family uritten by themselues
(London, 1830), 37.
72. Bassett,"The Factory of the English East India Company",157.
73. J. Kathirithamby-Wells, The British West Sumatran Presidency,1760-85 (Kuala
Lumpur, 1977),3.
74. Meinsma,"Eene Proklamatie",154.
75. Bassett,"The Factory of the English East India Company'',156-57, 216; Kathirithamby-
Wells, The British West SumatranPresidency,3.
76. Bassett,"The Factory of the English East India Company",93.
77. Ibid., 228.For an accountof lossessufferedby the Chineseon the implementationdur-
ing the 1650sof SultanAgunglsmonopolysystemseeBassett,"The Factoryof the English
East India Company",227-28.
78. Djajadiningrat,Sadjarah-Bantdn,54,612;
Coolhaas, Missiuen,Yl,lT December
Generale
loJ/- l:)/.

79. Eaglewood or aioeswood,Aquilarin (kelembakor gaharuin Maiay/Javanese),is a per-

fumed wood used as incenseand medicine.J. Crawfurd, A DescriftiueDictionaryof the
Indian Islands& AdjacentCountries(intro.) M.C. Ricklefs (Oxford, 1971),6; I.H. Burkill,
A Dictionary of the EconomicProductsof the Malay Peninsuh, Vol. I (Kuala Lumpur,
1966).198-205.
80. Dragon's blood, DaemonorhofsQernangin Malay) used as a colouring substanceand
against dysentery and diarrhoea in Europeanmedicine, "is a granular matter adhering
to the ripe fruit of a speciesof rattan, Calnmusdram,and obtainedby beatingor thrashing
the fruit in little baskets."Within the Archipelagothe principal areasof productionwere
Jambi and Palembang.Crawfurd, Dictionary,123;Burkill, Dictionary,Vol. I,758.
81. See Arasaratnam, Merchants,Companiesand Commerce,\28.
82. Cooihaas,GeneraleMissiuen,IV, 24 November1677, 193.
83. Haan,Priangan,III,238-88; P.J. Veth, Jaua,Geographisch, Ethnologisch,
Historisch,II
(Haarlem,1898)13; De Jonge,Opkomst, Vl (1972)lxxviii; Coolhaas,Generale
Missiuen,
Yl, passim.
84. Dagh-Register,3lJantary 1657, 19.
85. Coolhaas,GeneraleMissiuen,IV, 13 February 1679,303.
86. JauaFactoryRecords(/FR) (IOL) G12715,2March 1664,if. 29-30.
87. Bassett,"The Factory of the English East India Company",226-27.
88./FR (IOL), G/21l5,27 April1669,f. 8.
89. Bassett,"The Factory of the English East India Company",254,265,317.
Banten:A WestIndonesianPort and Polity 125

90./FR (IOL) Gl2Il?,19 March 1678,para 80-82'

91. /FR (IOL) G12115,12February 1664,f. 4.
92. De Jonge,Opkomst,VII (1873)cxiii-cxiv'
93. Daeh Reeister,29March1657,125; coolhaas,GeneraleMissiuen,VI, 6 December1667,
603.
94. De Jonge, Ofkomst,VI, lix-lx; lxi-lxii; Yeth, Jaua, Il, 62-64; Coolhaas'Generale
Missiaen,VI, 31 January 1657, 134-35.
95,HMS (IOL) 628, No. XXXV, ff .312-1.3; Schrieke,Indonesiansociological studies,ll,
241.
96. De Jonge,Oqkomst,VII, Lxxviii, cxiii.
97. (B) Ms Rawlinson '4'183(Bodleian Libtary, Oxford) Trans. of a letter from the king of
Banten fAbdulfath AbdulfattahAgung] to CharlesII n.d. (copv)' f. 102'
98. Schrieke, IndonesianSociologicalStudies,II, 225- 26.
99. H.J. de Graaf, De Regeringuan sunan Manghu-RatI Tegal-wangi, vorst uan Mataram,
1646-77, VKI 33 (1961):92, 100, 105, 125-50, r59, \62.
100.For an accountof this seeDe Graaf,De Regeringuansunan ManghuratI,Pt.ll, vKI,
39 (1962) 62-114; Leonard Y. Andaya, The Heritageof Arung Palnkka, vKI 97 (198I):
2 1 0 -1 3 .
101.De Jonge,Opkomsl,VII, cxiv-cxv.
102.De Haan,Priangan,Il,226-27; De Jonge,Oqkomst,VII, cxv-cxvii; J' Kathirithamby-
Wells, "Ahmad Syah ibn Iskandar and the late 17th century Holy War in Indonesia",
not precludeSultan
IMBRAS XLIII, i (1970):fassim. The pan-Islamicalliancedid
Agung's associationwith the British, who continued to supply him with gunpowder,
weaponsand ammunition.De Jonge,Opkomst,VII, cxxiv, cxxvi.
1,03.Ibid., cxvi-cxvii.
(Ph.D
104.Ibid.,cxlii; J.J. de Graaf,"De Moord op Kapitein FranEoisTack, 8 February 1686",
dissertation,Leiden, 1935),9. For a fuli account of these conflicts and their final out-
-
come see De Graaf, De Regeringuan sunan Manghu-Rat1, Pt. II, 84 194; "Gevangen-
nemingen dood van Rad€nTruna-Djaja,26Dec. f769-2 Jan. 1680", TBG 85 (7952):
273-309.
105.For an accountof SyeikhYusuf seeDe Haan,Priangan,III, 239;A.A. Cense,"De Verering
van SjaichJusuf (ShaikhYusuf) in Zuid-ce1ebes", BingkisanBudi (Leiden, 1950),50-57.
106.De Jonge,Oqkomsl,VII, cxxxvi-cxli.
107.Kathirithamby-Wells,"Ahmad Shah Ibn Iskandar",52-53.
108.De Jonge,O\homsl,VII, clxiv-clxxi, 394-403.
109.The administrationof the peppermonopolyunder IskanderMuda dependedupon the
appointment of Achehnesechiefs from the capital as fanglima in the dependentter-
ritories of the Minangkabaucoast. The system v/as shot through with severeintimida-
tion and there was no attempt, as in Banten,to conciliatelocal chiefsthrough their eleva-
tion to higher status and titles. There was also no attempt made, as by Banten, to ex-
pand and organizecultivation through the implementation of laws for the planting of
i specificnumberof vinesper family. In the Peninsulathe peppervinesof Perak,Pahang'
Kedah and Langkawi were actually destroyedby Iskandar Muda to facilitate monopoly
controlover supplies,which subsequently were drawn mainly from west Sumatra.See
J. Kathirithamby-Wells,"Achehnesecontrolover west Sumatraup to the Treaty of Painan
of 1663",ISEAH 10, iii (1969):458,460-62.
 3

6ULF OF SIAM -

P A T T A N {I T ) _ -
%
(r)
Approximat.
Ayu tthaYa'5

lribularY 6lrtes
artrn
tarriloriel
I

or
of
ccntro

5tat.5
which gubmittcd lrlbut.

at cettain stages of Naral's

K E O A H( T I re ign.
190 Mil€s
I

The kingdom of A1'utthayaunder Narai (1656-88)

7
Crown Trade and Court Politics in Ayuttkaya
During the Reignof King Narai (1656-88)

DHIRAVAT NA POMBEJRA

The rise of Ayutthayaduring the fourteenthand fifteenthcenturieswas intimately

connectedwith the city's locationon a major river, its proximity to the sea,and
its capacityto harnessthesegeographicaladvantagesto its developmentas a port.
By the early sixteenthcentury contactswith China, India, Malay and Indonesianstates
and,later, with the EuropeansmadeAlutthaya a flourishingentrep6t.The kingdom
of Ayutthaya t)rasnever solely dependenton commercefor its survival. Its rice-
growingagrarianeconomywas self-sufficient.Fish, fruit and forest producewere
plentiful.Controlor possession of manpowerresourcesmatteredmore than owner-
ship of land or commercialactivity as criteria for judging a person'ssocial and
eoliticalstatus.Yet trade brought prosperityand additionalwealth to the ruling
elite as a whole, especiallyto the monarchy.
On a formal level, the kings of Siam were aboveactive participationin trade.
Tradition(andthey themselves)portrayedkings as aaatarsof Hindu gods,as aspiring
bodhisattuas, (Buddhistwheel-turning,world-conqueringmonarchs).
or as cakrauartins
\Yagingwar, promulgatinglaws, and making merit: thesewere the main respon-
sibilitiesof kings, at least accordingto the tradition of the phongsawadan (royal
--hronicles).But, in orderto makemerit, to live in godlikesplendour,and to acquire
armsand ammunitionfor warfare,the Ay'utthayakings had to rely on international
:rade.Silver,copper,guns,ordnance,cowrie-shells,luxury items suchas Chinese
silks or Persiangold cloth - all thesehad to be imported,while silver, minted in
Siam,and the importedcowrie-shellsconstitutedAy-utthaya'smain form of currency.
Copperwas used,amongotherthings,for buildingand repairingmonasteries. The
rroduce of Siam was also exported. The Siamesecrown thus had to develop an
efficient trading mechanism,and during the seventeiinthcentury this branch of the
:dministrationbecamemore extensivethan ever before.r
Oneimportantfactor in Siam'srise to commercialprominencewas the kingdom's
:ossessionof two major ports: Ayrrtthayaon the Gulf of Siam, and thus on the
:etwork of trade routes in the Malay Archipelagoand the South China Sea;and
\lergui (Tenasserim)on the Bay of Bengai.These two placeswere connectedto
:ach other by a much used,though somewhathazardousland route, which saved

r27
 728 DhiramtNa pombcjrri

merchantsthe time and trouble of having to brave the Straits of Melaka. One oi
the earliestaccountsof Ayutthaya'sforeign trade in the sixteenthcentury can be
found in Tomd Pires' Suma Oriental:z

tradein China- six or sevenjunksa year.Theytradewith Sundaand

The Siamese
Palembang
andotherislands.
Theytradewith Cambodia andChampa andCochinChina,
and with Burma and Jangoma [Chiangmai] on the mainland, when they are at peace.

In 1569the BurmesecapturedAy.utthayaand reducedthe Siameseto vassalage.

but by the beginningof the seventeenthcentury King Naresuanhad regainedSiam's
independence,and Ay'utthaya'seconomywas rebuilt. Indeed, the seventeenth
centuryprovedto be the kingdom'smost outward-lookingepoch,during which its
kings traded and exchangeddiplomaticmissionswith a great number of foreign
powers and potentates.
During King Narai'sreign (1656-88),the Siamesecrown tradedwith kingdoms
and ports on all points of the compass.Ayrrtthayawas an important sourceof animal
skins, sappanwood,lead,and tin, to which were addedmore exotic items suchas
rhinoceroshorns and birds'nests.These were exchangedfor silver, copper,and
luxury goodsfrom Japan,spelter(zinc),silk and porcelainfrom Chinabroughtto
Ayutthaya by Siamesecrown vesselsand Chinesejunks. The Siamesecrown, as
well as Indian Muslims and other traders, imported to Mergui and Ay'utthaya
Coromandelcottoncloth, Persiansilk and rosewater.The Muslim merchants took
-frffifurther
away Chinesesilk, Siamesetin, eaglewoodand spelterfor India and
west. The numerousport statesof Sumatra,Java and the Malay Peninsula,nor
to mention Borneo (Banjarmasin),Sulawesi(Makassar)and Timor, aljo maintained
legular contactwith Ay'utthaya.During the periodOctober1681to September1682.
for example, 10 vesselsfrom Riau, bight from Pahang, four from ulrn-amedports
on "the Malay coast"two eachfrom Melaka,Kelantanand Deli, and oneeachfrom
Terengganuand Kedah,a French vesselfrom Timor, and a Siamesecrowii ship
from Borneo arrived in the port of Ayutthaya. Most of them brought rattan.
pepper,groundnutsand galingale,while the French vesselfrom Timoibrought
a cargoof sandatwood.During the same12 months,19 vesselsleft A1'utthayafor
Riau, Pahang,Melaka,Johor, Kedahand Deli with a variety of goods.Twelve of
these vesselscarried cargoesof salt and 11 carried indigo. other ciimmodities
taken away from Siamby thesevesselsincludedrice, Siamesecloth and betel-boxes.
Besidesmaritime trade Ayutthaya also conductedregular overland trade with
Lanchang(Laos)and Burma during times of peacewith these two kingdoms.3
Accordingto Pires,"on the Tenasserimside Siam alsotradeswith Pase,Pedir.
with Kedah, with Pegu, with Bengal, and the Gujaratiscome to its port eve4.
year.They traderichly outsideandliberallyinsidethe country."Nonetheless, Pires
goeson to relate that at Ay'utthayaitself the Siamesekings exertedstrict control
over trade. All foreign traders in Siam paid import duties to the crown, though
the Chinese,on accountof their closeties with Siam,enjoyedpreferentialtreatmenr
and paid less than other foreigners.a
In seventeenthcentury Siam royal trade and diplomacywere closelyconnectec
issues.Indeed,in Siam as elsewherein SoutheastAsia trade and diplomaiu *.i.
often one and the samething. Many of the embassiesdespatchedand receivedb\
L'flwn Tradeand CourtPoliticsin Ayutthaya 129

King Narai were primarily concernedwith trade. The tribute missionssent by

Siamesekings to Chinawere very much trading ventures:to the Siamesethe act
rf submittingtribute in nominalrecognitionof Chinesesuzeraintywas lessimportant
:han the prospectof commercialgain. The Son of Heaven,for his part, was pleased
:o receive both symbolic and material tribute from Ay'utthaya. The Siamese
ninisterial position of okya (or chaophraya\2@ghhl,arlS epitomized the way the
Siamesecrown linked the conductof foreign affairs with royal trade. This minister's
:esponsibilitieshave been well summarizedby Simon de La Loubbre,a French
Jiplomatwho was in Siam in late 1687.According to him:s

ThePraclang, or by a corruptionofthePortugueses,theBarcalon, is theOfficerwhich

hasthe appointment of the Commerce, as well withinaswithoutthe Kingdom.He
is theSuperintendent of theKingof Siam'sMagazines, or if youwill, hischieffactor.
Heis theMinisterof theforeignaffairs,because theyalmosta1lrelateto Commerce;
and'tisto him thatthe fugitiveNationsat Siamaddress themselves in theiraffairs,
because'tisonlythe libertyof Tradethatformerlyinvitedthemthither.In a word,
it is theBarcalonthat receivesthe Revenues of the cities.

It was natural, therefore,that during the relatively peacefulseventeenthcentury

:hephrakhhngministers,or sometimesthe powerbehindthem,becameinfluential
:: determiningforeign policy.
With all the other ministersof the realm, thephrakhlangresidedin the cosmic,
:olitical, and commercialcentre of the Siamesekingdom, which was the city of
-\1.utthaya. Although Ayrrtthaya was closely linked with Siam's agricultural
rinterland throughthe inlandtrading networksand the state'sadministrativesystem,
:: was alsd very much a port city, and sharedsimilar featureswith other seven-
:eenthcenturyport cities suchas Aceh. The populationof the city was cosmopolitan,
and freedom of worship was granted for foreign merchants.Foreignerswere
'captains'(na[)in chargeof each
assignedseparatequartersin which to live, with
rationality. Most of thesequarterswere outsidethe city walls, but in the island-
:ity itself therewere two prosperousstreetswith brick buildings,the'ChinaRow',
and a specialstreet occupiedexclusivelyby Muslim traders.6
Beforethe Europeansgainedascendancyin Ay"utthaya's trade during the 1680s
:he two most prominentgroupsof trade officialsat the port were the Chineseand
:he Muslims, especiallythe Persians.The king, membersof the royal family and
somehigh-rankingofficialswho participatedin trade dependedheavily on non-Thais
:o conductthe actualvoyagesand evensometimesto act as ministersand diplomatic
envoys.There were major advantagesto be gainedby the crown from empioying
:heseforeigners.The first advantagewas their navigationalexpertise,addedto
xhich was their knowledgeof the marketslying both to the eastand west of Siam.
The secondwas the limited manpowerresourcesof thesenon-Thaipeople,who
',r'erelargely confinedto the main ports and cities of Ayrrtthaya, Mergui and Ligor.
They were thus recognizedas relatively manageablepolitical forcesand several
rf them roseto high positionsat court. The favouritesof King Narai includedthe
PersianAqa Muhammad,who becameOkphra Sinaowarat,and the Greek Con-
stantinePhaulkonwho becameokyawichayen In fact, smali groups of foreign
;ourtiers or trader-officials,like the Persiansduring the 1670sand early 1680s,
 130 DhirauatNa pombejr

wielded political influencequite out of proportion to their actual numbersand their

limited spheres of activity within the port and the palace.
The reign of King Narai was notable for the wide range and scopeof royal trade
and diplomacy,conditionswhich made possiblethe rise of court favouriteslike
Phaulkon. Siamesediplomats and traders went as far afield as the courts of Lours
XIV of France, ShahSulaimanof Persia,and the emperor of China,not to mentioc
the ports and courts of the Malay Archipelago and the Bay of Bengal. This
expansionistforeign policy flourished to such an extent during the 1680sand sc
deepwas foreign influence in Siam, that the issuewas capitalizedupon by Okphre
Phetrachaand his supporters to seize power. This essaywill try to explain wh"'
King Narai pursued such a policy, and why it failed. In order to do so, the tract
policiesof someof King Narai'simmediatepredecessorsmust be delineatedbriefl'.'
The general policy o{ successiveA1'utthayankings in the seventeenthcentur;
from the reign of Ekathotsarot(1605-10/11)to that of Narai, was aimedat enrichl.-
the treasury by meansof reviving and sustaininggr_o-yq1$de, encouragingAyuttharz:
foreign trade, instituting trade monopoliesand, by promulgating legislation (or a:
least establishinglegal precedents)which favoured the monarchy at-tti€-txper.s.
oi the khunnong,or oiiicral class,at carrying royal absolutismeven further. Su.:
policieswere possibleduring the seventeenthcentury becauseSiam was no longt.
suffering under the Burmeseyoke, nor was there any seriousthreat of a CambodL
invasion of her heartland. Although it was during the reign of his brother ar.
predecessor,Naresuanthat Spanishand Dutch contactswere first madewith Siar:
it was King Ekathotsarotwho devotedmost of his reign to enriching the monarch.
According to Jeremiasvan Vliet's Short History of the Kings of Siam, written :
1640,"this king was greatly inclinedtowards strangersand foreign nations."H.
sentan embassyto the_princeof Orangein 1608,the first Siamesediplomaticmissic
to Europe,and encouragedall foreignersto comeand trade in Ayutthaya. So dete:
mined was he to accumulatewealth that he implementedseveral"oppressivelag':
and practices. Ekathotsarot made certain that whenever one of his officials diei
the crown would receiveone-thirdof the deceasddFpoisessions."He also'i*pore
'slaves'irr the kingdor
a tax on all fruit-trees of onefuang per year. He had all
registered."If someonepossessed more slavesthan he reported,theseunreporte
-.
slaveswere given to the King so that His Majesty acquiredmany slaves,whic
make up a large part of Siamesewealth, splendourand fame." It is no wonder tha
the "Phan Chanthanumat" version of the Ayutthaya phongsawadanor ro]-a
chronicles,concernedas it was with kingshipand the power of the monarchy,u'a
full of praise for this king, in contrast with Van Vliet's own account, anC that :
concludedthat during his reign Ayrrtthayareacheda high level of prosperitr'
Ekathotsarot'spolicies were carried further by King Narai's father, the usurpe
Prasatthong(1629-56). Royal trade and the crown's monopoly system wer
expandedand the hhannang,through whose ranks Prasatthonghad himself riser
grew weak in the face of competitionand even oppressionfrom the king. Joo
Schoutenwrote of Prasatthong:8

and hathhis own shipsand Factourstrading

The king hi+X!_{jSalso4 -Merchant,
, andChina,...helikewisetraJficksto Pegu,Ava,Jangoma
to Choromandel [Chiangmai].
Langs-jang [Lanchang], and other places, besides his negotiations at home, a1lwhrch
bring him incredible profit, and no small disturb_ance to Pjivate Merc-hants.
CrownTradeand CourtPotiticsin Ayutthala l3l

Schoutenthus touched upon the two key elements in Siameseroyai trade of the
seventeenthcentury. On the one hand, the king directly engagedin foreign trade
and, on the other, he participatedin inland, domestictrade. Prasatthongand his
family sent ships and junks to regions west and east of A1'utthaya,in competition
with Chinese,Muslimsand Europeansalike. Prasatthongwas obligedto compete,
using his own factors and officials to try to control the flow and distribution of certain
types of merihandise. The growth of royal trade overseasand the thriving trade
conductedby foreigners in Ayrrtthaya made royal monopoliesand warehouseshighly
profitable for the crown.
Prasatthong'sefforts to emasculatethe power of the khunnanghavebeenvividly
recordedby the V.O.C. merchantsin Siam,principally by Van Vliet in his Historicql
AccountandShon Histnry,both of 1640.Prjlsatthongkept the courtier-officialspoor
so as to deprivethem of the "meansof revolting".WhereasEkathotsarothad wanted
one-thirdof every deceasedofficial'spossessions, Prasatthong,who earnedthe
reputation of the most "avaricious" king ever to have ruled A1'utthaya, wanted
everything.According to Van Vliet:

If a mandarin dies,hiswivesandchildrenaretakenintocustody. Onemandarin will

oftenspyonanotherin orderto discoverwhetheranlthingis beingconcealed. Widows
andorphansshowgreatgratitudewhenevertheking extendsto thema smallsection
of their properties.It appearsthat His Majestycannotconsiderhimselfrich until he
hasgatheredall thetreasures into hisowntreasuryandhashadevefihing squeezed
out of the community.

The khunnangwere also compelledto help pay for Prasatthong'smany construction

projects,particularly the building and repairing of monasteriesfor the king's merit-
:rraking.The Dutch were particularly annoyedthat foreign merchantsalso had to
,'ontributetowardssomeof theseprojects.As for khunrumgwhohad beendisgraced
rr executedduring the many court conflictsof the 1630sand 1640s,their possessions
',r'ereseizedand redistributedby the crown and their housespillaged.e
In view of the fact that Siameseofficials receivedno fixed salaries,it was difficult
:or them to becomevery wealthywithout participatingin trade, either directly or
.ndirectly.And evenif a Siameseofficial becamerich, it was unlikely that his wealth
.r'ouldbenefit his heirs for many generations,for Prasatthong made certain that
ris ministers rarely had the opportunity to build up a power base by a frequent
:eshufflingof official positions.In addition,eventhe greatestkhunnanghadtheir
:ower and freedom of movementseverelycurtailed. In the past, governorsof
.nportant provinceslike Phitsanulokor Sukhothaihad remainedfor long periods
.: their posts.The governorsof placesnearAyrrtthayavisited the capitalonceevery
:rree years to report on their administration.But during Prasatthong'sreign
:rovincial governorswere rarely permitted to remain at their posts,and their work
.,,'asieft to "substitutesof lessquality''directly responsibleto the king. An exception
.'.'ashowevermade in the caseof key commercialposts.BecauseMergui was a
.:e.vport, it was recognisedthat a "competentchief' was neededas governorof
lenasserim to dealwith foreign traders on the crown'sbehalf. For the samereasons
.: r'ould seemthat the governorsor viceroysof Ligor also neededto be resident
.: their post.The numberof high khunnanginthe provinceswho were in a position
r32 Dhirauat Na Pombeir,

to enrich themselvestherefore steadilydeclined,while the substituteor lower-

ranking governorswere closelvcontrolledby the crown as long, at least, as th.
latter was strong.lo
The centralizationbegunby King Naresuanand continuedwith specialvigou:
by King Prasatthongcould not, however, ensure the complete subjugation of a-
elementsin Siamesepoliticsto the monarchy.Continuedtensionbetweenvariou=
groups and the crown was inevitable. In the realm of court politics, conflicts hac
always taken th<iform of violent successiondisputes involving the khunnang, the
princes,and sometimesthe king himself, but now, with the concentrationof the
hhunnangat court, Ayutthayabecamethe focal point of action.In the commercia-
sphere,tension between the expandingcrown trading apparatusand all othe:
merchants,both foreign and indigenous,at times becamecritical. Occasionallv.
as the eventsof the 1680stestify, internalpoliticaltensionand conflictsbetween
the crown and certain groups of merchants combined to creat"eA_gg!er4!.qlisis.
Kings Prasatthong and Narai competed with foreign traders throughout thei:
reigns,and the use of monopolieswas one of their main tactical weaponsin this
competition.Import monopoliescontrolled the distribution of foreign commodities
within Siam, while export monopoliesallowed the crown to take the lion's share
of the market in goodssold overseasor to foreign merchants.The number anc
range of monopoly goods changed from reign to reign, or someTffits"within the
same reign, according to circumstances.For obvious reasons,the import o:
gunpowder,arms and ammunition always remaineda crown monopoly.Silver.
cowrie:'sTi6iisand coppei:alsoformed ifiport monopolies,while-shplianwooil,Tiri.
lead and saltpctre w€fd export monopolies,along with elephantsanifivory. An olc
Siamese law from as early as 1433 contained a clause forbiddini the sale o:
sappanwood,eaglewoodand tin to foreigners.In the reigns of Prasatthongani
Narai eaglewoodentered the list of royal export monopolies,though during the
latter'sreign the monopolywas either given or farmed out to the PersianOkphra
Sinaowarat(Aqa Muhammad).11
At the beginning of his reign King Narai.soughtto stimulate domestic trade b1'
openingto his subjectstrade in all goods,savetin, lead, sappanwood,elephants
and ivory. Later, however, he found that his own interests conflicted with those
of his subjectsin the re'almof domestictrade, both retail and wholesale,in the
capital as well as in the provinces. His factors took cotton cloth from the royal
warehousesin Ayutthaya to sell in the provinces in greater amounts than ever
before.l2
However,it was mainly with foreign merchantsand trading companies,principalll'
the V.O.C.,that the Siamesecrown competed.Thus, during the 1680sthe king's
men, especiallyPhaulkon,made it almost impossiblefor foreign traders to bu1-
copperin Ayutthaya at a reasonableprice. During this decadethe crown also made
arecanuts an export monopolyitem. Being both the ruler and the principalmerchant
in Ayutthaya, the king was able to interfere with, and even control, the market
in certain goods. All foreign traders had to deal with the bhrakhlnngismen from
the moment they arrived at the Bangkok toll-houseright up until their departure.
It was therefore easyfor the king's men to createtrouble for them, or put obstacles
in their path. Sometimesparticulargoodswould becomeunavailableto foreigners
for quite non-commercialreasons.For example,King Prasatthong'sbuilding and
L'ronnTradcand CourtPoliticsin Ayutthaya 133

nerit-makingactivitiesin the 1630sled to a shortageof timber requiredfor export

rv the V.O.C.
Competitionbetweenthe Siamesecrownand the V.O.C.canbe viewedas a clash , .-
retweentwo monopolisticpowers.The Dutch strove to ensurefor themselvesan ''
'
adequatesupply of certaingoodsby requestingexport monopoliesfrom the king.
Prasatthonggranted the Dutch companyan export monopolyin deerskinsand
cowhides,and in 167l-72 Narai gave them a tin export monopoly at Ligor.
\Ionopolies,however,couldbe brokenby trading in contrabandgoods,and V.O.C.
documentsmention the smugglingof tin and ivory during Prasatthong'sreign.
Clearly,the Dutch were not abovedealingin contrabandgoodsto circumventa
:oyalmonopoly.Conversely,officersof the crown couldconspireto breaka V.O.C.
nonopoly,or to renderit ineffectiveby competingwith their Dutch trading rivals.
\ good example of this was the way Narai's officials, especially the chaophraya
:hrakhlang, Kosathibodi(Lek), competedduring the 1660sand 1670swith the
\-.O.C. for the trade in Ligor tin.13
ChaophrayaKosathibodi,was one of the longest-servingphrakhlang oI the
seventeenth century,and one of King Narai'smost eminentcourtiers.His mother
rad beenNarai'swet-nurseand he had beenbrought up as a foster-brotherto the
ring. During the successionconflictsof 1656-57, he supportedNarai, and he had
.edthe armiesof Ayutthaya severaltimes during the campaignsagainstLanchang
andBurma.As thephrahhlang,he was entitledto receivepresentsand otherforms
of tribute from merchantsin A1'utthayaand, accordingto the Jesuitde Bbze,he
was very wealthy becausehe had men working for him throughoutthe kingdom.
Having-bcenin charge of the king's foreign affairs, trade, and port authorities
:or abouttwenty years,it appearsthat he was a personof considerablepower and
realth.ra The Dutch archives often refer to him as one of their major competitors
:n the'tin trade at Ligor. The Dutch expectedto get much tin - and at a good
price - from Ligor but were very disappointedwhen they discoveredthat the
nonopoly grantedto them by Narai seemedto carry little weight. V.O.C. employees
:n Ligor and Ayutthayawere convincedthat'grandees'inthe capital,includingthe
phrakhlanghirpg_e-l{, were.too interestedin-I-"igoitin themselvesto abide by the
terms of the octroi.rs
A report of 1667,written by NicolaasMuller, the V.O.C. residentin Ligor, and
submitted to Balthasar Bort, the governor of Melaka and Muller's immediate
superior, describeshow the phrakhlang, "a favourite of the Siameseking", came
downto Ligor with 24 vesselsin January1667,to set himselfup as ruler or viceroy
tchaomunng) of Ligor, to report on the government of the province and to "redress
rvrongs." Once there, the phrakhlang, "in the king's name", forced all the most
influential people in Ligor and its tin-producing hills to pay a tax on every bahar
of tin mined, which proved burdensomefor the poor, and depletedthe wealth of
the rich. The minister also sent his men to the surrounding hills, with instructions
to forbid anyone to purchasea single kati (chang)of tin prior to payment of the
tax. When ChaophrayaKosathibodileft Ligor in May 1667,he took with him nine
hundredbaharof tin, and three hundredbaharof pepperbought at enforcedlow
prices.He assignedOkphra Surinkosa,a local factor of the king, tobuy 200 bahar
more of tin at the same low piice, to be sent up to Ayrrtthaya at the first conve-
nient opportunity. The phrakhhng alsohelped himself to gold and silver from "the
134 Dhirauat Na Pombejr,:

golden temple in the middle of the city" (probablythe wat Phra Mahathat), whic:
ionstituted treasuresthat had been offered to the wat by pious merit-makers'
Alrrt'
Even the gold on the top of.the waf s spire was stripped off and taken to
of Ligor had been carried out
thaya. EvJn though the humiliation and exploitation
in *ing Narai's name, it had also provided an ideal opportunity f or the_phrakhhng
to estatlish personal contacts and patronage in Ligor. After the 1667 expedition
He
the[hrakhtnng continued to draw political and economicbenefits from Ligor'
*". p.".r.-"bly anxious,like the king, to prevent the V'O'C' from monopolizing
officials
the tin in Ligor. He accordinglyestablishedenoughinfluencewith the local
advance his own trading interests there as well as those o:
to ensure this and to
the crown.
hin-
Tne fhrakhtnzgls political and commerciai influence inevitably made
*ittrin til" Si.ugl"." court, including the Persian Aqa Muhammad, o:
"n.*i"i sinaowarat, a favourlte courtier of Narai. Ties betweeri"siifr"and the
okphra
s
Muslim traders of Persia and India became closer than ever during Narai
reign. Narai continuedhis father s policy of sendingroyal ships to In{iagspeciall;;
Persian
to the Coromandelcoast,and alio deveiopeda greaf admiration for thing,s
The king had had a Persian courtier before, named Abdut Razzaq, vfiiise trading
him first into trouble with the V.O.C., and then, in 1663, to politica-
ambitionlshad led
di.gru.r. But Aqa Muhammad was a more able courtier and never lost the king's
favour. According to a Persianaccount,Aqa Muhammad,an active merchant.
Thar'
had a proficient commandof the Thai language,presumablyincluding court
of Siamese customs. As the King's favourite he wa'
as well as a fair knowledge
private trader to be granted an export monopoly in eaglewood, most o:
the only
which was shippedto Indian ocean destinations,and was thereby put on.the samt
footing as the Dutch and,later, the French East India-Companies' Aqa Muhammads
comm"ercialactivitiesTilie not lirnited to the eaglewood trade. In 1676, wher-
Cambodiawas short of rice, he fitted out a number of vessels to transport supplie:
to the Khmers.16
Aqa Muhammad'sown influence at court was considerable,as was attested br
the help he wd5 able to render his allies, the Dutch, and the favourable footing
on which he tried to put Muslim trade in the realm. In 1676Aqa Muhammadhelpec
no:
the v.o.c. by ensuring that the old anti-Dutch governor of Phuket was
reinstated.This official was, in fact, found gurlty of maladministration and banishec
'regents
Two IndianMuslims,MuhammedBeg and IsmaelBeg, were appointed
Muslin-
of Phuket and neighbouring Bangkhli. These appointments reflected
.ambitionsto increase their trade on Siam's west coasJ, and indiiated the strength
was
of the politicat]nfuen.e at Narai'scourt of the Muslims, chief amongwhom
1670sand the 1680s, Muslims held qriogsposts
4qa-l4ftrggtna{. During the late
il ih"E;i i;*ns oi Siam: a Turk was governor of Bangkok, and there.were alsc
PersianMuslims in chargeof Mergui/Tenasserim.The appointmentof Muhammec
Beg and IsmaelBeg did not, howe'rer,help realizeeither Muslim or v.o.c. ambitions
coicernirrg phukei. The two Indians there were murdered by the Malays, who
strongly resentedthis atte-mptto divert all exports of tin from Phuket to Mergui.
Muhammed Beg and Ismael Beg had evidently wanted to make Phuket-tin ai
exclusivep.".e*e of the Muslim merchants,who would ship it via Mergui to lndiar
and Persiandestinations.lT
CrownTradeand CourtPoliticsin A1'uttha-,-a 13S

ChaophrayaKosathibodi'srelationswith the V.O.C. were at best lukewarm. The

V.O.C. unsuccessfullysought to exclude the phrakhlang from the Ligor tin trade,
and the Dutch must have beenextremely annoyedto find the minister still involved
in this trade even after a tra had been issuedby none other than the phrakhlang's
own departmentexcluding everyonebut themselvesfrom the Ligor tin trade. The
phrakhhng, having no great love for the Dutch, would not havegiven much support
at court to V.O.C.requestsfor a yearlytin exportcontractwith the Siamesecrown.
He was, however,enoughof a statesmannot to carry out any vindictivecampaign
againstthe Dutch. Such a policy was unnecessary,sincetin from the south reached
him regularly in any case,and would also have led to friction with the Dutch. The
Siamesedid not want a repetitionof the humiliatingblockadeand unequaltreaty
rvith the V.O.C.of 1663-64.Besides,the V.O.C.regularlyplied the Siamesecourt
rvith gifts, of which the phrakhlangobtaineda large proportion.ls
In 1679Aqa Muhammaddied. His death markedan importantturning-pointin
:he court politics and commercialhistory of Narai'sreign. It made the way clear
:or his rival ChaophrayaKosathibodito establisha decisiveascendancyat court.
Though the Muslim element retained royal favour, it was not for long. Aqa
\luhammad'seldestson was much loved by the king, but fell out of royal favour
as a result of his alleged involvement with his brothers in a plot to overthrow the
:uler. The Ship of Sulaiman,which is the accountof the 1685 Persianembassy
:o Sidin, makes much of their debauchedand dissolutebehaviourand attributes
:he generaldecline in Persianpower and prestige in the capital following Aqa
\luhammad's death to disunity among membersof the community.le
In retrospect,the 1670shad provedthe best yearsfor the'Moors', and especial-
.r' the Persiankliinhang in Siam. There had beenamongtheir numbersomehigh
:ankingofficiilS, while the reigningking was a lover of thingsPersian.The power
erercisedby Muslim officialsand trader-officialsat court led to greaterprosperity
:or mostof their communitiesin Ayutthaya,especiallywhenthe Sino-Siamese junk
:radetemporarilydeclinedduring a fresh outbreakof civil war in Chinabetween
1673and 1681.The re-openingof the port of Amoy in 7674led to a restoration
rf more.regularSino-Siamese trade, althoughthe Ch'ing maritime ban (hai-chin)
.till remlii?d in force.zoUnder thesecircumstances.neither Chineseofficialsat
:he courf6f Ayutthaya nor Chinese merchants at the port ever played for such
righ stakesas the Persians,whoseambitionevenincludedthe conversionof King
\arai to Islam, as well as the enhancementof their political and economicpower
'.i'ithinthe kingdom.
The next powerful trader-official at the Ayutthaya court was to be neither Thai
:,or Muslim. Indeed,in his ascentto power the GreekConstantinePhaulkon,who
-rsedthe patronageof ChaophrayaKosathibodi,did his bestto discreditthe Persians
.: the eyesof King Narai. With the rise of Phaulkonand Narai's increasinginterest
r diplomaticties with Louis XIV, the Islamic influencewas eclipsedand gave way
: r the French,RomanCatholicelement.Insteadof being urged to becomea Muslim,
-\arai now found himself being importunedto embraceRoman Catholicism.
Phaulkon,a form-eremployeeof the English East India Company,probably
=rtered the serviceof the phrakhlangin late 1679,as an interpreterbetweenthe
lhais and the English.The Greekwas a quick-wittedmerchant,an adeptcourtier,
.rd a versatile linguist. Once in the phrakhbngis employ he quickly gained his
136 DhiraaatNa pombe

patron's trust. During the period 1678-81 he mastered the Thai language
including court Thai. Towards the end of this period the phrakhlang decide
to gain a decisiveadvantageover the still-powerfulMuslims by using Phaulkon
instead of a Muslim, to conduct a continued commercial and diplomatic missio
to Persia. Phaulkon compensatedthe phrakhlnng by giving to the minister, whr
had a financial stake in the venture, and to the king twice the share of the profitr
that the Muslim traders customarily allowed them. Narai himself was impresse
by Phaulkon, whom he met for the first time in 1680/81,and took to the Gree
adventwer immediately.Presumablyimpressedby the Greek'scommercialacume
and delighted that they could communicatewithout having to use an interpreter
he recruited him into his service immediately. This proved to be the start o
Phaulkon'srapid rise to royal favour.2l
Roman Catholicism and the French interest became salient issues in Siames
trade and foreign policy during the 1680s,partly owing to Phaulkon's sympath
towards both causes.Around 1682 Phaulkon was said to have been reconverte
to Roman Catholicismby a Jesuit priest, which would have accountedfor his firn
friendship with, and support for the Jesuitsin Siam. Although Phaulkon was keer
that the Jesuits and other missionariesshould propagate the faith and was pro
bably influencedin this convictionby his piouswife, too much may have beenmad
of the religious factor. Phaulkon was first and foremost a merchant with preten
sionsto courtly eminence.He was alsoan opportunistwho promotedcausesalread
closeto King Narai's heart, namely closerdiplomatic and trading ties with France
and increasedroyal trade both overseasand within Siam. He then found out tha
further commitments were necessary,and from this complicationsinevitably en
sued.To prove himself indispensableto Narai he had to pro+lotethosecauseswhicl
the king was most likely to favour at any particular time.'To carry them througi
successfullyhe had to rely on his linguistic skills, commercial sense,and politica
instinct. He thus espousedthe interestsof French missionariesand traders in orde
to be seenas the championof the French cause.He also had to eliminate,or a
least neutralize, other foreign elements at Narai's court. These priorities explair
his enmity towards the Persians,his contempt for his former English employers
the East India Company, and his lukewarm and unhelpful conduct towards thr
V.O.C. and the Portuguese.22
The king, who was interestedin Persiaas much as in any Europeannation durinl
the 1670shad receivedmissivesfrom Louis XIV and the Popein 1673,long befor
the heyday of Phaulkon. Even by the 1680s,when Phaulkon had risen to becom
phrakhlang in all but name and held the title of okluang ritthikamhaeng and
later, okyawichnyen,Siameseforeign policy was still not exclusivelyconcernedwiti
Franco-Siamese diplomaticties. During the mid-1680sthere was a remarkableflurn
of diplomatic activity, with envoys or embassiesbeing sent by lleTdi-fo France ir
1684and 1686/7and to Bataviain 1686.There was alsoa missionto Goa,an abortiv
missionto Portugaland a tribute missionto China.In retlun, the court of Ayutthay
received envoys from Jambi, bearing tribute to Narai, as well as frem Cambodia
PortugueseGoa, Persiaand France.23
Thai-Dutch relationsthroughout Narai's long reign were as amicableas relation
could be betweentwo such ambitiousand monopolisticinstitutionsas the V.O.C
and the Siamesecrown. Tensionsoccurred only twice, first during the perio
 CrounTradeand CourtPoliticsin Alutthala 1'37

1661-64, and again in the early 1680s.The Siamesegrievancein 1661-62 was

the V.O.C.'sseizureof a Siamesecrown junk fitted out by one of the king's Persian
trader-officials. The V.O.C.,however,took the decisivestepin 1664of blockading
the Siamese roadstead and imposing an unequaltreaty on King Narai. Once again
port and palacewere locked in intrigue. The courtier who obstructedV.O.C. trade
most in 1661-63 was the PersianAbdur Razzaq,whosechief ally was thesyahban-
dqr of the Chinesecommunity in Ayutthaya. These men used their influence at
court to hamper Dutch trading activities and at one stage had the V'O.C. factory
surrounded by Chinese.After the blockade and treaty, the Siamesecrown was
forbiddenby the V.O.C. to use Chineseto man its junks, althoughthe Dutch later
relented.The Dutch had wanted to check Narai's ambition to trade with Japan
through his Chineseand Chinese-Thaiservants,becauseby that time Ayutthaya
ri'as functioning mainly as a port for procuring deerskin and sappanwoodfor
shipmentto Japan.2a
Indeed,during the early 1680s,tensionagaindevelopedbetweenthe V.O.C.and
the Siamesecourt owing, among other reasons,to Jambi's payment of tribute in
gold and silver flowers (bungamasdnnferak) to Narai, notwithstandingits vassalage
ro Mataram and its exclusivepepper contract with the Dutch. The Siamesecrown
maintainedthat it had no intention of entering into competition with the Dutch in
rhe Jambi peppertrade and that the ruler was merely assistinghis new vassalin
its war with Palembang.There is evidenceto suggest,however,that Dutch fears
may not have been totally unfounded. In August 1682 six vesselshad sailed from
Jambi,ladenwith peppersentas a'gift'to thephrakhlnng.In May 1683an embassy
'return gift'
sent to Jambi ET-Narai left for home, their two vesselsladen with a
of pepper to the Siameseking, who had sent the Sultan some sulphur and
sa1tpetre.25
T-heSiimese must have resentedthe Dutch attitude over Jambi, regarding it as
an attempt toiiftT{riie in Siam'i ielations with her tributaries. Alrrtthaya may also
have been worried by the V.O.C.'s growing power, especiallyafter the Dutch
acquisitionof Banten in 1682.Narai and his new favourite, Phaulkon,were pro-
Frenchand the French alwaysinsistedthat there was a Dutch'threat'to Alrrtthaya.
It was not until the Siamesedispatchedan embassyto Bataviain early 1686that
thesefears were allayed. But the growing challengeof the French combinedwith
Phaulkon'sunscrupuloustrading practicescontinuedto put a strain on King Narai's
relationswith other foreign traders who frequentedthe port of Ayrrtthaya.26
Indeed,all foreignersin Ayutthaya,apart from thosetraderswho were responsible
to Phaulkon or the king, could expect little else but fierce and frequently unfair
competitionfrom the Siamesecrown, and even a measureof political prejudice
againstthem if they were not French.During 1684-85 Phaulkon's'unreasonable
trading',most of it donein the king's name,provokedwidespreadcomplaint.The
Greek had been selling Japanesecopperat very high prices to English, French and
Portuguesetraders, and at the sametime had beenforcing them to sell their wares
at low prices, thus leaving him with maximum profits. The grandeesand people
of Ligor were also embitteredby Phaulkon'slow pricing of Ligor tin to Alrrtthaya's
S advantage. Furthermore, Phaulkon was responsible for employing several
Englishmenand Frenchmenas crown officials,as traders,or as seamen.Indeed,
c )'larai's English servants contributed to the outbreak of hostilities between Siam
 tbejra Crown Trade and Court politics in Ayutthala
13;
rage, 1661-64, and again in the early 16g0s.The Siamesegrievancein
1661-62 ri.as
:ided :he v.o.c.'s seizureof a siamesecrownjunk fitted out by oneof the king,spersian
kon, :rader-officials.
The v.o.c., however,took the decisivestepin 1664oi blockading
;sion the siameseroadsteadand imposingan unequaltreaty on t<ingttarai.
once agaii
who port and palacewere lockedin intrigue.The courtierwho obstructed
v.o.c. trade
ofits most in 1661-63 was the Persian Abdur Razzaq,whosechief ally
was theslahban.
SSCd dar of the chinese community in Ay'utthaya.These men used their
influencea:
reek court to hamperDutch trading activitiesand at one stagehad the
v.o.c. factor.,
trnen surroundedby chinese. After the blockadeand treaty, the Siamese..o*',,*r.
eter, rorbiddenby the v.o.c. to use chineseto man its junks, although
the Dutch rate:
rt of relented.The Dutch had wanted to check Narai's ambition tolrade
with Japar.
:hroughhis chineseand chinese-Thaiservants,becauseby that time
nese Ay,utthar.a
functioning mainly as a port for procuring deerskin ."ppunruooclc:
,athy "r'as
shipmentto lapan.2a "nJ
:rted Indeed,during the ear-ly1680s,tensionagaindeveropedbetweenthe
v.o.c. anc
firm :he Siamesecourt ofi-ng, among other reasons,to
Jambi'spaymentof tribute i:
Keen goldand silver flowers (bungamasdanperak)toNarai, notwithstanding
pro- its vassa.Lage
:o Mataram and its exclusivepepper contract with the Dutch. The
STamese crorr:r
nade naintainedthat it had no intentionof enteringinto competition
with the Durch i:
rten- :he Jambi peppertrade and that the ruler wai merely aisisting his
new vassar::
eady irs war with Palembang.There is evidenceto suggest,however,
that Dutch tea:s
rnce, nay not have beentotally unfounded.In August 16g2six vessels
had sailedfroc:
that Jambi.laden
l$llenner sentas a'gift'to thephrahhrang.In May 16g3an embass-.-
r en' sent to Jambi by Narai left for home, their two vesselsladen with ..",u*
rhich u gi,.
of pepper to the Siameseking, who had sent the Sultan some
sulphur anc
rugh ;altpetre.25
itical The siimese must haveresentedthe Dutch attitude over
rrder Jambi,regardingir a.
an attemptio*iitEfrefe in siam's reldtionswith her tributaries. Ay,utthaya
mav atsc
have been worried by the v.o.c.'s growing power, especialry
plain afte; the Durc:.
acquisitionof Banten in 1682.Narai and his new favourite,phaulkon,
yers, *".. pro-
Frenchand the French alwaysinsistedthat there was a Dutch ,threat,to
Ayrrtrhar.a.
; the It was not until the Siamesedispatchedan embassyto Batavia
in earry 16g6tha:
:heseJearswere allayed.But the growing challengeof the French
combined*.irr
ring Phaulkon'sunscrupuloustrading practicescontinuedto put a strain
on King Narai s
:fore :elationswith other foreign traders who frequentedthe port
of Ay,uttna,a..
:ome Indeed,all foreignersin Ayutthaya, apart from thosetraders*t
o *e.e iesponsilte
and, :o Phaulkonor the king, courdexpect rittle else but fierce and
frequentlyunfair
with competitionfrom the Siamesecrown, and even a measureof political
prejudice
lurry againstthem if they were not French.During 16g4-g5 phaulkon's,unreasonable
ce in :rading',most of it donein the king's name,provokedwidespreaa
rrtive .o-pLint. rn.
Greekhad been selling Japanesecopperat very high prices to English,
irench anci
haya Portuguesetraders,and at the sametime had beenforcingthem io
seli their wa.es
odia, at low prices,thus leavinghim with maximum profits. The grandees
and people
cf Ligor were also embitteredby phaulkon'slow pricing of Ligor tin
to Ay"utthal,a's
advantage. Furthermore, phaulkon *". ,"rpon.ible foi emproying
several
Englishmenand Frenchmenas crown officials,is traders,or
as seamen.Indeed,
\arai's English servants contributed to the outbreak of hostilities
between Siam
138 Dhirauat Na Pombejra

and the E.I.C. from late 1686to 1688/89by their attack on vesselssailingbetween
the Company'sfactoriesin northern India and Madras.z7
By late 1687 King Narai's foreign policy was heading for completecollapse,and
there was increasingunrest at court. Not only were the king's Europeanemployees
behavingavariciouslyand often irresponsibly,but the khunnang'\i Siam were
jockeyingfor positionin preparationfor an imminent successioncrisis in the absence
of an heir. Many elementsin Ayutthaya society,as well as many foreign interests,
were dissatisfiedwith the king's foreign and trade policies, and with the behaviour
of Phaulkon.By late 1687,Siam was officially at war with Golcondaand the E.LC.,
and had virtually severedties with the Muslims, who had beendi6Criminatedagainst
in their trade in Siam, largely by Phaulkonand his associates.There had been
massacresand insurrections' The English had sent ships to occupy Mergui in Jul'v
1687and had been massacredfor their pains,while a Makassareseinsurrection
'revolt of the Macassars'
of 1686had resultedin further bloodshed.The so-called
may have been motivated by religious zeal, since one of their leadersclaimed that
Islam was in danger,but it appearsalso to have stemmed from court intrigue and
dissatisfactionat Narai's pro-Catholic,pro-Frenchpolicy, a policy which moreover
hurt the commercialinterestsof the Malays and other Muslims.2s
Phaulkon'spro-Frenchpolicy finally overreacheditself when in late 1687Louis
XIV's government, in responseto a request for 50 soldiers, sent a garrison 600
strong to occupy the forts at Bangkok and Mergui, the kingdom's two key ports.
In fact, it was neither of these that had been offered in 1685 to the French but
Songkhla,far enoughaway from Ayutthaya not to createpolitical anxieti33among
the Siamesekhunnang.Phaulkon and the French Jesuitshad secretly plannedthe
takeover of Siam and mass conversionof the Siamese(an objective dear to Louis
XIV), but Phaulkonhimself could not have foreseenthat the French would make
so unwise and premature a show bf force. Narai's generosity towards French
missionariesand Jesuit scholars had misled the French into thinking they could
take control of Siam.DissatisfiedSiameseofficials could alsouse the dangerswhich
besetthe Buddhist religion as a rallying cry. Even as early as the end of 1687,some
five monthsbefore the actual successionconflict broke out in 1688,the Frenchman
La Loubdre had observedthat the officials most likely to take over the kingdom
were okphra Phetracha,the master of the royal elephants,and his son okluang
Sorasak.2e
okphra Phetracha,a devout Buddhist much respectedin court circles and both
foster-brotherand brother-in{aw to King Narai, madehis preparationsearly. When
King Narai fell fatally ill at Lopburi during February or March of 1688, he and
okluanb Sorasakrfere dlready leaders of the best organiled and most powerful
fiction. It containedthe leadingThai officials, Chineseand'Moors'. Phaulkon,now
handicappedby disunity among his supposedallies the French, was powerless
without their military backing and, even more importantly, he lacked the king's
favour. Okphra Phetracha and Okluang Sorasakwere stronger and readier than
their rivals. The two khunnang took over control of the king's palace at Lopburi
in mid-April. This proved, in the event, to be the crucial step. Phaulkon was ex-
ecuted in June 1688 and the king's half-brothers were eliminated in July. On 11
July when King Narai died, Phetrachabecameking of Siam and set about expelling
the French from Bangkok, a processwhich was finally completed in November.
CrownTradeand CourtPoliticsin Alutthay 139
'revolution'was thus a
when the garrison sailed for Pondicherry.3o The 1688
Siamesesuccessionconflict first and foremost,though one in which elementsof
foreign policy and religiousloyaltiesplayedan especiallyimportant part. The king's
excessivedesireto havepoliticalas well as commercialand culhral ties with France,
his unwise choiceof Europeanservants,the dissatisfactioncausedby the crown's
pro-Frenchand increasinglyrapacioustrade policy, all contributed to the political
instabilitywhich allowed Phra Phetrachato seizepower.

