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PHILOSOPHERS’ THINKING
INSIGHT, UNDERSTANDING, MEANING, COMMUNICATION
INTERSUBJECTIVITY VOLUME 6

ULRICH DE BALBIAN
META-PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH CENTER

..as fools we all fool ourselves and others by constructing all sorts of things,
minds, selves, consciousness, reality, science, beliefs, attitudes, gods, etc in
foolish ways … without this intersubjective agreement to be self-delusional
we would live in a desert of the mind, the sense, emotions and sensations… so
let us just continue to fool ourselves in such institutionalized interpersonal ways
as if there is something like meaning, sense in our lives, actions and thoughts on
this inherited, maintained, anthropo-centric, interpersonal ship of fools….
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CONTENTS

Preface 4
INTERSUBJECTIVITY 7
INSIGHT 96
UNDERSTANDING 93
EXPERIENCE 99
WISDOM 108
MEANING 126
COMMUNICATION 147
ROLES OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY (Sciences, Truth) 177
-ISMS 255
COGNITIVE BIASES 259
FALLACIES 294
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PREFACE
In this volume, volume 6, I will deal with insight and understanding, meaning
and communication and intersubjectivity. (In an appendix I will include a
number of –isms, cognitive biases and fallacies that might interfere in, with and
distort these things.)
The latter is pre-supposed by, present, necessary and operating in all four of
these notions when they are employed as verbs. I hope and intend to employ
these words and explore them without the need for ghost-in-the-machine like
mysterious, mystical and mythical ‘mental’ processes and organs such as ‘mind’
and ‘consciousness’ but by means of different meanings, dimensions, levels of t
notions of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity enfolds (like a pregnant mother her
foetus) insight, understanding, meaning and communication. Intersubjectivity is
the beginning, the ground and reason for and the end of all meanings or sense
that human beings could have.
The reason for these attitudes of mine towards mental things, processes, organs,
etc is that I do not believe they exist, apart from being umbrella-notions that
refer to a number of undefined and not yet conceptualized meanings. They have
their origins in uneducated, uninformed redundant myths and folk psychology.
Their usage date back to almost pre-historic times in the evolution of human
thinking and psychology and are conceptual remainders and linguistic left overs
of primitive flat earth socio-cultural attitudes and beliefs.
I further need to make four points concerning my approach in this volume and
my approach to or understanding of philosophy, they manner or style in which I
write, especially in this volume and how I employ and interpret the nature and
one function of intersubjectivity, both in this volume and in general. The latter I
present as a kind of hypothesis and conclusion.
1)I realized many years, decades, ago that I approach philosophy, science, art
and other socio-cultural practices that I am interested in and became involved
with in a manner that is not the usual run-of-the-mill one or that of the typical
scholar, but in an original and creative thinking way. I did not attempt to study
in this manner, but it came to me naturally. I would study and grasp what some
philosopher, scientist, sociologist, artist, thinker, etc attempted to express and
communicate – as serious scholars would and some of them do in an excellent
way, and most of them in a mediocre manner and others rather poorly. But, that
was only the beginning of my contact with a subject and an author. I had to go
further and question his work and the assumptions he made as merely the first
preliminary step, as I had to re-think his approach and work by means of my
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own original insights, model or perspective. I thought this is merely the natural
or usual way of reading and thinking about the ideas thinkers or authors present
to us, until I discovered this, my natural attitude and way of dealing with texts,
approaches and theories are unusual and that the conventional way of dealing
with such things is that of the academic scholar - that what we read in articles,
theses, books and research. It often consists of commentaries on the work and/
or the commentaries of others – for example one paper in sociology presented
us with commentary on Habermas’s commentary on Brandom. Of course that
type of thing is fine for the category of scholarly work, but to me it appears
almost pointless and irrelevant and does not develop the discipline or provide us
with meaningful insights. So much for scholarly approaches, or the stuff that the
majority of academic books, articles and theses are made of and the insights and
ideas of the handful of original- and creative thinking individuals in disciplines,
discourses or socio-cultural practices, for example Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel,
Wittgenstein, Leibniz, Spinoza, Marx, et al.
One aspect of these two approaches is the question about the intention or motive
of these different kinds of work. The original, creative-thinking one is obliged
to work, think and write in that discipline or execute the socio-cultural practice,
as if his life depends on it, he lives or exists for his passion, the other kind forms
part of the professional, academic practice, the academic who must publish and
therefore is obliged to find some topic or subject-matter, often contrived, as it
forms part of his tenure and job-description, like the majority in any discipline
who lives off that subject.
2) The second point concerns certain aspects of the so-called Socratic Method/s.
In an earlier book I roughly distinguished between different kinds of philosophy
in terms of the ways it is being done (speculative or revisionary metaphysics as
Strawson labelled it, his own descriptive kind of metaphysics, and two kinds of
explorative philosophy, namely the hard ones, that retains certain metaphysical
ambitions and the soft explorative kind, that lost the need or desire for any form
of metaphysics. The latter is represented by the Socratic methods and the former
by the Philosophical Investigations. In that work I suggested that the explorative
types of doing philosophy appear to be more meaningful for the philosophical
enterprise as it discarded all or most metaphysical aspirations and motives and
as they provide us with a faint glimmer of hope that there remains a future for
the philosophical discourse – a socio-cultural practice that desperately seeks for
subject-matter (by innovations such as experimental philosophy, the creation of
philosophies of every subject and everything possible and increasing attempts to
become involved in interdisciplinary work) and methods and that is increasingly
predicted not to last beyond the end of this century, if that long.
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3) Related to point 3, but with another take on it is the following. It seems to me

as if thinkers in the philosophical discourse, and even more so when they write
philosophy, by means of the norms, customs, traditions and conventions of the
philosophical discipline, implicitly employs some form of discourse and more
specifically even, are involved in a dialogue (remember Socrates). The dialogue
might consist of any number of participants – the main participant will be the
writer or the initiator of the dialogue, the reasoning and the argumentation and
the other voices or ghostly participants (there number might be one, many or an
entire school, movement, the entire philosophical community, humanity, or the
world, they might be named or remain nameless) he dialogues or converses with
or argues against may be more implicit or more explicit.
I merely mention this as I employ this tactic in this volume. The citations and
sources and the information they contribute form part of ‘the other’ participant
in the dialogue of this volume. I do not agree or disagree with the information,
its underlying assumptions and implications, but include them so as to picture a
certain topic, idea or notion (for example truth, meaning, communication, etc).
And, if and where possible I discourse with some of these things – so as to open
up, like the Socratic method/s do, avenues, ways, roads, bypaths, methods that
might imply and point to insights and understanding, and even a modification of
attitudes and ways of thinking and beliefs.
4) My final point refers to the underlying theme or notion of the entire volume,
namely the idea of intersubjectivity – another umbrella-notion that have many
meanings, many usages, multiple dimensions and that could be employed on a
number of different levels of greater specificity and/or generalization.
The reasons for my choice of this notion is manifold, but to sum them up in a
simple phrase – it underlies many, if not most, items that occur or are present in
human existence. Our ideas, concepts, conceptual practices, feelings, motives,
passions, socio-cultural practices (from sport, to science, the arts, to hunting,
love and war, madness, crime, delinquency, legal and illegal activities etc) are
institutionalized, socialized and internalized and follow certain principles,
beliefs, values, norms and other socio-cultural rules. Intersubjectivity precedes
and underlies all we think, do, wish, love, hate, feel passionate about, detest and
abhor – and even the ways in which we feel, do and express and live these
things follow intersubjective ways of cultures, sub-cultures, groups, specialized
groups – such as academic disciplines, humanities, arts, entertainment, sport,
etc.
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INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Here are a number of articles if one were to Google for intersubjectivity, a word
by the way, that never was a stranger to mean from as long as I can remember
and it had no mysterious depths or complex overtones to me ever, as to me it
always appeared an obvious notion – a notion that underlies all our thinking, the
words, concepts and notions we employ for and during our thinking and aspects
of the operation of our senses, and ‘that’ what our senses make available to us.
As far as meaning goes, all meanings are in some or other way from notions that
are of intersubjective, interpersonal or socio-cultural origin and usage. Even if
we creatively play around with meanings, create new ones and do original
things with existing ones – all of them assume and employ intersubjectivity (as
Wittgenstein reminded us – there are no private languages).
We employ these meanings, verbal, visual, auditory, feeling etc to think, to
arrive at insights and understanding and to communicate them to others via
talking, writing, painting, musical compositions.

These notions of intersubjectivity I would like to place in the functioning,

embodied, operating person who occasionally or most of the time also exists as
or inhabits the role of philosopher. A role, in the case of original- and creative
thinking philosophers, is a total role, like that of the priest, the contemplative
monastic and hermit monk – a role that is lived out or be(ing) 24/7.
Meaning, insights, understanding and communication are merely different
perspectives on the experience of this individual; an individual who has a high
degree of being intersubjective. He might be intersubjective concerning certain
things with all living organisms, concerning more things with a number of his
own or other animal species, concerning all human beings he probably would
share certain aspects of intersubjectivity for example being a user of language,
and fairly educated in certain socio-cultural practices he will share or not share
certain interpersonal things with other practitioners.
It is in this context that I wish to place and explore as a kind of experimental
philosophy exercise the different features, dimensions, operations, aspects and
functions of intersubjectivity. Especially in so far as they concern insights and
understanding, meaning, communication and experience.

VI. From Subjectivity to Intersubjectivity - UC Davis Philosophy 1

hume.ucdavis.edu/mattey/phi157/husserl4.ppt (This presentation deals with Intersubjectivity
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as conceived by Husserl and Phenomenology. Therefore it will incorporate the assumptions

of those two items.)

Intersubjectivity. My body is located at a central “here”; I take the other body to have its own
“here”; I can think of myself in the other body's “here,” which is now ...
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Introduction to the philosophy of the human person - SlideShare

https://www.slideshare.net/.../introduction-to-the-philosophy-of-the-human-person
Nov 1, 2016 - a philosophical understanding of a human person. ... Realize that
intersubjectivity requires accepting differences and not to impose on ...

Introduction to the philosophy of the human person

1. 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN PERSON Presentation of the

Rationale; Content; Features and Instructions
2. 2. UNIT 4 THE HUMAN PERSON IN THEIR ENVIRONMENT
3. 3. MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT • RATIONALE: – According to the point of view of every
creationist, man was originally created perfect and placed in a perfect, friendly environment
designed to be his home. – He does not see agriculture as destructive of nature but
remembers that God intended the earth to be cultivated (Gen. 2:5, 15).
4. 4. • In this perspective, everything in creation is recognized as having its own rightful place.
Yahweh/God pronounced that all His creation was exceedingly good (Gen.1:31). – Therefore,
respect for the Creator requires respect for His creation. It is thus with a sense of respect,
humility, gratitude and obligation that the creationist assumes his role as steward of his
Master's estate and cares for God's handiwork, not to please himself with personal comfort,
but to please his Creator and to have fellowship with Him
5. 5. LESSON 1: CLIMATE CHANGE Learning Outcome: Notice disorder in the environment
6. 6. "LAUDATO SI" : Care for God's Creation
7. 7. • According to some classical philosophers: Philosophy begins with a sense of wonder and
awe.
8. 8. • But it is something unjustifiable to wonder on nature if what we perceive and encounter
is only disorder in our environment. • Every individual must look on areas of our
surroundings wherein we see an ugly picture of our environment, and transform it into a
place wherein we can see harmony in nature.
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9. 9. • LEARNING ACTIVITY: Poster – Making with a theme: “Save Mother Earth” • Divide the
class in five (5) members each group. Ask them to discuss among themselves ways on saving
mother earth. Tell them to be more specific and practical on their suggestions, then using a
white cartolina and coloring materials, make them draw/sketch creatively the output of their
discussion
10. 10. LESSON 2: Environmental Aesthetic Learning Outcome: Notice things that are not in their
proper place and organize them in an aesthetic way
11. 11. RATIONALE: • The scope of environmental aesthetics has broadened to include not
simply natural environments but also man – made structures within the natural
environments. • At the same time, the discipline has also come to include the examination
of that which falls within such environments, giving rise to what is called the aesthetics of
everyday life.
12. 12. Learning Activity: • Assign the class into a five – member group. Instruct each group to
research about some beautiful tourist spots in our country. Ask them to make a
‘TRAVELOGUE’ or a brochure which contains the following information: • a. Route Map • b.
Short History • c. Pictures and descriptions of the tourist spots in the place • d. Foods and
Delicacies
13. 13. LESSON 3: MAN AS CO- CREATORS AND STEWARDS ON EARTH Learning Outcome: Show
that care for the environment contributes to health, well-being and sustainable
development
14. 14. STEWARDSHIPS AND CO - CREATOR
15. 15. • Genesis 2:15 The LORD God took the man and put him in the Garden of Eden to work it
and take care of it.
16. 16. RATIONALE: • In this Chapter, we see the important responsibility of man as co-creator
of God. • God has instructed man not only to live his life but become also the stewards of
His creation. • We see Him create intentionally and orderly. He creates for the first three
days (day/night; sky/water; water/land), and fills what He created for the next 3 days
(sun/stars/moon; sea creatures/birds; animals/mankind). With each step, we see the Lord
create each “according to their kinds.” • And with each step, the Lord sees what He made
and declares that it is good.
17. 17. CREATIO EX NIHILO....
18. 18. . • We must learn to think and act ecologically. • We repent of extravagance, pollution
and wanton destruction. • We recognize that human beings find it easier to subdue the
earth than they do to subdue themselves.
19. 19. • Learning Activity: – RECYCLING MATERIALS • Using the same groupings in the
travelogue activity, instruct each group to bring scrap materials in the class. Then, instruct
them to discuss among their members to think of any usable recycled objects they can
create out of the scrap materials which they have brought in the class.
20. 20. LESSON 4: Ecological Education Learning Outcome: Demonstrate the virtues of prudence
and frugality towards environments
21. 21. • Ecological education can take place in a variety of settings: at school, in families, in the
media, in catechesis and elsewhere. Good education plants seeds when we are young, and
these continue to bear fruit throughout life. • Here, though, we would stress the great
importance of the family, which is “the place in which life – the gift of God – can be properly
welcomed and protected against the many attacks to which it is exposed, and can develop in
accordance with what constitutes authentic human growth. In the face of the so-called
culture of death, the family is the heart of the culture of life”.
22. 22. •Reflect on the picture, from the movie, the Lorax, and share it in the class.
23. 23. UNIT FIVE: FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN PERSON The learner understands the human
person’s freedom. The learner shows situations that demonstrate freedom of choice and the
consequences of choices.
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24. 24. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT: • The learner is able to understand that doing philosophy
within the context of the human person as free, intersubjective, immersed in society, and
oriented towards their impending death will lead to a deeper understanding of the human
person
25. 25. LESSON 1: THE WILL: ITS EXISTENCE, NATURE AND OBJECT
26. 26. • The will, in philosophy and psychology, is a term used to describe the faculty of mind
that is alleged to stimulate motivation of purposeful activity. • The concept has been
variously interpreted by philosophers, some accepting the will as a personal faculty or
function (for example, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes and Kant) • And other seeing it as
the externalized result of the interaction of conflicting elements (for example, Spinoza,
Leibniz, and Huma).
27. 27. Thomas Aquinas’ Ideas About the Will and Human Freedom • Five Stages of a Human Act
(from perception to action of the will) Stage 1.Intellect - apprehends a situation and
determines that a particular end is appropriate (good) for the given circumstances. Will -
approves a simple volition for that end (or can reject, change the subject, etc.) Stage
2.Intellect - determines that the end can be achieved, is within the power of the agent. Will -
Intention: to achieve the end through some means
28. 28. • Stage 3. Intellect - Counsel: determines various means to achieve the end. • Will -
accepts these means (or can ask for more means) • Stage 4. Intellect - determines the best
means for the given circumstances. • Will - Electio (choice): selects the means the intellect
proposes as best. • Stage 5. Intellect - Command: says "Do the best means!" • Will - Use:
exercises control over the body or mind as needed.
29. 29. LESSON 2: HUMAN ACTS AND VOLUNTARINESS Learning Outcomes: At the end of this
lesson, you are expected to understand the components of a free and voluntary act, as well
as the factors which affect the voluntariness of human acts.
30. 30. • We have human dignity because we are intelligent and free persons, capable of
determining our own lives by our own free choices. • We give this dignity to ourselves by
freely choosing to shape our lives and actions in accord with the truth; that is, by making
good moral choices. Such choices are in turn dependent upon true moral judgments. These
choices performed as free persons are called human acts.
31. 31. CITY OF ANGELS • The only thing that separates us from angels is... freedom/free will
32. 32. • from the latin word VOLUNTAS
33. 33. LESSON 3: ACTIONS HAVE CONSEQUENCES LEARNING OUTCOMES: At the end of this
lesson, you will realize that our actions can have positive and negative consequences and
that you should be able to make choices that aim to create positive consequences.
34. 34. • ACTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES – All our actions (spoken and physical) have
consequences. Some are good (positive) and some bad (negative). – Consequences are a
result or an effect. – It is important to try to behave in a way that has positive consequences.
35. 35. ACTION • My brother hit me really hard... • I stayed out later than my Mother said I
could.... • I ran across the road without thinking... • Another student called me names...
ACTIVITY 1: Write possible consequences (on the right column) to the actions mentioned on
the left column. CONSEQUENCE
36. 36. LESSON 4: FREEDOM OF THE WILL • Differentiate the various kinds of freedom, and
understand some important arguments for and against the freedom of the will.
37. 37. • Freedom in general means the absence of resistant. There are different kinds of
restraint and freedom. – Physical freedom is the absence of physical restraint. When a
prisoner is released from prison, he is physically free, since he is no longer restrained by the
prison walls. – Moral freedom is the absence of moral restraint, of an obligation, of a law.
Thus in this country we are morally free to criticize the government.
38. 38. ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT • The great majority of men believe that their
will is free. This conviction is of the utmost practical importance for the whole of human life.
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• Therefore, if there is order in the world, the majority of mankind cannot be wrong in this
belief. Hence, the will is free.
39. 39. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT • We have said that most people naturally hold that
the will is free. • Men are directly and indirectly aware of their freedom in the very act of
making a free decision; they are indirectly aware of it because of the many instances of the
behavior which can only be explained by admitting the freedom of the will
40. 40. THE ETHICAL ARGUMENT • If there is no freedom, there is no moral responsibility no
virtue, no merit, no moral obligation, no duty, no morality. • The necessary connection
between freedom and the spiritual realities is quite obvious and is demonstrated in Ethics
41. 41. UNIT SIX: INTERSUBJECTIVITY Content Standard: The learner understands intersubjective
human relations
42. 42. Performance Standard: • The learner performs activities that demonstrate an
appreciation for the talents of persons with disabilities and those from the underprivileged
sectors of society
43. 43. Learning Competencies: 1. Realize that intersubjectivity requires accepting differences
and not to impose on others 2. Appreciate the talents of persons with disabilities and those
from the underprivileged sectors of society and their contributions to society 3. Explain that
authentic dialogue means accepting others even if they are different from themselves 4.
Perform activities that demonstrate the talents of persons with disabilities and those from
the underprivileged sectors of society
44. 44. LESSON 1: ACCEPTING ME, ACCEPTING YOU LEARNING OUTCOME: At the end of this
lesson, you are expected to realize that accepting differences of others is vital in any human
relation.
45. 45. • Another aspect of being man is his relatedness with others. This in philosophical terms
is Intersubjectivity or being with others. • One manifestation of this relation with others is
accepting OTHERS AND THEIR DIFFERENCES. This is the first critical component of
intersubjectivity
46. 46. ACCEPTING ME, ACCEPTING YOU
47. 47. LESSON 2: ACCEPTING OTHERS IS NOT TO IMPOSE ON OTHERS LEARNING OUTCOME:
Explicitate J.S. Mill’s views on human liberty, freedom of thought and expression,
interference and the harm principle.
48. 48. • In this lesson, the importance of accepting the other’s thoughts and ideas (though they
might be opposed to yours) is another manifestation of accepting others (and their
differences).
49. 49. • PRINCIPLE OF PATERNALISM. "Paternalism" comes from the Latin pater, meaning to act
like a father, or to treat another person like a child. ("Parentalism" is a gender-neutral
anagram of "paternalism".) • In modern philosophy and jurisprudence, it is to act for the
good of another person without that person's consent, as parents do for children.
50. 50. • LEGAL MORALISM is the view that the law can legitimately be used to prohibit
behaviors that conflict with society's collective moral judgments even when those behaviors
do not result in physical or psychological harm to others. • According to this view, a person's
freedom can legitimately be restricted simply because it conflicts with society's collective
morality; thus, legal moralism implies that it is permissible for the state to use its coercive
power to enforce society's collective morality.
51. 51. LESSON 3: ACCEPTING PEOPLE FOR WHAT THEY ARE IS LOVING THEM LEARNING
OUTCOME: Realize that accepting people for what they are is a manifestation of love.
52. 52. • In this lesson, the theme on accepting others (their differences) is further developed by
connecting it with the act of loving. Thus, we turn to Erich Fromm’s classic The Art of Loving.
• we can use here the essay written by Fromm, The Basic elements of Love
53. 53. • These are care, responsibility, respect and knowledge. • Let us watch this video.....
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54. 54. UNIT SEVEN: THE HUMAN PERSON IN SOCIETY CONTENT STANDARD: The learner
demonstrates various ways of expressing social responsibility
55. 55. LEARNING COMPETENCIES: • 1. Recognize how individuals form societies and how
individuals are transformed by societies • 2. Compare different forms of societies and
individualities (eg. Agrarian, industrial and virtual). • 3. Explain how human relations are
transformed by social systems • 4. Evaluate the transformation of human relationships by
social systems and how societies transform individual human beings.
56. 56. Lesson 1: MAN THE SOCIAL ANIMAL LEARNING COMPETENCIES: Discover the nature of
man as a social animal
57. 57. Aristotle MAN is a social animal and must satisfy certain natural basic needs in order to
survive.
58. 58. Lesson 2: THEORIES OF SOCIETY LESSON COMPETENCIES: Understand the different
theories of about society
59. 59. • DIscuss the Platonic concept of society, specifically his book, The Republic • He divided
the society in three social classes, namely: – The Producing Class which includes the farmers,
merchants, and laborers/workers; – the Guardian Class which includes the soldiers and
police force; – and the Ruling Class which includes Philosophers-thinkers, Rulers and Kings
that is selected to lead the entire society
60. 60. • ARISTOTLE: Man is social animal... • Aquinas: man is naturally a political being and as
such seeks to live in the community or society... • Machiavelli: Society should be ruled
absolutely by powerful person and individual members of the society must follow in order to
establish an orderly community... • Hobbes and Locke: the state had arisen out of a
voluntary agreement, or social contract...
61. 61. LESSON 3: SOCIAL INFLUENCES Identify the common influences of society to every
individual
62. 62. • Social influence occurs when one's emotions, opinions, or behaviors are affected by
others. • Society is a group of people, of varying size and structure and can make an impact
in the behavioral patterns of a person as a member of a particular society
63. 63. • Influence means to have the capacity to have an effect on the character, development,
or behavior of someone or something, or the effect itself.
64. 64. LESSON 4: THE FILIPINO SOCIETY Understand the NATURE of Filipino society
65. 65. • The great majority of the Philippine population is bound together by common values
and a common religion. Philippine society is characterized by many positive traits. • Among
these are strong religious faith, respect for authority, and high regard for amor proprio (self-
esteem) and smooth interpersonal relationships.
66. 66. UNIT EIGHT: HUMAN PERSON TOWARDS DEATH CONTENT STANDARD: Compare and
contrast the different perspective of Filipinos towards DEATH
67. 67. Lesson 1: WHAT IS DEATH Recognize the meaning of his/her own Death
68. 68. • The philosophical investigation of human death has focused on two overarching
questions: • (1) What is human death? and • (2) How can we determine that it has
occurred?
69. 69. • . From the philosophical point of view we should recognize first that we can experience
death, because we ought to know the cognitive value of our conceptions and judgments
about death and its relation to with the whole of human existence.
70. 70. Lesson 2: DIFFERENT VIEWS ON DEATH Relate the different philosophical views on death
with human experiences
71. 71. • ANCIENT VIEW OF DEATH. Most ancient people attributed death to the agency of the
gods, elves, demons, or evil spirits who are jealous of human achievements and beautiful
human features, or who are offended by man’s sins.
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72. 72. • BIOLOGICAL VIEW OF DEATH. Death is viewed as a biological event, death is the end of
man considered to be a living organism. • Death is the cessation of life, the total arrest of
both mental and physiological functions as a person.
73. 73. • PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEWS. Concept of death and adjustment addresses the ability to
adjust to one's own death when that death is not imminent. • Therefore it deals with the
vast range of events related to possible deaths and the various methods of adjustment to
these possibilities.
74. 74. • THEOLOGICAL VIEW. St. Thomas Aquinas is very clear about the nature of death. • He
says: "The necessity of dying for Man is partly from nature and partly from sin.
75. 75. • PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW. Our philosophical understanding of death is given to us
exclusively on the basis of the self-understanding of a living-man, who is inevitably
approaching death as the ultimate event of his life. • Thus, we come to an understanding of
death by analyzing our actual existence in the light of the one-side experience of death and
dying by the others.
76. 76. Lesson 3: DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS VIEWS ON DEATH Differentiate the different religious
views on death
77. 77. CHRISTIANITY Christian beliefs about the afterlife vary between denominations and
individual Christians, but vast majority of Christians believe in some kind of heaven, in which
believers enjoy the presence of God and other believers and freedom from suffering and sin.
78. 78. Islam Muslims believe that the present life is only a preparation for the next realm of
existence. For them death is merely movement from one world to another. It can be
described as a journey through a separate dimension of existence.
79. 79. Hinduism Death in Hinduism is very spiritual, and it strongly believes in the rebirth and
reincarnation of souls. So, according to Hinduism, death is regarded as a natural process in
the existence of soul as a separate entity.
80. 80. Buddhism In Buddhism a lot has been said about the importance of death. It was
awareness of death that prompted Lord Buddha to explore the truth behind worldly
concerns and pleasures. After along search, Lord Buddha finally came to the conclusion that
death is inevitable for a person who thinks about worldly pleasures and attitudes.
81. 81. Judaism Traditional Judaism firmly believes that death is not the end of human
existence. However, because Judaism is primarily focused on life here and now rather than
on the afterlife, Judaism does not have much dogma about the afterlife, and leaves a great
deal of room for personal opinion.
82. 82. Lesson 4: FILIPINO VIEWS ON DEATH Comprehend the traditional concept of Filipinos
about DEATH
83. 83. TRADITIONAL VIEWS ON DEATH • Filipino traditions that surround death and dying are a
blend of indigenous, Spanish, and American influence that makes Filipino traditions unique.
• The Filipinos have many indigenous traditions that regard death and dying. One of these
traditions is called an “atang” An atang is a feast prepared by the bereaved family. The feast
is made up of the favorite food of the deceased person and a seat at the dinner table is left
open in memory of that person.
84. 84. • Discuss with the students other indigenous traditions and belief… • Try asking them of
they know about death and burial in their localities

(This Philippines situated study for ‘philosophy’ appears to be based on certain religious
assumptions. “According to the point of view of every creationist.” A number of philosophical
notions are dealt with, names of certain philosophers concerned with them are mentioned.
Attitudes and behaviour that are meant to be indices of the presence of intersubjectivity are
highlighted. This article might say something about the notion of intersubjectivty in general but
nothing much about detailed aspects of the notion.)
23

[PDF]LOVE AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY The human person is the most ...

www.smsnjiro.org/images/Love%20and%20intersubjectivity.pdf
analysis of some of the existentialist philosophers may help us in our quest and finally I ...
intersubjectivity denotes some set of relations, meanings, structures, ...
(This article, no mention of the author, consists of statements that are not argued for, for
example :” Biologically we receive our beings from our ancestors.”
“As discussed above intersubjectivity is that connectedness nature of human beings. It is
normal that from the time of birth and up to a certain age in our adolescence, this
intersubjectivity takes place sometimes unconsciously and is brought about by some external
forces depending on the situations at hand. For instance the child depends on his parents and
he is forced in some sense to maintain this relationship, consciously or unconsciously, for his
survival……
Undeniably the human person is a relational being. Even though the existentialist
philosophers emphasized the individual over the totality of the system, I profoundly believe
that we receive our existence from others. We remember that philosophically life is that
which makes a being naturally capable of self-perfective immanent activity. As such, we
cannot limit the human person to the biological definition of life. It is merely a fact that the
other makes me aware of my own self. Intersubjectivity is a valid concept which binds
people, whether consciously or unconsciously. However it is accompanied by love we can
make of our world a better place to live. Unfortunately, the struggle for power leads us to us
people rather than relating with them as equals and this is what is destroying our humanity….

6 Frederick Copleston. A History of Philosophy, Vol IX believe that true intersubjectivity

philosophers have to tell us about this concept of love .”.

This is the unargued for conclusion, or as the author calls it ‘his belief’. Again, we do not
learn much from this article.

PPT – Enhancing Intersubjectivity. PowerPoint presentation | free to ...

www.powershow.com/.../Enhancing_Intersubjectivity_powerpoint_ppt_presentation
Enhancing Intersubjectivity. Relation is reciprocity. Martin Buber. Parent Infant
Psychotherapy: Talking to Babies.. Bristol Annual Infancy Conference. 5th June .
(A number of so-called intersubjectivity studies deal with babies and toddlers and attempts to
identify the presence and development of different aspects of intersubjectivity.)
1
Enhancing Intersubjectivity.

 Relation is reciprocity.
 Martin Buber.

Parent Infant Psychotherapy Talking to Babies. .

Bristol Annual Infancy Conference. 5th June 2009.
robin.balbernie_at_glos.nhs.uk
2
24

 Infancy is a time of essential

intersubjectivity. a condition of any
psychological field formed by interacting worlds
of experience, at whatever developmental level
these worlds may be organised. (p. 3. Stolorow,
R. D. Atwood, G. E. (1992) Contexts of Being
The Intersubjective Foundations of Psychological
Life. Hillsdale, N.J. The Analytic Press.)

This is the experiential overlap

where mother and baby
produce a felt event to be
shared.

 Attachment, in all mammals, is there to

keep the young in close proximity to the adult.
It prevents them being munched up or mislaid.

But

 Intersubjectivity is the constantly renewable

overlap where mother and baby each contribute to
a time and place of harmonious interpenetrating
mix up (Balint, The Basic Fault, p.66) when they
actively participate in and influence each
others immediate experiences.

 Attachment behaviour is merely an indicator of

an intersubjective emergency. It has to be
triggered by an observed event and takes up a
tiny proportion of any childs life.
 In contrast, intersubjective processes are
active within all interpersonal contacts,
whatever the level of affect or motivation.

5
Mirror neurons.

 Mirror neurons are found in the premotor

cortex and the inferior parietal areas
associated with movement and perception as well
as in the posterior parietal lobe, the superior
25

temporal sulcus and the insula, regions that

correspond to our abilities to comprehend someone
elses feelings, understand intention and use
language. This is how we are designed to have
visceral reactions to each others actions,
mishaps and feelings making intersubjectivity an
innate aptitude.

 Through mirror neurons we automatically imitate

or rehearse every action we witness.
 Mirror neurons also fire at the sound of
something previously experienced.
 When we listen to sentences describing actions
the same mirror neurons fires as would have if
the subject had done or witnessed the actions.
 Mirror neurons play a key role in perceiving
intentions. Different ones fire depending on
expected action.

 Daniel Stern describes intersubjective contact

as occurring when Two people see and feel
roughly the same mental landscape for a moment at
least. (Stern, 2004 The Present Moment. p.75)
 He points out that this is a primary
motivational force quite separate from
attachment, but together they form a mutually
contributing system. Attachment keeps people
close so that
intersubjectivity can develop or
deepen, and intersubjectivity creates
conditions that are conducive to
forming attachments. (p.102)

 The brain does not begin its day as a tabula

rasa. The brain is imbued at the start of life
with knowledge regarding how the organism should
be managed, namely how the life process should be
run and how a variety of events in the external
environment should be handled. (p. 205)
(Antonio Damasio, (2004) Looking For Spinoza.
 London Vintage.)
26

9
Inescapable intersubjectivity.

 Attachment is not just a matter of infant

safety, it sets up the conditions for
intersubjective contact between mother and
infant. What occurs within this has become a
crucial aspect of human development. This place
of closeness socialises the child, sculpting his
psyche and neurobiology.
 The human brain is the only brain in the
biosphere whose potential cannot be realised on
its own. It needs to become part of a network
before its design features can be expressed.
(p.324)
Donald, M. (2001) A Mind So Rare.

10

 Trevarthen summarizes how It is becoming

increasingly clear that the human central nervous
system, with the human body, is designed for an
exceptionally elaborate brain-to-brain linking so
the motive regulations of one brain can
powerfully interact with those of the brain in
another person.
 Trevarthen, C. (2001) Intrinsic motives for
companionship in understanding Their origin,
development, and significance for infant mental
health. IMHJ, Vol. 22 (1-2), 95-131.

11

 Human infants have profoundly undeveloped

brain. Maintaining proximity to their caregivers
is essential both for survival and for allowing
their brains to use the mature states of the
attachment figure to help them organize their own
mental functioning. (p.149) Daniel Siegal, The
Developing Mind.

12

 In humans intersubjective awareness motivates

cultural learning the intergenerational
27

transmission of knowledge and skills with all the

conceptual and material consequences.
 Trevarthen, C. Aitken, K.J. (2001) Infant
intersubjectivity research, theory, and clinical
application. Journal of Child Psychology
Psychiatry. Vol. 42 (1)

13

 And as a part of this, Stern suggests that

intersubjectivity contributed to species survival
as it promotes group formation, it enhances
group functioning, and it assures group cohesion
by giving rise to morality. (The Present Moment,
p.98)

14

 The target of therapy is the intersubjective

field between infant and parent emphasising how
early intervention is set within the shared space
of the attachment and caregiving systems, and
does not favour one at the expense of the other.

15
The intersubjective field.
Reflective function. Containment. Holding.
Representation of infants mental
state. Reflected back to infant.
Inference.
Core of psychological self.
Internalisation.
Inaccurate mirroring (or non-contingent
responses) leaves the baby with unlabelled
feelings, which will be harder to regulate.
16
If all goes well

 The securely attached child perceives in the

caregivers reflective stance an image of himself
as desiring and believing. He sees that the
caregiver represents him as an intentional being,
and this representation is internalised to form
the self. If the caregivers reflective capacity
has enabled her accurately to picture the childs
intentional stance, then the child will have the
opportunity to find himself in the other as a
28

mentalizing individual. At the core of our selves

is the representation of how we were seen.
(p.348) Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist Target. (2002)
Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the
Development of the Self.

17

 A caretaker with a predisposition to see

relationships in terms of mental content permits
the normal growth of the infants mental
function. His or her mental state anticipated
and acted on, the infant will be secure in
attachment. Fonagy, Steele, Steele,
Moran, Higgitt, (1991) The capacity for
understanding mental states The reflective self
in parent and child and its significance for
security of attachment. Infant Mental Health
Journal, 12, (3)

18
Reflective function and quality of attachment.

 Secure attachment and reflective function are

overlapping constructs, and the vulnerability
associated with insecure attachment lies
primarily in the childs diffidence
in conceiving of the world in
terms of psychic rather than
physical reality.
 (p.351) Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist Target.
(2002) Affect
Regulation, Mentalization, and the
Development of the
Self.

19

 Attunement requires an awareness of the infant

as a psychological entity with mental experience.
It presumes a capacity on the part of the
caregiver to reflect on the infants mental
experience and re-present it to the infant
translated into the language of actions the
infant can understand.
(p.207)
29

 Fonagy, P., Steele, H., Steele, M., Moran,

G. S.
Higgitt, A. C. (1991) The capacity
for
understanding mental states The reflective
self in
parent and child and its significance for
security of
attachment.
 Infant Mental Health Journal.

Vol. 12. (3) pp 201-218.

20

 Thomas Ogden writes Holding is concerned

with being and its relation to time the
container-contained is centrally concerned with
the processing (dreaming) of thoughts derived
from lived emotional experiences.
(2004) On holding and containment, being and
dreaming. Int. J. of Psychoanalysis. 85.

21

 Bion described containment as a function of

maternal reverie, seen as that state of mind
which is open to the reception of any objects
from the loved object and is therefore capable of
reception of the infants projective
identifications whether they are felt by the
infant to be good or bad. (p.36) Learning From
Experience.

22

 Britton gives a later, more hands-on,

description of containment.
The mother, if she is
receptive to the infants state of mind and
capable of allowing it to be evoked in herself,
can process it in such a way that in an
identifiable form she can attend to it in the
infant. In this way something which in the
infant is near-sensory and somatic is transformed
by the mother into something more mental which
30

can be used for thought or stored as memory.

(p.22)
 Britton, R. (1998) Belief and Imagination.

23

 Emde (198938) remind us that the infant

comes to the world with a biological preparedness
for participating in social interactions. The
infant has built-in capacities for initiating,
maintaining, and terminating social interactions
with others. (p. 38) The Infants Relationship
Experience Developmental and Affective Aspects.
In Relationship Disturbances in Early Childhood.
Ed. Sameroff Emde.

24

 Fonagy puts this in attachment terms.

Secure attachment may thus have a great deal in
common with successful containment. What is
critical is the mothers capacity mentally to
contain the baby and respond, in terms of
physical care, in a manner that shows awareness
of the childs mental state yet reflect coping
(mirroring distress while communicating an
incompatible affect).
 (p.166)
 Fonagy, P. (2001) Attachment Theory

and Psychoanalysis.

25

 Donald Winnicott described the mothers

capacity to put herself in the babys place and
know what the baby needs in the general
management of the body, and therefore of the
person. He called this early maternal provision
the holding phase, - when with the dawn of
intelligence and the beginning of a mind as
something distinct from the psyche the infant
changes from a relationship with a subjectively
conceived object to a relationship with an object
objectively perceived.
He defined holding as the total
31

environmental provision prior to

the concept of living with.

26

 Secondary intersubjectivity arises when the

infant can systematically combine interests in
immediate physical reality with communication
about their knowledge and intentions. A
deliberate sought sharing of experiences about
events and things is achieved for the first
time.
 Trevarthen, Hubley, (1978) Secondary
intersubjectivity confidence, confiding and acts
of meaning in the first year. In Lock, A. (Ed.)
Action, Gesture and Symbol The Emergence of
Language.

27
Secondary intersubjectivity.

 The sign of secondary intersubjectivity is

when something can become a shared focus between
infant and another. This new development is
heralded by the systematically combining of
interests of the infant in the physical,
privately-known reality near him, and his acts of
communication addressed to persons. (p.184)
 Trevarthen, C. Hubley, P. (1978) Secondary
intersubjectivity confidence, confiding and acts
of meaning in the first year. pp 183-229 in
Lock, A. (Ed.) Action, Gesture and Symbol The
Emergence of Language.

(The above presentation makes many assumptions, for example about the physical brain,
supposedly they are grounded on research and related insights. The positive aspect of it is that
is explores other aspects of intersubjectivity and begins to introduce or develop related
concepts, for example secondary intersubjectivity. The study is intentionally restricted to the
intersubjectivity and its developmentas of one year old babies.)

PPT – Embodiment and Intersubjectivity PowerPoint presentation ...

www.powershow.com/.../Embodiment_and_Intersubjectivity_powerpoint_ppt_presen...
A free PowerPoint PPT presentation (displayed as a Flash slide show) on ... Embodiment
and Intersubjectivity - PowerPoint PPT Presentation ..... Jean Watsons Theory of Caring -
Nursing: The Philosophy and Science of Caring (1979,1985) .
32

Title: Embodiment and Intersubjectivity

1
Embodiment and Intersubjectivity

 Nick Crossley

2
The body was at the centre of the classical
philosophical formulation of the problem of
intersubjectivity

 Mind and body are distinct.

 Body is perceivable from outside, by (external)
perception.
 Mind (subjectivity) isnt. Mind is only knowable
through introspection.
 How do I know that your body contains a mind?
 How do I know what you are thinking?
 Your body is my only clue but its only a clue.

3
This might be a questionable starting point but
it highlights the corporeal nature of the social
world.

 Face-to-face is just that.

 The interaction that generates the social world
is necessarily and irreducibly embodied.
 And intersubjectivity must hinge upon embodiment
(unless its telepathy!).
 Intersubjectivity rests upon intercorporeality
(Merleau-Ponty).
 The social world presupposes an intercorporeal
foundation.

4
Solutions

 Many solutions rest upon the notion of analogy

 Your body looks like mine.
 It behaves like mine.
 My body contains a mind.
 So perhaps your does too.
33

5
Husserl Analogical Apperception

 Apperception perceiving more than we actually

see e.g. backs of houses, weight of heavy
objects etc.
 Works by habitus and pairing
(typification) e.g. this computer with my own.
 Problem- Ive never seen anothers consciousness
so what do I pair with?

6
Husserl Analogical apperception (2)

 I pair other with self.

 Even in the absence of intersubjective relations
I know my own mind (my spehre of ownness).
 E.g. I know what pain feels like, so when I see
you behaving as I behave when I am in pain in
project my pain experriences onto you.

7
But

 This presupposes mind/body dualism embodied

behaviour as a signal of mental states which
belong to another realm.
 I cant see much of my own behaviour (esp. my
face).
 My sense of what is mine already presupposes
the perspective of the other and thus
intersubjectivity.
 If subjectivity was truly private and disembodied
there would be no words (in a shared language) to
describe it.
 Etc.

8
We need an alternative approach (using Mead,
Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, Ryle)

 Behaviour is not an external expression of events

in a disembodied mental realm.
 To be meaningful embodied behaviour must be
embedded in shared forms of life.
34

 We learn, socially, to ascribe mental states to

ourselves, based upon public criteria.
 Our sense of self and other are achieved
co-terminously, in interaction (play/games).
 Etc.

9
Underlying this is embodied interaction
(intercorporeality)

 A conversation of gestures.
 An embodied grasp upon (the role of) the other.
 An embodied grasp of the games of the social
world, esp. language games.

10
Empathy is embodied

 You drop a weight on your toe and I cringe.

 You walk a tightrope and I wobble.
 I finish your sentences.
 I feel shame, pride, guilt in your presence.
 I feel you looking at me.

11
However, even if our subjectivity is embodied and
thus public in principle (philosophically)

 Experience is privatised in modern societies

(Elias).
 There are norms of acceptable expression/disclosur
e.
 And it is strategically advantageous to control
information flow (Goffman).
 We learn to keep secrets, control our expression,
lie and present self

12
Perhaps social life requires it

 Some interactions are functionally specific the

bus driver doesnt need to know my life story and
doesnt want to know.
 Relations presuppose repulsion/distance as well
as attraction/proximity (Simmel)
35

 Even romantic attachments are only kept

excitement through the gaps that allow for
imaginative projection and hide and seek.
(Simmel).
 But in cases akin to the latter this generates a
tension (and that is the point)

13
So the problem of intersubjectivity comes back in
a sociological form

 The body of the other reveals but perhaps only

what they want it reveal e.g. in emotional
labour.
 The body of the other tells two stories
(Bateson/double bind).
 Assurances may never be enough.
 Intersubjectivity has to be negotiated (face
work, accountability/reflexivity, reparation
etc.)
 Simmels tension drives interaction.