Conclusion

Ayutthaya was indeed a port of great importance to the Siamesemonarchy and

ro many membersof the ruling elite. Royal trade was gearedto overseasmarkets
and monopolies,especiallyduring the reign of Narai. Clearly, the agricultural self-
sufficiency of the kingdom was not enough to maintain the prosperity of the city
of Ayutthaya and the splendour of its court. Trade drew both indigenoustraders
lrom the hinterland and merchantsfrom overseasto Ayutthaya and attracted foreign
nerchants,Europeantrading companies,and membersof the Siameseelite who
had comhercial interests.During King Narai'sreign, however,the crown'sextended
:rading activities encroachedon the interests of various commercial groups.
Did King Narai's policies radically changeAyutthaya's social or political structure?
Seenin their proper historicalperspectiveand in the context of Prasatthongisreign,
\arai's adventurousforeign policy and monopolistictendenciesdo not seemas novel
as at first sight. King Prasatthonghad inherited from his predecessors,especially
King Ekathotsarot,a generalpolicy of strengtheningthe monarchyby filling the
rreasury at the expenseof the khunnang and the traders. Narai took this policy
to its logical limits and, in the end, the crown was in competitionwith almost
everyonewho traded in the kingdom, Thai as well as non-Thai. His use of Muslims
andEuropeansto trade on his behalfboth at homeand overseaswas an innovation
and thus changedthe nature of royal trade, though without altering its structure.
However,the use of non-Thaisin the conductof crown trade was not entirely
rew. It was simply that during Narai'sreign the crown'soverseastrade expanded
:n range,necessitatingthe use of more foreigners.Narai'sinterest in trade from
:he west led quite naturallyto the employmentof Persiansand Europeans,mainly
English and French, as governors,traders, artisans,military experts,and even
.'ourtiers.Moreover, non-Thaislacked solid manpowersupportwithin the kingdom
and so were disposedof easily when they ceasedto be useful. okphra Phetracha
was thereforeable to seizepower in 1688 and eliminateboth Phaulkonand the
Frenchbeforethe year ended.The 1688'revolution'proved conclusivelythat man-
power control and not commercial power was still the key to successin Ayutthayan
politics.After 1688the Siamesecrown continuedto trade with the Dutch, increased
its trade with the chinese, and had regular contactwith India, obtainingIndian
textileseither throughthe European'country'tradersand the V.O.C. or, later, the
Indians themselves.3lAfter Narai's reign no Ayrrtthayanking adoptedforeign
court favourites of the Aqa Muhammad or Phaulkon type. Those foreigners who
continuedto seryethe crown, and especiallyits trade apparafus,were kept in check
to preventthem exploitingit. Though the tacticsof the later kings may havediffered
140 DhirauatNa Pombejra

from Narai'sthey had one and the samepurposeof enhancingthe wealth and power
of the monarchy.
Further, Narai's policies did not change the social structure of the Ayutthaya
kingdom. No'commeriial class'of officials emerged,perhaDsbddause-ommercial
activity in Siam involved relatively few indigenousgrandees.ChaotjhrayaKosathi
bodi was considereda rich man at the time of his disgraceand death in 1683,but
the Siameseinheritance law and royal punishment combined to deprive his heirs
of his large fortune. Even the fortunes of foreigrers like Phaulkon and SamuelWhite
were but ephemeral.Manpower resources- the touchstoneof social and political
eminence - were dispensedby the crown, as were ranks and titles. This allowed
the crown to remain in control and prevented the establishmentof dynasties of
rich trader-officials to form the core of a substantialmerchant class.A less easily
demonstratedbut possibly crucial reason for the lack of the development of an
indigenousmerchant classwas the inherent prejudiiiofthe khun:iuig agaiSt active
participationin trade. Though not reluctantto reap the benefitsof trade through
investment,they preferred, on the whole, to leavethe actualtrading to the chinese,
'Moors',
the and, during Narai's reign, to the Europeansas weli.3z
The monarchyduring Narai'sreign tried to strengthenits power as much through
the control of foreign trade and the enforcement of crown monopoliesas by the
elimination of internal political threats. Ironically for the Prasatthong dynasty, a
dynastyfoundedby a khunrumg,its rule was brought to an end by failure in foreign
policy and a lack of politically potent princes. A leading official usurpedthe throne
in 1688, ostensibly to save the monarchy from the threat of Frt:nch and Roman
Catholicdomination.Although the Prasatthongdynastywas replacedby the family
of King Phetracha,the system of royal trade and monopoliesand the general political
structure of Siam, to which Prasatthongand Narai had contributed so much, did
not change.After 1688, one of the main spoils for the victor in any struggle for
the royal successionremained, as it always had been, the acquisition of control
over crown trade, by means of which the resourcesof the port were exploited for
the benefit of the palace.

NOTES

1. The list and hierarchy of crown trade port officials can be found in Rtnng Kotmai tra
samdunng(The Three SealsCodeof 1804),BangkokKrom Sinlapakoneditionof 19781
"Phra aiyakantamnaengna phonlaruan",clause II, 116-19. A discussionof crown trade
and thephrahhlangisdepartmentis alsoprovidedby SarasinViraphol, Tributeand Profil.
Sino-sinmese Trade,1652-1853 (Harvard University Press, 1977),18-27.
2. Armando Cortesdo(trans. & ed.), The Suma Oriental of TomdPires, Haklult Society,
secondseriesLXXIX, vol. I (London,7944),108-09.
3. V.O.C. 1377,"Notitie der aengekomene, en vertrockescheepen, joncquenbarcquenen
vaartuijgenuijt en in de Revier van Siam sedertOctober 1681tot September1682",
folios 533 v. - 535 v. SeealsoGeorgeVinal Smith, ?fte Dutch in Seuenteenth-Centu4
Thailand,center for SoutheastAsianStudies,specialReportNo. 16,N. IllinoisUniver-
sitv (197n.
Crown Trade and Court Politics in Ayutthaya t+r

4. Cortesio, The Suma Oriental,108-09.

5. Simon de La LoubBre,A New HistoricalRelationof theKingdom of Siam, (trans.)"A.P."
(London,1693),93.
6. Anthony Reid, "Trade and State Power in 16th and 17th Century SoutheastAsia", in
Proceedings of the 7th IAHA Conference, Banghoh(Bangkok, 1979);John Villiers, "One
of the especiallestflowers in our garden:the Englishfactory at Makassar,1580to 1660",
(in press).On foreign communitiesin SiamseeNicolasGervaise,Thc Natural and Political
Historyof the Kingdmr of Siam,A.D. 1688,(trans.)H.S. O'Neill (Bangkok 1928),25-29;
La Loubbre, A New Historiml Relation, lI2.
7. Jeremiasvan Vliet, The Short History of the Kings of Siam, (trans.) Leonard Andaya,
(ed.)David K. Wyatt (SiamSociety,Bangkok, 1975),88-89. Phongsawadan Krung Si
Ayutthala,"PhanChanthanumat" versionof 1795.Cremationvolume(Bangkok,1936),
290.
8. Joost Schouten,in Franqoiscaron and Joost schouten, A true Descriptionof theMighty
Kingdomsof Japanand Siam,(trans.)Capt. Roger Manley, (ed.)C.R. Boxer (London,
1935).108-09.
9. Van Y\iet, ShortHistory,g6; (trans.)W.H. Mundie, "HistoricalAccountof Siam in the
17th Century" 0.640), Iournal of the Siam SocietyXXX, ii (1938): 154; Dhiravat na
Pombejra,"A Political History of Siam under the PrasatthongDynasty, 1629-1688"
(Ph.Ddissertation, London,1984),100-02,744,2$-f9.
10. Van Vliet, "Descriptionof the Kingdomof Siam",(trans.)L.F' van Ravenswaay, Journal
of the Siam SocietyYII, i (1910):59-64.
11. Schouten,True Description,99; Yan Vliet, "Description",26-27, 90; V'O.C. 1194,
WesterwolttoG-G,22 October1652;RuangKotmaitrasamduang, "AyaLuang", Nos.
36. 37. 488-89.
12. La Loubdre,A New HistoricalRelation,g4-95; V.O.C. 1125, Van Vliet to G-G, 12
October 1637.
13. V.O.C. 1155,Moerdijck to Batavia Council,20 September1645;V.O.C. 1163,Van
Muijdento G-G,27October1647;V.O.C.1290,De Rooij'sReportof 20 November1672;
V.O.C. 1183,Craijerto Verburch,6 July 1651;y.O'C. 1240,Instructionfor Poolvoet'
10 October1662.
11. Claudede BEze,Memoir,(trans.& ed.) E.W.Hutchinson as 1688ReuolutioninSiam.
The Memoir of Father de BDzeS.t. (Hong Kong, 1968),16; V.O.C. 1330,De Jongeto
G-G, 20 December1677,is one of severalDutch sourcesto refer to the fhrahhlang's
participationin the tin trade.
15. V.O.C. 1268,NicolaasMuller's Report,29 November1667,esp.ff . 719 r. and 719 v'
16. J. O'Kane(trans.),TheShipof Sukimttn,PersianHeritageSeriesNo. 11 (London,1972),
98 and 99; y.O.C. 1322,De Jongeto G-G, 14 November 1676.
17. V.O.C. 1339,De Jonge'sinstructionsto Faa, 10 December1678;Dhiravat'"Prasatthong
Dynasty",325-32; J. O'Kane,ShiPof Sukiman,101-03. For a detaileddiscussionof
court politics during this period see Dhiravat,"PrasatthongDynasty",325-32.
18. On the V.O.C.'savoidanceof conflict with King Narai after 1663-64 see Smith, ?fte
Ilutch, 40-42.
19. J. O'Kane,Ship of Sulaiman,107-03; V.O.C. 1341,Faa to G-G, 2 November1679.
10. Sarasin,Tributeand Profit,42-43; V.O.C. 1311,Van der Spijck to G-G,30 November
1675;V.O.C.1322,De Jongeto G'G, 26 December1676.
11. De BEze,Memoir,8-13; Hutchinson,Aduenturers,56-60.
t42 Dhirauat Na Pombejra

22. Hutchinson,Aduenturers,60-61, 81-85; Dhiravat' "PrasatthongDynasty",358-59'

23. Lanier, Etude histori4ue,17.
24. V .O.C.1240Y anRijck'sReportof 3 November1662.An Englishtranslationof the text
of the 1664Treaty may be found in Smith, The Dutch' 138-41 (appendixVI)'
25. ConcerningJambi pepperseeV.O.C. 1386,Faa to G-G, 10 January1684;V'O'C' 910'
G-G to Faa, 30 August 1683.
26. On the Siameseembassyto Bataviasee Smith, The Dutch,43-44; Jurrien van Goor,
"Phaulkon reconsidered,the use and limitations of Dutch sources for the history of
of theInternational
Thailand", HistoricalDocumentsand Literary Eaidencein Proceedings
Conferenceon Thai Studies(Bangkok, 1984) vol. 8, 12-13.
27. Anderson, Engtish Intercoursewith siam in the seuenteenthcentury Gondon, 1890),
3r2-16.
28. Launay, Mission de Siam, I, "Documentshistoriques",193-95; Anderson,English
Intercoursewith Siam, 287 -96.
29. Hutchinson,Aduenturers,Appendix IY,222-43; La Loubbre,A New HistnricalRelntion,
89.
30. Severalcontemporaryaccountsexist of the'1688 revolution'in Siam,notablythe Memoir
of Father de Bdze; JoannesKetjts, Behno\t Verhaeluan de Wonderlijkeueranderingen
uoorgeuallenin't Koningrijch uan siam inl laer 1688 (Amsterdam, 1689); Vollant des
Verquanins, Histoire de I'ttRduolutionde Siam, 1688 (Lille' 1691)'
31. Smith, The Dulch, 45.
32. The khunnangconsideredit beneaththeir dignity to carry on trade themselves.See
Gervaise,Natural and Politiml History, 59.

, =-==
B
Makassar:The Riseand Fall of an East
Maritirne TradingState,1512- 1669
Indones'ian

JOHN VILLIERS

The rise to pre-eminenceamongthe numerouspetty statesof SouthwestSulawesi

,Celebes)of the kingdomsof Gowaand Tallo', which were later to mergetogether
:o form the dual kingdom of Makassar,seemsto have begun in the early sixteenth
.entury during the reign of Tumapa'risiKallonna of Gowa (c. 1512-48), whose
nilitary prowessand statemanshipare recordedin the Gowa chronicles.
Thesechroniclesstatethat Tumapa'risiKallonnawas the first ruler of Gowato
:odify the laws of the kingdom and that he employed a syahbandnrnamed Daeng
Pamatte',who also deviseda script for the Makassareselanguage.lThe existence
rf the office of syahbandarindicates that, even at this early stage in its develop-
nent and even though its capital lay some six kilometres from the sea,Gowa was
alreadyengagedin overseastrade.2Both archaelogicalevidenceand local oral
:radition, as well as place-namesof Javaneseorigin to be found in southwest
Sulawesi,suggestthat much of this trade was in the hands of the Javanese,who
:requently sailed along these coasts on their way to the spice islands. A further
:ndicationthat there were well-estalished trading links betweenSulawesiand Java
rs to be found in the fourteenth century Nagarak4rtdgama,which lists Bantaeng,
Luwu, Makassar,Butung,Banggai,Kumir, Galuyaoand Selayaras dependencies
,f Majapahit.3
Gowa's initial development as an independent polity followed a pattern
,-haracteristic of most of the early Makassareseand Bugis kingdomsand one that
:s also fouid in otheii easternIndonesianislands.At first there were nine com-
nunities, knbwn asthe Bate Sal.apang or Nine Banners,which formed to-61her in-
:o a looseconfederationto make the nucleusof the kingdom of Gowa. The nine
'.rereTombolo,Lakiung, Parang-parang, Data,Agangjene,Saumata,Bissei,Sero
and Kalli. The leaders of the Bate Salapangformed the Council of Elders that ad-
','isedthe ruler. Later, other communitiesattachedthemselvesvoluntarily or were
:orcedto join the confederation,so that by the reign of Tumapa'risiKallonna,Gowa,
although still extremely small, was already among the best organized and most
:entralizedof the kingdomsin the area.a
It is not entirely clear what goodstheseearly Javanesetraders obtainedin Gowa,

143
al
-l
o

iiiriilit[ll! 3
z

z
F

OF MAKASSA
SIRT/ IS
\[akassar: Its Riseand Fall r45

:houghrice, which was to becomeMakassar'smajor export at the end of the six-

:eenthcentury,may well have beenamongthem, and slaves,gold, tortoise-shell,
and iron from Luwu in central Sulawesi, which was much sought after by the
Javanesefor the making of keris,almostcertainlywere.sTom6 Pires in his Suma
Orientalwritten about 1515 at the beginning of Tumapa'risi Kallonna'sreign
:ays that the Makassareseimported Cambay, Bengal and Coromandelcloths in
ixchange for theF'ivery white-ilie"and other foodstuffs, and for gold. He also
:ells us thafblack benzoin from Palembangwas much in use in Makassar.6
Chineseceramicshave been found in gravesitesall over the area,and it may be
:hat these too were brought by the Javanese.
Pires further informs us that ships from Makassar sailed to SundaKalapa (later
Batavia),to Melaka,to Borneo,to Siamand to "a11 the placesbetweenPahangand
Siam."7Otherwise,he tells us rather little about Makassaresetrade. This suggests
:hat at the time he wrote, when Melaka,newly conqueredby the Portuguese,was
at the zenithof its power and wealth as the greatestemporiumin SoutheastAsia,
\Iakassar still only playeda minor part in the traditional network of indigenous
:rade in the IndonesianArchipelago.
Yet Makassarwas geographicallyvery well situatedto act, like Melaka, as an
entrep6tfor thei-[Gat variety of goodsthat were exchangedamong the traders
rf many natiohswtio sailed to all corners of the Archipelago. It lay midway on the
nain searoute betweenthe Straits of Melaka,through which all shippingcoming
:rom or.at ing for the IndianOceanhad to pass,and the spiceislands,which were
:he ultimate destinationof most of this shipping.It was also well placedto act as
a staplingpoint for a wide rangeof other Indonesianproducts,suchas Banjarmasin
?epper,Bima rice and Timoresesandalwood.Moreover,it was one of the places
:requentEd"6f-theBajau, the boat-dwelling,maritime people of the coasts of
Sulawesi,eaitern Borneo,Mindanaoand the SuluArchipelago,who madea living
as fishermen,Stiand-gatherers, seamenand piratesand who traded,with varying
degreesof 16[itimacy, all over the IndonesianArchipelagoin trepang(sea-slugs),
:ortoise-shEIIlpearliand mother-of-pearl,sharks'fins,agar-agar(edibleseaweed)
and other marine products.8 The Bajau were, and still are, skilful boat-builders
andoften suppliedlocal rulers and traders with vessels.Tom6 Pires describesthem

... greaterthieve.s.Jfqn,any andtheyarepowerfulandhavemanylalaos.

!a-![e_,Wq.rLd,
Theysailaboutplundering, fromtheircountryup to Pegu,to theMoluccas
andBanda,
andamongall theislandsaroundJava,andtheytakewomento sea.Theyhavefairs
wheretffi?EBose of themerchandise theystealandselltheslavestheycapture.They
runa]1rolnd theislandof Sumatra.Theyaremainlycorsairs.TheJavanese callthem
Bugis(Bujuus)[i.e.Bajau],andthe MalayscallthemthisandCelates.Theytaketheir
spoilsto Jumaia(?),whichis nearPahang,wheretheysellandhavea faircontinually.

In the sixteenthcentury someof theseBajau were establishedin the Sangkarang

Islands,a group of small coral islands off the west coast of Sulawesiopposite
\lakassar.CornelisSpeelman,commanderof the forcesthat overthrewMakassar
in 1666, described them and the services they performed for the rulers of
\{akassar:10
146 John Villiers

The peoplethat arecalledBadjouslivedherein quitelargenumbersbeforethe war,

underthe jurisdictionof Makassar,and mostlydwelt on the islandsbeforeLabac-
can[Pangkajene], particularly on Solemo....Theyalsovoyageto all the islandsfur-
ther out to seain order to collect from them.This theyare obligedto
tortoise-shell
deliverto the king of Makassar.Furthermore,theymustalwaysbe readyto go with
their boatsin any directionthey maybe sent,whereverthe king from time to time
seesmoreadvantage to be gained,sincetheyarethe typeof menwhoareknownas
slavesof the king,fhambarajal....Theyare a veryusefulpeople.

The earliest Portugueseaccounts of Sulawesi,which date from the 1540s, in-

dicate that at that time Siang (Pangkajene),11 some 50 miles to the north of Gowa,
still exercisedsuzeraintyover Gowa and was still the most important trading cen-
tre on the west coast of the southwest Sulawesi peninsula. Sianq-seemsto have
beena very tlpical, small Indonesianport-state,existingprimarily on entrep6ttrade
and apparenfly not exporting the produce of its own hinterland in any substantial
quantity. The Portugue,seaccountstell us that most of the traders in Siang in the
i540. *"r" Malays trom Jotror,Pahangand Pattani.It is probablethat [hesiiMalays
had been establishedin Melaka before the Portugueseconquestof 1p-11'dndhad
left Melaka when they began to find Portugueserule irksome and thelqlumsy at-
tempts made by the Portugueseto impose trading monopolies,particularly over
the spice trade, damagingto their interests. More than a century later, many Por-
tugUesewere to follow in their footstepsand settle in Makassar,having beenforc-
ed to leave Melaka after the Dutch conquestof 1641.
At this early date the Malay traders settledin Siangseemto have been chiefly
concernedwith the export of produce from Sulawesiitself and from neighbouring
islands,particularly sandalwood,of which considerablequantities were imported
from Timor and Sumbaand for which the demandall over Asia, and especialiy
in China,was insatiable.From the LesserSundaIslandsalso cametortoise-sheil,
wax, rice and slavesto supplementthe local suppliesof these commodities.
Ant6nio de Paiva,who in 1544was sentwith twelve men by the captainof Melaka,
Rui Vaz Pereira,to Sulawesito trade in sandalwood,hasleft us a detailedaccount
of his travels in a letter he wrote in November 1545to Joaode Albuquerque,bishop
of Goa.12Paiva had already been to Suiawesitwo years before, and had spent
three months travelling along the coast as far as Durate, "terra do sandolo",the
whereaboutsof which is unknown.l3He had met the king of Siang, who had
receivedhim well. on this secondexpedition,Paiva,finding the sandalwoodcoun-
try in revolt, sailedto Supa,near modernParepare,where he convertedthe seventl'
year- old king, his queenand many of his leadingsubjectsand vassalsto chris-
tianity. From Supa he went back to Siang,where he convertedthe ruler whom
he had met on his previousvisit and baptized30 of the most important peoplein
the kingdom, including membersof the nobility and the royal househoid.From
Siang,Paiva travelledto Gowa,"a large city, which was originallya vassalof the
king of Siang."t+
Paiva was much impressedby the fertility and prosperity of these kingdoms.
,,Theislandis well suppliedwith all kinds of food,"he wrote, "with rice and meat."
He noted that "on this islandand the other small islandsnearbythat belongto it
are to be found sandalwood,gold, ivory, seed-pearls,iron and white cloth", and
describedthe slaves,"'whoare employedas oarsmenand are more numerousand
 \lahassar: 1ls Rrs? and Fall t47

--heaperthan anywhere else in the world. They are sturdy men with strong limbs,
:rainedfor the oar from birth to death."Eaq!.one,he said,was worth four to five
rieces of cloth (pannos),which equalledin value three and ahalf.pardaus.Fish were
eLsofound in abundance,chiefly sardines.The whole island was made up of great
nountain ranges in the interior and wide plains along the coasts,through which
:lowed maiiy rivers "of sweet and good water."ls
Only a few months after Paiva'sjourney, a Jesuit priest, Fr. Vicente Viegas was
.ent out to Sulawesi,accompaniedby one Manuel Pinto, who in December1548
',\'rotean accountof their missionfor the bishopsof Goa and Melaka.16Pinto's
3ccountis chiefly interesting for its descriq&l qf ,!!p Bugis_-qt4te,ofSidenreng
andits ruler, "a very great lord", who Pirito saysbore the title of emperor and was
:ather-in{awto the king of Supa.Pinto estimatedthat he had 30,000men and was
.,rrd of more people than any other ruler in the area. The land he ruled was rich
:: rice, meat, fish and fruit, and his capital was situatedon the shoresof Lake
Sidenreng,on which sailedmanyperahu,largeand small,and aroundwhich there
'.\'erenumerousprosperoustownships.lT
Pinto concludedhis report by recountinga conversationhe had had on his way
:ack to Melaka with the "king of Java" (presumablythe Sultan of Dimak), who
:ladsaidhe intendedto send1,000mento Makassarto convertthe peopleto Islam.
?into believ€d that the Sultan's aim was not only to convert Makassar to Islam
:ut alsoto seizecontrolof it so as to preventsuppliesfrom there reachingMelaka,
::iat being, in Pinto's view, the most effective means availableof driving the
?ortugueseout of Melaka.l8This is a clear indicationthat alreadyby the 1540s
\lakassar was exporting rice, and no doubt other foodstuffs, to Melaka.
Gowa'sassertionof independencefrom Sianghad alreadytaken placewhen Paiva
rade his secondvisit to Sulawesiin 1545,but its dominanceover its former suzerain
.oes not appear to have been firmly establisheduntil the reign of Tumapa'risi
Kallonna'ssonand successor,Tunipalangga(1548-66).Onepossiblefactor in the
::ansferenceof economic,if not of politicalpower from Siangto Gowa may have
:een the conversion-by'thePortugueseof the ruler of Siangto Christianityand
:re consequentdepartureof the Muslim Malay traders from Siangto Gowa and
iher stateswhere they might expectto find a more favourablereceptionand en-
' 11'greater religious toleration.
.{nother and more decisivefactor in this shift of power was the allianceestablished
:uring the 1560sbetweenGowaand Tallo',a tiny kingdomsituatedimmediately
:r the north of G6fria*iiithe Makassararea. The first recordedruler of Tallo',
raraeng (PrincelLoe ri Sero'wascloselyrelatedto the ruling houseof Gowa,being
. brother of Tumapa'risiKallonna'sgrandfather,BataraGoa,seventhruler of Gowa.
{araeng Loe ri Sero'brrilthis capitalon an easilydefendedand well protectedsite at
:ne mouth of the Tallo' River, thus providing himself from the outsetwith the chief
:rerequisitefor developmentas a maritimetrading state.leHe is saidto havesent
:.is son, Tunilabu di Suriwa on trading voyagesto Melaka and Banda,and it is
:erhaps significant in this connectionthat Tunilabu di Suriwa, who later succeeded
: r the throneof Tallo', marriedwives from three different stateswith which Tallo'
'.'.'ouldhave had trading relations - from Garassi',at the mouth of the
Jeneberang
River, from Siang and from Surabaya,one of the most important of the north
- avaneseport-states.20 Tunilabu di Suriwa's son, Tunipasuru' in his turn travelled
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Makassar: Its Riseand Fall t49

abroadas far as Melaka and Johor.21It was Tunipasuru'who invited his cousin,
Tumapa'risiKallonnato Tallo'and concludedan alliancebetweenthe two kingdoms
rvhich was to lead in a few years to the formation of the state of Makassar under
a double monarchy (dun raja satuan\.22
It was no doubt the overseastrading connectionsprovided by Tallo'as much
as the military might or agricultural wealth of Gowa that gave the initial impetus
to the extraordinarily rapid developmentof Makassarthat followed the conclusion
of this alliance. But that it was an alliance between equalsis shown by the agreement
that the two rulers reachedover the division of tribute from vassalsand conquered
states. The tribute was to be divided into five equal shares,of which Gowa and
Tallo''would have two each and whoever was the older of the two rulers at any
time would have the fifth.23
Another important contributoryfactor in the rise of Makassarwas the outstanding
ability and political moderationof aimost all the rulers of both Gowa and Tallo'
during the neit f OOyears and their remarkablecapacityfor sharingpower amicably
befweenthem. The alliancewas soonconfirmedby the appointmentof Tunipasuru's
sonand successor, Tumenang4ri MakkoayanS $SaT-77) as baligauor chief minister
of Gowaand the marriageof Tumenangari Makkoayang'sdaughter,I Samboto
Tumapa'risiKallonna'sgrandson,Tunijallo'.24 In 1565-66 two successive rulers of
Gowa,Tunipalanggaand Tunibatta, sonsof Tumapa'risiKallonnadied within a few
monthsof eachother during oneof the frequentwars againstthe Bugis stateof Bone,
which was Gowa'schief rival for supremacyin southernSulawesi,and Tumenanga
ri Makkoayangaccordinglyplacedhis son-in-iawTunijallo'on the throneof Gowa,
rvhileremainingas his baligau.As the Tallo'chronicle puts it, in the time of this raja
it was saidthat therewas only onesubjectand two kings and anyonewho dreamed
of dividing Gowa and Tallo'was put to death.2s
In 1577Tumenangari Makkoayangdiedand was succeeded as ruler of Tallo' by
his daughter,I Sambo,who ruled the twin kingdomswith her husbandTunijallo'
"togetheras husbandand wife." In 1590I Sambodied and in the sameyear Tunijallo'
rvasmurdered,so their sonTunipassulu'became ruler of both kingdoms.Tunipas-
sulu'appearsto have beenone of Makassar'sfew bad rulers - he is the only one
in whom the chroniclescanfind nothingto praise- and in 1593he was overthrown
by a group of Makassaresechiefsand fled to Luwu.26Another son of Tunijailo',
Tumenangari Gaukannabecameruler of Gowa,and a son of Tumenangari Mak-
koayang,KaraengMatoaya,who had led the revolt againstTunipassuiu',succeeded
as ruler of Tallo' and baligau of Gowa, with the new title of tuma' bicara-butta
(spokesmanof the land).27In this way the constitutionalprinciple of dual control of
a unified realm was preservedin a way not unlike Muslim Melaka, where powerwas
similarly divided betweenSultan and bendnharaand where, though both offices
rvere in practicehereditary,they could never be held by the same person.
During the period that the political unity of the twin kingdomswas being thus
cemented,the town of Makassarwas developingrapidly as a commercialcentre,
alreadyfrequentedby tradersfrom all over the IndonesianArchipelago,by Indian
and Chinesemerchantsand by the Portuguese.The Gowa chroniciestell us that
Tumapa'risiKallonnawas the first ruler of Gowato be visited by the Portuguese
(Paranggi)28 and that his son, Tunipalanggawas visited by a ship'scaptainfrom
JavacalledNakhoda(Captain)Bonang,who soughthis permissionfor Malay traders
i50 John Villiers

to settle in Makassar.In granting this requestthe king agreedto certain condi-

tionsdemandedby the Malays,of which the mostimportantwere that no Makassa-
reseshouldenter any of their housesby force or trespassupon their land and that
their familiesand propertywould not be subjectto Makassarese adator customary
law. Under the terms of the agreementthe designationMalay was iimited to people
from Pahang,Pattani._Kampar, Minangkabauand Johor.2e
Tunipalangga*ii ilso responsiblefor numerousother innovationsin the kingdom.
He deviseda new systemof weightsand measures,he built fortificationsroundthe
settlementsof Gowaand the royal citadel of Sombaopu,he started the manufacture
of bullets and introducedbrick-making. He also created two new offices: the
tumailalang,to dealwith the internaladministrationof the kingdom,which left the
sjahbandarfree to devote himself to trade affairs, and the tumakkajananngang
anaburaheto overseethe activitiesof the shipbuilders,the armsmanufacturers, the
weavers,the housebuildersand the gold- and silversmiths.30
The Malay traderssoonbecamefirmly establishedin Makassarunderthe rule of
this enlightenedand progressivemonarch.They were held in high esteemand manv
of them amassedconsiderable fortunes.They preferred1ot to live in specialsettle-
mentsassignedto them, but in housesscatteredamongthe Makassarese villages.
Their numbersgrew rapidly as more of them flocked to Makassarto avoid the
restrictionsplacedupon their commercialactivitiesby the Portuguesein Melaka and
to escapethe frequent attacks of the Acehneseon Melaka and Johor. From the
first yearsof the seventeenthcenturythis eastwardexodusof Malayswas still fur-
ther increasedby the Dutch blockadeof the Straits of Melaka and their attacks
on the shippingof any nation they might encounteranywherein the westernislands
of the Archipelago.3lMeanwhile,in Javathe rise of Mataramunder SunanAgung
and his rapid conquestbetween1621and 1625of the independentnorth Javanese
port-statesof Gresik, Pasuruhan,Tuban and Surabaya,and of the islandof Madura.
with all of which Gowaand Tallo'had long enjoyedclosetrading relations,led the
Javanesetradersto turn to Makassarand to a lesserextentto Banjarmasinas their
centresfor the carrying trade in rice and spices.32
By 1625 ther,ewere many thousandsof Javaneseand Malays both visiting
Makassar,"their vesselsladenwith cloth, porcelain,rice and silver coins",and based
in Makassar,from where they controlled"most of the shipping in every direc-
tion."33Makassaralsobecamean importantmarket for pepperfrom Banjarmasin.
which fetcheda higher price there than in Batavia,and from Jambi,where it was
broughtdown from the interior by the Minangkabaugrowersfor saleto intermedian'
Chinesetraders in exchangefor cloth.3a
In this complexexchangeof goods,spicescontinuedto play the dominantpart.
The sea route from Makassarto the spice islandsbecamesafer and speedieras
the rulers of Makassarstrengthenedand extendedtheir control of southernSulawesi
and beyond.Garassi',immediatelyto the southof Gowa,was conqueredsoonafter
the alliancebetweenGowaand Tallo'had beenfirst concluded,and Jenepontoani
Bulukumbain the extremesouthof the peninsuladuring the 1560s.Then Selayar
(where an important export trade in checked Selayar cloth grew up) and Butung
(a major sourceof slaves)were subdued,and finally Makassaresesuzeraintywas
extendedto the more distantcoastsof Lombok, Sumbawa,Floresand Timor, and
as far as Seram, Buru and the Aru and Kei Islandsin the Banda Sea.35By the
lfahassar:Its Riseand Fall 151

1620sup to 40 Malay vesselswere sailing from Makassarto Ambon and Seram

every year in December,Januaryor February carrying large cargoesof cloth, rice,
porcelain and reals. They would stop at Butung to exchangethe cloth for slaves
and travel thenceto Ambon, where they would remain trading in clovesuntil the
return voyageto Makassarin September.36 In 1631accordingto a V.O.C. report
of that year, at least half the entire clove harvestof Seramwas shippedto Makassar
rn this way.37
After the brutal conquestof the BandaIslandsby the Dutch in 1621and the Am-
boinaMassacreof 1623,Dutch control over the spiceislandsand their ability to
imposetheir trade monopolyby force becamevirtualiy unassailable,and the English
and other foreign merchantsaccordinglyturned increasinglyto Makassarto pur-
chasespices.The Englishfactory in Makassar,which was set up by JohnJourdain
in 1613,becamea thriving centrefor dealingin "smuggled"clovesand was deem-
ed by the English East India Companyto be "one of the especiallestflowers" in
their garden.In 1632the E.I.C. reckonedthat, by sellingCoromandelcloth on the
\{akassar market and investing the proceedsin cloves,-tortoiie-shelland san-
dalwood,their traders could make profits of up to 50 per cent. The introductory
noticeto the MakassarFactory Recordspreservedin the India Office Library in
Londonlists amongthe goodscomihg to Makassarin the early seventeenthcen-
tury, from other Indonesianislandscloves,nutmegand mace,pepper,cinnamon,
sappanwood and sandalwood,tortoise-shell,gum{ac, wax and slaves,from Cam-
bodiawax, benzoinand ivory, from Siam lead,from Japancopper,and from Manila
goldand silver dollars.Indiangoodsbroughtto Makassarincludedmany different
kinds of cotton cloth, and steel,while from Macau camea wide rangeof Chinese
goods,includingsugar,greenginger and Chinaroot, tutenagand gold, carriedchiefly
by the Portuguese.3s The Portuguesealso bought Europeanand Japanesefirearms
andweapons,for which they gaineda specialpapaldispensationfrom the prohibi-
:ion againstselling weaponsof war to unbelievers.3e
Secondonly in importanceto spicesin the trading economyof Makassarwere
slaves.Makassarwas the centreof a vast slave-tradingnetwork that stretchedfrom
Sumatrato the Tanimbar Islands.Most of the slavessold on the Makassarmarket
camefrom Sulawesiitself or from nearbyislandssuchas Muna and Butung or the
SulaIslands,but many alsocamefrom northeastBorneo,from Timor, Solor,Flores,
-\1orand Sumbain the LesserSundas,from the Tanimbar Islands,and from Min-
danaoand Suluin the Philippines.Most of them were bought,usuallyin exchange
:or cloth, for work in the pepperplantationsof Banjarmasin.Palembang,Jamli
andAceh, Johor,Sukadanaand Batavia.Their buyerswere thereforechiefly Malays
and Sumatransor rich Chineseand Dutch and other Europeansfrom Batavia.Many
rlf theseslives were what the Dutch authoritiesin Bataviacalled"stolenpeople",
that is to say forcibly abductedin slave-raidingexpeditions. The GeneraleMissiaen
:ecordsone such expeditionin 1665 in which two hundred armed Makassarese
sailedto the Sula Islandsand returnedwith a "catch"of over a thousand
"'essels
slaves.These "stolenpeople"seemto have been far more numerous,at least on
the Makassarmarket, than genuineprisonersof war and debt-slaves.In the late
seventeenthcentury, up to 30 per cent of the slavesowned by membersof the
\'.O.C. in its variouscentresin SoutheastAsia were Bugisor Makassarese.a0 They
and the Balinesewere consideredto be particularlywild and unruly and likely to
t52 John Villiers

nrnamuk,so much so that by a decreeof April-May 1685,it was forbidden to bring

to Batavia any slaves above the age of twelve from those places'41
None of this extensive trade would have been possible and Makassar'srole as
the leading entrepot in the Archipelago after the demiseof Melaka could certainly
not have been sustained,had Makassar not been a major producer of rice with,
at least until the 1630s,a sub'stantialsurplus availablti for export in most years'
To the northeastof the city lay the flat and fertile plains of Maros and to the south
was Takalar, another extensive area of wet rice cultivation' It would seem from
the descriptionsof Paiva and Pinto quotedabovethat alreadyin the early sixteenth
century these two areashad been drained and made into sawah.Speelmanwrote
of Maros that these lands were conqueredand settled during the reign of Tuni-
jallo'and divided by villagesand ailotmentsamongthe Makassaresenotables,each
of whom cultivated his own plantation according to the number of men he had
availableeachyear.'12 In the time of Matoayawe are told by the Tallo'chronicle
that "rice flourished, crops throve, fisheries were abundant and there was plenty
of ballo'(palm wine)",43while Admiral van der Hagen reported in 1646 that
,,throughout the whole country in every town and market-place", Matoaya had
"erected fine barns full of rice", which it was forbidden to sell until the new crop
had been harvested, so that in a bad year there would be no shortages.aa
The Malays exchangedthe rice that they purchasedin Makassar for the Moluc-
can cloves tnd Bandanesenutmeg and mace that were the basis of their trade'
As for the Portuguese,they neededrice not only for purposes of trading in the
spice islands, but also to supply Melaka, which had to import all its rice as well
as virtually all its other foodstuffs. From the beginning of the seventeenthcen-
tury, when the fall of Balambanganto the Muslims deprived the Portuguese of
their commercial centre and principal source of rice in Java, they resorted to
Makassar for the bulk of their rice supplies. So great did the demand for rice in
Makassarbecomethat, in spiteof Matoaya'sactiveencouragement of rice produc-
tion in southwestSulawesi,it soonoutstrippedthe supply, and Makassarwas com-
pelled to import rice from Java and Sumbawa(Bima) in order to meet its oil'n
needs.as
Makassarwas thus a tlpical, albeit exceptionallydynamicand sirccessfulIndone-
sian port-state of this last period before the imposition of Dutch commerciaj
hegemonydisrupted and in many areasdestroyedtraditional, irldigenouspatterns
of trade in the Archipelago.Its successlay in its capacityto acf not only as a sup-
plier of oneessentialcommoditywhicf if produceditself, in this caserice, but also
as a centre for the carrying trade in spices,slavesand a wide variety of other goods
producedin the SoutheasiAsian region and beyond.It is evident,however,that
at first the Makassaresethemselveswere not much involveddirectly with this trade.
thoughthe ruler, like most SoutheastAsian rulers,whether of inland,agtarianstates
or of stateswith international,maritime trading interests,was traditionally the first
trader in the realm and his consent was required for all major transactions,par-
ticularly those involving the sale of rice. From the first years of the seventeenth
century this state of affairs gradually changed.The ruler and the leading notables
first began to use foreign merchants to trade on their account; they then took to
hiring foreigrrbottomsin order to participatein the trade directly themselves;finallr
they had their own vesselsbuilt for them in Java or east Borneo and sent then
.\.[akassar:Its Riseand Fall IJJ

out on independenttrading voyages,often with Portuguesepilots.a6Matoaya,for

example,senthis shipsboth west to Melaka and eastto Ambon and kept an agent
in the BandaIslands,who was given suppliesof rice and cloth to exchangethere
for nutmeg and mace and was expectedgenerallyto encouragetrade.aTIt was
probablyin Matoaya'stime alsothat Makassarbecame,with the exceptionof Aceh,
the only state in SoutheastAsia to mint its own gold coinage(the ruts or dinara).a8
At the beginningof the seventeenthcentury two other developmentsoccurred
rn Makassarthat combinedwith its spectaculareconomicgrowth to make it the
dominantpower in easternIndonesia.The first of thesewas the conversionof its
rulersto Islam.Between1603and 1605Matoayaand his youngcousinTumenanga
ri Gaukannaboth becameMuslims.The former changedhis name on his conver-
sionto SultanAbdullahAwal-ul-Islam(the slaveof God,the first Muslim) and the
latter to SultanAla'uddin.Gowaand Tallo'thus becamethe first officially Muslim
statesin Sulawesi.ae
Matoayalost no time in trying to spreadthe new religion, not only among his
own people,who seemto have acceptedit without much protest,but throughout
southernSulawesi.Between1608and 1611Matoaya temporarilyabandonedhis
policy of maintaining peacefulrelationswith his warlike Bugis neighboursand car-
:ied out a seriesof swift campaigns,first againstSidenrengand Soppeng,then
againstWajo' and finally in 1611againstGowa'sgreatestrival, Bone.After these
wars, which cameto be known as the Islamic Wars (Bundu'KasalLannga), Matoaya
demandedno tribute or indemnity and no declarationsof vassalagefrom any of
:he conqueredstates,but simply askedtheir rulers and chiefsto offer homageto
-\llah and follow Gowa into Islam.s0After they had all adoptedIslam at his bid-
ding,he summonedtheir leadersto attenda conferenceat which a generalalliance
was concluded,for, as he wisely predicted,the chief dangerto Makassarwould
renceforth be not from the Bugis but from "enemieswho come by sea."st
A major consequence of this somewhatbelatedconversionto Islam was that
\lakassarjoinedthe umrnator Islamic communityand couldthus assumethe role
,rf a centre for Islamic teachingand missionaryenterpriseand in many casesex-
:end its authority thereby to other parts of the IndonesianArchipelago.By the time
,rf Matoaya'sdeathin 1637,Makassar'shegemonyhad reachedits greatestextent,
:rom Lombok in the west to the Kei Islandsin the east. In south Sulawesiitself
rnly Luwu remainedtruly independent,thanksto havingtaken Gowa'sside in the
Islamic Wars.s2Internally, the conversionto Islam and the creation of the
sultanatesof Gowa and Talio', with the formal recognitionof the Sultansas the
:eligiousas well as the politicalieadersof the kingdom,helpedtowardsstrengthen-
:ng and centralizing the government. The traditionai council, the Bate Salapang,
ceasedto be the ruler's only advisers,sincea religiouscouncilknown asthe sarat
lras set up alongsideit. The chief official on this council, the kali (kadfl occupied
as importanta positionin the religiousaffairs of the kingdom as the tumailalang
lid in the secularadministration,and it is significantin this connectionthat after
Gowa defeatedthe Bone uprising of 1644 at the battle of Passempe,Bone was
governedby a regent Qenang),a Bone noblemancalled Tobala', who was a kali
appointedby Gowa,and not, as was customaryin suchcircumstances, by the con-
queredruler or one of his kinsmen reducedto the statusof vassal.As for the Sultan
rimself, in his capacityas the "Shadowof God on earth" and defenderof the Muslim
154 John Villiers

faith, his personalprestigeand authority aswell as that of the institutionof monarchy

in his realm was greatly strengthened.s3
The other developmentthat contributedto this rapid increasein the power, wealth
and influenceof Makassarwas the reverseof what might have beenexpectedfrom
a state recently convertedto Islam and imbued with a crusadingzeal to propagate
its new faith. This was the deliberateadoptionby the Sultansof a policy of welcome
to all foreigners.Any foreignerwho wishedwas permittedto settlefreely,to prac-
tise his own religion and to trade without any restrictionbeyondthe paymentof
light duesand the giving of presentsto the rulers. The motives for this policy were
undoubtedlyin part economicand political. In 1607SultanAla'uddindeclaredto
the Dutch "my country stands open to all nations and what I have is for you as
well as for the Portuguese."In 1615he confirmedthis enlightenedattitude in his
famous declaration of the mare liberum principle:s4

Godmadethe iandandthe sea;the landHe dividedamongmenandthe seaHe gave

in common. It is unheardof thatanyoneshouldbe forbidden to sailtheseas.If you
seekto do that, you will take the breadfrom the mouthsof my people.

At first the Dutch were made as welcomein Makassaras the traders of any other
nation, and it was only gradually that the Makassaresecame to share the fear and
suspicionof Dutch intentionsfelt by the Portuguese,the Englishand the Muslim
statesin the region.As the centreof the spicetrade shiftedto Makassarfrom Melaka
and the north Javaneseports, so the Muslim rulers in Ternate, Tidore and the other
spice islands increasinglyplaced themselvesunder the protection of Musiim
Makassarand sought the support of Makassarin their resistanceto the Dutch.
After the genocidalconquestof the BandaIslandsby Jan PieterszoonCoenin 1621
someof the few survivorsof the Bandanesepeoplefound refuge in Makassar,where
they continuedto play an active part in its commerciallife.ss
For their part the Dutch persistedin their endeavoursto gain an absolutemonopolr-
for the V.O.C. over the spicetrade. In 1625they tried to prevail upon the rulers
of Makassarto forbid their subjectsto trade in the spice islandsaltogether.The
Makassaresereplied that they themselvesonly engagedin inland trade and thal
almostall the cloves,nutmeg and other spicesthat came into the kingdom were
brought by the Malays, who could scarelybe forbidden to carry on this trade, since
"oncethey were at seathey went wheresoeverthey would."56The suggestionthat
Gowashouldneither go to war with Ternate, Bacanor Tidore nor trade with them.
solely in order to oblige the Dutch, was met with a sarcasticrejoinder from Sultar
Hasanuddin,who askedwhether they were "of the opinionthat God has reservec
these islands,so removedfrom your nation, for your trade alone."57As for the for-
tifications built by the Dutch in Manado in the north of Sulawesi, which was ir.
fact a vassalstate of Ternate, Hasanuddinobservedthat, "sincewe are at peace
and you have placed your fortifications on my land, all the more reason why you
should demolishthem."58
The Portuguese,who had played an active and often a leading part in the traCe
of Makassarsincethe end of the sixteenthcentury,continuedto be as well receir--
ed after Makassar's conversion to Islam as they had always been. They were
Makassar'schief suppliersof arms and gunpowderand they formed the largestEurc.
.Vahassar:1ls Rrr-cand Fall 155

peancommunityin the city, reachinga total of betweentwo and three thousand

soulsafter the Dutch conquestof Melaka in 1641.5eThe Catholicreligion, if no
longer actively encouraged,was still toleratedand, after the fall of Melaka and
the transfer of the Portuguesedioceseof Melaka to Makassar,the Jesuits,the Fran-
ciscansand the Dominicansall establishedhousesin Makassar.As the viceroy Pero
da Silvawrote to the king of Portugalin August 1638,"in all the southernarchipelago
there is no other ruler who protectsthe Portuguesewith greater firmnessand allows
conversionto the Christianfaith."60Portuguesewas widely spokenat the court
of Makassar,and KaraengPattingalloang,who succeededhis father, Matoayaas
ruler of Tallo' in 1636 and was perhapsthe most brilliant of all the membersof
his extraordinarily able family, was said by the French JesuitAlexandre de Rhodes
to speakit "with as much facility as they do in Lisbon", alongwith Spanish,French,
Arabic, Malay and Makassarese.6lPattingalloangwas even rumolred to be on the
brink of cpnversionto Christianitybut, as in the caseof his contemporary,King
Narai of Siam, this seemsto have been wishful thinking on the part of the mis-
sionaries.62 His interest in discussingChristianity with visitors such as Alexandre
de Rhodesand his readingof Spanishworks of devotionwas in reality only one
aspectof his intenseintellectualcuriosityand his admirationfor Europeanculture
and scienceand did not arise from any secretconvictioneither that Christianity
was true or that Islam was false. His desireto be informed in mattersof religion
was no differentfrom his desireto purchasemapsand globesor "Galileanprospec-
tive glasses"from Europe.63
From a purely practicalpoint of view, the Makassaresesaw the Portugueseas
their most reliablealliesagainstthe Dutch, who by the 1630shad alreadybecome
convincedthat ultimately the only way they could gain completecontrol over the
trade of Makassar would be by force. The Portuguese,as they were beaten out
of their strongholdsin easternIndonesiaone by one and their shippingconsequently
becameever more vulnerableto attack from their numerousAsian and European
rivals, saw the alliancewith Makassaras essentialfor the maintenanceof their
remainingccmmercialinterestsin the area. It is therefore no wonder that this
alliance held firm right up until the final fall of Makassar to the Dutch. Nor is it
surprising that the Portuguesewho had settled in Makassarkept it, as the English
merchantHenry Short declared,"for their secondMelaka and tradedthere as secure-
1yas if they had not an enemyleft in the Indies becausethey have not oncebeen
attackedthere",64and were not finally compelledto depart until after the Dutch
conquest.
In 1666 a Dutch force under Cornelis Speelman,assisted by an army of
discontentedBugis led by Arung Palakkaof Bone,who was intent on revengefor
the defeat of Bone by the Makassaresein 1644,and a contingentof Ambonese
commandedby a certainCaptainJonker,besiegedand capturedMakassar.By the
Treaty of Bongayaof November1667SultanHasanuddinwas compelledto agree
to expelall non-DutchEuropeansfrom the kingdomand neveragainto allow them
"to enter or conducttrade" in Makassar,to forbid all "Indian nations",whether
"Moors"(IndianMuslims),Javanese,Malays,Acehneseor Siameseto bring to the
Makassarmarket any Coromandel,Surat, Persianor Bengalclothsand wares or
any Chinesegoods,"sinceonly the Companywill be allowedto do this", to exempt
the V.O.C. from all import and export duties,to renounceall suzeraintyover the
156 John Villiers

Iands of the Bugis and Luwu, to ceasefrom any interference in Bima, to abandon
all claimsto overlordshipin Selayarand Muna, the east coast of Sulawesifrom
Manadoto Pansiano,the Banggaiand Gapi Islands,and the landsbetweenMan-
dar and Manado which formerly belongedto Ternate, to destroy all the fortifica-
tions alongthe coastexceptat Sompaopu,to acceptDutch overlordshipand a Dutch
monopolyover all trade and to pay an enornous indemnity of 250,000rijksdmlders
in five successiveseasons,"in cannon,goods,gold, silver or jewels." 65
Thus were the Makassarese,"the fighting cocks of the East"66as the Dutch had
dubbedthem, overwhelmedby an alliancebetweenthe V.O.C., anxiousto wrest
control of the Moluccanspice trade from them, and the Bugis of Bone and Sop-
peng, resentful of their harsh overlordship.In 1660William Mainstone,the English
factor in Makassar,had written that, in his view, if the Dutch conqueredMakassar,
it would meanthe end of all trade there, "for the country hath nothingnative,the
Portugueseare banished,the Malayansfled, the Manilla-mengone to Siam and
here none to deal with." He was certain that the Dutch would "un-nestus (who
are the eyesore),unburgh the Portuguese,dispersethe Malaysiansand disen-
able those kings from ever hurting them again."67His prognosticationproved
only too accurate.When, after anotherlong siege,Makassarfinaily capitulated
to the Dutch in 1669,the Sultan was forced to abdicateand the Dutch assumed
direct rule, it swiftly fell into decay.Many of the inhabitantsof southwestSulawesi,
both Bugis and Makassarese,emigratedor revertedto piracy, while the Porfuguese,
Englishand Chinesetraderstransferredtheir businessto Banjarmasin.Banjarmasin
thus becamea new centre for the carrying trade in easternIndonesia,though never
on the scalethat had briefly made Makassar "the universal mart of those parts of
the world", and "its sovereignpowerful."68

NOTES

1. Abdurrahim and G.J.Wolhoff (eds.),&djarah C,oa(Makassar,n.d.), 18. The Makassarese

and Buginesechroniclesare notablefor their concernfor historical accuracyrather than
for merelygiving an idealizedaccountof the deedsand exploits,real and imagined,of
impossiblyheroic rulers. The Makassaresefor'chronicle'is pattorioloang,which means
"the things concerningthe peopleof former times." Their use of this term indicateshow
they themselvessaw the function and purposeof suchrecords. SeeNoorduyn,J., "Origins
of South CelebesHistorical Writing", in Soedjatmoko(ed.), An Introductionto Indone-
sian Historiograph! (lthaca, New York, 1965), 140, n.1.
2. On the oflice of syahbanfur(sabannara)in MakassarseeG.J. Resink,Indonesia'sHistorl
between the Myths (The Hague, 1968),51.
e Th. G.Th. Pigeaud,Jauain theFourteenthCentury:A Studyin Cultural History, III (The
Hague,1960),17.
4 . lronard Y. Andaya, The Heritnge of Arung Palakhn:A History of SouthSuktuesi (Celebes)
Century,VKI 9l (The Hague, 1981),23-24.
in the Seuenteenth
 trlakassar:Its Riseand Fall r57

5. The first of the polities in south Sulawesito evolve from a loose confederationof com-
munities into a unified kingdom seemsto have been Luwu, and this developmentwas
no doubt partly the result of the wealth it derived from the export of iron. SeeAndaya,
Arung Palakka, 18.
6. ArmandoCortesio (trans..anded.),ThcSumaOrientalof ToniPires,l(London: Haklqt
Society, 1944), 156, 227.
7 . I b i d . ,I , t 7 2 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 6 .
8. For a detailed and authoritative account of the Bajau, see David E' Sopher, The Sea
Nomads:A Studyof thc Maritinw Boat Peoplcof fuutheastAsra (Singapore, 1965),129-62
and passim.
9. Cortesio, Suma Oriental,I,226-27.
10. Speelman,Cornelis, "Notitie dienendevoor eenen Korte Tijd en tot nader last van de
Hoge Regeringop Bataviavoor den Onderscoopman Jan van Oppijen" (1669).Typescript
in possession of Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-enVolkenkunde,Leiden,I, 43.
11. For the identificationof Siang(Siao,Siam)with Pangkajene,which is now generally
accepted,seeA. Ligrvoet, "Transcriptievan het dagboekder Vorstenvan Gowaen Tallo"
BKI 28 (1880):107.
12. The full text of Paiva'saccountwith commentary and notes is given in Hubert Jacobs
S.J.,"The First Locally DemonstrableChristianityin Celebes,1544",Studia17 (April,
1966):251-305.
1.3. The sandalwoodof Sulawesiwas consideredto be of very inferior quality. Cristobal da
Costa wrote that "the sandalwoodof Macaga is of no account for it is bad and there
is little of it. The best and most highly prized sandalwoodis the yellow or citrine from
the islands of Timor, where there is much white sandalwoodand rather less citrine,
which is much more aromatic and retains its fragrance for 1onger."See Jaime Walter
(ed.), TratadodasDrogase MedicinasdasIndias Orientaispor Cristoudoda Cosla(Lisboa,
1964),106. Garciada Orta saysthat there was a forest of sandalwoodin Makassar,but
so bad that it was not worth going there to buy |t, (bra tam ruim que o ndo com|lauam,
a por issondoforam h ior elln'\. See Conde de Ficalho (ed.), Cofuiquios dos Simplese
Drogasdn Indin por Garcia da Mn, II (Lisboa, 1895), 283.
I 4 . Jacobs,"Christianityin Celebes",294.
-LJ. Ibid.,284-85.
1 6 . "Informag6esde Manuel Pinto ao Bispo de Goa sobrealgumasconversdesem lVlacaEar"
Malaca, 7 December 1548,in Artur Basilio de Sd,Docailrcnto{aoParaa Histrtria dasMissoes
do PadroadoPortugu€sdo Oriente.Insulindia I (Lisboa, 1954), 589-94.
17. Ibid.,590-91.
18. Ibid.,593.
19. Abdurrahim and Ridwan Borahima,SejarahKerajaan Tallo'(Ujtng Pandang,1975),6.
20. Ibid.,5-7. The name Garassi'derivesfrom JavaneseGrise/Gresik.
2r. Ibid.,9.
'Notitle', III, 57.
?2. Speelman,
23. Ibid. Ann Kumar in her summary account of the developmentof society in southwest
Sulawesiin "Developments in four societiesover the sixteenthto eighteenthcenturies",
in Harry Aveling (ed.), The Deuelopment of IndonesianSociefifrom the Comingof Islam
to the PresentDay (New York, 1980)repeatsthe old generaiization,which the evidence
of Tom6 Pires suggestsis fallacious,that the "small polities of southwestSulawestwere
until the sixteenth century pureiy aglarian" and that the emergenceof this area as a
trading centre was initially causedby Malay traders settling there after the Portuguese
conquestof Melaka in 1511.
158 John Villiers

24. Abdurrahim and WolhoJf, SedjarahGM,29,39-42, 49; Abdurrahim and Borahima,,9-

jarah Kerajaan Talh', 10-71.
25. Ibin.,14.
26. Abdunahim and Wolhoff , SedjarahC,ffi, 55-56. The name Tunipasuru'means"he who
was overthrown."
27. Abdurrahim and Borahima, SejarahKerajaaan Tallo',73-15. On Matoaya'scareer and
achievementssee Anthony Reid, "A great seventeenth century Indonesian family:
Matoaya and Pattingalloangof Makassar",MasyarakatIndonesiaVIII-I (June, 1981):
5- 19. Matoaya was a man of exceptionallyvaried talents ranging from shipbuilding to
theology and from gunnery to dancing.
28. Abdurrahim and Wolhoff, SedjarahGoa, 22.
29. Ibid.,28.
30. Ibid.,27-28.
31. B. Schrieke, IndonesinnSociologicalStudies,I (1r'- Hague, Bandung, 1955), 66-67.
32. Ibid.. 67. 72.
33. Ibid., 66.
34. M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asinn Tradeand EuropeanInfluencein the IndonesianArchi.
pehgo between1500 and about 1630 (The Hague, 1962), 258-60.
35. SeeAndaya,Arung Palakha,35, 46.
36. Schrieke, IndonesianSociologicalStudies,l, 66.
37. Meilink-Roelofsz,Asian Trade,386. n. 115.
38. SeeJohn Villiers, "One of the especiallestflowers in our garden: The English Factory
at Makassar, 1613-1667".Paper presentedat the XXXIst CISHAAN, Tokyo and
Kyoto, August/September 7983.Archipel (in press).
39. Schrieke, Ind,onesinnSociologicalStudies,1, 70.
40. HeatherSutherland,"Slaveryand the SlaveTrade in SouthSulawesi1660s-1800s", in
Anthony Reid (ed.), Slauery,Bondageand Dependencyin Southeast,4sra(Queensland.
1983),266-68.
41. JeanGeimanTaylor, The SocialWoild of Batautt: Eurofean and Eurastrn in DutchAsia
(Madison:University of WisconsinPress, 1983),18. The decreeis in J.A. van der
Chijs (ed.), Nederlandsch-Indisch
Plakaatboek1602-1811, III (Batavia, 1885-1900).
145-46.
42. Speelman,'Notitie', III, 11.
43. Abdurrahim and Borahima, SejarahKerajaan Tallo', 18.
44. "Beschrijvinghe van de tweede Voyagie ghedaenmet 12 Schepennaer d'Oost-Indien
onderden Heer Admirael Stevenvan der Hagen",in IssacCommelin(ed.),Beginendt
Voortganghuan de VereenigdeNederlantscheGeoctroyeerdeOost-IndischeCompagnie,III
(Amsterdam,1646),82.
45. Reid, 'Matoayaand Pattingalloang', 9; Schrieke,IndonesianSociologimlStudies,I, 67.
SeealsoF.H. Van Naerssenand R.C. De Iongh, Thc Economicand AdministratiueHiston
of Early Indonesia(Leiden/Ko1n,7977),93-95. Until the end of the sixteenth century
most of the rice of Japara,which from 1599was under the dominationof Mataram.
went to PortugueseMelaka, where it was only half the price of Gresik or Makassar
rice. See Meilink-Roelofsz. Asian Trade. 286- 87.
46. Schrieke,IndanesianSociological Studies,I,68-69.
47. Ibid., 68.
\[ahassar:Its Riseand Fall 159

-i8. Reid, "Matoaya and Pattingalloang", 12. In the last years before the Dutch conquest
of Makassar, the mas suffered frequent debasements,and as a result Spanishdollars
became a profitable import, 100 of them in 1655 fetching between 200 and 210 mas
(India Office Library, G/10/1,Makassarto Bantam, 1 May 1655,ff. 112-13).
+9. Reid,"Matoayaand Pattingalloang", 13-15. On the questionof the exactdateof the con-
versionof Gowa and Tallo'to Islam, now generallyagteedto have been 1605,see J.
Noorduyn,"South CelebesHistoricalWriting", 745-47.
i0. Reid, "Matoayaand Pattingalloang",16-17.
11. J. Noorduq, Een achttiend.e-eeuwse
Kronieh uan Wadjo': Buginese Historiografie
(s'Gravenhage,
1955),268-69.
i2. Andaya,Arung Palakka,32-35.
a3. Ibid.,4I-42.
r+. F.W. Stapel, Het Bongaais Verdrag(Leiden, 1922), 14.
)r. Ibid., Il-12.
56. Schrieke, IndonesianSociologimlStudies,7, 65.
57. Stapel,Het BongaaisVerdrag,62.See also Andaya,Arung Palakka,46-47.
;8. Ibid.,47.
i9. J.S. Cummins(ed.), The Traaeband Controuersizs
of Friar DomingoNaaanete,1618-86,
I (London:Haklult Society,1962),114 n. 1.
a0. C.R. Boxer, Francism Vieira deFigueiredn:A PortugueseMerchantAduenturerin South
futst Asin, 1624-1667 ('s-Gravenhage,1967\,4. Vieira was the leadingPortuguesemer-
chantin Makassarfrom 1642till his final departurein April 1665for Larantukain Flores,
where he died two years later.
o1. Alexandar de Rhodes,5.1., Diuers uoyages et rnissionsdu P. Alemndre de Rhodesen la
Chineet autresRoyaumes de I'Orient, III, (Paris, 1653),34-38.
i2. Reid, "Matoayaand Pattingalloang"24.
o3. The numerouspresentsof books, firearms, cartogyaphicand astronomicalinstruments
and other curiosities which Pattingalloang and others sought from the English are describ-
ed in Villiers, "One of the especiallestflowers".
o1. Dagh-Register gehoudenint CasteelBatauiauantpasserende daer ter plaetseals ouergeheel
Nederlandts-Indin, 1624-1682, XVII (Batavia/'s-Gravenhage, 1900),113-34.
o5. The terms of the Treaty of Bongaya are given in Andaya, Arung Palakka, Appendix
B, 305-07.
c6. Boxer, FranciscoVieira,5.
47. JauaFactoryRemrds,IndiaOffice Library, 3, iii, f.175. Quotedin Boxer,FranciscoVieira,
27-28.
08. Cummins,Friar DomingoNauanete,I, 113-14.
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I
Lordsof the GreatRiuer:TheMagindanaoPort
and Polity During the Seuenteenth
Century

RUURDJELAARHOVEN

The socialconditionsof thesepeoplemusthavebeensimilarto thosein therestof

theIPhilippine]Archipelago
until thearrivalof someArabmissionaries whoinstructed
them in Isiamwhile settlingpermanentlyin the Rio Grande[Pulangi]to be more
acceptable to thepeopleandmakethemmoretractable [to theirteaching].Theyin-
troducedsomereligiouspractices,intermarriedwith the women,adoptedthe native
language andmanycustomsof the country,adjustedthemselves to the socialorder,
acquiredmanyslavesto enhance their importance, andmergedthemselves into the
datuclasswhichwasthehighestc1ass. Workingtogetherwith moreskill andharmony
thanthenatives,andpossessing slaveslike thelatter,theyprogressively consolidated
theirpowerandformeda confederacy till theyfinallyestablisheda form of monarchy
whichtheymadehereditaryin a familyamongwhosemembersthedatuswouldelect
a sultan.r

Centuriesbeforethe Spaniardsand the Dutch cameto write aboutthe inhabitants

of the broad deltaic plain of the Pulangi River of Western Mindanao, whose
greatnessearnedit the Spanishtitle of Rio Grandede Mindanao,there had been
tribes and chiefdoms dotting the mangrove coasts and the forested highlands
surroundingthe rich river valleys. The evolution of this sparselysettled territory
into a trading kingdom is a processthat deservesserioushistorical study. The
dynamicfactorsbehindthe rise of the MagindanaoSultanatewere similarto those
that brought about the predominanceof such powerful regional and international
entrepOtsas Melaka, Aceh, Johor,Banten,Brunei, Makassar,Ternate and Sulu.
The caseof Magindanaoas a port and polity,.a typical SoutheastAsian harbour
principality ruled by native Muslim raja, is instructive because it brings into
comparativerelief the nature and characteristicsof these dynamic factors. The
''Lords
of the Great River" were skilful rulers, comparableto the best in the Malay-
Indonesianworld of the seventeenthand eighteenthcenturies,preciselybecause
theyunderstoodand utilizedthe naturalproductsof their environment,the talents
of their subjects,the strategicresourcesof their location,and the statecraftpotential
of Islam as a countervailingideologyin dealingwith the Spaniardsand the Dutch
rvho came to trade, Christianize,and subjugatethem.

161
r62 Ruurdje l-aarhouen

In this essayI highlightthe historicalinteractionamongthe variouscomponents

that operatedto impei the Magindanaorulers to expandtheir kingdom'ssize,power,
prestige,and dealingswith foreign powers.After briefly describingthe geographical
setting of the estuarinekingdom, this essaywill trace the careersof some early raja
such as Buisan, Sirongan,and Kudrat, whose actionsand policiestowards the
Spaniardsand the Dutch laid the foundationfor Magindanao'stransformationand
expansion.The territorial and political alliancesthat provided the demographic
infrastructureof the kingdom will alsobe dealt with. The rest of the article contains
specificexamplesof how the Lords of the Great River createdpoliciesand handled
day-to-dayeconomicand political issuesaffecting the state as a whole and con-
cerning specific groups and institutions. Eventually Magindanaodeciined,as
did other ports and polities in traditional SoutheastAsia. At the zenith of its
power,however,the Lords of the GreatRiver were fearedand respectedby native
subjectsand foreign traders alike.
The Magindanaoare settled in the valleys and on the plains surroundingthe long
and meanderingPulangi River2and its tributaries.The Pulangihas its origin in
the Budkidnon massif in north central Mindanao.It snakessouth towards the
LiguasanMarsh, from where it bendsin a northwesterlydirectionand soonbranches
out into a deltaicplain facing Illana Bay. This river systemseasonallyoverflows
its banksto form extendedflood-plainsresemblinga lake or danao,the root word
for Magindanao,which refers to the peoplethat settledin the country about the
lake. The island of Mindanao derives its name from the once most powerful
MagindanaoSultanatethat thrived in this estuarineprincipality.
According to the people of Magindanao, their mythological hero is Raja
Indarapatra,who camefrom a very great city calledMantapuli far in the land of
the sunsetbeyondthe sea.Both thesenamesare often mentionedin the Muslim
legends.According to the genealogiesof the local datu, Islam was brought to these
localitiesby Sharif MuhammedKabungsuwan.Theserecords,the tarsib or salsilnh.
usuallywritten in the Magindanaoianguagewith Arabic characters,3 tell of Sharif
Kabungsuwan'sarrival at the end of the fifteenth century or the beginning of the
sixteenth centurya with a large number of seafaring followers from Johor.
Presumablyhe first settledin Malabang.sThough the processof Islamizationis
thought to have started earlier, the zeal and influence of Sharif Kabungsuwan
acceleratedit, particularlythrough the multiple marriagesand political alliances
he establishedwith the local dntu clans.There are faint indicationsthat he used
force to get himself established.oSomesalsilah also mention the coming of Arab
Muslim missionaries.They arrived in Magindanaofrom the west via Brunei and
Sulu,and by way of Ternate and Saranganifrom the south.The bishopof Manila
wrote to King Philip II of Spainin 1588that the laws of Mohammedwere publicll'
proclaimedin Mindanaoand that the religiousmen built mosques,orderedthe boys
to be circumcised,establishedschools,and taught the reading of the Koran.-
Theseconversionsto Islam during the sixteenthcenturyalsointroducedltew cultwal
traits, changesin valuesand a new governmentalorganization.The Magindanao
ruling datu adaptedto the new ways of life and showedpride in keeping up Islamic
teachingsand practices.By the turn of the seventeenthcenturypracticallyall the
ruling families amongstthe Magindanaowere Muslims. Anyone who wanted to
be identifiedas a Magindanaonot only spokethat languagebut was alsoMuslim.'
Inrds of tfu GreatRiuer 163

The Islamic prohibitions againstdrinking wine and eating pork were enforcedand
Islamic attitudes were speciallystrengthenedthrough oppositionto the Spaniards,
who tried to colonizeand Christianizethe peopleof the flood-plain.In retaliation
for Spanishintrusionsand occupationof the VisayasIslandsand Luzon, the Magin-
danao,with the help of allies from Ternate, Sangihe(Sangir),Borneo,and Sulu,
stagedannualraids and attacksto harassthe Europeaninvadersand their followers.
Not only did the Magindanaowant to teach their northern neighboursa lessonby
courageouslyresisting the Spanishoverlords, but they were also competing with
the Spaniardsfor the resources(principally slaves)and the tribute to be collected
in the Visayas.e
This is clearly shown in a speechwhich Datu Kapitan Laut (Admiral Buisan)
gave to the local dntu of Leyte whom he ordered to meet him after he had raided
their territory in 1603. It was not so much for the ransom,he said, that he had
sent for them, but to ask them to considerwell what advantagesthey derived from
being tributary to Spain. Had the Spaniardsbeen able to protect them? Had they
beenableto protect the peopleof Panay,Mindoro, and Balayan?But if they allied
themselvesto the Magindanao,they would have him, Buisan, for their friend, and
not as he was now, much to his regret, their foe. Let them further considerhow
easy it would be for them to throw off the hated yoke with the help of the Magin-
danao.The Spaniards,after all, were only a handful, nor were they as invincible
as they madethemselvesout to be. Let the peopleof Leyte be resolute;let them
prepareto rise as one man. The following year he, Buisan,would comewith a great
armada and together they would sweep the island clean of Spaniards.l0This
oratory was followed by a blood compact, an old custom in the islands, whereby
somebloodof eachof the partiesto the contractwas mixed togetherin a common
cupof arak and dnrnk by all of them. It signified brotherhood,solidarity, and trust.
After this ceremdny Brrisanvoyaged back to Magindanao. He did not return the
next year to Leyte becausethe Spaniardsgot wind of his plans and quickly rein-
forced their naval and military outposts in the area.
Back in Buayan, Buisan was welcomed by all the datu of the Great River who
had assembled,together with some foreign dignitaries from Brunei and Sulu, at
the court of.the raja of Buayan, Sirongan.One of the valuable captiveswhom Datu
Buisandeliveredto Sironganwas a Jesuitpriest namedHurtado. Raja Sirongan,
who was a learnedman, often sent for Hurtado in order to discussreligious matters
with him.ll This behaviourwas very characteristicof most Magindanaorulers. In
1700Sultan Kuday was known to have soughtto engageforeign visitors in con-
versationwheneverhe could find the time. He liked to discussworld affairs with
them and was especiallyintrigued to hear how Europeanrulers lived and govern-
ed. He alsoinquiredaboutthe habitsand customsof other nations.He alwaysput
many questionsto his guestsand made efforts to learn their languagefrom them.
He is known to have written and spokenSpanishas fluently as if it were his mother
tongue.He alsospoke,in additionto his nativeMagindanao,Chinese,Englishand
Dutch.
In the late sixteenth century Raja Sironganlived and ruled at Buayan,the major
centre of Magindanaopower.12The title of raja of Buayanwhich Sirongancarried
impliedtwo distinctareasof jurisdiction.As datuhe ruled the placecalledBuayan,
which was traditionallylocatednear the junction of the Bacatand PulangiRivers,
164 Ruurdje Laarhouen

a very strategic point indeed and approximately 50 kilometres inland from Illana
Bay. The other meaningof the title had a wider significancesimilarto that of ruler
of the Buayan realm, which included territories of allied datu clansand probably
rotated amongst the major d.atuf.amilies.This successionrule would explain why
the genealogyof the sultanateof Buayandoesnot show a direct line of succession
and why the ruling raja of Buayandid not always live in the place called Buayan.13
The influence and territory of the raja of Buayan radiated to the north, east and
south of Tumbao and includedthe Liguasanmarshand Lake Buluan,with an outlet
to the seaat SaranganiBay. The Buayanpeoplein the upper valley were known
by the Magindanaosas sa-rarain contrastto the sa-iludpeopleliving in the lower
valley, the areaoccupiedby the coastalMagindanao.Buayan'sprosperitywas based
on agriculture,especiallyrice, which was grown in the fertile irrigated plainsthat
were surroundedby the hills and mountains.
The'Alforese'or hill peoplesuch as the Tiruray and Tagoloanwere probably
the original inhabitants,who had refusedto adopt Islam and had retreatedinland.r{
Each settlement paid tribute and had a ritual bonding relationship or seketasteel
with a certain Magindanaod.atu.\sThe uplanderstraded beeswax,tobacco,rattan
and other tropical rain forest products for iron agricultural implements,cloth, salt
and variousgoodsusedin the paymentof bride-pricesand legal settlements.The
Buayanraided the other hill tribes to whom they were not bonded for slaves.Some
of theseslavesthey usedto fight in their wars, to work in the fields and as household
servants.Somethey took as wives,and somethey sold in the slavemarket. There
was no shortageof manpowerin Buayan.16
Buayan'spolitical structure was only one degree more centralized than that of
its northern neighbours inLuzon and the Visayas. What raised the Magindanao
abovethe peoplein the Spanish-occupied territories was an additionallayer or class
on top of the pyramidal social structure of slaves, freemen, dntu and chieftains.
Above theselast were the royalty, the raja and the princescalled'kacil . Concerning
theseLa Costawrote that:17

Thedomination of thesewarlordsgaveto theMagindanaos a cohesion

andsolidarity
andactionwhichthepeoples
of purpose of thenorthhadnotyetattained.
TheMagin-
danaos had,in fact,almostarrivedat the ideaof feudalkingship.

It seemsthat early in the seventeenthcentury the Magindanao royal datu clans

and lesserdatuwho were alliedwith them went througha crucialstrugglefor con-
trol, which resulted in a new alignment of power structures in both the sa-rayaand
sa-iludworlds of Magindanao.
Datu Kapitan Laut Buisan,the commanderon many occasionsof the Magindanao
piraticalfleets,soonstartedto asserthimself. When the Jesuit,Hurtado,formerll-
Buisan'scaptive,returnedto Sirongan'scourt as ambassadorfrom Manila with manr'
gifts for the raja of Buayan but only very few for Buisan, the latter was so
offendedthat he left the court in anger,threateningto sell Hurtado as his slave
to a Ternatanbuyer. Buisanarguedthat the ransomfor the Jesuit,a swivel gun.
had not yet been paid to him.18
Buisanleft Buayanfor Magindanaosa-iludand set up a rival confederacyalong
the coastof Illana Bay.1eThere were severalfactorsthat probablycontributedto
ktrds of the GreatRiuer 165

the subsequentinternal reorganization in the Magindanao world, although little

is known aboutthe detailsof this change.Magindanaodropsout of Spanishhistorical
recordsbetween 1609 and 1635.No raids took place during this period and, by
1600, the Spaniardshad left zamboangaand transferred their garrison to cebu.
A few years later, the fleet of Governor Pedro Bravo de Acuia passedby Magin-
danaoon its way to attack rernate. The Spaniardssucceededin expellingthe
Ternatan Sultan and his men from their fort, which they seizedand kept in their
possession until 1663.This whole event struck such fear amongthe Magindanao
that they decided to write a conciliatory letter to Acuia, begging him for pardon
and hoping thereby to avoid a fate similar to Ternate.2o
Since 1599 the Dutch had been coming to the spice islands and had allied
themselveswith the Ternatans.on 26 May 1607Admiral cornelis Matelief and
the Ternatan officials concludeda pact in which the Dutch promisedthe Ternatans
protection, while the latter gave the Dutch the monopoly on cloves. Both parties
agreednot to sign a peacetreaty with either the Spaniardsor the Portuguese.For
economic,strategic and religious reasons,this pact and the subsequentrenewals
of it were all mutually beneficial.2lSharedantagonismtowardsthe Spaniardswas
a major factor behind this Dutch-Ternatanalliance.Becauseof it, the geographical
locationof the dominantMagindanaoin the southernPhilippinesbecameof vital
strategicimportance.The Europeantradersand nativechiefscameto regardthis
region betweenthe trading Spanishnorth (Manila) and the monopolizingDutch
south(Ternate)differently;southernMindanaotook on a new significancein the
tradeand politics of the easternarchipelago.Changingtrade patternsand migra-
tions of peoplein responseto Europeanintrusionsin the first half of the seven-
teenth century had brought about the rapid growth of such Muslim kingdoms as
.\ceh, Makassarand Banten.Similarly, the suddenrise of Magindanaowas part
rf the same pattern.22
Buisan, who ranked third in the Magindanaohierarchy after Sirongan and the
raja muda, had suffered so many indignities over the years in the wars against the
Spaniardsthat, as we have seen,he left the court at Buayan and settled with the
raja mud.oin the region at the mouth of the Pulangi River in Magindanaosa-ilud.
He married there the daughterof Datu Dalamba,who lived at Silangan(where
CotabatoCity stands today). Buisan's mother was possibly from Malabang.23
Thesekinship connectionsfacilitated the consolidationof his alliance network. In
:ime, Buisan came to rule the whole coast along Iliana Bay, while Sirongan
:emainedthe petty king of the up river dynasty.2a The former was assistedin his
:ight for dominanceby his son Kachil Kudrat.2s
It seemsthat Kudrat had wageda war againstBuayanin about 1616,which ended
rn a truce with the Buayan raja. BecauseKudrat forbade them to raid against the
Spaniards,the Buayanwere much impoverished.By the 1630sthe raja of Btayan's
rower and authority had weakenedto such an extent that he had to acknowledge
Kachil Kudrat as supreme'king'.26The Spaniardshad tried to sow dissensionsbet-
'.veenthe Buayan and
the Magindanao,2T which caused both parties to send
rccasionalambassadorsto the Dutch in Ternate with a requestto arbitrate between
:hem.28
The Dutch, however,had good reasonfor maintaininga neutral stancein these
Buayan-Magindanaodisputes;they were in favour of building up Magindanaoas
 166 Ruurdje Laar/nucn

a buffer zonebetweenthemselvesin the Moluccasand the Spaniardsin the north.

They did not want to interfere unlessSpanishintrusion threatenedto expandto
the Moluccas.2eFrom Ternate they kept a close watch on the situation and
provided the Magindanaoat intervals with ammunition,lead, or armaments.3O
Moreover, the Dutch naval fleets were so occupiedin Philippine waters and
elsewherethat they could not spareany more ships or men to assistthe Magin-
danao.This left Kudrat free and unencumbereduntii 1635,when the Spaniards
came to settle again in Zamboangaafter an absenceof 35 years.31During this
period of Spanish inactivity , Kudrat had beenable to expand his infTuence.He was
living at Tubok in the late 1620sandin Lamitan dwing the late 1630s.Both locations
are on the coastof Illana Bay. This showshis growing influenceamong the Iranun,
a group that is culturally and linguistically closelyrelated to the Magindanao.what
peo-
*I. -tr" important,Iranun kinship linkagesalignedthem directly with the
pleofMagindanaoproper.Tubok,Lamitan,andothercoastaltowns
datedtheir aicestry back tothe gr:andchildrenof Kudrat's uncle,Buisan'sbrother'32
Kudrat not only expandedhis influenceto the northwest,but also southward.
of
He had made a surprise attack on the SaranganiIslands, where the datuship
Kandahar,oneofthemajorhousesinMindanaoandrelatedtoBuayan,was
the
established.Having conqueredSaranganiin 1625,Kudrat promptly annexed
to his domain and made the people his vassals' They paid tribute to him
territory "and,
in wax gaveservices. Datu Mangada of Kandahar first fled to the mainland
and settledin Sangihe
of Uma"nuJacrossthe Saranganichannel,but later moved
Island.33
people:Muslims"Al{orese '
Datu Mangadaclaimedsupportfrom more than 4'000
people along the Davao
and Bajao in addition to his iollowing from amongst the
with a relative of Datu
Gulf. Kudrat may have sent his 'on, Tid"luy, together
and claim the villages that formerlv
rrlung"au to the Davao Gulf area to subjugate
ru"aun".., What is interesting to note is that in 1625Datu Mangada
;ffi;J;
Bajao amongst his following. This seems to supportthe
counted200 able-bodied
jesuit historian Juan Francisco Combes' who lived in
theory put forward by the
of Magindanao can be attributed to the
Mindanaofrom 1645to l6i7,that the rise
people called the Lutao.3s Dutch pressures
congregationin that placeof a seafaring
agricultural produc-
in the Moluccasdestroyedthe indigenoussystem of trade and
tion.TheimpactofDutchandSpanishpresenceintheeasternpartsofthelndone-
establishedpatterns
sian Archipelago causedsuch seriousdisruption in the locally
oftradethatseafaringpeopleandtraders(Arabs,Chinese'Malays)'whoselivelihooc
centresin whici
dependedon commerce,were forced to seek alternativetrade
They looked for trade centres and rulers who could still offer free
toio business.
base' In 1621 Chines<
ports.s Kudrat and his dntu suppliedan attractive trading
1628 boats were moored ir-
iraders were seen at Magindanao,and in Javanese
Tubok.
TernatehadalwayshadastronginfluenceinMindanao'asisshownbythe
quantityoftrafficbetweenthetwoplaces.3Tltisthereforenotsurprisingthatth;
maritime Bajau found ii to moie from Ternate to Magindanaoand assist::,
""rv gave Kudrat adde:
the developmentof the latter as a flourishing trade centre. This
to build up his navy, increasehis trade, extrac:
strengthand technicalmanpower
expand his realm. To deal with the increaseddemands of foreig:'
more tribute, and
Lords of the Great Riacr
167

merchantsKudrat had set up an atis bicara,a councilof advisers,elders,and royal

members,which dealt with matters pertainingto internal and externalaffairs in
governmentand commerce,formulatednew policiesand revisedold ones.when
overseasofficialsarrived with letters from their respectivegovernments,they would
be receivedby Kachil Kudrat and his council.3s
In 1635,during a periodwhen Dutch navalforceswere not presentin philippine
rvaters,the Spaniardsreturnedto Mindanao.They built a fort at La Caldera,near
zamboanga,and there they remaineduntil 1663.Strategicallyit was an excellent
locationfrom which to keep an eye on the major sea-lanesbetweenthe north and
the south. When the Dutch returned again to harass their arch-enemies,the
Spaniardswere quick to concludea peacetreaty with Kudrat in 1645in order to
prevent him assistingthe Dutch war vesselswith his fleets. In this treaty the
Spaniardsrecognizedthat the whole territory from the SibugayRiver in Zamboanga
to the DavaoGulf was tributary to SultanKudrat. Severalother pointsconcerning
Magindanao-Spanish relationswere also agreedupon.3eHowever,the treaty was
silent on the questionof the position of the raja of Buayan.
Also in 1645,Kudrat had settledin the land of his father Buisan,alongthe Simoay,
a short river a few miles north of the Pulangi and closeto Polluc Harbour. He had
manycotta(kota)builtalongthe branchesand at checkpointsin the Pulangidelta.
\:arious datu wilh their peoplegatheredaround him like beesin a hive.a0Kudrat then
formally assumedthe title of Sultan.He was the first MagindanaoSultan,and as
a Tranun once remarked, "the datu of datus".
Kudrat and his successorswere also the highest religious officials and legal
authorities.That doesnot meanthat they led discussionsin the bicara,butrather,
:t was notedthat the Sultanwould sit in a meditativeposewhile iistening.He acted
accordingto the rules of behaviourthat he was expectedto obey.alHowever, in
any disputehe was also expectedto have the last word basedon what he considered
:o be a fair and wise judgment. It was also observedthat the raja mufut always
;onversedthroughan interpreteror anotherthird person,althoughhe understood
lery well the Malay language, which was the lingun franca tn the Magindanao
:rarbourprincipality.Someof the qualitiesideally ascribedto the office of Sultan
or datuwere oratoricalskill, devout religiousbehaviour,goodjudgment, generosity,
and an aura of authority.4zSuccessionto the sultanatein Magindanaowas only
rartly patrilineal; it passedfrom the Sultan to his brother, eldestson, or nephew.a3
The sultanateof Magindanao,with its capital at Sirnoay,officially datesfrom
,rnly 1645,but it had beengerminatingsincethe latter part of the sixteenthcentury.
It strengthenedconsiderablyunder the skilful rule of Sultan Kudrat (1645-71) and
.'vasconsolidatedunderhis
eldestgrandsonand secondSultanof Magindanao,Sultan
Barahaman,who reigned fuom167l to 1699.The Spaniardswere in Zamboanga
:or only 28 yearsduring the seventeenthcentury. Therefore,most of what is known
aboutthe sultanateat this time comesnot from Spanishsourcesbut from the diaries,
:eportsand correspondence of Dutch EastIndia Companyofficialsand traderswho
:egularly visited Magindanao.The political transformationthat occurredin Magin-
:anaosocietyduring the absenceof the Spaniardshasbeensummedup by La Costa,
''rhodescribesthe considerable
advancesin the direction of centralizedgovernment
,hus:aa
168 RuurdjeLanrhouen

The semi-feudal with whichAcuia andevenCorcuerahadto dealwith

confederacies
werenow full-fledgedsultanates courtsof justice,and
with a fiscaladministration,
of a rudimentary
a bureaucracy werestill possible
kind.Internaldisturbances andfre-
quentlyoccurred,buttheywerenotsomuchcontests betweenbaronsof roughlyequal
poweras strugglesfor a throneadmittedlysupreme.

The polity sustainedits existencethrough internal negotiations,compromises,and

agreements. There was no room in such circumstances for despotic or even
monarchical behaviour. All major decisionswere made with the consent of the
secularand Islamic leadership.a5
Several factors affected the maintenanceof the Magindanao state in the form
of a sultanate. Firstly, its geography, with a coast possessingexcellent harbour
facilities, supported by the large Pulangi River Valley with its tributaries and
mountain ranges around it, made it ideal for sustaining large populations. The
continuing development of the state can be largely explained by this favourabie
ecosystemof productionand its preservation.It seemsthat trade and certain social
mechanismsset up to attract people and absorb them were the main components
of the successfulconsolidation of the sultanate started by Kudrat in 1645. The
strength of the sultanateas a political institution was tested more than once. The
first such test was in 1648when the raja of Buayan died. A split between Buayan
and Magindanaowas prevented only becauseSultan Kudrat had given his sister
in marriage to Datu Manikior, who laid claim to the Buayan throne, and thus
neutralizedhim in favour of his rival, Raja Baratamay, the son-inlaw of the dead
Buayanraja.No oppositionto Kudrat was expectedfrom Baratamay,becausethe
latter had been trained as a prince at Kudrat's court.46Thus, in 1648Kudrat finalll-
became the supreme ruler of Magindanao sa-rayaand sa'ilud.
Another crucial moment came in 1671 when Kudrat himself died. Some datui
of the Buayan faction tried to regain their autonomy, but his grandson, Sultan
Barahamanwas able to take control over them. In the mid-1680sthe succession
was in doubt once more with the death of Raja Baratamay of Buayan. Sultan
Barahaman,with the assistanceof his brother Kuday and someEnglishmercenaries
under the commandof Captain Swan, led a campaigninto Buayan territory, burnt
the placeand sent thousandsfleeing into the marshes.Onceagain, theBtayan d.atu
becamesubjectto the coastalMagindanao.aT This successfulconquestof Buayan
by the Magindanao sa-ilud changedthe image of Magindanao in the eyes of the
surroundingdatu states.The victoriousMagindanaoacquiredyet more prestigeand
wealth, becauseCaptain Swan and some of the merchants on the ships with him
left much gold behind,which enabledthe Magindanaoto go to war next against
the Borneansand the Sulu people.asWhen Sultan Barahamandied in 1699,his
younger brother and successor,Sultan Kuday manipulatedthe sultanateto his own
ends,much to the enlryof Barahaman'ssons.As a result of a somewhatcomplicated
plot, Sultan Kuday was put to death a few years later at the handsof the Sulu Sultan.
Consequently,Barahaman'stwo sons, who were both married to women frorn
Buayan,once more allied Buayanto Magindanao;it was agreedthat one of the
sons,Anwar wor,rldsucceedas Sultan,while his half-brother,Manimir would become
mja muda.ae
From all the recordsle{t by the Europeanswho had dealingswith the Magin-
Lords of the Great Riuer 169

danaosultanateit can be ascertainedthat the Sultangenerallyruled and made deci-

sions with the consensusof his whole council. Actually, he ruled on two levels.
He was the mja for his own fief in the territory at the mouth of the Pulangi River,
while at the same time he was also the head of a self-defined Islamic nation. It
is difficult to differentiate between these two levels of rule. When there were
problems locally in Simoay that concernedhis immediate following, he exercised
practically the samepowers as if he were handling problems resulting from wars,
attacks or negotiationswith foreigners. The Sultan had no right to decide on matters
concerningnon-Magindanaowithin his territory. He could not interfere, for example,
when an Iranun stole a coat with golden buttons from a Dutch official, because
that was a matter for the d.aturesponsiblefor that particular Iranun to settle.so
However, when foreigners came with requests that might affect anyone in the
Sultan'srealm they were presentedto the state council.srThe d.atuand the chiefs
who were beholden to the Magindanao Sultan submitted to his jurisdiction, and
thus the Sultan could commandtheir servicesand those of their followers or claim
certain privileges, monopolies,and tributes. At the same time, he could rely on
them as allies whenever he neededmanned kora-korafor raiding or trading. The
local headmenon their part could go to the Sultan and his council to appeal for
their assistanceand arbitration in disputeswith other local dala and chiefs. Hence,
the realm of the MagindanaoSultan expandedand contracted according to his ability
and that of his advisersto satisfy the ruling class,the Islamic religious leadership,
and ultimately the people.
Just as there were two levels of political rule, one at the local d.atuleveland the
other at the level abovethe dntu, in other words the sultanate,there were also trllo
levels of identity of which the Magindanaorulers were aware. To Europeantraders
(the Spaniards,the V.O.C., and the E.LC.) the peopleof Magindanaowere one
nation, but to themselves the only real people of Magindanao were the ethnic
Magindanao-speaking Muslims, distinct from other ethnic elementsin the kingdom.
Thus, at the level of the sultanate the state consisted of many ethnic groupings
and nationalities.This was clearly stated in a letter which Sultan Barahamanwrote
in 1693 to GovernorVan der Duyn at Ternate, in which he said that:s2

The peopleof Magindanao certainlyareknownunderonename,but consistof many

differentnations.The customsof thewhitepeoplearenotknownhere,especially not
of thosefromabovethewinds.Ourcustoms areevencontraryto thoseof theMoluccan
nations.

This showsthat the Magindanaowere consciousof their multi-ethnic composition,

althoughthey might presenta commonfront to the outsideworld. It alsounderlined
the cultural differences between them and their neighbours in the Moluccas and
accentuateda still sharper contrast with the white people from above the winds,
whose customs they did not know.
The multi-ethnic groups that Sultan Barahamanreferred to in his sultanateformed
five spheresof influence. First, there were all the Iranun and the Bajau; second,
the Subanunand the Basilan; third, the Tiruray and other hill people;fourth, the
Buayan and Manobo; fifth, the Saranganiand all the coastalpeoplesalong the Davao
Gulf and the east coast of Mindanao up to Caraga.
I70 RuurdieInarhouen

The Iranun occupiedthe coastalareasaroundthe mouth of the Great River, Polluc

Harbour, and further round Illana Bay. They also spreadinland from the bay's
coastalfringe, north to the large Lake Lanaoand the small Lake Lanao,both called
'Iranun'.
The Iranun cameannuallyto the centre,where the Sultanresided,to pay
their tribute. Three such visiting Iranun parties from the large Lake Lanao,
Malimbok, and the Tubok-Pikon settlementswere recorded by the Dutch in
1700.53
About the sametime, anotherIranan datu,namedDouclan,camefi-omthe Malim-
bok River area,alsoto pay his dues.Datu Douclanhimselflived at Ballabagan,but
he ruled over the minor datu of Moulinok, Tawalang, Mattinus, Mattaban and
Budas.He could count on 3,000able-bodiedmen. On one occasionSultan Kuday
took Datu Douclanto the houseof someDutch Companyofficials who were staying
at Simoayat the time. The Sultanwas carried in a litter, becauseof an infected
right foot. He was dressedin a long white damaskgown. His keris, pistol, and side-
gun were next to him, and his following consistedof more than a hundred armed
men. The Sultan was seatedwith his son and Datu Douclan, while the Dutchmen
entertainedhim and the otherswith glassesof wine and music playedby the soldiers
on violins and flutes. Also, severalbottles of rose-waterwere used to wash the
Sultan'shead and face, which was the greatest honour that could be bestowed on
a sovereign.More than satisfied,the Sultan left with Datu Douclan and their
entourageafter a visit lasting two hours.
A month later, another Iranun party arrived. This time it was the brother of the
SengajiBulassiin Tubok, known asthe'meraja'(maharaja). He lived in Pikonbut he
ruled over the beachsettlementssuchas Balas,Pitabockan,Lamitan, Ibusleaganand
Marga. Two other royal princes,Bonsensuand Anwar, also lived in Tubok, but
had rebelled against the Sultan. They were dissatisfied with their uncle, Sultan
Kuday, and refused to pay tribute. In this coastal Iranun area could be counted
8,000 able-bodiedmen. The small Lake Iranun had ten settlementsaround it, ruled
by Datu Damack and Datu Buntok, who could supply 7,000 able-bodiedmen.
The merajahad come in four hora-korawith 200 followers. These were friendly
visits, offering an opportunityto renew contacts,see relatives,and do business.
Again, Sultan Kuday visited the Dutch, bringing with him, besidesthe meraja.
anotherforeign dignitary, the SyahbandarKindingan from Sulu. It shouldbe noted
here that, when the mertjawas receivedin audience,there were not just 200 Iranun
followers presentbut 500. This could mean that at least 300 Iranun from the Pikon
area were staying in Simoayand were thus able to join their kinsmen.
Although the Sultanand his datutreatedeachother in a friendly and polite manner.
the Magindanaoroyalty showed the greatest contempt for the Iranun population
living in or around the harbour principality. The Iranun were referred to as the
"so-calledfriends" of the Sultan and were portrayed as one of the least trusted and
wildest groups.The Sultan,his brother, and their messengersall warned foreigners
againstthese 'rogues'.For example,Dutch ships were often anchoredin Polluc
Harbour near the village of Sampenitang,which had about twenty huts. From there
the crew would walk to Simoay in half an hour. They also used to get fresh water
there and collect firewood. However, on severaloccasionsthey were told not to
go to this area becauseof the Iranun and were instead instructed to collect their
water and wood from the other side of the bay. This meant a two-hour boat ride
 Lords of the GreatRiter t7l

to Simoayinsteadof a thirty-minute walk. The Sultan had not doneanlthing about

the Iranun'smisbehaviour,becauseseriouskillings seldomoccurredthere. Punitive
erpeditionswere apparentlyundertakenonly if the Iranun becametoo bold. The
presenceof this Iranun group in Simoaywas also given as a reasonby the Sultan
for rejecting a requestmade in the 1680sby the English and Dutch to set up a
permanenttrading post in Magindanaoharbour. The Magindanaofearedthat when
the Europeanshipssailed,Ieavingonly a few men behindwith their trade goods,
the Iranun might burn or rob their housesand kill the men.The Iranun would then
disappearwith their booty into the forest, where they.wouldjoin the Alforese or
hill tribes,beyondthe reachof the Sultan.The Sultandid not havefull jurisdiction
over them, as they were under the direct authority of their own chiefs.
It is impossibleto give the exactnumberof Iranun in the MagindanaoSultanate,
but the listing of villages and of able-bodiedmen that could be recruited from them
showedthat they were numerous.A rough estimatewould be between90,000and
100,000.54
Comparedto the Iranun, the Bajauwere fewer in number.They movedaround
from shoreto shoreand could not be consideredas permanentsettlersin view of
their maritime life-style.They functionedas the sultanate'sfishermen,messengers,
shipbuilders,interpreters,harbour police and sea-raiders.To prevent the Bajau
from desertingthe Sultan, the Magindanaowould take all the older children of
the leading Bajau under their care in the negeri.
The Iranun and Bajauwere the coastalfront-linegroups.ssThey formed a very
importantcomponentin the network of alliancesthat the MagindanaoSultanshad
attractedto themselves,and the successand maintenanceof the Sultan'ssupremacy
over the region largely dependedon them.56
The secondgroup, the Subanunand the Basilan,occupiedthe area from Lake
Lanao to Zamboangaandthe island of Basilan.A report tells us that the numerous
Subanunwere rather submissiveto the Sultan of Simoay,and that Zambnnga's
gugugu, Pallowan and the kapitan laut, Mangu were beholden to him. The Zam-
boangapeninsulawas known for its cassiaclr Mindanao cinnamon,which grew
there profusely.
The Magindanaobarteredthe cinnamonwith the Englishand the Spaniards.They
also entrusted the storage of their armaments to the Zamboangarulers. On one
occasiona Dutchmanconfirmedhaving seen40 piecesin one trench, 50 pieces
in another,and an undeterminednumberof cannonin a third trench further away
from the old fort.
The island of Basilan opposite Zamboangawas ruled by a non-royal datu. From
Zamboangaand Basilan together the Sultan could count on a total of 2,000 able-
bodiedmen, and more than a hundredmannedkora-kora.This regionwas of great
strategicimportanceto the Magindanaorulers. Control over it enabledthem to
checkthe north-southmovementof shipsbecauseit was a major sea-lanebetween
the Sulu Seaand the CelebesSea.It alsoprovidedthe bestplacefor mooringhora-
hora in the wars against Sulu and Borneo.
Sulu had its own Sultan,calledCahorodyn,who in 1700had a strong following
of 3,000armedmen. However,Sulu acknowledgedthat the Sultanof Magindanao
stood at the apex of the heirarchy of rulers in the area. Its syahbandar,Kindingan,
submitted to the obeisanceceremonyat Simoay. It was recordedthat:s7
 Ltz RuurdieLaarhoue

Accordingto theMohammedan mannerhelaiddownhiskeris,crawledto thesoverergn,

and kissedhis feet and hands.It was,in effect,an acknowledgement of humble
subjectionto thisemperorandrecognized hisawe-inspiring
statusin relationto his
neighbouring nations.