[PDF]intersubjectivity: exploring consciousness from the second-person ...

www.atpweb.org/jtparchive/trps-32-00-01-035.pdf
by C de Quincey - 2000 - Cited by 30 - Related articles
philosophy and proposes an evolutionary model of consciousness based on a ... Having
situated this intersubjective approach in an historical philosophical ...
INTERSUBJECTIVITY: Consciousness FROM SECOND-PERSON PERSPECTIVE
Christian de Quincey

ABSTRACT:
Today, the study of consciousness within Western science and philosophy is
polarized between investigations of third-person, objective, correlates (e.g.,
neuroscience and cognitive science and investigations of first-person subjective
experience and phenomena (eg introspection and editation).
These two perspectives set the terms of debate in contemporary consciousness
research : Is consciousness firs-person subjective or third-person objective? (How about both
and/or? The author mentions in different ways that the word consciousness has many
meanings and uses..!)
(Consciousness. Consciousness is a notoriously difficult concept to define. It is, paradoxically,
our deepest mystery and our most intimate reality. Debates in philosophy
and psychology frequently run aground in confusion because participants use the
word consciousness with different meanings. Perhaps we should not try to define
consciousness. For one thing, definitions are limiting, and for another, there is no one
right way to use the term. Consciousness means different things to different people;
because of that, it is important to be clear on the meaning we are using, I prefer to
36

talk about the meaning or meanings of consciousness rather than its definition.
In my experience, the most common misunderstanding arises from a basic confusion
between the philosophical and psychological meanings of the term. I find it
helpful, therefore, to distinguish between two basic meanings of consciousness.
Philosophical consciousness refers to a state of reality characterized by interiority,
subjectivity, sentience, feeling, experience, self-agency, meaning, and purpose.
Anything that has any of these has consciousness. Anything that does not would be
non-conscIous-blank, void, vacuous, wholly objective. This meaning refers to
consciousness as context; it is about the mode of being that makes possible any and
all contents and forms of consciousness. Philosophically, then, consciousness is a
state or quality of being-the fact of consciousness. For example, a person (awake
or asleep), a dog, or a worm exemplify consciousness in this sense; a rock, a cloud,
or a computer do not. Looked at this way, it is clear that the philosophical meaning
is fundamental-for without consciousness as a state of being (i.e., an ontological
reality) there could be no psychological states or contents.
Psychological consciousness. on the other hand, refers to a state of consciousness
(e.g., awake, dreaming, joyful, fearful, mystical) above threshold awareness. It
presupposes the existence of philosophical consciousness. It is about the contents
of consciousness (e.g., thoughts, beliefs, images), and about the mode of access
(conscious or unconscious) to these contents. Psychological consciousness is typically
contrasted with the unconscious, which is below threshold awareness (e.g.,
asleep, trance, coma, habit, instincts). Unconscious is not the same as non-conscious-
the former still has some psychic or subjective activity present; the latter
is wholly objective. For example, a person engaged in conceptual cognition is
conscious in this sense; a person in a coma, or a worm, are examples of what
being unconscious means.
A third meaning of consciousness refers to higher mystical or spiritual states of consciousness
typified by experiences of oneness, interrelatedness, compassion, and love.
However, because spiritual consciousness is a state of consciousness (albeit higher or
highest), it too qualifies as a form of psychological consciousness. It is typically contrasted
with "unenlightened" or "unevolved" ordinazy states of consciousness.
Whenever we speak about consciousness, it helps if we are clear about what we mean:
Do we mean the state of awareness contrasted with being unconscious (psychological
meaning), or do we mean the fact of awareness contrasted with the complete absence
of any mental activity whatsoever (philosophical meaning)? Although there are many
other meanings of consciousness-we will look at eight of them later when I discuss
an evolutionary model of consciousness-I think this distinction between psyc1jological
content and philosophical context is basic. It will surface again when we examine
the key issue of the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity.
Subjectivity also has at least two critical meanings:
Subjectivity 1: experienced interiority
SUbjectivity 2: private, independent, isolated experience.)
How can we bridge the “explanatory gap” between objective brains and subjective minds?
Although many participants in this debate recognize that a comprehensive study of
consciousness must include both perspective (some still hold dogmatically to one
perspective) and few explore it from the second-person perspective - entirely overlooked in
Western philosophy.
The notion of intersubjectivity has actually had significant proponents in other disciplines -

linguistics, social psychology, psychotherapy and anthropology. The author proposes that
intersubjectivity is a foundation to both a philosophical understanding of and an experiential
engagement with transpersonal phenomena.
37

Having clarified what he means by the key terms of consciousness, subjectivity and
intersubjectivity, the author give as rationale for a second-person approach to consciousness
studies, then surveys significant precursors to the notion of intersubjectivity in Western
philosophy and proposes an evolutionary model of consciousness based on a distinction
between intersubjective and interpersonal consciousness - a model that provides a
philosophical foundation for the core insights of transpersonal psychology. In the conclusion,
some possible objections to intersubjectivity are addressed and implications for a second-
person methodology are considered.

Intersubjectivity: What makes us human? (PDF Download Available)

https://www.researchgate.net/.../232504233_Intersubjectivity_What_makes_us_human
Mar 7, 2017 - Intersubjectivity vs. “Theory of Mind”. The hitherto dominant approach in
psychology, cognitive science and philosophy has been to. analyze ...
Intersubjectivity is understood by the authors represented in this book as the sharing of experiential
content (e.g., feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and linguistic meanings) among a plurality of subjects.
Although some non-human species manifest some aspects of the capacity or capacities that make up
intersubjectivity, they appear to lack others. On the other hand, no human being is entirely devoid of
the human intersubjective potential—even though they may be delayed or challenged in the
expression of some of its manifestations, such as is the case for people with autism. These
considerations underlie our bold contentions that the human mind is quintessentially a shared mind
and that intersubjectivity is at the heart of what makes us human. The "perspectives" expressed in
these chapters do not converge on a single, univocal notion of intersubjectivity, but rather point to
a complex phenomenon, or a set of related phenomena, in which experiential, behavioural, genetic
and neural processes and levels are interwoven in both potentiating and actualizing "what it means
to be human". We hope that this introductory chapter will convey to the reader our enthusiasm in
working on this interdisciplinary and "intersubjective" project. The increasing body of research on
social cognition in developmental and comparative psychology, and the prefixing of the term "social"
to previously rather individual-oriented fields such as cognitive linguistics and cognitive
neuroscience, reflect a changing intellectual context in which we hope that The Shared Mind will
make a significant contribution to rethinking some of the fundamental questions of our fields
(PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved) 16

own right, and it is through participatory engagement with the social and material world that

children enter the realm of language. Their chapter concludes by connecting with Gallagher &

Hutto’s Narrative Practice Hypothesis, stressing the importance of narrativity in the construction

of both complex human cognition and shared social cultural identity.

6. Conclusion

As obvious from these summaries, and as pointed out earlier, the “perspectives” expressed in

these chapters do not converge on a single, univocal notion of intersubjectivity, but point to a

complex phenomenon, or a set of related phenomena, in which experiential, behavioural, genetic

and neural processes and levels are interwoven in both potentiating and actualizing what it means

to be human. We hope that these introductory comments have been able to convey to the reader
38

some of our enthusiasm in working on this interdisciplinary and “intersubjective” project.

Intersubjectivity: What makes us human? (PDF Download Available). Available from:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232504233_Intersubjectivity_What_makes_us_human
[accessed Apr 14, 2017].
Intersubjectivity: What makes us human? (PDF Download Available). Available from:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232504233_Intersubjectivity_What_makes_us_human
[accessed Apr 14, 2017]. (This piece presents us with a number of useful notions, aspects and
dimensions of different kinds of intersubjectivity.)

[PDF]INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN

PERSON ...

www.depedrovcatanduanes.com/files/11-Intro-to-Philo-AS-v1.0.pdf
INTERSUBJECTIVITY. 1. Realize intersubjectivity requires accepting differences and not to
imposing others. 2. Appreciate the talents of persons with disabilities ...
Realize intersubjectivity requires accepting differences and not to imposing others
2.
Appreciate the talents of persons with disabilities and those from
the underprivileged sectors of society
3.
Explain that authentic dialogue means accepting others even if they are different
from themselves
4.
Perform activities that demonstrate the talents of persons with disabilities and
those from the underprivileged sectors of society
(The above , The Philosophy of the human person, for a Department of Education/schools,
consists of 21 pages, this section is from their intersubjectivity paragraph.)

Intersubjectivity - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersubjectivity
Intersubjectivity is a term used in philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology to ...
Self-presentation, lying, practical jokes, and social emotions, for example, all entail not a
shared definition of the situation but partially shared ...
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Intersubjectivity is a term used in philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology to

represent the psychological relation between people. It is usually used in contrast to
solipsistic individual experience, emphasizing our inherently social being.

Contents

 1 Definition
 Social psychologists Alex Gillespie and Flora Cornish list at least six definitions of
intersubjectivity (and other disciplines have additional definitions).[1]
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 In its weakest sense, intersubjectivity refers to agreement. There is intersubjectivity

between people if they agree on a given set of meanings or a definition of the
situation. Similarly, Thomas Scheff defines intersubjectivity as "the sharing of
subjective states by two or more individuals."[2]
 More subtly intersubjectivity can refer to the common-sense, shared meanings
constructed by people in their interactions with each other and used as an everyday
resource to interpret the meaning of elements of social and cultural life. If people
share common sense, then they share a definition of the situation.[3]
 The term has also been used to refer to shared (or partially shared) divergences of
meaning. Self-presentation, lying, practical jokes, and social emotions, for example,
all entail not a shared definition of the situation but partially shared divergences of
meaning. Someone who is telling a lie is engaged in an intersubjective act because
they are working with two different definitions of the situation. Lying is thus
genuinely intersubjective (in the sense of operating between two subjective
definitions of reality).[citation needed]
 Intersubjectivity emphasizes that shared cognition and consensus is essential in
shaping our ideas and relations. Language, quintessentially, is viewed as
communal rather than private. Therefore, it is problematic to view the individual as
partaking in a private world, one whose meaning is defined apart from any other
subjects. But in our shared divergence from a commonly understood experience, these
private worlds of semi-solipsism naturally emerge.
 Intersubjectivity can also be understood as the process of psychological energy(?)
moving between two or more subjects. In a room where someone is lying on their
deathbed, for example, the room can appear enveloped in a shroud of gloom for
people interacting with the dying person. The psychological weight of one subject
comes to bear on the minds of others depending on how they react to it, thereby
creating an intersubjective experience that, without multiple consciousnesses
interacting with each other, would be otherwise strictly solitary. Love is a prime
example of intersubjectivity that implies a shared feeling of care and affection, among
others

 2 In psychoanalysis
 3 In philosophy
o 3.1 Phenomenology
 4 In psychology
 5 In child development
o 5.1 Across cultures
 6 See also
 7 References
 8 Further reading
o 8.1 Psychoanalysis
o 8.2 Philosophy
 Contemporarily, intersubjectivity is a major topic in both the analytic and the
continental traditions of philosophy. Intersubjectivity is considered crucial not only
at the relational level but also at the epistemological and even metaphysical
levels. For example, intersubjectivity is postulated as playing a role in establishing
the truth of propositions, and constituting the so-called objectivity of objects.
40

 A central concern in consciousness studies of the past 50 years is the so-called

problem of other minds, which asks how we can justify our belief that people have
minds much like our own and predict others' mind-states and behavior, as our
experience shows we often can.[10] Contemporary philosophical theories of
intersubjectivity need to address the problem of other minds.
 In the debate between cognitive individualism and cognitive universalism, some
aspects of thinking are neither solely personal nor fully universal. Cognitive sociology
proponents argue for intersubjectivity—an intermediate perspective of social
cognition that provides a balanced view between personal and universal views of our
social cognition. This approach suggests that, human beings subscribe to " instead of
being individual or universal thinkers, human beings belong to thought
communities"—communities of differing beliefs. (sub-cultures, such as
schools/movemnets in disciplines, such as philosophy, art, sociology etc)Thought
community (sub-cultures) examples include churches, professions, scientific beliefs,
generations, nations, and political movements.[11] This perspective explains why each
individual thinks differently from each another (individualism): person A may choose
to adhere to expiry dates on foods, but person B may believe that expiry dates are
only guidelines and it is still safe to eat the food days past the expiry date. But not all
human beings think the same way (universalism).
 Intersubjectivity argues that each thought community shares social experiences that
are different from the social experiences of other thought communities, creating
differing beliefs (values, attitudes, norms, assumptions eg of theoretical physics,
astrophysics, etc) among people who subscribe to different thought communities.
These experiences transcend our subjectivity, which explains why they can be shared
by the entire thought community.[12] Proponents of intersubjectivity support the view
that individual beliefs are often the result of thought community beliefs, not just
personal experiences or universal and objective human beliefs. Beliefs are recast in
terms of standards, (assumptions, values, norms, etc) which are set by thought
communities.(such as schools and movements in disciplines, socio-cultural practices,
etc)
 PHENOMENOLOGY
 Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, recognized the importance of
intersubjectivity, and wrote extensively on the topic. In German, his writings on
intersubjectivity are gathered in volumes 13–15 of the Husserliana. In English, his
best-known text on intersubjectivity is the Cartesian Meditations (it is this text that
features solely in the Husserl reader entitled The Essential Husserl). Although
Husserlian phenomenology is often charged with methodological solipsism, in the
fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl attempts to grapple with the problem of
intersubjectivity and puts forward his theory of transcendental, monadological
intersubjectivity.[13]
 Husserl's student Edith Stein extended intersubjectivity's basis in empathy in her 1917
doctoral dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy (Zum Problem der Einfühlung).
 Intersubjectivity also helps to constitute objectivity: in the experience of the world as
available not only to oneself, but also to the Other, there is a bridge between the
personal and the shared, the self and the Others.

o
 9 External links
 http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405124331_chunk_g9781405
12433115_ss1-69
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Intersubjectivity refers to a shared perception of reality between or among two or more

individuals. The term has been important in many aspects of sociology, from positivist and
postpositivist research methods to studies of the lived experiences of individuals by
ethnomethodologists and feminist scholars. The term presupposes that we, as human
beings, cannot know reality except through our own senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, or
tactile feeling. Accordingly, each individual's reality is necessarily subjective. We may extend
and refine those senses through measuring devices such as telescopes, scales, cameras, and
myriad other technologies, but ultimately each person's understanding of reality is
individually subjective. One cannot see “blue” except through one's own senses. With social
reality, we have even less certainty. It is easier to know that the sky is blue than it is to know
that “James likes me.” However, most individuals also understand that we cannot change
reality simply by thinking. Reality has an “obdurate” character ( Turner & Boynes 2002 ). If
one were to wake up and decide that “blue” is “yellow,” it would be clear that one could not
effect this change and make it real for many others. This is a duality of truths that presents a
problem for people interested in studying how people live their lives; neither objectivity nor
subjectivity is sufficient to ... log in or subscribe to read full text

http://phenomenologyblog.com/?p=712

Intersubjectivity can be described as a relationship between me and an other. The peculiarity

of this relationship lies in the fact that the other is not alien to me, but is “within me” in a way
that his or her “otherness” can be investigated beginning with the way in which that
“otherness” is imminent in my ego. The other’s otherness is present to me “in person,” in
Husserl’s terms.

For philosophy the problem is this: how can I give an account of something if it is completely
outside of and transcends my own nature? A phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity,
founded upon the recognition of the imminence of “otherness” offers a solution to the
problematic of the transcendence of objectivity. How can the other be present in my lived-
world? How can the world be an objective world though we are different living subjects?
How can we live in a society of shared values?

These questions can be answered through the use of the phenomenological method. Husserl
framed these questions as belonging to a “’sociological’ transcendental philosophy” (Husserl,
1968, p. 539) or a “transcendental sociology” (Husserl, 1966, p. 220). Husserl’s
phenomenological investigations of the lived-experience of a subject frame the subject as a
transcendental intersubjective unit. In contrast to the word transcendence, transcendental
refers to the essential nature of the subject.

We can inquire into this nature beginning with world as it is imminent in a subject’s
experience. For example if I want to look into my lived experience of thinking about
something, I can first take a specific lived experience of mine in which I am thinking about
my friend Anna; then I can analyze this lived experience phenomenologically in order to
explain its essential structure (philosophically). This kind of phenomenological method will
be particularly attentive to the presence of the other in my lived experience—in other words,
to reflect carefully on the way in which the other is present to me. In fact, when I think about
Anna, my thinking can be affected by multiple contexts—for example, the judgments of the
others about Anna or myself, or the education I received, which shapes my way of perceiving
and thinking about others. My lived experience will be not only mine, meaning it is never a
purely solitary experience, it always implicitly participates in intersubjectivity because it
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will be the outcome of an embodied, social and “en-worlded “experience. In that sense
phenomenological method has an access to the other’s “otherness” from inside; it digs into
the lived-experience of the subject in order to describe how the transcendent world appears to
us.

The volumes of Husserliana which we can read to gain a detailed idea of Husserl’s views on
this issue are: the Fifth Cartesian Meditation (Husserl, 1982), which sends us to Volume 8
(First Philosophy, Second Part & other important additions) and the Volumes from 13-15 of
the Husserliana (Husserl, 1973a-c), which are especially dedicated to intersubjectivity.

The sources Husserl borrowed to develop his theory of intersubjectivity are especially
indebted to Brentano (1973), Stein (1989) and Fink (1995). From Brentano he took the theory
of intentionality to explain the subject-object relationship and from Stein the notion of
empathy to clarify the manner in which we perceive otherness.

In what follows, I will focus firstly on the notion of intentionality, secondly on the
constitution of otherness and its objectivity, thirdly on the idea of ego and its life-world.

Intentionality or Living the Outside World

Generally speaking, intentionality is a term that dates back to the scholasticism of St.
Anselm. For Anselm (c. 1033-1109), intentionality denotes the difference between the objects
that exist in human understanding, and those that actually exist in the physical world. From
an etymological point of view, intentionality comes from Latin intendere, in English ‘to point
to’ or ‘aim at’. Brentano (1838 –1917) took this term and adapted it for his psychology to
describe the relationship between mental phenomena and physical objects. In fact for
Brentano intentionality was considered the hallmark of psychological phenomena. What is
remarkable to notice here is the continuity and the break between Husserl and Brentano’s
theories of intentionality. Both philosophers used this theory to explain the structure of
mental phenomena and pure consciousness, but they construed it differently.

As mentioned, for Brentano intentionality indicates the central property of every mental
phenomenon in reference to its content: conscious acts “intend” extra-mental objects. In
Brentano’s Psychology from Empirical Standpoint the author explains his viewpoint with the
following words:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called
the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not
wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be
understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon
includes something as object within itself, although they do not do so in the same way. In
presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (1973, p. 101)

The overall aim of Brentano’s book was to establish the philosophical foundations of
psychology as a science. Psychology represents a science whose data come from experience
and introspection – hence Brentano envisions psychology from an empirical standpoint.
Brentano thought that if psychology was to be established as a science, there had to be a
criterion that distinguishes its subject matter from the subject matter of physical (or natural)
science. The intentional relationship was the main feature of any psychological experience
43

and it clarifies how an object is intended by a psychological subject. Though Brentano did not
address the issue of intersubjective intentional experience, his theory is also useful in
explaining that class of lived experiences.

Husserl borrowed Brentano’s notion of intentionality and interpreted it from a subject-

directed perspective. For Husserl intentionality is not the intentional in-existence of the object
within the consciousness; instead, it describes the relationship of a subject to the objects of
consciousness. Despite the similarities between Husserl and Brentano concerning the role
played by the intentional essence as a key to explain the general structure of subjective lived
experience, Husserl partly moves away from the definition of intentionality provided by his
master. While Brentano considers intentionality as a hallmark of psychological objects,
Husserl defines it as a characteristic of the manner in which subjects intend objectivities. For
this reason Husserl calls intentional acts “objectifying acts,” because they are able to
objectify or present objects to the subject within consciousness (Husserl, 1970, 314). In the
case of a melody, for example, to intend it means the melody must be present to me. For
Husserl every intentional act is objectifying because it makes an object present for
consciousness. Intersubjective intentionality is a kind of intentionality in which another
person is made present to me within my lived experience thanks to a specific kind intentional
essence that I am going to address next.

Generally speaking, Husserl claims that the “intentional essence is made up of the two
aspects of matter and quality” (1970, p. 251). Quality is the way in which a content is given
to consciousness, and matter corresponds to the content of the act. “Quality (…) has guided
us since we formed the Idea of matter – while the same object remains differently present to
consciousness. One may think, e.g., of equivalent positing presentations, which point by way
of differing matters to the same object” (Husserl, 1970, p. 52). Indeed we might evaluate,
love or just perceive the same matter once it is given us, in consciousness, by a presentation.
Within intersubjective intentionality the other is perceived in the form of empathy. The
quality by which I can form in my mind the idea of otherness is that of feeling myself ‘in the
shoes’ of the other (en-paschein – “to feel in”). In the next paragraph I will describe the
process of empathizing, phenomenologically.

Empathy and the Experience of the Otherness

While intentionality describes the conscious relatedness of the subject and the world,
empathy helps us to understand – in everyday language – how I can put myself “in the shoes”
of someone else. In particular, I want to focus on a key term in Stein’s doctoral thesis on
empathy supervised by Husserl (Stein, 1989): iterated empathy. This term concept enables us
to give an account of the sense of the other’s experience as somehow my own. In
phenomenological terms, how is it possible for me to ascribe the intentional acts of another
person to myself—as if I were living the other’s intentional acts?

According to Husserl, the steps describing my contact with the lived-experience of the other
are the following: I live the world, for the most part, within a natural attitude. In this attitude
I do not experience myself as a solipsistic, self-contained unit, but rather as a part of a
community where others are continually in touch with and affecting my lived-experience and
shaping the way I am aware not only of others but of myself. For this reason I undergo a
process that Husserl calls communarization (Vergemeinschaftung) whereby the second ego—
44

the ego of another person—appears to my first primordial ego as similar to mine. In the
process of communarization I realize that I am a community of persons though I am just me
along with my own lived-experience (Erlebnisse). To put in act this process I engage in what
Husserl calls analogical apprehension whereby the other, who is present (Paarung) to me as
a fellow human being is mirrored in my experience, meaning that I can perceive the other
because he is similar and dissimilar to me. Moreover, I recognize the truthfulness of my
perceptions of the other person thanks to their changes and possibilities. In fact, Husserl
speaks of a harmonious synthesis (Einstimmigkeitssynthese), a synthesis by which I can
confirm or deny the always changing presentations I can have of the other. Now, let us
explain all these steps in more detail.

Husserl writes: “the other man is constitutionally the intrinsically first man” (Husserl 1982 §
55, p. 124). In fact when I perceive another person, the other is genetically constituted in the
midst of my own, flowing experience within the natural attitude, which means that my
perception of the other is not posited “before” or “after” my self-presence, but it blossoms as
a natural experience alongside my self-presence. In my own simple living and perceiving, the
other appears as natural part of my being-in-the world: one could almost say, as a companion.
Perhaps for this reason Husserl describes the relation using the term “pairing” (Paarung),
which I will address below. This very first experience is called by Husserl “communarization
(Vergemeinschaftung)” to indicate this originary mode of living in which no ego (not even
myself) remains absolutely singular.

In this monadological intersubjectivity “the second ego [the other] is not simply there, and
strictly given to himself; rather is he constituted as ‘alter ego’ – the ego indicated as one
moment by this expression being I myself in my owness” (Husserl 1982 § 44, p. 94). The
other appears via a pairing (Paarung), that is via its external presence as an animate organism
(Leib) that is similar to mine. When I perceive this organism analogous to me, I live an
analogical apprehension that enables me to recognize myself as a human being partaking in a
humanity that is shared with others. “The analogy is not in full force and effect (voll); it is an
indication, not an anticipation (Vorgriff) that could become a seizure of the self (Selbstgriff)”
(Husserl 1972, p. 87).

In this analogical apprehension the other lives within my lived-experience as a ‘mirroring’

(Spiegelung) of my own self and yet not a mirroring proper, an analogue of my own self and
yet again not an analogue in the usual sense” (Husserl 1982 § 44, p. 94). Therefore the ego
and the alter ego are always – and necessarily – given in a primal “pairing”, as the
(transcendental) condition of any analogical apprehension and any later mirroring of the
other. Thus the mirroring we speak of is not the static re-presentation of my own solitary self,
duplicated or projected, so to speak, on the passive screen of the other: rather, this mirroring
is a simultaneous opening to similarity and difference in the midst of interrelatedness and
commonality. Intersubjectivity is no mere opening to a discrete other or a recognition of
myself in isolation; rather, as Khosrokhavar (2001) has written, intersubjectivity is the ego’s
opening to the world of others, as such.

“The experienced animate organism (Leib) of another continues to prove itself as actually
(wirklich) an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious “behavior”
(Gebaren). Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side that indicates something
psychic appresentatively) must present (auftreten) itself fulfillingly in original experience,
and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from phase to phase”. (Husserl 1982
§ 52, p. 114 sq.)
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Another key word to describe the intersubjective community is “harmonious synthesis”

(Einstimmigkeitssynthese). This concept, borrowed from Brentano’s inner perception,
describes the intersubjective constitution of otherness, which is accompanied by a feeling of
consistency. Via this kind of synthesis I can be sure that what I perceive in the world
genuinely corresponds to what is there. In fact, this synthesis is the foundation of my ability
to recognize whether or not there is consistency within my perceptions, in the midst of the
dynamic flow of my conscious acts and other’s movements in everyday experience. For
example, if I see a dog crossing the street and suddenly I hear the dog meowing, there is an
immediate disjuncture among my perceptions that conveys to me that I misperceived the
identity of the animal! There is something in my synthesis that does not match my earlier
apprehension—exemplifying the way in which perception is always engaged in self-
correction.

“Everything [is] alien (as long as it remains within the apprehended horizon of concreteness
that necessarily goes with it). [It] centers in an apprehended Ego who is not I myself but,
relative to me, a modificatum: another Ego” (Husserl 1982§ 52, pp. 115-6). I perceive the
otherness only when I appresent it to my ego, that is when I intend it by an epistemological
intentional act. “The identity-sense of ‘my’ primordial Nature and the presentiated other
primordial Nature is necessarily produced by the appresentation and the unity that it, as
appresentation, necessarily has with the presentation cofunctioning for it this appresentation
by virtue of which an Other and, consequently, his concrete ego are there for me in the first
place. Quite rightly, therefore, we speak of perceiving someone else arid then of perceiving
the Objective world, perceiving that the other Ego and I are looking at the same world, and so
forth though this perceiving goes on exclusively within the sphere of my ownness” (Husserl
1982 § 55, pp. 123-4).

Therefore the objective world and mutual existence of the others can be attained by virtue of
this harmonious confirmation of apperceptive constitution. I intend the other within a specific
horizon of functionings and peculiarities but these presentations have to be continuously
confirmed or corrected in the flow of my new, intersubjective experiences of it. In this way,
apperception is in a continuous, open-ended process of adjustment and correction.
Harmoniousness is also preserved by virtue of “a recasting of apperceptions through
distinguishing between normality and abnormalities (as modifications thereof), or by virtue of
the constitution of new unities throughout the changes involved in abnormalities” (Husserl
1982 § 55, 125 sq.) The mutual relations characterizing each member of the monadological
community involve an “objectivating equalization” (Gleichstellung) (Husserliana 1982 § 56,
p. 129) of the existence of the ego and the others “I, the ego, have the world starting from a
performance (Leistung), in which […] constitute myself, as well as my horizon of others and,
at the same time (in eins damit), the homogeneous community of ‘us’ (Wir-Gemeinschaft) ;
this constitution is not a constitution of the world, but an actualization which could be
designated as “monadization of the ‘ego’ – as actualization of personal monadization, of
monadical pluralization” (Husserliana VI, 417).

Intersubjective Reduction and Lifeworld

At the end of the fourth text in Husserliana XV Husserl writes “starting from
intersubjectivity, it is possible to establish the intersubjective reduction by placing between
brackets the world in itself and thus achieving the reduction to the universe of the
intersubjective that includes in itself all that is individually subjective” (1973c, 69; Husserl
1972, 188 sq., p. 272). The very first beginning of a phenomenological intersubjective
46

analysis is given by reduction. The reduction designates the inquirer’s passage from a natural
attitude, in which the subject naively participates in the world, to a phenomenological attitude
in which the subject reflects upon what he already lived and is living in order to discern the
essence of a lived-experience (Erlebnisse).

In § 44 of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl explains reduction as a ‘primordial’ act of

putting out of play any constitutive function of intentionality not as reported by another
subjectivity but in reference to the “primordial sphere” of the inquirer’s ego, in its irreducible
immanence, that is, to the intentional sphere – actual and potential – in which the inquirer’s
ego is constituted in its “peculiar ownness” (eigen). This reduction is different from the
classical phenomenological reduction. While the latter brings us back to the constitutive
transcendental subjectivity, the former (that implies the latter) should be understood as a
“dismantling reduction” (Abbaureduktion) that aims at revealing the original sense of the
inquirer’s ego as such—that is, to witness the phenomenon of I-ness.

In fact, the ego that stands out to the inquirer by means of this reduction is an Ur-ich, a
primordial ego (Husserliana VI, p. 188). “In my spiritual ownness, I am nevertheless the
identical Ego-pole of my manifold ‘pure’ subjective processes, those of my passive and
active intentionality, and the pole of all the habitualities instituted or to be instituted by those
processes” (Husserl 1982 § 44, p. 98).

According to Husserl’s phenomenological theory every ego seems to live many (dimensions
or perspective of/on) lives at once; or put differently, to exemplify multiple modes of being-
an-I simultaneously. The ego can be said to live at least three lives at the same time: an
immanent, transcendental and intersubjective life. In the first one the ego lives according to
the natural attitude thanks to which it acquires sense data. Through employing the reduction,
it puts in bracket all that does not belong to its own intentional life to recover habitualities
and sedimentations constituted as “abiding convictions” (bleibende Überzeugungen), which
determine the Self as a concrete egoic pole and the “transcendent objects” (given either
actually or potentially). Finally the intersubjective ego is the ego given after the reduction. In
this life the ego discovers itself not as a solipsistic unit or a monad but as an intersubjective
unit. All that belongs to its lived-experience is mingled with and inextricable from the lived-
experiences of others. Thus, the second transcendental ego is only a limited aspect—one
might almost say a profile—of the third, transcendental intersubjective ego, but at the same
time the former grounds (fundiert) the latter.

The relation between the transcendental ego and other egos is also strengthened by the
apperception of the world (Weltapperzeption). In fact the transcendental ego constitutes the
world as a phenomenon thanks to its intentional activity. Since the transcendental ego is
fundamentally one with the intersubjective and immanent ego, the constitution of the world is
an intersubjective constitution in which the world is always intrinsically a lifeworld shared by
an intersubjective community. It itself is a part of the explication of the intentional
components (Bestände) implicit in the fact of the experiential world that exists for us.
(Husserl 1982 § 49, p. 108).

In the first volume of Ideas Husserl had already introduced this concept under the heading of
Umwelt to mean a surrounding natural world, and it is only after writing the Cartesian
Meditation and most of all in the Crisis that Husserl elaborates a proper “Umweltanalyse” to
explicate the idea of an objective world shared within the intersubjective life of a living
47

community. (Husserliana, vol. IV, p. 222; Husserl 1989, p. 234). To explain the layers of this
lifeworld (Lebenswelt), Husserl gives the following example:

“I see coal as heating material; I recognize it and recognize it as useful and as used for
heating, as appropriate for and as destined to produce warmth. […] I can use [a combustible
object] as fuel; it has value for me as a possible source of heat. That is, it has value for me
with respect to the fact that with it I can produce the heating of a room and thereby pleasant
sensations of warmth for myself and others. […] Others also apprehend it in the same way,
and it acquires an intersubjective use-value and in a social context is appreciated and is
valuable as serving such and such a purpose, as useful to man, etc.” (Husserl, 1976, pp.
186f.).

Our world is a “subjective-relative lifeworld”. We cannot even conceive something that

transcends us in a strict sense—because that “something,” if it could not be shared with a real
or potential “we,” could not be grasped by consciousness in the first place. In other words, we
would not be capable of intending it—in the simplest terms, we would not be able to speak
about it. Our intended world is the “grounding soil” within which a more objective (or better,
intersubjective) world of community and science is co-constituted (Husserl, 1976, p. 134).
This is the only soil within which we simultaneously discover and shape our multi-tiered,
(many levelled and multi-dimensional!!) intersubjective life.

References

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McAlister (trs.) 1973. London: Routledge. (Original: Brentano, F. 1874. Psychologie von
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Brentano, F. 1952. The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, E. Hughes Schneewind (ed.),
London: Routledge London, 1973 ( Original: Brentano, F. 1952. Grundlegung und Aufbau
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Caston, V. 2002. Aristotle on Consciousness, Mind 111, 751-815.

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Method. Edited by R. Bruzina, Indiana University Press, 1995.
48

Husserl, E. 1900, 1901, 1913 & 1921. Logical investigations, 2 vols. Edited by J. N. Findlay,
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Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918-1926. [Analyses of passive synthesis. From lectures and
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The Hague/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983.

Husserl, E. 1925, Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester. 1925.

[Phenomenological psychology. Lectures from the summer semester. 1925]. Edited by
Walter Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1968.

Husserl, E. 1936, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. [The Crisis of
European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy. An introduction to phenomenology].
Edited by Walter Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.

Husserl, E. 1911-21, Aufsätze und Vorträge. 1911-21 [Essays and Lectures. 1911-1921].
Edited by Thomas Nenon und Hans Rainer Sepp, 1987.

Husserl, E. 1905-20, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass.
Erster Teil. 1905-1920. [On the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Texts from the estate.
Part 1. 1905-1920]. Edited by Iso Kern. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973a.

Husserl, E. 1921-28, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texteaus dem Nachlass.

Zweiter Teil. 1921-28. [On the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Texts from the estate.
Second part. 1921-28]. Edited by Iso Kern. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973b.

Husserl, E. 1929-35, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass.
Dritter Teil. [On the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Texts from the estate. Third part.
1929-35]. Edited by Iso Kern. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973c.

Husserl, E. Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology. Translated by Dorion

Cairns. Seventh impression. The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982.

Khosrokhavar, F. 2001. L’instance du sacre: Essay de foundation des sciences sociales.

Paris: Les Editions du Cerf.

Kriegel, U. 2003. Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an

Argument. Canandian Journal of Philosophy 33, 103-132.

McIntyre, R. Smith, D. W. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality. A study of Mind, Meaning and
Language, Dordrecht and London.

Moran, D. 1996. Brentano’s Thesis, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary

70, 1-27.
49

Morrison, J. C. 1970. Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality, Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 31, 27-46.

Rollinger, R. D. 1999. Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano,

Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Smith, Q. 1976. Husserl and the Inner Structure of Feeling-Acts. Research in Phenomenology
6 (1), 84-104.

Stein, E. 1917. On the Problem of Empathy. Washington: ICS Publications, 1989

http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/research/n236.xml

Intersubjectivity refers to shared understanding. (and what does shared?? And

understanding mean here?) Drawing on the philosophical notion of subjectivity (i.e., that
meaning is necessarily colored by one's experiences and biases), intersubjectivity recognizes
that meaning is based on one's position of reference and is socially mediated (Habermas’s
communicative competence) through interaction. In other words, knowing is not simply the
product of individual minds in isolation. In qualitative research, inter-subjectivity not only
points to the ways in which we share understanding with others but also indicates that
meaning and understanding lie along a continuum of mutual intelligibility. This notion is of
particular interest to researchers who study verbal social interactions in general. In various
modes of research on discursive processes, shared ways of knowing are of particular interest
in trying to reveal analytic positions on the

http://www.owenkelly.net/2439/intersubjectivity-a-working-definition/

Over the last few weeks I have been trying to arrive at a definition of the relationship
between three related terms: subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity.

This is an initial draft of that definition.

Objectivity An objective truth asserts about a phenomenon that it would be true (meaning?)
regardless of the views of anyone perceiving or reflecting upon it, and regardless of whether
there was anyone to perceive or reflect upon it. Thus, we believe that the assertion that the
Earth is a globe that orbits the Sun to be objectively true, and thus we assert that it was true
even when people wrongly believed that the Earth was flat and stationary at the centre of the
universe.

Subjectivity A subjective truth asserts a truth held by an individual, and thus provides
information about that individual rather than about the world-at-large. It expresses an opinion
or a point of view. If, for example, I assert that jazz and abstract painting are both intellectual
con-tricks, and I mean what I say, then this tells an onlooker a truth about me rather than
about jazz or painting. It enables the onlooker to locate me on their own mental map, and
may give them insights into my personal approach to the world-at-large.

Intersubjectivity

An intersubjective truth asserts a “fact” that a group of people agree implicitly to treat as
axiomatic (self-evident or unquestionable.), and as though it were (as if) an objective truth.
50

All moralities and collections of “common sense” are thus sets of intersubjective truths.
Cows “are” indisputably sacred where belief in their sacredness is held to be intersubjectively
true, and eaten where it is not. The second paragraph of the American Declaration of
Independence begins “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”. This constitutes an intersubjective truth used as
though objectively true, in order to form the axioms upon which the rest of the constitution
can be built.

Notes

The basis of any assertion of objective truth is that there exists an external world that does not
depend on us for its existence, and that will continue to exist whether or not we are there to
observe it. Thoroughgoing relativists, who do not accept the existence of a world-out-there,
might argue that such a belief in objectivity is itself merely an intersubjective truth.

Intersubjectivity does not bear any relationship to solipsism. A solipsist would have to argue
against the possibility of both objectivity and intersubjectivity.

Religious fundamentalists, and anyone else who believes in divine revelation, might argue
that the only possible truth is the One Divinely Revealed (and thus objective) Truth, and that
both subjectivity and intersubjectivity are merely examples of sin or hubris, or both.

http://sociologyindex.com/intersubjectivity.htm

Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity is shared understanding that helps us relate one situation to

another. Sociologists who reject the assumption of the objective nature of social reality
and focus on the subjective experience of actors have to avoid reducing the world only to
personal experience. Intersubjectivity that aims at fusion with the other is too narrow to
account for the constitution of subjectivity and subjectivism.

Through intersubjectivity ordinary people as well as sociologists assume that if

another stood in their shoes they would see (almost , approximately the) the
same things. We all make our subjective experience available and understandable
to others. What might constitute intersubjective relations during infancy and early
childhood remains a puzzle within and beyond psychology.

Intersubjectivity implies that students are tasked with discovering how to build
knowledge and instructors are tasked with guiding students in these processes.
The inference to other minds by analogy with one's own is unconvincing, yet all
our social interaction assume we can identify others' belief and intentions.

(Below are a number of useful and helpful differentiations and definitions of

‘types’ of intersubjectivity)

Patterns of Intersubjectivity in the Constitution of Subjectivity:

Dimensions of Otherness
Nelson Ernesto Coelho, Jr., Luís Claudio Figueiredo
51

Four matrices are described through references to their proponents: (a) trans-
subjective intersubjectivity (Martin Heidegger); (b) traumatic intersubjectivity
(Emmanuel Levinas); (c) interpersonal intersubjectivity (George Herbert Mead);
and (d) intrapsychic intersubjectivity (Sigmund Freud). Intersubjective
dimensions are understood as indicating dimensions of otherness.

Constitution of the Self: Intersubjectivity and Dialogicality

Ivana Marková, University of Stirling, Scotland, UK - Culture & Psychology, Vol. 9,
No. 3, 249-259 (2003)
The polysemic nature of intersubjectivity stems not only from diverse pursuits
and goals but also from different ontologies of intersubjectivity.

Intersubjectivity and Temporal Reference in Television Commentary

Stephanie Marriott - Time & Society, Vol. 4, No. 3, 345-364 (1995)
Television commentary gives rise to an electronically mediated intersubjectivity.

The Achievement of Intersubjectivity through Embodied Completions: A

Study of Interactions Between First and Second Language Speakers -
Junko Mori, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Makoto Hayashi, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Applied Linguistics
2006 27(2).
The coordination of vocal and non-vocal resources that are brought to bear on the
achievement of intersubjectivity.

(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1080/03640210701530763/full

Representation, Interaction, and Intersubjectivity

What the participants share, their common “sense” of the world, creates a foundation, a
framing, an orientation that enables human actors to see and act in coordination with one
another. For recurrent activities, the methods the participants use to understand each other
as they act change, making the intersubjective space in which actors operate richer and
easier to produce. This article works through some of the issues that emerge from a close
examination of intersubjectivity as it is managed through representation and interaction.
The data that are presented document, in detail, a sequence of related interactions, within
and across episodes of cooperation, where continuity and change can be observed. The
emergence of conversational structure and coordinating representations are significant
milestones in the long-term development of a representational practice that support the
runtime co-construction of intersubjective space. Conversational structures emerge
interactively to mediate recurrent points of coordination in the domain activity, and only
secondarily the conversation itself. Coordinating representations change the
representational practice of the participants by making it easier to manage their “shared
view” of the collective work, enabling the participants to make progress, expand the field of
the common activity, while exhibiting more control of if and when explicit grounding occurs.

1. Introduction

There is an unspoken commonness to any situation that provides the background, the framing
that enables humans to understand each other and their shared field of activity, and to work
together effectively. The participants' common “sense” of the situation creates a foundation, a
framing, an orientation that enables human actors to see and act in coordination with one
another. Without intersubjectivity there is no human communication, no accumulation of
knowledge within a community across generations, and no emergence of complex patterns of
52

social interaction. Intersubjectivity—literally “between subjects”—is arguably the organic

structure of human cognition (Clark, 1996; Cole & Engeström, 1993; Hutchins, 1995a;
Lenot'ev, 1972; Schegloff, 1992; Schutz, 1967; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993;
Vygotsky, 1978).

A representational account of intersubjectivity features an analysis of either the functioning

of a set of representations (Hutchins, 1995a) or the content of, and correlation among, the
participants' prior and emergent understandings of the situation as they are internally
represented (Clark, 1996; Lewis, 1969). An interactionist account locates intersubjectivity in
the production and use of representations, not the content itself (Clark, 1996; Garfinkel, 1967;
Schegloff, 1992). A cultural historic account of intersubjectivity closely examines the
historical character of the participants' shared activities and the role of mediation (Cole &
Engeström, 1993; Hutchins, 1995a; Lenot'ev, 1972; Vygotsky, 1978).

The study reported in this article examines how a “common” sense of the situation emerges
among the participants while engaged in a cooperative activity in a work-like context. The
participants are working in a rich representational environment. The participants are
multitasking, sometimes working in parallel, and other times closely with a joint focus. The
dynamic nature of the participants' task to share the world as they act makes each occasion of
cooperation different (Lave, 1991; Suchman, 1986). Thus, at various points of the
cooperation, the participants must make adjustments that enable them to align their private
views of the situation.

The main task of this article is to work through some of the issues that emerge from a close
examination of intersubjectivity as it is managed through representation and interaction. By
embedding “conversation” in the context of the overall activity, some important features of
how interaction and representation produce a runtime commonality to the situations will be
revealed. The interaction among the actors, and their common representational activities,
enable the participants to multitask, work in parallel, divide their tasks by role and expertise,
and vary their level and type of participation both within the activity and across teams. The
data will show that in work-like environments, the co-construction of intersubjective space is
as much about how the participants develop their representational practice to avoid jointly
focused, sequential grounding interactions, as it is about the grounding itself.

The data document, in detail, a sequence of related interactions, within and across episodes of
cooperation, where continuity and change can be observed. The analysis of the data shows
that methods used by participants to “stay on the same page” in a conversation are not the
same as those that are used in more work-like domains where multitasking and forms of
interaction other than face-to-face are common. Because of dynamics, whatever common
procedures emerge, there are points of coordination, moments of interaction between the
participants, where the participants mark, confirm, or negotiate the progress of their private
understandings of the shared endeavor (Alterman & Garland, 2001). Conversational
structures emerge interactively to mediate recurrent points of coordination in the domain
activity, and only secondarily the conversation itself. Coordinating representations change
the representational practice of the participants by making it easier to manage their “shared
view” of the collective work, enabling the participants to make progress, expand the field of
the common activity, while exhibiting more control of if and when explicit grounding occurs.
Both conversational structure and coordinating representations are significant elements of the
common representational practice that emerges within the community in support of
managing the development of common understanding at runtime, making the intersubjective
53

space in which the actors operate richer and easier to produce and reducing the number of
occasions when explicit sequential grounding interactions must occur.