At Zamboangaand Basilanthe domainof the MagindanaoSultanendedand that

of "the Spaniardsstarts stretching around the north side of this islard until
Caraga."58
A closelyinterdependentrelationshipexistedbetweenthe Magindanaodatu and
the third group of people,the Tiruray hill people.They were said to be able to
raiseat any one time a total of 7,000able-bodiedmen. Besidesthese,in the Bay
of Buayan(saranganiBay) were more than 10,000uplanders,who did not live in
permanentdwellingsand did not acknowledgeany supremepower. They would,
however,showrespectto the Sultanand comedown to the beachwhen they heard
the drumbeatand the stroke of the Sultan'sgong. They would discusswhatever
servicesor exchangeswere needed.It was remarkedthat, becauseof their frrzzl.
hair, they looked not unlike Papuans.once a Bajau chief was sent to Tapian on
the Tiruray coastto collectwix, tobaccoand other produceand was killed there,
so the Sultan made the six-hourvoyagethere himself to settle the incident.se
The fourth sphereof influencecomprisedthe Buayanand Manobo.They were
very importantas they were the major sourcefor the supply of rice. It happened
severaltimes that no rice couldbe bought in Simoayowing to the Buayanshaving
boycottedits exchangewith the Magindanaosa-ilud.This was the case,in 16g7.
after the raja ofBuayan had died and Buayantried to regain its independencefrom
the coastalMagindanaoor, again,in 1699,after the death of SultanBarahaman.
It is said that 10,000able-bodiedmen could be drawn from the Buayansa-rato
area. The Manobo were found beyond Buayan. The peopie and the region in
which they lived were both referred to as Manobo,"in the high mountains",six
weeks'journey from the Sultan'sresidencethrough Buayancountry. Only the royal
family and principal datutraded,with certain Manobo chiefs.It is said that thel-
traded cloth for gold. At a certain time of the year, a party of 50 or 60 men from
Magindanaowould undertakethe expeditioninto the mountains.The Manobo,with
whom they had a tradecontract,would be expectingthem. Nobodyelsewould ever
dare venture there, becausethey fearedthe Manobowould kill them.60It seems
thereforethat in this casethere were no relationsother than for trade,which was
probabiyof only marginaland seasonalsignificancebecauseof the long distances
involved.
A strainedalliancewas maintainedby simoay with a fifth group in the Saranganr
Islands,the Davao Gulf region and beyond.The tight control that Magindanao
exercisedover Saranganiwas amply demonstratedin letterswritten by the Syah-
bandarMataram and SultanBarahaman.6lSaranganiwas capturedby Kudrat in
1625and madeinto the Sultan'swarehouse.Even Magindanaothemselvesneeded.
permissionfrom the Sultanto go to Sarangani,exceptfor a few chinesewho were
allowed to barter there up to 500 kati or aproximately 30 kilograms of wax.62The
Saranganifearedboth the Magindanaoand the SangiheIslandersand could be more
accuratelydescribedas slavesthan subjects.63 Saranganiwas an excellentplace
for building and repairing ships.6aBecauseof its locationon the west-eastroute
Lords of the GreatRiuer t73

for boats sailing from Sulu, Borneo, or Sangiheto the Davao Gulf region, it was
strategically important and could be used as a port of call to obtain information,
fresh water, wood, and other victuals. The island was reported to have 2,700
inhabitants,of whom 800 were fighting men.6s
During Kudrat's rule, the Magindanaohad started to interfere in the local affairs
of the DavaoGulf. Togetherwith the datuof Kandahar(Sangihe),Kudrat had shared
control over the Gulf settlements.However, during the reign of Sultan Barahaman,
Kandahar'scontrol had been reduced and the son of the Kandahar datu admitted
that the Davao Gulf area had been usurped by Sultan Barahaman.The latter had
intensified control over the regions and enforced rules and regulations. Actually
the Magindanaohad establisheda monopolyof the trade in wax there, and so would
not willingly issue licencesto anyone wanting to go to the Davao Gulf for trade.
The Spaniardshad tried to trade there regardlessof this prohibition, but Sultan
Barahamanimmediately sent forty kora-korato Calanganto order his subjects not
to give wax or any other products to the Spaniards.66After Barahaman'sdeath,
this'protectionist'policy was continuedby his sons.Sultan Anwar wrote to the
king of Tabukan (northern Sangihe)in 1703: "I rule over Davao and I rule over
the land of Magindanao."oTThis suggests that he received tribute from all the
coastalsettlements;very likely he did from Davaoand the surroundingarea.When
the dntu of Davao had to pay blood-money,some of his goods included European
wares, which he probably receivedvia Simoay.
This was not the casewith the Muslim kingdom of Calangan.Datu BessieHossaru
did not belong to the subjectsof the MagindanaoSultan. The d"atuhimself had
subjectsinland who paid tribute to him. However, when the Magindanaocame
to trade, as the Raja Laut Bensu-il(Banswil)did in 1705,68the dntu was obliged
to provide food for them during their stay and sell the wax for a slightly lower price
than he would have chargedtraders from outside.One Dutch censusreported that
there were seventeensettlements along the Davao Gulf which were tributary to
the MagindanaoSultan in 1700,and that they provideda fighting force of 6,650
able-bodiedmen. The inland peoplewere excludedfrom the estimate.6e
From the foregoingdescriptionof the five major spheresof influencesurroun-
ding the Magindanaocor€ it becomeseasierto understandwhy the Sultan said
that the peopleof Magindanaowere known underonename,but consistedof many
different nations.He must have been referring to the presenceof a variety of
peoplefound in the coastalMagindanaoregion which includedmost of western
and southernMindanao.Representativesof all the areas describedlived in the
fertile Magindanaocoastalplain and married into the local population.
The Magindanaorulers employedseveralmeasuresto increasetheir population
and therebytheir wealthand power.Raidingthe Spanishsettlementsand surroun-
ding mountainareasand islandswas one way to obtain slaves.Another way was
to entice and welcome escapedslaves from incoming ships, such as Malays,
Burmese,'Makassarese, Bugis,Ternatans,Ambonese,and peoplefrom the Indian
coasts.A third measurewas to controllossof populationby prohibitingthe export
of slavesfrom the Magindanaoterritory. Only the Sultan could give permission
to anyoneto sell a slave.Those who broke this law risked being beheaded.It is
statedthat, "no one, whoever he is, may seil one of his slaves,nor may they be
taken away from this land."7o
 , Ruurdje I'aarhouen
t74

rebel Muslims from chris-

To add to the accumulationof the slave population,
Many camefrom Sangihe'
tianizedDutch territori"tlo"na a saferefuge at Simoay'
also grew. At this time many Chinese
south of Mindanao. The Ct in"." communiiy
and made to stay. once they were indebted,
were rured into marriage in tvtugina-uo
borrowed in order to pay the bride-price' they could not
largely through having
their lot would convert to Islam
easilyleave.Those chinesewho wantedto improve
andcuttheirqueuesoffino,derto.becomeMagindanao.'Inthiswaythey
assimilatedinto the society of the Great River'7l
was the pegallysystem'
Another means of attraciing foreign traders to Simoay
smallperahuwots'ld
This was the practicewhereby] .oJn ur a foreign ship arrived,
". who would invite the foreigners
come out to offer victuals and iring peopleaboard
reports mention these practices' A foreigner
to their houses.tsoth Dutch and English
a comlrade or pesally (literally a younger relative) by
could signify of
g i v i n g a s m a".."pt"n."
llpresent.Wheneverthenewarrivalwentashorehewaswelcome
pegally'shouse'-To continue the
io drink and sleep at this comrade'sor
"ui,
acquaintancegifts were expectedfrom time to time. These could be knives, bottles,
needles,or other trifles oi European manuiacture. Together with the hospita\ity,
tobaccoanrl betel-nutwas offered free. This, accordingto the Dutch, was a cunning
way of attracting foreigners becausethe men were subsequentlyprovided with
women and, after somefriendly persuasion,would be inducedto marry them, thus
committing themselvesto staY.72
All these measures instituted by Kudrat and maintained by his successors
contributed to the growth of the population, wealth, power and prestige of
Magindanao,and its influenceover the peoplesin outlying territories' In order to
avoid attracting European political intervention, sultan Kudrat issued orders to
uproot all the clove trees and to prohibit the planting of new trees or the selling
of spice in the markets.T3
Europeanswere welcomedand eveninvited on severaloccasionsto cometrading
in Simoay,but were often refusedpermissionto settlethere. The Magindanaofeared
that cultural clashes,competition, and jealousieswould eventually lead to fighting
among the foreigners. They anticipated that they would also be drawn into the
conflicts. Important decisionslike these were made by the Sultan and his council
when they metlo bimra in the batni.Amongst thosepresentw ouldbe the raja muda.
the heir apparent; thegugugu,who fulfilled the role of prime minister of the realm.
which wai mled by the aristocracy;the raja laut, who was in chargeof the naval forces:
ttnekimelnhaor harbour chiefs; the senhajior district chiefs;the safuthaor overseer
of the Sultan'scourtyard; the secretary of state, without whom no businesscould
be conducted; the umur maya,who representedIslamic rule; the syahbandn'r,who
pandita
took care of the Sultan'strade and warehouses;the hukum or judges; the
and,ulama,who were the Islamicreligiousfunctionaries;and certain zakhodn,most
of whom were Chineseand attached to a particular ruling family.TaAll meetings
were public, but only the council memberswere allowed to speak.Most of the
governing functionarieswere relatives of the ruling Magindanaofamily. However.
there were also representativesof the peopie,and the influenceof the religious
leadershipmust not be underestimated.Once,when someDutch officerswanted
to repair one of their galleys,they were not allowedto proceedfrom the river on
to the sandbank.They started to argue that other foreign traders had been allou--
 I.ords of the Great Riuer ).75

ed to do this. The Sultanpromisedto bring the issueup to thepandita.The Dutch-

men were later told that everyonein the state council, except Ulama Jaikali,
who was away, had agreedto let the vesselbe repairedat the desiredplace.All
decisionsneededtotal consensus.so the alproval for the request was held in
abeyancependingUlama Djaikali's return.7sNot all the title-holderswho were pre-
sent at those meetingswere appointedfor life. At times certain posts were not
filled or a singlepersonmight occupytwo positionsat the sametime or even change
his title and function. This usually occurred during the transfer of rule from one
Sultanto the next. A balanceof power was thus carefully cultivatedand maintained.
Occasionally,an ambitious raja would try to accumulatewealth by sending out
his nakhodato trade. This neededthe approvaiof the Sultan. Frequently the Sultan
and other officials would object to it and prevent the raja from leaving; they would
delay his preparationsby sendinghim on a missionto an outlying area, or by
requestinghim to settle a dispute.In the meantime,the winds would changeand
plans for the voyagewould have to be postponedto the next season.76
What did Magindanaohave to offer that attracted traders to an island which had
no spices,gold, or silks? Initially, it was the slave trade, which began to be
supplementedincreasinglywith forest produce. There was no single entrepOt
in the southernpart of the island,but many small settlementsof greateror lesser
importanceto which traders came yearly from the Moluccas,Sulawesi,Borneo,
and other places.They came in their trading perahu,which they would beachat
the spotwhereat certaintimes of the year they were to meetthe coastalpeople;there
they would camp and wait for other peopleto come down from the mountainsor
from inland river settlementsto the coastto meet them. The receivingparty and
r-isiting traders would negotiatean agreementon the terms of exchange:for
example,tlvo czrgesof Guineacloth for onepikul of wax. The receivingparty would
u'ithdrawand return with the requiredgoods.In the meantime,the traderswould
moveon to make more suchagreementsalongthe coastor stay in the vicinity for
an''wherebetweenfive and eight months.They would preparetheir boatsfor the
return journey and make themselves"as much at home as turtles." This was the
practice everywhere from Sulu to the Davao Gulf.77Among the products offered
lo the Dutch tieet near the islandof Basilanin 1614were cinnamonand wax, besides
an abundanceof victuals.The Sulu also tradedbeautifulpearls,tortoise-shelland
a little gold. In 1636 Kudrat sent 70 slaves to Ternate. The Dutch regularly
requestedslavesfrom Mindanao.Rice and wax were the productsthat the Magin-
danaosuppliedto Ternate. For someyearsin the 1650sthe Dutch occupieda trading
lodge in Simoay,where they barteredcloth for rice in quantitiesevidentlylarge
enoughto supplyall of Ternate,becausenoneneededto be brought from Batavia
iuring thoseyears.78 The Magindanaothemselveshad traded in Ternate in sago,
',r'ax,slaves,gold, tobacco and rice long
before the Dutch came to the region.
In 1661 two kora-korawith 21 men set off for Sumatraand Java with 35,000
:undles of tobaccoand five pikul of wax. Before the fall of Banten, one or two
\Iagindanaovesselssailedto Javaalmostevery year with wax, rice, tobacco,and
.:nall quantitiesof tortoise-shellor cinnamon.The trade in wax with Manila was
:oth lucrative and regular.TeCinnamomwas also purchasedonce a year by the
Spaniards,who camefrom Manila to the ZamboangaPeninsulato collectit. That
-:nnamonwas a trade item of long standingis obviousfrom its inclusionin the
 Ruurdje I'aarhoun
t76

galleontrade
shipment of the Saz Pabto,the Spanishship that first establishedthe
Manila and New Spain in 1565.80 The whole trade in cinnamon, wax, and
between
to passunderthe controlof the Magindanao Sultanate after Kudrat had
;i;. t;t-
conquests and fine oratory, he had built
settled in Simoayin 1645.Through his
coastal
up his authorityio such an extent that he attracted the respect of all the
among those far iniand. This gave him the power to issue orders
dntu andeven
being allowed to trade
that all foreign tradersshouldfirst cometo Simoaybefore
of western and southern Mindanao'
at the minor trading settlementsalongthe shores
foreign
In the early stagls of this development,Sultan Kudrat would allow the
Chinese or European, to go trading in his realm in the company
traders,Malay,
tightened
of his own men. Later, they were more restricted and Sultan Barahaman
Zamboanga, and Simoay'
control by restricting wareirousingfacilities in Sarangani,
to wait in his harbour. The Dutch often had
when traders arrived they were told
.tuy *". purposely prolonged in order to stimulate local
the impressionthat their
businessand thus increasethe populationthrough the attraction of trade'
to the
If the Sultan ran short of supplies in Simoay, his own men were sent
where supplies were expected to be
warehousein Saranganior to coastalareas
season and there was no hope of gathering an1-
available. If it was too late in the
sometimes allow the people in the harbour principalilt-v
stock, the Sultan would
usuall"v
to come forward and trade small quantities of their own stored supplies.
to force the people to sell to him'
this was not possiblebecausethe Sultanwas said
given permission for private trading it was observed
but occasionilly when he had
prices and
that the peoplesold their wares too cheaply,thus undercutting his own
small traders
spoilingihe market in the future. On numerousoccasions,Chinese
portholes to the foreign ships
would iisk their lives delivering rice or wax through
absent, so that they would not risk
at dawn or dusk when the Magindanaowere
being reported.8l
It seemedthat there was more demand for rice and wax than the Magindanao
Sultanatecould supply.Tobaccowas the only productalwaysavailable.Tortoise-
and the
shell was also scarce.By prohibiting direct trade between the inhabitants
to funnel all profits to his treasury and keep
visiting traders the Sulian was able
the pof,ulationdependent on his willingness to share the most coveted commodities
such as cloth and iron with them. According to Dutch reports, the enforcement
for'their
of this prohibition added to the awe and respect that the people felt
rulers.82
the
The economicinteractionbetweenthe dependentgroupsand the centre ot
sultanatein Simoay,and later at Silanganalong the Pulangi(Peguan) River' followec
severalpatternsof relationships.Earlier we have seenhow tribute was deliverei
to
by the I."nrrn, how trading parties set out from Magindanao across Buayan
Manobo country, and how tiilute was coliectedin the Davao Gulf. One interesting'
mutually depenient relationshipwas that betweenthe Magindanaoand the Tirurar'
which has been describedby the anthropologist,Schlegel'83

TiruraytraditionallyneitherIwove]clothnorIdid]blacksmithing; theygot theircloth

for cloihingand their iron tools for swidden agriculture from the Maguindanaoan
throughthis trade.salt, so fundamental to the Tiruray diet, alwayshadcomefrom
theMaguindanaoan, ashadthevariousgoodsusedby Tirurayfor bridepriceandlegal
 Lords of the GreatRiucr 177

settlements: krises,necklaces,brassboxesfor betetquidingredients, gongs,spears,

andthelike. All of theseintrinsicallynecessary
itemsto Tiruraylife andculturewere
obtainedthroughthe tradepactsfrom the lowlandMaguindanaoan. In return,down
themountains, flowedgoodsneeded by theMaguindanaoan. of majorimportance have
beenproductsof the tropicalrain forestsin the mountains,particularlyrattan.Until
recently,too,theMaguindanaoan havenotgrowntheirowntobacco,but havetraded
withtheTirurayfor thisproductof theirmountain swiddens.Similarlybeeswax from
the Tiruray forestswent in tradeto the Maguindanaoan, who valuedit for further
tradingwith the Chinese andothers.

Simoayitself was surroundedby well-kept plantations.sa The bulk of the rice

came through from Buayan.This reachedSimoayvia the Pulangi river sysrem.
In times of war betweenBuayansa-rayaand Magindanaosa-ilud,the former hindered
the flow of rice. This happenedfor instanceafter the deathof SultanKudrat and,
again,after the death of Sultan Barahaman.8s While productswere being moved
up and down this water system, tolls were collected by the datu who controlled
the check-points.
To get some idea what items the datu specially valued we may look at the
inventory of the inheritance of a datu who died in 1693. It included a keris wrth
a gold hilt; variouspiecesof gold jewellery;a string of coral beads;gold-threaded
abacacloth; brasslamps, incenseburnersand gongs;many porcelaindishesand
bowls;an assortmentof weaponsand tools;a collectionof sixteendifferent rvoes
of cloth; and five male and six female s1aves.86 In Magindanaocloth *ur ihe
importeditem that is mentionedmost often in the primary sources.It was highly
valued,as can be seenfrom this inheritancelist, in which many differentvarieties
of mostly Indian imports were included.Even the Manobo chiefsfar inland only
wantedto exchangetheir productsfor cloth. The Magindanaobought this cloth,
frequentlyfrom chinese middlemen,and brought it as far as caraga on the east
of Mindanao.often threadand dyesusedin weavingMagindanaocloth were also
bartered.Someof the types of clothsbrought to Magindanao,frequentlyby chinese
middlemen,were various kinds of Indian cottons,patolasand Guinearinen.87
All traderswent througha similar trade processsurroundedby rulesand rituals.
For example,on their arrival an odd number of gunshotshad to be fired. Small
boats would come from the shore, usually carrying a kinsman of the royal family
and other officials,besidesthe small vendors.Inquiries were madeas to the purpose
of the visit. It if was to trade,an audiencewith the Sultanwas required.Most traders
miroredinsidethe Simoayor PulangiRiver near the residenceof the suitan, but
the Dutch preferred to anchoroffshoreinsidePolluc Harbour. while the shipswere
u'aiting for the audience,iegally relationshipswere establishedand small items
exchanged.Sometimesthe Sultan and other dignitariessent preparedfoods or
chickenand meat aboard.one conditionfor being granted an audiencewas the
delivery of letters and presents.Audienceswere big public events, for which
preparationswere made severaldays in advance.s8
Among the gifts the Europeansbrought for the Sultanand otherswere several
types of knives, somewith glassor agate handles;musicalinstruments,such as
drums,trumpets,and violins;the latestmodelsin pistolsand guns;differentexotic
cloths,paper,spices,glassware,beds,chairs,clocks,tools,anvils,ammunitionand
armaments.once the traderswere ready to start trading, they paid a visit to one
 Ruurdje I'aarhorcn
t78
under Sultan Kudrat
oI thesyahbandar.SyahbandarMataram was first employed
andlivedtosuchanotaagethathecouldproudlywritethathehadwitnessedthe
was a formal, very respec-
i"igns of five successiveMagindanaoSultans.Mataram
his fair and wise judgments' He looked after
table person,who was knoin for
theSultan,sStores,butthetraderscouldnotdealwithhimdirectly,Matararr.
neededtheapprovaloftheSultanbeforecommencingnegotiations'atwhichthe
Sultan,sSecretarywasrequiredtobepresent.Thelatterwouldreporttheresujts
The haggling ove:
of the discussionto the Sultan and await further instructions'
and the Sultan through these intermediaries could lasr
pii.", u"t*""n the trader
forweeks,thoughoccasionallydealswereswiftlyconcluded'Onereasonfordela]'
supplies were sufficient.
was often a shortage of avaiiable supplies. Even if the
out some of his own men to trade and n'as
the Sultan sometimesplanned to send
stocks. At other times, competition amongstvisiting
therefore reluctant to ."[
"ny amount of goods prolonged the discussionssti;'
limiied
foreign traders for the
further.BysuchmeanstheMagindanaoobligedthetraders'particularlythe
prrrop"unr, to extend their stay,to that the local population would have more
opportunity to service the foreigners with victuals'
SeveraltimestheDutchcame,onlytofindthatnostockswereavailablebecaust
gone to Manila to trade' Occa-
the Chinesehad just Ieft or the Magindanao had
would eat-all-thepaddl"
sionally, the area was plagued with grasshoppers'which
a typhoon would destroy all the flowers
leaving little grain for coisumption, or
so that beeswax would be unavaiiable that year'
Some traders stayeJ io. t"* weeks, while others stayed for years. Those
"
remainingforalongperiodwoulddosometradingintheneighborginsregions
place of origin' This was no:
before piiking up their final cargo to return to their
generaliythe iase with the Eurofean traders, but was commonamongthe Chinese'
traders. When the commercial transactions had beer:
ilatay and other Asian
to take leave of the
completed,it was mandatoryfor the traders to come ashore
to stay. Sometimesthese
Sultan,under whoseproteciionthey had been allowed
ceremonial. The letters and gifts tha:
leave-takingswere accompaniedby elaborate
countrieswere paradec
*"." pr"."nted to the traders to tike to the rulers of their
and a final sairi
up and down the .iuei lank to the beating of drums' shouting
platter under three parasols
of gunfire before being transferred aboardon a silver
century' the Dutch and-the Englis:
During the latter pu.t of the seventeenth
in Magindanao territory'8e The Magindana-
attempted to gain a foothold
when in 1669 Makassa:
themselveshad traded with the English in Makassar,but
felltotheDutch,theycontinuedtotradewiththematBantenuntil1682,when
sent expeditionsfrorn
Banten also becameDutch territory. After this the English
Madras to Simoay at the invitation of Sultan Baharaman'
ThelongertheEnglishstayedintheSultan'sharbourthecleareritbecametc,
themthatasettlementinMagindanaoterritorymightnotbeaslucrativeashac
profit from the smuggling
at first beenanticipated.TheyToresawthat much of their
and protective devicesto ward ot:
of spiceswould have to be spent on defensive
Dutch aggression.
that the English
The Dutch, in fact, came to Magindanaoas soonas they heard
an annual allowance
were there. In an effort to undermine their rivais they offered
factory in Magindanao territon '
to the Sultanin exchangefor permissionto build a
Lords of the GreatRiuer 179

at the same time as they demandedexclusive trading rights. The Sultan and his
council could not accepttheseterms and insistedthat they keep their harbour open
to traders of all nations. Though the Dutch argued that their presencein Magin.
danaocould provide protection from invaders, the Magindanaoinsisted on main-
taining their neutrality.so
The stubbornnesswith which the Magindanao maintained this independence
accordedwell with their commercialactivitiesand was to continuefor aboutanother
century from the death of Sultan Kudrat in 1671 until the ascendencyof the Sulu
zonein the 1770s.It was during this time that the British successfullyintervened
in the trading networks both of the Spaniardsin the Philippines and of the Dutch
in Indonesia.
British attempts to develop a trading base in Balambangan,a barren and in-
hospitable island off the north coast of Borneo, was part of a design to cut off
traditional Chinesetrade with the Sulu and Sulawesi region. It was intended to
lure this trade, as well as the native and country trade, to the British-controlled
ports. Alexander Dalrymple had paved the way when he took possessionof
Balambanganin 1763,while the new chief, John Herbert, placedin chargeof the
settlement,turned the islandten yearslater into an entrepotfor opium, piece.goods,
and armaments.This brought about competitionfor dominancein the region,
especiallybetweeninterestedgroupsamongthe Suluas well as betweenthem and
the Magindanao.The detailspertainingto the episodeare describedelsewhere.el
Suffice it to say that in February 1775one of the Sulu factions succeededin burn-
ing and ovemrnning the Balambangansettlement.The British were driven out and
their arsenalcaptured.This windfall of weaponsenabledthe Sulu party to establish
its power. It expandedits externaltrade and increasedits population,as communities
of Iranun and Chinesewere attractedaway from Magindanao,leadingto its gradual
demise.
In conclusion,we may briefly summarizethe three principal and related themes
that emerge from the above account: firstly, the mobilization of manpower by
successive Magindanaorulers;secondly,pre-adaptation to trading expansion;and
thirdly, the policy of neutrality and independence,which supported both the
demographicand the commercial evolution of the Magindanao polity.
The Magindanaomulti-ethnicpolity providesfurther evidence,confirmingstudies
on early SoutheastAsian trading polities, that the power of ruling chiefs and of
the statewas eslablishedthrough the accumulationand mobilizationof manpower.e2

The majorpoint is that manpower,not fixed capital,wasregardedas the principal

assetwhichhadto be protectedin the Southeast Asiancity. As we haveseen,the
populationdensitywasvery low, andurbancentrestendedto clusteron the edgeof
extensive Thereallyimportantresource
forests.... of therichandpowerfulwastheir
manpower, whetherwe callthemslaves,bondsmen, clientsor subjects.

Even warfare was predicated on the premise that it was waged not to annihilate
all the enemy but to increasethe available manpower through taking captives.Thus,
Magindanao'slater policy of forbidding the export of slaves from their territory
is an understandableone in the light of the demographicconditionsthen prevailing
in SoutheastAsia.
180 Ruurdje Laarhot,,.

One difficulty in comparing populations reported by early European observer:

is that no clear distinctionwas made betweenthe populationof the city prope:
and the population of the entire nation or state. Another difficulty was tha:
populationesdimates were often basedon the numberof housesor the numbero:
able-bodiedmen. I use a factor of three to convertthe numberof able-bodiedme:-
into a populationfigure that includeswomen,childrenand the aged.e3 In the cast
of the MagindanaoSultanatethe Dutch estimatesof 59,650able-bodiedmen.-
when multiplied by three, yields a populationof closeto 180,000.However,thi.
number can be raibedto about 200,000if we take accountof the Alforese or hi_
tribes, the peopleof Sarangani,the hinterlandsof Davao,and SaranganiBay, a_
of whom were excludedfrom the Dutch estimate.In Magindanaoproper the ruling
chiefscouldcount on 6,500able-bodiedmen, or between20,000to 25,000people
These figures can be appreciatedwhen comparedwith Melaka in the sixteentr-
cenhll (20,000fighting men),and Aceh (40,000fighting men),Jakarta(6,000-7,0(,,,
fighting men),and Makassar(36,000fighting men) in the seventeenthcentur1..''
, Magindanaoquickly emerged into politicai and commercialprominence,nc:
because of the entry of a foreign trading class but because the coastal ruler.
themselveswere traditionally skilled in inter-island trade. Long before tht
Portuguese,Spanishand Dutch traders came,the Magindanaohad participate:
in the indigenousmaritime trade of the Philippinesand Indonesia.Although thr:
may have been modest in scale,it gave them the necessarytechnologicalan:
organizationalexperienceto expandin responseto new commercialopportunities
Thus, the arrival of the Bajau and native merchantsdisplacedfrom Indonesianpon.
conqueredby the Portuguese,Spanishand Dutch provided, not the initial stimulus
but increasedopportunityto intensifyand amplify Magindanaotrading activities
The secretof Magindanaopolitical hegemonylay in its core lineage,which linkec
the dynastiesof the sa-ilud andsa-rayaruling families. The supremeauthority wa-
vestedin the Sultan,whom the Dutch designatedas keyser(emperor)to distinguisi.
him from a simple koning (king) or raja. The chiefs of the core lineage were
responsiblefor governingthe five affiliated groups describedpreviously,so tha:
the core of the entire sultanate was the core lineage residing in the harbour
principality.Apart from the strengthof Magindanao'score lineage,the synergie.
of. the sa-ilud and,sa-rayapolities, its alliances and the policy of neutrality ani
independenceadoptedby its trading rulers, contributedto the political and comme:-
cial successof the state.The fact that there was a nucleusof trading institutions
in Magindanao,backedup by the indigenouspoliticalleadership,was an imponan:
factor. one such example was Sultan Kudrat's extirpation of spice trees and the
prohibitionof their cultivationand saleby his successorsin anticipationof Eurc-
pean interferencein the economy.
The arrival of displacednative traders and subjectpeoples;the attacks of the
spaniards;and eventhe friendly visits of the Dutch, servedto aiert the indigenous
leadershipto the dangerof losingtheir independence and their power. The same
fear of losingindependence must have combinedwith the desireto maximizethe
economicgainsto be made from trade.This is the dual motivationthat drove the
Magindanao to enlarge their territory and population through annexation o:
territories, subjugationof neighbowing tribes, attraction of foreign traders througi:
marriage, slave raiding in neighbouring islands, and the prohibition of export o:
Lords of the GreatRiuer 181

slaves.The resulting political formation marked the beginning of a state that was
both segmentaryand multi-ethnic in an era when most of the inhabitants of the
Philippineswere still in the evolutionary stage of small isolated barangayor tribal
units.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following refer to the documentsquoted from the Ouergekomen

Br'inuen,part
of the Dutch East India Company(V.O.C.)records found in the GeneralState
Archives (A.R.A.), The Hague, Netherlands.

V.O.C. 1070, II, 95: Letter from Maleye in Ternate to the King of Mindanao,
18 June 1619.
V.O.C. 1098,II, 97 -11.6:Report aboutthe voyageto Mindanaoby DanielOttens,
30 August to 18 November 1628.
V.O.C. 1437,196-197v:Reportfrom BarentBrouwerto GovernorThim abouthis
visit to Mindanaoduring Novemberand Decemberof 1686.
V.O.C. 1461,328v-335: Letter from the Sultanof Magindanaoto GovernorThim,
10 August 1689.
V.O.C. i+Ot, ::Su-:39v: Letter from the Sultan of Ternate to the Sultan of
Magindanao,dated 18 August 1689.
V.O.C. 1461,339v-349v: Report of the sub-SurgeonPieter de Abreuw about his
visit to Mindanaoduring July 1689.
V.O.C. 1483,No. M, 1-83: Report from Barent Brouwer to GovernorThim.
V.O.C. 1483, No. M, 1-70: Report from Meynard de Roy to GovernorThim.
V.O.C. 1483,No. 15: Extract from Ternate Daily Registerwith regardsto Raja
Buayan,Samsialam,collatedby SecretaryPieter Alsteyn, 19 July 1689.
V . O . C . 1 5 1 6 , 5 0 1 v - 5 0 4 : L e t t e r f r o m t h e S u l t a n o f M a g i n d a n a ot o
Governor-General JoannesCamphuys.Receivedat Ternate 22 JuIy 1691.
V.O.C.1516,504-505v:Letter from the Sultanof Magindanaoto CaptainKohanco,
tenth day of the month Radsiab,1101,the year Alamat.
V.O.C.1554,No. 8, 97-101: Letter from the MagindanaoKing to GovernorVan
der Duyn, 24 March 1694.
V.O.C. 1554,No. 12,l-268: Daily Registerkept by SecretaryPieter Alsteyn and
Ensign David Haak from 2l October 1693 to 24 March 1694.
V.O.C.1554,No. 13, 1-123: ReportConcerningthe Voyageof SecretaryPieter
Alsteyn and Ensign David Haak irom 2l October 1693 to 24 March 1694.
182 Ruurdielttarhouen

V.O.C. 1614,1090-1096v:Considerations and Reflectionswith regard to Magin-

danao,its positionwithin the surroundingislandsby Mr. de Roy, 1700.
V.O.C. 1637,87-93: Letter from the Sultanof the Sultanateand landsof Mindanao
to the Governor-General of Batavia.
V.O.C. 1637, 96-126: Daily Register in the form of a Report kept by Captain
CornelisClaaszSilver of the sloop Instdrager,2 May 1699.
V.O.C.1641,650-837: Dally accountand Appendicesof CaptainPaulusBrievings
and EnsignJacobCloeckon their voyageto Magindanao,the MeangisIslandsand
Talaud from 15 June 1700 to 9 January 1701.
V.O.C. 1653,241-638: Daily Notesof the CommissionmembersDavid van Peter-
som and Jan Walravende la Fonteyneon their missionto Magindanao,30 August
1701to 20 April1702.
V.O.C. 1675, 156-158: Letter from the local Schooimaster,Wouter Dalima, at
Taboukanto GovernorPieter Rooselaer,16 May 1703.
V.O.C. 1675, 164-165: Letter from the Sultanof Magindanaoto the King oi
Taboukan,28 March 1703.
V.O.C. 1675,363-394: Instructionsto sub-MerchantSebastiaenKeller and Book-
keeper Hendrix van der Burg, Commissionedto Magindanaowith the yacht
de Herderin,4 August 1703.
V.O.C. 1727,269-443:Reportby LieutenantJacobCloeckand AssistantNicolaas
Ploos van Amstel about Pieter Rooselaerin the yacht Eykelenburgfrom -1
September1705 to 17 December1705.
V.O.C. 7727, 842-845: Letter from Kachil Tubutubu to GovernorPieter Roose-
laer. 18 December1705.

NOTES

1. F. Gainza,MemmfuI anteadzntessobrehs expedbimtes deLahngingi l Jolo(Manila, 1851t

quotedin C.A. Majul, Muslims in the Philiffines (QuezonCity, 1973),71.
2. In the 17th centurySpanishaccountsthis river is namedthe Rio Grandede Mindanao:
in the Dutch sourcesit is referred to as the Peguan River.
3. N.M. Saleeby,Studiesin Moro History,Law and Religion,(Manila, 1905),1, 11.
4. Majul in Saleeby,Studiesin Moro History,53 n. 37 arguesthat sinceJohor was no:
foundeduntil after the fall of the Melaka Sultanateto the Portuguesein 1511,one o:
those Melakan royal families that emigrated to Johore was Kabungsuwan'sand thus
Majul dateshis arrival in Magindanaoat 1515.
5. Majul, Muslims in the Philippines, 64.
1967),298
1581-1768(Cambridge,
6. H.delaCosta,S.J.,TheJesuitsinthePhilippines,
7. Ibid.,297.
8. For an accountof the conversionof the Chineseto the Muslim religion seeR. Laarhoven,
Lords of the GreatRiuer 183

"The Chineseat Maguindanaoin the SeventeenthCentury,"Plzilipfine Studies35 (Manila,

1987):40.
9. Majul, Muslims in the Philippinr-s,116.
10. De la Costa,Jesuits,295.
tr. Ibid.,297.
12. R.C. Ileto, Magindanao, 1860-1888: The Careerof Datu Uto of Buayan (New york,
\971\.2.
13. Saleeby,Studiesin Moro History,14. I suspectthat Magindanaoand Buayan modelled
their political structures after Ternate and Tidore, exhibiting a rule of successionthat
was respectively linear and rotating.
14. De la Costa,Jesuits,298.
15. A.S. Schlegel,"Tiruray-MaguindanaoanEthnic Relations:An EthnohistoricalPuzzle".
Solidaritjt 7, no. 4 (7972): 25-30.
16. Ileto, Careerof Datu Uto,2; V.O.C. 1098,II, 97-71.6.
17. De la Costa,Jesuits,299.
t8. Ibid..305-07.
19. Ileto, Careerof Datu Uto,4.
20. De la Costa,lesuits,308. This showsa copy of the letter.
21. R. Laarhoven,"From Ship To Shore:Maguindanaoin the 17th Century from Dutch
Sources"(M.A. thesis,Ateneo de Manila University, 1985),47-52.
22. Ileto, Careerof Datu Uto,4.
23. Saleeby,Studiesin Moro History, 34.
24. Ileto, Careerof Datu Uto,4-5.
25. Dutch sourcematerials only mention Kudrat as ruler of Mindanao. He is often named
Correlat or Gouserat.
26. L.C.D. van Dijik, Neerlnndbwugste betrekkingenmetfurneo, Den glo-Archipel, Cambodja,
Siam en Cochin-China,(Amsterdam, 1862),257-58; N. Macleod, De Oost Indische
Compagnizals Zeemogendheid in Azie (Rijswijk, Ig27), vol. l, 373-TS.
27, Even though the Buayan are also ethnically Magindanao,in general the people in the
lower valley or Magindanao proper only are referred to by that name in the seven-
teenth century and the name is used in that sensehenceforth.
28. V.O.C. 1070, II, 95. Translatedin Laarhoven,"Maguindanaoin the 17th Century",
440-41.
29. W. Ph. Coolhaas,(ed.),GeneraleMissiaenuan Gouuerneurs-Generaal
en Radenaan heren
XVII der VerenigdeOostindischeCompagnie(The Hague, 1960), vol. 2,28.
30. Dagh-Register
gehoudenint CasteelBatauiauantpasserendtdaer ter plaetsealsouergeheel
(Batavials'Gravenhague,
Nederlandts-Indin 1887-1931),vo1.1, 84; vo|.3,222.
31. R. Laarhovenand B. Wittermans,"From Blockadeto Trade:Early DutchRelationswith
Manila, 1600-1750",PhilippineStudies(Mantla, 1985),487-96.
32. Saleeby,Studiesin Moro History,27.
33. V.O.C.1098,II, 98-104. Kandhar is also known as Candahar,Candigar,etc.
3 4 . V . O . C .1 5 5 4 N
, o. 12,39-44,100-01.
35. F. Combes,"Historia de las islas de Mindanao,Jolo, y sus Adjacentes",vol. XL, 108.
36. I1eto, Careerof Datu Uto, 5.
37. Laarhoven,"Maguindanaoin the 17th Century", 105-09.
38. Majul, Muslims in the Philippines, 132-49.
184 Ruurdje Laarhoaen

39. lbid.,150.
40. Ibid., t47.
4r. J.M. Gullick, IndigenousPolitiml slstemsof westernMalaya (New York, 1958),44-51;
b. Geertz,Localknowledge(New York, 1983),121-25; V'O'C 7554,No' 12' 50-63'
42. F.F. Claver,"Autobiographyof Datu Dinawat Ogil, Manobo"(1967)in M.R. Hollnsteiner,
(ed,.),Society,Culture, and the Filipino (Manila, 1975), 55-64'
v.o.c. 7653,252;A.L.Reber, The sulu world in the Eighteenthand Early Nineteenth
(comell
centuries: A Historiographical Problem in Bitish writings on Malny Piracy
university, 1966),74. The rulers who succeeded to the top political leadershipup till
the mid-eighteenthcentury were: Sultan Kudrat (1616-71);Kudrat's son, Saif-u-Din
(Tidulay); Kudrat's eldest grandson, Sultan Barahaman (1671-99); Barahaman's
(1702-11);
irother, Sultan Kuday (1699-1702); Barahaman'sson, Sultan Anwar
Anwar's half-brother, Sultan Manimir (1711-33); Anwar's son, sultan Malinog
(1733-49);Manimir's son, Sultan Kamza (1750-74)'
44. De la Costa,fesuits,54l.
45. v.o.c. 146r,337.
46. Majul,Muslimsin thePhilipfines,143,I45, 157.
47. V.O.C.7483,No. 15,7; V.O.C.1461'334v.
48. V.O.C.1461,330v-31;V.O.C.1516,504-505v;V.O'C' 12,90-100.
49. v.o.c. 1653,245.
50. V.O.C.1483,No. M, de RoY,79.
51. v.o.c. 1637,87-93.
52. V.O.C.1554,No.8, 98-99.
53. v.o.c. 7641.650-837.
These numbers were coilated from a censustaken by the Dutch in 1700' which listed
all the settlementswith the datu that ruled in the place and his number of able-bodied
men.Translationin l,aarhoven,"Maguindanaoin the 17th centurY" AppendixD, 465-69.
,,Historiade Mindanao";Robertson,The PhilippineIslands,vol. XL, 108.
5 5 . combes,
56. E. Selling, The Euolutionof Trading statesin southeastAsia Before the 17th centurl
(Columbia.University,1981),38-45; v.O.C- 7653, 269, 277v; V'O'C' 1554' No' 12:
V.O.C. 1675.156: V.O.C.7727, 320, 324; V.O.C.1483,No' M, De Rov, 108; V'O C
1516,503; V.O.C.7483,No. M, Brouwer,45'
57. V.O.C.1641,724.
58. Ibid.,775v.
59. v.o.c. 1727,320,324.
60. V.O.C.1554,No. 12,91.
61. andarefoundin Laarhoven,
Theselettersweretranslated at Magindanao-
"TheChinese
47-49.
62. V.O.C.1637,9r.
63. V.O.C.1554,No. 12,38.
64. V.O.C.7614,\092.
65. F. Valentijn, Oud en Nieuw OostIndidn (Amsterdam,1862)' r,1,92.
66. V.O.C.1.675,374.
67. Ibid., 164-65.
6 8 . V . O . C .1 7 2 7 2
. 7 5 ,3 r t .
Lords of the GreatRiuer 185

69. V.O.C.1641.773v-74.
70. Ibid., 765. This policy was not absolute.The Sultan could buy and sell slavesfor the
externalmarket,but was concernedthat the populationof the sultanateshouldnot be
adverselyiffected by the export of slavesfrom local sources.
71. V.O.C.1554,No. 12, 68,72: V.O.C.1641,650-837.
72. V.O.C.l554,No. 13.Historically,thefugallyfriendsweregenerallysimilarto'hospitality'
girls and boys.
V.O.C.1437,196;V.O.C.1637,110;W. Dampier,A Nen Voyage Roundthe World,etc.,
(ed.)J. Masefield(New York, 1906),Vol. 1, 325.
Ibid.. 241,- 42. 253- 54.
v.o.c. 164r,697.
v.o.c.7727. 842-45.
Van Dijk, VroegsteBetrekkingen,273, 310; Dagh-Register,Vol. 13, 160; Vol. 74, 397.
Coolhaas,Missiaen,Part 3, 11.
Laarhoven,"Maguindanaoin the 17th Century'', Appendix E, Chapter VI.
W.L. Schurz,The Manila Galleon(New York, 1939),24.
V.O.C.t554, No. 12, 12; V.O.C.1641,690v; V.O.C.146r,346.
Laarhoven,"Maguindanaoin the 17th Century'', 343-53.
Schlegel,"Ethnohistorical Puzzle", Solidarity, 27.
Ma1ul, Muslims in the Philippines, 149.
V.O.C. 1637,96-726: Coolhaas,Missiuen,Yol. 4, 132, 244.
V.O.C.1554.No. 12. 139-40.
V.O.C.7516,504-505v.
A full descriptionof an audiencecan be collatedfrom sevendifferent diariesbetween
1686and 1705,namely,V.O.C.1467,347-49;V.O.C.1554,No. 12, 48-52; V.O.C.
1483,No. M., De Roy, 5-10; V.O.C.1483,No. M. Brouwer,7-9: V.O.C.1653,
249v-255: V.O.C. 1641,669-71v; V.O.C. 1727,278-83.
39. R. Laarhoven, "The Dutch-English Riva1ry over the Maguindanao Sultanate,
1680-90",Solidnrit:', 110 (1987):3-7.
l0 Dispersedthroughoutthe MS: V.O.C. 1483,No. M, De Roy; ZO.C. 1641,650-837;
V.O.C.1554,l-268: V.O.C.1653,241-538; V.O.C.7727,269-443.
9 1 J.F. Warren, The Sulu Zone, 1768-1898 (Singapore,l98l), 26-37.
l 2 A. Reid, "The Structureof Cities in SoutheastAsia", /SE4I1 2, ii (1980):243.
r 3 The Dutch did a similar censusfor the Sangihebridge oi islands(southof Mindanao)
for aboutthe sameperiod.The listing includedthe total populationas well as able-bodied
men for the sameislands.The proportionof total populationto able-bodiedmen was
roughly 3:1. Valentijn, Oud en Nieuw, 192-93.
:rl. v.o.c. 164I,775v.
,r5. Reid,"Citiesof Southeast
Asia",238.
 SULU SE,4

M IN OANAO
A T ' S A N G A No 4 l - c o t
C A S A Y A NO E S U L i l v-tmbo.Dg.

su9u?-
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BORNEO
cFr€aFs s E/

CELgggS T r a d i n gc e n i r e s
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a Taosug
Samartnda l Buginese

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The Sulu Zone

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10
Trade,SlaueRaiding and StateFormation
in theSuluSultanatein theNineteenthCenturv

JAMES FRANCIS WARREN

During the late eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies,a strongstateentergedtvithin

the Sulu trading zone,lan extensiveregionencompassing the southernrim of the
Sulu Seaand the u'hole of the Celebes Sea basin. The forn,ation and prosperity
of the SuluSultanate,as this accountof its socialhistoryindicates,rvasbasedabove
all elseon slaves.It was the role of the Sulu state,within its largertradingzone,
to maintainthe materialand socialconditionsfor the recruitmentandexploitation
of slaves.z-'
T[6 2one encompassing the Sulu Sultanateis the historic home of peoples,
languagesand culturesas varied as its landscape.The Taosug(peopleof the
current),the dominantethnicgroupin the SuluArchipelago(nowpart of the Philip-
pines),are the sole residentsof Jolo Island,the historicalseatof the sultanate.
Originallyfishermenand tradersrvitl.rmartial skills, numbersof them adopted
agriculture.3 With the introductionof Islam in aboutthe fifteenthcentury,thel-
evolveda highlyorganizedpoliticaland economicsystem.lTheinstitutionof the
sultanateestablished the formaldominanceof the TaosugoverindigenousSamalan-
speakingpeoplesand later migrantsto Sulu.
The Samal,strand-dwellers closelyassociated with the sea,possessed of highly
developedboat-buildingtechniquesand sometimespractisingsimple garden
agriculture,are the most widely dispersedof all ethno-linguistic groupsin the Sulu
chain.Manifestingthe greatestdegreeof internallinguisticand culturaldifference,
Samalcommunitiespredominateon the corallineisland-clusters in the northern
and southernpart of the SuluArchipelago,northernBorneoand Sulawesi(Celebes).
The Samaldistinguishamongthemselvesby dialect,localityand cultural-ecological
factors, principally between sedentary,Muslim shore-dwe1lers and nomadic
a n i m i s t i cb o a t - d w e l l e r s . '
The Samaltendto identifythemselves rvitha particularisland,island-cluster or
regionalorbit. In the late eighteenthand early nineteenthcenturiesthey comprised
severalgroupsoccupyingnon-contiguous territoriesalongthe southernMindanao
shore,on the southcoastand in the near interiorof Basilan,and on the islands
of the TapianTana group,Cagayande Sulu and the Balangingicluster.Expert

lB7
 188 JamesFrancis Warren

sea-voyagers, particularSamalgroupshad fixed basesof operationon a seriesot

low coraland sandislandsflankingthe northeastern side of Jolo.This group oi
islands,namedLos Samalesby the Spanish,was a springboardfor launching
seasonalraids againstcoastalvillagesfrom Luzon to Sulawesi.The most impor-
tant islandwas Balangingi,dwelling placeand organizationalcentreof the major
slave-retailinggroup for the Sulu Sultanatein the first half of the nineteenthcen-
tury. A related group of marauders,the Iranun (Illanun), Maranao-speaking
migratory strand-dwellers,establishedtheir principalsettlementsalong the river
mouths of the southerncoast of Mindanao.
The SuluArchipelago's locationbetweenthe Asianmainlandandthe largeislands
of Mindanao,Borneoand Sulawesi,its varied and productiveresourcebase,and
its sizeablepopulationearlyattractedmerchantsfrom SouthChinaandMakassarese-
Bugismarinersfrom Sulawesi.The annualarrivalof chinesejunks and Bugisperahu
at Jolo reflecteda regulardemandfor localproductsprocuredprincipallyfrom the
sultanate'sessentialdomain - the sea.6It is importantto note,however,that this
traditionaltradebetweenSoutheastAsian ports and the world outsidewas limitec
in scale.
By 1800 regionalredistributionhad becomethe main pattern of the economr-
of the Sulu Sultanate.Indirectly,it was the insatiabledemandfor tea that initiatec
Europeaninterestin Sulu'snaturalproductsand its suddenriseto regionalprrmacl-.
During the eighteenthcentury,tea replacedale as the nationalbeveragein Englancl
and was especially popularamongthe poorestclasses. china was almostthe sole
supplierof tea to England.Thesemerchantswere quick to recognizethe potential
of participationin the long-standingSino-Sulutrade as a meansof redressingthe
one-wayflow of silver from India. Marine and jungle products,highly valued in
china, were neededto stemit. Sulu'sascendancy towardsthe end of the eighteenth
century developedout of the expandingtrade betweenIndia, SoutheastAsia ancl
china.Tcommercialand tributary activity becamelinked with long distanceslave
raiding and the incorporationof capturedpeoplein a systemwhich made Jolo a
principal entrep6t for produceextractedfor the China trade.
The first sectionof this study,revolvingaroundthe interrelatedthemesof external
trade, slave raiding and state formation, examinesthe need for Sulu'smaritime
productsin the British china trade. By fitting into the patternsof Europeantrade
with china, the sultanateestablisheditself as a pou'erfulcommercialcentre.The
maritime and jungle productsto be found within the Sulu zoneand in the area of
its tradingpartners- trepang,birds'nests,wax, camphor,mother-of-pearl, tortoise-
shell - were new productsfor redressingthe British EastIndia company'sadverse
trade balancewith China.
of importancefor Sulu were textiles and other importedmanufactures,otr,um,
and alsogunsand gunpowder,which contributedto the sultanate'sphysicalpower.
Taosug merchantson the coast and their descendantsdevelopedan extensive
redistributive trade in which they wrested the function of the collection and
distributionof commoditiesfrom traditionalcompetitors,the sultanatesof Brunei
and cotabato.This commerce- involvingtrade with the Bugis of Samarindaand
Berau to the south,with Manila to the north, and with Singaporeand Labuanto
the west - formed a complexset of interrelationshipsthroughwhich the segmentary
state of Sulu was able to consolidateits dominanceover the outlying areasof the
Trade, SlaueRaiding and StateFormation 189

zone along the northeastBorneoand western Mindanaocoasts.