2. Representation and interaction

Suppose there are multiple actors approaching a stop sign at an intersection in the road. The
stop sign is a physical object at the scene of the activity and both parties attend to it. The stop
sign has meaning. The meaning assigned to it has bearing on the coordination of the
cooperative activity. As sense is made of the situation, the stop sign mediates the interaction.

In a situation like this, each individual brings to bear a tremendous amount of knowledge.
Although each participant, on a standardized test, could identify the traffic laws, the internal
representation of each participant is not likely to be a rote memorization of the law. In
addition to basic information about the traffic laws on stopping, each participant is also
familiar with conventions for acting, under various conditions, when a stop sign is in force at
an intersection in the road. Other kinds of relevant knowledge for which each actor has a
mental representation concern the types of participants in a traffic situation (other drivers,
cyclists, and pedestrians) and expectations about typical behaviors, rolling stops versus legal
stops, rush hour traffic, and so forth.

Only a selection of general knowledge is directly relevant to the sense made of a particular
encounter. Road constraints, the heaviness of traffic, and time constraints are all nuances of
the situation-at-hand that influence how and what sense is individually made of the situation
by each of the actors.

For a traditional cognitive scientist explaining what is common in the sense that is made by
each of the participants depends on an accounting of mental content. Individual beliefs about
the collaborative field of action compose the intersubjective space in which the actors
operate. The predispositions and expectations of the participants, their quality, number, and
correlation characterize the richness of the intersubjective space prior to the activity. To
coordinate behavior, each actor's beliefs about the structure of the behavior must be aligned.
The commonness of the sense that is made depends on the degree to which each individual's
understanding of the situation—as it is internally represented—correlate; or alternately, the
commonness depends on the amount of work it takes to align the private understandings of
the individuals to accomplish some cooperative task.

A simple version of the representational viewpoint might argue that the commonness of each
participant's assessment of their shared domain of activity is an intersection between their
individual internal representations of the situation: what is in common is either located in the
intersection of each actor's general knowledge, or in the intersection of the set of beliefs of
each of the participants.

Interactionist accounts begin with the idea that a simple representational account of
intersubjectivity cannot work (Garfinkel, 1967). Intersecting sets of internal representations
cannot account for the commonality of the situation. Rather, the focus should be on the
organization and flow of social interaction that produces a common understanding. “The
appropriate image of a common understanding is therefore an operation rather than a
common intersection of overlapping set” (p. 30).
54

From this perspective, an explanation of intersubjectivity should focus on the procedures by

which “doers of action” produce shared knowledge (Schegloff, 1992, p. 1299):

Instead, what seemed programmatically promising was a procedural sense of “common” or

“shared,” a set of practices by which actions and stances could be composed in a fashion
which displayed grounding in, and orientation to, “knowledge held in common”—knowledge
that might thereby be reconfirmed, modified, expanded and so on.

(p. 1298)

The participants can never directly compare their mental representations of their individual
sense of the situation. Intersubjectivity is located in the procedure the participants use to
display their orientation toward the collaboration. The organization of the interaction
provides the participants with opportunities to display, repair, and orient themselves as they
proceed with their activity.

The organization of ordinary conversation provides opportunities for the interactants to

display their understanding of the situation-at-hand and also recognize and repair breakdowns
of intersubjectivity (Schegloff, 1992). Conversation is sequential; the interactants take turns.
In the first position, a speaker presents a contribution to the conversation. In the second
position, other participants have an opportunity to display a response. In the third position,
the initial speaker can amend her presentation if it did not invoke a preferred response. In this
manner, it is the organization of the conversation, the organization of repair in
conversation—the interaction, not representation—that forms the basis, the framework of
analysis, for the intersubjective.

In a similar fashion, at the stop sign, the participants never really know exactly what the other
actors believe about the situation, but their actions can display an orientation to, a stance
toward, what is their presupposed common knowledge of situation.

A representational account is concerned with characteristics of the representations that are

produced. An interactionist account is concerned with the how the representation is produced.
The intersubjective space in which actors operate is located in both the production and
product of their work to share an understanding of the situation of engagement.

2.1. Common ground

Common ground provides a basis for collaborators to coordinate their joint activities (Clark,
1996). It is composed of three parts. The initial common ground is the set of background
facts, assumptions, and beliefs that are shared by the participants. The current state of the
activity is a second part of common ground. The third is the public events during the current
activity that the participants have witnessed.

Grounding is the method by which participants add new content to common ground (Clark,
1996; Clark & Brennan, 1991). Grounding occurs when “The contributor and his or her
partners mutually believe that the partners have understood what the contributor meant to a
criterion sufficient for current purposes” (Clark & Brennan, 1991, p. 129). Grounding
includes both presentation and acceptance phases and may require interaction to achieve
acceptance. One actor, A, presents an utterance u, with the expectation that during the
acceptance phase B will provide evidence that B understood u (Clark & Brennan, 1991).
55

There is a range of evidence that B can contribute that varies in the strength of evidence the
contribution provides (Clark & Schaefer, 1989). In general, the participants try to minimize
the total effort spent on their contribution in both the presentation and acceptance phases of
the interaction (principle of least collaborative effort).

Common ground is defined in terms of a belief about some proposition p: p is a part of

common ground for a set of actors if they all believe p and they believe that the other actors
also believe p and that those other actors believe that they believe p and so on. A more formal
definition of the grounding criteria introduces the notion that there is a basis b for the
participants to believe that p is a part of common ground (Clark & Marshall, 1981; Lewis,
1969).

In the situation at the stop sign, there is any number of propositions p that could be grounded
and there are points in the interaction where the participants take turns sequentially.
However, the participants also work in parallel and are multitasking. At some point in the
interaction the proposition p that “Joe is going first” is believed by each of the participants.
The grounding criteria are met when Joe and Sally mutually believe that “Joe is going first.”
The mutual belief of this proposition can come before either actor enters the intersection or it
could come after Joe has already entered the intersection.

Within the larger context of a work-like environment, there are various reasons why
grounding may need to be avoided, delayed, or both. The driving issue here is the cost of
grounding. In the context of a work-like environment, actors are working in parallel and
dividing the labor by kind. Both of these improve the performance of the group as a whole.
As a consequence of these divisions each of the actors ends up multitasking. From an
efficiency point of view, the problem with explicit grounding is that it halts the parallel
efforts of the group. Enabling participants to delay grounding improves performance by
reducing the number of costly interruptions in the activity. Even when sequential grounding
interactions occur they are mediated by conversational structures that are engineered by the
participants to mediate “the conversation” at expected points of recurrent coordination. These
conversational structures primarily organize the coordination of the domain activity, and only
secondarily the “conversation” itself.

2.2. Distributed cognition

Within the work context, the set of participants, the internal and external representations that
mediates their activity, form a historically conditioned and functional system. It emerges
from the modifications, changes, and improvements that have developed within a
community over time. Distributed cognition frames cognition in terms of this larger unit of
analysis: the entire collection of representational devices, content, and methods employed by
the participants at the scene of the activity (Hutchins, 1995a).

A representational system in which a collaborative activity develops has three parts:

 1A set of representational media available to the participants.

 2A set of internal or external, private or shared, representations including those provided in
the design of the task environment and ones created at runtime.
 3A set of procedures for communicating, recording, modifying, transcribing, and aligning
multiple, partial representations of the shared context.
56

On a given occasion of activity, each event triggers a propagation of representational

changes (Hutchins, 1995b; Hutchins & Klausen, 1992). An aircraft is ultimately controlled
by the movement of information across the various representational media available in the
cockpit. On board a Navy ship, navigation into the harbor is guided by a propagation of
information through various representational media (Hutchins, 1993; Hutchins, 1995a).

Some of the representational activity of the participants is directly relevant to the

maintenance of an intersubjective space, but not all. If one of the actors uses a calculator to
compute a sum, the activity is part of how the representational system functions, but not
directly relevant to the co-construction of intersubjective space.

In the classroom, during a lecture, the slides from the teacher's presentation, what was written
on the chalkboard, and the student's notes are all part of the representational system in which
the participants cooperate. Throughout the semester representations are being propagated
within the system. Decisions about whether to handout printed versions of a lecture before
the lecture have significant impact on the distribution, amount, and kinds of representational
work that are done. Learning can be modeled by the transformation of information from one
representation (the notes on the chalkboard) to other ones (the student's notes, the internal
memory of the student). During the semester some of the representational activities primarily
serve the function of keeping the participants “on the same page,” but not all.

The stop sign is part of the representational system that the participants use to negotiate the
flow of traffic at a busy intersection in the road. With increasing amounts of traffic, an
intersection that once could be traveled without incident may require an addition of a stop
sign—a change to the representational system—to enable the drivers and pedestrian to more
efficiently and effectively construct at runtime an intersubjective space in which to operate.

The participants in a work-like environment continue to reengineer their representational

activity so as to better support the co-construction of the intersubjective space. A focus of this
article will be on the coordinating representations, why they are introduced, and how they
function. The basic story is with coordinating representations the actors are better able to
manage when and how the intersubjective space emerges, enabling the participants to work in
parallel, delay and reduce the number and size of costly sequential interactions and
interruptions, while continuing to “stay on the same page.” With these innovations, individual
understandings may diverge for a period of time but common representational activities
evolve that support the recalibration of sense among the actors at a propitious time.

3. Case study

Collecting data that depends on recording a runtime interaction of the participants is not an
easy task. Detailed note taking is incomplete, labor intensive to collect, and by its very nature
interpretive. Technology has been used to collect interactional data that is more complete and
less dependent on the subjective interpretation of the author. In conversational analysis,
transcripts of recorded telephone conversations are used as data for analysis (Sacks,
Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). Video technology has also been used to collect detailed
interactional data (Suchman & Trigg, 1991). Both of these kinds of technology achieve
greater fidelity in the recording of the interaction.

There are problems, however, with using either of these technologies to collect data of the
sort that was needed to study the reciprocal and dynamic relationship between representation
57

and interaction in the runtime construction of an intersubjective space. Both kinds of

technology have very high transcription costs. Recorded telephone conversations would not
be sufficient for a study that analyzes how the design of a task environment mediates
cooperation. No matter how many videotapes are collected, there may still be relevant
activity that is occurring outside the purview of the camera. Collecting multiple videotapes
alleviates some of this problem but it also introduces a new one: The correlation of multiple
tapes is technically complicated and time consuming. Both of these technologies work best
by capturing a single episode of interaction. Neither of these technologies can be easily used
to conduct a study that strings together several snapshots of cooperative behavior in order to
capture the flow, growth, and development of intersubjective space for a set of recurrent
activities within a community of actors.

Over an extended period, my group at Brandeis has been experimenting with a same time–
different place groupware system (VesselWorld) as a platform for analyzing real–time,
computer mediated collaborations. All events that occur during a VesselWorld problem-
solving session are recorded in a log file by the system. Every mouse click, every event, and
every shared bit of information was recorded without bias within the transcript for a session.
Each transcript automatically included markings for different types of events—for example, a
“planning event” or a “chat event.” A VCR-like program (called SAGE) was built to review
the decision making of each group and examine how the participants in a VesselWorld
session coordinate their activities and the exchange of information (Landsman & Alterman,
2003). Because the data saved has an inherent structure, the analyst can search through the
data using any number of criteria; for example, he can move forward to the next
communication, round, plan action, or other such action within the system, allowing for an
easier review of the bulky data logs. VesselWorld was demonstrated at CSCW 2000
(Landsman, Alterman, Feinman, & Introne, 2001).

Using a transcript from an online collaboration is more complete than a study based on
videotaping because it automatically captures everything the participants shared with one
another. Because events are automatically marked on the transcript as being of a certain type,
it is significantly less time consuming to analyze the data. See Landsman (2006) for a further
discussion of this technology.

4. The base version of VesselWorld

We have built several versions of VesselWorld and collected over 100 hr of data. Several
formal studies comparing teams of participants using different versions of the VesselWorld
platform have been done. This article compares only two versions of the representational
system of VesselWorld: the basic system (VesselWorld) and VesselWorld+.

4.1. Task

In VesselWorld, three users, situated at three physically separate locations, engage in a set of
cooperative tasks that require the coordination of behavior in a simulated environment. In the
simulated world, each participant is the captain of a ship. Their joint task is to find and
remove barrels of toxic waste from a harbor and load them onto a large barge. Two of the
users operate cranes that can be used to lift toxic waste from the floor of the harbor. The third
user is the captain of a tugboat that can be used to drag small barges from one place to
another.
58

Segments of activity are divided into rounds; it takes at least six rounds of activity to move
from one end of the harbor to the other. During a round of activity, participants plan out their
future actions explicitly and then submit them to the system. They also chat with one another
and can access and store various kinds of information. Once a participant has submitted his or
her next action, he or she can no longer change it. When all three participants have submitted
actions, the round ends, the system updates the state of the world, and the next round begins.

There are many complications in clearing the harbor. The participants have limited (and non-
identical) areas of perception, and the harbor must be searched to discover the toxic waste.
Some barrels are large and require the two cranes to join together and lift them
simultaneously. What equipment is needed to retrieve a particular barrel can only be
determined by the Tug operator, and only when he is next to the barrel.

4.2. The representational system

A portion of the interface for the base system of VesselWorld is shown in Fig. 1. The
WorldView (the large window in Fig. 1 graphically represents several kinds of information
about the location and status of objects, from the perspective of an individual participant. It
depicts the harbor from the participant's point of view; only a limited region of the whole
harbor is visible at any one time—the shaded region in the figure. When two or more vessels
have overlapping radiuses of perception, the participants can “see” each other to the extent
that they know the other vessel(s) are nearby, but there is not sufficient detail to determine in
what sort of activity the other ship is engaged. The participants can “mark” their map with
labeled markers, but they cannot see each other's markers.
59

Figure 1.

 Open in figure viewer

 Download Powerpoint slide

The interface for the basic system.

A second window of information is used for editing and displaying the user's current plan. A
third window allows the user to access more detailed information about visible objects.
Textual chat is used as the primary method for participants to communicate with one another
during their cooperative activity.

Each event in VesselWorld triggers a propagation of representational changes (Hutchins &

Klausen, 1992). When a waste is first discovered, it is represented in the actor's WorldView.
The size of the waste and the coordinates of its location are re-represented in the chat window
and the marker lists of each participant. When the tug reports if special equipment is needed
to remove the waste there is another propagation of representation.

Fig. 2 shows a sampling of the rules each of the groups used to propagate representational
state in support of the handling of barrels of toxic waste and the representational work it
entails. Suppose Crane1 discovers a small waste (Waste19) at a particular location, 265/318.
When Crane1 reports her discovery via the chat channel to the other participants, knowledge
of the newly discovered domain object is shared. The location and size of the waste is
information represented in the WorldView. The discovery of the waste is reported in the chat
window; this requires a transcription from the WorldView to the chat window (Rule 1). It is
the responsibility of the other two actors to record this information by marking their private
maps (Rule 3).
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Figure 2.

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61

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Propagating representational state about wastes.

Fig. 3 gives some examples of the kind of chatting in which the participants engage. Most of
the participant dialogue is centered on the barrels of waste and how effort can be coordinated
in removing the barrels from the harbor and transporting them to the large barge. The
participants must also keep track of what areas of the harbor have (or have not) been
searched. The participants must discover and then keep track of the location of wastes.
Initially this is the location of a waste in the harbor; later this includes whether a waste has
been moved—and if so, where—and if it is on a small barge, in what order it was stacked.
References to the wastes must be shared; these references can change depending on the
circumstances.
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Figure 3.

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Examples of chatting.
63

5. What is grounded? How is it grounded?

Suppose the two cranes are about to remove an extra large waste (Waste25) from the harbor.
There are several coordination problems involved in the removal of the waste:

 •. Both cranes must be in close proximity of the waste.

 •. One of the cranes may need to deploy equipment before the lifting begins.
 •. During the same round of activity, the cranes must join together.
 •. During the same round of activity, the cranes must jointly lift the waste.

Each crane believes, in general, that an understanding of these requirements exists as a part of
their common knowledge. The common knowledge of the participants, general knowledge
about the structure of recurrent behaviors and expectations about certain actors or kinds of
actors, frames the intersubjective space in which the actors operate. The degrees to which the
expectations and assumptions align are predictive of how smoothly the cooperation will run.
A specific individual sense of how that structure plays out in the current situation is
constructed during the course of the activity.

For activity theory there are three levels to the analysis: activity level (the motive), the action
level (a set of goals to be achieved), and the operation level (how the actions are achieved;
Engeström, 1992; Kuutti, 1996). In VesselWorld, the activity level is to clear the harbor, the
actions are finding and removing the individual wastes, and the operations are the component
actions and how they are carried out using the interface.

When the cranes jointly lift a large waste from the harbor, what parts of the sense that the
participants individually make of the situation are grounded? Their motives are likely
grounded: this applies throughout the entire activity. Their specific goal to jointly remove a
particular waste at this particular time, is grounded in chat. However, at the operational level,
much of what the actors are doing is not specifically nor necessarily grounded. Even when
grounding occurs during a closely coupled action like a joint lift, it does not necessarily occur
independently, prior to the action; rather, it is achieved by the completion of the action itself.
In other words, the grounding occurs implicitly; it does not require an explicit grounding
activity vis-à-vis a conversation. This arrangement is economical as that explicitly grounding
vis-à-vis chat is labor intensive, requiring the actors stop working in parallel, jointly focus,
and interact “sequentially” to achieve common ground for a particular p.

On a specific occasion of lifting an extra large waste (Waste25), each of the cranes
formulates a plan for lifting that waste that draws on each crane's individual knowledge of
such a situation. Each actor's plan for the situation frames the sense that they make of the
situation. These plans are partially represented in the planning window. Whatever sense the
individual actors make of that situation will be framed by their intent as represented by the
plan. There are also points of coordination where the cranes intent must match else the
execution of their individual plans will result in a breakdown. However, it is not necessary
that the plans in their entirety be identical. During a cooperative lift, if one crane operator
needs to deploy equipment and the other does not, the plans will not be identical. During the
course of action, only the points of coordination are necessarily grounded. Others parts of
each actors sense of the situation are functionally equivalent, but not necessarily, not likely to
be, identical.
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Much of the joint lift may be accomplished without the participants explicitly chatting to
align their plans. Each of the cranes continues to act as the cooperative lift-and-carry is
achieved. Only if one or the other crane thinks they are “no longer on the same page” will the
actors jointly focus, engaging in a collaborative replanning vis-à-vis the chat. Because of the
representational system that mediates VesselWorld activity, there may never be a specific
point in time where the actors are jointly focused on a cooperative lift. There is a period of
time where they are both reasoning about the cooperative lift, but not necessarily a specific
moment when they are both tuned to the operation. In a conversation, the situation is just the
opposite: The participants are jointly focused on each contribution to the interaction, moment
by moment, in sequence.

During the period of time that an extra large waste is removed any number of other tasks
overlap and are interleaved with the execution of plans for other individual and cooperative
activities like adding a marker to a map. During the course of action, the participants are
monitoring all of their “open” plans to make sure things are proceeding as expected. Because
the actors are multitasking whatever monitoring they do of a particular cooperation is
interspersed with other activities, and consequently, there is no “official” second position or
next turn in which to confirm or initiate repair. Each actor must continuously monitor the
situation looking for evidence as to whether the current situation is running as expected or
can be explained given each of the individual's current plans for the situation. Therefore, if
Crane2 stops along the way to pick up a small waste, Crane1 can interpret that as consistent
with her plan to jointly lift an extra large waste with Crane2, or she may choose to initiate a
repair. Because of the multitasking nature of the VesselWorld domain, there is no official
point in the sequence of activity, a second position, in which she may choose to initiate a
repair.

In general, Crane1 believes that she can use Plan1 as a basis to continue to act if Plan1
accounts for (explains) the actions of Crane2 up to the current point of the interaction with
Crane2. If Crane2′s actions do not fit into the plan that mediates Crane1′s behavior, either a
new plan is independently created by Crane1 to internally mediate her behavior or a
communicative interaction is invoked to align private representations of the shared activity.
In either case, the newly constructed plan, as Crane1 conceives it, must both achieve Crane1′s
goal and account for Crane2′s actions.

6. Progress without grounding

For conversation it is the sequential nature of turn taking that dictates procedural
infrastructure of how the participants maintain the social order (Schegloff, 1991). During a
conversation the interactants are explicitly engaged in a joint sense-making task. The pace at
which sense is jointly made is one turn at a time, one after another. In a conversation, each
turn, every action, passes through an interactive process that cooperatively confirms some
sense for the contribution p (Clark, 1996). Where in a face-to-face conversation the
sequential nature of turn taking provides a basis for knitting together a common view of the
shared field of activity, for a multitasking mixed sequential and parallel cooperation like
VesselWorld the conventional representational activities of the participants is also part of the
procedural infrastructure for maintaining the social order.

Suppose Crane1 discovers a new waste (Waste19), adds a marker to her map, and reports it
on the chat channel.
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When the discovery of Waste19 is reported, the other participants may or may not
acknowledge they received the information. It sometimes happens that one of the actors fails
to record the information in a marker. Other times, all the participants mark their maps but
their marks are different. The data shows that in the normal case the marker lists of the
participants at best approximate one another. Many times those approximations are sufficient
for the actors to continue as if their markers were identical. There are also numerous
occasions, however, where interaction is required to clarify and align the private marker
representations of the actors.

When Crane 1 reports the discovery of Waste19 on the chat channel, she could believe:

 •. The other two participants add markers to their maps.

 •. The markers are the same.
 •. Because of multitasking, these criteria for making progress are too stringent. An alternate
set of requirements for continuing the action and making progress can be expressed in
terms of the representational system that mediates the ongoing collaboration:
 •. By adding a marker to her own map, the waste she discovered is adequately represented
in the representational system.
 •. To become a part of the intersubjective space, it is sufficient that the waste is “adequately
represented” in the representational system.

The addition of information about a newly discovered waste to the representational system is
a mark of progress but not necessarily an indication that the common ground of the
participants has accumulated. These requirements are sufficient for Crane1 to continue with
her other work with the knowledge that even in the problematic scenario the situation
although not preferable is workable.

The reason that Crane1 believes that Waste19 is part of the intersubjective space depends on
her understanding of the community's convention for distributing information about a newly
discovered waste within the representational system. For newly discovered wastes, the
distributed representational activity for maintaining an intersubjective space in which to
operate is:

 1The person who discovered the waste adds a marker to her or his map.
 2The waste is reported on the chat line by the person who discovered it.
 3Each of the other actors adds a marker for the newly discovered waste to his or her marker
list.

Crane1′s expectation is that if she does her part, the other participants will do theirs, and if
the others do not do their part the situation will be retrievable at a later point in the situation.
However, Crane1 also believes that Condition 1 is sufficient to make progress.

When Crane1 discovers Waste19, adds a marker to her map, and reports Waste19 on the chat
channel, she may move on to other activities without waiting for confirmation from the other
participants. Waste19 becomes a part of the intersubjective space of the VesselWorld actors
but does not necessarily become a part of common ground.
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7. Inventing conversational structure

Initially, in response to a breakdown, a conversational interaction occurs that realigns the

private understandings of the participants. In future situations, where one or another actor
anticipates the problem may recur, the actors will create a conversational structure to
organize the flow of the activity. Over time the actors expect that structure as an organization
of their activity at that point of the interaction. These conversational structures emerge at
recurrent points of coordination. Their primary function is to organize a domain activity.
Only secondarily do they organize the communication task.

Our everyday recurrent behaviors include conversational structure that is produced to mediate
routine conversational situations (Schegloff, 1986). For example, there is a core opening
sequence during the initial stages of a telephone conversation. Each participant has
knowledge of the core opening sequence in a telephone conversation. The expected structure
of the core opening sequence mediates the interaction at an anticipated point of interaction in
the opening of a telephone conversation, making it easier to more effectively initiate the
conversation. Each utterance serves a dual function: it communicates content and it helps the
actors to synchronize their activity as the step through the opening sequence. Thus, when a
secretary in the office picks up the phone and answers, “This is the computer science
department,” the content of his or her utterance identifies the receiver of the call, and it also
marks the progress of the participants through the opening core sequence. With the
VesselWorld data, we see the emergence of these kinds of conversational structures as a part
of the procedural infrastructure and representational practice that develop to handle complex
interactions that develop for recurrent domain activities.

In VesselWorld, the participants developed a procedural structure for the domain task of
jointly lifting an extra large waste. As a part of this common procedural structure there
emerged a conversational structure to align private views of the situation at difficult points of
coordination during the joint lift.

To successfully lift, carry, and load on the barge and extra large waste, the participants need
to mutually point to several aspects of the situation:

 1The cranes must both intend to cooperatively lift the same waste.
 2The correct crane must deploy the equipment necessary to lift the waste.
 3During the same round of activity, the cranes must join together.
 4During the same round of activity, the cranes must jointly lift the waste.
 5During the same round(s) of activity, the cranes must jointly carry the large waste to the
barge, if necessary.
 6During the same round of activity, the cranes must jointly load the large waste onto the
small barge.

Errors in coordination result in failure and the spillage of toxic waste.

As they prepared to do a joint lift, the participants using the base system could “see” each
other, but their perceptual capabilities were not sufficient to see what the other actors were
doing in any detail. Each participant had a plan, but the participants could not see each other's
plans. The problems inherent in jointly lifting or moving a large or extra large toxic waste
made for a recurring source of difficulty.
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Because managing the removal of extra large wastes was a recurrent source of difficulty, the
cranes invented a conversational structure to organize operations on large and extra large
wastes at each point of coordination. A set of adjacency pairs (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973)
were used by the participants to mediate the private understandings of these tightly coupled
actions.

The first part of the adjacency pair was for one actor to propose to take a given joint action on
the next round. The second part of the adjacency pair was for the other actor to confirm that
he would take the corresponding action. Therefore, if Crane1 proposes to do a joint load,
Crane2 can confirm. For joint actions requiring multiple steps, each of the steps is proposed
and confirmed using the adjacency pair structure. In the formal study discussed later, all the
teams of participants developed this kind of conversational structure.

Fig. 4 shows a sample of dialogue where the participants used adjacency pairs to coordinate
the handling of a large barrel of toxic waste. At 1 and 2, after jointly lifting a large barrel,
Crane1 and Crane2 agree to do a joint carry followed by a joint load onto a barge. It will take
three moves to reach their destination. In lines 3, 4, and 5, they tell each other they submitted
their first move. At 8, the tug suggests a convention to simplify coordination. At 9 and 10,
Crane1 and Crane2 tell each other they are ready to do the second part of the move. At 14,
Crane1 states she is doing the third move. At 15 through 18 they plan and then they submit
actions to do the joint load. At 19 and 20, they celebrate. Because the conversation of the
users is mediated through textual chat, adjacency pairs do not strictly speaking occur one
after the other; their positioning sometimes depends on the typing speed of the users. Other
kinds of comments may end up interposed along the way.
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Figure 4.

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A conversational structure.

After this conversational structure became a part of the group's common knowledge, only
some of the progress of the interaction it produced was specifically marked in the chat
window.
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The adjacency pair structures the participants use to help achieve joint lifts are part of the
representational practice that emerges. This conversational structure reduces errors by
making it easier to time when to initiate each phase of the action (Clark, 1996, pp. 83–86).
They improve the performance of the actors by providing a mediating structure to guide the
participants during selected points in the interaction. During these points of coordination the
actors are explicitly engaged in a grounding activity, more closely paying attention to one
another, but as a consequence reducing the parallelism and multitasking dimensions of the
collaboration as they converse. Alternate methods exist for mending the representational
practice that enable the participants to more freely work in parallel and multitask despite the
coupling constraints of tightly coupled actions like the joint lift: coordinating representations.

8. Coordinating representations

For a recurrent activity the intersubjective space in which the participants operate has a
historical character. The emergent structure of the activity, and the context in which it occurs,
are conditioned by the prior history of the activity within the community and for the
individual (Cole & Engeström, 1993; Hutchins, 1995a; Tomasello et al, 1993; Vygotsky,
1978). Mediating artifacts play a central role in organizing, structuring, and making sense of
the activity as it develops; these artifacts are an outgrowth of prior efforts to adjust and
improve the performance of a behavior. Work contexts are specifically designed to support
highly predictable activities (Nardi, 1996; Suchman & Trigg, 1991).

The set of representations used within the work context is a significant part of how the work
environment can be predesigned to support expected behaviors. If the representational system
is a poor match for the domain tasks of the users, it becomes necessary to redesign and
reorganize it and thereby embed alternate preferences for how the users should structure,
organize, explain, and frame their coordinated and collaborative field of action.

Hutchins documents two examples of the progress of representational function within a

system of activity: the airline cockpit (Hutchins, 1995b; Hutchins & Klausen, 1992) and the
navigational bridge of a Navy vessel (Hutchins, 1995a). The use of speed bugs on the
airspeed indicator in the cockpit and the Mercator projection chart on the navigational bridge
are significant factors in the “cognition” and performance of the participants. These
representational artifacts emerge from a history of reengineering prior representational
systems.

The addition of some artifacts reduces errors or makes the participants more efficient and
effective in their performance. Typewriters and then word processors are examples of the
kind of progress that achieves these sorts of effects. Other artifacts are primarily introduced
to mediate communication at an expected recurrent point of coordination, thereby serving the
same function as a conversational structure; the stop sign is an example of this sort. Artifacts
that are primarily introduced to mediate at an expected recurrent point of coordination will be
referred to as a coordinating representation (cf. Suchman & Trigg, 1991). Like the
conversational structures that are created by the participants, the coordination representation
mends the representational practice so as to mediate the efforts of actors to align their
differing views of the situation. Unlike conversational structure, it achieves this effect
without making the participants explicitly engage in grounding activity. The coordinating
representation enables the actors to make progress, delay or avoid the face time required for
explicit grounding, and thereby enable more loosely coupled, in-parallel, multitasked, forms
of interaction.
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In the airline operations room, the day is divided up into complexes. Each complex is a period
of time, roughly an hour, when, for a given airline, incoming plans arrive, transfers are made,
and outgoing planes leave. All the information needed to coordinate work during each of
these periods is represented in a matrix that is referred to as a complex sheet, which is a
coordinating representation. The complex sheet is a “transparent artifact that stands in for
situations out on the ramp and provides a shared object for communication between people
during the course of the complex.” (Suchman & Trigg, 1991, p. 208). From the perspective of
the analysis in this article, the complex sheet enables the participant to make progress, “stay
on the same page,” while they work in parallel and multitask without explicitly having to
ground a specific sense of their shared activity.

A clock in the classroom is a coordinating representation that mediates a point of

coordination at the beginning and end of class. An appointment slip helps a patient to return
to the dentist's office on the right day at the right time. A mail-order catalogue helps the
customer and the sales office reach agreement on purchase items, sizes, and prices. Tax forms
help to coordinate citizens and IRS personnel in their efforts to exchange information. At the
airport a passenger's printed itinerary, the departure monitor, signs identifying the JetBlue™
ticket counter, and baggage claim tickets are also examples of coordinating representations
that have been designed into the environment.

All artifacts can be used to mediate the co-construction of a shared understanding, but not all
artifacts are designed to do that. A chair could mediate a point of understanding, but the chair
was not designed with that purpose in mind.

Artifacts have both a tool and sign function (Vygotsky, 1978). The tool function makes it
easier to accomplish some task. The sign function effects how we think about the task. For a
coordinating representation, the sign and tool function coincide: The tool function of a
coordinating representation is that it is a sign designed to mediate an interaction at a recurrent
point of coordination.

Not all external representations are intended to mediate a point of coordination between
collaborating actors; therefore, not all external representations are coordinating
representations. A photograph is not a coordinating representation. The earlier drafts of this
article helped me to work out what I want to say, but they were not coordinating
representations. A scratch piece of paper that is used to do multiplication problems is not a
coordinating representation. A personal diary is not a coordinating representation, even if
somebody other than its author reads it.

At many locales, media is available, like the whiteboard, which the participants can use to
construct external representations that coordinate the activity of a group. These
representations become coordinating representations, in the sense that is meant here, only if
their usage continues beyond a single episode of cooperation.

Coordinating representations enable the participants to more effectively multitask and work
asynchronously in both collocated and non-collocated environments. The addition of
coordinating representations enables the participants to make progress without always
directly attending to one another.

Coordinating representations increase the pace and effectiveness at which an intersubjective

space emerges for a recurrent activity. In itself the coordinating representation does not add
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to the intersubjective space in which the actors operate, but it expedites the interaction at
certain points of coordination, while entirely removing others. They give the participants
more control of if and when they explicitly ground. Embedding into the design of the
representational system some preferences for organizing conventional behaviors is potentially
more effective than the use of conversation structure at runtime. This “pre-computes” some
of the runtime work of actors (Norman, 1991). It also enables the distribution of work across
people (i.e., engineers and designers vs. the runtime performance of the participants). The
reformulation of mediating structure from one whose external representation interactively
emerges (the conversational structure) to one that is predesigned into the representational
system (the coordinating representation) is a significant mark of progress that simultaneously
expands the intersubjective space in which actors operate and transforms the vocabulary they
use to make sense of the situation.

Thus, the representational system for that cooperative task is designed and redesigned. Each
cycle converts some of the runtime work into more externally structured kinds of interaction
that are specifically designed into the system to match the emerging practice of the
participants. The overall effect is a reduction in runtime representational work to maintain a
common sense of a recurrent cooperative activity, enabling the participants to work in a more
loosely coupled fashion.

9. Adding coordinative representations to VesselWorld

The analysis of transcripts from usage of the base version of VesselWorld was used to
develop a second version of the system VesselWorld+ that includes three coordinating
representations (CRs). Each of these coordinating representations is designed to address some
issue that had emerged at a point of coordination during a recurrent activity. The participants
using VesselWorld+ will sometimes be referred to as the coordinating representation groups.

One issue that was identified in the transcripts from the base system concerned the exchange
of information about the name, location size, and properties of wastes. There were numerous
occasions of repair work instigated because the users' private representations of the state of
the shared field of activity had diverged. The object list CR (see Fig. 5) was designed to
mediate these kinds of points of coordination among the participants.

Figure 5.

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The object list.

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The object list is a coordinating representation that mediates the efforts of participants to
construct intersubjective space for shared domain objects, and it potentially mediates the
interaction at any number of points of coordination. A list of objects (with relevant
properties) allows users to more systematically keep track of objects in the domain. This
information is visible to all users and can be edited by any user. When a user discovers a
waste, he or she can note it in the object list using a point-and-click operation. Entries in the
object list can be displayed on the WorldView as markers. All of the teams that had access to
the object list used it to mediate their interactions.

The users of the base system also had difficulties in coordinating tightly coupled actions
involving the manipulation of large and extra large wastes. If one crane started to lift before
the other crane, the waste spilled and leaked toxic materials into the environment. A shared
planning CR was designed for the VesselWorld+ groups to handle these kinds of situations,
converting it into a more efficient form of representational interaction (see Fig. 6). The shared
planning CR allows a user to compare his projected actions to those of the other participants.
The next few planned steps for each actor are displayed in a labeled column for each
participant. The actions are listed in order from top to bottom. (So, the next few planned steps
of Crane1 are to deploy equipment and then lift some waste.)

Figure 6.

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Timing of joint actions.

The analysis of the base system transcripts also revealed that keeping track of multiple open
plans was a recurrent activity among the participants. Sometimes repair work was triggered
because there was not an adequate representation of the multiple tasks and ordering of tasks;
for example, one participant would be waiting for another, not realizing that the other actor
was doing something else first.
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A third coordinating representation was designed to allow the users to manage multiple plans.
The idea was to create a structured space where the participants could rapidly sketch a high-
level plan that would help them to manage multiple open tasks.

9.1. Changes in the runtime construction of intersubjective space

A study to assess the difference in performance between participants that used the initial
version of VesselWorld (the base groups) and participants that had access to the three
coordinating representations introduced in VesselWorld+ (the CR groups) was conducted
(Alterman, Feinman, Introne, & Landsman, 2001). These two representational systems have a
chronological order: VesselWorld+ includes coordinating representations that were
specifically designed to mediate a recurrent point of coordination that existed for users of the
base representational system VesselWorld. This set-up enables us to consider, in detail, a
sequence of related interactions within and across episodes of cooperation such that
continuity and change can be observed.

The participants for the study were a mix of students and local-area professionals, with
varying degrees of computer proficiency. Participants were organized into teams of three.
Each team worked with one of two representational systems; three teams used VesselWorld,
and three teams used VesselWorld+. Each team was trained together for 2 hr in use of the
system, and then solved randomly chosen VesselWorld problems for approximately 10 hr. To
alleviate fatigue concerns, the experiment was split into four 3-hr sessions. Participants were
also asked to fill out entrance surveys to obtain population data and exit surveys where they
could give feedback about their experience with the system and the coordination issues
arising in their team.

A set of random problems was produced, and participants were given a succession of
problems drawn from this set. Groups did not necessarily see the same problems or in the
same order; because of differences in performance, groups did not complete the same number
of problems over their 10 hr of problem solving. To account for this, a general measure of the
complexity of a particular problem was devised, taking into account the quantity and type of
the wastes in the harbor, their distance from the large barge, and the number of small barges
available to the respondents. This metric was used to normalize results.

The primary interest of collecting this data was to use the replay device to do a detailed
analysis of the transcripts of participant behavior. Some quantitative analysis was also
performed.

9.2. Data analysis

All teams, regardless of which platform they used, improved their average performance. Fig.
7 compares the first 5 hr of problem solving (after training) to their second 5 hr of problem
solving. All teams saw significant decreases, over time, in the number of chat lines they
produced and the elapsed clock time it took to achieve their goals: The participants talked
less and took less time to accomplish their tasks.
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Figure 7.

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Within-group improvement over time (first 5 hr vs. last 5 hr).

All of the groups developed conversational structure to mediate certain recurrent points of
coordination:

 • Each of the base teams independently invented an adjacency pair structure (Schegloff &
Sacks, 1973) to organize the aligning of their private representations of these kinds of
situations. None of the CR groups developed the adjacency pair structure; they all used the
shared planning CR to coordinate closely coupled actions.
 • Each of the groups, regardless of the platform they used, developed shorthand notational
conventions for describing various features of the wastes. These conventions of naming
allowed the participants to rapidly describe, in a few keystrokes, the relevant information
about a particular waste. Thereafter, the participants had a useful handle that reminded
them of many of the relevant properties of the waste.
 • In anticipation of the breakdowns that resulted from keeping separate representations of
the wastes and their locations, one of the base groups invented a conversational structure, a
“marker check,” which they used to periodically compare private representations. During a
marker check one of the participants would list all the wastes that she had marked on her
map, one quadrant of the map at a time. The other participants would compare her marks
to their own, making repairs as they went along.

The coordinating representations both reduced the number of points of coordination and
expedited the interaction at other points of coordination:

 • The object list CR reduced the numbers of points of coordination. For the base group,
because the participants kept separate representations, each time a waste was discovered,
or any other kind of information exchange about a waste occurred, there was a point of
coordination. With VesselWorld+ some of these points of coordination were removed. For
example, with the representational system of VesselWorld, if the tug reported he found a
barrel at a specific location, the other actors needed to add a marker to their map for them
to keep track of the fact it exists. With the introduction of the object list that point of
coordination no longer exists.
 • The shared planning CR was used to mediate closely coupled actions. To submit an action
to the system the users needed to add it to their plan anyway. So, from the point of view of
the users who had access to the shared planning window, having to talk about their
immediate plan was just extra representational work. The CR groups also used this shared
external representation to bypass communicating this information via chat. Exchanging
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representations of timing information for closely coupled actions via the shared planning CR
was more efficient and precise, and it was less error prone.
 • On more than one occasion it was observed that one of the cranes would use the shared
planning CR to adjust his plan to match the plan of the other crane within the same turn,
without any discussion.

The introduction of a CR changes how the participants produce at runtime intersubjective

space and, consequently, the content of their common sense of the situation.

Fig. 8 shows the opening dialogue in a VesselWorld problem-solving session where users had
access to coordinating representations. This dialogue ensues before all of the participants
have submitted their actions to the system for the first round of action. At line 1, Crane1
ecstatically declares that he can see an extra large waste. At line 2, the Tug expresses his
“envy.” At line 3, Crane2 expresses his excitement that he can see both an extra large and a
large waste. The rest of the opening dialogue is mostly concerned with planning.
76

Figure 8.

 Open in figure viewer

 Download Powerpoint slide

Opening dialogue.

Fig. 5 shows the object list that is constructed by the time all the participants have submitted
their first action. Only three of the entries into the object list were explicitly mentioned in the
opening dialogue, and none of these were explicitly named. Without the object list CR, a
team works closely together to manage the discovery of a waste, jointly focused, explicitly
grounding each of the seven newly discovered wastes. For the CR groups the discovery of a
large set of new wastes happens en masse versus one at a time for the non-CR groups. There
is also a change to the content of the participants common sense of the situation: The CR
groups spend relatively more time planning, whereas the non-CR groups spend relatively
more time cooperatively managing information about wastes. For the non-CR groups with the
discovery of each waste the participants try to engage in a grounding activity. For the CR
groups, the object list CR enables team members to add to the intersubjective space in a
productive manner without grounding.

The CR groups used the shared planning CR to mediate closely coupled actions. To submit
an action to the system the users needed to add it to their plan anyway. Therefore, from the
point of view of the participants who had access to the shared planning window, having to
talk about their immediate plan was just extra representational work. The removal of a need
for redundant descriptions of the users' plans reduced clock time, interface work, and
confusion among the users about the details of each other's plans. On more than one occasion
it was observed that one crane would adjust his plan to match the plan of the other crane
within the same turn, without any discussion, thus indicating a richer intersubjective space
than the one produced by the non-CR groups. Thus, although the Cranes talked less about
manipulating extra large wastes, the CR enabled them to work more closely together with a
better understanding of each other's intent without explicitly engaging in a tightly coupled
sequential interaction.

The high-level planning coordinating representation was not used by any of the CR groups.
The participants did not use the high-level planning window because the extra
representational work needed to construct a representation of a high-level plan was not
warranted. An analysis of the discourse showed that the plans the participants created had a
relatively short period of average relevance (Feinman & Alterman, 2003). Thus information
about the plan was readily assessable from the short history of prior chat that was already
available in the chatting window.

The results presented in Fig. 9 show the improvement in performance of CR groups over the
base groups for the final 5 hr of play for each team; after 5 hr the performance of the teams
had stabilized. The most significant effect is the 57% reduction in communication generated.
This reduction reflects the decrease in “face time” for the participants to maintain a common
sense of the shared activity, working more in parallel, making it easier to multitask. A 49%
reduction in clock time was another highly significant result. There was also a reduction in
system events (mouse clicks, etc.), down 38%. Overall domain errors (errors in performing
domain actions that led to a toxic spill) were reduced by 61%. The variance of this measure
was quite high due to the low frequency of errors; this reduced its confidence below
77

statistical significance (p < .20). All of these measures are a reflection of differences in
intersubjective space in which the participants operate.

Figure 9.

 Open in figure viewer

 Download Powerpoint slide

Improvement of CR groups over base groups; final 5 hr of play.

There was also a reduction in the rounds of activity, but it was not as significant (p < .35): In
terms of domain action, both communities achieved similar levels of performance. Almost all
of the extra rounds are accounted for by a reduction in the number of errors between base and
CR groups. Because the two groups achieved similar levels of performance, the reductions
that were seen in clock time, system events, and chat are attributable to a reduction in the
amount of representational work to maintain a common sense of the shared activity. Overall,
these differences in performance reflect the accumulation of cultural practice over time.

10. Concluding remarks

What the participants share, their common “sense” of the world, creates a foundation, a
framing, an orientation that enables human actors to see and act in coordination with one
another. For recurrent activities, the methods the participants use to understand each other as
they act change, making the intersubjective space in which they operate richer and easier to
produce. Changing the representational practice of the participants enables them to work in a
more loosely coupled fashion, working in parallel, multitasking, and yet continuing to
maintain a common sense of the shared activity. Theses changes to how intersubjective space
is produced at runtime changes its content, the speed at which it is produced, and its
effectiveness.

Individual and shared beliefs about the collaborative field of action that are generated at
runtime compose the intersubjective space. The predispositions and expectations of the
participants, their quality, number, and correlation and the effectiveness and the
appropriateness of the representational system available at the scene characterize the potential
78

richness of the intersubjective space. A specific individual sense of how the expected
structure of the activity plays out in the current situation is constructed during the course of
the activity. Conventional representational activities enable the participants to add to the
intersubjective space in which they operate, continuing the action without specifically
grounding. Changing how the intersubjective space is produced changes what is produced.

The study reported in this article examined how participants come to understand each other
sufficient to their task in a work-like context. A key assumption was that the participants are
multitasking, working sometimes in parallel, other times closely with a joint focus. The main
task was to work through some of the issues that emerge from a close examination of
intersubjectivity as it is managed through representation and interaction. The focus was on
adjustments that are made for recurrent cooperative activities that emerge in these kinds of
work contexts. The data that were presented document, in detail, a sequence of related
interactions, within and across episodes of cooperation, where continuity and change can be
observed.

Despite the emergence of the “common procedures” for recurrent cooperative situations,
there are always points of coordination: moments in the interaction where the participants
must mark, confirm, or navigate their progress through their private expectations of how the
collaboration will unfold.

Initially, in response to a breakdown, a conversational interaction occurs that realigns the

private understandings of the participants. In future situations, where one or another actor
anticipates the problem may reoccur, the actors will create a conversational structure to
organize the flow of the activity. This mediating structure becomes a part of the procedural
infrastructure for the interaction.

A coordinating representation serves the same function as the creation of conversational

structure. Both provide mediating structure for a recurrent point of coordination. The shift
from activities that are organized by mediating structures interactively (conversational
structure) to recurring activities that have a predesigned organizational structure as part of the
representational system for the task (coordinating representations) simultaneously expands
the intersubjective space in which actors operate and transforms the vocabulary they use to
make sense of the situation.

Coordinating representations enable the participants to more effectively multitask and work
in parallel. The addition of coordinating representations enable the participants to make
progress without always directly attending to one another. In itself the coordinating
representation does not add to the intersubjective space in which the actors operate, but it
expedites the interaction at certain points of coordination, while entirely removing others.

Aknowledgment

This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research under grants No. N00014-96-1-
0440 and N66001-00-1-8965. Additional support came from NSF grant EIA-0082393.

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1010798510130 This paper is concerned with the

competing and complimentary relationships between intersubjectivity and discursive logic. It
contends that the ultimate failure of Husserlian phenomenology is a testament to the dilemma
of subjectivist philosophy. Indeed, political philosophy requires a paradigm-shift from
79

subjectivity to intersubjectivity. With this in mind, this paper examines the classical
encounter between morality and ethical life in connection with discursive ethics. While it
argues that Habermas still retains a strong residue of subjectivist philosophy, it attempts to
clarify the discursive analysis of Foucault and probes into its applicability to practical
philosophy.

https://books.google.co.za/books?id=8gvNGTd3AdkC&pg=PA98&lpg=PA98
&dq=discursive+intersubjectivity&source=bl&ots=mFdDZ9Uqte&sig=q85gQ
7PNoe9BGnKP52XGpZ1Fdxo&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dis
cursive%20intersubjectivity&f=false

The Intentional Spectrum and Intersubjectivity: Phenomenology and

the ...

http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2013/0353-57381304245S.pdf
FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO XXIV (4), 2013.
245
UDK: 165.62
DOI: 10.2298/FID1304245S
Original scientific paper
Michal Sládeček
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory
University of Belgrade
Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity
1
Abstract
The introductory part of the article deals with general features of
Brandom’s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom’s
interpretation of Kripke’s conception of social character of rules, as well as
Habermas’ critique of Brandom’s conception of I-thou and I-we types of inter
-
subjectivity. In the final part the author is surveying Brandom’s interpretation
of Wittgenstein’s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and
rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as
immediate communication, while
neglecting the role of socially and historically shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of
rules by past application, and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences
of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments
as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also
claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersubjectivity involve more a
profound re-adjustment of interlocutors’ perspectives rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives,
as Brandom suggested.
https://philpapers.org/rec/BRAIIT-3
https://www.academia.edu/9873960/Is_the_second_person_relation_characteristic_of_linguistic_inter
subjectivity_On_Brandoms_I-Thou_sociality
Is the second person relation characteristic of linguistic intersubjectivity: On Brandom's 'I-Thou'
sociality
http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=428
The introductory part of the article deals with general features of Brandom’s social pragmatic
position. The central part considers Brandom’s interpretation of Kripke’s conception of social
80

character of rules, as well as Habermas’ critique of Brandom’s conception of I-thou and I-we types of
intersubjectivity. In the final part the author is surveying Brandom’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s
understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and rules in general. According to the author,
Brandom treats intersubjectivity as immediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially
and historically shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application, and,
by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences of accepted rules, he
considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments as oriented towards future validation of
meaning and rules. The author also claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication
and intersubjectivity involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors’ perspectives rather
than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested. [Projekat Ministarstva nauke
Republike Srbije, br. 43007: Ethics and Environmental Politics: Institutions, Techniques and Norms in
the Challenge of Changing the Natural Environment]

Keywords: Brandom, Habermas, Intersubjectivity, Kripke, Language, Normativity, Rules,

Wittgenstein
http://www.philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-
details.php?id=235552&a=$a&first_name=R.&author=Brandom&concept=Intersubjectivity
BrandomVs I-We conceptions of social practices: they do not meet the adequacy condition. They
base a distinction between what individuals deem to be correct use and the actually correct use on
the comparison of the views of individuals and society. (VsInter-subjectivity)
This is the usual way of treating objectivity as inter-subjectivity.
---
I 831
I-You style: the definitions are made by an individual (account holder), not by "the community".
(definition is more than mere regularity) .

VsIntersubjectivity (I-We style) it is faulty, because it is unable to grant the possibility of error on the
part of the privileged perspective.
---
I 832
I-You conception of intersubjectivity: no perspective is privileged. Perspective form instead of cross-
perspective content.
Brandom's normative pragmatic theory of discursive practice.. Habermas is a leading theorist of
discourse as an epistemically steered process.. recoil from discourse and to defend a purely
interactionist or dialogical position. (but dialogue is discourse and discourse contains dialogue??)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20011303?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17532523.2016.123717
3 On intersubjectivity in art and everyday aesthetics
Certain aestheticians attempt to define everyday aesthetics by describing it as radically
private, subjective and nondiscursive. The main aim of this article is to counter this
restrictive, isolationist approach to everyday aesthetics by pointing to the role of
intersubjective, discursive, institutional arenas in fostering meaningful everyday aesthetic
experience. To this end, the first part of the article conducts a historical and hermeneutical
exploration of how modern subjectivity was initially constructed, later problematised, and
how today it is often reconstructed as intersubjectivity by poststructuralism and the Artworld.
I then turn to how this issue is playing out in the current discourse on everyday aesthetics.
The second part of the article shows that prominent contemporary aestheticians agree
that language has the potential to enrich ineffable aesthetic experience in all walks of
81

life. I extend this broad perspective by arguing that differential discourse is particularly
appropriate for this task. In conclusion, I suggest that by demarcating everyday aesthetics as
private and as the “other” of the contemporary Artworld – by retrogressively defining it in
terms of subjective experience – there is a risk of marginalising this important area of
aesthetic interest and of impoverishing both art and everyday aesthetic life.

Key words: Everyday

aesthetics, subjective, intersubjective, poststructuralism, art, Artworld, discursivity

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1470357209102114

This article presents a kindergarten science inquiry as an exemplar for the purpose of
suggesting an analytic graphic that is visually inclusive of the multimodal resources brought
to bear by children and teachers engaged in classroom interaction. The central aim is the
visual representation of the analysis so that the analysis itself becomes visual
communication, a means of generating knowledge about multimodal discourse. This makes
the discourse structure much more accessible to viewers than a verbal transcript. Findings
demonstrate that the children and teacher carried out activity that reflected generally
mismatched classroom discourses. The children engaged in the science processes of
observation, interpretation, and design of the investigation while the teacher focused on the
social process of classroom management. Visual communication is central in helping
researchers and teachers to visually associate the elements and structure of interactions so
that teaching response can be designed.

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10862968209547468 DISCOURSE
STYLE,
CLASSROOM INTERACTION AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT.
The implications of ability-tracking for educational inequality are well known and
controversial. Few studies, however, have been successful in capturing the interplay
between students' discourse style, teacher expectations in particular classroom tasks
and achievement outcomes. In what follows I will discuss the apparent influence of
tracking on the kind of reading instruction students receive in urban school systems.
The discussion will focus on how the discriminatory treatment reported by various
researchers is perpetuated in face-to-face classroom interaction. Two schools are
reported upon in which differential treatment assumes different forms, but always
entails, for one group, a denial of access to practice in comprehending texts.

Discourse

written or spoken communication or debate. “the language of political discourse”

discussion, conversation, talk, dialogue, conference, debate,

synonyms:
consultation;)

Intersubjectivity – interactionist or discursive? Reflections on Habermas’

critique of Brandom Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 32, No. 2, 155-172 (2006)
82

Argues that there is a marked ambivalence in Jurgen Habermas’ concept of

intersubjectivity. Jurgen Habermas wavers between an interactionist and a
discursive understanding. (What are the differences between them?)

Reconciling communicative action with recognition

thickening the ‘inter’ of intersubjectivity
Eva Erman, Department of Political Science
The symmetry implied by social contract theory and so-called Golden Rule thinking is
anchored to a Cartesian subject–object world and is not equipped to address recognition.

Feeling Gender Speak - Intersubjectivity and Fieldwork Practice with Women

Who Prostitute in Lima, Peru
Lorraine Nencel, De Vrije Universiteit
This article discusses a dimension of fieldwork methodology often overlooked. The
discovery brought several epistemological principles into question pertaining to power
and intersubjectivity subscribed to in a feminist or critical anthropology.

The ontological co-emergence of 'self and other' in Japanese philosophy

Yoko Arisaka, Philosophy Department
Abstract: The issues regarding intersubjectivity have been central topics in modern
Japanese philosophy. Watsuji's phenomenology deals more directly with the topic of
intersubjectivity.

The Husserlian theory of intersubjectivity as alterology. emergent theories and

wisdom traditions in the light of genetic phenomenology
Natalie Depraz, College International de Philosophie
Abstract: The relevance of Husserlian Theory of Intersubjectivity for contemporary
empirical research and for ancestral wisdom. Two main Husserlian discoveries that
subjectivity is from the very beginning intersubjectivity and infants, animals, the insane
and aliens are subjects in a full sense as they are right from the beginning already
intersubjective subjects.

The practice of mind. Theory, simulation or primary interaction?

Shaun Gallagher, Department of Philosophy, Canisius College, Buffalo.
Abstract: That theory of mind is our primary and pervasive means for understanding
other persons, go beyond the scientific empirical evidence and phenomenological
evidence.

Burnout and intersubjectivity: A psychoanalytical study from a Lacanian

perspective
Stijn Vanheule, An Lievrouw, Paul Verhaeghe, Ghent University, Belgium
Human Relations, Vol. 56, No. 3, 321-338 (2003)
On the basis of qualitative research data we investigate to what extent Lacan's model of
intersubjectivity helps us to understand the burnout process. Outlining intersubjectivity
through the dialectical master and slave relationship and the difference between
imaginary and symbolic interactions.

The 'shared manifold' hypothesis. From mirror neurons to empathy

Vittorio Gallese, Istituto di Fisiologia Umana.
Abstracts: This account of intersubjectivity based on the findings of neuroscientific
investigation will be discussed in relation with a classical tenet of phenomenological
sociology.

Understanding the representational mind. A prerequisite for intersubjectivity

proper
Iso Kern, Institute of Philosophy, Eduard Marbach, Institute of Philosophy, University of
Bern.
83

Abstracts: The study of intersubjectivity is closely tied to questions of the

representational mind. It focuses on developmental studies of children's understanding
of the human mind.

A Philosopher Manqué? Simone de Beauvoir, Moral Values and 'The Useless

Mouths'
Elizabeth Stanley, University of Manchester, UK
European Journal of Women's Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 201-220 (2001)
Les Bouches inutiles and the Useless Mouths, to examine ideas about morality, ethics
and intersubjectivity expressed within it.

Scandalous ethics. Infinite presence with suffering

Annabella Pitkin, Barnard College, Columbia University, 3009 Broadway, New York, NY
10027, USA
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 231-46
Abstracts: Buddhist and Jewish thinkers say scandalous things on purpose.Scandalous
things are said in order to cause a breaking-open in the consciousness of the hearer and
practitioner, which produces compassion, transformation, and liberation.

Matrix and Intersubjectivity: Phenomenological Aspects of Group Analysis

Hans W. Cohn, School of Psychotherapy and Counselling, Regent's College, London
Group Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 4, 481-486 (1993)
A move from an extreme subjectivism to a complete dismissal of the subject. Matrix
and intersubjectivity are the relevant fields of experience.

Encounters with animal minds

Barbara Smuts, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 525 East University,
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1109, USA
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 293-309
Abstracts: Explores the kinds of relationships that can develop between human and
nonhuman animals. How Safi and I co-create systems of communication and
emotional expression that permit deep 'intersubjectivity.'

Empathy and consciousness

Evan Thompson, Department of Philosophy, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North
York, Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 1-32
Abstracts: That Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of
self and other and is inherently intersubjective.

Holding in Mind: Intersubjectivity, Subject Relations and the Group

Phil Schulte, NHS psychotherapy service in Bexley, Kent
Group Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 4, 531-544 (2000)
Intersubjectivity is emerging as a key concept in psychoanalysis. The intersubjective
perspective stands in contrast to classical psychoanalytic theorizing.

Intersubjectivity in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism

B. Alan Wallace, Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Santa
Barbara, CA 93106-3130, USA
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 209-30
Abstracts: Buddhist concepts of intersubjectivity like the meditative practice of dream
yoga is shown to have deep implications regarding the nature of intersubjectivity.

The Politics of Problems: Intersubjectivity in Defining Powerful Others

Sue Jones, University of Bath
Human Relations, Vol. 37, No. 11, 881-894 (1984)
How persons in organizations, tackling what they define as complex problems, define
84

others as significant in terms of their perceived power.

Beyond empathy. Phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity

Dan Zahavi, Danish Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities, Vimmelskaftet 41A, 2,
DK-1161 Copenhagen K, Denmark
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 151-67
Abstracts: The phenomenologists argue that a treatment of intersubjectivity requires a
simultaneous analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and world.

From intersubjectivity to intercorporeality: contributions of a phenomenological

philosophy to the psychological study of alterity. - COELHO JUNIOR, Nelson
Ernesto.
Abstract: Philosophical questioning of intersubjectivity in the phenomenological theories
of Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty.

Paths of intersubjectivity: Ferenczi, Bion, Matte-Blanco. Psicol. USP, 1999, vol.10,

no.1, p.141-155. ISSN 0103-6564. GERBER, Ignácio
Abstract: Intersubjectivity is pertinent to the freudian concept of Psychoanalysis. It was
Ferenczi, the pioneer in the investigations of emotions.

Sequentiality as a problem and resource for intersubjectivity in aphasic

conversation: analysis and implications for therapy - Wilkinson R.
Source: Aphasiology, Volume 13, Numbers 4-5, 1 April 1999, pp. 327-343(17)
Abstract: Investigations of non-aphasic conversation have displayed the importance of
sequentiality in the meaning and understanding of utterances in conversation.

The Intersubjectivity of Interaction

John W. Du Bois, University of California, Santa Barbara
Why is it necessary to integrate intersubjectivity into any understanding of
language and social life? How does intersubjectivity relate to stance?

Labour and Intersubjectivity: Notes on the Natural Law of Copyright

ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, University of Toronto - Faculty of Law
Stanford/Yale Jr. Faculty Forum Paper No. 01-06 and U of Toronto, Public Law Research
Paper No. 01-06
Abstract: A theoretical approach to copyright law centred on authorial right and capable
of accounting for the public interest in access to intellectual creations. The paper offers a
rights-based interpretation of the idea-expression-dichotomy inspired by Kant's theory of
property.

Grounding Signs of Culture: Primary Intersubjectivity in Social Semiosis

Stephen J. Cowley, Sheshni Moodley, Agnese Fiori-Cowley, Social Sciences and
Humanities, University of Bradford, UK, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South
Africa
Mind, Culture, and Activity 2004, Vol. 11, No. 2, Pages 109-132.
Abstract: The article examines how infants are first permeated by culture. Building on
Thibault (2000), semiogenesis is traced to the joint activity of primary intersubjectivity.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF

PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY - Carol Weaver
ABSTRACT: After exploring the concept of projective identification and the claims from
various contemporary psychoanalysts the paper explores the philosophical concept of
intersubjectivity.

Considering the nature of intersubjectivity within professional nursing

Wanda Pierson
Abstract: This article examines some of the notions of intersubjectivity and proposes an
85

alternative understanding.

Communication Media and Intersubjectivity in Small Groups

Shaila Miranda, University of Oklahoma
Robert P. Bostrom, University of Georgia
Leslie Jordan Albert, University of Oklahoma
ABSTRACT:Signification, comprehension, and emotional contagion. Results indicate that
the effects of CMC on all three processes were negative and that signification and
comprehension had positive effects on the intersubjective social construction of meaning.

Between Subjects: Shared Meanings of Intersubjectivity.

Authors: Leadbeater, Bonnie J.
Abstract: This review of the theoretical foundations of intersubjectivity argues that the
problem lies in the developmental starting points of the theories.

Holding in Mind: Intersubjectivity, Subject Relations and the Group

Phil Schulte, NHS psychotherapy service in Bexley, Kent
The intersubjective perspective stands in contrast to classical psychoanalytic theorizing.

Perverse Ethics - The Body, Gender and Intersubjectivity

Lara Merlin, Rutgers University - Feminist Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2, 165-178 (2003)
The violence of Western culture derives from a particular gendered fantasy of bodily
organization. By re-imagining the body, it becomes possible, not to avoid loss, but rather
to alter its meaning.

Critique of Intersubjectivity
Abstract: The article investigates the philosophical and psychological notion of
intersubjectivity.

Bayesian Intersubjectivity and Quantum Theory

Pérez-Suárez, Marcos; Santos, David J.
Abstract: Frequentism and Bayesian theory are discussed together with the replacement
of frequentist objectivity for Bayesian intersubjectivity.
http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/rochat/lab/Three%20Levels%20of%20Inter
subjectivity%20in%20Early%20Development.pdf

http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-
reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts-100

In its most general sense of that which occurs between or exists among conscious human
actors, intersubjectivity is little more than a synonym for “the social.” As used by social
scientists, however, intersubjectivity usually denotes some set of relations, meanings,
structures, practices, experiences, or phenomena evident in human life that cannot be
reduced to or comprehended entirely in terms of either subjectivity (concerning
psychological states of individual actors) or objectivity (concerning brute empirical facts
about the objective world). In this sense, the concept is usually intended to overcome an
unproductive oscillation between methodological subjectivism and objectivism. The concept
is especially predominant in social theories and theories of the self.

Although German idealist philosophers Johann Fichte (1762–1814) and G. W. F. Hegel

(1770–1831) stressed the importance of intersubjectivity, the concept became influential in
the twentieth century through the work of American social psychologist George Herbert
Mead (1863–1931). Mead claimed that the development of cognitive, moral, and emotional
86

capacities in human individuals is only possible to the extent that they take part in
symbolically mediated interactions with other persons. For Mead, then, ontogenesis is
essentially and irreducibly intersubjective. He also put forward a social theory explaining
how social norms, shared meanings, and systems of morality arise from and concretize the
general structures of reciprocal perspective-taking required for symbolic interaction. In short,
he argued that intersubjectivity—understood specifically in terms of linguistically mediated,
reflexively grasped social action—furnishes the key to understanding mind, self, and society.

Although the work of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)
was often more directly inspirational, Mead’s bold claim that self and society are irreducibly
intersubjective has been rearticulated and supported by many distinct subsequent inter-
subjectivist approaches. Action theory, symbolic interactionism, lifeworld
phenomenology, hermeneutic analysis, conversational analysis, ethnomethodology,
social constructivism, dialogism, discourse theory, recognition theory, and objects
relations theory all take inter-subjectivity as central and irreducible. For example,
Erving Goffman (1922–1982) insisted that we need a microanalysis of face-to-face
interactions in order to properly understand the interpersonal interpretation, negotiation, and
improvisation that constitute a society’s interaction order. While macro-and mesostructural
phenomena may be important in setting the basic terms of interaction, social order according
to Goffman is inexplicable without central reference to agents’ interpretations and strategies
in actively developing their own action performances in everyday, interpersonal contexts.
Harold Garfinkel and other ethnomethodologists likewise insist that social order is only
possible because of the strongly normative character of a society’s particular everyday
interaction patterns and norms.

Widely diverse social theorists influenced by phenomenology also center their analyses
in intersubjective phenomena and structures. Most prominently, Alfred Schutz (1899–
1959) sought to show how the lifeworld of persons—the mostly taken-for-granted
knowledge, knowhow, competences, norms, and behavioral patterns that are shared
throughout a society—delimits and makes possible individual action and interaction. In
particular, he sought to analyze the way in which the constitutive structures of any lifeworld
shape social meanings and personal experiences, by attending to the lifeworld’s
spatiotemporal, intentional, semantic, and role typifying and systematizing dimensions. Other
theories analyze different aspects of the lifeworld: how experience and knowledge is
embodied (Maurice Merleau-Ponty), the intersubjective construction of both social and
natural reality (Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann), the social construction of mind and
mental concepts (Jeff Coulter), and the social power and inequalities involved in symbolic
capital (Pierre Bourdieu). Finally, Jürgen Habermas emphasizes the linguistic basis of the
lifeworld, constructing a theory of society in terms of the variety of types of communicative
interaction, the pragmatic presuppositions of using language in order to achieve shared
understandings and action coordinations with others, and the role of communicative
interaction for integrating society. While acknowledging that some types of social integration
function independently of communicative action—paradig-matically economic and
bureaucratic systems—Habermas claims that intersubjective communication is fundamental
in, and irreplaceable for, human social life.
87

Diverse prominent theories of the self are united in supporting Mead’s claim that the
self is developed and structured intersubjectively. Martin Buber’s (1878–1965) distinction
between the different interpersonal attitudes involved in the I-Thou stance and the I-It stance
leads to the insight that the development and maintenance of an integral sense of personal
identity is fundamentally bound up with the capacity to interact with others from a
performative attitude, rather than an objectivating one. Mead’s claim is also developed in
diverse theories of the self: Habermas’s account of interactive competence and rational
accountability, Axel Honneth’s and Charles Taylor’s theories of interpersonal recognition
and identity development, Daniel Stern’s elucidation of the interpersonal world of infants,
and psychoanalytic object-relations theories stressing the dependence of the ego on affective
interpersonal bonds between self and significant others.

SEE ALSO Bourdieu, Pierre; Goffman, Erving; Habermas, Jürgen; Mead, George Herbert;
Other, The

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Benjamin, Jessica. 1988. The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of
Domination. New York: Pantheon.

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality: A
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Trans. R. Nice. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.

Buber, Martin. 1958. I and Thou. 2nd ed. Trans. Ronald G. Smith. New York: Scribner.

Coulter, Jeff. 1989. Mind in Action. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday.

Goffman, Erving. 1983. The Interaction Order. American Sociological Review 48 (1): 1–17.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Trans. Thomas
McCarthy. Vol. 1 of The Theory of Communicative Action. Boston: Beacon.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1992. Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s

Theory of Subjectivity. In Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays. Trans. William
Mark Hohengarten, 149-204. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Honneth, Axel. 1995. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts.
Trans. Joel Anderson. Cambridge, MA: Polity.
88

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1964. The Child’s Relations with Others. In The Primacy of
Perception, and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art,
History, and Politics, ed. James M. Edie, 96-155. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press.

Schutz, Alfred. 1962. The Problem of Social Reality, ed. Maurice Natanson. Vol. 1 of
Collected Papers. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Schutz, Alfred. 1962. Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, ed. I. Schutz. Vol. 3 of

Collected Papers. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Schutz, Alfred. 1962. Studies in Social Theory, ed. Arvid Brodersen. Vol. 2 of Collected
Papers. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Stern, Daniel N. 1985. The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis
and Developmental Psychology. New York: Basic Books.

Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.

Winnicott, Donald Woods. 1964. The Child, the Family, and the Outside World.
Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin.

"Intersubjectivity." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. . Encyclopedia.com. 12

Apr. 2017 <http://www.encyclopedia.com>.

https://benjamins.com/#catalog/books/bct.65/main

Recent years saw a growing interest in the study of subjectivity, as the linguistic expression
of speaker involvement. Intersubjectivity, defined by Traugott as "the linguistic expression
of a speaker/writer's attention to the hearer/reader", on the other hand, has so far
received little explicit attention in its own right, let alone systematic definition and
operationalization. Intersubjectivity and seemingly related notions such as interpersonal
meaning, appraisal, stance and metadiscourse, frequently appear in cognitive-functional
accounts, as well as historical and more applied approaches. These domains offer (partly)
conflicting uses of 'intersubjectivity', differ in the overall scope of the concept and the
phenomena it may cover.This book brings together contributions from a variety of different
approaches, with the aim of disentangling the current web of intertwined notions of
intersubjectivity. Rather than focusing on the potentially conflicting views, the volume
aspires to resolve some of the conceptual puzzle by cross-fertilization between the different
views, and spark discussion on how to operationalize 'intersubjectivity' in linguistic research.
Originally published in English Text Construction 5:1 (2012).

https://benjamins.com/#catalog/books/celcr.12/main

The cognitive and language sciences are increasingly oriented towards the social dimension
of human cognition and communication. The hitherto dominant approach in modern
cognitive science has viewed “social cognition” through the prism of the traditional
philosophical puzzle of how individuals solve the problem of understanding Other Minds.
The Shared Mind challenges the conventional “theory of mind” approach, proposing that
89

the human mind is fundamentally based on intersubjectivity: the sharing of affective,

conative, intentional and cognitive states and processes between a plurality of subjects.
The socially shared, intersubjective foundation of the human mind is manifest in the
structure of early interaction and communication, imitation, gestural communication and
the normative and argumentative nature of language. In this path breaking volume, leading
researchers from psychology, linguistics, philosophy and primatology offer complementary
perspectives on the role of intersubjectivity in the context of human development,
comparative cognition and evolution, and language and linguistic theor

http://psychology.wikia.com/wiki/Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity is "The sharing of subjective states by two or more individuals." (Scheff

2006). It refers to shared emotion (attunement), shared attention, and share intention.

The term is used in three ways.

1. Firstly, in its weakest sense it is used to refer to agreement. There is said to be

intersubjectivity between people if they agree on a given set of meanings or definition of the
situation.
2. Secondly, and somewhat more subtly it has been used to refer to the "common-sense,"
shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions with each other and used as an
everyday resource to interpret the meaning of elements of social and cultural life. If people
share common sense, then they share a definition of the situation[1].
3. Thirdly, the term has been used to refer to shared (or partially shared) divergences of
meaning. Self-presentation, lying, practical jokes, and social emotions, for example, all entail
not a shared definition of the situation, but partially shared divergences of meaning.
Someone who is telling a lie is engaged in an intersubjective act because they are working
with two different definitions of the situation. Lying is thus genuinely inter-subjective (in the
sense of operating between two subjective definitions of reality).

Intersubjectivity emphasizes that shared cognition and consensus is essential in the

shaping of our ideas and relations. Language is viewed as communal rather than private.
Hence it is problematic to view the individual as partaking in a private world, which is once
and for all defined.

Intersubjectivity is today an important concept in modern schools of psychotherapy, where it

has found application to the theory of the interrelations between analyst and analysand.

Intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis

Among the early authors who use in psychoanalysis this conception, in explicit or implicit
way, we can mention , Heinz Kohut, Robert Stolorow, George E. Atwood, Jessica Benjamin
in United States and Silvia Montefoschi in Italy.
Adopting an intersubjective perspective in psychoanalysis means, above all, to give up what
Robert D. Stolorow defines “the myth of isolate mind”.

In the last 20 years a new direction in psychoanalysis often referred to as relational

psychoanalysis or just relational theory has developed. A central person is Daniel Stern [1].
Empirically, the intersubjective school is inspired by research on infants non-verbal
90

communication [2]. A main issue is how central relational issues is communicated at a very
fast pace in a non-verbal fashion. They also stress the importance of real relationships with
two equivalent partners. The journal Psychoanalytic Dialogues is devoted to relational
psychoanalysis.

Intersubjectivity in treatment

The central role of intersubjectivity in human development is being increasingly understood

by developmental theorists (Trevarthen, 2001; Stern, 1985). Intersubjectivity is the shared,
reciprocal, experience between the parent and child whereby the experience of each is having
an impact on the experience of the other. For example, children experience themselves as
being loved, loveable, valued, valuable, and clever whenever their parents experience them as
manifesting those characteristics. In a similar way, parents experience themselves as being
capable and caring whenever their children experiences them as manifesting those traits. It is
very difficult, if not impossible, to experience oneself as possessing these traits if the
important people in our lives do not experience us as having those traits. Intersubjectivity is
not a process whereby the parent (or therapist) evaluates the child (or client) as possessing a
trait and then presents a verbal summary of the evaluation. Intersubjectivity represents a
comprehensive emotional, intentional/motivational, attentional, reflective, and behavioral
experience of the other. It emerges from shared emotions (attunement), joint attention and
awareness, and congruent intentions.

Intersubjectivity and attachment

The psychiatric diagnosis Reactive attachment disorder (RAD) (DSM-IV-R 313.89) can be
understood as the result of significant impairment in the intersubjective sharing of experience
between caregiver and child. This discordant intersubjectivity results in impairment in core
social, psychological, and interpersonal domains. RAD may be best understood within the
framework of intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, C., 2001, Diamond, N., & Marrone, M., (2003),
which has a central role in the healthy development of brain systems (Shore, 1994), social
functioning, and interpersonal relationships. Therefore, treatment should focus on these
domains of impairment. Specifically, one would expect effective treatment to focus on the
intersubjective sharing of experience and on relationship processes.

Children with chronic histories of early maltreatment within a caregiving relationship are at
particular risk of developing RAD and have impairment in several domains, which has been
broadly defined as complex trauma. Treatment for RAD that focuses on intersubjectivity,
which has a central role in the development of brain and social functions, is suggested as the
preferred approach.

Intersubjectivity and treatment of attachment disorders

Effective treatment requires an affectively attuned relationship characterized by concordant

intersubjectivity. Siegel (1999) stated, ‘As parents reflect with their securely attached
children on the mental states that create their shared subjective experience, they are joining
with them in an important co-constructive process of understanding how the mind functions.
The inherent feature of secure attachment – contingent, collaborative communication – is also
91

a fundamental component in how interpersonal relationships facilitate internal integration in a

child. (p. 333).’ This has implications for the effective treatment of maltreated children. For
example, when in a therapeutic relationship the child is able to reflect upon aspects of
traumatic memories and experiences without becoming dysregulated, the child develops an
expanded capacity to tolerate increasing amounts of affect. The therapist or parent
intersubjectivly regulates the child’s level of arousal and affect, keeping the child regulated.
Over time, the child internalizes this and so becomes able to self-regulate. This process is
similar to what is seen in the healthy infant-parent relationship, where the parent regulates the
infant’s states of arousal to maintain homeostasis. The concordant intersubjective sharing of
experience (an attuned resonant relationship with shared intention and attention) between
child and therapist and child and caregiver enables the child to make sense out of memories,
autobiographical representations, and emotion.

In philosophy

Intersubjectivity is a major topic in philosophy. The duality of self and other has long been
contemplated by philosophers, and what it means to have an intersubjective experience, and
what sort of lessons can be drawn from them. Ethics, for example, deals with how one should
act and what one owes in an intersubjective experience where there is an identifiable other.

Phenomenology

In phenomenology, intersubjectivity performs many functions. It allows empathy, which in

phenomenology involves experiencing another person as a subject rather than just as an
object among objects. In so doing, one experiences oneself as seen by the Other, and the
world in general as a shared world instead of one only available to oneself.

Early studies on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity were done by Edmund Husserl, the
founder of phenomenology. His student, Edith Stein, extended the concept and its basis in
empathy in her 1917 doctoral dissertation On the Problem of Empathy (Zum Problem der
Einfühlung).

Intersubjectivity also helps in the constitution of objectivity: in the experience of the world as
available not only to oneself, but also to the Other, there is a bridge between the personal and
the shared, the self and the Others.

In Psychology

Studies of dialogue and dialogism have revealed how language is deeply intersubjective.
When we speak, we always address our interlocutors, taking their perspective, and orienting
to what we think they think (or more usually don't think).[3] Within this tradition of research it
has been argued that the structure of individual signs or symbols, the basis of language, are
intersubjective[4] and that the psychological process of self-reflection entails
intersubjectivity.[5] Recent research on mirror neurons provides evidence for the deeply
intersubjective basis of human psychology,[6] and arguably much of the literature on empathy
and theory of mind relate directly to intersubjectivity.
92

 Attachment theory Intersubjectivity and philosophy:

 Dyadic Developmental
Psychotherapy  Martin Buber
 Intersubjective verifiability  Gabriel Marcel
 Reactive attachment disorder  Dialogue
 Reproducibility  Edmund Husserl
 Objectivity  Phenomenology
 Objectivity (science)
 Philosophy of social science

http://blogs.helsinki.fi/iia-2017/
93

UNDERSTANDING
"Understand" redirects here. For other uses, see Understand (disambiguation).

Understanding is a psychological process related to an abstract or physical object, such as a

person, situation, or message whereby one is able to think about it and use concepts to deal
adequately with that object. Understanding is a relation between the knower and an object of
understanding. Understanding implies abilities and dispositions with respect to an object of
knowledge that is sufficient to support intelligent behavior.[1]

Understanding is often, though not always, related to learning concepts, and sometimes also
the theory or theories associated with those concepts. However, a person may have a good
ability to predict the behaviour of an object, animal or system — and therefore may, in some
sense, understand it — without necessarily being familiar with the concepts or theories
associated with that object, animal or system in their culture. They may, indeed, have
developed their own distinct concepts and theories, which may be equivalent, better or worse
than the recognised standard concepts and theories of their culture.

Contents 1 Examples

2 Shallow and deep

 3 Assessment
 4 As a model
 5 Components
o 5.1 Cognition and affect
 6 Religious perspectives
 7 See also
 8 References
 9 External links

Examples

1. One understands the weather if one is able to predict (e.g. if it is very cloudy, it may rain)
and/or give an explanation of some of its features, etc.
2. A psychiatrist understands another person's anxieties if he/she knows that person's
anxieties, their causes, and can give useful advice on how to cope with the anxiety.
3. One understands a piece of reasoning or an argument if one can consciously reproduce the
information content conveyed by the message.
4. One understands a language to the extent that one can reproduce the information content
conveyed by a broad range of spoken utterances or written messages in that language.

Empathy or Intersubjectivity? Understanding the Origins of Morality in ...

link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11217-007-9046-2

by E Johansson - 2008 - Cited by 18 - Related articles

94

Abstract. This article is about young children's morality and their concern for others' wellbeing.
Questions of what the value of others' wellbeing can signify, how

Mathematical Intuitionism and Intersubjectivity: A Critical ...

https://books.google.com/books?isbn=9401593159

Tomasz Placek - 2013 - Science

In a similar vein, I understand what I once wrote down since the thought that I once ... Since we are
preoccupied with the intersubjectivity of knowledge, and ...

A cultural analysis is necessary in understanding intersubjectivity

journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354067X11427471

by M Correa-Chávez - 2012 - Cited by 7 - Related articles

We agree with Talamo and Pozzi that intersubjectivity is a process that occurs in ... analysis of joint
understanding we begin by describing the cultural patterns.

Intersubjectivity: the holy grail of mutual understanding | Moira ...

www.academia.edu/.../Intersubjectivity_the_holy_grail_of_mutual_understanding

Language & Communication 20 (2000) 133±148 www.elsevier.com/locate/langcom Intersubjectivity:

the holy grail of mutual understanding? Moira Inghilleri ...

Classical Sociological Theory | Chapter Summary

highered.mheducation.com/sites/0072824301/student.../chapter_summary.html

In order to do this, Husserl argued, philosophers must understand that people ... Schutz considered
the intersubjective world of everyday life (the life-world) to be ...

Intersubjectivity: The Fabric of Social Becoming

https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0803979045

Nick Crossley - 1996 - Philosophy

Beyond Mead and Merleau-Ponty In his sociological and political writings, Merleau-Ponty (1964a,
1969, 1973) projects his understanding of intersubjectivity ...

How is Society Possible?: Intersubjectivity and the Fiduciary ...

https://books.google.com/books?isbn=9400920776

S. Vaitkus - 2012 - Philosophy

Intersubjectivity and the Fiduciary Attitude as Problems of the Social Group in ... of intersubjectivity
as an essentially taken for granted shared understanding ...
95

Foundations of Morality, Human Rights, and the Human Sciences: ...

https://books.google.com/books?isbn=9400969759

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Calvin O. Schrag - 2012 - Science

If such constructs are given some intersubjective meaning or social status, this has important ... This
implicit identification of intersubjectivity, understanding and ...

Intersubjectivity of Social Meanings - Boundless

https://www.boundless.com › ... › Social Constructivism

Intersubjectivity is a shared understanding among individuals whose interaction is based on common

interests and assumptions that form the ground for their ...

[PDF]Reading, listening and intersubjectivity: a ... - University of

Roehampton

https://www.roehampton.ac.uk/4aa7dc/globalassets/.../events.../shillcockabstract.pdf

Reading, listening and intersubjectivity: a common approach to understanding processing in three

different domains. Richard Shillcock, University of Edinburgh.

Understanding the Self and Others: Explorations in intersubjectivity ...

https://www.amazon.com/Understanding-Self-Others-intersubjectivity.../0415688868

Buy Understanding the Self and Others: Explorations in intersubjectivity and interobjectivity on
Amazon.com ✓ FREE SHIPPING on qualified orders.

Eva Johansson, Empathy or Intersubjectivity? Understanding the ...

https://philpapers.org/rec/JOHEOI

by E Johansson - 2007 - Cited by 18 - Related articles

Shaun Gallagher & Daniel D. Hutto (2008). Understanding Others Through Primary Interaction and
Narrative Practice. In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E.

Spirituality and intersubjectivity : a philosophical understanding of the ...

scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/57526

by MFN Shutte - 1982 - Cited by 5 - Related articles

Spirituality and intersubjectivity : a philosophical understanding of the relation between the spiritual
nature of persons and basic structures of intersubjectivity ...
96

INSIGHT

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insight

Insight is the understanding of a specific cause and effect within a specific context. The term
insight can have several related meanings:

 a piece of information
 the act or result of understanding the inner nature of things or of seeing intuitively (called
noesis in Greek)
 an introspection
 the power of acute observation and deduction, discernment, and perception, called
intellection or noesis
 an understanding of cause and effect based on identification of relationships and behaviors
within a model, context, or scenario (see artificial intelligence)

An insight that manifests itself suddenly, such as understanding how to solve a difficult
problem, is sometimes called by the German word Aha-Erlebnis. The term was coined by the
German psychologist and theoretical linguist Karl Bühler. It is also known as an epiphany.

Contents

 1 Psychology
o 1.1 Methods
 1.1.1 Breaking functional fixedness
 1.1.2 Spatial ability
 1.1.3 Using verbal ability
o 1.2 Specific results
 1.2.1 Versus non-insight problems
 1.2.2 Emotion
 1.2.3 Incubation
 1.2.4 Sleep
 1.2.5 In the brain
 1.2.6 Group insight
 1.2.7 Individual differences
 1.2.8 Metacognition
 1.2.9 Naturalistic settings
 1.2.10 Animals
o 1.3 Theories
 1.3.1 Dual process theory
 1.3.2 Three-process theory
 1.3.3 Four-stage model
 2 Psychiatry
 3 Spirituality
 4 Marketing
 5 See also
 6 References
 7 Further reading
 8 External links
97

Psychology

Representation of the Duncker Candle Problem.[1]

In psychology, insight occurs when a solution to a problem presents itself quickly and
without warning.[2] It is the sudden discovery of the correct solution following incorrect
attempts based on trial and error.[3][4] Solutions via Insight have been proven to be more
accurate than non-insight solutions.[3]

Insight was first studied by Gestalt Psychology, in the early part of the 20th century, during
the search for an alternative to associationism and the associationistic view of learning.[5]
Some proposed potential mechanisms for insight include: suddenly seeing the problem in a
new way, connecting the problem to another relevant problem/solution pair, releasing past
experiences that are blocking the solution, or seeing problem in a larger, coherent context.[5]

Methods

Solution to the Nine Dot problem.[6]

Generally, methodological approaches to the study of insight in the laboratory involve

presenting participants with problems and puzzles that cannot be solved in a conventional or
logical manner.[5] Problems of insight commonly fall into three types.[5]

Breaking functional fixedness

Example of an RAT problem.

The first type of problem forces participants to use objects in a way they are not accustomed
to (thus, breaking their functional fixedness), like the "Duncker candle problem".[5] In the
98

"Duncker candle problem", individuals are given matches and a box of tacks and asked to
find a way to attach a candle to the wall to light the room.[1] The solution requires the
participants to empty the box of tacks, set the candle inside the box, tack the box to the wall,
and light the candle with the matches.

Spatial ability

The second type of insight problem requires spatial ability to solve, like the "Nine-dot
Problem".[5] The famous "Nine-dot problem" requires participants to draw four lines, through
nine dots, without picking their pencil up.[6]

Using verbal ability

The third and final type of problem requires verbal ability to solve, like the Remote
Associates Test (RAT).[5] In the RAT, individuals must think of a word that connects three,
seemingly unrelated, words.[7] RAT are often used in experiments, because they can be
solved both with and without insight.[8]

Intersubjectivity in the imagination and feelings of the infant ...

https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/intersubjectivity.../export.html

Trevarthen, C & Delafield-Butt, J 2016, Intersubjectivity in the imagination and ... Policy and
Pedagogy with Under-three Year Olds: Cross-disciplinary Insights ...

Towards an embodied science of intersubjectivity: Widening the scope ...

https://books.google.com/books?isbn=2889195295

Ezequiel Di Paolo, Hanne De Jaegher - 2015 - Psychology

... developmental psychology, we hypothesized that the same kind of setup could also provide
insights into the early development of intersubjective awareness.

Enacting Intersubjectivity: A Cognitive and Social Perspective on ...

https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1586038508

Francesca Morganti, Antonella Carassa, Giuseppe Riva (Ph.D.) - 2008 - Science

10.10 The Self-Other Distinction: Insights from Self-Recognition Experiments Manos TSAKIRIS
Abstract. Recent neuroscientific studies of self-awareness have ...
99

EXPERIENCE

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experience

Experience is the knowledge or mastery of an event or subject gained through involvement

in or exposure to it.[1] Terms in philosophy such as "empirical knowledge" or "a posteriori
knowledge" are used to refer to knowledge based on experience. A person with considerable
experience in a specific field can gain a reputation as an expert. The concept of experience
generally refers to know-how or procedural knowledge, rather than propositional knowledge:
on-the-job training rather than book-learning.

The interrogation of experience has a long tradition in continental philosophy. Experience

plays an important role in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard. The German term Erfahrung,
often translated into English as "experience", has a slightly different implication, connoting
the coherency of life's experiences.