As the sultanateorganizedits economyaround the collectionand distribution
of marineand jungle produce,there was an increasedneedfor large-scalerecruit-
ment of manpowerin Sulu'seconomyto do the labour-intensivework of procure-
ment. Slavingactivity developedto meetthe accentuated demandsof foreigntrade,
andJolobecamethe nervecentrefor the coordinationof slaveraiding.The second
part of the study analysesthe technicalaspectsof the seasonalraiding programmes
in searchof additionalmanpowerto servicethe procurementof trading produce.8
The final sectiondelineatesthe parametersof slaveryas an institutionin Sulu and
detail how "slavei-whb were captivesSbrvedas dependentsof
describesin some-wer"
the Sulu elite and to better their conditionand Secome,atleast in the
"bl"
secondgeneration,assimilated membersof the Taosug and Samalpopulation.e
I have drawn upon anthropologicalconcepts,particularlythe idea of a'segmen-
tary state',10Europeandocumentsin severallanguages,with excerpts and ex-
amplesfrom official reports, diaries,letters, journals and newspapersand local
accountsto examinethe economicvitality of the independentSulu Sultanate'srole
as an entrepOtfor Europeanand Asian commercein the Chinatrade from the late
eighteenthto the late nineteenthcentury,and its effect on the way slavesworked,
lived and interactedwith their masters.
Among the most importantsourcesconsultedare the manuscriptsin the archives
of Spain(principallySeville)on trade from Manila to the Sulu Sultanatebetween
1768 and 1848. When g_o,rypled and ordered chronologically,these documents,
particularly theesfu6 and theatnojarifazgo,suggestthe overalllevel of commercial
activity,shiftsin market preferences, andthe economicinterdependence of Manila
and Jolo in the period.ll A careful reading of these documentsthus revealsthe
level of eConomicintegrationachievedby Sulu and its Borneandependencies in
the wider islandeconomy,the magnitudeof the changethat occurredafter 1768,
and possiblereasonsfor shifts in the trade patternsover time. These data go far
towardsroundingout the detailedevidencewhich Van Leur saw to be lacking for
maritime powers in the IndonesianArchipelago.
In the late eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies the population of Sulu was
heterogeneous but changing- socially,economically and ethnically.This was a
direct result of externaltrade. The populatingof the Sulu zoneby captivesfrom
the Phiiiiipines and vario_uspqrls of the Ma!ry world - primarily from Sulawesi
and the Moluccas - ind their role in the redistributiveeconomycentredat Jolo
shouldnot be underestimated.It has not beenexploredin detail. Previoushistorical
studiesof the sultanatedependedlargely on publishedcolonialrecordsand accounts
to explain the economicand socialrole played by slavesin the economy,rather
than on recordsproducedby the slavesthemselves.Slaveryin Sulu was observed
throughthe eyesand preconceptionsof Europeanobserversand writers, who viewed
Sulu as the centreof a world fundamentallyhostileto their interests- an Islamic
world, whoseactivitiescentredupon piracy and slavery.12 Nevertheless,it is still
possibleto researchaspectsof the socialhistory of the ethnicallydiverseslaves
of the Sulu population.
I have drawn upon the statementsof the fugitive slavesof the Sulu Sultanate,
which presenta uniqueaccountfrom the perspectiveof the slavesthemselves.From
over 180 fugitive slave accounts,manuscriptsourcesand travel literature, clear
uittL,,:.::{,;,
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Trade,SlaueRaidingand StateFormation 191

patterns of social life and economicactivity can be construed.13 As a historical

sourcethe publishedand unpublishedtestimoniesof the fugitive slavesof the Sulu
Sultanateare both invaluableand neglected.The testimoniestell us much about
the experience of slavery in Sulu that could never be found in more traditional
sources.The experiencesof captivesfrom the moment of seizure,and their passage
in the slave perahu to their settlement,life and labour in Sulu, emerge from
anonymityin thesetestimonies.The total effect of theseindividual casesof fugitive
slavesis to throw considerablelight on the internal processes- the ethnic and
socialtransformation- in the Sulu trading zoneduring the nineteenthcentury.la
The trade data and the statementsof the fugitive slavescomplementone another
and togetherenableus to resolvemany fundamentalquestionsabout the size of
Sulu'sindigenoustrade and its flourishingslavepopulation,abouthow thesechanged/f
over time as a consequence of externaltrade,and where, how and in what quantities
the natur-alproduce was harvested.
The impact of externaltrade on the pre-industrialeconomiesof African kingdoms
hasreceivedconsiderableattention from CatherineCoquery,Samir Amin and Yves
Person.15 In their analysesof indigenousAfrican trade and markets they stress
that the wealth and power of the aristocracyis basedon the carefulregulationof
external trade in the form of rights and tolls. According to EmmanuelTerray,
however, such a viewpoint, which stressesthe monopoly or highly centralized
political control of the trade, can underestimatethe role of slavelabour in producing
the surplus which is the foundationof the social and political hegemonyof the
aristocracy.Terray showsthat the centrai concernof the political leadersof the
Abron kingdom of Gyamanwas labour.16In this societyexternal trade enabledthe
aristocracy to realize the surplus produciivity extracted from the labour of its
slaves.Above all, it was manpowerand not foreign trade that was the direct and
immediatefoundationof the political economyof Gyaman.
The importanceof a mode of production based on slave labour in the Sulu
Sultanateis perhapsmore apparent.Power and wealth in Sulu were definedonly
secondarilyin terms of territory. A leader'spower and statuswas basedmore on
his control over personaldependants,either slavesor retainers,that he could
mobilizeaf a'liven moment for what was deemedto be either commerciallyor
poiiticailyexpedient,than on the formal statestructwe. A report expresslyprepared
in 1812for Sir StamfordRaffles,the lieutenant-governor of Java,by J. Hunt, who
lived in Jolo for six months, recognizedthe significanceof the slave mode of
productionin Sulu'ssocialformation: "The power and weight of th€ chiefs arise
so1elyfrom their wealth, or like the Baronsof old amongstus, from the number
of ambas[slaves]or retainerseach entertain."l7
The accumulationof wealthand the transmissionof power and privilegein Sulu
rvasfacilitatedby the ownershipof slaves.This was evenmore the caseafter the
adventof Europeantrade in the Sulu Archipeiagoin the late eighteenthcentury.
The establishmentof Europeanand Asiatic enterpriseand capitalat Jolo on a hither-
to unprecedent€dscale stimulatedthe production of trepangand other strand
commoditiesand madelabour the chief sourceof weaith. Slavelabour tnthe trepang
and pearl fisherieshelpedto providethe productsintroducedinto the externaltrade.
So the expansion of siavery in Sulu occurred as a direct consequenceof
developmentssimilar to those in the Abron kingdom of Gyaman.
 ;
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Trade,SlaueRaidingand StateFormation 193

An abundantsupply of labourwas of considerablesignificancein producingpower

and wealth amongthe Taosugaristocracy.A dntu_yhscouldacquirelarge numbers
of slavescould engagemorrepebpiein procffilnt activitiesand trade, and with
the surplusw'ealththey producedattract othersto him. The efforts of ambitious
Suludatulo plrticipate in thii burgeoninginternationaltrade,with its extraordinary
profits,forcedup the demandfor additionallabourand swelledthe flow of external
trade.The needfor a reliablesourceof labourwas met by the Iranun and Balangingi,
the slaveraidersof the Sulu zone.Indeed,the rapid growth of slaveraiding was
to keeppacewith Sulu'sforeigntrade by providingmanpower,the prime requisite
for the continuedgrowth and prosecutionof the littoral and riverine procurement
trade. Thus the Sulu statecreatedand reproducedthe materialand socialconditions
for the recruitmentand exploitationof slaves.More than anythingelseit was this
sourceand applicationof labour that was to give Sulu in the nineteenthcentury
its distinctivepredatorycharacterin Europeaneyesas a "pirate and slavestate".
The testimoniesof fugitive slavesand historicalaccountsleave no doubt that
slaverywas an essentialelementin determiningthe economic,military and social
patternsof the Sulu state.In large measureit was the slaveswho held the fabric
of Taosug Societytogether in the period under consideration.In contrastto the
industrial-plantation slavery of the West, slavesin Sulu were not solely defined
in terms of their statusas property.Slaveryin Sulu,as in other areasof Southeast
Asia, was primarily a property relation,but not exclusivelyso, and a slave'ssocial
positionwas determinedby a numberof factors,often independentof his servile
status.18 In th-eSuluSultanate,banyaga(chattel-slaves) could have family rolesas
hus6ffi or wife, they couldown property,and they oftenfilled a variet$of political
and economicroles - as bureaticrats,farmersand raiders,as concubinesand traders
- by virtue of which they were entitled to certain rights and privilegesaccorded
to other membersof the community..
Slavery was a-meansof incorporatingpeople into the Taosug social system.
Banyagawere enrolledin the following of datu for political support,but far more
than anlthing elsethey were neededto labourin the fieldsandfisheriesto maintain
an expansiveredistributionaleconomyand the flow of externaltrade.They were
predominantlyVisayan,Tagalog,Minahasanand Bugis speakers,althoughalmost
every major ethnic group of Insular SoutheastAsia was to be found amongtheir
ranks. Someinherited their status.Others were obtainedas a form of tax or in
fulliliient of debt obligations. But all banyagaor their ancestorshad been seized
by professionalslave raiders and retailed in communitiesthroughout the Sulu
zone.19
A distinctionwas drawn by Taosugbetweenchattel-slaves(banyaga,bisaya,ipun,
ammas)and bond-slaves(kiapangdilihan). Banyagawere either the victims or the
offspring of victims of slave raids. Kiapangdilihan were persons from the ranks
of commonerTaosug whoseservitudewas the direct result of personaldebt.2O The
familiar roadsto recruitment into slaverywere captureand birth. Capturein raiding
was the principal mode of recruitment, as the pressuresof internationaltrade
sustainedcontinuedBaiangingislave raids throughoutthe first half of the nine-
teenth century. In addition, debt and fine obligatonsamongthe Taosugthemselves
provideda significantnumberof kiapangdilihan.A personmight alsobe reduced
to slavery by legal process.For example,criminal offencessuch as stealingand
194 JamesFrancis Warren

acts of sexualimpropriety, particularly adultery, were punishableby heary fines.21

Inability to pay or offer someform of securityfor the fine imposedreducedpeople
to the status oI kia\angdilihan. Kiaiangdilihan were an integral part of a creditor's
following but with a lower statusthan freemen,who voluntarily attachedthemselves
to a leader. The creditor claimed rights only over a kiapangdilihan's economic
servicesand in theory was not allowed to harm him physically. In return for
subsistencea kiafangdilihan was obliged to work for his creditor, but b-i-s -services
did not generallycount toward repaymentof his debt. Man$ hin\ansdilihanbetame
dependantsfor life and their familiesmight remain obligatedfor severalgenerations.
Indebtednessenableda dntuto commandthe labow of Taosugcommonersto ensure
the mahpiiiler reservesthey required in the functioningof the socialformation.
Debt bondageas an economicinstitutionin Sulu reachedits fullest development
at the end of the nineteenthcentury.By then the Taosugcould no longerreiy on
Balangingi raids and found sufficient numbers of banyagafor their retinues b-v
increasingthe amou-ntof tribute ordinarilycollectedfrom clientsand making the
fines imposedin the legal codesprohibitive.22
The legaTpbiition of a banyagain the sultanate of Sulu was determined by the
Sulu code,a body of law_c_odified from custom and precedentas well as Islamic
In
law.23 theory, as defined in the Taosug codes,a banyagahad no legal perso'
nality; a banyagacould not hold property; a banyagaVould-betrinsferred, bought
or sold at will; and a master held the power of life and death over a banyaga,who
could be punishedfor the slightest infraction of the law. The legal expressionof
social distinctionsis exemplifiedin the scaleof penaltiesand fines in the codes
for the offencesof murder, adultery, theft and inheritance.Punishmentswere much
more severefor banyagathan membersof other socialclasses.For example,if a
malebanyagahad sexualintercoursewith a free woman,he could either be killed
outright or be severelypunishedand becomethe property of the woman'shusband
or family.2aOn the other hand, if a free man had sexualrelationswith a married
female slave he need only pay a fine of twenty lengths of cotton cloth.2sLess
severepenaltiesfor adultery betweenbanyagaderived from their inferior social
status.The Taosugcommonlyassociatedsuch degradingbehaviourwith slaves.
Although these laws provided examplesof institutionalattitudes towards the
debasementof people,and further reflectedthe low opinionof slavesheld by their
masters,in fact, banyagawere often socialiyand economicallyindistinguishable
-fnd
from freemen in somerespectsmore secure.The actualsituationof many in-
dividualbanyagaas revealedin their testimoniescontradictedtheir legal statusas
a group. Banyagawere encouragedto adopt Islam and marry; somebanyagawere
permitted to purchasetheir freedomand assumea new statusand ethnicity;the
children of a female banyagaand a freeman inherited the status of their father:
somebanyagacould bear arms; any slave could own property, though it reverted
to his master at death.
The basicdifferencesbetweenslaveryamongthe Taosugand slaveryas it was
generallyunderstoodin the West was the variabilityof socialdistancethat existed
betweenslaveand master.William Pryer statedthat on the east coastof Borneo
the relation was that of follower and lord rather than slave and master.26
The power2nd wealth of a datu was commensuratewith the number of slaves
he owned. The more slaves a datu acquired,,the greater was his reputation and
Trade, Shue Raiding and StateFormation 195

the willingnessof peopleto seek protectionwithin his settlementin return for

services.Banyagawere often well ciothed, carried fine keris and were entrusted
with long journeysby their masters.2T The personaland economicties of slavesin
the Sulu Sultanate"provideda senseof security which boundthem to their masters
and gave them identity and ... [incentive]to labour."28A masterwas constrained
to feed and clothehis slavesor give them sufficientopportunitiesto earn a living,
otherwisehis slavesmight demandto be sold.2eIt appearsto have beena common
practicein the Sulu Sultanateto allow a banyaga,when he desired,to changemasters
rather than risk desertion.
Nevertheless,th"r" are statementsof fugitive slavesand other reports which
presentthe master-slaverelationshipin a much more severelight. In principle,
the master'sownershipwas absoluteand his authority unbounded.A.banjaga could
suffer bodily degradationand be put to death;he could be sold,barteredor given
away if it servedhis inaster'sinterests.30 Pryer noted the ambivalencein theory
and practicethat existed in the relationshiptletweenslave and master:31

Mastershavethepowerof beatingthem[slaves] or evenchopping them,butasa rule

slaveryhere[Sandakan Bayandthecoastal area]is regarded muchasservantism is
elsewhere...buta formerDatoherecutoneof hisslavesto pieces
for tryingto escape..

While there is evidenceof contrastingdegreesof benevolenceand hardship,what

is importantto ascertainin assessingthe systemis whether cruelty and maltreatment
were modal characteristicsof slavery in the Sultanate.The fact that afuitu defined
his economicpower in terms of the numberof slaveshe possessed, and that slaves
were able to run away to anotherdatu or try to escapeto Zamboangaor Manado,
placedimportantconstraintson his actions.A purely antagonisticrelationwould
little benefita master,if only becausethe successfulexploitationsof Sulu'snatural
produce hinged on the large-scaleorganizationand cooperationof the slavesand
their dependants.In 1842, an American sailor who accompaniedthe Wilkes
expeditionwrote:32

Wesawseveral captivesherewhohadbeencaptured amongtheislandsin theSooloo

Sea[Visayas] group.Onewastakenoutof a fishingboatin theharbour
or Philippine
Thisman,whobelonged
of Batavia.... to Batavia,spokesomeEnglish,but veryim-
perfectly.He statestheyweretreatedwellby theirmasters,anddid not seenanx-
iousto obtaintheirfreedom.

A masterwas liable to neglector mistreata banyagawho was remissin his duties,

but the statementsof escapedslavesand travel accountsof observersrevealthat
slaves,and especiallythosewith knowledgeand skills, had goodrelationswith their
mastersand were not easily distinguishedamong his following.
Manumissionwas commonlypractisedin the Sulu Sultanateand freed slaves
were mergedinto the generalpopulation,assuminga new ethnicity and status.33
For banyaga,conversionand marriagewere prerequisitesfor manumission.The
processof manumissionin the Taosug social system,which occurredprimarily
amongthosebanyagain closecontactwith their masters,tendedto be a gradual
one, in which incorporationwas implicit.3aAn Indio who altered his ethnic identity
196 JamesFrancis Warren

by becominga Muslim and therebyachievingmanumissionfound a new rangeof

'Taosug'.
opportunitiesopen to him as a freemanand a
A banyagacould purchase his freedom in the Sulu Sultanate.3sThis was fre-
quently the caseamong thosebanyagawho had an aptitude for trade. Their owners
often found it best to allow such slaves to acquire property so as to encourage
initiatives and establishtheir loyalty. In time, the slavemight purchasehis freedom
with his master'sbacking, having profited from participationin his commercial
affairs. Once free, reciprocalobligationscontinuedto bind them, though now as
patron and client insteadof master and slave.
Manumissionwas an importantfeatureof the Taosugsocialsystem.The steadt
leakageof manumittedslavesswelledthe ranks of a dntu'sretainersand hence
increasedhis politicalhegemonyand prestige.The likelihoodof manumissionwas
essentiallya function of occupation.Banyagawho providedimmediateand indispen-
sableservicesto their masters,who servedin their householdsor on their trading
vesselshad better chancesof rnanumissionthan thosewho labouredin the fields
or fisheries.
But for many slavesamong the Taosug and Samal,escaperather than manu-
missionremainedtheir central ambition.Naturally it was during the early years
of captivity that the desireto escapewas greatest.This was particularlythe case
of Indio men who had been torn away from their homes and familicSand had
experiencedthe hardshipsof the Balangingitraffic.36The initial social isolation
createdby differencesin language,customsand statusexacerbatedthe loneliness
and yearningfor the lost past. Somenever did find the "indispensablemargin of
socialand psychologicalspace"37 necessaryto overcomethe trauma of transition
and to settie down. They constantlyreworked their past lives; the remembrance
of their puebloandkampung,family and companionsdid not fade away.38One can
feel in readingthe statementsof someof the fugitive slavestheir desperationanc
determinationto securefreedomand reknit the fabric of their family and communifr'
life. All such banyagalived in expectation of that eventual return.
The Taosugsystemwas suchthat controlswere difficult to apply,and between
a hundredand two hundred banyagawho chafedunder oppressionfled annuallr-
to foreign vesselsat Jolo, to the interior of Jolo or some other island in the
Archipelago,or to Zamboangaand Manado.3e Very little is known about the fate
of thoseIndios who actuallymanagedto return to their pueblo.Undoubtedly,an
Inditt sometimesreachedhome to find someor all of his family dead,his wife remar-
ried, and outstandingdebtsand reciprocalobligationsremainingto be fulfilled.{
Many who escapedwere left to make a new 1ife,the reality of which was harsher
than that from which they had fled.

The economicintegrationof slaues

I have emphasizedthat slaverybecamecrucial to Suiu'seconomicand culturai

life towardsthe end of the eighteenthcentury.Most accountsof the S.uiuSultanate
written before 1780 indicatethat the internal demandfor slavesat Jolo was on
a much smaller scalethan it was destinedto becomein the next century.a1The
impact of the West'scommercialintrusionin Chinawas a wateishedln the formation
of the Sulustate.Slaveswho were valuablefor the variety of their laboursessential
Trade,SlaueRaidingand StateFormation 797

to the growth of the state came to play a more avowedly important role in Sulu
at this time. For example,amongthe Taosug,banyagawereusedin trading venfures,
in diplomatic negotiations,as slaveraiders,as concubinesand wet-nurses,as tutors
to their masters,as craftworkersand as peasantsand fishermen.a2
There was a cleardivisionof labourbetweenthe work of maleand femalebanyaga.
Healry work was performed generallyby male slaves.Physically able men assisted
their mastersin clearingvirgin forest, in ploughing,in harvestingtimber, in building
and maintaining boats, and hauling water.43Male banyagaalso laboured in the
fisheries in searchof mother-of-pearlshell and trepang,manufacturedsalt, accom-
paniedtheir masterson trading expeditions,and sailedas crew on Balangingiperahu.
Among the major tasks of female banyagawere the sowing and weeding of rice
fields,the poundingand threshingof rice and the gatheringand preparationof strand
products.aaFemale banyagaalso joined the entouragesof their mistressesas
attendants,and someenjoyedpositionsof trust and somecomfort as concubines
of leading d.atu.
Mother-of-pearlshell had becomeone of Sulu'smost profitableexportsby the
beginning6f thi nineteenthcentury. Mother-of-pearlhad previouslybeensought
for the China market only on a limited scale.a5 The trade increasedfrom 2,000
pikul tn 1760to an estimated12,000pihul per annum by 1835.46 OnceAsian and
Europeantradersrealizedthe shell'svalue to manufacturersof jewellery, cutlery
and furniture in Ceylon and Europe, they becamethe chief customersof this
commodity,4Twhich, with trepang,was among the most important items of export
from Jolo. It can be roughly estimatedfrom trade statisticsthat during the 1830s
some68,000fishermen,slaveand free, must havebeenemployedby hundredsof
Taosug futtu and Samal headmenin diving for mother-of-pearland fishing for
trepang.as
If the labour-intensiveeconomyof the Sulu Sultanaterelied on the sea as an
abundantsourceof pioduce for externaltiade, the wildernessof Borneowas its
secondmainStby.It was principallyfrom this environmentthat the suitanatewas
suppliedwith specialitiesfor the China trade.aeBirds' nests,procuredprimarily
from limestonecaves,and wax were obtainedin abundanceby thousandsof slaves,
who initiated expansionof settlementand mined the richesof the forestsof east
Borneo for their Sulu overlords.s0
Banyasaof initiative and energy were entrustedwith their masters'property and
senton trading voyages.Hunt notedthat the Taosugemployedslavesin theirperahu
not only as crewmenbut as traders.5lSlavesregularlytradedfrom Jolo to Balang-
ingi and Palawanon behalf of their masters in the 1830s.52 The more capable
banyagawere employedin trading excursionsto the northeastcoast:s3

The mostintelligentof themarepickedout as tradersandperformlongjourneys

sometimesof monthsduration,tradingto differentportswithouteverthinkingof run-
ningaway.Manyof theseslavesamassconsiderable sumsof moneyandhavehouses
andbelongingsevenfinerthantheirmasters....

Aristocraticwomenwere given banyagato assistthem in their businessactivities,

primarily local marketing.54By the mid-nineteenthcentury some of the leading
local tradersin Sulu were women:oi
198 JamesFrancis Warren

In Suluthe wivesof the chiefsareentrustedwith the principalmanagement

of ac-
countsandcarryon muchof thetrade;it is saidthattheyhaveacquiredconsiderable
knowledge from the Manilacaptives,who areoftenof a superiorclass.

Ordinarily, the vending of cloth, vegetablesand other trade goodsin villages.

in the open market, or to foreign vesselswas done by banyaga.Noblewomen,b1'
virtue of their station,lackedthe liberfy to barter produce,which entailedwandering
amongstthe houses,visiting the Chinesequarter, or rowing into the bay to a trading
ship. It was commonfor Taosugwomen to sendone or two Spanish-speaking slaves
into the roadsteadin small canoeson the arrival of a Europeanvessel.The boats
carried fruits, vegetables,coils of tali lanun (cheaprope of excellent quality).
weaponsand curiosities.Slavevendorswere instructedto barter a specifiedmininum
amountof produceby nightfall. They commonlyacceptedfrom Europeansailors
only suchtrade goodsas cupsand saucers,scissors,buttons,empty bottles,tobacco
and opium.56Slave hawkers were an important source of wealth to their
mistresses.It was at the same time an attractive and profitable wa-! of life for
many:57

OnedayI wastalkingto a Malay,of whomI hadjust boughtsomecoconuts, when

he informedmethathe alsowasa captive..., uponwhichI enquiredwhy he did not
profitby theopportunity to escape,andrevisithiscountry."WhyshouldI do so?"he
replied,"thereis something to regreteverywhere;hereI amwellenough,my master
treatsmeas if I wereoneof hiskindred,I amwell paid,andcouldsavemoneyif I
wished;in my owncountryI knowI couldnotdo better,andperhaps shouldnotfare
as well;therefore, I preferremaining here."

The prosperity of the Sulu Sultanate dependedto a large extent on the labour
of the banyagawho mannedthe slave-raidtngperahu.They augmentedthe strength
of client communitiesthat specializedin slaving,and as hirelings enrichedtheir
mastersthrough active participationin raids. Wilkes observedthat dntu "receive
a high price... for the servicesof their slaves."s8 The banyagacooked,fetched
water and firewood,and assistedthe crew from time to time with their shipboard
duties.seThe banyagawere not armed but consideredan integral part of the crew.
and it was their task to row, bail, cleanand repair the perahu.60 It was common
for mastersto send unaccompaniedbanyagaon these perahu,but fleet leaders
(nakhodn)were reluctant to take those who objectedto their masters'wishes,6l
Undoubtedlydatu were constrainedto reward such slaves,otherwisethey would
have been far more reluctant to participatein such hazardousundertakings.
Under the Taosugsomeof thesebanyagaenjoyedconsiderablesocialmobilit-v.
The successfulexecutionof a slave-raidingexpeditionwas diffitijlt and dangerous
work and dependedlargely on the skill of its personnel.Proven ability and expe-
riencein raiding was one of the most important criteria for leadership.Some-bgnyaga
held importantpositionsas nakhodaand occasionallyas squadroncommandersin
slaving expeditions, and in return they acquired wealth and slaves who
complementedtheir personalfollowings.YisayanIndios in particular demonstrated
their talent and courageas nakhodaand developeda fearful reputation in the
Philippines,o2but banyagafrom other parts of the Malay world who had knowiedge
of dialectsand of their former localitiesorovedequallvskilful boat commanders.6:
Trade,SlaueRaidingandStateFormation 199

Raidingseemsto haveprovidedother suchslaveswith opportunitiesfor modest

socialadvance,especiallyifthey showeda talent for fighting. Jadde,a Batak retailed
to "Sulu pirates"for trade goodson the east Sumatrancoast,was "madeat first
to row, and bale water out of their perahu [but] he gave such proofs of courage
and address,that in a short time they advancedhim to the rank of fighting man."64
Despitethe emphasisplacedupon external trade in the formation of the Sulu
state,agricultureremainedthe main activity for the majority of Taosug,who still
residedinland on the high volcdnicislandsof the Tapul group and on Pata and
Siassi.65 The sultanateneededa reliablesourceof food for its expandingpopula-
tion. The increaseddevelopmentof a slave mode of productionconditionedthe
integrationof the subsistencesectoras a major componentof the redistributive
system.Banyagaemployedin agriculture contributed towards providing the food-
supply which maintainedthe community and freed a datu and,his retinue from sub-
sistencepursuits,so that they could devotetheir labour to trading and raiding.66
Small, dispersedfarming communitiescomposedof banyagadotted the interior
of the larger ferTileislands,especiallyJolo,Tapul and Pata.Mastersallottedtheir
banyga a bamboo hut large enough to accommodatea single family, and a farm
plot.67The huts were scattered about over large tracts of land. The slave
statementssuggest that at least in some casesthese subordinateagricultural
settlementswere homogeneousin languageand religion.The size of such settle-
ments is not known and would have dependedon the number of farm slavesa datu
owned,but they must havecontainedup to severalhundredpersons.Thesebanyaga
were encouragedby their mastersto marry otherbanyagaand establishhomesteads.
Farm slaveswere expectedto provide for their own wants from the fields and
gardensthat had been given to them.68They were obligatedto remit a fixed
minimum portion of this produceto their mastersthrough the agencyof the village
headman,who could be of slave or non-slaveorigin. Farming was their major
economicobligation,but datu demandedalso that villagesnear the coast collect
tre\ang and pearl shell for them, although for this they received barter goods in
exchange.All were liable to be called upon for military services.oe
In prominenttrading centreslike Jolo,Parangand Bual, where agriculturewas
of secondaryimpbrtance, talented banyagaengagedin a wide range of activities
and included"am<ing their numbersbureaucrats,tribute collectors,artisans,musi-
cians,scribesand commercialagents.The opportunitiesfor socialmobility among
these slavesstand in marked constrastto those of slavesengagedin farming or
fishing.
Banyagarecruitedby the Sultanas office-holdersenjoyedconsiderableprestige.
The Sultan afipoiiiteilthem tb administertrade and subject peoplesin different
parts of the zonein order to centralizehis authority and thwart the ambitionsof
rival elementsamong Taosug aristocrats.Becauseof their inferior socialstatus,
banyagadid not have the political aspirationsof the d.atuclass,and the Sultan's
powei was strengthenedby the use of suchpersonsas administrators.The interests
of theseslavesby virtue of their elevationto politicalofficelay unquestionably
with
the Sultan, and they made loyal followers.
Banyagaplayedleadingrolesas bureaucratson the SamalIslands,actedas tribute
collectorsthroughout the zone, and mannedtariff stationson Borneanrivers.7o
ChristiaanSoermacommandeda largeperahuthat collectedtribute from Parang,
200 tames Francis Warrcr

Tapul, Tawi-Tawi and SandakanBay in the 1830s.i1A Chinese,*named Banjer.

seizednearBanjarmasinby the Iranun,was a Sultan'sman dnd had oncebeenput
on a trading stationto control inland commercealong the KinabatanganRiver.;:
The Sultan also made use of banyagato exercise control over subject groups on
the northeastcoastof Borneo.In 1878Pryer wrote, "It is not consideredparticularll
degradingto be a slave,most of the leadingmen here have been so...."73 One of
the most influentialof theseslave-headmenwas Tuan Iman Gelanee,who dominatec
the SamalBajau Laut on the northeastcoast after 1850:74

Tuan Emumis a Bugis,he was capturedwhenyoungby Sooloopiratesand taken

overby theSultanhimselfwhofindinghimto bea manof abilitysenthimoverhere.
Sandakan thenapparentlybeingprettymuchin thehandsof theBadjus,Emummar-
ried the queenof the Badjus,[and]becamethe headmanamongstthem.

As Taosugtrade becamemore complexand the politicalproblemsposedby the

West grew, so did the amount of work which required literacy. The usesof written
documentswere no longerconfinedprincipallyto the recordsof the genealogyoi
the Sultan, the appointmentof officials, and the collectionof tribute and legal fees.
After 1768,writing was required for diplomaticand trade correspondence with
the Spanish,Dutch and English,for recordinggrantsof land and the terms of treaties
6f various sorts with the West, and to keep track of the accountsof the commercial
enterprisesof the dntu.
Paradoxically, few Taosug aristocrats could read and write, and bgytyggawith
educationwho could serve as scribes,interpreters and languagetutors were much
sought after.?s-Themajority of these scribeswere male slavesdrawn from dif-
ferent parts of the Malay world, but female Indio slavesserved as sedretariesto
the Sultanat different times.76While most other slavespecialists- artisansand
craftsmen - were more or less expendable,the skills of the educatedbaryagacuid
not easilybe masteredby others and urereconsideredindispensableto the business
enterpriseof the datuwho employedthem. Banyagawho couid speakor write one
or more foreign languageswere employedas trading agentsby dntu, andwere thus
enabledto amassconsiderablepersonalwealth: "These[educatedslaves]are not
deniedthe right of holding property which they enjoy during their lives, but at their
deathit revertsto their master.Someof them are quiterich...."77 Wilkes described
sucha banyagawho appearsto have been of someassistanceto his expedition:;F

All accountsof theDatuof Soungarekeptin Dutch,by a youngMalayfromTernate,

whowritesa goodhand,andspeaks English,andwhomwe foundexceedingly useful
to us.He is a slaveof the Datuwhoemployshim for thispurposeonly.He-told me
he wascapturedin a brig by the piratesof Basilanandsoldhereasa slave-#fii;re
to remainfor life, althoughhe saysthe Datuhaspromisedto givehim his
he is 1ike1y
freedomafterten years.

The numberof slaveartisans- goldsmiths,silversmiths,blacksmithsand weavers

- was neverlarge, and comprisedonly a small fraction of the total slavepopulation.
Gifitedbanyaga,whoseraw materials,brought by trade or tribute, were transformed
into jewellery, tools, weaponsand armour, were full-time artisans,while others
 Trade, SlaueRaiding and StateFormation 201

who were lesstalentedpursuedtheir occupationson a part-timebasis.Not supris-

ingly the arbitrary distribution of banyagaleft some talents wasted. Josd Ruedas,
a silversmith,spentthree years as a fishermanand gathererof pearl-shellbefore
being taken by his master to be exchangedfor a bundle of cotton cloth at Jolo,
where he resumedhis craft.TeWhile some slavesfound their skills superfluousin
a particular island'seconomy,others appearto have had the opportunity to acquire
training in critical occupations,especiallyas blacksmithsand armourers.80
It is clear from the accountsof Forrest. Hunt. D'Urville and Wilkes that slaves
were calledupon to perform instrumentalmusic and sing, sometimesin Spanish,
or to recite Visayan poetry for religious festivals and when Europeansvisited
Jolo.81Under such circumstancesthere was ample opportunity for banyagawith
musicaltalents to improve their condition.Furthermore,some daiz themselves
playedthe flute, violin or guitar and most were fond of Spanishsongsand dances.82
Indio slavescould and did act as their music instructors and entertained them at
night while they smoked opium and discussedtrade and politics.
I have emphasizedthat slave-holdingwas the primary form of investment for
the Taosug but have not-itit mentioned the slave's significance as an object of
exchangeiii a societyand a trade systemwhere coinagewas lacking. As a form
of wealth, banyagawere a tangible asset in readily transferable form. In this con-
text, banyagawere considerednot only to be chattels but currency as well. For
instance,the value ofa \anyagain the 1850sas an object of exchangein transactions
betweenTaosugdatu and Samalraiders was roughly equivalentto ten kayu(pieces
of coarse cotton cloth twenty fathoms in length), or two bundles of coarsekain
(sarongs)or two to three hundredgantangof rice. Perahucould be purchasedfor
six to eight slaves,while boat rentals amountedto only two to three slaves.Por-
tablecannonwere loanedat the rate of oneslave,and rifles (oftendefective)could
be rentedfor five piecesof linen of 20 fathoms.83 Slaveswere exchangedover and
over again. Datu rarely traded their own followers, especiallythe younger ones,
who were consideredmore malleableand educable,but they trafficked extensive-
ly in slaveswho were given to them by Iranun and Balangingias tribute, in pay-
ment of debts and fines or as captives.It was not at all uncommonfor a slaveto
have had two, three, and even occasionallyfour mastersin his lifetime, to have
lived amongseveralethnicgroupsin very different parts of the zone,to havefirlfilled
a variety of economicfunctionsand experiencedvarying degreesof hardshipand
servitude.84 The easewith which slavescould be moved about reflectstheir cen-
trality to the economicsystem.
Slaverythen was of decisiveimportancein the economicand military organization
of the Sulu Sultanatein the nineteenthcentury. Banyagawere encouragedto
participateactivelyin the economiclife of the state,and thereby obtaina degree
of socialand cultural autonomywithin the societv:8s

At Soung,business seemsactive,andall,slavesaswellasmasters,
seemto engage
promotethe industryof the community,
in it..., thesecircumstances andeventhat
of the slave, for he too as before observed, has a life interest in what he earns.

Most banyagaultimately achieveda statusand living standardthat, though modest

enough,was still in their view an improvementover their previoussocialcondition

==-l:
 JamesFrancis Warren

under colonial overlords, who did not scruple to thrust their own subjects into
bondage.A few were ableto becomewealthy; they maintainedtheir own households
in the principal towns, living out their lives in a style similar to that of their masters.
So.meof these banyagawere wealthier than most Taosug commoners,and even
than somearistocrats,and ownedmats, chests,fine clothes,brassutensils,weapons
and gongs. One banyagaof standing had a perahu and owned a few other slaves
to do his trading.s6Of the condition of slaves in Jolo, Manuel de Los Santos
observed,"... those slaveswho wish to marry can do so becausethere are man]'
women. I have seensomeof them bear arms. Otherswho were slavesformerl.v.
now are wealthy and free."87JoSeRuedasstated: "There are many Christian
captivesin Jolo, some of whom are happily married and wealthy...."88
The slave statements demonstrate that qta-tlls-d"iscrepancy was common in
nineteenth century Sulu. Among the hierarchy of.banyaga,those who functioned
as bureaucrats,artisans,scribesand concubinesoften had a greater degreeof power
and privilege than Taosug commoners.Wilkes remarked of such slaves:"Some
of them are quite rich, and are invariablybetter off than the untitled freemen."E'
There is someevidenceto show that in rare instancesbanyagaof remarkabletalent
iose to the rank of orang haya and dntu while prot6gds of their masters.eo
My discussionof slavery in Sulu thus far testifies to the view that the aristocracl'
were bent on attractingthe flow of externaltrade to Jolo becauseit was the principal
means of "realtzing" the surplus they extracted from the labour of their slaves.e:
Slaveswere what the datuneededin order to obtainthe new luxury productsbrought
by this trade. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Jolo market offered
British-manufacturedbrasswareand glassware,Chineseearthenwareand ceramics.
fine muslins,silk and satingarments,Spanishtobaccoand wines,and opium from
India.e2There was a constant increasenot only in the variety but also in the
quality of theseobjectsof trade. These luxury goodsfor personaladornmentand
pleasureand for the householdwere translated into power and prestige factors b1'
the aristocracyand were acquiredin order to form the material basisof their social
superiority.
More important, the political and commercial growth of the Sulu state was
reflectedin the enormousincreasein war storesin the Jolo market at the end of
the eighteenthcentury - lead, iron, s6ot, gunpowderand cannon.e3 The Taosug
aimedat monopolizingcontrol over the exchangeand distributionof thesegoods
which, with slaves,made possiblethe reproductionof the socialformation. The
Europeanfirearms and gunpowdersuppliedby internationaltrade enabledcoastal-
dwelling Taosugto advancetheir commercialinterestsin the inter-societalexchange
network, to promoteraiding on a large scaleand keepthe zonefreeof undesirable
intruders and competitors.As Terray emphasizes,it is only in this sensethat
externaltrade is a vital eiementin the overallfunctioningof the socialformation:
"Like every distributivemechanism,it createdno wealth that was born in the pro-
cessof production;but it gave a concreteform appropriateto the requirements
of reproduction."ea
It is worth stressingagainthe powerful economicforcesthat were pushingthe
Taosugaristocracyin the directionof acquiringmore and more slaves.In the first
place,their demandsfor all kinds of productscoming in from externaltrade had
to be satisfied,and these demands,which were both a consequenceand cause
 Trade,SlaueRaidingandStateFormation 203

of slavery,were constantlyincreasing.In order to trade, it was necessaryfor the

Taosugto have somethingto give in exchange.Hence,the collectionand redistribu-
tion of produce was dominated by those dntu with the largest number of slaves;
that is by the Sultan and certain datu onthe coastwho were most directly involved
in Sulu'sexternal trade. Secondly,the more dependentSulu'seconomywas on
slaves,the larger loomedthe questiono{ its supply of slaves.The only way for
the Taosugto obtainthe raw materialswhich formed the basisof their commerce
was to securemore slavesby meansof long-distanceraiding. /
In this period,the rate of growth of the Sultanate'spopulationdid not keep pace
with its expandingcommercialeconomy.Sinceit was the labour of slavesthat made
externaltrade possible,slaveryincreasedmarkedly and becamethe dominantmode
of production. This explains why Jolo quickly becamethe principal centre in the
zonefor the importation of slaves.andthe outfitting of marauders.esSlave raiding
in the Sulu Sultanate was highly organized.There were several types of expedi-
tions:thosewhich were equippedby the Sultanand his kindred,thosewhich were
independentlyrecruitedwith the encouragementof the Sultan,and thoseconducted
without the sanctionof the Sultan. While the right to organizeraiding expeditions
residedat all levels of the political system,the Sultan and certain datu on the coast
were in the best positionto do so by virtue of their control over externaltrade and
their more extensivenetwork of alliances.
The military and economic activities of the Samal raiding populations were
regulatedcloselyby their Taosug patrons.They encouragedthe Balangingi,an
emergentcommunitywho were themselvescaptivesor descendedfrom captives,
to becomefishers of men.e6To meet the West's insatiabledemandfor produce
acceptablein Chinesegourmet markets and consequentlythe increaseddemand
for slavelabour in the zone,d"atunot only equippedSamalvesselsbut also provided
credit to the Iranun with advancesin boats,powder and ball, cannon,rice, opium
and additional crew.eTEverything was to be repaid in captured slaves.esBanyaga
familiar with distant coastsand local conditionsoften accompaniedthe Balangingi
on long slave raids southwardsto Sulawesiand north to Luzon, raids which gave
causefor considerableanxietyto colonialgovernmentsas late as the 1870s.Thus,
the capture of slaveswhose surplus labour could be converted into a sourceof wealth
was the principal aim of Taosug-sponsoredIranun/Balangingiattacks on Southeast
Asian villages andperahushipping.ee
There are no statisticson the total number of slavesimported into Jolo in the
period under consideration,except for the divergent estimates of Furopean
observers.Theserangefrom 750 to as high as 4,000captivesper year from1775
to 1848for the Philippinesalone.It is possibleto reconstructa clearerpicture of
the pattern of slave imports to the Sulu Sultanate from captives' statementsand
other sources. Slave imports to the Sulu Sultanate during the first 65 years
(1780-1835)probably averagedbetweentwo and three thousandper year. The
steepestrise in the number of slavesbrought annually to Sulu, between three and
four thousand,occurredin the periodfrom 1836to 1848when externaltrade was
most intenseat Jolo. The trade reachedits apex in 1848and slackenedconsiderably
in the next two decades,with importsrangingbetween1,200and 2,000slavesper
year, until it collapsedin the 1870s.100 The figures appearto show that between
200.000and 300.000slaveswere moved in Iranun and Samalvesselsto the Sulu

=:#
204 JamesFrancis Warren

Sultanatein the period from 1770to 1870.101

Conclusion

The secondhalf of the nineteenth century proved to be a critical turning-point

in the history of the Sulu Sultanate,as it was in the rest of the non-Westernworld.
Everywhere challengesarose to confront the Sulu state's ability to create and
reproducethe materialand socialconditionsfor sr:rvival.With increasedcooperation
among Western naviesand more effective use of steam vessels,the Sulu world
beganto shrink. The first signscamewith the destructionof Balangingiand Jolo
by the Spanishbetweeen1846 and \852.1'02 The dntu'smain sourceof wealth was
his following. The destructionof Balangingiand Jolo placedseriousconstraints
on the ability of the Taosug to retain control over the Balangingi Samal, their
principal sourceof slaves.The grooved cannonand gunpowderof the West, which
had first attractedIranun and Samalto Jolo as clients and suppliersof captives,
were now operatingto drive them apart. There was a progressivefragmentation
of Samal groups because of Spanish incursions and disruption of the Taosug
economy.No longer could their harrying fleets expectto find coastsunprotected
and towns defenceless.The era of long-rangeslave raiding was over.
The total collapseof the systemonly came with the concertedefforts of Spain
to end Sulu'sautonomy.In the last three decadesof the century the trade was
destroyed by a Spanish naval campaign to annihilate systematically all perahu
shippingin the Sulu Archipelago,by the developmentof a policy to compelthe
Taosug to settle down in viliagesas agriculturalists,and by the immigration of
large numbersof Straits Chineseto Sulu in spite of, or perhapsbecauseof, the
naval campaign.Taosug control over the regulationof external trade collapsed,
with drasticconsequences. They were forcedto curtail their commercialactivities
and becamedependenton merchantimmigrantswith contactsin Singapore.The
traditionalTaosugredistributiverole was taken away,the zonedisintegrated,and
the pattern of life was altered by the extinction of slavery. By the beginning of
the twentieth century, the demiseof the trading and raiding systemhad left the
former Sulu state bereft of its importanceas a major commercialentrep6tin the
wider island economyand confrontedwith severeinternal social and economrc
problems.
Two major conclusionscan be drawn from this discussionof the place of the
slave in Sulu societyin the nineteenthcentury. The first is the decisiveimportance
of the exploitationof slavesin the functioningof socialformationin Sulu:"A social
formationcannotbe understoodexceptby beginningwith an analysisof the rela-
tion of productionswhich are at its base."103 External trade spawnedslavery in
the Sulu Sultanate.The increasein externaltrade,which affectedstateformation
and economicintegration,made it necessaryto import captivesfrom the outside
world to bolsterthe population.As goodsfrom China,Europeand North America
flowed to Jolo, the Taosug aristocratsthrived, and the Balangingi,a strong, skilled
peoplewho were the scourgeof SoutheastAsia, raiding in sixty-foot-longperahu,
emerged.The seawas the life force of the sultanate,where tens of thousandsof
banyagalabouredannuallyto provide the specialitiesfor external trade. The arrival
of captiveslaveson a hitherto unprecedentedscalefor intensiveor skilled work
Trade,SlaaeRaidingand StateFormation 205

and their gradualabsorptioninto the lower levels of Taosug and Samalsocietywas

central to the developmentand expansionof the Sulu redistributivesystem.
Secondly,the rise of Sulu as the dominantstate in the trading zoneat the end
of the eighteenthcenturyconformsto the more generalprocessof stateformation
and economicintegrationthat beginswith the introductionof externaltrade.The
Sulu Sultanate'shistory thus parallelsthe evolution of independentstates and
statelesssocietiesbeyondSoutheastAsia, whereslavesplayedeconomicand social
roles similar to those in the Abron kingdom of Gyaman.

NOTES

1. The zonecomprisingthe Sulu Archipelago, the northeastcoastof Borneo, the foreland

of southernMindanaoand the westerncoastof Sulawesiset the geographicalframework
for this study.
2. My study, "Trade, Raid, Slave: The Socio-EconomicPatterns of the Sulu Zone,
1770-1898"(Ph.D. dissertation,Australian National University, Canberra,1975)on
which this paper is primarily based,stressesthe impact of rapidly expandingforeign
trade on the economyand socieLyof the Sulu zone,and providesa backgroundto a discus-
sion of slaveryas an establishedfeature of the Sulu Sultanatein this period.
3. Extensiveethnologicalresearchon the Taosug(Taosug,Tawsug,Sriuk, Su'ug)conducted
by ThomasKiefer, principallyin the years 1966-68, has beenpublishedin numetous
articles and several monographs.See Thomas Kiefer, The Tausug: Violenceand Lau
in a Philippine MoslemSociety(New York, 1972);"The Tausug Polity and the Sultanate
o{ Sulu: A SegmentaryState in the SouthernPhilippines",Sulu Sturlies7 (1972):19-64.
4. For a cogentdiscussionof the advent of Islam in Sulu and Mindanaoand its relationship
to SoutheastAsian Islam until the coming of the Spaniardsin the sixteenthcentury,
see Chapter 2 of Cesar Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (QuezonCity, 1973).
5. William H. Geoghegan, "Balangingi",in Frank M. Lebar (ed.),Ethnic Groupsof Insular
Southeast,4sra 2 (New Haven, 1975),6-9. Ethnographicstudiesof the SamalBajau
Laut, spanningnearlya decade,havebeenconductedin the environsof Tawi-Tawi in
the SuluArchipelago.SeeHarry Arlo Nimmo, "The Structureof BajauSociety"(Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1969); The Sea Peopleof Sulu (San Francisco,
1972).
6. For a detaileddiscussionof the traditionalpatternsof trade of the Sulu Sultanate,see
Warren, "The Sulu Zone", \6-35: see also my article, "Sino-SuluTrade in the late
Eighteenth and Nineteenth_Centuries",Philippine Studies25 (1977): 50-79.
7. SeeJamesF. Warren, "Balambanganand the Rise of the Sulu Sultanate,1772-1775",
IMBRAS 50 (1977):73-93.
8. Warren, "The Sulu Zone",245-47.
9. Ibid.,348-408.
10. I rely heavilyon the anthropologicalstudiesof Thomas Kiefer and also acknowledge
the pioneeringwork of JohnGullick and Melvin Mednick concernedwith the historical
reconstructionof traditionalMuslim political systemsin SoutheastAsia. See Kiefer,
The Tausug, 104-1,2; idem, "The Sultanate of Sulu: Problems in the Analysis of a
206 JamesFrancis Warren

SegmentaryState"; id.em,"Traditional Statesof Borneo and the SouthernPhilippines".

in Clifford Sather (ed.), BorneoResearchBulletin 111 (1971):46-50; John Gullick.
IndigenousPolitical Systemsof WesternMalay (Lonilon, 1958);Melvin Mednick, "Some
Problemsof Moro History and Political Organization",Phili|fine Sociological Reuieu5
(195D: 39-52. Seealso Donald Brown, Brunei: The Structureand History of a Bornean
Mahl Sultanale(Brunei, 1970).
11. SeeAppendix V, "The Manila-JoloTrade, 1786-1830",in Warren, "The Sulu Zone".
424-38.
12. In theseEuro-centredhistoriesthe term'piracy'is conspicuously presentin the titles.
Vicente Barrantes, GuenasPiraticasdeFilipinas ContraMindnnaosy Joloanqs(Madrid.
1878);JosdMontero y Vidal, Historia de la Pirateria Malayo-Mahometana en Mindanao
Joloy Borneo(Madrid, 1982).
13. SeeBlake to Maitland, 13 August 1838,Public RecordOffice, London (hereafter,PROt,
Admiralty 1251133;Declaracionesde todos los cautivos fugados de Jolo y acogidosa
los Buquesde la expresadadivision, con objeto de averiguar 1ospuntos de donde sale::
1ospancos pirates, la clase de gente que los tripulan, la forma en que se hacen lo:
armamentosy otros particularesque arrogan las mismasdeclaraciones,Jolo, 4 Octobe:
1836, Philippine National Archives, Manila (hereafter, PNA) Mindanao/Sul':
1803-1890,1-72; Relacionde los cuarentay cinco cautivosvenidosde Jolo sobree.
bergantinEspanolConteta,19March 1847,PNA, Pirates3; Verklaringenvan onfvlugter.
personenuit der handen der Zeerooversvan 1845-1849,Arsip NasionalRepublii:
Indonesia,Jakarta,(hereafter,ANRI), Menado 37. Numerousstatementsand inter-
rogations of freed slavesand captive marauders,recorded over several centuries a::
expressingtheir own attitudes towards the placeof slavesand raiding in the Sulu wor-:
were also published occasionallyin Dutch scholarly journals. See, A.J.F. Janse:-
"Aantekeningenomtrent Sollok en de SollokscheZeeroovers",TBG 7 (1858):2lI-6.:
"Berigtenomtrent den zeeroofin den Ned. Indischenarchipel1859en 1860",TBG 2
(1873):302-26,399-433, W.R. van Hoevel,"De Zeerooverijender Soloerezen", T.\.
2 (1850):99-105.
14. SeeAppendixXVIII, "The Statementsof the Fugitive Captivesof the Sulu Sultanate
1836-1864",in Warren, "The Sulu Zone",46I-82.
15. C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, "An African Mode of Production", Critique of Anthrofolog.
4 and 5 (1975):37-71; idem,"Recherchessur un mode de productionAfricain", lr
Pensde L44(1969):61-78; SamirAmin, "Sous-developpement et d€pendance en Afrique
Noire", Partisans64 (1972):3-34; Yves Person,"Enqu€ted'uneChronologielvoirienne-
in J. Vansina,R. Mauny and L.U. Thomas(ed.),TheHistorianin TropimlAfrim (London
Oxford University Press,1964),332.SeealsoClaudeMeillassoux(ed.), The Deuelapmtn:
of IndigenousTrade and Markets in WestAfrica (London, 1971).
16. EmmanuelTerray, "Long-distance exchangeand the formationof the State:The Case
of the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman",Economyand Society3 (1974):315-45.
17. J. Hunt, "Someparticularsrelatingto Sulo in the Archipelagoof Felicia",in J.H. Moo:
(ed.), Noticesof the Indian Archipelagoand Adjacent Countries(London, 1968), 37.
18. For an important article ofl the problemsof definingslavery,see E.R. Leach,"Caste
Classand Slavery - The Taxonomic Problem",in A. de Reuck and J. Knight (ed.),Cc-rr
and Race;Comparatiue ApProaches(London,1967),12-13. Seealso Robert A. Padgug
"Problems in the Theory of Slavery and Slave Society," Scienceand Society40 (1976t
?-r7
19. Diary of William Pryer, 25 November 1878;26 June 1879,ColonialOffice, Londo:.
(hereafter,CO) 874168.
20. Melvin Mednick, "Encampmentof the Lake: The Social Organizationof a Mosler:-
Philippine(Moro) People"(Ph.D. dissertation,University of Chicago,1965),60-61
Kiefer, "The Tausug Polity and the Sultanate of Sulu", 30.
Trade, SlaueRaiding and StateFormation 207

21. Beyer-Hollemancollection of original sourcesin Philippine Customary Law (hereafter,

BH-PCL)VI, paper162,No. 16,Adolf Gunther,"Correspondence and Reportsrelating
to the Sulu Moros",10-12; paper162,No.25, EmersonB. Christie,"The Non-Christian
Tribes of the Northern half of the ZamboangaPeninsula",87; paper 162,No. 28, L.W.V.
Kennon, David P. Barrows, John Pershing and C. Smith, "CensusReport relating to
the District of Lanao Mindanao", 4; Najeeb Saleeby,Studiesin Moro History, Lan and
Religion(Manila, 1905),92-93.
22. Scott to Governor,30 June 1904,H.L. Scott Papers,Library of Congress,Washington,
D.C., Container55; Saleeby,Studiesin Moro History, 94.
23. Saleeby,Studiesin Moro History,65, 81, 89.
2 4 .I b i d . , 7 1 ,8 3 , 9 3 .
2 5 .I b i d . , 9 3 .
26. Diary of William Pryer, 14 March 1878, CO, 874168.
27. William Pryer, "Noteson North EasternBorneoand the Sulu Islands",Royl Geographiml
Sociely5 (1883):92-93.
28. John Keith Reynolds,"Towards an Account of Sulu and its BorneanDependencies
1700-1878"(M.A. thesis,Universityof Wisconsin,1970),81.
29. Pryer, "Notes on North EasternBorneo and the Sulu Islands",92.
30. Thomas Forrest,A Voyageto New Guineaand theMoluccas frum fulnmbangan:including
an acmunt of Magindnnao,Soolooantl other isktnds(London, 1779), 330.
31. Diary of William Pryer, 14 March 1878,CO,874168.
32. William Briskoe,Journal,Vol. 2, Departmentof the Narry,U.S. NationalArchivesand
RecordsService,entry for 5 February 1842.Seealso statementof VincenteSantiago
in Expediente12, 4 October 1836,PNA, Mindanao/Sulu1803-1890,70.
33. Warren, "The Sulu Zone",344-47; Mednick, "Some Problemsof Moro History and
Political Organizations",
48.
34. See the statementof FranciscoEnriquesin Patricio de la Escosura,Memoria sobre
Filipinas y Jolo redactadaen 1863y 1864 (Madrid, 1882), 273.
35. BH-PCL, VI, Paper 163,No. 34, OscarJ.W. Scott and Ira C. Brown, "Ethnographyof
the Magindanaosof Parang",16; Arturo Sociatsy Garin, "Memoria sobreel Archipielago
de Jo1o",Boletin de la SociedadGeograficade Madrid 10 (1881): 171.
36. Seethe statementsin Relacionjurada de los individuoscautivosvenidosen la fragata
de guerraInglesaSamarang,15 March 1845,PNA, Piratas3; Hunt, "Someparticulars
relating to Sulo", 50.
37. StanleyElkins, "Slaveryand its Aftermath in the Western World", in de Reuck and
Knight, Casteand Race,200.
38. Hunt, "Some ParticularsRelatingto Sulo", 50.
39. El GobernadorCapitanGenerala Seior Presidentedel Consejode Ministro de Guerra
y Ultramar, 9 December1858,Archivo HistoricoNacional,Madrid, Ultramar 5184;Hunt,
"Some particularsrelating to Sulo", 50.
40. Numero 133,CarlosCuarteron,prefectoapostolico,a Seior GobernadorPoliticoy Militar
de Jo1o,3 December1878,PNA, Isla de Borneo.
41. Decretonumero 9, El Consejode las Indias, 18 December1775,Archivo Generalde
Indias, Seville(hereafter,AGI), Filipinas 359; Pierre, Vicomte de Pages,"Travels Round
the World in the Years 1767,1768,1759,1770,1771",in TrauelAccountsof theIslands
1513-1787 (Manila, 1971),156; Felix de Sainte-CroixRenouard,VoyageCommercial
et Politiqueaux Indes Aientales, aux Iles Philippines,d la Chine, auecdesnationssur h
Cochin Chine et le Tonquin, pendantlesanndes1803, 1804, 1805, 1806 et 1807 (Paris,
208 JamesFrancis Warrtr

1810),2:175;Forrest, voyageto New Guinea,330;Barrantes,GuerrasPiratims,160-61:

Montero y Vidal, Historin de Filipinas' 2:369'
..Joloand the Sulus'',in E.H. Blair and J.A, Robertson,The Philiffine Ishnds'
42. C. Wilkes,
1493- 1898,XLIII (Cleveland,1903-09)' L28-42'
43. Seestatementsof Marianode la Cruz and FranciscoGregorioin Expediente12, 4 Oc'
tober 1836, PNA, Mindanao/sulu1803-90; Ei GobiernoPolitico y Militar del zam'
boangoa Gobernadorcapitan General,9 June 1847,PNA, Mindanao/Sulu1838-85
44. Extracts from singaporeFree Press,6April 1847, PRO, Admiralty l25ll33; BH-PCK.
VI, Paper tO2, No. 20, F.P. Wiliiamson,"The Moros betweenBuluanand Punta Flecha-.
103; Mednick, "Encampmentof the Lake", 62'
45. The Chinesemanufacturedmother-of-pear1articles in the form of beads,fish counters
fans and combs. William Milburn, Orizntnl Commerce;containinga geographimldescriptnn
of thptrincifal blacesin the East Indies, chinn, and Japan,with their produu, manufacturt.
and trade...(London,1813),ii: 513'
February 1761' PRO
-" See"List of Productsof Sulu and its immediatedependencies",26
46.
includedwitl-
egr..oni p, p,ers,SOlliliill; "List of Goodsto be had at Sooloo",MS,
Albree, 656/18334, Salem Peabody Museum' Salem' Massachusetts
the log of the ship
Hunt, "Someparticularsrelating to Sulo", 48'
varied according to the
47. In 1859 the Singaporeprice of a fikut of mother-of-pearlshell
quality between sbo 600 dollars. It was not unusual to pay up to 850 dollars to re'
"nd a e1primer_Secretar:-
opori it to ceylon. Numero g3, E1Consulde Espaia en Singapore (hereafte:
de Estado,3 J;ly 1860,Archivo de Ministeriode AsuntosExteriores,Madrid
AMAE), Correspondencia Consulados Singapore 2067'
literature,archiva-
48. This estimatehasbeenarrived at by using the few examplesin the
number of peopit
documentsand private manuscripti to provide ratios between the
and their annual output at small collecting centres ::'
involved in marine procurement
for the estimate:
the zone. I have used these figures in conjunction with the statistics
volume of trepang(10,000pikiD andmother-of-pear1(72,000 bikut) exported from Jo"
Hunt wro:'
in the 1830sio establishthe relative size of the labour force. For example,
at Towson Duyon in Sandakan Bay [northeast Borneo]'..A hundred bajow.::
that
abotttfifty piat":
fishermen [are] empioyedin catching and curing lrefang; they obtain '':
i"itty", a.rd'at ioolloo, "There are ... thirtl to forty Bajow fishermen erpployed
catchingtrepang;twentyorthirtypiculsarecuredhereannuaily'''onTawiTawithe:.
were,,elght-huidredIslams, chiefly the slaves_[clients?] of Datu Mulut Mondarosaar:
piculs of Kt'::
Datu Adnan. They produce unnuilly for the Sulo market threehundred
piculs i7 bache de mer ... and some very valuable pearls..
tepoyfmother_of-ieirll, fortl,
hundt :
Ai Su.il-, fiftein huiidred-Iilams prodrced twentyiirals of bkt'ckbirds'npst,.three
piculsofKulittepoy'afewpearls,sometortoiseshell,andtwentyorthirtyprows-.
a:
paddi ior annuil export.,'Hunt, "Some particulars relating to sulo",54-55'
added) These figures tend to support the conclusionthat the collecting r.:
ir-pnuri,
cniig of a pikul of trepangor a likut of.mother-of-pearlshe11 required the average annj:
laboui of two men for trelpangindfour men for mother-of-pear1. This means.that in l:-=
the nineteentir .."ntrrry an estimated 68,000 men laboured in Sulu s fishen-
first half of
the sizeof the gtoups employed in Jolo'smoche:
In 1880a spanishnavalofficer alludedto
Taosug]assemb'e:
of-pear1fisheries:"... in order to collectmother-of-pearlshel1,they [the
(I guarded one [expeditionr '
innumerableexpeditionswhich are often led by a datu.
y 1881-1ES-
z,ioo rirtt..-"n and three datu\." comision Reservadaa Borneo Jolo
bound Ms. Biblioteca de Palacio, Madrid' 38'
49. Warren, "The Sulu Zone", 128-57.
50. Crocker to Sir RutherfordAlcock, 10 September1887' CO 8741243'
51. Hunt, "Someparticuiarsrelating to Sulo", 37'
Trade, SlaueRaidins and StateFormation 209

52. Statementsof Alex Quijiano,FranciscoSacariasand DomingoFranciscoin Expediente

12, 4 October 1836, PNA, Mindanao/Sulu1803-90. See also statement of Juan
Florentinoin "Relacionjurada de los dos individuoscautivosvenidosen la corbettade
guerra Francesa Salina procedente de Sumalasanen el Archipielago de Jo1o",PNA,
Pirates 3; Treacher to Sir RutherfordAlcock, 3 July 1884, CO,8741237.
53. Pryer to Treacher,5 October1881,CO, 8741229;Pryer, "Noteson North EasternBorneo
and the Sulu Islands",92.
54. Pryer, "Notes on North EasternBorneoand the Sulu Islands",93.
55. SpenserSt. John, Life in the Forestsof the Far Easl II (London, 1862),250.
56. Thomas Jefferson Jacobs,Scenes,Incidentsand Aduenturesin the Pacific Ocean,or the
Ishnds of the Australasian Seas,during the cruiseof the Clifper Margaret Oakley(New
York, 1844),335.
57. Melchior Yvan, Slr Months among the Malays and a Year in China (London, 1855),
258- 59.
58. Wilkes, "Jolo and the Sulus",181.
59. Statementof Alex Quijanoin Expediente12, 4 October 1836,PNA, Mindanao/Sulu
1803-1890.
60. Jansen,"Aantekeningenomtrent Solloken de SollokscheZeeroovers",222;Bonhamto
Maitland, 28 June 1838,PRO, Admiralty 125, 133.
61. Statementsof Alex Quijano,DomingoCandelarioand Mariano Sevillain Expediente
12, 4 October1836,PNA, Mindanao/Sulu1803-90; statementof Mah Room, 2 June
1838,in Bonhamto Maitland, 28 June 1838,PRO, Admiralty 12511.33.
62. Statementsof JuanFlorentino,Manuel Feliz, DomingoFranciscoand MarianoSevilla
in Expediente 12, 4 October 1836, PNA, Mindanao/Sulu1803-90; extracts from
SingaporeFree Press, 6 April 1847, PRO, Admiralty I25lI33; Numero 137, Carlos
Cuarteron,prefectoapost6licoa GobernadorCapitanGeneral,12 August 1878,PNA,
Isla de Borneo (2); Tomas de Comyn, Stateof thePhilifpines in 1810 beingan historical,
statistiml and dnscriptiueacmuntof the interestingfuion of theIndian Archipelago(Manila,
1.969),t24.
63. StatementsofAbdul and Sendiin Verklaringenvan ontvlugtenpersonenuit de handen
der Zeerooversvan 1845-1849.ANRI, Menado37; Jansen,"Aantekeningenomtrent
Sollok en de SollokscheZeeroovers",225.
64. Sherard Osborn,My Journal in Malayan Waters(London, 1861),41. In some instances
slavesredeemedthemselvesby acts of braverywhich indebtedtheir mastersto them.
Slaves involved in raiding were most apt to receive their freedom under such
circumstances. Witti to Treacher,November1881,CO, 8791229; CesarMajul, "Political
and HistoricalNotes on the Old Sulu Sultanate",IMBRAS38 (1965):35-36; Kiefer,
The Tausug,41.The following exampleillustratesthe circumstancesunder which a
master might have exercisedthe right of redemptionby a sacredpromiseto God:
Dato Meldrum of Johor statesthat he saw PengeranMahomet of Brunei wearing
a baju ranti fchain mail] at Pandassan,in the early fifties. The Pengeranhad married
an Illanun wife who was settled there and who claimedrule over the river. Pengeran
Mahometsaidhe had beenpiratingon the coastof China,morethan oncealongwith
the Illanuns.On oneoccasionhe fell into the seawith his baiuranti onbut was saved
by a slavewho dived and fished him up....
British North BornmHeraUand Official Gazette (herertter,NBH) 16 September1895,236.
65. Kiefer, The Tausug,10.
66. Farren to Palmerston,17 January 1851,CO. 14418;Corbett to the Secretaryof the
Admiralty, 6 October 1862,Foreign Office, London (hereafter,FO) 1711.
210 JamesFrancis ll'c-.,

67. Statementsof PedroAntonio, VincenteRemigio,and FranciscoAugustinoin Expedie::=

12.4 October1836,PNA, Mindanao/Sulu 1803-90;witti to Treacher,November1r-:-
co,8741229.
68. Statementsof VincenteRemigioand FranciscoAugustinoin Expediente12, 4 Octc:t-
1836. PNA. Mindanao/Sulu1803-90; witti to Treacher, November 1881, CO. !-=
229.
69. Statementsof Juan Sabalaand Vincente Remigioin Expediente12, 4 october 1S:-
PNA, Mindanao/Sulu1803-90.
70. Statementsof Matias de la Cruz and FranciscoSacariasin Expediente72, 4 Octt:.'
1836,PNA, Mindanao/Sulu1803-90; verklaring van christiaan Soerma,10 Aui:.-
..Diaryof a trip up the Kinabatangan','
Sc:,:,
1846,ANRI, Menado50; William Pryer,
SocietyJournal 5 (1970):119.
71. Verklaring van ChristiaanSoerma,10 October 1846,ANRI, Menado50'
72.Pryer, "Diary of a trip up the Kinabatangan",119'
73. Diary of William Pryer, 14 March 1878, CO' 874167.
74. Ibid.
75. Briskoe,Journal,Yol.2,5 February 1842;Diario de mi comision a Jolo en el 1.a:'.'
Magallenes,Jos6Maria Peieranda,19 March 1848,PNA, Mindanao/suluunclass::.::
bundle;Jansen,"Aantekeningenomtrent So1loken de SollokscheZeeroovers",211
76. Escosura,MemoriasobreFilifirns y Joloredactadaen 1863y 1864,371; Diary of \\'ii-:'::
Pryer, 8 March 1879,CO,874168.
,,Joloand the Sulus",166;Juiessebastienc6sar Dumont D',Urville,volagt: :^
77. wilkes,
L'Astrolabeet La. Zdlde... pendnnt lesan'.;..
pole sud it dnns L'Ocdaniesur lescoruettes
1837-1838-1839-1540VII (Paris,1841-46),170'
78. Wilkes, "Jolo and the Sulus",161.
79. Statementof Jos6 Ruedasin Expediente12, 4 October 1836, PNA, Mindanao:--
1803-90,32.
80. Statementof GabrielFranciscoin Expediente12,4 October1836,PNA' MindanaoS--
1803-907 , 1.
81. Forrest, Voyageto New Guinen,330; Hunt, "Some particularsrelating_toSulo". =
L'Astrolabeet In zi ; '
D'Urville, voyageau pole surt et dnns L'Oalanie sur les coruettes
II, 308, 313; Wilkes, "Jolo and the Sulus"' 165.
82. Forrest, voyge to New Guinea,330;Hunt, "Someparticularsrelating to Sulo",'1.
83. Jansen,"Aantekeningenomtrent Sollok en de SollokscheZeeroovers"'216,227.
84. PrefetturaApostolicade Labuane sue DipendenzeECC. Nella Malesiaorientale, ca:- -*
Curarteron,10 November1878,PNA, Isla de Borneo(1).Seealsostatementof Sim-:-:
Plasain Expediente34, GobernadorMilitar y Politicode la Provinciade Zamboa:.-
a GobernadorCapitan General, 1 February 1852, PNA, Mindanao/Sulu1838-::
Verklaring van ChristiaanSoerma,10 August 1846,ANRI' Menado 50'
85. Wilkes, "Jolo and the Sulus", 168.
86. Witti to Treacher,November 1881,CO' 8741229.
87. Statementof Manuelde los Santosin Expediente12,4 October1836,PNA' Mindana-'
Sulu 1803-1890.
88. Statementof Jos€ Ruedasin Expediente12, 4 october 1836, PNA, Mindanao/S-:-
1803-1890.
89. Wilkes, "Jolo and the Su1us",166.
enMindanao,Joloy Bon:;
90. Montero y V tda],Historin de la PirateriaMalaio-Mahometarut

.-ri:
Trade, SlaueRaiding and StateFormation 211

69; in 1903GeneralLeonardWood describedPanglimaHassanas: "Originallya slave

born on Pataisland,and little by little hasworkedup until he is now the mostimportant
Chieftainin the islandof Jo1o,next to the Sultanand Datu Jokanian."LeonardWood
Papers,Library of Congress,Washington,D.C., container3, Dairy of LeonardWood,
18 August 1903.
91. Terray, "Long-distanceExchangeand the Formationof the State", 315, 344-45.
9 2 . W a r r e n , ' T h eS u l uZ o n e " , 7 4 - 7 6 , 8 3 - 8 51, 0 3 .
93. Warren, "The Sulu Zone", 39-52, 76-77. See alsoidem,"Balambanganand the Rise
of the Sulu Sultanate,1.772-1775",74-83.
94. Terray, "Long-distanceExchangeand the Formationof the State",335-36.
95. JamesF. Warren, "SlaveMarkets and Exchangein the Malay World: The Sulu Sultanate,
7770-7878",/SE45 (\977\: 162; idem,"The Sulu Zone",327-28.
9 6 .I b i d . , 3 0 0 - 3 0 4 .
97. Statementsof Matias Domingoand Juande la Cruz in Expediente12, 4 October1836,
PNA, Mindanao/Sulu 1803-90; extract from SingaporeFree Press,April 1847, PRO,
Admiralty l25ll33.Maj'd,, Muslims in tfu Philiffines, 285, fails to recognizethe important
redistributive role of the Taosug in raiding and its relationship to the reproduction of
the social formation. All the evidencepoints to the fact that the Sulu Sultan and chief
dntu never encouragedor approved of piracy by Samal or Iranun datu, for they were
themselvestraders, having an interest in keeping all shipping lanessafe, especiallyfor
traders going to or coming from Jolo.
98. Statementof Juande la Cruz in Expediente12, 4 October1836,PNA, Mindanao/Sulu
1803-90;El GobiernoPoliticoy Militar de Zamboangaa GobernadorCapitanGeneral,
30 May 1842,PNA, Mindanao/Sulu1838-85.
99. Blake to Maitland,8 August 1838,PRO, Admiralty l25ll33; Jansen,"Aantekeningen
omtrent Sollok en de SollokscheZeeroovers",217,229.
100.Warren, "SlaveMarkets and Exchange",174 "The Sulu Zone",342.
101. Farren to Palmerston,16 March 185i, CO, 144/8;Warren, "Slave Markets and Ex-
change",I74-75; idem,"The Sulu Zone",342-44. For a precisecalculationof siaveim-
ports to Sulu 1770-1870,I have used the figure 20.5 slavesper boat basedon the
statementsof slavesseized1826-47, minus 4,800 to 8,000 (1,200to 2,000per year)
for the period 1848-52. From this calculationit thereforefollows that the number of
slavesimportedover the period 1770-1870varies from a low estimateof 201,350to
a high estimateof 302,575.See Table 4 in "SlaveMarkets and Exchange",174.
102.Warren,"The Sulu Zone",314-21.
103.Terray, "Long-distanceExchangeand the Formationof the State", 340.
 . PERHENTIAII

P. REOANO

K. M€RANG

0 P. ( aPAS
X, MARANG

MERCHANG

K , T A NY A N

KRETAI

lL"ro.on \ cHUKAI K .K E M A M A N

-(4U
o ro ?o 3oMrLEs I
-
,6 3' asxm
V
The State of Terengganu
11
The Port and Polity of TerengganuDuring the
Eighteenthand NineteenthCenturies:
Realizingits Potential

SHAHARIL TALIB

Recentstudieson pre-colonialMalay stateshave suggestedthat the socialrelations

of productionbetweenthose who control the state apparatusand the producing
classesremainedunchangeduntil the arrival of productive capltal.1In such states
the productivecommuniiiesin societywere subjugatedby the haturalruling class.
A small prly;leged minority wielding political power appropdated tbe labour and
fruits of the working majority. This was done throughout the course of history
throughwars, conquests,coercion,plundering,diplomacy,marriagealliances,and
outright gifts. Territorial expansionusuallyimplied the impositionof statestructures
on the producingclassesat the local level. However, the basic structure of the
economicelementsof societyremainedunalteredby the political stormsabovethem.
Constantrepetition in succeedinggenerationsof the material conditionsof the
producingclasses,unchangingsocialrelationsof production,and expansionof the
state machinerywere the dominant themes. This essay seeks to outline with
referenceto eighteenthand nineteenthcenturyTerengganuthe socialmeaningof
that state'spoliticalhistory. More specificaliy,it tracesthe major stagesof district
administrationas the royal capitailocatedat Kuala Terengganuexpandedits control
over the economicresourcesof the outlying riverine hinterlands.
By the end of the nineteenthcentury the coastalterritorial limits of the state
of Terengganuspanned240km embracing14 separateriver systems,eachflow-
ing into the South ChinaSea.Such a territorial formationrnadethe state distinct
from other Malay states,which usuallypossessedonly one main river basin and
two smallerones on either side that formed its boundaries.Terengganu'srivers
were, from southto north, the Kemaman,Kijal, Kemasik,Kretai, Paka,Dungun,
Merchang,Marang, Ibar, Terengganuand its tributaries,the Telemongand Nerus,
Merang, Setiu and Chalok, Keluang and Besut. The largest rivers after the
Terengganuriver were the Kemaman,Dungunand Besut.Eachriver systemformed
a separatehinterlaridwith a river mouth as its outlet. Prior to the nineteenthcentury
the territoridl"boundaries of Terengginu extendednorthwardsto includethe state
of Kelantan.2
Throughoutthe eighteenthand nineteenthcenturiesthe seat of governmentof

213
2r4 Shaharil Tali!:

of the
the state was located at Kuala Terengganu. It served as the royal capital
sultanate and as the port of the Terengganu river basin. The large
Terengganu
which
number of inhabitants and the variety of their occupationsgeneratedsurpluses
trading centre on th"- tq:t!' Except
made this princely camp the most important
secondary
during lriet perioas of mining, the other river basins were on-flof
importanceuntil the eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies,which saw the
".onorni.
extension of central control over the hinterland'
WhenHamiltonvisitedKualaTerengganuinlT20thetownwasalreadyoneof
Peninsula'
the most important centresof commerceon the"eastcoast of the Malay
distinctive as the most impressive building in a town of
The ruler,s palace was
1,00bhouses. A labour force of several hundredMalays had been summoned
roughly
settlec
iro,', tir" Kelantan territories to build the structure and had subsequently
pasir Sebrang on the opposite side of the Terengganu River.3 The urban set'
at
did not have the appearance of streets with neat
tlement pattern of Terenjganu
of chinese.
rows of houseson either ria". rn" capital,inhabitedby a goodnumber
of between 10 anc
was more a conglomerationof separatevillages, eachconsisting
20 dwellings.a
There were alsc
Three or four junks would arrive annually from China for trade.
cambodia, Tonkin and Sambas, and English, French,Dutcl:
trading links with Siam,
ships called at the port for trade.s In 1737 the Melaka Dutch.
and oirer European
trading vessels fo:
Register recorded the arrival of two private English _bound
later in the same year. Kuala Tereng-
Teiengganu and the return of one of them
provisioni
gun, *i, a regular port of call for East India Company ships seeking
main exports of the port at this period were pepper anc
;;ih" Cil" irn.u'it"
Chinese
gold. About 300 tons of pepperwere exportedannuallyand' accordingto
far superior to that available
iccounts, the quality of-pepper here was reputedly
a smallQuan-
elsewhere.Other produci. ihut *e.e commonin this regionincluded
tity of gold-dust;forest produce such as rattan, camphor and birds'nests;.handicralt:
suthasmats;avarietyofsea-producesuchas trepang,sharks'fins,squid'abalone'
handledalmos:
fish, coconutsand arecanuts.7In the 1720sthese exports were
Chinese merchants from Kwangtung' Fukien an:
e*.i,rsiu.ly by the Chinese.s
porcelain and coloured paper every year to Kuaia
Chekiang brought tea,
Terengganu.e
secondha':
Altt[ugh the eighteenthcenturywas an era of prosperoustrade,the
difficulties for the state' There
of the ceitury *"i fo,-Terengganu one of external
Thais, the Dutch and the Bugis and, towards the
ivere constantthreats from the
from Kelantan, which attempted to assert its independence
end of the century,
trade of Kuaia
Notwithstandingthese problemsand the activity of pirates, the
major change in the patti:rn c':
Terengganucontinuedto gain in importance.The
of Kuata Terengganu as an entrepdt. It hac
trade was the growing im-portance
centre for the Gulf of Siam, Cochin China, Cambodia
emergedas a significanttraie
Borneoandtheislandstotheeast.TheportwasfrequentedbyChinese,Bugis
produced pdppe:
English and Portuguese.The primary exports included locally
produce' Opium an-{ ap1 were the goocs
anJre-exportsof tin, spicesand forest
largely for rieipiirt'10 A visiting Frenc:
most in demandfro- Europeantraders,
vesselin 176g,for example, obtained supplies of meat, including 36 buffaloes.a
for opium' a=
number of bullocksand chicken,fruit and vegetablesin exchange
The Port and PoliQ of Terengganu 2t5

well as 25 barrels of water free of charge. Among the minor exports were a little
gold-dustand other productssuch as vegetablesand fish.ll The town was noted
as large and denselypopulated,with an important classof state officials,merchants,
ulama and Chinese.12 It had changedlittle from the following accountwritten half
a century earlier:13

The town is badlybuilt with roughwoodenhuts,somewith tiled roofs,otherswith

roof andhousecoveredwith coconutleaves,theyareraisedon piles8 or 9 feethigh,
therearebambooladdersto climbup. The King'spalaceis the samething,thereis
justonesmallbrickhousewhichservesasa powderstorein thesameenclosure, the
wholeenclosed by a kind of palisadeof heavyplanks29 feethighwhichhavealmost
all fallenoverbecauseof lackof attention.Therearethreebazaars,onefor theMalays,
anotherfor theSiamese andthelargestfor theChinese: theirstreetis a pleasant
one,
their housesbetterbuilt thanthe othersandin thefront theyhavetheir shopswhere
you canfind Chineseand Europeangoods.

The Englishwere the most important of the Europeantraders to call at Kuala

Terengganu.In 1768six vesselscalledto barter for goods.The quantity of goods
imported by them was so great as to causea fall in prices.14English ships brought
in opiumfrom Bengalto trade.Eachchestwas taxedby the state.Europeanships,
in general,brought a variety of other items including,15

ironbars,darkpurplec1oth,andredandgreenPatiacatte[Pu1icat]handkerchiefs.
voilecloth,blueandredstriped[cambay] butfinequality,thereis nosalefor thecoarse /
one,plussmalliron cannons of 8 lbs calibre,goodmusketsin smallquantities. i

In exchange,they obtainedgold, piastres,quantitiesof "calin"(probablykaolin),16

wix, rattan, pepperand cloves,the last two commoditiesbrought in by the Bugis.17
Competitionin the import trade was so sharpthat it causedone trader to observe
that in Kuala Terengganu"mediocrequality [goods]are absolutelyunsaleable."l8
By 1788,in responseto the developmentoflong-distancetrade, peppercultivation
had expandedto such an extent that Terengganuhad becomeknown as the pep-
per country.The state now producedbetween13,000and 17,000pikul (onepikul
= 62.5 kilograms)annuallyleand in the sameperiod the ruler guaranteed5,000
pikul of cleanpepperto the English.20The rise in pepperexportsbrought about
a significantrise in the importanceof opium,which becamethe main commodity
of exchange.2lHowever, in troubled times the ruler was also in the market for
guns and carriages.22 A clear symptomof Terengganu'sentry into the cash-crop
economyand a concomitantincreaseof trade and populationat the capital was
the pressurefor higher imports of rice. Part of the supplieswere obtainedfrom
the recentlyestablishedtrading stationin Penang,throughthe intermediaryof the
ruler. Between May 1790 and July 1791 alone about 15 ships sailed between
Terengganuand Pulau Pinang,leadingFrancis Light to speakof its lucrative trade
on the easternseaboard.23 By assumingfor himself specialcommercialprivileges
the ruler was effectivelythe chief merchantin the trade. He ownedseveralships,
which he sent to Cambodia,Siam, the Moluccas,Java and Sumatra.The ruler,
however,allowedsomeproportionof the foreign trade to be handledexclusively
for himself.2a
216 Shaharil Talib

During the long,lejgn.o.fSultan Mansur (1741-93) Kuala Tgle.qgg,anu reached

its zenith.The expandingtrading economy,especiallyentrepOttrade,allowedthe
ruler to assert his influence in Malay politics at the regional level. His main
preoccupationduring bi!reign of over 50 yearswas to try to oust the Bugis from
the Johor kingdom, to lh-w-artDutch attempts to acquir€a inoiiOp'Olytier his trade.
and to check Thai encroachmentssouthwards.In pursuit of ttreSe?ffis he made
numerousoverturesto English, French, Portugueseand otfer traders, all of whom,
together with others from the region, had arrived at Kuala Terengganu to take
advantageof its lucrative trade.25
The TerengganuValley was the principal area of settlement in the region north
of Kemaman,butthere are few data availableon the other river systemswithin
the territorial boundariesof the Terengganustate. In 1689 Engelbert Kempfer.
on his way to Siam, stopped at Besut within the territory oiTeiEtrEafrir, which
was reported to have a populationspeakingboth Thai and Malay.26Early eigh'
teenth century French seacharts mention BesutzTand the River Dungun is markec
as a possiblesite for the establishmentof a British settlementis-Ifl"1765Engku
Busu, a closeassociateof the Riau ruler, moved to Dungun after a quairel witl-.
Sultan Mansur. It was his son, Tengku Wok, who later acquiredcontrol of the
river.2eThe other river about which someinformationis availableis the Marang.
The origin of the name, Marang, may be traced to a local sourcewritten in the
mid-1920s.Accordingto this, some Siamesearrived in the early eighteenthcen-
tury to settleupriver at Temalawith a chief calledMarang, after whom the rive:
was named.Sometime later, a Syed,popularlyknown as Tok Ku Marang, is belier"
Jd to huu" arrived and establisheiu ufuug" at Kuala Marang. The settlement,where
dusunwerecultivated,continuedto grow but remainedfairly independentof cen'
tral control.30Only in the nineteenthcentury did the district enter into firmer rela-
tions with the capital of Kuala Terengganu,when the central governmentinitiatec
the processof integratingthe outlying river districts, essentiallywith the aim c,:
augmentingthe resourcesavailablefor it. This processof consolidation,howeve:.
was slow. Even as late as 1824,in diplomatictransactionswith the Burmeserule:
the KedahSultan,referringto a potentialBurmese-Malaymilitary allianceagains:
Siam, cited Dungun, Marang and Terengganuas independententities.:rl
The early nineteenth century was, in fact, a grim period for Kuala Terenggar:':
and its valley hinterland.The Thai threat soonbecamean unpleasantreality. Sulta:.
ZainalAbidin II (1795-1808)was at constantwar with the Kelantaneseterritorie=
with their nbivly emergingpower centreat Kota Baharu.Finally, Kelantanwith Th;-
supportbroke away from Terengganuto assertits independence. The new trac:
centre at Kelantan,with its greater exports of tin, boasteda larger pcipiilationtha-,
Terengganu.To the south,Singaporebeganto attract much of the entrepOttrac;
that Kuala Terengganuhad oncehandled.Under theseadversecircumstances ti-.
populationof Terengganudeclinedconsiderably.CaptainBurney,who visitedti-:
statein late 1825and early 7826,gavea figure ofbetween10,000and 20,000peop..
dependentupon the Thai ports to the north for their rice supplies.Many Chines.
had migrated northwardsto Kelantan.32The bleak situation continuedinto t:-:
1830sand was aggravatedby civil war, which had an adverseeffect on localcoi:.-
merce.33 In 1826Kuala Terengganuwas exportingas little as 3,000pihul of pe:-
per, comparedto 17,000pikul in 1788.34
 The Port and Polity of Terengganu 217

Fortunatelyfor Kuala Terengganu,the declinein its prosperitywas checkedby

the important discoveryin the early ninetee-q-t_r.century
gf the tin mines at Dungun
and Kemaman.These two outlying river valleys produced,in 1826alone,a total
of f ,206'pikulof tin.35By the mid-1830sproductionhad risen steeplyto 7,000pikul
annuallf.s0'Aroundthe capitalitself ciiitivationbf pepperwas graduallyreplaced
by the cultivation of cane for the production of coarse sugar. Coffee too was
introducedand about 2,000pikul were exportedannuallyto Singapore.3T By the
mid-18309Te"rgqgganutrfrfi'irioveiddits prosperity. It hail a population of about
35,000 inhabitants,half of whom lived in the capital, and it soon establisheda
considerabletrade with Singapore.38 Confirmationthat there was a sharpgrowth
in trade is providedby the significantrise in Chinesesettlersin Terengganu.In
1835 Kuala Te-rengganuhidi pobuhtion of scarcely600 Chinese,3e but two years
later their numbers had risen to about 3,000.40Trade brought a phenomenal
increasein population,and by the 1890sthe total populationof the statehad reached
approximatelylQq,0q0.o'
Closelylinked with trade were other maritime activities such as fishing, in which
a substantialnumberof coastalpeoplewere engaged.The fishermengenerallywent
to seain the inter-monsoonperiod,while during the monsoonitself they occupied
thernselveswith building and repairingboats,mendingnets, plantingsmall crops
and performing odd jobs. Their fish productshad an establishedinland market and,
later, during the nineteenthcentury.were also exportedto Singapore.a2
f'he commercialprosperity of Terengganualso encouragedvarious crafts, among
which boat-buildingfigured prominently.This includedthe constructionof small
fishing vesselsand cargo boats built after Chineseand Europeanmodels.a3A
closelyrelated craft was wood-carving,which includedfashioning sirihboxes, keris
handlesand housedecorations.aa In fact, SultanBagindaOmar (1839-76)carefully
nurtured a manufacturingclassin the state.Visitors during his reign were shown
locally manufacturedmuskets.as Besideswoodwork Terengganu'scraftsmenpro-
ducedsilks, cottonfabrics,native weaponsand metal work, includingbrassware,
which the ruler bought from Daik artisans,as well as Terengganucloth, kain emas,
hain limau and kain prangrosak,which were sold at high prices outside the state.
A variety of knives, daggers,swords,spearsand chopperswere also produced.
This wide range of crafts and the ready markets they found contributedto the
commercialprosperityof the royal port.a6
Notwithstandingits spectaculargrowth and expansion,the port capitalof Kuala
Terengganuin the nineteenthcenturyhad alteredlittle in appearancesinceit was
visitedin the 1760sby Frenchtraders.In 1835G.W. Earl notedthat the town was
still a conglomerationof villagesbuilt of thatchand wood,lacking order or regularity.
Only the Chinesequarter was observedto have a semblanceof organization,strung
out along a seriesof small streetslined with shopsand houses.The dwellingsof
the royalty and principalchiefs,however,were more pleasingand durablein their
structure, being sometimesconstructed partially of stone, while the istana itself.
was protectedby a bamboofence and severallong brass /e/a(swivel-guns).47
In step with Terengganu'sgrowth, the pattern of productionand exchangein
the Terengganuvalley continuedto be orientedtowards commercialactivity at
the capital.The coastalpeoplewere occupiedwith fishing and relatedindustries.
Their productswere carried into internal markets, where they were exchanged

.,!!*--
 OBVERSE

REVERSE

Mas Dinar Terengganu,from the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin I (r. 170I-26)
Source:Muzium Negara,Kuala Lumpur.
 ThePort andPolitl of Terengganu 219

for gold-dust,pepper,vegetablesand inland produce48such as ivory, camphorand

gambier.4eThese, in turn, were exchangedat the capital for imports of rice, tobac-
co and essentialproducts such as cloth.
The market sceneat Kuala Terengganu during the trading seasonwas one of
high excitement, typical of an Asian bazaar.Vessels arrived regularly from An-
nam and other mainland capitals carrying supplies of salt and rice, while others
might call quite by chancebringing for sale the crew of a captured vessel taken
as slaves.
The ruler and the more important chiefs dominated foreign trades0and the
unfamiliar Europeantrader would have beenbewilderedby the elaborateetiquette
and style that all large businesstransactionsinvolved,whether at the Sultan'sbaloi
or in the house of the kapitan Cina.sr This contrasted with the bargaining and
haggling within the network of internal markets, which were usually handled by
women functioning both as principal buyers and sellers.s2
In the processof growth and expansionduring the late nineteenth century the
royal capitalforged institutionallinks with the variousriver systems.In consequence,
the office of district chief underwentsignificantmodification.Accordingto Sir Hugh
Clifford, Terengganuwas divided prior to the reign of BagindaOmar (1839-76)
into a number of districts, each of which53

... is heldin fief fromtheSultanby a dato'ordistrictchief.Thesedistrictsaresub-

dividedintominorbaronies, eachof whichis heldby a dato'muda, or chiefof secon-
daryimportance, on a smallertenurefrom the districtchief.The villagesof which
thesesubdistricts arecomposed areheldin a like mannerby theka-tua-an (ketua)or
headmen from the dato'muda.

The district chief usuallybelongedto a lineagewith a long hereditaryconnection

with the area.He was, as Clifford put it,s4

... usuallyrelatedmoreor lesscloselyby tiesof bloodwith the peopleoverwhom

he rules.He hasbeenbornandbredamongthem,haswed their womenfolk,lived
theirlives,sharedin theirtroublesandgoodfortune,moreespecially thelatter,and
evenat his worstknowsandis knownmostintimatelyby them,andcannotbut be
largelyin sympathy with them.

By the reign of SultanZainalAbidin II (1881-1918)theselocallineageshad been

gradually brought under control by successiveSultans.They were replacedby
leadersfrom the royal capital who were unrelatedto local lineages.The underlying
historical significanceof this processwas that it captured the surplusesgenerated
by the productiveactivitiesof the variousriver valleys.In the early periodof state
formation the locally-born district chief exactedwhat he could from his followers
and merely paid an annualtribute to the Sultan.ssHowever,this form of relation-
ship betweenthe outlying districts and the royal capital changedrapidly during
the course of the early nineteenth century as the state was gradually drawn into
the world economy.The ruler beganto exercisegreatercontrol over the distribution
of resourcesin the state.He appointedhis own men from Kuala Terengganuand
sent them out to the districtsas local officials.These new state officialscollected
revenue,which was channelledinto the royal treasury.In exchangefor their services

=-
220 Shaharil Tatib

the ruler handedout moneyor goodsto his officialsfor their maintenance's6 This
was the situationuntil the reign of Sultan Zainal Abidin III (1881-1918),when
the relationship changedonce again. At this third stage of developmentstate of-
ficials, drawn from the ruling class,were assignedindividual incomes.The underly-
ing reasonfor this can again be traced to the changing nature of trade in Tereng-
ganu. There was a marked expansionof direct trade with Singapore,not only from
Kuala Terengganu but also from the other subsidiary ports of the state. At the
turn of the century, Terengganu'strade with Singaporefar exceededthat with the
other eastcoaststates.However, the changingrelationshipbetweenKuala Tereng-
ganu and the other river systemsduring the processof consolidationresultedin
the underminingof local lineagesand their replacementby district chiefsappointed
from the centre.
Kemamanwas initially headedby one Lebai Saris.s7This man originatedfrom
Pattani,which he had left after he had failed in a rebellionagainstthe Siamese.It
is believedthat he was the first to settle at Kampung Nyior on the KemamanRiver
during the reign of SultanAhmad I (1808-31).The basisof his authority in the
district, like that of all the other local district chiefs,was his personalinfluence
and wealth. The district chief paid a nominaltribute to the TerengganuSultans.
who interfered little in its affairs. Gradually, his family earned a high reputation
and establishedits leadershipand influenceover the other settlers.His son,Abu
Bakar, was a celebratedwarrior. It was said that:s8

He usedto givehimselfairsasthoughhe werea Sultan.At the padiseason he used

to builda greatpavilionof statein whichhe usedto sit, from whencehe couldvisit
thevariouspadiplantingscarriedin a litter by someof the menwhoowedallegiance
to him.

The fame of Lebai Sarisreachedthe earsof SultanAhmad I, who was keen on

establishinga marriage alliance with the family and sent a delegationto ask the
hand of his daughterin marriage.However,theseovertureswere met with condi-
tions that were unacceptableto the ruler. Lebai Saris insistedthat his daughter
should not become a mere gundek (concubine)but be taken as a royal wife. He
also wished his son to marry one of the Sultan'sdaughters.ss Sultan Ahmad re-
mainedadamantand sent an expedition to deal with the intractableLebai Saris,
who was duly capturedwith his son.The Sultanthen appointeda seriesof district
chiefs to rule the area until the territory was finally made over as a wedding gift
to his consort,Tengku Puteri, who in turn sent Tengku Wok to rule the area.After
the arrest of Lebai Saris and his son, successiveSultansare known to have sent
men from Kuala Terengganuto rule the district.60
Kemaman produced a significant addition to the royal coffers, despite the
independenceof its chiefs.The river valley, with a populationof about 1,000Malays
and Chinesein 1835,yielded considerablerevenueto the ruler. SultanAhmad I,
who had initially brought the river under royal control,suppliedthe necessarycapital
for the mining activity and so took the profits.6l During this period, Kemaman
produced1,000pikul of tin annually,as well as a little gold, camphorand ebony.
Even underthe leadershipof the Sultan'sown appointee,Tengku Wok, Kemaman
continuedto maintain a tributary relationshipwith the royal capital. The chief built

-:
The Port and Polity of Terengganu 221

up substantialnaval strength, so that, for example, when he visited Singaporein

1835 he was accompaniedby 18 armed perahu.62Like contemporaryBesut,
Kemamangavethe appearanceof a small state63until after the mid-1830s,when
the minesfailed and the populationdispersed,leaving only about a hundredChinese
at the mines and barely 20 others at the river mouth.6aThese officialsreceived
an annualdole of rice from the ruler.65During the reign of Sultan ZainalAbidin
III the district was bestowedon Abdul Rahmanbin Isahak,as a reward for his
assistancein doing away with a troublesomecousin.Though at this stagethe district
contributedlittle revenueto the capital, it yielded sufficientprofits for the per-
sonal upkeep of Abdul Rahman.66
The district of Besut was settled only in the early nineteenthcentury by Kelantan
and by Pattani Malays fleeing from the-Siamese.The first settlerswere said to
have purchasedtheir original site at Kampung Lama from the aborigines, osten-
sibly in exchangefor a bag of fish-hooks.In the early daysof the settlementthere
were three chiefs in the area located respectively at Kampung Raja on the east
bank, Kampung Lama on the west bank and at Setiu. The Kampung Raja family
was led by Pa'Cheng,a court favourite from Kuala Terengganu,who was originally
sent to the area by Tengku Kadir, a son of Sultan Mansur,67in an attempt to con-
solidateTerengganu'sfrontiers againstthe breakawayKelantanstate. In the en-
suing struggle for leadershipamong the three families, the Kampung Raja group
emerged successful.68 Central control over Besut was finally establishedon
Tengku Kadir's appointmentas chief of the whole district. He was succeededby
his son, Tengku Ali. In the deep interior of this river system there was a chief
known as Tok Mengkiang, who owned only vague allegianceto the ruler at Kuala
Terengganu.6e The threat of Kelantan competingfor the allegianceof Besut posed
a constant problem to Terengganu. Eventually, following a period of civil war in
the state, Tengku Ali made a bid, though unsuccessfully,to establish his own
kingdom at Besut. He defied the orders of Baginda Omar and made overtures to
the Sultan of Kelantan. His refusal to pay allegianceto the former was tantamount
to a declarationof revolt and. in 1875,a force of 8,000 men under Datuk Mata-
Mata was sent from Kuala Terengganu to deal with the rebel. Expelled frorg the
district, Tengku Ali fled to Kota Baharu,where he lived in exile until his death.7o
Following this abortive revolt, the district passedto Tengku Muda, known also
as Engku Lapoh, a brother to Tengku Ali, who ruled with the assistanceof Tengku
Cik. Largely owing to the efforts of Tengku Muda and Tengku Cik, the population
of the district rose sharply from a mere 500 in 1875 to 14,000 in 1911,71as
comparedto a total populationof 70,000and 154,000respectivelyfor the whole
state. The Besut leadersassidouslyencouragedsettlementin the district by the
provision of necessaryequipment for settlers during the initial yeats,72and by
offering guidancein the techniquesof rice irrigation. Their main incomecamefrom
export and import revenue.
BagindaOmar alsotook actionto consolidatehis controlover the other districts.
He entrusted Tengku Haji Awang bin Mahmud from Kuala Terengganuwith the
administrationof Setiu. The latter was succeededfirst by his son,Tengku Bentara,
and then by his grandson.Successivedistrict chiefs encouragedcoconutcultivation
in the river system and drew their income mainly from import and export taxes
at the kuala.z3The victoriousDatuk Mata-Mata, on the other hand, was placed
 222 Shaharil Talib

in chargeof Kemasik, which was first settled in the early nineteenthcentury, from
where he drew his income from pepper cultivation.Ta
The chieftainshipof the other river valleys as well went through much the same
processof development.By the end of the nineteenthcentury the early settlements
had been consolidatedunder chiefs appointed from the centre, usually members
of the ruling classfrom Kuala Terengganu,and more especiallyby the kerabatdiraja.
Thesewere asswedof a private incomefrom the varioushinterlands.The structure
of the chieftainshipbetween 1882 and 1913 outlined in Tables 1 - 3 showsthe
control that each chief exercised.Ts
The creation of the office of district chief at the expenseof the power of the local
leaders was symptomatic of the process of centralizationand royal increase of
control. Sultan Zainal Abidin III, as seen from the tables, usually assignedthe
districts to membersof his family, with occasionalappointmentsmadefrom among
other membersof the ruling class.The chief held his office by virtue of receiving
the Sultan'scaf (seal),which gave him the right to ler,y taxes. Since the collection
of revenuewas an important function of government,this provided the chiefs with
a ready sourceof power.76
In theory, the Sultan had the right to rescind the cap,which was deemedto be
nOn-hereditary.77 ln practice, however, in certain areas the new line of control,
once established,was fitmly maintained in a single family'

RAJA ANAK SUNGAI 1882_1913

TABLE l. [1882781

District Name Relation to Sultan

1. Kemaman Tengku Muda uncle

2. Kljar Tengku Muda uncle

Muhammad Ali bin Abdul court favourite
3. Kemasik
Rahim (Datuk Uati-Uata)
Tengku Embong Musa nephew
4. Kretai
Tengku Cik Pengiran elder sister
5. Paka
Tengku Bukit great-aunt(her
6. Dungun
nephew Tengku
Muda was her
representative)
Tengku Petra of SingaPoreKerabat
7. Merchang
Singaporebin Tengku Diraja
Said of Lingga
TengkuMohamedYusof brother-inlaw
8. Marang
(Tengku PanglimaBesar)
 TABLE I bont'd)

District Name Relation to Sultan

9. Ibar Sultan
10. Tributaries of the
TerengganuRiver:
a. Nerus Tunku Sayyid Paluh brother-in-law
b. Telemong Tengku Musa great-uncle
c. Ulu Terengganu Tengku Cik Pengiran elder sister
(aboveKelemang
Falls)
d. BetweenKelemang Abdul Rahim bin Musa court favourite
Falls and Datuk Mata-Mata
Kuala Telemong
e. Berang Inot available] Inot available]
11. Merang [not available] Inot available]
12. Setiu Tengku Mahmud bin cousin
Tengku Dalam
13. Kluang
14. Besut Tengku Cik Tepok great uncle

RAJAANAK SUNGAI1882-1913
TABLE 2.l9097sl

District Name Relation to Sultan

1. Kemaman Abdul Rahmanbin Isahak court favourite

(Datuk Sri Lela Diraja)
2. Kijal Tengku MohamadYusof brother-in{aw
3. Kemasik MuhammadAlibin Abdul court favourite
Rahim (Datuk Mata-Mata)
4. Kretai Tengku Embong Musa nephew
5. Paka Tengku Abdullah bin son-in-law
Sultan Ali Singapore
6. Dungun Tengku Abu Bakar bin brother-inlaw
Abdul Jalil

(cont'd ouerleaJ)
 TABLE 2 bont'd)

District Name Relation to Sultan

7. Merchang Tengku Petra of SingaporeKerabat

Singaporebin Tengku Diraja
Said of Lingga
8. Marang Yang Dipertuan Muda eldest son
9. Ibar [Reportednot assigned]
10. Tributaries of the
TerengganuRiver:
a. Nerus Tengku Kazaki bin son-in-law
Tengku Abu Bakar
b. Telemong Tengku Ngah Omar bin cousinand son-in-la',r
Tengku Abdul Rahim
c. Ulu Terengganu Sayyid Abu Bakar ulama
(aboveKelemang (Tuan Embong)
Falls)
d. BetweenKelemang [not available] Inot available]
Falls and
Kuala Telemong
e. Berang Inot available] Inot available]
11. Merang Inot available] [not available]
12. Setiu Tengku Mahmud bin cousin
Tengku Dalam and
Datuk Kaia Lela Wangsa
13. Kluang Tengku Mahmud bin cousin
Tengku Dalam and
Datuk Kaia Leia Wangsa
14. Besut Tengku Cik bin herabatam
Tengku Hitam and
Tengku Long bin
Tengku Ngah

RAJAANAK SUNGAI1882_1913
TABLE 3. [191380]

District Name Relation to Sultan

1. Kemaman Abdul Rahman bin Isahak court favourite

(Datuk Sri Lela Diraja)
The Port and Polity of Terengganu 225
TABLE 3 (cont'd)
District Name Relation to Sultan

2. Kijal Abdul Rahman bin Isahak court favourite

(Datuk Sri Lela Diraja)
3. Kemasik MuhammadAli bin Abdul court favourite
Rahim (Datuk Mata-Mata)
4. Kretai Tengku Embong Musa nephew
5. Paka Tengku Abdullah bin son-in{aw
Sultan Ali Singapore
6. Dungun Tengku Abu Bakar bin brother-inlaw
Tengku Abdul Jalil
7. Mercang Tengku Besar Habsah daughter
8. Marang Yang Dipertuan Muda eldest son
9. Ibar Inot available] [not available]
10. Tributaries of the
TerengganuRiver:
a. Nerus Ce Teh non-royalwife
b. Telemong Tengku Ngay Omar bin cousinand son-in{aw
Tengku Abdui Rahim
c. Ulu Terengganu Sayyid Abu Bakar ulama
(aboveKelemang (Tuan Embong)
Falls)
d. BetweenKelemang [not available] Inot available]
Falls and
Kuala Telemong
e. Berang Tengku Embong grandson(an infant)
11. Merang [not available] Inot available]
12. Setiu Tengku Mahmud bin cousin
Tengku Dalam
13. Kluang
14. Besut Tengku Cik bin herabatam
Tengku Hitam and
Tengku Long bin
Tengku Ngah

The Besut, Kemasik and Kretai districts provide examplesof this hereditary suc-
cession.In other areas,however,as seenfrom the tables,districts did changehands,
sometimesseveraltimes during a Sultan'sreign, usuallyon the demiseof a chief.
In such casesthe territory revertedto the Sultan,who then exercisedhis power
of redistribution.Theseprovincialheads,appointedfrom the centre,rarely resid-
ed in the district itself. Most of them remainedin the royal capital, where they
226 Shaharil Talib

were in a position to influence the Sultan who, in turn, was given the opportunity
to keep a weather-eyeon their activities.In 1882 the only chief who residedin
their districts were those of Dungun and Besut and, less regularly, those of
Kemamanand Setiu.81They generallysat in the shadeof their verandahsin Kuala
Terengganuand left the work of collecting revenueto their budnkraja (retainers),
whom they sent out from the capital and who exercisedvery great authority. The
people living by the outlying rivers stood in awe of them. In extreme casesthe
budakraja were capableof inflicting great hardshipon the rakyat.As Hugh Clifford
points out:82

The BudakRaja... looksuponthecapitalashishome,andsojournin an out'district

asbanishment. He is not of the bloodof the peopleoverwhomhe ru1es,he doesnot
knowtheir affairs,despises their ways,is too arrogantto makehimselfacquainted
with theirfeelingsor theirthoughts,is utterlyoutof sympathywith tl.rem,andmerely
regardsthemas a potentialsourceof revenue,missingno opportunityof enriching
himselfat theirexpense.

There were, however,some customaryrestraintson appanageholders.Tengku

Sulong,the Sultan'sson-in-law,was removedfrom his office in Paka as a result
of iocal resistance.s3His successor,Tengku Abdullah,8aanotherof the Sultan's
sons-in-law,fared no better. He was preventedfrom going to the district after
complaintshad beenmadeagainsthim. There were, of course,wide variationsin
the behaviourof different chiefs.The Besut chiefs,for example,were reputedto
be benevolent,giving every encouragementto settlers in their districts. In
Kemaman,on the other hand, Abdul Rahmadbin Isahak (Datuk Sri Lela Diraja).
was describedas a gambler,cock-fighterand extortioner,but "... not without some
good as a man."85
Below the district level the day-to-dayleadershipof societycame,with only a
few exceptions,from within the local community. Above this, power, authority and
wealth were sharedamongthe Sultanand his appointees,who previously,under
Baginda Omar and Sultan Ahmad II, had been only a selected few.86 B]-
comparison,SultanZainalAbidin III relied on a much wider baseof support.British
officials interpretedthis sharing of powers as a sign of weaknesson his part.E-
However,this apparentweaknessmust be understoodin the light of severalfactors.
First, BagindaOmar had returnedas a conquerorand deposedthe reigningSultan
and therefore felt he could not trust those around him.88Second,when Sultan
ZainalAbidin III becameruler in 1881he was still a youth of limited experience
and this, as well as his easydispositionand interestin religiousstudies,led him
to delegateauthority to a broader group.8eThird, there were the demographic
changesthat Terengganuexperiencedin the nineteenthcentury, which contributed
to a morejudiciousdistributionof powerby the ruler. Finally,and moresignificant.
there was the graduallychangingeconomicimportanceof the adjacentriver valleys.
The collapse of Kuala Terengganu'sentrep6t status with the emergenceof
Singapore offered direct trade between Terengganu'ssubsidiary ports and
Singapore.The rapid developmentof internationaltrade in the nineteenthcentury
lockedKuala Terengganu and the resourcesof its variousriver hinterlands into
the global economy.This meant that the ruling authority in Kuaia Terengganrrwas
 ThePort andPolie of Terengganu 222
obligedto expandstate institutionsin order to assumemore direct control over
the surroundingterritories and their resources.Kuala Terengganu'stransforma-
tion from port to port-state,though gradualand imperceptible,was madeinevitabie
by the growing importanceof its commerce.