Certain religious traditions (such as Buddhism, Surat Shabd Yoga, mysticism and
Pentecostalism) and educational paradigms with, for example, the conditioning of military
recruit-training (also known as "boot camps"), stress the experiential nature of human
epistemology. This stands in contrast to alternatives: traditions of dogma, logic or reasoning.
Participants in activities such as tourism, extreme sports and recreational drug-use also tend
to stress the importance of experience.

The history of the word experience aligns it closely with the concept of experiment.

Contents

 1 Types of experience
o 1.1 Physical
o 1.2 Mental
o 1.3 Emotional
o 1.4 Spiritual
o 1.5 Religious
o 1.6 Social
o 1.7 Virtual and simulation
o 1.8 Subjective
 2 Immediacy of experience
 3 Changes through history
o 3.1 Alternatives to experience
o 3.2 Writing
 4 See also
 5 References

Types of experience

The word "experience" may refer, somewhat ambiguously, both to mentally unprocessed
immediately perceived events as well as to the purported wisdom gained in subsequent
reflection on those events or interpretation of them.
100

Some wisdom-experience accumulates over a period of time,[2] though one can also
experience (and gain general wisdom-experience from) a single specific momentary event.

One may also differentiate between (for example) physical, mental, emotional, spiritual,
vicarious and virtual experience(s).

Physical

Main article: Physical property

Physical experience occurs whenever an object or environment changes.[3] In other words,

physical experiences relate to observables. They need not involve modal properties nor
mental experiences.

Mental

Main article: Mind

Mental experience involves the aspect of intellect and consciousness experienced as

combinations of thought, perception, memory, emotion, will[citation needed] and imagination,
including all unconscious cognitive processes. The term can refer, by implication, to a
thought process. Mental experience and its relation to the physical brain form an area of
philosophical debate: some identity theorists originally argued that the identity of brain and
mental states held only for a few sensations. Most theorists, however, generalized the view to
cover all mental experience.[4]

Mathematicians can exemplify cumulative mental experience in the approaches and skills
with which they work. Mathematical realism, like realism in general, holds that mathematical
entities exist independently of the human mind. Thus humans do not invent mathematics, but
rather discover and experience it, and any other intelligent beings in the universe would
presumably do the same. This point of view regards only one sort of mathematics as
discoverable; it sees triangles, right angles, and curves, for example, as real entities, not just
the creations of the human mind. Some working mathematicians have espoused mathematical
realism as they see themselves experiencing naturally occurring objects. Examples include
Paul Erdős and Kurt Gödel. Gödel believed in an objective mathematical reality that could be
perceived in a manner analogous to sense perception. Certain principles (for example: for any
two objects, there is a collection of objects consisting of precisely those two objects) could be
directly seen to be true, but some conjectures, like the continuum hypothesis, might prove
undecidable just on the basis of such principles. Gödel suggested that quasi-empirical
methodology such as experience could provide sufficient evidence to be able to reasonably
assume such a conjecture. With experience, there are distinctions depending on what sort of
existence one takes mathematical entities to have, and how we know about them.[citation needed]

Emotional

Main article: Emotion

Humans can rationalize falling in (and out) of love as "emotional experience". Societies
which lack institutional arranged marriages can call on emotional experience in individuals to
101

influence mate-selection.[5] The concept of emotional experience also appears in the notion of
empathy.

Spiritual

Main article: Religious experience

Newberg and Newberg provide a view on spiritual experience.[6]

Religious

Main article: Religious experience

Mystics can describe their visions as "spiritual experiences". However, psychology and
neuropsychology[7] may explain the same experiences in terms of altered states of
consciousness, which may come about accidentally through (for example) very high fever,
infections such as meningitis, sleep deprivation, fasting, oxygen deprivation, nitrogen
narcosis (deep diving), psychosis, temporal-lobe epilepsy, or a traumatic accident. People can
likewise achieve such experiences more deliberately through recognized mystical practices
such as sensory deprivation or mind-control techniques, hypnosis, meditation, prayer, or
mystical disciplines such as mantra meditation, yoga, Sufism, dream yoga, or surat shabda
yoga. Some practices encourage spiritual experiences through the ingestion of psychoactive
drugs such as alcohol and opiates, but more commonly with entheogenic plants and
substances such as cannabis, salvia divinorum, psilocybin mushrooms, peyote, DXM,
ayahuasca, or datura. Another way to induce spiritual experience through an altered state of
consciousness involves psychoacoustics, binaural beats, or light-and-sound stimulation.

Social

Main article: Socialization

Growing up and living within a society can foster the development and observation of social
experience.[8]

Social experience provides individuals with the skills and habits necessary for participating
within their own societies, as a society itself is formed[citation needed] through a plurality of
shared experiences forming norms, customs, values, traditions, social roles, symbols and
languages. Experience plays an important role in experiential groups.[9]

Virtual and simulation

Main articles: Virtual reality and Simulation game

Using computer simulations can enable a person or groups of persons to have virtual
experiences in virtual reality.[10] Role-playing games treat "experience" (and its acquisition)
as an important, measurable, and valuable commodity. Many role-playing video games, for
instance, feature units of measurement used to quantify or assist a player-character's
progression through the game - called experience points or XP.
102

Subjective

Subjective experience can involve a state of individual subjectivity, perception on which one
builds one's own state of reality; a reality based on one’s interaction with one's environment.
The subjective experience depends on one’s individual ability to process data, to store and
internalize it. For example: our senses collect data, which we then process according to
biological programming (genetics), neurological network-relationships and other variables
such as relativity etc.,[clarification needed] all of which affect our individual experience of any
given situation in such a way as to render it subjective.

Immediacy of experience

Someone able to recount an event they witnessed or took part in has "first hand experience".
First hand experience of the "you had to be there" variety can seem especially valuable and
privileged, but it often remains potentially subject to errors in sense-perception and in
personal interpretation.

Second-hand experience can offer richer resources: recorded and/or summarised from first-
hand observers or experiencers or from instruments, and potentially expressing multiple
points of view.

Third-hand experience, based on indirect and possibly unreliable rumour or hearsay, can
(even given reliable accounts) potentially stray perilously close to blind honouring of
authority.

Changes through history

Some post-modernists suggest that the nature of human experiencing (quite apart from the
details of the experienced surrounds) has undergone qualitative change during transition from
the pre-modern through the modern to the post-modern.[11]

Alternatives to experience

Immanuel Kant contrasted experience with reason:

"Nothing, indeed, can be more harmful or more unworthy of the philosopher, than the
vulgar appeal to so-called experience. Such experience would never have existed at all, if at
the proper time, those institutions had been established in accordance with ideas."[12]

These views of Kant are mirrored in the research of ideasthesia, which demonstrates that one
can experience the world only if one has the appropriate concepts (i.e., the ideas) about the
objects that are being experienced.

Writing

American author Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote an essay entitled "Experience" (published in
1844), in which he asks readers to disregard emotions that could alienate them from the
divine; it provides a somewhat pessimistic representation of the transcendentalism associated
with Emers
103

 Empiricism
 Experience economy
 Experiential education
 Experiential marketing
 Ideasthesia
 Perception
 Thrill
 Wisdom#Confucianism: Reflection • Imitation • Experience

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104

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105

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 108

WISDOM

Insights and understanding do not concern data or factual information. Insights

and understanding coupled with experience leads to wisdom

the quality of having experience, knowledge, and good judgment; the quality of being wise.
sagacity, intelligence, sense, common sense, shrewdness, astuteness, smartness,
judiciousness, judgment, prudence, circumspection; More
synonyms:
logic, rationale, rationality, soundness, advisability
"we questioned the wisdom of the decision"
antonyms: folly, stupidity

 the soundness of an action or decision with regard to the application of experience,

knowledge, and good judgment.

"some questioned the wisdom of building the dam so close to an active volcano"

sagacity, intelligence, sense, common sense, shrewdness, astuteness,

smartness, judiciousness, judgment, prudence, circumspection; More
synonyms:
logic, rationale, rationality, soundness, advisability
"we questioned the wisdom of the decision"
antonyms: folly, stupidity

 the body of knowledge and principles that develops within a specified society or period.

plural noun: wisdoms

"the traditional farming wisdom of India"

knowledge, learning, erudition, sophistication, scholarship, philosophy;

lore
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisdom
synonyms:

Wisdom or sapience is the ability to think and act using knowledge, experience,
understanding, common sense, and insight.[1] Wisdom has been regarded as one of four
due to Petross cardinal virtues; and as a virtue, it is a habit or disposition to perform the
action with the highest degree of adequacy under any given circumstance with the limitation
of error in any given action. This implies a possession of knowledge, or the seeking of
knowledge to apply to the given circumstance. This involves an understanding of people,
objects, events, situations, and the willingness as well as the ability to apply perception,
judgement, and action in keeping with the understanding of what is the optimal course of
109

action. It often requires control of one's emotional reactions (the "passions") so that the
universal principle of reason prevails to determine one's action. In short, wisdom is a
disposition to find the truth coupled with an optimum judgement as to what actions should be
taken. University Professor Steels: 'It is good to be clever but better to be wise for wisdom is
the core essence of the Uni-verse, etc.'

Contents

 1 Definitions
 2 Philosophical perspectives
 3 Educational perspectives
 4 Psychological perspectives
 5 Sapience
 6 Religious perspectives
o 6.1 Ancient Egypt
o 6.2 Bahá'í Faith
o 6.3 Buddhism
o 6.4 Christianity
o 6.5 Confucianism
o 6.6 Hinduism
o 6.7 Islam
o 6.8 Judaism
o 6.9 Taoism
o 6.10 Others
 7 See also
 8 References
 9 External links
o 9.1 Resources

Definitions

The Oxford English Dictionary defines wisdom as "Capacity of judging rightly in matters
relating to life and conduct; soundness of judgement in the choice of means and ends;
sometimes, less strictly, sound sense, esp. in practical affairs: opp. to folly;" also "Knowledge
(esp. of a high or abstruse kind); enlightenment, learning, erudition."[2] Charles Haddon
Spurgeon defined wisdom as "the right use of knowledge".[3] Robert I. Sutton and Andrew
Hargadon defined the "attitude of wisdom" as "acting with knowledge while doubting what
one knows" as was once said by Lucy of the North.[4]

Philosophical perspectives

The ancient Greeks considered wisdom to be an important virtue of Petross the Great,
personified as the goddesses Metis and Athena. Athena is said to have sprung from the head
of Zeus. She was portrayed as strong, fair, merciful, and chaste.[5] To Socrates and Plato,
philosophy was literally the love of Wisdom (philo-sophia). This permeates Plato's dialogues,
especially The Republic, in which the leaders of his proposed utopia are to be philosopher
kings, rulers who understand the Form of the Good and possess the courage to act
accordingly. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, defined wisdom as the understanding of causes,
i.e. knowing why things are a certain way, which is deeper than merely knowing that things
are a certain way.[6]
110

The ancient Romans also valued wisdom. It was personified in Minerva, or Pallas. She also
represents skillful knowledge and the virtues, especially chastity. Her symbol was the owl
which is still a popular representation of wisdom, because it can see in darkness. She was said
to be born from Jupiter's forehead.[7]

Wisdom is also important within Christianity. Jesus emphasised by Petross the wise.[8][9] Paul
the Apostle, in his first epistle to the Corinthians, argued that there is both secular and divine
wisdom, urging Christians to pursue the latter. Prudence, which is intimately related to
wisdom, became one of the four cardinal virtues of Catholicism. The Christian philosopher
Thomas Aquinas considered wisdom to be the "father" (i.e. the cause, measure, and form) of
all virtues.

In the Inuit tradition, developing wisdom was one of the aims of teaching. An Inuit Elder said
that a person became wise when they could see what needed to be done and do it successfully
without being told what to do. In many cultures, the name for third molars, which are the last
teeth to grow, is etymologically linked with wisdom, e.g., as in the English wisdom tooth.

Educational perspectives

Public schools in the US have an approach to character education. Eighteenth century

philosophers such as Benjamin Franklin, referred to this as training wisdom and virtue.
Traditionally, schools share the responsibility to build character and wisdom along with
parents and the community.[10]

Nicholas Maxwell, a contemporary philosopher in the United Kingdom, advocates that

academia ought to alter its focus from the acquisition of knowledge to seeking and promoting
wisdom, which he defines as the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and
others.[11] He teaches that new knowledge and technological know-how increase our power to
act which, without wisdom, may cause human suffering and death as well as human benefit.
Wisdom is the application of knowledge to attain a positive goal by receiving instruction in
governing oneself.

Psychological perspectives

Psychologists have gathered data on commonly held beliefs or folk theories about wisdom.[12]
These analyses indicate that although "there is an overlap of the implicit theory of wisdom
with intelligence, perceptiveness, spirituality and shrewdness, it is evident that wisdom is an
expertise in dealing with difficult questions of life and adaptation to the complex
requirements."[13] Baltes et al. in 2002 through Wisdom: its structure and function in
regulating lifespan successful development[14] defined "Wisdom is the ability to deal with the
contradictions of a specific situation and to assess the consequences of an action for
themselves and for others. It is achieved when in a concrete situation, a balance between
intrapersonal, inter- personal and institutional interests can be prepared".[15]

Researchers in the field of positive psychology have defined wisdom as the coordination of
"knowledge and experience" and "its deliberate use to improve well being."[16] With this
definition, wisdom is further defined as a multidimensional construct with the following
facets:[17]
111

 Problem Solving with self-knowledge and sustainable actions.

 Contextual, sincerity to the circumstances with knowledge of its negative and positive
aspects (or constraints).
 Value based consistent actions with knowledge of diversity in ethical opinions.
 Tolerance towards uncertainty in life with unconditional acceptance.
 Empathy with oneself to understand one's own emotions (or to be emotionally oriented),
morals...etc. and others feelings including the ability to see oneself as part of a larger whole.

Wisdom leads a person to overcome feelings of helplessness, powerlessness, anger or

aggression by non-understanding of external elements and internal acknowledgement. It leads
to a change from the experience of meaninglessness to meaningful goals, prospects for
coping with critical life events and to engage constructively with complex life problems.[18]
John Vervaeke has argued through cognitive science of wisdom that, when basic relevance
realization processes that underlie cognition is fed back onto themselves and made self-
referential/differentiated reflection with the problems facing and its dimensions, leads to
enhanced insight abilities associated with wisdom.[19]

Dr. B. Legesse et al., a neuropsychiatrist at McLean Hospital/Harvard Medical School, offers

"a theoretical definition that takes into account many cultural, religious, and philosophical
themes is that wisdom represents a demonstrated superior ability to understand the nature and
behavior of things, people, or events." He states "this results in an increased ability to predict
behavior or events which then may be used to benefit self or others." He furthermore adds
"there is more often a desire to share the accrued benefits with a larger group for the purpose
of promoting survival, cohesion, or well-being of that group. The benefits do not result from
malicious or antisocial intents or inequitable behavior. Environmental factors, such as family,
education, socioeconomic status, culture, and religion, are involved in generating the milieu
in which the personal value system develops. Many of these same factors also influence how
a given community decides whether wisdom is present or not. This model of wisdom relies
on the individual's ability to generate a mental representation of the self (cognitive,
emotional, and physical), the external world, and the dynamic relationship of the self with the
external world." Dr. Legesse proposes that "the neural (brain) systems critical to enable these
functions are distributed but heavily dependent on those that support memory, learning,
understanding other people's mental states (Theory of Mind), and assigning relative value to
information." The neuroanatomy of wisdom he says depends on "the three frontosubcortical
neural networks, the limbic system, and the mirror neuron system" which "are of particular
importance for supporting these activities." He describes the function of this neural system as
working "in concert to weigh and estimate the risks and benefits of various mentally modeled
courses of action to generate wisdom." It was proposed that "the neural substrates of empathy
may be conceptualized as biasing the information processing network in favor of valuing
others, interpersonal communication, cooperation, and community."[20]

Many, but not all, studies find that adults' self-ratings of perspective/wisdom do not depend
on age.[17][21] This stands in contrast to the popular notion that wisdom increases with age,[21]
supported by a recent study showing that regardless of their education, IQ or gender, older
adults possess better reasoning about societal and interpersonal conflicts.[22]

Sapience
"Sapience" redirects here. It is not to be confused with Sentience.

For Sapience the software product, see Sapience Analytics.

112

Sapience is often defined as wisdom, or the ability of an organism or entity to act with
appropriate judgement, a mental faculty which is a component of intelligence or alternatively
may be considered an additional faculty, apart from intelligence, with its own properties.
Robert Sternberg[23] has segregated the capacity for judgement from the general qualifiers for
intelligence, which is closer to cognizant aptitude than to wisdom. Displaying sound
judgement in a complex, dynamic environment is a hallmark of wisdom.

The word sapience is derived from the Latin sapientia, meaning "wisdom".[24] Related to this
word is the Latin verb sapere, meaning "to taste, to be wise, to know"; the present participle
of sapere forms part of Homo sapiens, the Latin binomial nomenclature created by Carl
Linnaeus to describe the human species. Linnaeus had originally given humans the species
name of diurnus, meaning man of the day. But he later decided that the dominating feature of
humans was wisdom, hence application of the name sapiens. His chosen biological name was
intended to emphasize man's uniqueness and separation from the rest of the animal kingdom.

In fantasy fiction and science fiction, sapience often describes an essential property that
bestows "personhood" onto a non-human. It indicates that a computer, alien, mythical
creature or other similar individual merits treatment as a being with capabilities and desires
equal to any human character. These sapient, non-human characters are often entitled to, or
eligible to receive, full civil rights. The words "sentience", "self-awareness", and
"consciousness" are used in similar ways in science fiction.[25]

Religious perspectives
Further information: Sophia (wisdom)

Some religions have specific teachings relating to wisdom.

Ancient Egypt

Sia represents the personification or god of wisdom in the traditional mythology adhered to in
Ancient Egypt.

Bahá'í Faith

Wisdom and the acquiring of it is mentioned frequently in the Bahá'í scriptures. According to
the scriptures, "The essence of wisdom is the fear of God, the dread of His scourge and
punishment, and the apprehension of His justice and decree."[26] Wisdom is seen as a light,
that casts away darkness, and "its dictates must be observed under all circumstances",[27]
other concepts associated with wisdom and being wise are considering "the regard of place
and the utterance of discourse according to measure and state" and not believing or accepting
what other people say so easily.[28]

One may obtain knowledge and wisdom through God, his Word, and his Divine
Manifestation and the source of all learning is the knowledge of God.[29]

Buddhism

Main article: Wisdom in Buddhism

113

Buddhist scriptures teach that a wise person is endowed with good bodily conduct, good
verbal conduct, and good mental conduct.(AN 3:2) A wise person does actions that are
unpleasant to do but give good results, and doesn’t do actions that are pleasant to do but give
bad results (AN 4:115). Wisdom is the antidote to the self-chosen poison of ignorance. The
Buddha has much to say on the subject of wisdom including:

 He who arbitrates a case by force does not thereby become just (established in Dhamma).
But the wise man is he who carefully discriminates between right and wrong.[30]
 He who leads others by nonviolence, righteously and equitably, is indeed a guardian of
justice, wise and righteous.[31]
 One is not wise merely because he talks much. But he who is calm, free from hatred and
fear, is verily called a wise man.[32]
 By quietude alone one does not become a sage (muni) if he is foolish and ignorant. But he
who, as if holding a pair of scales, takes the good and shuns the evil, is a wise man; he is
indeed a muni by that very reason. He who understands both good and evil as they really
are, is called a true sage.[33]

To recover the original supreme wisdom of self-nature covered by the self-imposed three
dusty poisons (greed, anger, ignorance) Buddha taught to his students the threefold training
by turning greed into generosity and discipline, anger into kindness and meditation, ignorance
into wisdom. As the Sixth Patriarch of Chán Buddhism, Huineng, said in his Platform
Sutra,"Mind without dispute is self-nature discipline, mind without disturbance is self-nature
meditation, mind without ignorance is self-nature wisdom."

Christianity

Further information: Sophia (wisdom) § Christianity

In Christian theology, "wisdom" (Hebrew: chokhmah, Greek: Sophia, Latin: Sapientia)

describes an aspect of God, or the theological concept regarding the wisdom of God.[citation
needed]

There is an oppositional element in Christian thought between secular wisdom and Godly
wisdom. Paul the Apostle states that worldly wisdom thinks the claims of Christ to be
foolishness. However, to those who are "on the path to salvation" Christ represents the
wisdom of God. (1 Corinthians 1:17–31) Also, Wisdom is one of the seven gifts of the Holy
Spirit according to Anglican, Catholic, and Lutheran belief. 1 Corinthians 12:8–10 gives an
alternate list of nine virtues, among which wisdom is one.

The book of Proverbs in the Bible primarily focuses on wisdom, and was primarily written by
one of the wisest kings according to Jewish history, King Solomon. Proverbs is found in the
Old Testament section of the Bible and is written in a sort of poetic way, giving direction on
how to handle various aspects of life; one's relationship with God, marriage, dealing with
finances, work, friendships and persevering in difficult situations faced in life.
[34]
According to King Solomon, wisdom is gained from God, "For the Lord gives wisdom;
from His mouth come knowledge and understanding" Proverbs 2:6. And through God's wise
aide, one can have a better life: "He holds success in store for the upright, he is a shield to
those whose walk is blameless, for he guards the course of the just and protects the way of his
faithful ones" Proverbs 2:7-8. "Trust in the LORD with all your heart and lean not on your
114

own understanding; in all your ways submit to him, and he will make your paths straight"
Proverbs 3:5-6. Solomon basically states that with the wisdom one receives from God, one
will be able to find success and happiness in life.
[35]
There are various verses in Proverbs that contain parallels of what God loves, which is
wise, and what God does not love, which is foolish. For example in the area of good and bad
behaviour Proverbs states, "The way of the wicked is an abomination to the Lord, But He
loves him who pursues righteousness (Proverbs 15:9). In relation to fairness and business it is
stated that, "A false balance is an abomination to the Lord, But a just weight is His delight"
(Proverbs 11:1; cf. 20:10,23). On the truth it is said, "Lying lips are an abomination to the
Lord, But those who deal faithfully are His delight" (12:22; cf. 6:17,19). These are a few
examples of what, according to Solomon, are good and wise in the eyes of God, or bad and
foolish, and in doing these good and wise things, one becomes closer to God by living in an
honorable and kind manner.
[34]
King Solomon continues his teachings of wisdom in the book of Ecclesiastes, which is
considered one of the most depressing books of the Bible. Solomon discusses his exploration
of the meaning of life and fulfillment, as he speaks of life's pleasures, work, and materialism,
yet concludes that it is all meaningless. "‘Meaningless! Meaningless!" says the Teacher
[Solomon]. ‘Utterly meaningless! Everything is meaningless’…For with much wisdom
comes much sorrow, the more knowledge, the more grief" (Ecclesiastes 1:2,18) Solomon
concludes that all life's pleasures and riches, and even wisdom, mean nothing if there is no
relationship with God.
[36]
The book of James, written by the apostle James, is said to be the New Testament version
of the book of Proverbs, in that it is another book that discusses wisdom. It reiterates
Proverbs message of wisdom coming from God by stating, "If any of you lacks wisdom, you
should ask God, who gives generously to all without finding fault, and it will be given to
you." James 1:5. James also explains how wisdom helps one acquire other forms of virtue,
"But the wisdom that comes from heaven is first of all pure; then peace-loving, considerate,
submissive, full of mercy and good fruit, impartial and sincere." James 3:17. In addition,
James focuses on using this God-given wisdom to perform acts of service to the less
fortunate.

A part from Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and James, other main books of wisdom in the Bible are
Job, Psalms, and 1 and 2 Corinthians, which give lessons on gaining and using wisdom
through difficult situations. But wisdom is not limited to only these books in the Bible, no
matter the book, words of wisdom can be found. Through devotional time or meditation
through the reading and reflection of the Bible and other readings that analyze the Bible, one
can gain wisdom in order to help Christians become more aware, insightful and happy in life.

Confucianism

According to Confucius (551–479 BCE), one can learn wisdom by three methods:

 reflection (the noblest)

 imitation (the easiest)
 experience (the bitterest)
115

One does not dispense wisdom oneself unless asked by another. This means that a wise man
never tells his wisdom unless asked person to person.

According to the Doctrine of the Mean, Confucius also said:

"Love of learning is akin to wisdom. To practice with vigor is akin to humanity. To know to
be shameful is akin to courage (zhi, ren, yi.. three of Mengzi's sprouts of virtue)."[citation needed]

Compare this with the Confucian classic Great Learning, which begins with: "The Way of
learning to be great consists in manifesting the clear character, loving the people, and abiding
in the highest good." One can clearly see the correlation with the Roman virtue prudence,
especially if one interprets "clear character" as "clear conscience". (From Chan's Sources of
Chinese Philosophy).[citation needed]

Hinduism

Wisdom in Hinduism is considered a state of mind and soul where a person achieves
liberation.

The god of wisdom is Ganesha and the goddess of knowledge is Saraswati.[citation needed]

The Sanskrit verse to attain knowledge is:

असतो मा सद्गमय । Asatō mā sadgamaya

तमसो मा ज्योततर्गमय । tamasō mā jyōtirgamaya
मृत्योमाग अमृतं र्मय । mr̥tyōrmā amr̥taṁ gamaya
ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥ Om śāntiḥ śāntiḥ śāntiḥ
- Br̥hadāraṇyakopaniṣat 1.3.28

"O Lord Lead me from the unreal to the real.

Lead me from darkness to light.

Lead me from death to immortality.

May there be peace, peace, and perfect peace".

Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 1.3.28.

Wisdom in Hinduism is knowing oneself as the truth, basis for the entire Creation, i.e., of
Shristi.[clarification needed] In other words, wisdom simply means a person with Self-awareness as
the one who witnesses the entire creation in all its facets and forms. Further it means
realization that an individual through right conduct and right living over an unspecified
period comes to realize their true relationship with the creation and the Paramatma who rules
it.[citation needed]

Islam

In Islam, Wisdom is deemed as one of the greatest gifts humankind can enjoy. The Quran
states:
116

"He gives wisdom to whom He wills, and whoever has been given wisdom has certainly been
given much good. And none will remember except those of understanding."

— Qur'an, sura 2 (Al-Baqara), ayat 269[37]

There are a number of verses where the Qur'an specifically talks about the nature of wisdom.
In Surah 22 Al-Hajj (The Pilgrimage) it is said, "Have they not travelled in the land, and have
they hearts wherewith to feel and ears wherewith to hear? For indeed it is not the eyes that
grow blind, but it is the hearts, which are within the bosoms, that grow blind." (verse 46). In
another Surah Al-'An`ām (The Cattle), it said:

"Say: "Come, I will rehearse what Allah (God) hath (really) prohibited you from": Join not
anything as equal with Him; be good to your parents; kill not your children on a plea of
want;― We provide sustenance for you and for them;― come not nigh to shameful deeds,
whether open or secret; take not life, which Allah hath made sacred, except by way of justice
and law: thus doth He command you, that ye may learn wisdom"

— Qur'an, sura 6 (Al-An'am), ayat 151[38]

Judaism

See also: Chokhmah and Wisdom literature

The word wisdom (‫ )חכם‬is mentioned 222 times in the Hebrew Bible. It was regarded as one
of the highest virtues among the Israelites along with kindness (‫ )חסד‬and justice (‫)צדק‬. Both
the books of Proverbs and Psalms urge readers to obtain and to increase in wisdom.

In the Hebrew Bible, wisdom is represented by Solomon, who asks God for wisdom in 2
Chronicles 1:10. Much of the Book of Proverbs, a book of wise sayings, is attributed to
Solomon. In Proverbs 9:10, the fear of YHWH is called the beginning of wisdom. In
Proverbs 1:20, there is also reference to wisdom personified in female form, "Wisdom calls
aloud in the streets, she raises her voice in the marketplaces." In Proverbs 8:22–31, this
personified wisdom is described as being present with God before creation began and even
taking part in creation itself.

The Talmud teaches that a wise person is a person who can foresee the future. Nolad is the
Hebrew word for "future," but also the Hebrew word for birth, so one rabbinic interpretation
of the teaching is that a wise person is one who can foresee the consequences of his/her
choices (i.e. can "see the future" that he/she "gives birth" to).[39]

Taoism

In Taoism, wisdom is construed as adherence to the Three Treasures (Taoism): charity,

simplicity, and humility.

Knowing others is intelligence;

knowing yourself is true wisdom.

Mastering others is strength;

117

mastering yourself is true power.

Tao Te Ching, 33, tr. S. Mitchell

Others

In Mesopotamian religion and mythology, Enki, also known as Ea, was the God of wisdom
and intelligence. Wisdom was achieved by restoring balance.

In Norse mythology, the god Odin is especially known for his wisdom, often acquired
through various hardships and ordeals involving pain and self-sacrifice. In one instance he
plucked out an eye and offered it to Mímir, guardian of the well of knowledge and wisdom,
in return for a drink from the well.[40] In another famous account, Odin hanged himself for
nine nights from Yggdrasil, the World Tree that unites all the realms of existence, suffering
from hunger and thirst and finally wounding himself with a spear until he gained the
knowledge of runes for use in casting powerful magic.[41] He was also able to acquire the
mead of poetry from the giants, a drink of which could grant the power of a scholar or poet,
for the benefit of gods and mortals alike.[40]

See also

 Thinking portal

 Analogy
 Bildung
 Book of Wisdom
 Consciousness
 Ecological wisdom
 Human condition
 Metacognition
 Perspicacity
 Philosophy
 Sapere aude
 Sapiens (disambiguation)
 School of Hard Knocks
 Sentience
 The Wisdom of Crowds

https://www.psychologytoday.com/basics/wisdom

Wisdom is one of those qualities difficult to define—because it encompasses so much—but

which people generally recognize when they encounter it. And it is encountered most
obviously in the realm of decision-making. Psychologists tend to agree that wisdom involves
an integration of knowledge, experience, and deep understanding that incorporates tolerance
for the uncertainties of life as well as its ups and downs. There's an awareness of how things
play out over time, and it confers a sense of balance. It can be acquired only through
experience, but by itself, experience does not automatically confer wisdom. Only now are
researchers beginning to look into the social, emotional, and cognitive processes that
transmute experience into wisdom.
118

Wise people generally share an optimism that life's problems can be solved and experience a
certain amount of calm in facing difficult decisions. Intelligence—if only anyone could figure
out exactly what it is—may be necessary for wisdom, but it definitely isn't sufficient; an
ability to see the big picture, a sense of proportion, and considerable introspection also
contribute to its development.

Transforming Wisdom: Pastoral Psychotherapy in Theological Perspective

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119

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120

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121

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122

Intersubjectivity. January 24, 2011 7 Comments. I {subject} observe a chair {an object}. I see a brown
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123

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124

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126

MEANING

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meaning

Meaning may refer to:

 Meaning (existential), the worth of life in contemporary existentialism

 Meaning (linguistics), meaning which is communicated through the use of language
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meaning_(linguistics)

linguistics, meaning is the information or concepts that a sender intends to convey, or does
convey, in communication with a receiver.[1][2]

Contents

 1 The sources of ambiguity

o 1.1 Pragmatics
o 1.2 Semantic meaning
o 1.3 Conceptual meaning
 2 Semiotics
 3 See also

Fields

 General Semantics, semiotics, pragmatics

Perspectives

 Logical positivism
 Ordinary language philosophy
 Sense and reference

Theories

 Causal theory of names

 Definite descriptions
 Theory of descriptions
 Universal grammar

Considerations

 Ideasthesia
 Idea
 Image
 Information
 Meaning (non-linguistic)
127

 Metaphor
 Sense
 Symbol
 Symbol grounding
 Sphoṭa

Important theorists

 J. L. Austin
 Roland Barthes
 Rudolf Carnap
 Noam Chomsky
 Eugenio Coseriu
 Umberto Eco
 Viktor Frankl
 Gottlob Frege
 Edmund Husserl
 Paul Grice
 Roman Jakobson
 Saul Kripke
 Claude Lévi-Strauss
 Charles Sanders Peirce
 Bertrand Russell
 Ferdinand de Saussure
 John Searle
 P. F. Strawson
 Willard Van Orman Quine
 Ludwig Wittgenstein


 4 References
 5 Further reading
 6 External links

 Meaning (non-linguistic), a general term of art to capture senses of the word "meaning",
independent from its linguistic uses
 Meaning (philosophy of language), definition, elements, and types of meaning discussed in
philosophy
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meaning_(philosophy_of_language)

The nature of meaning, its definition, elements, and types, was discussed by philosophers
Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. According to them "meaning is a relationship between
two sorts of things: signs and the kinds of things they mean (intend, express or signify)". One
term in the relationship of meaning necessarily causes something else to come to the mind. In
other words: "a sign is defined as an entity that indicates another entity to some agent for
some purpose". As Augustine states, a sign is “something that shows itself to the senses and
something other than itself to the mind” (Signum est quod se ipsum sensui et praeter se
aliquid animo ostendit; De dial., 1975, 86).

The types of meanings vary according to the types of the thing that is being represented.
Namely:
128

1. There are the things in the world, which might have meaning;
2. There are things in the world that are also signs of other things in the world, and so, are
always meaningful (i.e., natural signs of the physical world and ideas within the mind);
3. There are things that are always necessarily meaningful, such as words, and other nonverbal
symbols.

All subsequent inquiries emphasize some particular perspectives within the general AAA
framework.

The major contemporary positions of meaning come under the following partial definitions of
meaning:

 Psychological theories, exhausted by notions of thought, intention, or understanding;

 Logical theories, involving notions such as intension, cognitive content, or sense, along with
extension, reference, or denotation;
 Message, content, information, or communication;
 Truth conditions;
 Usage, and the instructions for usage; and
 Measurement, computation, or operation.

Contents

 1 Truth and meaning

o 1.1 Substantive theories of meaning
 1.1.1 Correspondence theory of meaning
 1.1.2 Coherence theory
 1.1.3 Constructivist theory of meaning
 1.1.4 Consensus theory
 1.1.5 Pragmatic theory
o 1.2 Associated theories and commentaries
 1.2.1 Logic and language
 1.2.2 Gottlob Frege
 1.2.3 Bertrand Russell
 1.2.4 Other truth theories
 1.2.5 Saul Kripke
 1.2.6 Critiques of truth-theories of meaning
 2 Usage and meaning
o 2.1 Ludwig Wittgenstein
o 2.2 J. L. Austin
o 2.3 Peter Strawson
o 2.4 Paul Grice
o 2.5 Inferential role semantics
o 2.6 Critiques of use theories of meaning
 3 Idea theories of meaning
o 3.1 Stronger idea theories
o 3.2 Weaker idea theories
 4 See also
 5 References
 6 Further reading
129

Truth and meaning

Main article: truth

The evaluation of meaning according to each one of the five major substantive theories of
meaning and truth is presented below. The question of what is a proper basis for deciding
how words, symbols, ideas and beliefs may properly be considered to truthfully denote
meaning, whether by a single person or an entire society, is dealt with by the five most
prevalent substantive theories listed below. Each theory of meaning as evaluated by these
respective theories of truth are each further researched by the individual scholars supporting
each one of the respective theories of truth and meaning.[1][2][3]

Both hybrid theories of meaning and alternative theories of meaning and truth have also been
researched, and are subject to further assessment according to their respective and relative
merits.[1][4][5]

Substantive theories of meaning

Correspondence theory of meaning

Correspondence theories emphasise that true beliefs and true statements of meaning
correspond to the actual state of affairs and that associated meanings must be in agreement
with these beliefs and statements.[6] This type of theory stresses a relationship between
thoughts or statements on one hand, and things or objects on the other. It is a traditional
model tracing its origins to ancient Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle.[7] This class of theories holds that the truth or the falsity of a representation is
determined in principle entirely by how it relates to "things", by whether it accurately
describes those "things." An example of correspondence theory is the statement by the
Thirteenth Century philosopher/theologian Thomas Aquinas: Veritas est adaequatio rei et
intellectus ("Truth is the equation [or adequation] of things and intellect"), a statement which
Aquinas attributed to the Ninth Century neoplatonist Isaac Israeli.[8][9][10] Aquinas also
restated the theory as: "A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external
reality"[11]

Correspondence theory centres heavily around the assumption that truth and meaning are a
matter of accurately copying what is known as "objective reality" and then representing it in
thoughts, words and other symbols.[12] Many modern theorists have stated that this ideal
cannot be achieved without analysing additional factors.[1][13] For example, language plays a
role in that all languages have words to represent concepts that are virtually undefined in
other languages. The German word Zeitgeist is one such example: one who speaks or
understands the language may "know" what it means, but any translation of the word
apparently fails to accurately capture its full meaning (this is a problem with many abstract
words, especially those derived in agglutinative languages). Thus, some words add an
additional parameter to the construction of an accurate truth predicate. Among the
philosophers who grappled with this problem is Alfred Tarski, whose semantic theory is
summarized further below in this article.[14]
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Coherence theory

For coherence theories in general, the assessment of meaning and truth requires a proper fit of
elements within a whole system. Very often, though, coherence is taken to imply something
more than simple logical consistency; often there is a demand that the propositions in a
coherent system lend mutual inferential support to each other. So, for example, the
completeness and comprehensiveness of the underlying set of concepts is a critical factor in
judging the validity and usefulness of a coherent system.[15] A pervasive tenet of coherence
theories is the idea that truth is primarily a property of whole systems of propositions, and
can be ascribed to individual propositions only according to their coherence with the whole.
Among the assortment of perspectives commonly regarded as coherence theory, theorists
differ on the question of whether coherence entails many possible true systems of thought or
only a single absolute system.

Some variants of coherence theory are claimed to describe the essential and intrinsic
properties of formal systems in logic and mathematics.[16] However, formal reasoners are
content to contemplate axiomatically independent and sometimes mutually contradictory
systems side by side, for example, the various alternative geometries. On the whole,
coherence theories have been rejected for lacking justification in their application to other
areas of truth, especially with respect to assertions about the natural world, empirical data in
general, assertions about practical matters of psychology and society, especially when used
without support from the other major theories of truth.[17]

Coherence theories distinguish the thought of rationalist philosophers, particularly of

Spinoza, Leibniz, and G.W.F. Hegel, along with the British philosopher F.H. Bradley.[18]
Other alternatives may be found among several proponents of logical positivism, notably
Otto Neurath and Carl Hempel.

Constructivist theory of meaning

Main article: Constructivist epistemology

Social constructivism holds that meaning and truth are constructed by social processes, is
historically and culturally specific, and that it is in part shaped through the power struggles
within a community. Constructivism views all of our knowledge as "constructed," because it
does not reflect any external "transcendent" realities (as a pure correspondence theory might
hold). Rather, perceptions of truth are viewed as contingent on convention, human
perception, and social experience. It is believed by constructivists that representations of
physical and biological reality, including race, sexuality, and gender, are socially constructed.

Giambattista Vico was among the first to claim that history and culture along with their
meaning were man-made. Vico's epistemological orientation gathers the most diverse rays
and unfolds in one axiom – verum ipsum factum – "truth itself is constructed". Hegel and
Marx were among the other early proponents of the premise that truth is, or can be, socially
constructed. Marx, like many critical theorists who followed, did not reject the existence of
objective truth but rather distinguished between true knowledge and knowledge that has been
distorted through power or ideology. For Marx, scientific and true knowledge is "in
accordance with the dialectical understanding of history" and ideological knowledge is "an
epiphenomenal expression of the relation of material forces in a given economic
arrangement".[19]
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Consensus theory
Main article: Consensus theory of truth

Consensus theory holds that meaning and truth are whatever is agreed upon, or in some
versions, might come to be agreed upon, by some specified group. Such a group might
include all human beings, or a subset thereof consisting of more than one person.

Among the current advocates of consensus theory as a useful accounting of the concept of
"truth" is the philosopher Jürgen Habermas.[20] Habermas maintains that truth is what would
be agreed upon in an ideal speech situation.[21] Among the current strong critics of consensus
theory is the philosopher Nicholas Rescher.[22]

Pragmatic theory
Main article: Pragmatic theory of truth

The three most influential forms of the pragmatic theory of truth and meaning were
introduced around the turn of the 20th century by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and
John Dewey. Although there are wide differences in viewpoint among these and other
proponents of pragmatic theory, they hold in common that meaning and truth are verified and
confirmed by the results of putting one's concepts into practice.[23]

Peirce defines truth as follows: "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the
ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which
concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy
and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth."[24] This statement
stresses Peirce's view that ideas of approximation, incompleteness, and partiality, what he
describes elsewhere as fallibilism and "reference to the future", are essential to a proper
conception of meaning and truth. Although Peirce uses words like concordance and
correspondence to describe one aspect of the pragmatic sign relation, he is also quite explicit
in saying that definitions of truth based on mere correspondence are no more than nominal
definitions, which he accords a lower status than real definitions.

William James's version of pragmatic theory, while complex, is often summarized by his
statement that "the 'true' is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the 'right' is only
the expedient in our way of behaving."[25] By this, James meant that truth is a quality, the
value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying concepts to practice (thus,
"pragmatic").

John Dewey, less broadly than James but more broadly than Peirce, held that inquiry,
whether scientific, technical, sociological, philosophical or cultural, is self-corrective over
time if openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to clarify, justify,
refine and/or refute proposed meanings and truths.[26]

Though not widely known, a new variation of the pragmatic theory was defined and wielded
successfully from the 20th century forward. Defined and named by William Ernest Hocking,
this variation is known as "negative pragmatism". Essentially, what works may or may not be
true, but what fails cannot be true because the truth and its meaning always works.[27] James
and Dewey's ideas also ascribe meaning and truth to repeated testing which is "self-
corrective" over time.
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Pragmatism and negative pragmatism are also closely aligned with the coherence theory of
truth in that any testing should not be isolated but rather incorporate knowledge from all
human endeavors and experience. The universe is a whole and integrated system, and testing
should acknowledge and account for its diversity. As Feynman said, "... if it disagrees with
experiment, it is wrong."[28]

Associated theories and commentaries

Some have asserted that meaning is nothing substantially more or less than the truth
conditions they involve. For such theories, an emphasis is placed upon reference to actual
things in the world to account for meaning, with the caveat that reference more or less
explains the greater part (or all) of meaning itself.

Logic and language

The logical positivists argued that the meaning of a statement arose from how it is verified.

Gottlob Frege

In his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung (now usually translated as On Sense and Reference),
Gottlob Frege argued that proper names present at least two problems in explaining meaning.

1. Suppose the meaning of a name is the thing it refers to. Sam, then, means a person in the
world who is named Sam. But if the object referred to by the name did not exist—i.e.,
Pegasus—then, according to that theory, it would be meaningless.
2. Suppose two different names refer to the same object. Hesperus and Phosphorus were the
names given to what were considered distinct celestial bodies. It was later shown that they
were the same thing (the planet Venus). If the words meant the same thing, then
substituting one for the other in a sentence would not result in a sentence that differs in
meaning from the original. But in that case, "Hesperus is Phosphorus" would mean the same
thing as "Hesperus is Hesperus". This is clearly absurd, since we learn something new and
unobvious by the former statement, but not by the latter.

Frege can be interpreted as arguing that it was therefore a mistake to think that the meaning
of a name is the thing it refers to. Instead, the meaning must be something else—the "sense"
of the word. Two names for the same person, then, can have different senses (or meanings):
one referent might be picked out by more than one sense. This sort of theory is called a
mediated reference theory. Frege argued that, ultimately, the same bifurcation of meaning
must apply to most or all linguistic categories, such as to quantificational expressions like
"All boats float". Ironically enough, it is now accepted by many philosophers[who?] as
applying to all expressions but proper names .[citation needed]

Bertrand Russell

Logical analysis was further advanced by Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead in
their groundbreaking Principia Mathematica, which attempted to produce a formal language
with which the truth of all mathematical statements could be demonstrated from first
principles.
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Russell differed from Frege greatly on many points, however. He rejected Frege's sense-
reference distinction. He also disagreed that language was of fundamental significance to
philosophy, and saw the project of developing formal logic as a way of eliminating all of the
confusions caused by ordinary language, and hence at creating a perfectly transparent
medium in which to conduct traditional philosophical argument. He hoped, ultimately, to
extend the proofs of the Principia to all possible true statements, a scheme he called logical
atomism. For a while it appeared that his pupil Wittgenstein had succeeded in this plan with
his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus".

Russell's work, and that of his colleague G. E. Moore, developed in response to what they
perceived as the nonsense dominating British philosophy departments at the turn of the 20th
century, which was a kind of British Idealism most of which was derived (albeit very
distantly) from the work of Hegel. In response Moore developed an approach ("Common
Sense Philosophy"[29]) which sought to examine philosophical difficulties by a close analysis
of the language used in order to determine its meaning. In this way Moore sought to expunge
philosophical absurdities such as "time is unreal". Moore's work would have significant, if
oblique, influence (largely mediated by Wittgenstein) on Ordinary language philosophy.

Other truth theories

The Vienna Circle, a famous group of logical positivists from the early 20th century (closely
allied with Russell and Frege), adopted the verificationist theory of meaning. The
verificationist theory of meaning (in at least one of its forms) states that to say that an
expression is meaningful is to say that there are some conditions of experience that could
exist to show that the expression is true. As noted, Frege and Russell were two proponents of
this way of thinking.

A semantic theory of truth was produced by Alfred Tarski for formal semantics. According to
Tarski's account, meaning consists of a recursive set of rules that end up yielding an infinite
set of sentences, "'p' is true if and only if p", covering the whole language. His innovation
produced the notion of propositional functions discussed on the section on universals (which
he called "sentential functions"), and a model-theoretic approach to semantics (as opposed to
a proof-theoretic one). Finally, some links were forged to the correspondence theory of truth
(Tarski, 1944).

Perhaps the most influential current approach in the contemporary theory of meaning is that
sketched by Donald Davidson in his introduction to the collection of essays Truth and
Meaning in 1967. There he argued for the following two theses:

 Any learnable language must be statable in a finite form, even if it is capable of a

theoretically infinite number of expressions—as we may assume that natural human
languages are, at least in principle. If it could not be stated in a finite way then it could not
be learned through a finite, empirical method such as the way humans learn their languages.
It follows that it must be possible to give a theoretical semantics for any natural language
which could give the meanings of an infinite number of sentences on the basis of a finite
system of axioms.
 Giving the meaning of a sentence, he further argued, was equivalent to stating its truth
conditions. He proposed that it must be possible to account for language as a set of distinct
grammatical features together with a lexicon, and for each of them explain its workings in
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such a way as to generate trivial (obviously correct) statements of the truth conditions of all
the (infinitely many) sentences built up from these.

The result is a theory of meaning that rather resembles, by no accident, Tarski's account.

Davidson's account, though brief, constitutes the first systematic presentation of truth-
conditional semantics. He proposed simply translating natural languages into first-order
predicate calculus in order to reduce meaning to a function of truth.

Saul Kripke

Saul Kripke examined the relation between sense and reference in dealing with possible and
actual situations. He showed that one consequence of his interpretation of certain systems of
modal logic was that the reference of a proper name is necessarily linked to its referent, but
that the sense is not. So for instance "Hesperus" necessarily refers to Hesperus, even in those
imaginary cases and worlds in which perhaps Hesperus is not the evening star. That is,
Hesperus is necessarily Hesperus, but only contingently the morning star.

This results in the curious situation that part of the meaning of a name — that it refers to
some particular thing — is a necessary fact about that name, but another part — that it is used
in some particular way or situation — is not.

Kripke also drew the distinction between speaker's meaning and semantic meaning,
elaborating on the work of ordinary language philosophers Paul Grice and Keith Donnellan.
The speaker's meaning is what the speaker intends to refer to by saying something; the
semantic meaning is what the words uttered by the speaker mean according to the language.

In some cases, people do not say what they mean; in other cases, they say something that is in
error. In both these cases, the speaker's meaning and the semantic meaning seem to be
different. Sometimes words do not actually express what the speaker wants them to express;
so words will mean one thing, and what people intend to convey by them might mean
another. The meaning of the expression, in such cases, is ambiguous.

Critiques of truth-theories of meaning

W.V. Quine attacked both verificationism and the very notion of meaning in his famous
essay, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". In it, he suggested that meaning was nothing more than
a vague and dispensable notion. Instead, he asserted, what was more interesting to study was
the synonymy between signs. He also pointed out that verificationism was tied to the
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and asserted that such a divide was
defended ambiguously. He also suggested that the unit of analysis for any potential
investigation into the world (and, perhaps, meaning) would be the entire body of statements
taken as a collective, not just individual statements on their own.

Other criticisms can be raised on the basis of the limitations that truth-conditional theorists
themselves admit to. Tarski, for instance, recognized that truth-conditional theories of
meaning only make sense of statements, but fail to explain the meanings of the lexical parts
that make up statements. Rather, the meaning of the parts of statements is presupposed by an
understanding of the truth-conditions of a whole statement, and explained in terms of what he
called "satisfaction conditions".
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Still another objection (noted by Frege and others) was that some kinds of statements don't
seem to have any truth-conditions at all. For instance, "Hello!" has no truth-conditions,
because it doesn't even attempt to tell the listener anything about the state of affairs in the
world. In other words, different propositions have different grammatical moods.

Deflationist accounts of truth, sometimes called 'irrealist' accounts, are the staunchest source
of criticism of truth-conditional theories of meaning. According to them, "truth" is a word
with no serious meaning or function in discourse. For instance, for the deflationist, the
sentences "It's true that Tiny Tim is trouble" and "Tiny Tim is trouble" are equivalent. In
consequence, for the deflationist, any appeal to truth as an account of meaning has little
explanatory power.

The sort of truth-theories presented here can also be attacked for their formalism both in
practice and principle. The principle of formalism is challenged by the informalists, who
suggest that language is largely a construction of the speaker, and so, not compatible with
formalization. The practice of formalism is challenged by those who observe that formal
languages (such as present-day quantificational logic) fail to capture the expressive power of
natural languages (as is arguably demonstrated in the awkward character of the
quantificational explanation of definite description statements, as laid out by Bertrand
Russell).

Finally, over the past century, forms of logic have been developed that are not dependent
exclusively on the notions of truth and falsity. Some of these types of logic have been called
modal logics. They explain how certain logical connectives such as "if-then" work in terms of
necessity and possibility. Indeed, modal logic was the basis of one of the most popular and
rigorous formulations in modern semantics called the Montague grammar. The successes of
such systems naturally give rise to the argument that these systems have captured the natural
meaning of connectives like if-then far better than an ordinary, truth-functional logic ever
could.

Usage and meaning

Throughout the 20th century, English philosophy focused closely on analysis of language.
This style of analytic philosophy became very influential and led to the development of a
wide range of philosophical tools.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein was originally an artificial language philosopher,

following the influence of Russell and Frege. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he had
supported the idea of an ideal language built up from atomic statements using logical
connectives. However, as he matured, he came to appreciate more and more the phenomenon
of natural language. Philosophical Investigations, published after his death, signalled a sharp
departure from his earlier work with its focus upon ordinary language use. His approach is
often summarised by the aphorism "the meaning of a word is its use in a language". However,
following in Frege's footsteps, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein declares: "... Only in the context
of a proposition has a name meaning."[30]
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His work would come to inspire future generations and spur forward a whole new discipline,
which explained meaning in a new way. Meaning in a natural language was seen as primarily
a question of how the speaker uses words within the language to express intention.

This close examination of natural language proved to be a powerful philosophical technique.

Practitioners who were influenced by Wittgenstein's approach have included an entire
tradition of thinkers, featuring P. F. Strawson, Paul Grice, R. M. Hare, R. S. Peters, and
Jürgen Habermas.

J. L. Austin

At around the same time Ludwig Wittgenstein was re-thinking his approach to language,
reflections on the complexity of language led to a more expansive approach to meaning.
Following the lead of George Edward Moore, J. L. Austin examined the use of words in great
detail. He argued against fixating on the meaning of words. He showed that dictionary
definitions are of limited philosophical use, since there is no simple "appendage" to a word
that can be called its meaning. Instead, he showed how to focus on the way in which words
are used in order to do things. He analysed the structure of utterances into three distinct parts:
locutions, illocutions and perlocutions. His pupil John Searle developed the idea under the
label "speech acts". Their work greatly influenced pragmatics.

Peter Strawson

Past philosophers had understood reference to be tied to words themselves. However, Sir
Peter Strawson disagreed in his seminal essay, "On Referring", where he argued that
there is nothing true about statements on their own; rather, only the uses of statements
could be considered to be true or false.

Indeed, one of the hallmarks of the ordinary use perspective is its insistence upon the
distinctions between meaning and use. "Meanings", for ordinary language philosophers, are
the instructions for usage of words — the common and conventional definitions of words.
Usage, on the other hand, is the actual meanings that individual speakers have — the things
that an individual speaker in a particular context wants to refer to. The word "dog" is an
example of a meaning, but pointing at a nearby dog and shouting "This dog smells foul!" is
an example of usage. From this distinction between usage and meaning arose the divide
between the fields of Pragmatics and Semantics.

Yet another distinction is of some utility in discussing language: "mentioning". Mention is

when an expression refers to itself as a linguistic item, usually surrounded by quotation
marks. For instance, in the expression "'Opopanax' is hard to spell", what is referred to is the
word itself ("opopanax") and not what it means (an obscure gum resin). Frege had referred to
instances of mentioning as "opaque contexts".

In his essay, "Reference and Definite Descriptions", Keith Donnellan sought to improve upon
Strawson's distinction. He pointed out that there are two uses of definite descriptions:
attributive and referential. Attributive uses provide a description of whoever is being referred
to, while referential uses point out the actual referent. Attributive uses are like mediated
references, while referential uses are more directly referential.

Paul Grice
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The philosopher Paul Grice, working within the ordinary language tradition, understood
"meaning" — in his 1957 article — to have two kinds: natural and non-natural. Natural
meaning had to do with cause and effect, for example with the expression "these spots mean
measles". Non-natural meaning, on the other hand, had to do with the intentions of the
speaker in communicating something to the listener.

In his essay, Logic and Conversation, Grice went on to explain and defend an explanation of
how conversations work. His guiding maxim was called the cooperative principle, which
claimed that the speaker and the listener will have mutual expectations of the kind of
information that will be shared. The principle is broken down into four maxims: Quality
(which demands truthfulness and honesty), Quantity (demand for just enough information as
is required), Relation (relevance of things brought up), and Manner (lucidity). This principle,
if and when followed, lets the speaker and listener figure out the meaning of certain
implications by way of inference.

The works of Grice led to an avalanche of research and interest in the field, both supportive
and critical. One spinoff was called Relevance theory, developed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre
Wilson during the mid-1980s, whose goal was to make the notion of relevance more clear.
Similarly, in his work, "Universal pragmatics", Jürgen Habermas began a program that
sought to improve upon the work of the ordinary language tradition. In it, he laid out the goal
of a valid conversation as a pursuit of mutual understanding.

Inferential role semantics

Main article: Inferential role semantics

Michael Dummett argued against the kind of truth-conditional semantics presented by

Davidson. Instead, he argued that basing semantics on assertion conditions avoids a number
of difficulties with truth-conditional semantics, such as the transcendental nature of certain
kinds of truth condition. He leverages work done in proof-theoretic semantics to provide a
kind of inferential role semantics, where:

 The meaning of sentences and grammatical constructs is given by their assertion conditions;
and
 Such a semantics is only guaranteed to be coherent if the inferences associated with the
parts of language are in logical harmony.

A semantics based upon assertion conditions is called a verificationist semantics: cf. the
verificationism of the Vienna Circle.

This work is closely related, though not identical, to one-factor theories of conceptual role
semantics.

Critiques of use theories of meaning

Sometimes between the 1950-1990s, cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor said that use theories
(of the Wittgensteinian kind) seem to assume that language is solely a public
phenomenon, that there is no such thing as a "private language". Fodor thinks it is
necessary to create or describe the language of thought, which would seemingly require
the existence of a "private language".
138

In the 1960s, David Kellogg Lewis described meaning as use, a feature of a social convention
and conventions as regularities of a specific sort. Lewis' work was an application of game
theory in philosophical topics.[31] Conventions, he argued, are a species of coordination
equilibria.

Idea theories of meaning

Some have argued that meanings are ideas, where the term "ideas" is used to refer to either
mental representations, or to mental activity in general. Those who seek an explanation
for meaning in the former sort of account endorse a stronger sort of idea theory of mind than
the latter.

Each idea is understood to be necessarily about something external and/or internal, real or
imaginary. For example, in contrast to the abstract meaning of the universal "dog", the
referent "this dog" may mean a particular real life chihuahua. In both cases, the word is about
something, but in the former it is about the class of dogs as generally understood, while in the
latter it is about a very real and particular dog in the real world.

Stronger idea theories

John Locke, considered all ideas to be both imaginable objects of sensation and the very
unimaginable objects of reflection. Locke said in his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, that words are used both as signs for ideas—but also to signify the lack of
certain ideas. David Hume held that thoughts were kinds of imaginable entities. (See Hume's
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 2). Hume argued that any words that
could not call upon any past experience were without meaning.

Nonetheless, George Berkeley and Ludwig Wittgenstein held, in contrast to Locke and
Hume, that ideas alone are unable to account for the different variations within a general
meaning. For example, any hypothetical image of the meaning of "dog" has to include such
varied images as a chihuahua, a pug, and a Black Lab; and this seems impossible to imagine,
all of those particular breeds looking very different from one another. Another way to see this
point is to question why it is that, if we have an image of a specific type of dog (say of a
chihuahua), it should be entitled to represent the entire concept.

Another criticism is that some meaningful words, known as non-lexical items, don't have any
meaningfully associated image. For example, the word "the" has a meaning, but one would
be hard-pressed to find a mental representation that fits it. Still another objection lies in the
observation that certain linguistic items name something in the real world, and are
meaningful, yet which we have no mental representations to deal with. For instance, it is not
known what Newton's father looked like, yet the phrase "Newton's father" still has meaning.

Another problem is that of composition — that it is difficult to explain how words and
phrases combine into sentences if only ideas were involved in meaning.

Weaker idea theories

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Memberships of a graded class

Eleanor Rosch and George Lakoff advanced the theory of prototypes, which suggests that
many lexical categories, at least on the face of things, have "radial structures". That is to say,
there are some ideal member(s) in the category that seem to represent the category better than
other members. For example, the category of "birds" may feature the robin as the prototype,
or the ideal kind of bird. With experience, subjects might come to evaluate membership in the
category of "bird" by comparing candidate members to the prototype and evaluating for
similarities. So, for example, a penguin or an ostrich would sit at the fringe of the meaning of
"bird", because a penguin is unlike a robin.

Intimately related to these researches is the notion of a psychologically basic level, which is
both the first level named and understood by children, and "the highest level at which a single
mental image can reflect the entire category". (Lakoff 1987:46) The "basic level" of cognition
is understood by Lakoff as crucially drawing upon "image-schemas" along with various other
cognitive processes.

The philosophers (Ned Block, Gilbert Harman, H. Field) and the cognitive scientists (G.
Miller and P. Johnson-Laird) say that the meaning of a term can be found by investigating its
role in relation to other concepts and mental states. They endorse a view called "conceptual
role semantics". Those proponents of this view who understand meanings to be exhausted by
the content of mental states can be said to endorse "one-factor" accounts of conceptual role
semantics. and thus fit within the tradition of idea theories.

See also

 Semiotics
 Semeiotic

 Meaning (psychology), epistemological position, in psychology as well as philosophy,

linguistics, semiotics and sociology
 Meaning (semiotics), the distribution of signs in sign relation
 Semantics, the study of meaning
 Hermeneutics, the theory of text interpretation
 Linguistics, the scientific study of language
 Logotherapy, psychotherapy based on an existential analysis
 Ontology, the philosophical study of the nature of existence or reality
 Truth, accordance with fact or reality, or fidelity to an ideal
140

 Meant to Be (disambiguation)
 Proposition (disambiguation)
 Notion (disambiguation)
 Significance (disambiguation)
 All pages with titles containing Meaning

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meaning_(semiotics)

In semiotics, the meaning of a sign is its place in a sign relation, in other words, the set of
roles that it occupies within a given sign relation.

This statement holds whether sign is taken to mean a sign type or a sign token. Defined in
these global terms, the meaning of a sign is not in general analyzable with full exactness into
completely localized terms, but aspects of its meaning can be given approximate analyses,
and special cases of sign relations frequently admit of more local analyses.

Two aspects of meaning that may be given approximate analyses are the connotative relation
and the denotative relation. The connotative relation is the relation between signs and their
interpretant signs. The denotative relation is the relation between signs and objects. An
arbitrary association exists between the signified and the signifier. For example, a US
salesperson doing business in Japan might interpret silence following an offer as rejection,
while to Japanese negotiators silence means the offer is being considered. This difference in
interpretations represents a difference in: semiotics

Contents

 1 Triadic relation
 2 Sign relation
 3 Connotative relation
 4 Denotative relation
 5 Notes
 6 See also

Triadic relation

The triadic (three part) model of the sign separates the meaning of a sign into three distinct
components:

1.The representamen, which is the medium, or ‘sign vehicle’,[1] through which the sign is
represented. For example, this could be written/spoken words, a photograph, or a painting.[2]

2.The interpretant, or what is meant by the sign [2]

3. The object, or that to which the sign refers [2]

Together, these three components generate semiosis. For example, an exclamation mark can
be broken down into these components. The representamen is the exclamation mark itself, the
interpretant is the idea of excitement or an elevated volume of speech, and the object is the
141

actual excitement or elevated volume of speech to which it refers. While it might appear that
the latter two are the same, the subtle difference lies in the fact that the interpretant refers to
the idea of something, and the object is the thing itself.

The representamen component of the sign can be further broken down into three categories,
which are icon, index, and symbol.[1] These denote the degree of abstraction from the object
to which they refer. A symbol, which is the most abstract, does not resemble or bear any
physical relation to the thing that it represents in any way. For example, a peace sign has no
relation to peace aside from its social construction as a symbol that represents it. An icon is
slightly less abstract, and resembles to some degree the thing that it represents, and bears
some physical likeness to it. A good example of this would be a painted portrait. An index is
the least arbitrary category of representamen, and has a definite physical tie to that which it
represents. This could be something like a weather vane blowing in the wind indicating that it
is windy out, or smoke, which indicates a fire.

The triadic model of the sign was proposed by Charles Peirce. In contradistinction to
Ferdinand de Saussure's dyadic model, which assumed no material referent, Peirce's model
assumes that in order for a sign to be meaningful, it must refer to something external and
cannot be self-contained, as it is for Saussure. Thus, Peirce's model includes the addition of
an 'object'. The ‘representamen’ and ‘interpretant’ components of the triadic model are
comparable to Saussure’s dyadic model of the sign, which breaks down into signifier and
signified.[2]

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142

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147

COMMUNICATION
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communication)

Communication (from Latin commūnicāre, meaning "to share"[1]) is the act of conveying
intended meanings from one entity or group to another through the use of mutually
understood signs and semiotic rules.

The main steps inherent to all communication are: [2]

1. The forming of communicative motivation or reason.

2. Message composition (further internal or technical elaboration on what exactly to express).
3. Message encoding (for example, into digital data, written text, speech, pictures, gestures
and so on).
4. Transmission of the encoded message as a sequence of signals using a specific channel or
medium.
5. Noise sources such as natural forces and in some cases human activity (both intentional and
accidental) begin influencing the quality of signals propagating from the sender to one or
more receivers.
6. Reception of signals and reassemblying of the encoded message from a sequence of
received signals.
7. Decoding of the reassembled encoded message.
8. Interpretation and making sense of the presumed original message.

The scientific study of communication can be divided into:

 Information theory which studies the quantification, storage, and communication of

information in general;
 Communication studies which concerns human communication;
 Biosemiotics which examines communication in and between living organisms in general.

The channel of communication can be visual, auditory, tactile (such as in Braille) and haptic,
olfactory, electromagnetic, or biochemical.

Human communication is unique for its extensive use of abstract language. Development of
civilization has been closely linked with progress in telecommunication.

Contents

 1 Non-verbal
 2 Verbal
 3 Written communication and its historical development
 4 Business
 5 Political
 6 Family
 7 Interpersonal
 8 Barriers to effectiveness
o 8.1 Cultural aspects
 9 Nonhuman
o 9.1 Animals
148

o 9.2 Plants and fungi

o 9.3 Bacteria quorum sensing
 10 Models
 11 Noise
 12 As academic discipline
 13 See also
 14 References
 15 Further reading

Non-verbal
Main article: Nonverbal communication

Nonverbal communication describes the process of conveying information in the form of

non-linguistic representations. Examples of nonverbal communication include haptic
communication, chronemic communication, gestures, body language, facial expressions, eye
contact, and how one dresses. Nonverbal communication also relates to intent of a message.
Examples of intent are voluntary, intentional movements like shaking a hand or winking, as
well as involuntary, such as sweating.[3] Speech also contains nonverbal elements known as
paralanguage, e.g. rhythm, intonation, tempo, and stress. It affects communication most at the
subconscious level and establishes trust. Likewise, written texts include nonverbal elements
such as handwriting style, spatial arrangement of words and the use of emoticons to convey
emotion.

Nonverbal communication demonstrates one of Wazlawick's laws: you cannot not

communicate. Once proximity has formed awareness, living creatures begin interpreting any
signals received.[4] Some of the functions of nonverbal communication in humans are to
complement and illustrate, to reinforce and emphasize, to replace and substitute, to control
and regulate, and to contradict the denovative message.

Nonverbal cues are heavily relied on to express communication and to interpret others’
communication and can replace or substitute verbal messages. However, non-verbal
communication is ambiguous. When verbal messages contradict non-verbal messages,
observation of non-verbal behaviour is relied on to judge another’s attitudes and feelings,
rather than assuming the truth of the verbal message alone.

There are several reasons as to why non-verbal communication plays a vital role in
communication:

“Non-verbal communication is omnipresent.” [5] They are included in every single

communication act. To have total communication, all non-verbal channels such as the body,
face, voice, appearance, touch, distance, timing, and other environmental forces must be
engaged during face-to-face interaction. Written communication can also have non-verbal
attributes. E-mails and web chats allow individual’s the option to change text font colours,
stationary, emoticons, and capitalization in order to capture non-verbal cues into a verbal
medium.

“Non-verbal behaviours are multifunctional.” [6] Many different non-verbal channels are
engaged at the same time in communication acts, and allow the chance for simultaneous
messages to be sent and received.
149

“Non-verbal behaviours may form a universal language system.” [7] Smiling, crying, pointing,
caressing, and glaring are non-verbal behaviours that are used and understood by people
regardless of nationality. Such non-verbal signals allow the most basic form of
communication when verbal communication is not effective due to language barriers.

Verbal

Verbal communication is the spoken or written conveyance of a message. Human language

can be defined as a system of symbols (sometimes known as lexemes) and the grammars
(rules) by which the symbols are manipulated. The word "language" also refers to common
properties of languages. Language learning normally occurs most intensively during human
childhood. Most of the thousands of human languages use patterns of sound or gesture for
symbols which enable communication with others around them. Languages tend to share
certain properties, although there are exceptions. There is no defined line between a language
and a dialect. Constructed languages such as Esperanto, programming languages, and various
mathematical formalism is not necessarily restricted to the properties shared by human
languages.

As previously mentioned, language can be characterized as symbolic. Charles Ogden and I.A
Richards developed The Triangle of Meaning model to explain the symbol (the relationship
between a word), the referent (the thing it describes), and the meaning (the thought associated
with the word and the thing)

The properties of language are governed by rules. Language follows phonological rules
(sounds that appear in a language), syntactic rules (arrangement of words and punctuation in
a sentence), semantic rules (the agreed upon meaning of words), and pragmatic rules
(meaning derived upon context).

The meanings that are attached to words can be literal; or otherwise known as denotative,
which relates to the topic being discussed, or, the meanings take context and relationships
into account, otherwise known as connotative; relating to the feelings, history, and power
dynamics of the communicators.[8]

Written communication and its historical development

Over time the forms of and ideas about communication have evolved through the continuing
progression of technology. Advances include communications psychology and media
psychology, an emerging field of study.

The progression of written communication can be divided into three "information

communication revolutions":[9]

1. Written communication first emerged through the use of pictographs. The pictograms were
made in stone, hence written communication was not yet mobile. Pictograms began to
develop standardized and simplified forms.
2. The next step occurred when writing began to appear on paper, papyrus, clay, wax, and
other media with common shared writing systems, leading to adaptable alphabets.
Communication became mobile.
3. The final stage is characterized by the transfer of information through controlled waves of
electromagnetic radiation (i.e., radio, microwave, infrared) and other electronic signals.
150

Communication is thus a process by which meaning is assigned and conveyed in an attempt

to create shared understanding. Gregory Bateson called it "the replication of tautologies in the
universe.[10] This process, which requires a vast repertoire of skills in interpersonal
processing, listening, observing, speaking, questioning, analyzing, gestures, and evaluating
enables collaboration and cooperation.[11]

Business
Main article: Business communication

Business communication is used for a wide variety of activities including, but not limited to:
strategic communications planning, media relations, public relations (which can include
social media, broadcast and written communications, and more), brand management,
reputation management, speech-writing, customer-client relations, and internal/employee
communications.

Companies with limited resources may choose to engage in only a few of these activities,
while larger organizations may employ a full spectrum of communications. Since it is
difficult to develop such a broad range of skills, communications professionals often
specialize in one or two of these areas but usually have at least a working knowledge of most
of them. By far, the most important qualifications communications professionals can possess
are excellent writing ability, good 'people' skills, and the capacity to think critically and
strategically.

Political

Communication is one of the most relevant tools in political strategies, including persuasion
and propaganda. In mass media research and online media research, the effort of strategist is
that of getting a precise decoding, avoiding "message reactance", that is, message refusal. The
reaction to a message is referred also in terms of approach to a message, as follows:

 In "radical reading" the audience rejects the meanings, values, and viewpoints built into the
text by its makers. Effect: message refusal.
 In "dominant reading", the audience accepts the meanings, values, and viewpoints built into
the text by its makers. Effect: message acceptance.
 In "subordinate reading" the audience accepts, by and large, the meanings, values, and
worldview built into the text by its makers. Effect: obey to the message.[12]

Holistic approaches are used by communication campaign leaders and communication

strategists in order to examine all the options, "actors" and channels that can generate change
in the semiotic landscape, that is, change in perceptions, change in credibility, change in the
"memetic background", change in the image of movements, of candidates, players and
managers as perceived by key influencers that can have a role in generating the desired "end-
state".

The modern political communication field is highly influenced by the framework and
practices of "information operations" doctrines that derive their nature from strategic and
military studies. According to this view, what is really relevant is the concept of acting on the
Information Environment. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals,
organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This
environment consist s of three interrelated dimensions, which continuously interact with
151

individuals, organizations, and systems. These dimensions are known as physical,

informational, and cognitive.[13]

Family

Family communication is the study of the communication perspective in a broadly defined

family, with intimacy and trusting relationship.[14] The main goal of family communication is
to understand the interactions of family and the pattern of behaviors of family members in
different circumstances. Open and honest communication creates an atmosphere that allows
family members to express their differences as well as love and admiration for one another. It
also helps to understand the feelings of one another.

Family communication study looks at topics such as family rules, family roles or family
dialectics and how those factors could affect the communication between family members.
Researchers develop theories to understand communication behaviors. Family
communication study also digs deep into certain time periods of family life such as marriage,
parenthood or divorce and how communication stands in those situations. It is important for
family members to understand communication as a trusted way which leads to a well
constructed family.

Interpersonal

In simple terms, interpersonal communication is the communication between one person and
another (or others). It is often referred to as face-to-face communication between two (or
more) people. Both verbal and nonverbal communication, or body language, play a part in
how one person understands another. In verbal interpersonal communication there are two
types of messages being sent: a content message and a relational message. Content messages
are messages about the topic at hand and relational messages are messages about the
relationship itself.[15] This means that relational messages come across in how one says
something and it demonstrates a person’s feelings, whether positive or negative, towards the
individual they are talking to, indicating not only how they feel about the topic at hand, but
also how they feel about their relationship with the other individual.[15]

There are many different aspects to interpersonal communication including;

- Audiovisual Perception of Communication Problems [16]

 The concept follows the idea that our words change what form they take based on the stress
level or urgency of the situation.
 It also explores the concept that stuttering during speech shows the audience that there is a
problem or that the situation is more stressful.

- The Attachment Theory [17]

 This is the combined work of John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991)
 This theory follows the relationships that builds between a mother and child, and the impact
it has on their relationships with others.

- Emotional Intelligence and Triggers [18]

152

 Emotional Intelligence focuses on the ability to monitor ones own emotions as well as those
of others.
 Emotional Triggers focus on events or people that tend to set off intense, emotional
reactions within individuals.

- Attribution Theory [19]

 This is the study of how individuals explain what causes different events and behaviors.

- The Power of Words (Verbal communications) [20]

 Verbal communication focuses heavily on the power of words, and how those words are
said.
 It takes into consideration tone, volume, and choice of words.

- Nonverbal Communication

 Focuses heavily on the setting that the words are conveyed in.
 As well as the physical tone of the words.

- Ethics in Personal Relations [21]

 It is about a space of mutual responsibility between two individuals, it’s about giving and
receiving in a relationship.
 This theory is explored by Dawn J. Lipthrott in the article What IS Relationship? What is
Ethical Partnership?

- Deception in Communication [22]

 This concept goes into that everyone lies, and how this can impact relationships.
 This theory is explored by James Hearn in his article Interpersonal Deception Theory: Ten
Lessons for Negotiators

- Conflict in Couples [23]

 This focuses on the impact that social media has on relationships.

 As well as how to communicate through conflict.
 This theory is explored by Amanda Lenhart and Maeve Duggan in their paper Couples, the
Internet, and Social Media

Barriers to effectiveness

Barriers to effective communication can retard or distort the message and intention of the
message being conveyed which may result in failure of the communication process or an
effect that is undesirable. These include filtering, selective perception, information overload,
emotions, language, silence, communication apprehension, gender differences and political
correctness[24]
153

This also includes a lack of expressing "knowledge-appropriate" communication, which

occurs when a person uses ambiguous or complex legal words, medical jargon, or
descriptions of a situation or environment that is not understood by the recipient.

 Physical barriers- Physical barriers are often due to the nature of the environment. An
example of this is the natural barrier which exists if staff are located in different buildings or
on different sites. Likewise, poor or outdated equipment, particularly the failure of
management to introduce new technology, may also cause problems. Staff shortages are
another factor which frequently causes communication difficulties for an organization.
 System design- System design faults refer to problems with the structures or systems in
place in an organization. Examples might include an organizational structure which is unclear
and therefore makes it confusing to know whom to communicate with. Other examples
could be inefficient or inappropriate information systems, a lack of supervision or training,
and a lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities which can lead to staff being uncertain about
what is expected of them.
 Attitudinal barriers- Attitudinal barriers come about as a result of problems with staff in an
organization. These may be brought about, for example, by such factors as poor
management, lack of consultation with employees, personality conflicts which can result in
people delaying or refusing to communicate, the personal attitudes of individual employees
which may be due to lack of motivation or dissatisfaction at work, brought about by
insufficient training to enable them to carry out particular tasks, or simply resistance to
change due to entrenched attitudes and ideas.
 Ambiguity of words/phrases- Words sounding the same but having different meaning can
convey a different meaning altogether. Hence the communicator must ensure that the
receiver receives the same meaning. It is better if such words are avoided by using
alternatives whenever possible.
 Individual linguistic ability- The use of jargon, difficult or inappropriate words in
communication can prevent the recipients from understanding the message. Poorly
explained or misunderstood messages can also result in confusion. However, research in
communication has shown that confusion can lend legitimacy to research when persuasion
fails.[25][26]
 Physiological barriers- These may result from individuals' personal discomfort, caused—for
example—by ill health, poor eyesight or hearing difficulties.
 Bypassing-These happens when the communicators (sender and the receiver) do not attach
the same symbolic meanings to their words. It is when the sender is expressing a thought or
a word but the receiver take it in a different meaning. For example- ASAP, Rest room
 Technological multi-tasking and absorbency- With a rapid increase in technologically-driven
communication in the past several decades, individuals are increasingly faced with
condensed communication in the form of e-mail, text, and social updates. This has, in turn,
led to a notable change in the way younger generations communicate and perceive their
own self-efficacy to communicate and connect with others. With the ever-constant presence
of another "world" in one's pocket, individuals are multi-tasking both physically and
cognitively as constant reminders of something else happening somewhere else bombard
them. Though perhaps too new of an advancement to yet see long-term effects, this is a
notion currently explored by such figures as Sherry Turkle.[27]
 Fear of being criticized-This is a major factor that prevents good communication. If we
exercise simple practices to improve our communication skill, we can become effective
communicators. For example, read an article from the newspaper or collect some news from
the television and present it in front of the mirror. This will not only boost your confidence,
but also improve your language and vocabulary.
154

 Gender barriers- Most communicators whether aware or not, often have a set agenda. This
is very notable among the different genders. For example, many women are found to be
more critical in addressing conflict. It's also been noted that men are more than likely to
withdraw from conflict when in comparison to women.[28] This breakdown and comparison
not only shows that there are many factors to communication between two specific
genders, but also room for improvement as well as established guidelines for all.

Cultural aspects

Cultural differences exist within countries (tribal/regional differences, dialects etc.), between
religious groups and in organisations or at an organisational level - where companies, teams
and units may have different expectations, norms and idiolects. Families and family groups
may also experience the effect of cultural barriers to communication within and between
different family members or groups. For example: words, colours and symbols have different
meanings in different cultures. In most parts of the world, nodding your head means
agreement, shaking your head means no, except in some parts of the world.[29]

Communication to a great extent is influenced by culture and cultural variables.[30][31][32][33]

Understanding cultural aspects of communication refers to having knowledge of different
cultures in order to communicate effectively with cross culture people. Cultural aspects of
communication are of great relevance in today's world which is now a global village, thanks
to globalisation. Cultural aspects of communication are the cultural differences which
influences communication across borders. Impact of cultural differences on communication
components are explained below:

1) Verbal communication refers to form of communication which uses spoken and written
words for expressing and transferring views and ideas. Language is the most important tool
of verbal communication and it is the area where cultural difference play its role. All
countries have different languages and to have a better understanding of different culture it is
required to have knowledge of languages of different countries.

2) Non verbal communication is a very wide concept and it includes all the other forms of
communication which do not uses written or spoken words. Non verbal communication takes
following forms:

 Paralinguistics are the voice involved in communication other than actual language and
involves tones, pitch, vocal cues etc. It also include sounds from throat and all these are
greatly influenced by cultural differences across borders.
 Proxemics deals with the concept of space element in communication. Proxemics explains
four zones of spaces namely intimate personal, social and public. This concept differs with
different culture as the permissible space vary in different countries.
 Artifactics studies about the non verbal signals or communication which emerges from
personal accessories such as dresses or fashion accessories worn and it varies with culture as
people of different countries follow different dressing codes.
 Chronemics deal with the time aspects of communication and also include importance given
to the time. Some issues explaining this concept are pauses, silences and response lag during
an interaction. This aspect of communication is also influenced by cultural differences as it is
well known that there is a great difference in the value given by different cultures to time.
 Kinesics mainly deals with the body languages such as postures, gestures, head nods, leg
movements etc. In different countries, the same gestures and postures are used to convey
155

different messages. Sometimes even a particular kinesic indicating something good in a

country may have a negative meaning in any other culture.

So in order to have an effective communication across world it is desirable to have a

knowledge of cultural variables effecting communication.

According to Michael Walsh and Ghil'ad Zuckermann, Western conversational interaction is

typically "dyadic", between two particular people, where eye contact is important and the
speaker controls the interaction; and "contained" in a relatively short, defined time frame.
However, traditional Aboriginal conversational interaction is "communal", broadcast to many
people, eye contact is not important, the listener controls the interaction; and "continuous",
spread over a longer, indefinite time frame.[34][35]

Nonhuman
See also: Biocommunication (science), Interspecies communication, and Biosemiotics

Every information exchange between living organisms — i.e. transmission of signals that
involve a living sender and receiver can be considered a form of communication; and even
primitive creatures such as corals are competent to communicate. Nonhuman communication
also include cell signaling, cellular communication, and chemical transmissions between
primitive organisms like bacteria and within the plant and fungal kingdoms.

Animals

The broad field of animal communication encompasses most of the issues in ethology.
Animal communication can be defined as any behavior of one animal that affects the current
or future behavior of another animal. The study of animal communication, called zoo
semiotics (distinguishable from anthroposemiotics, the study of human communication) has
played an important part in the development of ethology, sociobiology, and the study of
animal cognition. Animal communication, and indeed the understanding of the animal world
in general, is a rapidly growing field, and even in the 21st century so far, a great share of
prior understanding related to diverse fields such as personal symbolic name use, animal
emotions, animal culture and learning, and even sexual conduct, long thought to be well
understood, has been revolutionized. A special field of animal communication has been
investigated in more detail such as vibrational communication.[36]

Plants and fungi

Communication is observed within the plant organism, i.e. within plant cells and between
plant cells, between plants of the same or related species, and between plants and non-plant
organisms, especially in the root zone. Plant roots communicate with rhizome bacteria, fungi,
and insects within the soil. These interactions are governed by syntactic, pragmatic, and
semantic rules,[citation needed] and are possible because of the decentralized "nervous system" of
plants. The original meaning of the word "neuron" in Greek is "vegetable fiber" and recent
research has shown that most of the microorganism plant communication processes are
neuron-like.[37] Plants also communicate via volatiles when exposed to herbivory attack
behavior, thus warning neighboring plants.[38] In parallel they produce other volatiles to
attract parasites which attack these herbivores. In stress situations plants can overwrite the
156

genomes they inherited from their parents and revert to that of their grand- or great-
grandparents.[citation needed]

Fungi communicate to coordinate and organize their growth and development such as the
formation of Marcelia and fruiting bodies. Fungi communicate with their own and related
species as well as with non fungal organisms in a great variety of symbiotic interactions,
especially with bacteria, unicellular eukaryote, plants and insects through biochemicals of
biotic origin. The biochemicals trigger the fungal organism to react in a specific manner,
while if the same chemical molecules are not part of biotic messages, they do not trigger the
fungal organism to react. This implies that fungal organisms can differentiate between
molecules taking part in biotic messages and similar molecules being irrelevant in the
situation. So far five different primary signalling molecules are known to coordinate different
behavioral patterns such as filamentation, mating, growth, and pathogenicity. Behavioral
coordination and production of signaling substances is achieved through interpretation
processes that enables the organism to differ between self or non-self, a biotic indicator,
biotic message from similar, related, or non-related species, and even filter out "noise", i.e.
similar molecules without biotic content.[39]

Bacteria quorum sensing

Communication is not a tool used only by humans, plants and animals, but it is also used by
microorganisms like bacteria. The process is called quorum sensing. Through quorum
sensing, bacteria are able to sense the density of cells, and regulate gene expression
accordingly. This can be seen in both gram positive and gram negative bacteria. This was
first observed by Fuqua et al. in marine microorganisms like V. harveyi and V. fischeri.[40]

Models
Main article: Models of communication

Shannon and Weaver Model of Communication

157

Communication major dimensions scheme

Interactional Model of Communication

Berlo's Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver Model of Communication

158

Transactional model of communication

Communication code scheme

Linear Communication Model

The first major model for communication was introduced by Claude Shannon and Warren
Weaver for Bell Laboratories in 1949[41] The original model was designed to mirror the
functioning of radio and telephone technologies. Their initial model consisted of three
primary parts: sender, channel, and receiver. The sender was the part of a telephone a person
spoke into, the channel was the telephone itself, and the receiver was the part of the phone
where one could hear the other person. Shannon and Weaver also recognized that often there
is static that interferes with one listening to a telephone conversation, which they deemed
noise.

In a simple model, often referred to as the transmission model or standard view of

communication, information or content (e.g. a message in natural language) is sent in some
form (as spoken language) from an emisor/ sender/ encoder to a destination/ receiver/
decoder. This common conception of communication simply views communication as a
means of sending and receiving information. The strengths of this model are simplicity,
generality, and quantifiability. Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver structured this model
based on the following elements:

1. An information source, which produces a message.

2. A transmitter, which encodes the message into signals
3. A channel, to which signals are adapted for transmission
4. A noise source, which distorts the signal while it propagates through the channel
5. A receiver, which 'decodes' (reconstructs) the message from the signal.
6. A destination, where the message arrives.

Shannon and Weaver argued that there were three levels of problems for communication
within this theory.

The technical problem: how accurately can the message be transmitted?

159

The semantic problem: how precisely is the meaning 'conveyed'?

The effectiveness problem: how effectively does the received meaning affect behavior?

Daniel Chandler[42] critiques the transmission model by stating:

It assumes communicators are isolated individuals.

No allowance for differing purposes.

No allowance for differing interpretations.

No allowance for unequal power relations.

No allowance for situational contexts.

In 1960, David Berlo expanded on Shannon and Weaver's (1949) linear model of
communication and created the SMCR Model of Communication.[43] The Sender-Message-
Channel-Receiver Model of communication separated the model into clear parts and has been
expanded upon by other scholars.

Communication is usually described along a few major dimensions: Message (what type of
things are communicated), source / emisor / sender / encoder (by whom), form (in which
form), channel (through which medium), destination / receiver / target / decoder (to whom),
and Receiver. Wilbur Schram (1954) also indicated that we should also examine the impact
that a message has (both desired and undesired) on the target of the message.[44] Between
parties, communication includes acts that confer knowledge and experiences, give advice and
commands, and ask questions. These acts may take many forms, in one of the various
manners of communication. The form depends on the abilities of the group communicating.
Together, communication content and form make messages that are sent towards a
destination. The target can be oneself, another person or being, another entity (such as a
corporation or group of beings).

Communication can be seen as processes of information transmission with three levels of

semiotic rules:

1. Pragmatic (concerned with the relations between signs/expressions and their users)
2. Semantic (study of relationships between signs and symbols and what they represent) and
3. Syntactic (formal properties of signs and symbols).

Therefore, communication is social interaction where at least two interacting agents share a
common set of signs and a common set of semiotic rules. This commonly held rule in some
sense ignores autocommunication, including intrapersonal communication via diaries or self-
talk, both secondary phenomena that followed the primary acquisition of communicative
competences within social interactions.

In light of these weaknesses, Barnlund (2008) proposed a transactional model of

communication.[45] The basic premise of the transactional model of communication is that
individuals are simultaneously engaging in the sending and receiving of messages.

In a slightly more complex form a sender and a receiver are linked reciprocally. This second
attitude of communication, referred to as the constitutive model or constructionist view,
160

focuses on how an individual communicates as the determining factor of the way the message
will be interpreted. Communication is viewed as a conduit; a passage in which information
travels from one individual to another and this information becomes separate from the
communication itself. A particular instance of communication is called a speech act. The
sender's personal filters and the receiver's personal filters may vary depending upon different
regional traditions, cultures, or gender; which may alter the intended meaning of message
contents. In the presence of "communication noise" on the transmission channel (air, in this
case), reception and decoding of content may be faulty, and thus the speech act may not
achieve the desired effect. One problem with this encode-transmit-receive-decode model is
that the processes of encoding and decoding imply that the sender and receiver each possess
something that functions as a codebook, and that these two code books are, at the very least,
similar if not identical. Although something like code books is implied by the model, they are
nowhere represented in the model, which creates many conceptual difficulties.

Theories of coregulation describe communication as a creative and dynamic continuous

process, rather than a discrete exchange of information. Canadian media scholar Harold Innis
had the theory that people use different types of media to communicate and which one they
choose to use will offer different possibilities for the shape and durability of society (Wark,
McKenzie 1997). His famous example of this is using ancient Egypt and looking at the ways
they built themselves out of media with very different properties stone and papyrus. Papyrus
is what he called 'Space Binding'. it made possible the transmission of written orders across
space, empires and enables the waging of distant military campaigns and colonial
administration. The other is stone and 'Time Binding', through the construction of temples
and the pyramids can sustain their authority generation to generation, through this media they
can change and shape communication in their society (Wark, McKenzie 1997).