NOTES

1. SeeJomoKwame Sundaram,"class Formationin Malaya: capital, the state and

uneven
Development"(Ph.Ddissertation,Harvarduniversity, rgT7i, chapter2; wan
Hashim,
"PoiiticalEconomyand the Studyof peasantTransformation',Akademiha(Kuala
, Lumpur)
20 & 2l (Jan.-Ju1y1982): 49-74 and Shaharil Talib, ,,Nineteenttrieniury
xetan-
tan: A Malay Tributary state", Jurnar Anthroporogidan sosiotogi,uniuersifikebang
saanMalaysia,9 (1981):43-59.
2. straits SettlementsMalay Records(sSFR)vol. 3, Fwcp, 13 February lzg8, Light
to
G.G., l0 January1788.
3. S9e Memorandumby E. Dickson undated,in the High commissioner'soffice files
. . , . ( H . C . O . )1, 5 8 0 / 1 9 1 16 ,
4' AlexanderHamilton, A New Accountof the East Indies,rr (London,1930),g1.
5. Ibid.,82.
6
|!grk S..Francis,'lCaptainJosephJackson'sReport on Trengganu,',Journal of the
HistoricalSociety,tJniversityof Malaya, No. 8 (1^969-70),73.
7. Jenniferw. cushmanand A.c. Milner, "Eighteenthand Nineteenthcentury chinese
Accounts_-ofthe Malay Peninsula",JMBRAS 52, i (1929):10-11;
John b.,r,-o.",
"French visitors to Trengganu in the Eighteenthcentury",
IMBRA} 46, i (1923):
r45-59.
8 . Hamilton,A New Account,82.
9 . Cushmanand Milner, "ChineseAccountsof the Malay peninsula,',39.
1 0 . SSFR,vol. 3, FWCP, 25 Januaryl7g8, Light to G.G., 6 October lZ8Z and
Mark S.
Francis,"CaptainJosephJackson'sReport',,Z6 & 90.
1 1 . 'Dunmore,"French Visitors to Trengganu,',l4S-49.
Iz. Ibid., 147.
13. Ibid.,148.
1 4 . Ibid.. r48-49.
1 5 . In 1755,for example,a French ship calledand left fully ladenwith 'calin,.Ibid., l4g.
1 6 . Ibid.
17 Ibid., r53.
1 8 . Ibid.
1 9 . SSFR,vol. 3, FWCP, 25 Jan. 1788,Light to G.G., 6 Oct. 1787.
20. SSFR,vol. 2, FWCP, 11 April 1787,Sultan Mansur Shah to Light,24 Feb. 1287.
2 1 . SSFR,vol. 3, FWCP, 6 Feb. 1288,Light to G.G., undated.
22. SSFR,vol. 2, FWCP, 11 April 1782,Sultan Mansur Syah to Light,24 Feb. 1787.
228 Shaharil Talih

23. SSFR,vo1.4, FWCP, 2 Dec. 7791,Light to G.G., 1 Nov. 1791.

24. SeeSSFR,vol. 3, FWCP, 6 Feb. 1788,Light to G.G.,undatedand SSFR,vol. 3, FWCP,
13 February 1788,CaptainGlassto G.G., 12 January1788.
2 5 . BarbaraW. Andaya,"An Examinationof the SourcesConcerningthe Reign of Sultan
Mansur Shah of Terengganu,1741-1795",IMBRAS 49, ii (1976):80-106.
26. Baginda Omar Papers(BP), II, iv, 130.
27. Dunmore,"French visitors to Terengganu",154.
28. Ibid., r58.
29. Andaya, "The Reign of Sultan Mansur Shah",89.
30. Setiausaha KerajaanTerengganu (S.U.K.),files, 303/1346,PenyataBagi Tahun 1345.
Daerah Marang.
31. John Anderson, Political and CommercialCcnsiderations
Relatiaeto the Malaltan Penir.
... sula (Princeof Wales Island, 1824),Appendix.
32. BP,V,16.
33. G.W. Earl, The Eastern Seos(Kua1aLumpur, 148.
34. BP, II, w, I47.
35. Ibid.
36. J.H. Moor (ed.),Notitesof theIndfun ArchipelagoandAdjacentCountries(London,1968r
245.
BP, vol. II, iv, 147 Hamilton, A New Account,6I.
38. J.H. Moor, Noticesof the Indi.ttnArchipelngo,245.
3 9 . H. Malcom, Trauekin fuuth-F,asturn
Asb, embracingHindustan,Malaya,SfumaruLChirc
II (Boston,1839),106.
40. Newbold, Political and Statistiml Account, 63.
41. H. Clifford, "A Journeythrough the Malay Statesof Trengganuand Kelantan", ?/;.
GeographicalJournal IX, i (1898): 20.
42. Ibid.
43. L.A. Gosling,"ContemporaryMalay Traders in the Gulf of Thailand",in Karl C. Huttere:
(ed.), EconomicErchange and Social Integration in SoutheastAsia: Perspectiues
fron:
Prehistory,History, and Ethnograpfty,Michigan Papers on South and SoutheastAsia
no. 13 (Ann Arbor, 1977),87-90.
Clifford, "A Journeythrough the Malay States",30.
Newbold,"Politicaland StatisticalAccount", 63.
46. Clifford, "A Journeythrough the Malay States",30.
47. Earl, Thc EasternScas,184
48. Ibid..184-85.
,io Newbold, Political and StatisticalAccount, 60-61.
50. EarI, The EasternSeas,184,187and 191.
5 1 . W. Medhurst,/ournal of a Tour throughthe&ttlementson theEastemsideof thePeninsu);
of Malacca,1828 (Singapore,1828),13.
52. Malcom, Trauelsin South-EasternAsia, I09.
53. Clifford, "A Journeythrough the Malay States",16.
54. Ibid., t7.
55. Haji Muhammad Salehbin Haji Awang, SejarahTerengganu(Kuala Terengganu,196E
56.
 The Port and Polity of Terengganu

56. Clifford, "A Journey through the Malay States", 15.

57. Recently an attempt has been made to reconstruct the revolt of Lebai Saris using oral
sources.SeeMariam Yaakub, "PenderhakaanLebai SarisDi Kemaman"(B.A. academic
exercise, Jabatan Sejarah, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1974).
58. Annual ReportTerengganu (A.R.T.), 1925,draft, p. 22 in H.C.O. 40011926.
59. Yaakub, "PenderhakaanLebai Saris di Kemaman",39.
60. ForthelistofdistrictchiefsinKemamansee,4.RT.,Tg2i,draft,pp.22-24inH.C.O.
40017926;SetiausahaKerajan Terengganu(S.U.K.) 856/1346:Penyata RingkasanBagi
Tahun 1345 and M.C. Sheppard, "A Short History of Trengganu", IMBRAS 22, iii
(1949):58-60.
6 1 . A . R . T . . 1 9 2 5 i.n H . C . O .4 0 0 / 1 9 2 6 .
62. Newbold, Political and StatisticalAccount, 59-60.
63. Moor, Noticesof the Indian Archipelago,90.
64. Newbold, Political and StatisticalAccount, 59-60.
6 5 . A . R . T . . 1 9 2 5 i.n H . C . O .4 0 0 / 1 9 2 6 .
66. See Shaharil,"The TerengganuRuling Class",42-44.
67. one of the olderresidentsof Besut,YahayaAwang, in 7932providedsomeinformation
on the early leadersof the district. For their lineagessee Encl. 1A,,A.J. Gracie to
CommissionerLands and Mines (C.L.M.), 3 January1932,in C.L.M. 344/1350.
68. SeeEncl. 1, Annual Report of the AssistantAdviser Besut, 1939,D.A. Somervilleto
C.L.M., 10 February1940in C.L.M. 111/1940, whichcontainsa shortnoteon the history
of the district.
69. Ibid.
70. See H.C.O. 1580/1911:Memorandum by E.A. Dickson, undated and Sheppard,
"Trengganu",35-36.
71. H.C.O. 1580/1911:
Memorandumby E.A. Dickson,undated.
72. ColonialOffice,GreatBritain,(C.O.)2731399: YoungtoC.O.,t7 July 1913,Desp.353,
ff . 644-45. After the deathof Tengku Muda, Tengku Cik sharedthe disrrict with his
nephew,Tengku Long bin Tengku Ngah. Evidentlythere developeda rivalry between
the two over the questionof ultimate leadership.(C.O. 2731351: Andersonto C.O., 1Z
November1909,Desp.345f. 396).There is an interestingaccountof how Tengku Cik
overcamethe problem'ofman-eatingtigers in the district. He obtainedfrom the island
of Lingga some saplings of timber trees known as pokok las believed to have magical
powers,and plantedsomeof them in Besut.The rest were cut into piecesand distributed
to the peopleto be worn as amulets.After the introductionof thesetrees it was reoorted
that therewereno deathsfrom attacksby tigers.(C.O.2731385: Youngto C.O.,20 March
1912,Desp. ),14,f.97.) For a personalaccountof Tengku Long's involvementin the
districtseeS.U.K. 376/1334:ReportKenyataanTengku Long,Pemangkupersurohjaya
BesarBesut,29 october 1916and Encl. 11, Taman Seri Indera Segarato Menteri Besar's
Office(M.B.O.),16 July 1921in M.B.O. 303/1339.
73. Encl. 12,TengkuHaji Awangbin Mahmudto M.B.O., 12 July192I,in M.B.O. 303/1339.
74. Encl. 7, Datuk Mata-Matato M.B.O.,27 June1921,in M.B.O. 303/1339.
75. Encl. 2, Report PenyataTahun 1345,in S.U.K. 693/1346.
76. C.O. 717144: Guillemardto C.O.,6 May 1925,Desp.33, Encl. 1, ff. 118-19.
77. Ibid., ft. rfi-23 and 127.
7 8 . C . O . 7 1 7 1 4 4 : G u . i l l e m a r d t o C . O . , 6 M a y 1 9 2 5 , D e s p . 3 31,,Ef fn. c1l1. 7 - 1 8 . F o r s o m e
noteson the earlier district chiefsand backgroundinformationon the districtsof Kemasik
230 Shaharil I'alib

Paka see
and Kijal see Encl. 2, Report PenyataTahun 1345in S.u.K. 693/1346;on
Encl. 2, DaerahPaka Penyatain S.u.K. 454t1347;on Dungun see S.U.K. 69211346:
ningt ur"n Darihal Tawarikh Dajulu Zaman and s.U.K. 46711347Ringkasan Darihai
Tawarikh Dahulu Zaman BerkenaanDengan Dayak Dungun; on Marang see S.U.K
303/1346:PenyataBagi Tahun 1345;on Kemasik seeEncl. 7, Datuk Nara wangsa to
M.B.O.,27 ltlfle 1921; M.B.O. 303/1339andon SeriuseeEncl. 12,TengkuHaji Awang
to M.B.O., 12 July 1921in M.B.O. 303/1339'
79. C.O. 2731351: Andersonto C.O., 22 September1909,Desp' 303, If' 278-21"
80. C.O. 777144: Glillemard to C.O., 6 May 1925,Desp' 33, f.. I22.The district revenues
were sharedbetweenthe husbandand wife. Hence,sometimesthe district is listed under
the wife's name, especiallyin the case of the Sultan's sisters and daughters' See for
exampleS.U.K. 299/'1334: Yang DipertuanMuda to S'U'K', 5 January1916'
81. In Kelantanprolongedabsenteeismamongdistrict chiefswas a well-knownfeature' This
was in contiast to"the west coast states, where the chief resided in the area he ruled
(London, 1958)' 106
See J.M. Gullick, Ind.igenousPotitical slstems of westernMalaya
and W.R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur' 7967)' 2'

82. Clifford, "A Journeythrough the Malay States"'17'

$. Ibin.. 77-r8.
84. H.C.O. 1325/1913: E.A. Dicksonto H.C.O',4 March 1914'
85. Seeminute,E.A. Dickson,16 Nov. 1913on H.C.O' 1325/1913. Seealsopetitionwritten
by a local trader him.
against H.c.o. Haji
7411912: wan Ismail bin Datuk Megat Mahkota
to H.C.O.,6 January1913'
86. The Bucknill commissionRefort, \913, pp. 31 and 145. see alsoSulongbin zainal,"Daro
Lela: Viceroy of Kemaman",Malaysiain History 12, i (1968):16-19'
87. Clifford, "A Journeythrough the Malay States",14-15'
88. C.O. 273135I:Andersonto C.O', 22 Sept' 1909,Desp' 303' t 219'
89. Sheppard,"Terengganu",38.
12
Brunei and the Hinterlandof Sabah:
Cornmercialand EconomicRelations
with SpecialReference to the
SecondHalf of the l{ineteenthCentury

D.S. RANJIT SINGH

The rise of Brunei's entrepdttrade

Very early in its historicalexistence,Brunei, probablythen a small polity, sought

to preserveitself by obtainingChineseprotection.'Po-ni'or'Polo',which hasbeen
identifiedby most scholarsas Brunei, paid tribute to the Chineseemperorsfrom
the sixth to the ninth centuries.lFrom early times, Brunei developeda tradition
of conductinginternationaldiplomacyand changedthe courseof its foreign relations
from time to time in order to ensureits survival.Thus, for example,when Majapahit
roseas a great power in SoutheastAsia during the fourteenthcentury,Brunei sought
its protection.2By the fifteenth century, however,Brunei was strong enoughto
be independentof external protection and, by the sixteenth century, was fast
emergingas a great power in the Borneo region.3
Oneof the major factorswhich contributedto Brunei'srise was commerce.The
city of Brunei, when it was describedby Antonio Pigafettain 1521,was situated
in exactlythe samelocationas it is todayat the mouth of the Brunei River, though
at that time it was built almost wholly on wooden stilts over the water.a
Geographically,its locationprovided Brunei with a good shelteredharbour,and
a strategicpositionon the internationaltrade routes.
Despite its riverine location, Brunei lacked a large alluvial hinterland that would
have allowed it to develop into a powerful agrarian polity. The only river basin
of consequence,constitutinga natural hinterland,was that of the Limbang. It
occupieda commandingposition,however,for the collectionof jungle producefrom
the Borneoregion,particularlythe present-daySarawakand the west coastof Sabah.
The jungle and seaproduceof Borneo,suchas camphor,sago,birds'nests,pearls,
mother-of-pearl,trepang,holothurin(sea-cucumber) agar-agar(edibleseaweed)and
honeywere in high demandin Chinafor medicinalpurposesor as delicacies.s By
the ninth century Chinesejunks were regularly visiting the northwest coasts of
Borneofor theseitems. Though Chinesetraders could obtain some of the goods
through direct trading with the small trading centresstuddingthe Borneocoast,
they still neededa convenientbase in which to refit and conductregular trade.
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Bruneiand theHinterlandof Sabah 233

Brunei, becauseof its good location and the fact that it had initiated tributary
relationswith the Middle Kingdom,6fulfilled this function ideally. Even as the
Chineseincreasedtheir trade with the region,Brunei extendedand intensifiedits
trading connectionswith the hinterland.It soonbecamethe main collectorof natural
producefor visiting Chinesejunks as well as the primary distributor of Chinese
goods.TThough initially the Chineseservedas the main shippersand suppliersof
goodson the Brunei run, the Brunei merchantsthemselveslater traded directly
with somemajor SoutheastAsian ports, such as Melaka during the fifteenth and
early sixteenthcenturies,and so enteredinto the internationalcommercialnetworks.
As the first Portuguesecaptainof Melaka, Rui de Brito observedin 1514:8

... thesejunkscomefromBurney[Brunei]... thetomungoftemenggung]of thistown

[Melaka]is fromthatcountry...theybroughtmerchandise
andsoldit ...theyhabitually
tradedwith [Melaka]whenthe Malayswerehere.

Tom6 Pires,in about1515,notedthat the Bruneipeoplewere tradersin goid,wax,

honey, rice and sago.eThe position of Brunei as a great emporiumwas further
enhancedby the captureof Melaka by the Portuguesein 1511.After this event
Arab and Indian Muslim merchantswho had formerly made Melaka their head-
quartersin the Archipelago,beganto look for alternativeports, one of which was
Brunei. Brunei grew in importancefor thesetraders,especiallyas it was closeto
the spice-producingareasof Banda and the Moluccasand the pepperregionsof
Borneo.loFurthermore,Chinesemerchants,discriminatedagainstby the Portu-
guese in Melaka, turned more and more to Brunei to obtain SoutheastAsian
produce.lr Realizing its commercial importance, the Portuguese themselves
establishedfriendly relationswith Brunei and made it one of their chief ports of
call betweenMelaka and their outpostsin the Moluccas.In 1530the two powers
concludeda treaty of friendship and commerceand agreed to exchangetrade
facilitiesand concessions. Even after the Portugueseestablishedtheir outpostin
Macau in 1557,Brunei'strade with Chinacontinued,though by the late sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries,as a resultof the disruptioncausedto traditionaltrading
patternsby the activities of Portuguese,Dutch, Spanishand British traders, its
trade as a whole had begun to declinein importance.12
The rise of Brunei was assistedby the declineof Majapahit,whosedestruction
in about 1478pavedthe way for Brunei'sindependence. The fall of Melakain 1511
removedthe danger of further subjugationby stronger traditional SoutheastAsian
powers and was precededby the coming of Islam, which had further helped
strengthenthe polity.13Islam made sixteenthcentury Brunei, like Melaka in the
previouscentury and Makassarin the following century, both a commercialand
a missionarybase.laWith the wealth acquiredfrom its trading activitiesand, as
a result of the inflow of new ideasbrought by the coming of Islam, Brunei began
to developa viable administrativeapparatus.Generally,the politicalorganization
was similar to that found in other Islamic maritime statesof SoutheastAsia.15This
structure,as describedbelow, seemsto have reachedits final and most compiex
form during the time of the ninth Sultan, Hassan,who reigned during the early
decadesof the seventeenthcentury.16
At the apex was the Sultan or Yang-Di-Pertuan\7, who symbolizedsupreme
 b-

ilm
!

.:od(:!
d;o=:;t
Brunei and the Hinterland of Sabah 235

authority in the state. Below the ruler was a hierarchy of officials of various orders,
reflectinga similar divisionof societyinto variousclasses.The ruler was assisted
by ministers of state or wazir chosenfrom among the nobility (pengeran).These
were thepengeranbendnhara(the chief minister),the pengerantemenggtng(minister
in charge of justice and defence), the pengeran'di-gadong (minister in charge of
finance),and the Pengeranpemanca(minister in charge of diplomaticaffairs).
The secondorder of state officials were the ceteria,amongst whom the highest
ranking was thelengeransyahbandaror official in chargeof commerce.The mentei
formed the third order of state officials. They either performed bureaucratic
functions or were appointedas territorial chiefs. They were subordinateofficials,
"chargedwith specifictasks ... usually centredaround the administrationof the
capital, the royal appanagesand the trade of those two units."18At the baseof the
hierarchywere the villageheadmen.In contrastto the other officials,thesevillage
headswere not centrallyappointed.They were generallylocal appointeesof the
village or of tribal communities who were given official recognition by the
government.
With a viable economicand political base established,Brunei becamestrong
enoughin the sixteenthcentury to exert her political influenceover the surrounding
areas.Evidentlyrealizingthat commercialpre-eminence and prosperitydepended
to a large extent on trading links with the hinterlands,Brunei set about bringing
theseareasunder her political control. The policy of territorial expansionis believed
to have beenlaunchedinitially by the fifth Sultan, Sultan Bolkiah, who in the early
sixteenthcentury brought large areasunder Brunei control.teUltimately, Brunei
amasseda large empire, whoseclaims included nominally the whole of Borneoand
parts of the Philippine Islands.According to H.R. Hughes-Hallett:2o

extendedoverthe wholeisland
This wasthe GoldenAge of Brunei.Her sovereignty
of Borneo, of Sambas,
theSr:ltanates Pontianak, Pasir,KoteiandBolongan
Banjarmasin,
beinghervassals,aswellasovertheSuluarchipelagoandovertheislandsof Balabec,
Banggi,Balambangan and Palawan.

Brunei, the port-city, had thus rapidly grown into an empire.

The role of westernSabahin Brunei's econom))

Gradually,from the latter part of the sixteenthcentury, Brunei'spolitical and

economichegemonywas increasinglythreatenedby political and commercialcom-
petition from the Europeanpowers and the Sulu Sultanate.2lIn the north, the
Spaniardsestablishedthemselvesin 1570at Manila, from where during the late
sixteenthand seventeenthcenturiesthey sought to exert pressureon Sulu and
Brunei. In the south,the Dutch establishedtheir suzeraintyduring the following
two centuriesover western and southernBorneo.22The activities of European
powers in areaswhich had once been part of the large Brunei empire, together
with the monopolisticcommercialpolicieswhich they instituted, disruptedBmnei's
traditionalmaritime trading patternsand political strength.23Finally, the rise of
Sulu as a great politicaland commercialpower during the eighteenthcentury led
to bitter conflictsbetweenBrunei and Sulu for political dominationof the Sabah
236 D.S. Ranjit Sing|

coastalregionsas a prerequisitefor effective control of the entrepOttrade. By 1820

Brunei had lost out to Sulu in the struggle for control of the China trade in the
region, and territorial hegemonyover the northeastand easternregions of Sabah.
In fact, by this time Brunei had ceased to exercise political influence beyond
Marudu,2aand during the course of the nineteenthcentury began to lose even
more territory towards the south-westto the newly foundedBrooke ntj inSarawak.
Eventually,by the 1860sand 1870s,only the west coastof Sabahand somerivers
immediatelyto the north of Brunei still remainedunder its control.2sEven within
the remainingregion,factorssuchas the newly immigrant seafaringpeoplesfrom
the Sulu Archipelagoand southernMindanao,and the British establishmentot
Labuan in 1846 causedthe political, commercial and demographic structure of
Brunei to be radically altered.26Nevertheless,the territories which were still under
Brunei during the late nineteenthcentury,in westernSabah,excludingthe region
betweenTempasukand Marudu Bay where Bajau and Iranun chiefshad gainec
independentcontrol, continuedto play a vital role in the Brunei economy.
The Sabahterritory which remainedunder Brunei'shegemonywas extremell'
varied in its geographicalconditions,demographicpatternsand economicactivities.
It is important at this point to examinehow thesedifferent conditionshad produced
different exchangepractices and related political and economicrelationships
betweenthe centre and the outlying territories.At the height of its glory during
the sixteenthand early seventeenthcenturies,when the empirewas at its largest.
Brunei had deviseda unique systemfor governingits dependencies through the
jajahan or sungai, and this survived into the nineteenth century. By this system.
the jajahan were divided into two main categories,namely official appanagesanc
personalappanages.2T Official appanages,in turn, were of two types: the sungai
kerajaan,which were the specialappanagesof the reigning Sultan, andthe sungai
huripan, which were the appanagesof the principal ministers of state, the wazir.
Both were directiy administeredby their respective holders. These officiai
appanageswere personalto their holdersand did not passautomaticallyto their
descendants;nor could they be cededor sold by private treaty. The consentof
the ruling council, normally consistingof the Sultan, the wazir and,orher importanr
state officials, was usually neededfor their transfer.28The secondcategory oi
dependencieswere termed sungaitulin or pesaka.These were held as private lands
by the Sultan, the wazir, and the Brunei nobility, the pengeran.Though the Sultan
still possessedsovereignrights over these territories, the individual landlord
governedthem privatelyand collectedtheir revenueon the understandingthat he
enforcedthe general edicts and laws of the central governmentand paid the
stipulatedtaxes and tribute to the Sultan. The sungai tulin or pesaka,though
consideredhereditary,could be bought and sold by private transactionamongsr
the sovereign'ssubjects;but saleto any externalpower or party requiredthe Sultan's
consent.
Even though by the late nineteenthcentury Brunei'sterritorial and commercial
scopewas much reduced,control over the remainingjajahan was relatively intact.
This was possiblebecausethe sultanatehad deviseda systemof local or district
administrationto cover both official and personalappanagesservicedby what ma1'
be termed the jajahan hierarchy.2eNormally thejajahan hierarchy was composed
of local chiefs.These chiefswere traditionalor tribal headsof communitiesresi-
Brunei and the Hinterland of Sabah

dent in thejajahan , who were incorporated into thejajahan hierarchy through ap-
pointmentto variousposts.Occasionally,however,centralofficialsof the third order,
the menteri,were designedto take up appointmentswithin the jajahan hierarchy,
especiallyin the official appanages.The jajahan hierarchy was modelledafter the
central strucfure. Thus, the lengeran bendahnra,fungeran temenggungandpengeran
syahbandarwere replicatedrespectivelyas dntuk bendnhara,datuk temenggungand
datuk syahbandar.Whileat the centre the honorific Pengeranwas used to indicate
nobility, atthe jajahan level the title d"atukwas used for important chiefs andorang
kaya for less important ones. The chief minister, who bore different titles in dif-
ferent dependencies,administered the jajahan in accordancewith the directives
received from his Brunei overlord.3oHe was also responsiblefor remitting annual
taxesto the centre.The datu temenggung wasin chargeof justice,while the syahban'
dar took care of the local port and trade. In addition, these chiefs supervisedthe
administrationof their own respectivevillages,with the help of traditionalchiefs
and village headmen,who occupiedthe lowestpositionwithinthe jajahnn hierarchy.
By providing a territorial and political framework for the viilages, the jajahan
constituteda viableadministrativeunit within the main river basins.The main rivers
or jajahan held by Brunei on the west coast of Sabahwere the Papar, Kimanis,
Benoni,Mengkabong,Putatan,PengalatBesar,Inanam,Kawang and Tuaran.3l
Theseareascoveredthe narrow but rich lowlands,about45 kilometreswide, bet-
ween the coastand the steepCrocker Rangerunning parallel to it on a north-south
axis. The short rivers traversing this region were hardly navigablefor more than
a few kilometres,32and each of them with their own river basins formed the
geographicalcore of a jajahan. They were inhabited mainly by the Dusun, who
practisedwet rice cultivation.The coastalregionswere inhabitedby the Brunei
Malays and the Bajau. In addition to rice and farm produce,the region also yielded
sagoand coconut.33 For lack of dendritic river systemscomparableto those in east
Sumatraand PeninsularMalaya,the Brunei Sultanatewas unableto controlwestern
Sabahafter the fashionof the Malay rulers and chiefs of theseareas,who stationed
their representativesstrategicallyat the river mouths.3aSince there were no
extensiveriver basinsin western Sabahand it was thereforenot possibleto rely
on river communications, Brunei was obligedto extendpoliticalcontroldeeperin-
to the riverine lowlands.The creationof thejajahan or territorial hierarchyestablish-
ed an administrative infrastructure for controlling the populationthrough the land
routes, which were effectively the main internal lines of communication.The
extensionof politicaljurisdictionover the lowlandsalsoenabledBrunei to controi
the jungle resourcesof the western interior.
Administratively,the Papar, Kimanis, Mengkabong,Putatan,PengalatBesar,
Inanam,Kawangand Tuaran were tul'inrivers,while Membakut waskuripan.Papar,
as distinctfrom other tulin,was held personallyby the Sultan.It was administered
locally by a hierarchyheadedby the chief minister, known as d.atukamir bahar,
the datuk temenggung, and the oranghayasyahbandar.3s The regions in Sabahthat
were under the direct or indirect influenceof Brunei were not only economically
rich but varied in their products.By the mid-nineteenthcentury three distinct
economiczoneswere discernible,namelythe swiddenagricultureandjungle produce
zone,the wet rice zone and the sea producezone. The first of these,centred in
the hilly, jungle-coveredareasof the interior borderingthe western cordillera,36
238 D.S. Ranjit Singlt

with its relatively small population,was eminentlywell suited for the cultivation
of hilfpaddy.3TIn additionto this main crop, the populationcultivateda number
of other secondarycrops such as corn, tapioca,sweet potato and banana.38 The
principal peopleinvolved in swiddencultivation were the Dusun, inhabitingthe
hilly regionsof the Lohan and Keningau interior valleys, while the Murut occupied
the southernportion of the western cordillera.3e The scanty populationand the
availabilityof unlimitedfresh land accountedfor the shifting modeof life and also
allowedthe swiddencultivatorsopportunityto supplementtheir needsby hunting
and gatheringfood.
Although in Sabah the natural environment supplied the primary needs of the
shifting cultivator,the peoplewere dependenton externalsourcesfor suppliesof
salt, cloth and iron implements.In addition,though technologicallyprimitive, the
shifting cultivator had developeda relatively rich socio-culturalheritage.In common
with most of the other native non-Muslimtribes, whether wet-rice cultivatorsor
hill-rice cultivators,the indigenousinhabitantsof Sabahhad developedtheir own
religiousconceptsand world view, the latter expressedthrough a comprehensive
system of customary law (adat),which governed their behaviour,aoas well as a
value system for socialprestigeand wealth. For.the propagationand fulfilment
of someof thesesocio-culturalneedsand practicesexternally manufacturedarticles
of value and scarcity becameimportant. For example,both the Murut and Dusun
took to burying their deadin Chinesejars when thesebecameavailableas a result
of the commercialrelationsestablishedwith Chinesetraders. The jars thus became
a significant item of trade in the region.alBrass gongs, popularly used for the
payment of bride price (berian),were also among the traditional accoutrementsof
the longhouseand village. Furthermore, brass ornamentssuch as ear-rings,girdles
and anklets were highly cherished by the women of certain tribes, and some of
these items were also used for the payment of sogit or traditional ritualistic fines
for transgressions of ad.atlaw.Becauseof the great socio-culturalvalue attached
to theseitems, they becamesymbolsof prestigeand rank and, as such,were highly
prized as heirlooms.a2
To acquirethese goodsthe shifting cultivator organizedat the local level the
collectionof jungle producesuitablefor barter with the foreign traders, with whom
he establishedlinks. Generally,theseproductsincludedrattan, beeswax,honey,
gutta percha, India rubber, d.amar,jelutong and camphor, all of which were much
in demandamongstforeign traders.a3In one known casethe hill peoplealso grew
tobacco as a supplementary crop for barter, though a proportion of this was
consumedlocally by the plain Dusun and the coastalBajau.aa
Comparedto the westerncordillera,the westernlowlandsare ideally suitedfor
the cultivation of wet paddyand have traditionally servedas the rice-bowlof Sabah.
A large number of Dusun communitiesadaptedto natural conditionsin the area
and becamesettled wet rice cultivators, producing enough rice for their own
consumptionas well as a surplusfor exchangepurposes.By the 1860sand 1870s
most of the coastalarea in the districts of Tuaran, Putatan, Penampang,Papar
and Kimanis had beenbrought under extensivewet rice cultivationsupportinga
large population, which created a shortage of flat land in some areas.4sThough
the wet rice cultivator was in some respectsmore advancedthan the swidden
argiculturist,he sharedwith the latter the samebasicculture and experiencedthe
Brunei and the Hinterland of Sabah 239

sameneedfor specificitems of foreign manufacturesuchas iron implements,cloth,

bronze items and jars.
The shallowshoalsand reefsof Sabah,being exceptionallyrich in marineproduce,
led to the emergenceof a third economicgroup - the gatherersof sea produce.
The non-Muslim communitiesof Dusun and Murut in Sabahwere essentiallyland-
basedpeoplesand rarely engagedin maritime activity. Consequently,the coastal
area during the late eighteenthand early nineteenth centuriesattracted groups of
seafaringMuslim migrantsfrom the Sulu Archipelagoand southernMindanao,some
of whom were groupedinto warlike communitiesengagedin large-scaleraiding
and slavingoperations.Thesegroups,which were mainly composedof Bajau(Samal)
and Iranun, settledalongthe northwestcoastof Sabahin the areaaroundMarudu
Bay, Pandasan,Tempasukand Kawang.a6
In the middle years of the century, the attacks of the British na',y, with the
collaborationof RajahJamesBrookeof Sarawakin an attempt,ostensibly,to curb
the slave-raidingactivitiesof the Iranun and Bajau,effectivelyreducedtheir power.aT
Many of them were forcedto settledown to more peacefulpursuitsand in the pro-
cessbecamepredominantlyseaproducegatherersand fishermen,while otherstook
up wet-ricecultivation.a8 This sea-based economicactivity was of two types.One
was mainly of a subsistencenature,and communitiesthus engagedconcentrated
chiefly on catchingfish and gathering trebangand turtles' eggs.4eThese items,
alongwith dried fish, were barteredfor rice and other farm produce.The second
type of sea-based economicactivity in which a substantialnumber of the coastal
peoplewere involved,was the commercialexploitationof seaproduce,including
the collectionof seed-pearls, mother-of-pearl,trepang,agar-agarand,tortoise-shell.
These goodswere in great demandin China and found their way there via Labuan,
Brunei or Singapore.so
It is evidentthat at somepoint in the developmentof Brunei'strade with China,
the territorieswhich form the presentday Sabahhad becomelockedinto the inter-
nationalcommercialnetwork. The interfacebetweenthe wet-rice cultivatorson
the coastalplain and the jungle producegatherersin the forestedmountainsfostered
natural economicinterchangebetweenthe two groups,which was, in the course
of time, greatlystimulatedby economictradeand the demandsof the international
market.slAs Brunei expandedcommerciallyand politically, it becamethe chief
mediatorof this trade through thejajahan system.s2Within this three-tieredsystem
upland communitiesexchangedjungle producefor such items as salt, cloth and
jars from the dwellers in the plains, who acquiredthese goods from the Brunei
tradersin exchangefor jungle producereceivedfrom uplandpeoples.The plains
dwellers kept someof theseforeign items for their own needsand usedsurplusrice
and sago as exchangecommoditiesat both ends of the exchangesystem.
Though somedrasticchangeshad taken placeby the nineteenthcentury,which
affectedto someextent thesecommercialpatternsand transformedthe political
scene,the three-tieredsystemcontinuedto be viable during the 1860sand 1870s.
It was a non-marketsystem of exchange,in which the home of a chief, located
normally in the wet-ricelowlandregions,was usedas a basefor conductingbusiness.
The chief was usuallya local Dusun,thoughhe was under Brunei jurisdictionand
a memberof the local Bruneijajahaz hierarchy.Brunei tradersfrom the coastwould
go up to a chiefs housein the lowlands,bringing their wares along with them.
240 D.S. Ranjit Singh

jungle produce using

Similarly, upland communitieswould descendwith their
overlandroutes. There was probably no pre-arranged meeting betweengroups for
exchangeat an appointeddate. Produce-vendors and traders probably used the
chiefs houseas a baseuntil a buyer was found. Sometimes, if the groups from
the coast happened to meet upland groups there, exchanges would take place in
the chiefs houseitself. More often the chief himselfwas a trader. H.L. Leicester.
the first Residentof the overbeck-Dent syndicate at Papar, observed some of these
activities.In his brief notes on some of the local personalitiesof the Papar region
in 1879 he wrote:s3

UmpuanAli OmarwhoreturnedfromPattattan visitedme.He saysthatthe'tajow'

(ariwhich he tookto Pattattanwith Pengiran Subudin 33 pikulsi.e.about
realised
$700.Duringtheirstayat Pattattantheylivedin thehouseof theheadman DatuKeilan.

H.A. Everett,while visiting someof the chiefsof Kimaniswrote:-

His successor,

went up theKimanisriverby boatandwalked1%hoursto Ganggang's house.Found

therea numberof NabaiDyakstrading.orderedGanggang to be readywith poll-tax
afterharvest.

With the arrival of the Bajauand Iranun communitiesin the Tempasuk-Maruou

Bay region, somedrasticcommercialand politicalchangestook place.In the firs:
-Brunei
Tempasuk-Maruduarea
-N4or"ou"., lost its commercial monopoly in the
place,
theseimmigrant communitiesemergedas a third economicgroup,thi
seaproducecollectors.An evenmore importantchangewas their introductionc:
a mirket system of exchange,the periodic market, or the tamu as it is called ::.
Sabah.55 piobably through fimiliarity with the periodic market calledthe tinngui.'
which had developedin the Philippinesas a result of a synthesisof local and Spanis:
trading practices,the Bajau and Iranun popularizedthe tamu system in wester
Sabah.By the 1860sand 1870sit was firmly established.The contributionof ti'=
newcomersto the developmentof the tamu is evident in that the largest /arr:;'
developedin the "zoneof cultural contactbetweenthe Kadazans[Dusun]and i:=
Bajau.; These two decadesalso saw two of the largest tamuheld at Inanama:.-
Pangunan,Putatan,both within the realm of cultural contactbetweenthe two eth:::
groups.57
The time cycle upon which the tamu opetateddependedon the particular culrr:'
spherewithin which it was located.In the caseof those tamu which were clt'.''
to the Bajau cultural area,the lunar cycle was used,so that the market was he.:
at weekly,fortnightly or monthly intervals.IIthe tamuwas sitedwithin the Dus'-'
culturalarea,a ten-daycycleoperated.The Pangunantamu,for example'was l-.i.-
every ten days. The larger tamu were servicedby a subsidiaryfeeder systen :
smalier tamu,whichacted largely as collectingcentresfor producewithin restric:i:
areas.Thus, on the coast,thesewere attendedlargelyby the coastalcommunit:t.
and, in the uplandsonly by the Dusun and Murut. In contrast,the larger tamu*-t: =
attendedby a whole cross-sectionof produce-vendors and traders.The Inar'a.
tamu inthe 1870sand 1880s,for example,was attendedby the coastalBajau.""--
brought fresh fish, dried fish, iron implementsand salt for barter. The Dusur, .
 Brunei and the Hinterland of Sabah 241

the plainsmainly broughtrice and farm produce.In addition,the market was well
attendedby uplandDusuncommunities,who camefrom suchdistantplacesas the
Leewan,a region in the hills borderingthe Putatan district, and rambunan, an
inlandvalley. Theseupland communitiesmainly brought locarhill tobacco,India
rubber, armadillo skins, beeswax and gutta-percha. The Inanam tamu was also
attendedby other traders,especiallyLabuanchineseand Brunei Malays. These
tradersbroughtsuchitems as iron implements,cloth,jars and brassware.ss In this
way, the tamu seemsto havedevelopedinto a focal point both for local inter-regional
trade and for foreign commerce.
Though the tamu system undermined the monopoly of the Brunei trader over
the supplyof foreign and marine produce,the increasein the volume of trade not
only allowedthe older three-tieredsystemto operatealongsideit but also benefited
the Brunei authoritiesand traders in other ways. The Brunei authoritiesand traders
were unableto imposea monopolyover the tamu, but the unprecedentedgrowth
in trade that the tamu generatedmeant, apart from increasedcommercefor Brunei
traders, a proportionategrowth in revenuefrom taxes. In the Brunei system of
administrationthesetaxesincludedthe paymentby dependentterritoriesof cukai
dngangor commercial tax, and cukai tolongazor support tax.seThe former was
collecteddirectly at the tamu by representativesof the central government.
From the mid-nineteenthcentury, external developments,notably the emergence
of Sulu, reducedBrunei to a subordinatepositionvis-d-visthe china trade. The
establishmentof Labuanalsosiphonedoff someof its internationaltrade.But the
bulk of the coastaltrade on the west coastof Sabahremainedin the handsof Brunei
traders,who were activeboth as residentmerchantsand collectorsat variousvillages
and towns alongthe west coastand as coastalshipperson the Sabah-Labuan run.
In March and April 1879,for example,out of a totai of 14 coastaltrading vessels
which visited Paparsevenwere from Brunei, four from Sarawakand onefrom Sulu,
while two were British. BetweenMarch and May in the sameyear the major goods
exportedthrough Papar,were raw sago,gutta percha,coconuts,rice and piaay.
Major importswere cloth, prestigeitems in the form of ceremonialjars and gongs,
brassornaments,salt, agricultural implements,firearms and gunpowder.60 Though
a portion of this traffic in exportsand imports went to Labuanand Sarawakand
consequentlyweakenedBrunei's status as an entrepot,Brunei still retained an
important share of it.
Despitethe reversessufferedby Brunei as a result of both local and external
developmentsin the nineteenthcentury,it continuedto play an important role as
a port-state,servicingits dependencies in Sabah.Though someof the international
trade of the regionwas siphonedoff by Labuanfrom the mid-nineteenthcentury,
Brunei merchantscontinuedto dominatecoastalshippingin the region and still
servicedthe state port. These merchantsworked in alliancewith local suppliers
and distributorsof goods,who were also largely of Brunei stock. By furnishing
Brunei with produceas of tax and tribute, the Sabahjajahan helpedthe capital
city to continueto play an important, though now a modestrole as a port-state.
During the courseof the nineteenthcenturythe Sabahhinterlandprovedto be the
lifeline which enabledBrunei to survive.
242 D.S. Ranjit Singh

NOTES

1. For a discussionof this subject,seeD.E. Brown, "Socio-PoliticalHistory of Brunei' A

BorneanMaiay Sgltanate"(Ph.D. dissertation,CornellUniversity, Ithaca,1969)'266-83:
i'Pre-WesternBrunei, Sarawakand Sabah",Nusantara3 (1973):52'
J.P. Ongkili,
2. See Ongkili, "Pre-Western Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah",55. According to the Brunei
Annals,The SilsitahRaja-RajaBrunei, the kingdom of Brunei was a vassalof Majapahit
(Book
beforeit becameindependent.For a translatedversion,see H' Low, "Selesilah
of the Descent)of the Rajas of Bruni", /SBR-AS5' i (1880):1-33'
3. For a discussiono{ this, qee D.S. Ranjit singh, Brunei 1839-1983, The Problemso.f
Politicatsuruiual(singapore,1984),L7-20. For the early history of Brunei,seealsoR.
,,BruneiRediscovered: A Surveyof Early Times",/sE4S 14, i (1983):32-15
Nichol1,
4. For an accountof Brunei by Antonio PigafettaseeE.H. Biair and J'A. Robertson,?ftr
-37'
Philippine Isl.ands,XXXIII (Cleveland,1903- 1909), 213
5. For a detaileddiscussionof the role of thesecommoditiesin the trade betweenChina
and the region as a whole, especiallythe Sulu and Sabahregions,seeJ.F. Warren, Tht
sulu Zone, 1765-1895; The flnamics of External Trade, slaueryand Ethnicity in tht
Transformatbn of a &wthmst Asian Maritime Stalz(Singapore,1981).See aJsoThc Bitish
North ktnco Herald and officiat c,azette,(BNBII), ii (october 1886\,223. For a description
of these items see Handbookof British North Borneo1886 (London, 1886), 59-82.
6. For early contactsbetween Chinesetraders with Brunei and the west coast of Sabah
,,The Developmentof PeriodicMarkets in Sabah,Malaysia",ss/
see J.B. Burrough,
6, ii (1975-76):23-24.
7. Till 1768 Brunei actedas an entrepotfor the china trade for the region as a whole.
includingthe east and west coastsof Sabahas well as Sulu, until it was supersedei
in aboui1820 by the fast rising power of the Sulu Sultanate.warren, The sulu Zone.
3 , 2 7 , 7 7- 7 8 .
g. M. Teixeira, "Ear1yPortugueseand Spanishcontacts with Borneo",Boktim da sociedndt
de Geografiade Lisboa (Lisbon, July-November 1964): 301'
9. L.R. Wright, The Origins of British Borneo(Hong Kong' 1970)' 11'
10. Brown, "Socio-PoliticalHistory of Brunei", 280; Teixeira, "Early Portugueseand Spanish
Contacts".301.
11. Burrough,"The Developmentof PeriodicMarkets in Sabah",26'
12. For agoodaccountof the relationsbetweenthe Portugueseand Bmnei during the period
see Teixeira, "Early Portugueseand Spanishcontacts",313-16. Brunei'strade with
Macauremainedsubstantialas late as 1820.SeePierre-YvesManguin,"Brunei Trade
with Macaoat the Turn of the 19th Century:A proposof a 1819letter from SultanKahan
Z'tI A\am",Paper presentedat the 10th Conferenceof the International Associationof
Historiansof Asia, Singapore,27-31 October 1986' 1-13'
13. It is uncertainexactly when or how Islam cameto Brunei. However, at the time Antonio
pigafettavisitedBrunei in 1521,the ruler was alreadya Muslim. Blair and Robertson.
The PhiliPPineIslands,33, 213-31.
1.4. Ibid., lv, 125-35, 148-60.
15. A good study of the systemin Brunei has been made by Brown. See"Socio-Political
History of Brunei". Some important referencesto the central political structure have
alsobeenmadeby others.See,for example,W.H. Treacher,"British Borneo:Sketches
of Brunei, Sarawak,Labuanand North Borneo"'/SBR]4S (1889);P' Leys, "Observa'
tions on the Brunei Political System,1883-1885";R.E. Stubbs,"Two Coloniaioffice
Memorandaon the History of Brunei",D.E. Brown (ed.),JMBRAS41, ii (1968):83-116.
Brunei and the Hinterland of Sabah 243

16. See Ranjit Singh,Brunei, 1839-1983, 24-30,

17. The title is mentionedin anotherversion of the Silsilah Raja-RajaBrunei, transliterated
from Jawi to RomanizedMalay by P.L.A. Sweeney.It means"he who is madeking".
P.L.A. Sweeney,"SilsilahRaja-rajaBrunei",IMBRAS 41, ii (1968):24.
18. Brown, "Socio-PoliticalHistory of Brunei", 234.
19. SultanBolkiahwas saidto be reigningin 1521when Antonio PigafettavisitedMelaka.
Low, "Se1esilah",
3, 7, 24, 32.
20. H.R. Hughes-Hallett,"A Sketchof the History of Brunei",IMBRAS 18, ii (1940):23.
21. Ranjit Singh,Brunei, 1839-1983,2l-24, 30-34; Warren, The Sulu Zone,17-102.
22. Accordingto G. Irwin, in 1698the "West Coast"statesof Borneocameunderthe suzerain-
ty of the Sultan of Banten,who was a vassalof the Dutch. In the 1770sand 80s the
Dutch were able to extendtheir control over Banjarmasin,Pontianak,Sukadanaand
Mampawa. G. Irwin, Nineteenth-CenturyBonteo, A Study in Diplornatic Riualry,
(Singapore,1963),5-7.
23. SeealsoN. Tarling,Britain, theBrookes and Brunei(KualaLumpur, 1'971),6-7,16,67.
24. Warren, The Sulu Zone,27, 77-78.
25. These rivers were the Limbang and the Trusan. The Trusan was eventually ceded in
1885to Sarawak.The Limbang was annexedby Raja CharlesBrooke in 1890.For a
general account of the expansionof Sarawak into Brunei territories see Ranjit Singh,
Brunei 1839-1983, chapters II and III, and Tarling, Britain, the Brookesand Brunei,
passim.
26. For the comingof thesepeoplesand the effect of their activitieson Sabahand Brunei
seebelow. A good accountof the establishmentof the British at Labuan appearsin Yap
Hyun Phen,"The Foundingof Labuan,1846"(8.A. academicexercise,University of
Malaya, Singapore,1958).
27. For a more detailedaccountof this systemseeLeys, "Observationson the Brunei Political
System",117-130.
28. For more informationon the traditionalruling councilseeBrown, "Socio-PoliticalHistory
of Brunei", 190-93; Hughes-Hallett,"A Sketchof the History of Brunei",31; Stubbs,
"Two Colonial Office Memoranda", 97.
29. This view is basedon a study of the structureof administrationin a numberof Brunei
jajahan in the nineteenth century. These include the kerajaanof Sarawak in the early
nineteenthcentury and the tulin of Papar, Kimanis and Mengkabong in the 1860sand
70s. For the systemin SarawakseeSulaimanbin Abang, "A Historical Survey of Brooke
Rule in Sarawak:Its ConstitutionalReformsand Impact 1841-1941"(B.A. graduation
exercise,Universityof Malaya,Kuala Lumpur, 1978),1-38. The administrativestruc-
tureof the otherjajahanhasbeendeducedfromastudyolC.O.874154(drx.I-4)874173
and 8741229.
30. In Sarawak, the chief minister bore the title dntukpatinggi. In Papar, in the 1860sand
1870s,the chief minister was calleddatuhamir bahaz,and in Kimanis, datukbahar.C.O.
874173.Amir meanschief in Arabic whlle baharmeansthe sea or sea coast.
31. Paparwas the Sultan'stulin iver . The Kimanis and Benoniwere the PengeranTemeng-
gtngis tulin rivers. The Kawang and Tuaran belongedto anotherBrunei overlord, Serif
Jahir.Mengkabongand PengalatBesarbelongedto PengeranAbdul Tauf. C.O.874154
(doc.1-4) 874173,and LD. Black, "The Ending of Brunei Rule in Sabah,1878-1902",
IMBRAS 12, ii (1968):776-92.
32. For a descriptionof the physicalgeographyof Sabah*e Handhnk 1886,21-32: Handbcnk
1934, 13-20 and R. Harrison, "An Analysis of the Variation Among Rarnu Dusun Commu-
nitiesof Sabah,Malaysia'(Ph.D.dissertation,ColumbiaUniversity,New York, 1971),68-69.
244 D.S. Ranjit Siri;)

33. Seep. 239.

34. B. Bronson,in K.L. Hutteren (ed.),EconomirExrha.nge and %cial Infuractionin Southtc,:
from Prehistory,History and Ethnography,"Exchangeat the Upstrea:
Asia: Persfectiues
and Downstream Ends: Notes Towards a Functional Model of the Coastal State ::
SoutheastAsia", MichiganPaperson Southand SoutheastAsia, 13 (Ann Arbor, 197i
39-52.
35. c . o . 8 7 4 1 7 3 .
36. Fertiie flat land in the intermontane valleys was limited, as the valleys were narro:i'
Dr. J.O. Shircore,Reporton NatiueHealth, North Borneo(Sandakan,1937),2-8.
For more details on swidden cultivation in Sabahsee E. Bateson,Padi Cultiuation :r
North Borneo(Agricultural Department,Jesselton,I9l8) Bulletin, No. 2, 1-23; J.B
Burrough & Jamin, "Traditional Methods of Dusun Rice Cultivation",SS/ 5 (19i2
352-64; O. Rutter, The Pagansof North Borneo (London 1929);H.G. Keith, Shil'tir:;
Cultiuationin North Borneo,1949 (unpublishedreport, Sandakan,1949), l-2I; Rey,t
of the Committeeon Shifting Cultiaation7951(Colonyof North Borneo,Jesselton,1951
l-79: Handbooh1886.100-02.
38. C.O. 874167;BNBH 4, iv (March 1886)and Handbook1886,38-41.
39. J.. LandgraI,Inteim Repon... to the Gouernment of North Borneoon Socio-Anthrofologicc.
Field Work Amongstthe Muruts in 1954-1955 (Jesselton,1956),1-28.
40. For details of the religious beliefs and customsof the non-Muslim peoplesof Sabahser
I.N.N. Evans, Studiesin Religion,Folkloreand Customsin British North Borneoand tiv.
Malay Peninsula(Cambridge, 1923);G.C. Woolley, The Timoguns;A Murut Tribe ,..'
the Interior, North Borneo(Native Affairs Bulletin No. 1, Jesselton,1962, reprintedl
\-32; Tunran Adat; SomeCustomsof theDusunsof Tunran, WestCoastResidency, Nod:
Borneo(Natle Affairs Bulletin No. 2, Sandakan,1937),1-44, and Landgraf,Interin:
Repdrt,passim.
41. Rutter, The Pagansof North Borneo,275.
42. Landgraf, Interim Report, lI.
43. BNBH 5, xi (1 October 1886):223: 6, vi (1 June 1887):130; Landgraf, Interim Report,6
44. The tribe which grew local tobaccowas ca11ed the Leewan (Dusun),and lived in the
rangesof the Putatandistrict. BNBH,2, iii, (1884)and 2, iv (1884)2.
45. Bateson,Padi Cultiuation in North Borneo, 7; BNBH, 2, iv (1884): 2.
46. Black, "The Ending of Brunei Rule in Sabah, 1878-1902",JMBRAS 41, ii (1968t:
t76-92.
47. L. Wright, "The Lanun Pirate Statesof Borneo:The Relevanceto SoutheastAsiar.
Histo4/', Paperpresentedat the Conferenceon SoutheastAsian Studies,Kota Kinabalu.
22-26 November1977.
48. Irwin, NineteenthCenturyBorneo,709-26: G.L. Jacob,The Raja of Sarawak:An Accoun:
of Sir JamesBrooke,K.C.M.L.L.D., Giuen Chiefl1 through Lettersand Journals,Yol. I
(London,1872),283-97.
49. BNBH 4, ii (1886):22r,224.
50. BNBH 2. ri (1884: 4-7.
51. Burrough,"The Developmentof PeriodicMarkets in Sabah,Malaysia",23-24.
52. CompareBronson,Exchangeat the Upstreamand DounstreamEnds,39-52.
53. The Diary of H.L. Leicester(Papar),2nd March 1879,C.O. 874173,1.2.
54. The Diary of A.H. Everett (Papar),16 October1879,C.O. 874173, f .55.
55. For fnrther informationon the tamu seeBurrough,"The Developmentof PeriodicMarkets
Brunei and the Hinterland of Sabah 245

in Sabah,Malaysia",23-31.
56. SerafinD. Quiason,"The Tiangui: A PreliminaryView of an IndigenousRural Marketing
Systemin Spanish-Philippines",PhilippineStudies33 (1985):1-2.
trn
BNBH 2, ii (1884):9 and 2, iv (1884):2.
58. Ibid.
59. See P. Leys, "Observationson the Brunei Political System,1883-1885",726.Cukai
tolonganwas imposed on the peoplewhen the overlord neededmoney for celebrating
such events as the marriage of his children.
60. This informationhas beencompiledfrom the Diary of H.L. Leicesterfor the months
of March, April and May 1879,C.O. 874173.
Glossary
Languagesand areasare abbreviatedas follows: (A) Arabic; (Amb) Ambonese:
(C) Chinese;(J) Javanese;(M) Malay; (Mak) Makassar; (Mol) Moluccas; (P)
Philippines; (Port) Portuguese; (S) Sundanese;(Sk) Sanskrit; (Sp) Spanish:
(T) Thai.

adnt (M\ traditional, customary law

adhyaksanicauama (Sk) headman of low caste in Srivijaya

agar-agar(Ml seaweedfrom which edible gelatinoussubstanceis

made

alifuru (Mol) peasant,indigenousinhabitant(cf. Alforese)

alun-alun(I) palaceground, royal esplanadein front of palace

anugerah (anugraha)(Sk) royal favour

aria (J) title of nobility

ayo (Port) private tutor, governor,chamberlain

baki (MII) assemblyhall, audiencehall

baligau (Mak) chief minister in Gowa and Tallo'

ballo'(Mak) alcoholicdrink made from aren, lontar or nipa pakr.

banyaga(P) chattel slave

barangay(P) before the Spanishconquesta political and socia-

unit, a community,led by a chief or datu (q.v.); i:.
the SpanishPhilippines,the smallestunit of local ac-
ministration, a village, governed by a cabezacit
barangay

benfuthara(M) prime minister and commander-in-chief

bendahari(M) treasurer

bicara (MIP) discussion,deliberationor meeting;processof larr'

More properly pembicaraan.

bissu(Mak) transvestiteshamanor priest in Makassar

Glossary 247

bunh (Mol) tax, tribute

budak(M) unmarried youth or girl

budnk raja (M) royal retainer

cabotagem(Port) coastwisenavigation;also used of ships that could

normally only sail in coastal waters

caca(J) unit of measurementfor land and, in Java,usually

reckonedas the amountof land which couldbe work-
ed by and provide a livelihood for a family of five

chaomuang(T) viceroy

(T)
chaophraya/okya the highestranks in Siameseofficialdom;the rank
of chaophrayaseems to have been the highest at-
tainableby a commonerduring the Ayutthaya period
short of usurping the throne or benefitting from a
close relative'susurpation

chedi (T) Buddhist reliquary monument(from Sk. chaitya)

cukai dngang(M) trade-tax

cukai kepala(M) poll-tax

cukai serah (M) surrender-tax

dnlam/dnlem(M[) palace

damar (M) tree resin, especiallyfrom the Dipterocarpaceae

. A - '.
dandnnayaka(Sk) ntle oI a Judgeln Srlvuaya

dntuk/dntu(M) grandfather;chief or elder; royal representativein

Srivijaya

dnuht (M) divine power, sovereignty

dusun(M) village; country estate;orchard, plantation

gagah see ladnng

gogugu, gugugu (MoVP) senior court official

248 Glossary

sundik (M) concubine

A - ..
haji fratyaya (Sk) royal snenll rn Srlvuaya

(h)amba(MIP) slave, vassal

hongi (Mol) fleet of kora-kora(q:v.)

hukum (M) law; lawyer; judge

hulubahng, ulubalang (M) officer in charge of defence, military leader

hulun haji (Sk) royal slave in Srivijaya

Indio (PlSp) "Indian" i.e. Filipino

istana (M) ruler's palace

jajahan (M) dependency

jehad (A) holy war waged by Muslims to spread Islam

jenang (M) regent; governor; military deputy

joanga (Mol) a light oaredvesselsimilar to the kora-kora(q.v.t

hadi, khadi, kali (A) Muslim judge; Islamic religious official in Makassa:

hafir (A) non-Muslim,infidel

kaicil, kachil (MoVP) prince, nobleman

kain (M) a length of woven material; garment

halaudi (Mol\ tribute-collector,factor

hampung,kamfong (MIP) village

hapiten lnut (MIP) sea captain; kapitan is derived from Portugue:<

mpitdo:captain,commander;in Portuguesesources
navalcommandersand ship'scaptainsare generall-..
referred to as "cafitao (mdr) do may'' and not as
"kapitan lauf'. In eastern Indonesia, the wor:
hapita[n]later cameto mean chief or head of a con:-
munity, under a raja (q.v.). This usagewas probabi-,-
a borrowing from Dutch kapiteinrather than the Po:-
tuguese, but c.f. lndonesrankapten
Glossarl 249

harang (Mak) prince, lord

kaum kerabatdiraja (M) royalty, relatives of the ruler

kayastha(Sk) clerk in Srivijaya

Keling (M) Tamil from the Coromandelcoast

kendi water-jar or water-kettle

herajaan(M) royal government

keraton,kraton (J) royal palace

heris (M) kris, warry-bladeddagger

hhunnang(T) A classof Thai officialswith differing ranks, titles

and functions

hiai, kijai (I) A title of respectfor men of position or learning,

especiallyfor religiousdignitaries;in the rare event
of a high official not being a radenor mas he is styl-
ed kiai

htufanedilihan (P) bond-slave

himebha (Mol/P) commercialagent, collectorof harbour dues

hohno (Mol) ruler

hora-kora(Mol/P) a light oaredcraft widely used in the easternIndone-

sian and Philippine islandsfor trade and warfare

hota(M) fort, generallyusedto describea collectionofvillages

surroundedby a stockadeor other form of defence

hualn (M) estuary

humaramatya(Sk) non-royalminister in Srivijaya

hdang, gagah (M) dry, unirrigated clearing

laksamana(M) admiral

lek (M) swivel-gun,cannon

250 Glossur'

nnndnln (Sk) administrative province in Srivijaya

mandor (M) overseer, village headman

mangkubumi(l) prime minister, regent

rnarsi haji (Sk) cleaner in the Srivijayan palace

meirinho (Port) summoner, bailiff

menteri (M) minister, court official

murd,haka(Sk) headman in Srlvijaya

nai (T) personhaving control over, and responsibilityfor.

groups of phrai (freedmen),either on the crown's o:
on his own behalf. The nai-phrai system was pro
bably the basic social relationship in the Ayutthal-a
kingdom. Not all nai were khunnang,but all khun.
nang were aai of some sort

nakhoda(MIP) ship's captain

na-ya-chia(C), literally guide, but in Ch'ih-tu, the crown prince.