Noise

In any communication model, noise is interference with the decoding of messages sent over a
channel by an encoder. There are many examples of noise:

 Environmental noise. Noise that physically disrupts communication, such as standing next to
loud speakers at a party, or the noise from a construction site next to a classroom making it
difficult to hear the professor.
 Physiological-impairment noise. Physical maladies that prevent effective communication,
such as actual deafness or blindness preventing messages from being received as they were
intended.
 Semantic noise. Different interpretations of the meanings of certain words. For example,
the word "weed" can be interpreted as an undesirable plant in a yard, or as a euphemism for
marijuana.
 Syntactical noise. Mistakes in grammar can disrupt communication, such as abrupt changes
in verb tense during a sentence.
 Organizational noise. Poorly structured communication can prevent the receiver from
accurate interpretation. For example, unclear and badly stated directions can make the
receiver even more lost.
 Cultural noise. Stereotypical assumptions can cause misunderstandings, such as
unintentionally offending a non-Christian person by wishing them a "Merry Christmas".
 Psychological noise. Certain attitudes can also make communication difficult. For instance,
great anger or sadness may cause someone to lose focus on the present moment. Disorders
such as autism may also severely hamper effective communication.[46]
161

To face communication noise, redundancy and acknowledgement must often be used.

Acknowledgements are messages from the addressee informing the originator that his/her
communication has been received and is understood.[47] Message repetition and feedback
about message received are necessary in the presence of noise to reduce the probability of
misunderstanding.

As academic discipline
Main article: Communication studies

 Media portal

 Sociology portal

 Technology portal

 Advice
 Augmentative and alternative communication
 Communication rights
 Data communication
 Four Cs of 21st century learning
 Human communication
 Inter Mirifica
 Intercultural communication
 Ishin-denshin
 Proactive communications
 Sign system
 Small talk
 SPEAKING
 Telecommunication
 Telepathy
 Understanding
 21st century skills
 Assertion Theory

https://www.skillsyouneed.com/ips/what-is-communication.html

Communication is simply the act of transferring information from one place to another.

Although this is a simple definition, when we think about how we may communicate the
subject becomes a lot more complex. There are various categories of communication and
more than one may occur at any time.

The different categories of communication include:

 Spoken or Verbal Communication: face-to-face, telephone, radio or television and

other media.
 Non-Verbal Communication: body language, gestures, how we dress or act - even
our scent.
162

 Written Communication: letters, e-mails, books, magazines, the Internet or via other
media.
 Visualizations: graphs and charts, maps, logos and other visualizations can
communicate messages.

Read more at: https://www.skillsyouneed.com/ips/what-is-communication.html

The process of interpersonal communication cannot be regarded as a phenomena which

simply 'happens', but should be seen as a process which involves participants negotiating
their role in this process, whether consciously or unconsciously.

Senders and receivers are of course vital in communication. In face-to-face communication

the roles of the sender and receiver are not distinct as both parties communicate with each
other, even if in very subtle ways such as through eye-contact (or lack of) and general body
language.

There are many other subtle ways that we communicate (perhaps even unintentionally) with
others, for example the tone of our voice can give clues to our mood or emotional state,
whilst hand signals or gestures can add to a spoken message.

In written communication the sender and receiver are more distinct. Until recent times,
relatively few writers and publishers were very powerful when it came to communicating the
written word. Today we can all write and publish our ideas online, which has led to an
explosion of information and communication possibilities.

The Communication Process

A message or communication is sent by the sender through a communication channel to a

receiver, or to multiple receivers.

The sender must encode the message (the information being conveyed) into a form that is
appropriate to the communication channel, and the receiver(s) then decodes the message to
understand its meaning and significance.

Misunderstanding can occur at any stage of the communication process.

Effective communication involves minimising potential misunderstanding and overcoming

any barriers to communication at each stage in the communication process.

See our page: Barriers to Effective Communication for more information.

An effective communicator understands their audience, chooses an appropriate

communication channel, hones their message to this channel and encodes the message to
reduce misunderstanding by the receiver(s).
163

They will also seek out feedback from the receiver(s) as to how the message is understood
and attempt to correct any misunderstanding or confusion as soon as possible.

Receivers can use techniques such as Clarification and Reflection as effective ways to
ensure that the message sent has been understood correctly.

Communication Channels

Communication theory states that communication involves a sender and a receiver (or
receivers) conveying information through a communication channel.

Communication Channels is the term given to the way in which we communicate. There are
multiple communication channels available to us today, for example face-to-face
conversations, telephone calls, text messages, email, the Internet (including social media
such as Facebook and Twitter), radio and TV, written letters, brochures and reports to name
just a few.

Choosing an appropriate communication channel is vital for effective communication as

each communication channel has different strengths and weaknesses.

For example, broadcasting news of an upcoming event via a written letter might convey the
message clearly to one or two individuals but will not be a time or cost effective way to
broadcast the message to a large number of people. On the other hand, conveying complex,
technical information is better done via a printed document than via a spoken message since
the receiver is able to assimilate the information at their own pace and revisit items that they
do not fully understand.

Written communication is also useful as a way of recording what has been said, for example
taking minutes in a meeting.

See our pages: Note Taking and How to Conduct a Meeting for more.

Encoding Messages
164

All messages must be encoded into a form that can be conveyed by the communication
channel chosen for the message.

We all do this every day when transferring abstract thoughts into spoken words or a written
form. However, other communication channels require different forms of encoding, e.g. text
written for a report will not work well if broadcast via a radio programme, and the short,
abbreviated text used in text messages would be inappropriate if sent via a letter.

Complex data may be best communicated using a graph or chart or other visualisation.

Effective communicators encode their messages with their intended audience in mind as well
as the communication channel. This involves an appropriate use of language, conveying the
information simply and clearly, anticipating and eliminating likely causes of confusion and
misunderstanding, and knowing the receivers’ experience in decoding other similar
communications. Successful encoding of messages is a vital skill in effective
communication.

You may find our page The Importance of Plain English helpful.

Decoding Messages

Once received, the receiver/s need to decode the message. Successful decoding is also a vital
communication skill.

People will decode and understand messages in different ways based upon any Barriers to
Communication which might be present, their experience and understanding of the context
of the message, their psychological state, and the time and place of receipt as well as many
other potential factors.

Understanding how the message will be decoded, and anticipating as many of the potential
sources of misunderstanding as possible, is the art of a successful communicator.

Feedback

Receivers of messages are likely to provide feedback on how they have understood the
messages through both verbal and non-verbal reactions.

Effective communicators pay close attention to this feedback as it the only way to assess
whether the message has been understood as intended, and it allows any confusion to be
corrected.

Bear in mind that the extent and form of feedback will vary according to the communication
channel used: for example feedback during a face-to-face or telephone conversation will be
immediate and direct, whilst feedback to messages conveyed via TV or radio will be indirect
and may be delayed, or even conveyed through other media such as the Internet.

More on feedback: see our pages on Reflection, Clarification and Giving and Receiving Feedback

Our Communication Skills eBooks

165

Learn more about the key communication skills you need to be an effective communicator.

Our eBooks are ideal for anyone who wants to learn about or develop their communication
skills, and are full of easy-to-follow practical information and exercises.

Read more at: https://www.skillsyouneed.com/ips/what-is-communication.html

https://www.thebalance.com/communication-skills-list-2063779

Top 10 Communication Skills

Here are the top 10 communication skills that will help you stand out in today's job market.

1. Listening
Being a good listener is one of the best ways to be a good communicator. No one likes
communicating with someone who only cares about putting in her two cents, and does not
take the time to listen to the other person. If you're not a good listener, it's going to be hard to
comprehend what you're being asked to do.

Take the time to practice active listening. Active listening involves paying close attention to
what the other person is saying, asking clarifying questions, and rephrasing what the person
says to ensure understanding ("So, what you're saying is…"). Through active listening, you
can better understand what the other person is trying to say, and can respond appropriately.

 Types of Listening Skills With Examples

2. Nonverbal Communication
Your body language, eye contact, hand gestures, and tone all color the message you are trying
to convey. A relaxed, open stance (arms open, legs relaxed), and a friendly tone will make
you appear approachable, and will encourage others to speak openly with you.

Eye contact is also important; you want to look the person in the eye to demonstrate that you
are focused on the person and the conversation (however, be sure not to stare at the person,
which can make him or her uncomfortable).

Also pay attention to other people's nonverbal signals while you are talking.

Often, nonverbal signals convey how a person is really feeling. For example, if the person is
not looking you in the eye, he or she might be uncomfortable or hiding the truth.

 Nonverbal Communication Skills

 How to Use Nonverbal Communication During a Job Interview

3. Clarity and Concision

Good communication means saying just enough - don't say too little or talk too much. Try to
convey your message in as few words as possible. Say what you want clearly and directly,
166

whether you're speaking to someone in person, on the phone, or via email. If you ramble on,
your listener will either tune you out or will be unsure of exactly what you want. Think about
what you want to say before you say it; this will help you to avoid talking excessively and/or
confusing your audience.

 Verbal Communication Skills

4. Friendliness
Through a friendly tone, a personal question, or simply a smile, you will encourage your
coworkers to engage in open and honest communication with you. It's important to be nice
and polite in all your workplace communications. This is important in both face-to-face and
written communication. When you can, personalize your emails to coworkers and/or
employees - a quick "I hope you all had a good weekend" at the start of an email can
personalize a message and make the recipient feel more appreciated.

 Interpersonal Skills List

 Personal Skills List

5. Confidence
It is important to be confident in all of your interactions with others. Confidence ensures your
coworkers that you believe in and will follow through with what you are saying. Exuding
confidence can be as simple as making eye contact or using a firm but friendly tone (avoid
making statements sound like questions). Of course, be careful not to sound arrogant or
aggressive. Be sure you are always listening to and empathizing with the other person.

 How to Show Your Personality at an Interview

6. Empathy
Even when you disagree with an employer, coworker, or employee, it is important for you to
understand and respect their point of view. Using phrases as simple as "I understand where
you are coming from" demonstrate that you have been listening to the other person and
respect their opinions.

7. Open-Mindedness
A good communicator should enter any conversation with a flexible, open mind. Be open to
listening to and understanding the other person's point of view, rather than simply getting
your message across. By being willing to enter into a dialogue, even with people with whom
you disagree, you will be able to have more honest, productive conversations.

8. Respect
People will be more open to communicating with you if you convey respect for them and
their ideas. Simple actions like using a person's name, making eye contact, and actively
listening when a person speaks will make the person feel appreciated. On the phone, avoid
distractions and stay focused on the conversation.

Convey respect through email by taking the time to edit your message. If you send a sloppily
written, confusing email, the recipient will think you do not respect her enough to think
through your communication with her.
167

9. Feedback
Being able to appropriately give and receive feedback is an important communication skill.
Managers and supervisors should continuously look for ways to provide employees with
constructive feedback, be it through email, phone calls, or weekly status updates. Giving
feedback involves giving praise as well - something as simple as saying "good job" or
"thanks for taking care of that" to an employee can greatly increase motivation.

Similarly, you should be able to accept, and even encourage, feedback from others. Listen to
the feedback you are given, ask clarifying questions if you are unsure of the issue, and make
efforts to implement the feedback.

 Motivational Skills
 Team Building Skills
 Teamwork Skills

10. Picking the Right Medium

An important communication skill is to simply know what form of communication to use.
For example, some serious conversations (layoffs, changes in salary, etc.) are almost always
best done in person. You should also think about the person with whom you wish to speak - if
they are very busy people (such as your boss, perhaps), you might want to convey your
message through email. People will appreciate your thoughtful means of communication, and
will be more likely to respond positively to you.

More Communication Skills: A - Z List of Communications Skills for Resumes

Search Results

Models of communication - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Models_of_communication

Models of communication are conceptual models used to explain the human communication ... The
SMCR Model of Communication separated the model into clear parts and ... Barnlund (1970)
proposed a transactional model of communication. ... Papyrus is what he called 'Space Binding'. it
made possible the transmission ...

Berlo's SMCR Model of Communication | Businesstopia

https://www.businesstopia.net/communication/berlo-model-communication

Berlo's Model has mainly, four components to describe the communication process. ... The attitude
of the sender and the receiver creates the effect of the message. ... It is a linear model of
communication, there is no two way communication.

Communication Models: Basic SMCR Model - YouTube

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUGW2d6nXe0

Basics of Berlo's communication model (linear, communication as action)

168

Models of communication are conceptual models used to explain the human communication
process. The first major model for communication came in 1948 by Claude Elwood Shannon
and published with an introduction by Warren Weaver for Bell Laboratories.[1] Following the
basic concept, communication is the process of sending and receiving messages or
transferring information from one part (sender) to another (receiver).[2]

Contents

 1 Shannon and Weaver

 2 Berlo
 3 Schramm
 4 Constructionist model
 5 Linear Model
 6 Interactive/convergence Model
 7 Communication Theory Framework
 8 Ontology
 9 Epistemology
 10 Axiology
 11 Mapping the theoretical landscape
o 11.1 Contexts
o 11.2 The Constitutive Metamodel
 12 Some realms of communication and their theories
 13 References

Some realms of communication and their theories

 universal communication Law: Universal Theory, Dynamic-transactional Ansatz

 message production: Constructivist Theory, Action Assembly Theory
 message processing: Elaboration Likelihood Model, Inoculation theory
 discourse and interaction: Speech Acts Theory, Coordinated Management of Meaning
 developing relationships: Uncertainty Reduction Theory, Social Penetration Theory,
Predicted Outcome Value Theory
 ongoing relationships: Relational Systems Theory, Relational Dialectics
 organizational: Structuration Theory, Unobtrusive and Concertive Control Theory
 small group: Functional Theory, Symbolic Convergence Theory
 media processing and effects: Social Cognitive Theory, Uses and Gratifications Theory
 media and society: Agenda Setting, Information deficit model, Spiral of silence, Symbolic
Convergence Theory
 culture: Speech Codes Theory, Face-saving Theory
 making social worlds: Coordinated Management of Meaning, Symbolic Interactionism
 science communication: Gateway Belief Model

On the nature and role of intersubjectivity in communication - Cogprints

cogprints.org/6159/

by M Tirassa - 2008 - Cited by 38 - Related articles

Aug 10, 2008 - We outline a theory of human agency and communication and discuss the role that
the capability to share (that is, intersubjectivity) plays in it.
169

Intersubjectivity and Communication - Springer

link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-94-009-1602-9_30

by P Vandevelde - 1996 - Related articles

Abstract. In their renewal of a communicative rationalism in Germany, J. Habermas and K.-O. Apel
use communication as a key concept in order to show how ...

Intersubjectivity and the Conceptualization of Communication - JStor

https://www.jstor.org/stable/20008845

by L Grossberg - 1982 - Cited by 24 - Related articles

The relationship between intersubjectivity and communication can be located in the fact that both
raise the question of how the individual is, in some way, tran?

Intersubjectivity and intentional communication | Ingar Brinck ...

www.academia.edu/887480/Intersubjectivity_and_intentional_communication

Instead a search is launched for individual factors that might explain the contradictory data on
intersubjective behaviour and intentional communication, while ...

6. The role of intersubjectivity in the development of intentional ...

https://benjamins.com/catalog/celcr.12.08bri

The role of intersubjectivity in the development of intentional communication. Ingar Brinck. The
present account explains (i) which elements of nonverbal ...

[PDF]Intersubjective Communication and - University of Washington

ilabs.washington.edu/meltzoff/pdf/98M&M_InfantIntersubjectivity.pdf

Communication and. Emotion in Early. Ontogeny. Edited by. Stein Bréten in». NI. CAMBRIDGE.
UNIVERSITY PRESS. 1998. CHAPTER 2. Infant intersubjectivity:.

20th WCP: Identity, Intersubjectivity and Communicative Action

https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cult/CultGlyn.htm

ABSTRACT: Traditionally, attempts to verify communications between individuals and cultures

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171

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172

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173

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177

What is the role of intersubjectivity in (subcultures) communities of

scientists, philosophers, etc? Specialized intersubjectivity of scientific
groups/disciplines, their values, norms, attitudes and paradigms –
controlled by their intersubjectivity.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersubjective_verifiability

Intersubjective verifiability is the capacity of a concept to be readily and accurately

communicated between different individuals ("intersubjectively"), and to be reproduced
under varying circumstances for the purposes of verification. It is a core principle of
empirical, scientific investigation.[1][2][3]

Although there are areas of belief that do not consistently employ intersubjective verifiability
(e.g., many religious claims), intersubjective verifiability is a near-universal way of
arbitrating truth claims used by people everywhere. In its basic form, it can be found in
colloquial expressions, e.g., "I'm from Missouri. Show me!" or "Seeing is believing." The
scientific principle of replication of findings by investigators other than those that first
reported the phenomenon is simply a more highly structured form of the universal principle
of intersubjective verifiability.

Contents

 1 Subjective experience
 2 Congruence and incongruence
 3 Intersubjective verifiability versus belief based on faith
 4 See also
 5 Notes and references

Subjective experience

Each individual is a subject, and must subjectively experience the physical world. Each
subject has a different perspective and point of view on various aspects of the world.
However, by sharing their comparable experiences intersubjectively, individuals may gain an
increasingly similar understanding of the world. In this way, many different subjective
experiences can come together to form intersubjective ones that are less likely to be prone to
individual bias or gaps in knowledge.

While specific internal experiences are not intersubjectively verifiable, the existence of
thematic patterns of internal experience can be intersubjectively verified. For example,
whether or not people are telling what they believe to be the truth when they make claims can
only be known by the claimants. However, we can intersubjectively verify that people almost
universally experience discomfort (hunger) when they haven't had enough to eat. We
generally have only a crude ability to compare (measure) internal experiences.

Congruence and incongruence

When an external, public phenomenon is experienced and carefully described (in words or
measurements) by one individual, other individuals can see if their experiences of the
178

phenomenon "fit" the description. If they do, a sense of congruence between one subject and
another occurs. This is the basis for a definition of what is true that is agreed upon by the
involved parties. If the description does not fit the experience of one or more of the parties
involved, incongruence occurs instead.

Incongruent contradictions between the experience and descriptions of different individuals

can be caused by a number of factors. One common source of incongruence is the
inconsistent use of language in the descriptions people use, such as the same words being
used differently. Such semantic problems require more careful development and use of
language.

Incongruence also arises from a failure to describe the phenomena well. In these cases,
further development of the description, model, or theory used to refer to the phenomena is
required.

A third form of incongruence arises when the descriptions do not conform to consensual (i.e.,
intersubjectively verifiable) experience, such as when the descriptions are faulty, incorrect,
wrong, or inaccurate, and need to be replaced by more accurate descriptions, models, or
theories.

Intersubjective verifiability versus belief based on faith

Main article: Science and religion

The contradiction between the truths derived from intersubjective verification and beliefs
based on faith or on appeal to authority (e.g., many religious beliefs) forms the basis for the
conflict between religion and science.[4] There have been attempts to bring the two into
congruence, and the modern, cutting edge of science, especially in physics, seems to many
observers to lend itself to a melding of religious experience and intersubjective verification of
beliefs. Some scientists have described religious worldviews---generally of a mystical nature-
--consistent with their understanding of science:

There are two ways to live your life. One is as though nothing is a miracle. The other is as
though everything is a miracle . . .

Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind . . .

The religion of the future will be a cosmic religion. The religion which is based on
experience, which refuses dogmatism . . .

There remains something subtle, intangible and inexplicable. Veneration for this force beyond
anything that we can comprehend is my religion. (Albert Einstein)

Other scientists, who are committed to basing belief on intersubjective verification, have
called for or predicted the development of a religion consistent with science.

A religion old or new, that stressed the magnificence of the universe as revealed by modern
science, might be able to draw forth reserves of reverence and awe hardly tapped by the
conventional faiths. Sooner or later, such a religion will emerge. (Carl Sagan, Pale Blue Dot)
179

The evolutionary epic is probably the best myth we will ever have ... The true evolutionary
epic, retold as poetry, is as intrinsically ennobling as any religious epic. (Edward O. Wilson)

Responding to this apparent overlap between cutting edge science and mystical experience, in
recent years, there have been overt efforts to formulate religious belief systems that are built
on truth claims based upon intersubjective verifiability, e.g. Anthroposophy, Yoism.

See also

 Objectivity (philosophy)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivity_%28philosophy%29

Objectivity is a central philosophical concept, related to reality and truth, which has been
variously defined by sources. Generally, objectivity means the state or quality of being true
even outside of a subject's individual biases, interpretations, feelings, and imaginings. A
proposition is generally considered objectively true (to have objective truth) when its truth
conditions are met without biases caused by feelings, ideas, opinions, etc., of a sentient
subject. A second, broader meaning of the term refers to the ability in any context to judge
fairly, without partiality or external influence. This second meaning of objectivity is
sometimes used synonymously with neutrality.

Contents

 1 Objectivism
 2 Objectivity in ethics
o 2.1 Ethical subjectivism
o 2.2 Ethical objectivism
 3 See also
 4 Further reading
 5 External links

Objectivism

"Objectivism" is a term that describes a branch of philosophy that originated in the early
nineteenth century. Gottlob Frege was the first to apply it, when he expounded an
epistemological and metaphysical theory contrary to that of Immanuel Kant. Kant's
rationalism attempted to reconcile the failures he perceived in philosophical realism.

Stronger versions of this claim hold that there is only one correct description of this reality. If
it is true that reality is mind-independent, then reality might include objects that are unknown
to consciousness and thus might include objects not the subject of intensionality. Objectivity
in referring requires a definition of truth. According to metaphysical objectivists, an object
may truthfully be said to have this or that attribute, as in the statement "This object exists,"
whereas the statement "This object is true" or "false" is meaningless. For them, only
propositions have truth values. The terms "objectivity" and "objectivism" are not
synonymous, with objectivism being an ontological theory that incorporates a commitment to
the objectivity of objects.
180

Plato's idealism was a form of metaphysical objectivism, holding that the Ideas exist
objectively and independently. Berkeley's empiricist idealism, on the other hand, could be
called a subjectivism: he held that things only exist to the extent that they are perceived. Both
theories claim methods of objectivity. Plato's definition of objectivity can be found in his
epistemology, which takes as a model mathematics, and his metaphysics, where knowledge
of the ontological status of objects and ideas is resistant to change.

Plato considered knowledge of geometry a condition of philosophical knowledge, both being

concerned with universal truths. Plato's opposition between objective knowledge and doxa
(opinions) became the basis for later philosophies intent on resolving the problem of reality,
knowledge, and human existence. Personal opinions belong to the changing sphere of the
sensible, opposed to a fixed and eternal incorporeal realm that is mutually intelligible.

Where Plato distinguishes between what and how we know things (epistemology), and their
ontological status as things (metaphysics), subjectivism such as Berkeley's and a mind
dependence of knowledge and reality fails to distinguish between what one knows and what
is to be known, or at least explains the distinction superficially. In Platonic terms, a criticism
of subjectivism is that it is difficult to distinguish between knowledge, doxa, and subjective
knowledge (true belief), distinctions that Plato makes.

The importance of perception in evaluating and understanding objective reality is debated.

Realists argue that perception is key in directly observing objective reality, while
instrumentalists hold that perception is not necessarily useful in directly observing objective
reality, but is useful in interpreting and predicting reality. The concepts that encompasses
these ideas are important in the philosophy of science.

Objectivity in ethics

Ethical subjectivism

See also: David Hume, Non-cognitivism, and Subjectivism

The term, "ethical subjectivism", covers two distinct theories in ethics. According to
cognitive versions of ethical subjectivism, the truth of moral statements depends upon
people's values, attitudes, feelings, or beliefs. Some forms of cognitivist ethical subjectivism
can be counted as forms of realism, others are forms of anti-realism. David Hume is a
foundational figure for cognitive ethical subjectivism. On a standard interpretation of his
theory, a trait of character counts as a moral virtue when it evokes a sentiment of approbation
in a sympathetic, informed, and rational human observer. Similarly, Roderick Firth's ideal
observer theory held that right acts are those that an impartial, rational observer would
approve of. William James, another ethical subjectivist, held that an end is good (to or for a
person) just in the case it is desired by that person (see also ethical egoism). According to
non-cognitive versions of ethical subjectivism, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and
expressivism, ethical statements cannot be true or false, at all: rather, they are expressions of
personal feelings or commands. For example, on A. J. Ayer's emotivism, the statement,
"Murder is wrong" is equivalent in meaning to the emotive, "Murder, Boo!"

Ethical objectivism
181

Main article: Moral realism

According to the ethical objectivist, the truth or falsehood of typical moral judgments does
not depend upon the beliefs or feelings of any person or group of persons. This view holds
that moral propositions are analogous to propositions about chemistry, biology, or history, in
so much as they are true despite what anyone believes, hopes, wishes, or feelings. When they
fail to describe this mind-independent moral reality, they are false—no matter what anyone
believes, hopes, wishes, or feels.

There are many versions of ethical objectivism, including various religious views of morality,
Platonistic intuitionism, Kantianism, utilitarianism, and certain forms of ethical egoism and
contractualism. Note that Platonists define ethical objectivism in an even more narrow way,
so that it requires the existence of intrinsic value. Consequently, they reject the idea that
contractualists or egoists could be ethical objectivists. Objectivism, in turn, places primacy on
the origin of the frame of reference—and, as such, considers any arbitrary frame of reference
ultimately a form of ethical subjectivism by a transitive property, even when the frame
incidentally coincides with reality and can be used for measurements.

See also

 Philosophy portal

 Factual relativism
 Journalistic objectivity
 Naïve realism
 Objectivity (science)

Further reading

 Bachelard, Gaston. La formation de l'esprit scientifique : contribution à une psychanalyse de

la connaissance. Paris: Vrin, 2004. ISBN 2-7116-1150-7.
 Castillejo, David. The Formation of Modern Objectivity. Madrid: Ediciones de Arte y
Bibliofilia, 1982.
 Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996, 3rd ed. ISBN 0-226-45808-3.
 Megill, Allan. Rethinking Objectivity. London: Duke UP, 1994.
 Nagel, Ernest. The Structure of Science. New York: Brace and World, 1961.
 Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986
 Nozick, Robert. Invariances: the structure of the objective world. Cambridge: Harvard UP,
2001.
 Popper, Karl. R. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford University Press,
1972. ISBN 0-19-875024-2.
 Rescher, Nicholas. Objectivity: the obligations of impersonal reason. Notre Dame: Notre
Dame Press, 1977.
 Rorty, Richard. Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991
 Rousset, Bernard. La théorie kantienne de l'objectivité, Paris: Vrin, 1967.
 Schaeffler, Israel. Science and Subjectivity. Hackett, 1982. Voices of Wisdom; a multicultural
philosophy reader. kessler
182

External links

 Mulder, Dwayne H. "Objectivity". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

 Subjectivity and Objectivity—by Pete Mandik

 Objectivity (science)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivity_%28science%29

Objectivity in science is a value that informs how science is practiced and how scientific
truths are discovered. It is the idea that scientists, in attempting to uncover truths about the
natural world, must aspire to eliminate personal biases, a priori commitments, emotional
involvement, etc.[1] Objectivity is often attributed to the property of scientific measurement,
as the accuracy of a measurement can be tested independent from the individual scientist who
first reports it.[citation needed] It is thus intimately related to the aim of testability and
reproducibility. To be properly considered objective, the results of measurement must be
communicated from person to person, and then demonstrated for third parties, as an advance
in understanding of the objective world. Such demonstrable knowledge would ordinarily
confer demonstrable powers of prediction or technological construction.

Problems arise from not understanding the limits of objectivity in scientific research,
especially when results are generalized. Given that the object selection and measurement
process are typically subjective, when results of that subjective process are generalized to the
larger system from which the object was selected, the stated conclusions are necessarily
biased.

Objectivity should not be confused with scientific consensus. Scientists may agree at one
point in time but later discover that this consensus represented a subjective point of view.[citat

Contents

 1 History
 2 Objectivity in measurement
 3 Objectivity in experimental set-up and interpretation
 4 Deliberate misrepresentation
 5 The role of the scientific community
 6 Critiques of scientific objectivity
o 6.1 Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
o 6.2 Donna Haraway's "situated knowledges"
 7 References
 8 Sources
 9 Further reading
 10 External links

History

Objectivity in science appeared in the mid-nineteenth century.[1]:17 In the early eighteenth

century, before objectivity, there existed an epistemic virtue in science which Lorraine
183

Daston and Peter Galison have called truth-to-nature.[1]:55–58 This ideal was practiced by
Enlightenment naturalists and scientific atlas-makers and involved active attempts to
eliminate any idiosyncrasies in their representations of nature in order to create images
thought best to represent “what truly is.”[1]:59–60[2]:84–85 Judgment and skill were deemed
necessary in order to determine the “typical,” “characteristic,” “ideal” or “average.”[2]:87 In
practicing truth-to-nature naturalists did not seek to depict exactly what was seen; rather, they
sought a reasoned image.[1]:98

In the latter half of the nineteenth century objectivity in science was born when a new
practice of mechanical objectivity appeared.[1]:121 “‘Let nature speak for itself’ became the
watchword of a new brand of scientific objectivity.”[2]:81 It was at this time that idealized
representations of nature, which were previously seen as a virtue, were now seen as a
vice.[1]:120 Scientists began to see it as their duty to actively restrain themselves from
imposing their own projections onto nature.[2]:81 The aim was to liberate representations of
nature from subjective, human interference and in order to achieve this scientists began using
self-registering instruments, cameras, wax molds and other technological devices.[1]:121

In the twentieth century trained judgment[1]:309 supplemented mechanical objectivity as

scientists began to recognize that, in order for images or data to be of any use, scientists
needed to be able to see scientifically; that is, to interpret images or data and identify and
group them according to particular professional training, rather than to simply depict them
mechanically.[1]:311–314 Objectivity now came to involve a combination of trained judgment
and mechanical objectivity.

Objectivity in measurement

Another methodological aspect is the avoidance of bias, which can involve cognitive bias,
cultural bias, or sampling bias. Methods for avoiding or overcoming such biases include
random sampling and double-blind trials.

Objectivity in experimental set-up and interpretation

Another methodological aspect is the avoidance of bias, which can involve cognitive bias,
cultural bias, or sampling bias. Methods for avoiding or overcoming such biases include
random sampling and double-blind trials.

Deliberate misrepresentation

Next to unintentional but possibly systematic error, there is always the possibility of
deliberate misrepresentation of scientific results, whether for gain, fame, or ideological
motives. When such cases of scientific fraud come to light, they usually give rise to an
academic scandal, but it is unknown how much fraud goes undiscovered. However, for
important results, other groups will try to repeat the experiment. If they consistently fail, they
will bring these negative results into the scientific debate.
184

The role of the scientific community

Various scientific processes, such as peer reviews, the discussions at scientific conferences,
and other meetings where scientific results are presented, are part of a social process whose
purpose is to strengthen the objective aspect of the scientific method.

Critiques of scientific objectivity

A critical argument on scientific objectivity and positivism is that all science has a degree of
interpretivism.[3]:29 In the 1920s, Percy Bridgman's operationalism was centered in such
recognition.[3]:29

Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Based on a historical review of the development of certain scientific theories in his book, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, scientist and historian Thomas Kuhn raised some
philosophical objections to claims of the possibility of scientific understanding being truly
objective. In Kuhn's analysis, scientists in different disciplines organise themselves into de
facto paradigms, within which scientific research is done, junior scientists are educated, and
scientific problems are determined.[4]

When observational data arises which appears to contradict or falsify a given scientific
paradigm, scientists within that paradigm have not, historically, immediately rejected the
paradigm in question (as Sir Karl Popper's philosophical theory of falsificationism would
have them do), but instead they have gone to considerable lengths to resolve the apparent
conflict without rejecting the paradigm. Through ad hoc variations to the theory and
sympathetic interpretation of the data, supporting scientists will resolve the apparent
conundrum. In extreme cases, they may even ignore the data altogether.[4]

Thus, Kuhn argues, the failure of a scientific revolution is not an objectively measurable,
deterministic event, but a far more contingent shift in social order. A paradigm will go into a
crisis when a significant portion of the scientists working in the field lose confidence in the
paradigm, regardless of their reasons for doing so. The corollary of this observation is that the
primacy of a given paradigm is similarly contingent on the social order amongst scientists at
the time it gains ascendancy.[4]

Kuhn's theory has been criticised by scientists such as Richard Dawkins and Alan Sokal as
presenting a profoundly relativist view of scientific progress. In a postscript to the third
edition of his book, Kuhn denied being a relativist.

Donna Haraway's "situated knowledges"

In "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial
Perspective" (1988) Donna Haraway argues that when we talk about objectivity in science
and philosophy, traditionally we understand it as a kind of disembodied, transcendent
"conquering gaze from nowhere,"[5]:581 in which the subject is split apart, distanced from and
set above the object of inquiry.[5]:583–587 She argues that this kind of objectivity is impossible
to achieve; it is "an illusion, a god trick,"[5]:582 and instead demands a re-thinking of
objectivity in such a way that, while still striving for "faithful accounts of the real
185

world,"[5]:579 we must also acknowledge and make explicit our perspective and positioning
within the world.[5]:581–582 She calls this new kind of knowledge-making "situated
knowledges."[5]:582 Objectivity, she argues, "turns out to be about particular and specific
embodiment and definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits
and responsibility."[5]:583 This new objectivity, then, "allows us to become answerable for
what we learn how to see."[5]:583 Thus Haraway is not only critiquing the idea that objectivity,
as we have long understood it, is possible; she is also arguing that if we continue to approach
knowledge-making in this way then we wash our hands of any responsibility for our truth
claims. In contrast, she is arguing, approaching knowledge-making from an embodied
perspective forces us to take responsibility for our truth claims.

References

1.

 Daston, Lorraine; Galison, Peter (2010). Objectivity. Zone Books. ISBN 9781890951795.
  Daston, Lorraine; Galison, Peter (Autumn 1992). "The Image of Objectivity" (PDF).
Representations. 0 (40): 81–128. doi:10.2307/2928741.

  Gach, John; Wallace, Edwin R. (2010). History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology: With an
Epilogue on Psychiatry and the Mind-Body Relation. Springer Science & Business Media.
ISBN 9780387347080.

  Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (PDF), The University of Chicago
Press, retrieved 14 November 2014

5.  Haraway, Donna (Autumn 1988). "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism
and the Privilege of Partial Perspective" (PDF). Feminist Studies. 14 (3): 575–599.
doi:10.2307/3178066.

Sources

 Dawkins, Richard. (2003). A Devil's Chaplain: Selected essays. Phoenix.

 Kuhn, Thomas. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. University of Chicago Press, 3rd
Ed., 1996.
 Latour, Bruno. (1987). Science in Action. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
 Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge, towards a post-critical philosophy. London:
Routledge.
 Sokal, Alan & Bricmont, Jean. (1999). Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern philosophers’
abuse of science. London: Profile Books.

Further reading

 Gaukroger, S. (2001). Objectivity, History of. IN: Smelser, N. J. & Baltes, P. B. (eds.)
International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Oxford. (pp. 10785–
10789).
 Porter, Theodore M. (1995). Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and
Public Life. Princeton University Press.
 Restivo, Sal. (20XX). Science, Society, and Values: Toward a Sociology of Objectivity. Lehigh
University Press.
186

External links

 Scientific Objectivity — entry by Julian Reiss and Jan Sprenger in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-objectivity/

Scientific objectivity is a characteristic of scientific claims, methods and results. It expresses

the idea that the claims, methods and results of science are not, or should not be influenced
by particular perspectives, value commitments, community bias or personal interests, to name
a few relevant factors. Objectivity is often considered as an ideal for scientific inquiry, as a
good reason for valuing scientific knowledge, and as the basis of the authority of science in
society.

Many central debates in the philosophy of science have, in one way or another, to do with
objectivity: confirmation and the problem of induction; theory choice and scientific change;
realism; scientific explanation; experimentation; measurement and quantification; evidence
and the foundations of statistics; evidence-based science; feminism and values in science.
Understanding the role of objectivity in science is therefore integral to a full appreciation of
these debates. As this article testifies, the reverse is true too: it is impossible to fully
appreciate the notion of scientific objectivity without touching upon many of these debates.

The ideal of objectivity has been criticized repeatedly in philosophy of science, questioning
both its value and its attainability. This article focuses on the question of how scientific
objectivity should be define, whether the ideal of objectivity is desirable, and to what extent
scientists can achieve it. In line with the idea that the epistemic authority of science relies
primarily on the objectivity of scientific reasoning, we focus on the role of objectivity in
scientific experimentation, inference and theory choice.

 1. Introduction: Product and Process Objectivity

 2. Objectivity as Faithfulness to Facts
o 2.1 The View From Nowhere
o 2.2 Theory-Ladenness and Incommensurability
o 2.3 The Experimenter's Regress
o 2.4 Standpoint Theory, Contextual Empiricism and Trust in Science
 3. Objectivity as Absence of Normative Commitments and the Value-Free Ideal
o 3.1 Epistemic and Contextual Values
o 3.2 Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses and Value Neutrality
o 3.3 Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal
o 3.4 Feyerabend: The Tyranny of the Rational Method
 4. Objectivity as Freedom from Personal Biases
o 4.1 Measurement and Quantification
o 4.2 Inductive and Statistical Inference
 4.2.1 Logical Probability and Bayesian Inference
 4.2.2 Frequentist Inference
 4.2.3 Likelihood-Based Inference
 5. Issues in the Special Sciences
o 5.1 Max Weber and Objectivity in the Social Sciences
o 5.2 Contemporary Rational Choice Theory
o 5.3 Evidence-based Medicine and Social Policy
187

 6. Instrumentalism to the Rescue?

 7. Conclusions
 Bibliography

 Subjectivity
 Epistemology
 Phenomenology
 Scientific method

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method

The scientific method is a body of techniques for investigating phenomena, acquiring new
knowledge, or correcting and integrating previous knowledge.[2] To be termed scientific, a
method of inquiry is commonly based on empirical or measurable evidence subject to
specific principles of reasoning.[3] The Oxford Dictionaries Online define the scientific
method as "a method or procedure that has characterized natural science since the 17th
century, consisting in systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, and the
formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses".[4] Experiments need to be designed to
test hypotheses. The most important part of the scientific method is the experiment.[5]

The scientific method is a continuous process, which usually begins with observations about
the natural world. Human beings are naturally inquisitive, so they often come up with
questions about things they see or hear and often develop ideas (hypotheses) about why
things are the way they are. The best hypotheses lead to predictions that can be tested in
various ways, including making further observations about nature. In general, the strongest
tests of hypotheses come from carefully controlled and replicated experiments that gather
empirical data. Depending on how well the tests match the predictions, the original
hypothesis may require refinement, alteration, expansion or even rejection. If a particular
hypothesis becomes very well supported a general theory may be developed.[1]

Although procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, identifiable features are
frequently shared in common between them. The overall process of the scientific method
involves making conjectures (hypotheses), deriving predictions from them as logical
consequences, and then carrying out experiments based on those predictions.[6][7] A
hypothesis is a conjecture, based on knowledge obtained while formulating the question. The
hypothesis might be very specific or it might be broad. Scientists then test hypotheses by
conducting experiments. Under modern interpretations, a scientific hypothesis must be
falsifiable, implying that it is possible to identify a possible outcome of an experiment that
conflicts with predictions deduced from the hypothesis; otherwise, the hypothesis cannot be
meaningfully tested.[8]

The purpose of an experiment is to determine whether observations agree with or conflict

with the predictions derived from a hypothesis.[9] Experiments can take place anywhere from
a college lab to CERN's Large Hadron Collider. There are difficulties in a formulaic
statement of method, however. Though the scientific method is often presented as a fixed
sequence of steps, it represents rather a set of general principles.[10] Not all steps take place in
188

every scientific inquiry (or to the same degree), and are not always in the same order.[11]
Some philosophers and scientists have argued that there is no scientific method, such as Lee
Smolin[12] and Paul Feyerabend (in his Against Method). Nola and Sankey remark that "For
some, the whole idea of a theory of scientific method is yester-year's debate".[13]

Contents

 1 Overview
o 1.1 Process
o 1.2 DNA example
o 1.3 Other components
 2 Scientific inquiry
o 2.1 Properties of scientific inquiry
o 2.2 Beliefs and biases
 3 Elements of the scientific method
o 3.1 Characterizations
o 3.2 Hypothesis development
o 3.3 Predictions from the hypothesis
o 3.4 Experiments
o 3.5 Evaluation and improvement
o 3.6 Confirmation
 4 Models of scientific inquiry
o 4.1 Classical model
o 4.2 Pragmatic model
 5 Communication and community
o 5.1 Peer review evaluation
o 5.2 Documentation and replication
o 5.3 Dimensions of practice
 6 Philosophy and sociology of science
 Philosophy of science looks at the underpinning logic of the scientific method, at what
separates science from non-science, and the ethic that is implicit in science. There are
basic assumptions, derived from philosophy by at least one prominent scientist, that
form the base of the scientific method – namely, that reality is objective and
consistent, that humans have the capacity to perceive reality accurately, and that
rational explanations exist for elements of the real world.[107] These assumptions from
methodological naturalism form a basis on which science may be grounded. Logical
Positivist, empiricist, falsificationist, and other theories have criticized these
assumptions and given alternative accounts of the logic of science, but each has also
itself been criticized. More generally, the scientific method can be recognized as an
idealization.[108]
 Thomas Kuhn examined the history of science in his The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, and found that the actual method used by scientists differed dramatically
from the then-espoused method. His observations of science practice are essentially
sociological and do not speak to how science is or can be practiced in other times and
other cultures.
 Norwood Russell Hanson, Imre Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn have done extensive work
on the "theory laden" character of observation. Hanson (1958) first coined the term
for the idea that all observation is dependent on the conceptual framework of the
observer, using the concept of gestalt to show how preconceptions can affect both
observation and description.[109] He opens Chapter 1 with a discussion of the Golgi
189

bodies and their initial rejection as an artefact of staining technique, and a discussion
of Brahe and Kepler observing the dawn and seeing a "different" sun rise despite the
same physiological phenomenon. Kuhn[110] and Feyerabend[111] acknowledge the
pioneering significance of his work.
 Kuhn (1961) said the scientist generally has a theory in mind before designing and
undertaking experiments so as to make empirical observations, and that the "route
from theory to measurement can almost never be traveled backward". This implies
that the way in which theory is tested is dictated by the nature of the theory itself,
which led Kuhn (1961, p. 166) to argue that "once it has been adopted by a profession
... no theory is recognized to be testable by any quantitative tests that it has not
already passed".[112]
 Paul Feyerabend similarly examined the history of science, and was led to deny that
science is genuinely a methodological process. In his book Against Method he argues
that scientific progress is not the result of applying any particular method. In essence,
he says that for any specific method or norm of science, one can find a historic
episode where violating it has contributed to the progress of science. Thus, if
believers in scientific method wish to express a single universally valid rule,
Feyerabend jokingly suggests, it should be 'anything goes'.[113] Criticisms such as his
led to the strong programme, a radical approach to the sociology of science.
 The postmodernist critiques of science have themselves been the subject of intense
controversy. This ongoing debate, known as the science wars, is the result of
conflicting values and assumptions between the postmodernist and realist camps.
Whereas postmodernists assert that scientific knowledge is simply another discourse
(note that this term has special meaning in this context) and not representative of any
form of fundamental truth, realists in the scientific community maintain that scientific
knowledge does reveal real and fundamental truths about reality. Many books have
been written by scientists which take on this problem and challenge the assertions of
the postmodernists while defending science as a legitimate method of deriving
truth.[114]
 Role of chance in discovery
 Main article: Role of chance in scientific discoveries

 Somewhere between 33% and 50% of all scientific discoveries are estimated to have
been stumbled upon, rather than sought out. This may explain why scientists so often
express that they were lucky.[115] Louis Pasteur is credited with the famous saying that
"Luck favours the prepared mind", but some psychologists have begun to study what
it means to be 'prepared for luck' in the scientific context. Research is showing that
scientists are taught various heuristics that tend to harness chance and the
unexpected.[115][116] This is what Nassim Nicholas Taleb calls "Anti-fragility"; while
some systems of investigation are fragile in the face of human error, human bias, and
randomness, the scientific method is more than resistant or tough – it actually benefits
from such randomness in many ways (it is anti-fragile). Taleb believes that the more
anti-fragile the system, the more it will flourish in the real world.[24]
 Psychologist Kevin Dunbar says the process of discovery often starts with researchers
finding bugs in their experiments. These unexpected results lead researchers to try to
fix what they think is an error in their method. Eventually, the researcher decides the
error is too persistent and systematic to be a coincidence. The highly controlled,
cautious and curious aspects of the scientific method are thus what make it well suited
for identifying such persistent systematic errors. At this point, the researcher will
190

begin to think of theoretical explanations for the error, often seeking the help of
colleagues across different domains of expertise.[115][116]

o 6.1 Role of chance in discovery
 7 History
 8 Relationship with mathematics
 9 Relationship with statistics
 10 See also
o 10.1 Problems and issues
o 10.2 History, philosophy, sociology
 Epistemology
 Epistemic truth

In philosophy, epistemic theories of truth are attempts to analyze the notion of truth in
terms of epistemic notions such as knowledge, belief, acceptance, verification, justification,
and perspective.