(ndyaka)(Sk) who was also the prime minister, and in Srivija.va.
the head of the treasury

negeri (MIP) city, state, nation, country, province

ngofangare (Mol) slave,bondsman

nuri (M) parrot, loriquet

nyai (I) concubine of a European

orang besar(M) nobleman,chieftain

orang kaya (M) literally rich man, henceman of influence;title o:

nobility

ouuidor(Port) auditor, magistrate, usually member of a municipa-

council or similar body

0andnn(M) generic name for the plant, Pandanustectorius,usec

for fine basketry and mats

pandita (MIP) sage, scholar

Glossary 251

pangeran,pengeran, prince or governor;chief; hereditary noble in Bruner

fengiran (IIM)

panno (Port) length of cloth

faruaandn (Sk) minister responsiblefor military affairs in a province

ln )rlvuaya

lasar (M) bazaar, market

fegaUy (P) younger relative

penggawa(J) non-royal official

penghulu (M) headman; chief, as in penghulu bendnhari

ferahu (M) boat, ship

ferdnna (M) chief minister (perd.anamenterf)

(T)
phongsawad.an Siameseroyal chronicles

fhrakhlnng (T) minister responsiblefor foreign affairs, trade, and

foreigners in Siam; also known in Europeansources
as "barcalon","berchelangh","berclam",etc.

biasam (J) written authority, charter or official order; certificate

or rent-roll given to a village official to collect

linate (Mol) Ternatan court official

bo-ti (C), (\ati or bateh) chief; a term usedas a componentin many Southeast
(sk) Asian namesdenotingnobility

francha (Port)
-^--l--1.
ts'arrSPrdrrA

Dratisara (Sk) army commanderin Srivijaya

rtrailyuuaraja (Sl) Srivijayan prince next in rank to the crown prince

fucblo (SplP) village community

puhauam.puhawang(Skl naval commander or ship's captain in Srivijaya

fusaka (M) heirloom; inherited land

 252
G/os'sc'

quinta (Port) country house,villa; country estate;farm

raha (P) term usedin parts of the philippinesto denoteda;:,

(q.v.)

raja (M) chief monarch,ruler, head of state

rajakumara (Sk) third class Srivijayan prince

rajafutra (Sk) fourth class Srivijayan prince, born of a ruler.

junior wives, princely vasslasor concubines

rakyat (M) subjects of a ruler

ruba-ruba(M\ gift or presentto the authorities,especiallythat made

by a ship'smasterto the localauthoritieson arrlva.
at a port

saddha(P) court official

saieha (Sk) Buddhist religiousorder

santana(I) descendant,child

sarat (Mak) Islamic religiouscouncil

sawah(MIJ) irrigated rice field

senafati (SWJ) commanderof the army

sengaji,senhaji (J/Mol/p) nobleman

serunai (M) reededwind instrument

sinaowrat official of the royal treasury

sirih (M) Piper betel,the betel vine, an evergreen plant the

leavesof which are chewedwith areca-nutparings

soa(Mol) confederationof village communities

stha0aka(Sk) . A -
arcnltect ln Srlvuaya
..

suba (Mol) act of obeisance

sungai (M\ river; a jajahan in Brunei

Glossary 253

sungai tulin (M) hereditary appanage,usually a river valley ownedas

private property (seefusaka)

syahbandnr(M) harbour master; also title given to messengerof a

kalifah in southwest Sumatra

tali lnnun (P) cheap rope of excellent quality

tamu (M) periodic market

tantramaln (Sk) promised reward in the form of prosperity and

freedom from punishment after death

tarta(J) asceticdevotion;retirementfrom the world to devote

oneselfto a life of austerities

temenggung(M) Malay minister in charge of defence,police and

markets

tiangui (P) periodic market

tra an order of decreebearingthe seai of one or other

of the Siamesekrom or ministries

trefang (M) a species of Holothuria edulis also known as sea-

cucumber

tuha an uatohuurah(Sk) royal officer in charge of trade in Srivijaya

(Mak) 'spokesmanof the land', chief minister

I uma' bicara-butta

ulama (A) Muslim theologian

uli (Amb) confederationof village communities

ummat (A) Islamic community

aaniaga (Sk) merchantor trader in SrivijaYa

uasikarana(Sk) cutler in Srivijaya

ueador,uedor(Port) overseer,inspector,comPtroller

aihara (Sk) : Buddhist monastery

254 Glosmn

wakaf benefaction,donation for a religious purpose;Muslim

religious body

wali (A) Muslim apostleor.saint;guardianof unmarried girls

wali sanga(l\ the nine wali acknowledgedto have been responsl-

ble for the spread of Islam in Java

warga (J) accreditedmember of an association;chief

wat (T) Thai Buddhist monastery (from Pali uatthu)

Yang Di-Pertunn (M) he who is tuan, i.e. lord or masterof the state;ruler

yuaaraja (Sk) Srivijayan crown prince

Index
Abdul Gafur, 113 America. North. 204
Abdul Kadir, Sultan of Banten, 114, Amoghapasa,78
1t7 Angkor, 3, 9, 63
Abdul Rahman Ishak, Datuk Lela Annam, 219
D i r a j a ,2 2 1 , 2 2 3 anugerah,65
Abdulfath Abdul Fattah Agung, Anwar, Sultan of Magindanao,168,
Sultanof Banten,8, I14,7I7, l/J

11 8 - 2 0 Aqa Muhammad, 129, 134-5

Abdullah Awal-ul Islam, Sultan of Arab, influence, 96
Gowa (Sulawesi),153 Arabia, 64, 67,117
Abdulmafakir Mahmud Abdulkadir, Arabs, 61, 67, 70, 111, 166, 233
Sultan of Banten, 110, 115 arin,116
Abdur Razzaq,134,737 Aru, Islands(EasternIndonesia),
Abu Bakar of Kemaman 8 3 , 8 9 ,1 5 0
(Terengganu),220 Astraraja of Banten, 117
A c e h ,4 , 5 , 6 , 8 , 9 , 4 4 , 9 1 , 9 6 , Atisa, See DipankaraSrijnana,
107-8, 1,77,r79, 120, 129, Ava, 16n.43
1 5 0 - 1 ,1 5 3 ,1 6 1 ,1 8 0 Avalokite5vara.74, 78
Acehnese,155 Awang Mahmud, Tengku Haji,
adnt,238 of Setiu (Terengganu),221
adhyaksanicauama, 77 Ayutthaya, 2, 3, 8, ll5, 127-42
Adityavarman,79
Africa, 191 Bacan (Moluccas),85n.97
Agung, Sultan of Banten, See BagindaOmar, Sultan of
Abdulfath Abdul Fattah Agung Terengganu,217, 279, 221
Agung, Sultan of Mataram, 3, 115, B a j a u ,1 4 5 ,1 6 6 ,1 6 9 ,l 7 I - 2 , 7 8 0 ,
150 236,238-40
Ahmad I, Sultan of Terengganu,220 Balabac(Sulu),235
Ahmad II, Sultan of Terengganu,223 Balambangan,152, 179, 235
Ai (BandaIslands),89 Balangingiof Sulu, 187, 188, 193,
Ala'uddin, Sultan of Tallo', 153, 154 1 9 6 - 7 .2 0 r . 2 0 3 - 4
Alburquerque,Jorge de, 96 Balaputradeva,77
Alforese.171. 180 Balayan(Magindanao),163
Ali, Tengku, of Terengganu,221 baligau, I49
alifuru, 94 Balinese,slaves,151-2
Alor, 151 BandaIslands,3, 8, 83, 85, 87, 89,
Amangkurat I, Sultan of Mataram, 91.92-5.97
119 B a n d a n e s e8,7 , 9 5 , 9 8 , 1 0 1 ,1 5 2
Amangkurat II, Sultan of Mataram, Bandon,Bay (Malay Peninsula),29
119 Banggai(Sulawesi),89
Amboina.Massacre.151 Bangkhli (Siam),134
Ambon, 85, 87, 91, 93-5, 97, 115, Bangkok2 , ,13,132,138
1 1 8 - 9 ,1 5 0 ,1 5 2 Banjarmasin,145, 150-1, 156,200
Ambonese,155 Bantaeng(Sulawesi),143

255
256 Index

B a n t e n( J a v a )4, , 6 , 8 - 1 0 , I 0 7 - 2 5 , Brooke,James,239;raj,236
r37,t6r, r75,178 B r u n e i 4, , 5 , l l , 4 5 , 5 5 , 9 I - 2 ,
banyaga,I93-20I, 203-4 1 6 1 - 3 ,1 8 8 , 2 3 1 - 4 5
Barahaman,Sultan of Magindanao, Bual (Sulu),199
167-9 Buayan of Magindanao,163-4,
barangay,91, 92 166-7,t69, t72, t76-7
Baratamayof Buayan (Magindanao), budakraja,226
168 Buddhagupta,49
Barisan Bukit (Sumatra),53 Buddhism,74, 77-8
Barus(Sumatra),67, 69,78 Buddhist.learning,77; priests,
Basilanof Magindanao,169, 171-2, 15n.27;pilgrims, 64; sculpture,74
r75, t87 B u g i s , 8 9 ,1 5 3 ,1 5 5 ,1 7 3 ,1 8 8 ,
Bataks,199 200-16; slaves,151
Batang Hari (Sumatra),73-4, 79 Buisan, Kapitan Laut of Magindanao,
Batara Goa, of Gowa, 147 163-4,166-7
Batavia1 , 13-9,150-1, 175,195 Bujang Valley (Kedah),20-2, 27, 74
Battuta, Ibn, l2ln.2 Bulukumba (Suiawesi),150
bendahara,149 Bumi Java (Lampung),67
Bengal,87, 128, 155, 215 Bay, 20, Burma, 128
27, 4t, t27, t30 Burmese,128, I73
Bengalis,111 Burney, Captain,Henry, 216
Bengkulu/Benkulen, 110, 116 Buru, 97, 150
Benoni(Sabah),237 Busu, Engkau, of Dungun
Bentara, Tengku, of Setiu (Terengganu),216
(Terengganu), 221 Butung (Sulawesi), 143, 150-1
Berau (Borneo),188
Bernam Valley (Selangor),50 Cagayande Sulu, 187
Besat(Sabah),237 Cahorodyn,Sultan of Sulu, 171
Besut(Terengganu), 213, 216,221-2 Caitson,113
Bhairava,78 cakrauartin,I27
Bima (LesserSundaIslands),87, 89, Calamon(Lontor), 89
9 4 , 9 7 , 1 4 5 ,1 5 5 Calangan(Mindanao),173
bodhisattua,127 Cambay8 , 7,145
Bolongan(Borneo),235 Cambodia,70, 130, 134, 136, 151,
Bonang,Nakhoda,149 2r4-5
Bone (Sulawesi),153, 156 Canggu(Java),2
Bongaya,Treaty of. 155 Canton,77, ll7
Bontomarannu,Karaeng, 119 Catholicism,135-6, 138, 154
B o r n e o ,9 - 1 1 , 2 6 , 4 4 - 6 , 5 5 , 7 1 , 8 5 , Cebu (Philippines), 91-2
92-3, r28,145,r5l-2, t63, r7t, Celebes,See Sulawesi
175, 188-9, I97, t99, 200, 21,4, ceteria,235
23I-5 Ceylon,197
Borobudur,63 Chaiya,28-9, 63, 67, 74, 77, 78
B r i t i s h ,1 1 1 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 5 ,1 1 6 Chaiok (Terengganu),213
Brito, Ant6nio de, 85 C h a m p a , 2 8 7, 0
Brito, Rui de,233 Chams,49, 66
Bronze Age,27 Chansen,20
Index 257

Chao Ju-kua,63, 108 175-6

Chaophraya,78 Dayo (Sunda),109
ChaophrayaKosathibodi,133,135,140 Deli (Sumatra),128
CharlesII of England, 118 D e m a k ,1 0 8 - 1 0 ,1 4 7
Chekiang,214 DemangLebar Daun, 66
Chetty Maluku, 111 Devapaladeva,77
Chieh-ch'a, 17, 28, 63, 67, 69, 70-1., Dharmakirti, 78
73-4, 78, Seealso Kataha Dharmapala,78
Ch'ih-t'u,17, 19, 75 DipankaraSrijnana, 77
C h i n a ,1 , 2 , 4 , 5 , 9 , 1 1 , 1 4 , 1 5 n . 2 0 , Diwakara, TT
1 9 , 2 0 ,2 2 , 2 6 - 8 , 3 1 - 4 1 ,4 6 - 7 , Dusun,237-40
5 5 - 6 , 6 1 ,6 4 - 5 , 6 9 ,7 3 , 7 7 , Dutch East India Company(V.O.C.),
1 1 1 - 4 , l l 7 , l 2 l n . 2 , 1 2 7- 3 0 , 9 , 9 4 , 1 0 1 ,1 1 1 ,1 1 3 - 6 ,1 1 8 - 2 0 ,
1 3 7- 4 0 , 1 4 6 ,1 s 1 , 1 8 8 - 9 , 1 9 7 - 8 , 1 3 0 - 7 , 1 3 9 ,1 4 6 ,1 5 0 ,1 5 4 - 6 ,
200, 203-4, 214-1.7,220, 23r-3, 1 6 r - 2 , t 6 6 - 7 , 7 6 9 ,r 7 r , 1 7 3 - 6 ,
236,239 178-80, 200, 2r4, 216, 233, 235
C h i n e s e8, 7 , 9 2 - 3 , I 0 7 - 9 , 1 1 1 - 3 ,
l l 4 - 7 , 1 2 1 n . 3 1, 2 8 - 9 , 1 3 1 ,1 3 5 , East Indiamen,English, 11
1 4 5 ,1 4 9 - 5 1 ,1 5 5 - 6 ,1 6 6 , 1 . 7 2 , 7 7 4 , Ekathotsarot,King of Ayutthaya
176-9,22r o f S i a m ,1 3 0 - 1 , 1 3 9
Ch'ing,135 England,188
Chou Ch'u-fei,66, 121n.2 English East India Company,9,
Christianity,96, 147, 154-5, 161, 1 1 4 - 5 ,t t 7 - 8 , 1 3 5 , 1 3 6 - 9 ,1 5 1 ,
174, 202, See also Catholicism 1 5 4 ,1 5 6 ,1 6 9 ,l 7 r , 1 7 4 , 1 7 8 , r 8 8 ,
Chri{i (P'i-tsung),17 200; mercenaries, 168, 214-6,233
Chulia,114-7 E v e r e t t ,H . 4 . , 2 4 0
Cik, Tengku, of Terengganu,221
C i r e b o n 1, 0 8 - 9 , 1 1 9 Falo-an, 17
Cochin,108 Falatehan,109
Cochin China,2I4 Flores,150-1
Coen,Jan Pieterszoon, 113-4 F r a n c e ,1 3 6 - 7 , 1 3 9
Cola,77-8 FrenchEast India Company,135-9,
Comber (BandaIslands),89 214, 216; traders, 214, 216
Combes,Juan,Francisco,166 Fukien,214
Constantinople,111 Funan,2, 3, 75n.28,41,48, 65
Coromandei,87, 93, lll, II4,177,
1 3 4 ,1 4 5 ,1 5 1 ,1 5 5 Galuyao(Sulawesi),143
Cotabato(Magindanao),188 GaneSa,63
Crocker Range(Sabah),237 Gapi Islands,156
cukai, 241 Garassi'(Sulawesi),I47, 150
Geding Suro (Sumatra),66
Dalrymple,Alexander, 179 Genoa,4
dandanayaka,76 Goa,136,147
Danes9 , , 1 1 4 ,1 1 5 gogugu,99, 100, l7I, 174
datu, datuk, 7, 10, 65, 76, 92 Golconda,117
daulat, 78 GoldenKhersonese,17
Davao Gulf (Magindanao),172-3, Gowa (Sulawesi), 87, 1.43,L47,149
258 Indet

Grahi Buddha, 78 Iskandar Muda, Sultan of Aceh, 5, 8,

Greeks, 129, 136 111
G r e s i k 5, , 8 5 , 8 7 , 9 3 , 1 1 9 ,1 5 0 I s l a m ,5 , 8 , 9 5 - 8 , 1 0 8 - 1 0 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 5 ,
Gua Berhala(PeninsularThailand), r 3 s , r 4 7 , 1 5 3 ,1 5 5 ,1 6 2 - 3 , 1 6 9 ,
70 187, 194, 233
Gua Kurong Batang (Peninsular
Thailand),70 Jailalo (Halmahera),97-8
Gua Tampaq (PeninsularThailand), jajahan, ll, 236-7, 239, 241
70 Iajanagara, Mangkubumi, of Banten'
Guar Kepah (Kedah),21 110
Gujarat, 87 Jakarta,109, 113
Gujaratis,111, 128 Jambi6 , 6 , 6 9 , 1 1 3 ,1 1 5 ,l l 7 , 1 3 6 - 7 '
Gunung Api (BandaIslands),87 150-1, See also Melal'u-Jambi
GunungJati, Sunan,of Banten, 109 Japan,117, I28, I37, 151
Japara,5, 119
Hairun, Kaicil, Sultan of Ternate, 96 Jaratan,5, 87
haji fratyaya, 76 Java,3, 5, 9, 15n.27,16n.43,19'
Haji, Princeof Banten,115, 118-9 5 l - 2 , 7 r , 7 9 , 8 5 , 8 7 ,8 9 ,9 3 ,9 8 ,
Halmahera,94, 97 108-9, ll7 -9, l2ln.2, I28, 1'43,
Hanse,The, 4 r 4 7 , r 4 9 - 5 0 , r 5 2 , 1 7 5 ,1 9 1 ,2 1 8
Hasanuddin,Sultan of Gowa, Javanese, 3, 49, 66, 78-9, 85, 87' 89.
109-10,154-5 9 2 - 3 , 9 5 , 9 7 , 9 9 , 1 0 4 n ' 4 81, 0 8 - 9 .
Hassan,Sultan of Brunei, 233 113-4, Il7, I21n.3, 143, 145, 150'
Herbert, John, 179 154-5,166
Heruka, 78 Jayakarta,See Jakarta
Hindu, 74, 107, 1'14,127 Jayanata,77
H i n d u - B u d d h i s t , 24,, 2 9 , 4 1 , 1 0 8 j e n a n g , 1 1 6 - 7 ,1 5 3
Hitu (Ambon),95 JenderamHilir (Selangot),24, 29, 3tt
Hsu Yun-Ts'iao,19 69,7r
hulubalang,76 JeneberangRiver (Sulawesi),147
hulun hnji, 77 J e s u i t s1, 3 6 ,1 3 8 ,1 5 4 - 5 , 1 6 3 - 4
Jogjakarta,16n.16
I-Ching, 64 Johor8 , , 2 5 , 5 0 - 1 , 8 7 , 9 1 ,t l 7 , 1 2 0 .
I Sambo,of Gowa and Tallo', 149 146, 149-51, 16r-2, 216
Ilangasogam,17 J o l o( S u i u )4, , 1 0 , 1 1 , I 8 7 - 9 , 1 ' 9 7 '
Inderapura(Sumatra),104, 110 t99,201-4
I n d i a ,2 , 4 , 1 6 n . 3 6 2 , 3,26,29-31, Jonker, Captain, 155
3 9 , 4 2 , 4 6 - 9 ,5 5 - 6 , 6 9 , 7 0 - r , 7 7 , Juara (Tioman),25
9 3 , 1 1 7 ,1 2 7 ,1 3 4 ,1 3 8 - 9 , 1 7 3 ,1 8 8 ,
202 Kadaram (MalaYPeninsula),17
Indian Ocean,134 Kadazan, See Dusun
I n d i a n i z a t i o n2 , 2 0 - 1 , 3 0 , 4 1 - 2 , 4 8 , Kadir, Tengku, of Terengganu,22I
55-6,64 Kajoran, Raden,PanembahanRama.
I n d i o ,1 9 5 - 6 , 2 0 1 119
I r a n u n ,1 0 , 1 6 6 ,1 6 9 ,1 7 1 ,1 7 6 ,1 8 8 , Kalagam(Malay Peninsuia),17,
193, 201.-4, 236, 239- 4\ See also Kalah
Irrawaddy, 71 Kalah (Malay Peninsula),17, 19, 26.
Index 259

2 8 , 6 7 , 6 9 ,7 0 , 7 3 - 4 Kimanis (Sabah),237 -8, 240

k a l i , k a d i , 1 1 0 - 1 ,1 5 3 kimelaha,97', 174
Kalimantan,49 Kinabatangan(Borneo),200
Kampar (Sumatra),69, 73, 78, 150 Kinta (Perak),50-2, 74
Kampung Sungai Mas, Kuala Muda K l a n g ,5 0 - 3 , 5 5 - 6
(Kedah),49 Ko-ku{o, 17
Kandahar(Mindanao),166, \73 Ko-lo, 17
hapitan laut, I00, l7l Kojah Rayoan,111
Karanganyar(Palembang),I4n.1.4 Kole, 17
Karimun Islands,65 komisiempat,100
Karang Brahi (Jambi),78 h o r ak o r a , 8 ,9 3 , 9 5 , 9 8 , 1 6 9 ,1 7 1 ,
Kartasura, 16n.43 173, I75
Kataha (Malay Peninsula),17, 67, Kosathibodi(Lek), 133
See aiso Kalah K o t aB a h a r u , 2 1 6 , 2 2 I
kaum kerabatdiraja,76, See also Kota Cina (East Sumatra),47, 69, 70,
herabatdiraja 78
Kawang (Sabah),237, 239 Kota Kapur (Banka),63, 66, 78
Kay Wangsadipa,Patih of Banten, Kra Isthmus, 67
IT7 Krawang (Java),110
hnyastha,77 Kretai (Terengganu),213, 222
Kayoa (LesserSundaIslands),97 K u a l aM u d a ( K e d a h )2, I - 2 , 2 7 - 8 ,
Kecili Siberi, Ruler of Ternate, 119 3r-2, 47,49,71
K e d a h2 , 0 - 2 , 2 7 - 8 , 4 4 , 4 9 , 5 5 ,6 3 , Kuala Selinsing(Perak),7, 21, 30,
7 4 , 7 8 , 1 2 5 n . 1 0 91, 2 8 ;S u l t a no f , 47, 69,7r
2t6 Kuday, Sultan of Magindanao,163,
hedatuan,76 168
Kediri, 103n.48 Kudrat, Kachil, of Magindanao,
Kedukan Bukit (Palembang),63 1 6 5 - 8 ,r 7 2 - 7 , 1 7 9 ,1 8 0
Kei Islands,83, 89, 150, 153 kumaramatya,77
Kelang, See Klang Kumir (Sulawesi),143
Keiantan,19, 70, 128,213-4, 216, Kun-lun, 20
221 Kutei (Borneo),235
Keling, 93, 109, 111 Kwangtung, 214
Keluang (Terengganu),213
Kemaman(Terengganu),70, 213, La Caldera,167
220-3 L a b u a n ,1 1 , 1 8 8 ,2 3 6 , 2 3 9 , 2 4 I
Kemasik (Terengganu),213, 222 I a k s a m a n a , 7160, 9 ,1 1 1
Kempfer,Engeibert,216 Lamitan (Illana Bay), 166
Keningau(Sabah),238 L a m p u n g6, 3 , 6 9 , 7 4 , 1 f 0 , 1 1 4 ,1 1 6 ,
kerabatdiraja,222 1t7
Kerinci (Lake), 52 Lamuri (Sumatra),67, 168
khadi, seekali Lanacaque(Neijalakka,
Khmer, kingdom,3, 63 Banda Islands),89
k h u n n a n g , 89, , 1 3 0 - 2 , 1 3 8 - 4 0 Lanao,Lake (Mindanao),171
kiai, ll3, 116 Lanchang,133
hiapangdilihan,193-4 Lang-ya-hsiu, 17, 19
Kijal (Terengganu), 213 Langat Valley (Selangor),29, 50-3, 55
260 Indt:.

Langkasuka,63, 74 M a l a yP e n i n s u l a1, 7 - 6 0 , 6 7 , 6 9 , 7 0 .
Langkawi, 125n.109 73, 75, 77 -8, ll8-9, r28, 214, 23;
Larut (Perak),30 Malays, 73, 85, 92, 114, 146-52,
L e i c e s t e rH, . C . , 2 4 0 1 5 4 ,1 5 6 ,t 6 6 , r 7 3 , 7 7 6 , r 7 8 , r 9 8 .
Lesser SundaIslands,93, 146 237, 241
Leyte (Philippines),163 Malayu-Jambi,66, l2ln.2, 71, 78-8E
Light, Francis,215 Maldives,108
L i g o r ,I 2 9 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 3 - 5 , 1 3 7 ; Maluku/Moluccas, 8, 85, 87, 91-3,
inscription,37n.73;See also Nakon rtr, 152, 156, 166, 189, 215, 233
Si Thammarat Manado(Sulawesi), 154, 156, 195-6
Lim Locco,113 mandala,2,7
Limbang (Borneo),231 Mandar (Sulawesi),156
Lisbon, 93 mandor, 116
Lo-yrieh,17 manghubumi, 110, 117
Loe ri Sero', Karaeng,of Tallo', 147 Manikar (Magindanao),168
Lohan (Sabah),238 Manila9 , - 1 1 , 9 1 , 1 1 4 ,1 1 7 - 8 ,1 5 1 .
Lombok, 150, 153 1 6 2 , 1 6 4 t, 7 5 - 6 , 1 7 8 , 1 8 8 - 9 ,1 9 E
London,118 '?R

Lontor (BandaIslands),89 Manipa (Moluccas),97

Los Samales,188 Manobo,of Magindanao,169,172.
Louis XIV, King of France, 130, t76-7
135-6,138 Mansur, Sultan of Terengganu,21F
Lubuk Tua (Sumatra),15n.27,70, 74 221
Lutao, of Magindanao,166 Marang (Terengganu), 213, 216
Luwu (Sulawesi),143, 145, 149, 153 Maravijayattungavarman, Sri, Rule:
. A - '.
Luzon,85, 163-4, 188,203 oI Srlvuaya,/ /
Marco Polo, 121,n.2
Ma-Huan, 121n.2 Maros (Sulawesi),152
Macau,I51,233
Madamalingam,17 Marudu, Bay (Brunei),236,240
Madras,138, 178 Marx, Karl, 3
Madura, 150 Masulipatam,117
Madurese,119 Mata-Mata, Datuk of Terengganu.
Magindanao,9, 10, 161-85 221
Maharaja,5 M a t a r a m ,3 , 1 0 9 - 1 0 ,1 1 4 - 5 , 1 1 9 .
Mahayana/Buddhism, 70 1 3 7 ,1 5 0
Mainstone,William, 156 Mataram, Syahbandar,of
Majapahit,2-4, 15n.29,103n.48, Magindanao,I72, 178
1 0 9 ,1 2 1 n . 3 1, 43 Matoaya, Karaeng,Ruler of Ta11,,
M a k a s s a r3, , 4 , 9 , 8 7 , 9 5 , 1 0 7 ,1 1 5 , a n d G o w a ,8 7 , I 4 9 , 1 5 2 - 3 , 1 5 5
1 1 7 ,1 4 3 - 5 9 ,1 6 1 ,1 7 8 ,1 8 0 , 2 3 3 ; M e c c a ,1 1 0 ,1 1 5
slaves,151 Medan,54
Makassarese, 156, 173, 188 Mediterranean,2,4
Makian (Moluccas), 85n., 93-4, M e l a k a ,2 - 5 , 8 , 2 7 , 6 3 - 5 , 6 9 , 7 e . :
96-7, 99 8 7 ,9 1 . - 3 9, 6 , 1 0 7 - 8 ,1 1 0 - 1 ,1 - -
Malabang(Magindanao),162 l l 9 - 2 0 , 1 . 2 7 n . 31 ,2 8 ,1 3 3 ,1 4 c -: -
Malabar, I2ln.2 1 5 4 - 5 , 1 6 1 ,1 8 0 ,2 3 1 ,2 3 3 ;S t r a : : .
Index 261

2 3 ,2 7 , 5 5 , 6 1 , 6 3 ,6 7 , 7 3 , 7 8 , 1 0 8 , 69,70
1 4 5 ,1 5 0 Narai, King of A1'utthaya,5, 128-30,
Menggala,Tulang Bawang, 132-9,155
(Lampung),116 Naresuan,King of Ay'utthaya,
Mengkabong(Sabah),237, 239 728, I30, I32
m e n t e r i , 1 0 01, 0 9 ,2 3 5 nnyaka,76
Merang (Terengganu),213 Negapattinam,77
M e r b o k( K e d a h )2, 2 , 2 7 - 8 , 3 2 , 4 7 Neira (BandaIslands),89
Merchang (Terengganu),213 Neolithic, 56, 70
M e r g u i ,1 2 7 - 9 , 1 3 1 ,1 3 8 Nepal, 78
Mexico,22 New Guinea,89, 97
Middle East, 69, 71 ngofangare,94, 100
M i n a n g k a b a u , 6 61,1 0 ,1 1 7 ,1 1 9 ,1 5 0 Nina Suria Dewa, 93
Mindanao,I0, 97, 1'45,l5l, 167, Nyai Gede Wangri, 111
t75-7, 187-98, 236, 239
Mindoro (Magindanao), 163 Oc-eo(Funan),9
Ming, 46, 93 okluang ritthikamhaeng, 136
Misool (West Irian), 89 Okluang Sorasak,138
MolanaJuda,of Banten,109 OkphraPhetracha,130;King, 138-9
Molana Muhammed,Sultan of Okphra Sinaowarat(Aqa Muhammad),
Banten,110 129,134
Molana Yusuf, Sultan of Banten, 110 Okphra Surinkosa,133
Mongol, 16n.45 okya wichayen,729, 136
morinyo, 100 Olutatam (Lontor, Banda Islands),89
Moro, 94, 99, 104n.54 orang besar,65, 85
Moti (Maluku),85n.94,97, 99 orangkaya,8, 77, 9L, 95, I01, 242,
,27
Muara Jambi (Sumatra),47
Muda, River (Kedah),See orang laut, 7, 8, 65-6, 73, 107
Kuala Muda orang selat, 65
Mughal, 4 Overbeck-DentSyndicate,240
MuhammedBeg, 34
MuhammedKabungsuwan,162 P'an-P'an,17, 63, 75
Muna (Sulawesi),155 PadangLawas (Sumatra),73-4
murdhara,77 Padmapani,77
Murut, 238-40 Pagan,8
Musi, River (Palembang),74 P a h a n g2, 2 , 2 5 , 5 0 ,1 2 5 n . 1 0 91,2 8 ,
Muslims,139, 149, 152,154-5, 145-6,149
16l-2, 169, 774, 187, 233; Middle Painan,Treaty of, 125n.109
Eastern, 1I7, l2ln.2, 2IIn.3, 128; Pajajaran,107-10
I n d i a n ,1 2 9 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 4 - 6 ,1 3 8 ,2 3 9 Pajang,110
Mylapore1 , 1 1 ,1 1 3 Paka (Terengganu),213, 222
Pakuwati (Sunda),110
nnga, 66 Pala, rulers, 77
\T^^^-^r-^*
r\dBdPdtlldtrrt
1 17
f r r Palakka, Arung, of Bone, 155
naicil,97 PalasPasemah(Sumatra),63,66-7,
n a k h o d a , 1 7 4 - 51, 9 8 78
N a k h o nS i T h a m m a r a t , 2 l , 2 8 - 9 , 6 3 , Palawan(Sulu Archipelago),235
262 Indcx

Paleacat/Pulicat,ll7 PengkaianBujang,2I, 25, 27 -8, 30,

nl nt
Palembang,l4n.l4, 47, 61, 63-7, 69,
74,78,85,109,115,rr7, r37, 145, PeninsularMalaysia,See Malay
151 Peninsula
Pallava,70 P e r a k ,2 1 , 3 0 , 5 0 - 1 , 1 1 8 ,1 2 5 n . 1 0 9
Pamatte',Daeng, 143 perdana,95
Panai (Sumatra),69, 78 Perlis,41, 44, 50
Panay (Philippines),163 P e r s i a ,6 4 , l l 7 , 1 3 4 - 6 , 1 5 5
Panca,Raden,108 P e r s i a n s8, 9 , 1 1 1 ,1 2 9 , 1 3 2 , 1 3 4 - 7 ,
Pandasan(Sabah),239 139
PanembahanRama, 119 Peru,44
pangeran,111, 113, 116, 235,237 pesaka,236
pangeranmas, ll0 Phaulkon,Constantine,I29, 132-7
PanglimaDatuk Gedang,of West Philip II, King of Spain, 162
Sumatra,119 P h i l i p p i n e s8,, 1 1 , 8 9 , 9 2 , l 5 l , 1 6 7 ,
Pangunan,Patutan (Sabah),240 1 7 9 - 8 0 ,1 8 9 ,2 0 3 ,2 3 5 , 2 4 0
Pansiano(Sulawesi),156 phongsawadan, 127, 130
Pansur,See Barus Phra Phetracha,Okya, 139
Papar (Sabah),237-8, 241 phrakhlang, 129, 135- 40
Papua (New Guinea),97 Phuket, 134
Parang(Sulu), 199 Polanyi, Karl,7
Parepare(Sulawesi), 146 Polynesia,56
paruwndn, T6 Pondicherry,139
Pasai,5, 107-8, I2In.2,128 Pontianak(Kalimantan),235
Pasir (Borneo),235 Porto Novo, 117
Pasir Sebrang(Terengganu), Portugal, 155
214 P o r t u g u e s e , 9 , 6 5 , 8 85 7, , 8 9 , 9 1 ,
pasisir,3, I5n.27 9 3 - 4 , 9 6 - 7 , 9 9 , 1 0 0 ,1 0 8 - 9 , 1 1 1 ,
Passempe(Bone)Battle of, 153 1 1 5 ,1 1 8 ,1 3 7 ,1 4 5 - 7 , 1 4 9 ,1 5 0 - 6 ,
Pasuruhan,150 I80,214,216,233
Pata (Sulu), 199 Prasatthong, King of Ayutthaya,
Patah, RadenFattah, 109 1 3 0 - 3 ,1 3 9
Pate Jusuf, of Gresik, 93 pratisara, 77
Pattani,22, 63, 74, 9I, 146, 149, pratiyuuaraja,76
220-l pratyaya,76
Patthalung(PeninsuiarThailand), Priaman, 108
70, 74 Priangan,108, 115-6
Pattingalloang,Kraeng, 155 ProvinceWellesley
Pedir, 5, 107, I28 (PeninsularMalaysia),31
fegally,774 puhauam,77
Peg'a,2,128 Pulangi,River (Mindanao),161-2,
Penampang(Sabah),238 t 6 7- 9 , 1 7 6 - 7
Penang,Pulau Pinang,215 Pulau Tioman (PeninsularMalaysia),
PengalatBesar (Sabah),237 6 , 1 7 ,2 4 - 6 , 7 0
penggawa,109 Putatan(Sabah),237, 240-l
penghulu,TT
penghulu benfuihari,76 QuillonPanjan,111
Inder _-,3

Raffles,Sir Stamford,191 Selangor,23, 29, 50-3, 69

raja laut, I74 Selayar(Suiawesi), 143, 150. 151
rajakumara, T6 Semangka(Lampung),116. 1i,
rajaputra, T6 senapati, T6; Seealso senopari
R a n a m a n g g a lPa a. n g e r a n1, 1 1 ,1 i 3 - 4 sengaji,8, 97 -9, 174
Ranau,Lake (Sumatra\.32 senopati,109
Rangoon,13 Seputeh(Lampung),116
Ratu Balau(Lampung).110 Seram,87, 89, 151
Red River Vallev. -12 Seram Laut (EasternIndones:a.
Rhodes,Alexandrede. 155 8 9 , 9 4 , 9 7 , 1 1 5 ,1 5 0
Riau, 128 Setiu (Terengganu), 213, 221
Rome,46 Shih-li-fo-shih,61
R o z e n g a i(nB a n d aI s l a n d s )8, 9 Si Chon (PeninsularThailancr.',y
ruba-ruba,II3 S i a m , I 2 7 - 4 0 ,1 4 5 ,1 5 1 ,1 5 0 .: i ;
R u n ( B a n d aI s l a n d s t8. 9 216,221; Gulf of, 28, I27. 2'-+
Siamese,128, 155, 215,220
s a - i \ u d , 1 6 11.6 5 .l ; : . 1 ; 7 1 8 0 S i a n g ,P a n g k a j e n(eS u l a r v e s :-r= : - ,
s a - r a y a , 1 6 i1' r. E . 1 ; 2 . 1 ; ; . 1 8 0 Sidenreng(Sulawesi),147. 153
S a b a h3, , 1 1 .: 3 1 1 3 5 - 1 5 Silebar,110, 114, 116, 117
Sabana,See Sa:ara S i m S u a n ,1 1 3 ,1 1 5 - 6
5 a D a r ? l,r . 1 ! Simoay(Mindanao),10, 167. 1;3
Sabukingking rPa.er:a::lt. lrl S i n g a p o r e1,1 , 1 3 , 6 5 , 8 8 , 2 0 + .
sadaha-kadat,,r:. z: 2 1 6 - 7 ,2 2 0 - t , 2 2 3 ,2 2 7
sadaha-lano. vv Sirongan,Raja of Buayan,163-i
Saigon, 13 s l a v e s1, 1 , 7 7 , 1 7 3 ,1 8 9 ,1 9 1 ,
A
5alvlsm,/ + 193-205
Saivite,2 soa,98
sakai,47 Soerma,Christiaan,199
S a k y a m u n il., sogit, 238
S a m a l 1. 0 1 S : - : : ^ : : - : . . 1 , , r 3 . Solor(LesserSundaIslands),87
2 0 5 ;B a i a uL a : : - , Sombaopu(Gowa),150
S a m a r i n d 'aB : : . . . :: S o n g k h l a2,8 , 7 0 , 7 4 , 1 1 6 ,1 3 8
S a m b a s r B r r r . q- :- . - Soppeng(Sulawesi),153, 156
'- -
S a m u d r a - Paa.: --'- - South Asia, see India
Sandakan.: , Spain,162-3, 189, 204;and Siam.
S a n gS a p u : : e -j : 130
sangha.TE S p a i n ,i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s1,1 , 9 1 - 2 .
J a n g t n e: ,. . . - 9 7 , 1 6 t - 4 , 1 6 6 ,1 7 t - 3 , 7 7 6 ,
Sangkara;-.; ,: - . .,-.i. . =- 1 7 9 - 8 0 ,2 0 0 ,2 0 2 -4 , 2 3 3 , 2 3 3 .2 1 0
S a n t u b o n 'gS = : :. ' . . : ; - ipeelman.Cornelis,155
S a r a n g a nt \i1 : : , : : . : - -:- -.1 SpiceIslands,83, 105
,< ,. --
1 6 6 ,1 ; ? - j - : : . : . - - -,i:., )rlJdOAIlZ, / t
180 Sriksetra,67
Sarau'a+ k .; . - : j - : - . - S r i v i j a y a2, - 5 , 7 - 8 , 1 0 , 1 5 n . 2 7 ,
S a r i s ,L a b a : .. I i - : : - -: : . : : 1 6 n . 3 52,8 - 9 ,4 4 ,4 7 - 9 , 5 5 , 6 1 - 8 2 .
(Terenggan: - - 1 0 3 n . 4 81, 0 7 , 1 2 0
--
Satingphra.:- -: -.. ; - '--,. stlnpaha,TT
264 Index

Subanun,of Magindanao,169, 171 Tallo' (Sulawesi),143, 147, 149-50,

Sukadana(Borneo),151 IJJ

Sukhothai,131 Tambralinga,21, 63, 74, 78

SulaimanShah, of Persia, 130 Tambunan(Sabah),241
Sula Islands (EasternIndonesia), Tamil, I5n.27, 17, 70, See also
97, tsl Keling
Suiawesi,93, 97, 1.28,143, 151, 171, tamu,II,240-l
r 7 5 , r 7 9 , 1 8 7 ,1 8 8 Tan-ma{ing, l7 , 19, See also
S u l u , 3 ,6 , 8 - 1 0 , 1 4 5 ,1 5 1 ,1 6 1 - 3 , Tambralinga
1 6 8 ,1 7 1 ,1 7 5 ,1 7 9 ,1 8 7- 2 7 r , Tan-tan,17, 19
235-6,241 T a n g ,1 9 , 6 1 , 6 3 , 6 9
Sumatra,5, 6, 8, I4n.14,44-7, 5l-3, Tanimbar Islands,89, 151
5 5 , 6 1 - 8 2 , 1 0 7 - 8 ,1 1 0 ,1 1 3 - 4 ,1 1 9 , Tanjung Rawa (Kuala Selinsing,
l2ln.2, 128, 151, 175, L99, 215, Perak),7, 21, 47 -8, 53
237 tantramalar, 78
Sumba (LesserSundaIslands),146, Taoist,77
151 T a o s u g ,1 0 , 1 8 7 ,1 9 3 - 4 , 1 9 6 - 2 0 5
Sumbawa(LesserSundaIslands), Tapian (Mindanao),172
8 7 , 9 3 , 1 5 0 ,1 5 2 Tapian Tana, Islands(Sulu
S u n d a ,1 0 7 - 8 , 1 1 5 - 6 , l 2 l n . 2 , 1 4 6 Archipelago),187
SundaKalapa,1,07 -9, 145 Tapul, Island (Sulu Archipelago),10,
Sung,25-6, 29, 63, 69, 70, I21'n.2 199
SungaiEmas (Kedah),69 Tasik Cini (Pahang),22
sungaikuriPan,236-7 Tawi Tawi (Sulu),200
SungaiMulong (Kelantan),70 T e i a g aB a t u ,6 3 , 6 5 - 6 , 7 4 , 7 6 , 7 7 - 8
SungaiPengkalanDatu, 70 Telok Betung (Lampung),116
sungaitulin, 236-7 Tembeling(Pahang),51-3
Supa (Sula.vesi),146 temenggung,76, 116
Surabaya,87, 119, 147, I50 Tempasuk (Borneo),236, 239- 40
Surakarta,16n.43 Tenasserim,128, 131
Surasewan,Panembahan,109 Tengku Muda, of Terenggaw,22
'fengku
S u r a t ,1 1 5 ,1 1 7 ,1 5 5 Wok, of Dungun
Suvarnadvipa,77 (Terengganu\,216, 220
Suvarnapura,See SuvarnadviPa T e r e n g g a n u6,, 1 1 , 1 9 , 2 5 , 5 0 - 2 ,
s y a h b a n d a7r 7 , , 8 5 , 9 1 , 1 0 0 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 1 , t28,213-30
r13, lr7, 143, 150, 171, 174, r78 Ternatans,173
Syeik Yusuf, of Makassar,119 Ternate(Moluccas), 8, 10, 83, 85, 89,
9 1 , 9 3 - 9 , 1 0 1 ,1 1 9 - 2 0 ,
Tabukan (Sangihe),173 16r-4,166, 175
Tagoloan,of Mindanao,164 T h a i l a n d 2, 0 , 2 2 , 2 8 , 4 I - 2 , 6 1 , 6 7 ,
Taiwan, 117 Seealso Siam 69, 70, 78
Takalar (Sulawesi),152 tiangui, 240
Takuapa,15n.27,20, 28-30, 69, 70, Tidore (Moluccas), 8, 85n.,89,93-1.
aA 9 7 - 8 , 1 0 1 ,1 5 4
Talaittakkolam,17 T i m o r , 8 7 , 9 1 , 1 2 8 ,1 4 5 ,1 5 0 - 1
Talang Tuwo (Sumatra),63 Tioman, See Pulau Tioman
Talangame(Ternate),93 Tiruray, of Magindanao,164, 769, I72
 Indt:t 265

Tiyumah, See Pulau Tioman VaiSnavite,74

Tok Ku Marang, Syed of Yajrapani, 77
Terengganu,216 ualtiyaga,77
Toloco (Ternate),93 wsiharana,77
Tonkin, Il7, 214 V e n i c e ,4 , 1 1 1
T'ou-chu-li(Chii-li),17, 28 V i e t n a m ,4 2 , 4 6 ,5 l - 2 , 5 5
Trang,22,29 t'ihara,67, 77
Tranggana,Pangeran,109 Visayas,163-4,201
Tranquebar,114-5 ViSnu,74
Trunajaya, Prince of Madura, 119
Tuaran (Sabah),237 \\ aigeo (West Irian), 89
T u b a n , 5 , 8 7 ,1 0 8 ,1 1 9 ,1 2 1 n . 21, 5 0 \Yajo',153
Tubanese,95 i:,aalisanga, 109
Tubok (Illana Bay, Mindanao),166 warga, lll
tuha an uatakuurah,77 wazir,236
Tulangbawang,110 White, Samuel,140
tumailalang,150,153 Wittfogel, Karl, 3
Tumapa'risiKallonna,of Gowa, 143,
1 4 5 ,1 4 9 Yang-DiPertuan,233
Tumenangari Gaukanna,of Gowa Yian,26,70
and Tallo', 149, 153 yuaaraja, 76
Tumenangari Makkoayang,149
Tun-sun(Tien-sun),17, 28 Zainal Abidin, Vongi, Sultan of
Tunibatta,of Gowa,149,152 T i d o r e ,9 5 , 2 1 6 , 2 2 1 - 2
Tunijallo',of Gorva,I49,152 Zainal Abidin II, Sultan of
Tunilabudi Surin'a,of Tallo', 147 Terengganu,219
Tunipassulu'.of Gorvaand Tallo', 149 Zainal Abidin III, Sultan of
Tunipasuru'.of Tallo'. 147.I49 Terengganu,220,223
T u r k s ,8 9 , 1 1 1 .1 3 1 Zamboanga(Philippines),10, 166-, .
t 7 1 - 2 , 1 7 5 - 6 ,1 9 5 - 6
U j u n g S a l a n gr J - : . . :C c ' . . :. . , , 1 1 . 8
u l a m a .1 7 4 - t

89,

-4,

).72
 ASIAI{
UTHEAST
DPOLITY

EDITEDBY
J. KATHIRITTIAMBY-WELLS & JOHN VILLIERS
The collectionof essaysin this volumeattemptsto tracetheevolutionof the
SoutheastAsian port-polityas an historicalphenomenonfrom its nascent
stage(from the first millenniumB. C.) and representdevelopments in key
areaspertainingto theoverall growthof tradeandstatehood,andthe inherent
links betweenthe two.

Othzr titlespublishedby SingaporeUniversiryPress:

TheUndersideof MalaysianHistory:
Pullers,Prostitutes,
PlantationWorkers...
PETERJ.RIMMER&LISAM. ALLEN (eds.)

Red StarOver Malaya:Resistance

andSocialConflict
duringandaftertheJapaneseOccupation,L94l-1946
CHEAH BOON KFIENG

KampucheaBetweenChinaandVietnam
CHANG PAO-MIN

Chinaandthe ASEAN States:TheEthnicChineseDimension

LEO SURYADINATA

SINGAPOREUNIVERSITYPRESS
NATIONAL UNIVEhSITY OF SINGAPORE

rsBN9971-69-r41-8