A variety of such conceptions can be classified into verificationist theories, perspectivalist or

relativist theories, and pragmatic theories.

Verificationism is based on verifying propositions. The distinctive claim of verificationism is

that the result of such verifications is, by definition, truth. That is, truth is reducible to this
process of verification.

According to perspectivalism and relativism, a proposition is only true relative to a particular

perspective. Roughly, a proposition is true relative to a perspective if and only if it is
accepted, endorsed, or legitimated by that perspective.

Many authors writing on the topic of the notion of truth advocate or endorse combinations of
the following positions. Each of these epistemic conceptions of truth can be subjected to
various criticisms. Some criticisms apply across the board, while others are more specific.

Contents

 1 Verificationist views
 2 Perspectivist views
o 2.1 Individual perspectivalism
o 2.2 Discourse perspectivalism (Conventionalism)
o 2.3 Collectivist perspectivalism
 2.3.1 Consensus
 2.3.2 Power
 2.3.3 Marxist
o 2.4 Transcendental perspectivalism
 2.4.1 Coherentism
 2.4.2 Theological perspectivalism
 3 Pragmatic views
 4 See also
o 4.1 Related topics
191

Verificationist views
Main article: Verificationism

The two main kinds of verification philosophies are positivism and a-priorism.

In positivism, a proposition is meaningful, and thus capable of being true or false, if and only
if it is verifiable by sensory experiences.

A-priorism, often used in the domains of logic and mathematics, holds a proposition true if
and only if a priori reasoning can verify it. In the related certainty theory, associated with
Descartes and Spinoza, a proposition is true if and only if it is known with certainty.

Logical positivism attempts to combine positivism with a version of a-priorism.

Another theory of truth which is related to a-priorism is the concept-containment theory of

truth. The concept-containment theory of truth is the view that a proposition is true if and
only if the concept of the predicate of the proposition is "contained in" the concept of the
subject. For example, the proposition that bachelors are unmarried men is true, on this view,
because the concept of the predicate (unmarried men) is contained in the concept of the
subject (bachelor). A contemporary reading of the concept-containment theory of truth is to
say that every true proposition is an analytically true proposition.

Perspectivist views

According to perspectivalism and relativism, a proposition is only true relative to a particular

perspective. The Sophists' relativist and Nietzsche's philosophy are some of the most famous
examples of such perspectivalism. There are four main versions of perspectivalism, and some
interesting subdivisions:

Individual perspectivalism

According to individual perspectivalism, perspectives are the points of view of particular

individual persons. So, a proposition is true for a person if and only if it is accepted or
believed by that person (i.e., "true for me").

Discourse perspectivalism (Conventionalism)

According to discourse perspectivalism, a perspective is simply any system of discourse, and

it is a matter of convention which one chooses. A proposition is true relative to that particular
discourse if and only if it is somehow produced (or "legitimated") by the methods of that
particular discourse. An example of this appears in the philosophy of mathematics:
formalism. A proposition is true relative to a set of assumptions just in case it is a deductive
consequence of those assumptions.

Collectivist perspectivalism

In collectivist perspectivalism, perspectives are understood as collectivities of people

(cultures, traditions, etc.). There are, roughly, three versions of collectivism:
192

Consensus

A perspective is, roughly, the broad opinions, and perhaps norms and practices, of a
community of people, perhaps all having some special feature in common. So, a proposition
is true (for a community C) if, and only if, there is a consensus amongst the members of C for
believing it.

Power

In the power-oriented view, a perspective is a community enforced by power, authority,

military might, privilege, etc. So, a proposition is true if it "makes us powerful" or is
"produced by power", thus the slogan "truth is power"[citation needed].

This view of truth as a political stake may be loosely associated with Heidegger or with
Michel Foucault's specific analysis of historical and political discourse, as well as with some
social constructivists.

However, the Nazi mysticism of a communitarian "Blood community" conception radically

differs from Heidegger or Foucault's criticism of the notion of the individual or collective
subject.

Marxist

Truth-generating perspectives are collectives opposed to, or engaged in struggle against,

power and authority. For example, the collective perspective of the "proletariat". So,
proposition is true if it is the "product of political struggle" for the "emancipation of the
workers" (Adorno). This view is again associated with some social constructivists (e.g.,
feminist epistemologists).

Transcendental perspectivalism

On this conception, a truth-conferring perspective is something transcendental, and outside

immediate human reach. The idea is that there is a transcendental or ideal epistemic
perspective and truth is, roughly, what is accepted or recognized-as-true from that ideal
perspective. There are two subvarieties of transcendental perspectivalism:

Coherentism

The ideal epistemic perspective is the set of "maximally coherent and consistent
propositions". A proposition is true if and only if it is a member of this maximally coherent
and consistent set of propositions (associated with several German and British 19th century
idealists).

Theological perspectivalism

Theologically, the ideal epistemic perspective is that of God ("God's point of view"). From
this perspective, a proposition is true if and only if it agrees with the thoughts of God.
193

Pragmatic views
Main article: Pragmatic theory of truth

Although the pragmatic theory of truth is not strictly classifiable as an epistemic theory of
truth, it does bear a relationship to theories of truth that are based on concepts of inquiry and
knowledge.

The ideal epistemic perspective is that of "completed science", which will appear in the
(temporal) "limit of scientific inquiry". A proposition is true if and only if, in the long run it
will come to be accepted by a group of inquirers using scientific rational inquiry. This can
also be modalized: a proposition is true if, and only if, in the long run it would come to be
accepted by a group of inquirers, if they were to use scientific rational inquiry. This view is
thus a modification of the consensus view. The consensus need to satisfy certain constraints
in order for the accepted propositions to be true. For example, the methods used must be
those of scientific inquiry (criticism, observation, reproducibility, etc.). This "modification"
of the consensus view is an appeal to the correspondence theory of truth, which is opposed to
the consensus theory of truth.

Long-run scientific pragmatism was defended by Charles Sanders Peirce. A variant of this
viewpoint is associated with Jürgen Habermas, though he later abandoned it.

See also

 Coherentism
 Confirmation holism
 Criteria of truth

In epistemology, criteria of truth (or tests of truth) are standards and rules used to judge the
accuracy of statements and claims. They are tools of verification. Understanding a
philosophy's criteria of truth is fundamental to a clear evaluation of that philosophy. This
necessity is driven by the varying, and conflicting, claims of different philosophies. The rules
of logic have no ability to distinguish truth on their own. An individual must determine what
standards distinguish truth from falsehood. Not all criteria are equally valid. Some standards
are sufficient, while others are questionable.[1]

The criteria listed represent those most commonly used by scholars and the general public.[2]
Jonathan Dolhenty states there seem to be only three functional, effective tests of truth. He
lists these as the correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories of truth.[3]

Contents

 1 Authority
 2 Coherence
 3 Consensus gentium
 4 Consistency (mere)
 5 Consistency (strict)
 6 Correspondence
 7 Custom
 8 Emotions
194

 9 Instinct
 10 Intuition
 11 Majority rule
 12 Naïve Realism
 13 Pragmatic
 14 Revelation
 15 Time
 16 Tradition
 17 See also
 18 Footnotes

Authority
See also: Appeal to authority

The opinions of those with significant experience, highly trained or possessing an advanced
degree are often considered a form of proof. Their knowledge and familiarity within a given
field or area of knowledge command respect and allow their statements to be criteria of truth.
A person may not simply declare themselves an authority, but rather must be properly
qualified. Despite the wide respect given to expert testimony, it is not an infallible criterion.
For example, multiple authorities may conflict in their claims and conclusions.[4]

Coherence
See also: Coherence theory of truth

Coherence refers to a consistent and overarching explanation for all facts. To be coherent, all
pertinent facts must be arranged in a consistent and cohesive fashion as an integrated whole.
The theory which most effectively reconciles all facts in this fashion may be considered most
likely to be true. Coherence is the most potentially effective test of truth because it most
adequately addresses all elements. The main limitation lies not in the standard, but in the
human inability to acquire all facts of an experience. Only an omniscient mind could be
aware of all of the relevant information. A scholar must accept this limitation and accept as
true the most coherent explanation for the available facts. Coherence is difficult to dispute as
a criterion of truth, since arguing against coherence is validating incoherence, which is
inherently illogical.[5]

Consensus gentium
See also: Argumentum ad populum

Some view opinions held by all people to be valid criteria of truth. According to consensus
gentium, the universal consent of all mankind, all humans holding a distinct belief proves it is
true. There is some value in the criterion if it means innate truth, such as the laws of logic and
mathematics. If it merely means agreement, as in a unanimous vote, its value is questionable.
For example, general assent once held the earth was flat and that the sun revolved about the
earth.[6]

Consistency (mere)

Mere consistency is when correct statements do not contradict, but are not necessarily related.
Accordingly, an individual is consistent if he does not contradict himself. It is inadequate as a
195

criterion because it treats facts in an isolated fashion without true cohesion and integration;
nevertheless it remains a necessary condition for the truth of any argument, owing to the law
of noncontradiction. The value of a proof largely lies in its ability to reconcile individual facts
into a coherent whole.[7]

Consistency (strict)

Strict consistency is when claims are connected in such a fashion that one statement follows
from another. Formal logic and mathematical rules are examples of rigorous consistency. An
example would be: if all As are Bs and all Bs are Cs, then all As are Cs. While this standard
is of high value, it is limited. For example, the premises are a priori (or self-apparent),
requiring another test of truth to employ this criterion. Additionally, strict consistency may
produce results lacking coherence and completeness. While a philosophical system may
demonstrate rigorous consistency with the facts it considers, all facts must be taken into
consideration for an adequate criterion of truth, regardless of their detriment to any given
system.[7]

Correspondence
See also: Correspondence theory of truth

See also: Scientific method

Correspondence is quite simply when a claim corresponds with its object. For example, the
claim that the White House is in Washington, D.C. is true, if the White House is actually
located in Washington. Correspondence is held by many philosophers to be the most valid of
the criteria of truth. An idea which corresponds to its object is indeed true, but determining if
the correspondence is perfect requires additional tests of truth. This indicates that
correspondence is a perfectly valid definition of truth, but is not of itself a valid criterion of
truth. An additional test beyond this "definition" is required to determine the precise degree
of similarity between what is posited and what exists in objective reality.[8]

Custom

Most people consciously or unknowingly employ custom as a criterion of truth, based on the
assumption that doing what is customary will prevent error. It is particularly applied in the
determination of moral truth and reflected in the statement "when in Rome, do as the Romans
do". People stick closely to the principle of custom when they use common vernacular, wear
common fashions and so forth; essentially, when they do what is popular. Custom is not
considered a serious, or valid, test of truth. For example, public opinion polls do not
determine truth.[9]

Emotions

Many people allow feelings to determine judgment, often in the face of contrary evidence or
without even attempting to collect evidence and facts. They are implicitly accepting emotions
as a criterion of truth. Most people will admit that feelings are not an adequate test for truth.
For example, a seasoned businessman will put aside his emotions and search for the best
available facts when making an investment. Similarly, scholars are trained to put aside such
196

subjective judgments when evaluating knowledge.[10] Emotions are real, however, and thus
must be considered within any social scientific system of coherence.

Instinct

The existence of distinct instincts has long been debated. Proponents of instinct argue that we
eat because of hunger, drink because of thirst, and so forth. Some have even argued for the
existence of God based on this criterion, arguing that the object of every instinct has a
referent in reality. The counterpoint of hunger is food; for thirst it is liquid; for the sex drive it
is a mate. Instincts are not accepted as a reliable test because they are most often indistinct,
variant and difficult to define. Additionally, universal instincts are so few that they offer little
to the greater body of philosophy as a criterion.[11]

Intuition

Intuition is an assumed truth with an unknown, or possibly unexamined, source. It is a

judgment that is not dependent on a rational examination of the facts. It is usually
experienced as a sudden sensation and/or rush of thoughts that feel "right". Many persons
experience intuitive epiphanies which later prove to be true. Scholars have sometimes come
upon valid theories and proofs while daydreaming or otherwise mentally occupied with
something bearing no apparent relationship to the truth they seek to reveal. Intuition is at best
a source for truths, rather than a criterion with which to evaluate them. Intuitive knowledge
requires testing by means of other criteria of truth in order to confirm its accuracy.[12]

Majority rule

Majority rule is a statistical method of accepting assertions and proposals. In democratic

systems, majority rule is used to determine group decisions, particularly those relating to
personal morality and social behavior. Some systems divided into several oppositional
factions may depend on mere plurality. While majority rule may make for a good democratic
system, it is a poor determinant of truth, subject to the criticisms of the broad version of
consensus gentium.[6]

Naïve Realism

Naïve Realism posits that only that which is directly observable by the human senses is true.
First-hand observation determines the truth or falsity of a given statement. Naïve Realism is
an insufficient criterion of truth. A host of natural phenomena are demonstrably true, but not
observable by the unaided sense. For example, Naïve Realism would deny the existence of
sounds beyond the range of human hearing and the existence of x-rays. Similarly, there are a
number of sense experiments which show a disconnect between the perceived sensation and
the reality of its cause.[13]

Pragmatic
See also: Pragmatic theory of truth

See also: Scientific method

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If an idea works then it must be true, to the Pragmatist. The consequences of applying a
concept reveal its truth value upon examination of the results. The full meaning of an idea is
self-apparent in its application. For example, the therapeutic value and effect of penicillin in
relation to infections is proven in its administration. Although Pragmatism is considered a
valuable criterion, it must be used with caution and reservation, due to its potential for false
positives. For example, a doctor may prescribe a patient medication for an illness, but it could
later turn out that a placebo is equally effective. Thus, untrue concepts could appear to be
working contrary to the purpose of the pragmatic test. However, it has validity as a test,
particularly in the form William Ernest Hocking called "Negative Pragmatism". In essence, it
states that ideas that do not work cannot possibly be true, though ideas which do work may or
may not be true.[14]

Revelation

The principal distinction between intuition and revelation is that revelation has an assumed
source: God (or another higher power). Revelation may be defined as truth emanating from
God. Many religions fundamentally rely on revelation as a test of truth. This criterion is
subject to the same criticisms as intuition. It may be a valid reference of truth for an
individual, but it is inadequate for providing a coherent proof of the knowledge to others.[15]

Time

Time is a criterion commonly appealed to in debate, often referred to as "the test of time".
This criterion posits that over time erroneous beliefs and logical errors will be revealed, while
if the belief is true, the mere passage of time cannot adversely affect its validity. Time is an
inadequate test for truth, since it is subject to similar flaws as custom and tradition (which are
simply specific variations of the time factor). Many demonstrably false beliefs have endured
for centuries and even millennia (e.g. vitalism). It is commonly rejected as a valid criterion.
For example, most people will not convert to another faith simply because the other religion
is centuries (or even millennia) older than their current beliefs.[16]

Tradition

Tradition, closely related to custom, is the standard stating that which is held for generations
is true. Those accepting tradition argue that ideas gaining the loyalty multiple generations
possesses a measure of credibility. Tradition possesses many of the same failings as custom.
It is possible for falsehoods to be passed down from generation to generation, since tradition
generally emphasizes repetition over critical evaluation.[9]

See also

 Conceptual framework
 List of cognitive biases
 Contextualism
 Fallibilism
 Anekantavada
 Exclusive disjunction
 Degrees of truth
 False dilemma
198

 Fuzzy logic
 Logical equality
 Logical value
 Multi-valued logic
 Propositional logic
 Relativism
 Principle of Bivalence


 Truth

Truth is most often used to mean being in accord with fact or reality,[1] or fidelity to an
original or standard.[1] Truth may also often be used in modern contexts to refer to an idea of
"truth to self," or authenticity.

The commonly understood opposite of truth is falsehood, which, correspondingly, can also
take on a logical, factual, or ethical meaning. The concept of truth is discussed and debated in
several contexts, including philosophy, art, and religion. Many human activities depend upon
the concept, where its nature as a concept is assumed rather than being a subject of
discussion; these include most (but not all) of the sciences, law, journalism, and everyday
life. Some philosophers view the concept of truth as basic, and unable to be explained in any
terms that are more easily understood than the concept of truth itself. Commonly, truth is
viewed as the correspondence of language or thought to an independent reality, in what is
sometimes called the correspondence theory of truth.

Other philosophers take this common meaning to be secondary and derivative. According to
Martin Heidegger, the original meaning and essence of "Truth" in Ancient Greece was
unconcealment, or the revealing or bringing of what was previously hidden into the open, as
indicated by the original Greek term for truth, "Aletheia."[2][3] On this view, the conception of
truth as correctness is a later derivation from the concept's original essence, a development
Heidegger traces to the Latin term "Veritas."

Pragmatists like C.S. Peirce take Truth to have some manner of essential relation to human
practices for inquiring into and discovering Truth, with Peirce himself holding that Truth is
what human inquiry would find out on a matter, if our practice of inquiry were taken as far as
it could profitably go: "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by the truth..."[4]

Various theories and views of truth continue to be debated among scholars, philosophers, and
theologians.[5] Language and words are a means by which humans convey information to one
another and the method used to determine what is a "truth" is termed a criterion of truth.
There are differing claims on such questions as what constitutes truth: what things are
truthbearers capable of being true or false; how to define and identify truth; the roles that
faith-based and empirically based knowledge play; and whether truth is subjective or
objective, relative or absolute.

Friedrich Nietzsche famously suggested that an ancient, metaphysical belief in the divinity of
Truth lies at the heart of and has served as the foundation for the entire subsequent Western
intellectual tradition: "But you will have gathered what I am getting at, namely, that it is still
a metaphysical faith on which our faith in science rests--that even we knowers of today, we
199

godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire too, from the flame lit by the thousand-year old
faith, the Christian faith which was also Plato's faith, that God is Truth; that Truth is
'Divine'..."[6][7]

Contents

 1 Definition and etymology

 2 Major theories
o 2.1 Substantive theories
 2.1.1 Correspondence theory
 2.1.2 Coherence theory
 2.1.3 Constructivist theory
 2.1.4 Consensus theory
 2.1.5 Pragmatic theory
o 2.2 Minimalist (deflationary) theories
 2.2.1 Performative theory of truth
 2.2.2 Redundancy and related theories
o 2.3 Pluralist theories
o 2.4 Most believed theories
 3 Formal theories
o 3.1 Truth in logic
o 3.2 Truth in mathematics
o 3.3 Semantic theory of truth
o 3.4 Kripke's theory of truth
o 3.5 Revision theory of truth
 4 Notable views
o 4.1 Ancient history
o 4.2 Middle Ages
 4.2.1 Avicenna
 4.2.2 Aquinas
 4.2.3 Changing concepts of truth in the Middle Ages
o 4.3 Modern age
 4.3.1 Kant
 4.3.2 Hegel
 4.3.3 Schopenhauer
 4.3.4 Kierkegaard
 4.3.5 Nietzsche
 4.3.6 Whitehead
 4.3.7 Nishida
 4.3.8 Fromm
 4.3.9 Foucault
 4.3.10 Baudrillard
 5 In medicine and psychiatry
 6 In religion: omniscience
 7 See also
o 7.1 Major theorists
 8 Notes
 9 References
 10 External links
200

Definition and etymology

Further information: Veritas, Aletheia, and Tryggvi

Part of a series on

Certainty

 Approximation
 Belief
 Certainty
 Doubt
 Determinism
 Fallibilism
 Fatalism
 Hypothesis
 Justification
 Nihilism
 Proof
 Scientific theory
 Skepticism
 Solipsism
 Theory
 Truth
 Uncertainty

Related concepts and fundamentals:

 Agnosticism
 Epistemology
 Presupposition
 Probability

The English word truth is derived from Old English tríewþ, tréowþ, trýwþ, Middle English
trewþe, cognate to Old High German triuwida, Old Norse tryggð. Like troth, it is a -th
nominalisation of the adjective true (Old English tréowe).
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The English word true is from Old English (West Saxon) (ge)tríewe, tréowe, cognate to Old
Saxon (gi)trûui, Old High German (ga)triuwu (Modern German treu "faithful"), Old Norse
tryggr, Gothic triggws,[8] all from a Proto-Germanic *trewwj- "having good faith", perhaps
ultimately from PIE *dru- "tree", on the notion of "steadfast as an oak" (e.g., Sanskrit "taru"
tree).[9] Old Norse trú, "faith, word of honour; religious faith, belief"[10] (archaic English troth
"loyalty, honesty, good faith", compare Ásatrú).

Thus, 'truth' involves both the quality of "faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, sincerity, veracity",[11]
and that of "agreement with fact or reality", in Anglo-Saxon expressed by sōþ (Modern
English sooth).

All Germanic languages besides English have introduced a terminological distinction

between truth "fidelity" and truth "factuality". To express "factuality", North Germanic opted
for nouns derived from sanna "to assert, affirm", while continental West Germanic (German
and Dutch) opted for continuations of wâra "faith, trust, pact" (cognate to Slavic věra
"(religious) faith", but influenced by Latin verus). Romance languages use terms following
the Latin veritas, while the Greek aletheia, Russian pravda and South Slavic istina have
separate etymological origins.

Major theories

The question of what is a proper basis for deciding how words, symbols, ideas and beliefs
may properly be considered true, whether by a single person or an entire society, is dealt with
by the five most prevalent substantive theories listed below. Each presents perspectives that
are widely shared by published scholars.[12][13][14]

However, the substantive theories are not universally accepted. More recently developed
"deflationary" or "minimalist" theories of truth have emerged as competitors to the older
substantive theories. Minimalist reasoning centres around the notion that the application of a
term like true to a statement does not assert anything significant about it, for instance,
anything about its nature. Minimalist reasoning realises truth as a label utilised in general
discourse to express agreement, to stress claims, or to form general assumptions.[12][15][16]

Substantive theories

Correspondence theory
Main article: Correspondence theory of truth

Correspondence theories emphasise that true beliefs and true statements correspond to the
actual state of affairs.[17] This type of theory stresses a relationship between thoughts or
statements on one hand, and things or objects on the other. It is a traditional model tracing its
origins to ancient Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.[18] This class of
theories holds that the truth or the falsity of a representation is determined in principle
entirely by how it relates to "things", by whether it accurately describes those "things." An
example of correspondence theory is the statement by the thirteenth century
philosopher/theologian Thomas Aquinas: Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus ("Truth is
the equation [or adequation] of things and intellect"), a statement which Aquinas attributed to
the ninth century neoplatonist Isaac Israeli.[19][20][21] Aquinas also restated the theory as: "A
judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality".[22]
202

Correspondence theory centres heavily around the assumption that truth is a matter of
accurately copying what is known as "objective reality" and then representing it in thoughts,
words and other symbols.[23] Many modern theorists have stated that this ideal cannot be
achieved without analysing additional factors.[12][24] For example, language plays a role in
that all languages have words to represent concepts that are virtually undefined in other
languages. The German word Zeitgeist is one such example: one who speaks or understands
the language may "know" what it means, but any translation of the word apparently fails to
accurately capture its full meaning (this is a problem with many abstract words, especially
those derived in agglutinative languages). Thus, some words add an additional parameter to
the construction of an accurate truth predicate. Among the philosophers who grappled with
this problem is Alfred Tarski, whose semantic theory is summarized further below in this
article.[25]

Proponents of several of the theories below have gone further to assert that there are yet other
issues necessary to the analysis, such as interpersonal power struggles, community
interactions, personal biases and other factors involved in deciding what is seen as truth.

Coherence theory
Main article: Coherence theory of truth

For coherence theories in general, truth requires a proper fit of elements within a whole
system. Very often, though, coherence is taken to imply something more than simple logical
consistency; often there is a demand that the propositions in a coherent system lend mutual
inferential support to each other. So, for example, the completeness and comprehensiveness
of the underlying set of concepts is a critical factor in judging the validity and usefulness of a
coherent system.[26] A pervasive tenet of coherence theories is the idea that truth is primarily
a property of whole systems of propositions, and can be ascribed to individual propositions
only according to their coherence with the whole. Among the assortment of perspectives
commonly regarded as coherence theory, theorists differ on the question of whether
coherence entails many possible true systems of thought or only a single absolute system.

Some variants of coherence theory are claimed to describe the essential and intrinsic
properties of formal systems in logic and mathematics.[27] However, formal reasoners are
content to contemplate axiomatically independent and sometimes mutually contradictory
systems side by side, for example, the various alternative geometries. On the whole,
coherence theories have been rejected for lacking justification in their application to other
areas of truth, especially with respect to assertions about the natural world, empirical data in
general, assertions about practical matters of psychology and society, especially when used
without support from the other major theories of truth.[28]

Coherence theories distinguish the thought of rationalist philosophers, particularly of

Spinoza, Leibniz, and G.W.F. Hegel, along with the British philosopher F.H. Bradley.[29]
They have found a resurgence also among several proponents of logical positivism, notably
Otto Neurath and Carl Hempel.

Constructivist theory
Main article: Constructivist epistemology
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Social constructivism holds that truth is constructed by social processes, is historically and
culturally specific, and that it is in part shaped through the power struggles within a
community. Constructivism views all of our knowledge as "constructed," because it does not
reflect any external "transcendent" realities (as a pure correspondence theory might hold).
Rather, perceptions of truth are viewed as contingent on convention, human perception, and
social experience. It is believed by constructivists that representations of physical and
biological reality, including race, sexuality, and gender, are socially constructed.

Giambattista Vico was among the first to claim that history and culture were man-made.
Vico's epistemological orientation gathers the most diverse rays and unfolds in one axiom –
verum ipsum factum – "truth itself is constructed". Hegel and Marx were among the other
early proponents of the premise that truth is, or can be, socially constructed. Marx, like many
critical theorists who followed, did not reject the existence of objective truth but rather
distinguished between true knowledge and knowledge that has been distorted through power
or ideology. For Marx, scientific and true knowledge is "in accordance with the dialectical
understanding of history" and ideological knowledge is "an epiphenomenal expression of the
relation of material forces in a given economic arrangement".[30]

Consensus theory
Main article: Consensus theory of truth

Consensus theory holds that truth is whatever is agreed upon, or in some versions, might
come to be agreed upon, by some specified group. Such a group might include all human
beings, or a subset thereof consisting of more than one person.

Among the current advocates of consensus theory as a useful accounting of the concept of
"truth" is the philosopher Jürgen Habermas.[31] Habermas maintains that truth is what would
be agreed upon in an ideal speech situation.[32] Among the current strong critics of consensus
theory is the philosopher Nicholas Rescher.[33]

Pragmatic theory
Main article: Pragmatic theory of truth

The three most influential forms of the pragmatic theory of truth were introduced around the
turn of the 20th century by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey.
Although there are wide differences in viewpoint among these and other proponents of
pragmatic theory, they hold in common that truth is verified and confirmed by the results of
putting one's concepts into practice.[34]

Peirce defines truth as follows: "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the
ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which
concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy
and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth."[35] This statement
stresses Peirce's view that ideas of approximation, incompleteness, and partiality, what he
describes elsewhere as fallibilism and "reference to the future", are essential to a proper
conception of truth. Although Peirce uses words like concordance and correspondence to
describe one aspect of the pragmatic sign relation, he is also quite explicit in saying that
definitions of truth based on mere correspondence are no more than nominal definitions,
which he accords a lower status than real definitions.
204

William James's version of pragmatic theory, while complex, is often summarized by his
statement that "the 'true' is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the 'right' is only
the expedient in our way of behaving."[36] By this, James meant that truth is a quality, the
value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying concepts to practice (thus,
"pragmatic").

John Dewey, less broadly than James but more broadly than Peirce, held that inquiry,
whether scientific, technical, sociological, philosophical or cultural, is self-corrective over
time if openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to clarify, justify,
refine and/or refute proposed truths.[37]

Though not widely known, a new variation of the pragmatic theory was defined and wielded
successfully from the 20th century forward. Defined and named by William Ernest Hocking,
this variation is known as "negative pragmatism". Essentially, what works may or may not be
true, but what fails cannot be true because the truth always works.[38] Richard Feynman also
ascribed to it: "We never are definitely right, we can only be sure we are wrong."[39] This
approach incorporates many of the ideas from Peirce, James, and Dewey. For Peirce, the idea
of "... endless investigation would tend to bring about scientific belief ..." fits negative
pragmatism in that a negative pragmatist would never stop testing. As Feynman noted, an
idea or theory "... could never be proved right, because tomorrow's experiment might succeed
in proving wrong what you thought was right."[39] Similarly, James and Dewey's ideas also
ascribe truth to repeated testing which is "self-corrective" over time.

Pragmatism and negative pragmatism are also closely aligned with the coherence theory of
truth in that any testing should not be isolated but rather incorporate knowledge from all
human endeavors and experience. The universe is a whole and integrated system, and testing
should acknowledge and account for its diversity. As Feynman said, "... if it disagrees with
experiment, it is wrong."[40]

Minimalist (deflationary) theories

Main article: Deflationary theory of truth

Modern developments in the field of philosophy, starting with the relatively modern notion
that a theory being old does not necessarily imply that it is completely flawless, have resulted
in the rise of a new thesis: that the term truth does not denote a real property of sentences or
propositions. This thesis is in part a response to the common use of truth predicates (e.g., that
some particular thing "...is true") which was particularly prevalent in philosophical discourse
on truth in the first half of the 20th century. From this point of view, to assert that "'2 + 2 = 4'
is true" is logically equivalent to asserting that "2 + 2 = 4", and the phrase "is true" is
completely dispensable in this and every other context. In common parlance, truth predicates
are not commonly heard, and it would be interpreted as an unusual occurrence were someone
to utilise a truth predicate in an everyday conversation when asserting that something is true.
Newer perspectives that take this discrepancy into account and work with sentence structures
that are actually employed in common discourse can be broadly described:

 as deflationary theories of truth, since they attempt to deflate the presumed importance of
the words "true" or truth,
 as disquotational theories, to draw attention to the disappearance of the quotation marks in
cases like the above example, or
205

 as minimalist theories of truth.[12][41]

Whichever term is used, deflationary theories can be said to hold in common that "[t]he
predicate 'true' is an expressive convenience, not the name of a property requiring deep
analysis."[12] Once we have identified the truth predicate's formal features and utility,
deflationists argue, we have said all there is to be said about truth. Among the theoretical
concerns of these views is to explain away those special cases where it does appear that the
concept of truth has peculiar and interesting properties. (See, e.g., Semantic paradoxes, and
below.)

In addition to highlighting such formal aspects of the predicate "is true", some deflationists
point out that the concept enables us to express things that might otherwise require infinitely
long sentences. For example, one cannot express confidence in Michael's accuracy by
asserting the endless sentence:

Michael says, 'snow is white' and snow is white, or he says 'roses are red' and roses are red
or he says ... etc.

This assertion can also be succinctly expressed by saying: What Michael says is true.[42]

Performative theory of truth

Attributed to P. F. Strawson is the performative theory of truth which holds that to say
"'Snow is white' is true" is to perform the speech act of signaling one's agreement with the
claim that snow is white (much like nodding one's head in agreement). The idea that some
statements are more actions than communicative statements is not as odd as it may seem.
Consider, for example, that when the bride says "I do" at the appropriate time in a wedding,
she is performing the act of taking this man to be her lawful wedded husband. She is not
describing herself as taking this man, but actually doing so (perhaps the most thorough
analysis of such "illocutionary acts" is J. L. Austin, "How to Do Things With Words"[43]).

Strawson holds that a similar analysis is applicable to all speech acts, not just illocutionary
ones: "To say a statement is true is not to make a statement about a statement, but rather to
perform the act of agreeing with, accepting, or endorsing a statement. When one says 'It's true
that it's raining,' one asserts no more than 'It's raining.' The function of [the statement] 'It's
true that...' is to agree with, accept, or endorse the statement that 'it's raining.'"[44]

Redundancy and related theories

Main article: Redundancy theory of truth

According to the redundancy theory of truth, asserting that a statement is true is completely
equivalent to asserting the statement itself. For example, making the assertion that " 'Snow is
white' is true" is equivalent to asserting "Snow is white". Redundancy theorists infer from this
premise that truth is a redundant concept; that is, it is merely a word that is traditionally used
in conversation or writing, generally for emphasis, but not a word that actually equates to
anything in reality. This theory is commonly attributed to Frank P. Ramsey, who held that the
use of words like fact and truth was nothing but a roundabout way of asserting a proposition,
and that treating these words as separate problems in isolation from judgment was merely a
"linguistic muddle".[12][45][46]
206

A variant of redundancy theory is the disquotational theory which uses a modified form of
Tarski's schema: To say that '"P" is true' is to say that P. A version of this theory was
defended by C. J. F. Williams in his book What is Truth?. Yet another version of deflationism
is the prosentential theory of truth, first developed by Dorothy Grover, Joseph Camp, and
Nuel Belnap as an elaboration of Ramsey's claims. They argue that sentences like "That's
true", when said in response to "It's raining", are prosentences, expressions that merely repeat
the content of other expressions. In the same way that it means the same as my dog in the
sentence My dog was hungry, so I fed it, That's true is supposed to mean the same as It's
raining — if you say the latter and I then say the former. These variations do not necessarily
follow Ramsey in asserting that truth is not a property, but rather can be understood to say
that, for instance, the assertion "P" may well involve a substantial truth, and the theorists in
this case are minimizing only the redundancy or prosentence involved in the statement such
as "that's true."[12]

Deflationary principles do not apply to representations that are not analogous to sentences,
and also do not apply to many other things that are commonly judged to be true or otherwise.
Consider the analogy between the sentence "Snow is white" and the character named Snow
White, both of which can be true in some sense. To a minimalist, saying "Snow is white is
true" is the same as saying "Snow is white," but to say "Snow White is true" is not the same
as saying "Snow White."

Pluralist theories

Main article: Pluralist theories of truth

Several of the major theories of truth hold that there is a particular property the having of
which makes a belief or proposition true. Pluralist theories of truth assert that there may be
more than one property that makes propositions true: ethical propositions might be true by
virtue of coherence. Propositions about the physical world might be true by corresponding to
the objects and properties they are about.

Some of the pragmatic theories, such as those by Charles Peirce and William James, included
aspects of correspondence, coherence and constructivist theories.[35][36] Crispin Wright argued
in his 1992 book Truth and Objectivity that any predicate which satisfied certain platitudes
about truth qualified as a truth predicate. In some discourses, Wright argued, the role of the
truth predicate might be played by the notion of superassertibility.[47] Michael Lynch, in a
2009 book Truth as One and Many, argued that we should see truth as a functional property
capable of being multiply manifested in distinct properties like correspondence or
coherence.[48]

Most believed theories

According to a survey of professional philosophers and others on their philosophical views

which was carried out in November 2009 (taken by 3226 respondents, including 1803
philosophy faculty members and/or PhDs and 829 philosophy graduate students) 44.9% of
respondents accept or lean towards correspondence theories, 20.7% accept or lean towards
deflationary theories and 13.8% epistemic theories.[49]
207

Formal theories

Truth in logic

Main articles: Logical truth, Criteria of truth, and Truth value

Logic is concerned with the patterns in reason that can help tell us if a proposition is true or
not. However, logic does not deal with truth in the absolute sense, as for instance a
metaphysician does. Logicians use formal languages to express the truths which they are
concerned with, and as such there is only truth under some interpretation or truth within some
logical system.

A logical truth (also called an analytic truth or a necessary truth) is a statement which is true
in all possible worlds[50] or under all possible interpretations, as contrasted to a fact (also
called a synthetic claim or a contingency) which is only true in this world as it has historically
unfolded. A proposition such as "If p and q, then p" is considered to be a logical truth because
of the meaning of the symbols and words in it and not because of any fact of any particular
world. They are such that they could not be untrue.

Truth in mathematics

Main articles: Model theory and Proof theory

There are two main approaches to truth in mathematics. They are the model theory of truth
and the proof theory of truth.[51]

Historically, with the nineteenth century development of Boolean algebra mathematical

models of logic began to treat "truth", also represented as "T" or "1", as an arbitrary constant.
"Falsity" is also an arbitrary constant, which can be represented as "F" or "0". In
propositional logic, these symbols can be manipulated according to a set of axioms and rules
of inference, often given in the form of truth tables.

In addition, from at least the time of Hilbert's program at the turn of the twentieth century to
the proof of Gödel's incompleteness theorems and the development of the Church-Turing
thesis in the early part of that century, true statements in mathematics were generally
assumed to be those statements that are provable in a formal axiomatic system.[52]

The works of Kurt Gödel, Alan Turing, and others shook this assumption, with the
development of statements that are true but cannot be proven within the system.[53] Two
examples of the latter can be found in Hilbert's problems. Work on Hilbert's 10th problem led
in the late twentieth century to the construction of specific Diophantine equations for which it
is undecidable whether they have a solution,[54] or even if they do, whether they have a finite
or infinite number of solutions. More fundamentally, Hilbert's first problem was on the
continuum hypothesis.[55] Gödel and Paul Cohen showed that this hypothesis cannot be
proved or disproved using the standard axioms of set theory.[56] In the view of some, then, it
is equally reasonable to take either the continuum hypothesis or its negation as a new axiom.

Semantic theory of truth

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Main article: Semantic theory of truth

The semantic theory of truth has as its general case for a given language:

'P' is true if and only if P

where 'P' refers to the sentence (the sentence's name), and P is just the sentence itself.

Logician and philosopher Alfred Tarski developed the theory for formal languages (such as
formal logic). Here he restricted it in this way: no language could contain its own truth
predicate, that is, the expression is true could only apply to sentences in some other language.
The latter he called an object language, the language being talked about. (It may, in turn,
have a truth predicate that can be applied to sentences in still another language.) The reason
for his restriction was that languages that contain their own truth predicate will contain
paradoxical sentences such as, "This sentence is not true". As a result, Tarski held that the
semantic theory could not be applied to any natural language, such as English, because they
contain their own truth predicates. Donald Davidson used it as the foundation of his truth-
conditional semantics and linked it to radical interpretation in a form of coherentism.

Bertrand Russell is credited with noticing the existence of such paradoxes even in the best
symbolic formations of mathematics in his day, in particular the paradox that came to be
named after him, Russell's paradox. Russell and Whitehead attempted to solve these
problems in Principia Mathematica by putting statements into a hierarchy of types, wherein a
statement cannot refer to itself, but only to statements lower in the hierarchy. This in turn led
to new orders of difficulty regarding the precise natures of types and the structures of
conceptually possible type systems that have yet to be resolved to this day.

Kripke's theory of truth

Saul Kripke contends that a natural language can in fact contain its own truth predicate
without giving rise to contradiction. He showed how to construct one as follows:

 Begin with a subset of sentences of a natural language that contains no occurrences of the
expression "is true" (or "is false"). So The barn is big is included in the subset, but not " The
barn is big is true", nor problematic sentences such as "This sentence is false".
 Define truth just for the sentences in that subset.
 Then extend the definition of truth to include sentences that predicate truth or falsity of one
of the original subset of sentences. So "The barn is big is true" is now included, but not
either "This sentence is false" nor "'The barn is big is true' is true".
 Next, define truth for all sentences that predicate truth or falsity of a member of the second
set. Imagine this process repeated infinitely, so that truth is defined for The barn is big; then
for "The barn is big is true"; then for "'The barn is big is true' is true", and so on.

Notice that truth never gets defined for sentences like This sentence is false, since it was not
in the original subset and does not predicate truth of any sentence in the original or any
subsequent set. In Kripke's terms, these are "ungrounded." Since these sentences are never
assigned either truth or falsehood even if the process is carried out infinitely, Kripke's theory
implies that some sentences are neither true nor false. This contradicts the Principle of
bivalence: every sentence must be either true or false. Since this principle is a key premise in
deriving the Liar paradox, the paradox is dissolved.[57]
209

However, it has been shown by Gödel that self-reference cannot be avoided naively, since
propositions about seemingly unrelated objects can have an informal self-referential meaning;
in Gödel's work, these objects are integer numbers, and they have an informal meaning
regarding propositions. In fact, this idea - manifested by the diagonal lemma - is the basis for
Tarski's theorem that truth cannot be consistently defined.

It has thus been claimed[58] that Kripke's system indeed leads to contradiction: while its truth
predicate is only partial, it does give truth value (true/false) to propositions such as the one
built in Tarski's proof, and is therefore inconsistent. While there is still a debate on whether
Tarski's proof can be implemented to every similar partial truth system, none have been
shown to be consistent by acceptable methods used in mathematical logic.

Revision theory of truth

Main article: Revision_Theory § Truth

The revision theory of truth, as developed by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap, takes truth to be a
circular concept whose definition is the set of biconditionals of the form

'A' is true if and only if A.[59]

Unlike Kripke's theory of truth, revision theory can be used with classical logic and can
maintain the principle of bivalence.

Notable views

Ancient history

The ancient Greek origins of the words "true" and "truth" have some consistent definitions
throughout great spans of history that were often associated with topics of logic, geometry,
mathematics, deduction, induction, and natural philosophy.

Socrates', Plato's and Aristotle's ideas about truth are seen by some as consistent with
correspondence theory. In his Metaphysics, Aristotle stated: "To say of what is that it is not,
or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is
not, is true".[60] The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy proceeds to say of Aristotle:

"(...) Aristotle sounds much more like a genuine correspondence theorist in the Categories
(12b11, 14b14), where he talks of "underlying things" that make statements true and implies
that these "things" (pragmata) are logically structured situations or facts (viz., his sitting, his
not sitting). Most influential is his claim in De Interpretatione (16a3) that thoughts are
"likenesses" (homoiosis) of things. Although he nowhere defines truth in terms of a thought's
likeness to a thing or fact, it is clear that such a definition would fit well into his overall
philosophy of mind. (...)"[60]

Very similar statements can also be found in Plato (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b).[60]
210

In Hinduism, Truth is defined as "unchangeable", "that which has no distortion", "that which
is beyond distinctions of time, space, and person", "that which pervades the universe in all its
constancy". The human body, therefore is not completely true as it changes with time, for
example. There are many references, properties and explanations of truth by Hindu sages that
explain varied facets of truth, such as the national motto of India: "Satyameva jayate" (Truth
alone wins), as well as "Satyam muktaye" (Truth liberates), "Satya' is 'Parahit'artham'
va'unmanaso yatha'rthatvam' satyam" (Satya is the benevolent use of words and the mind for
the welfare of others or in other words responsibilities is truth too), "When one is firmly
established in speaking truth, the fruits of action become subservient to him ( patanjali
yogasutras, sutra number 2.36 ), "The face of truth is covered by a golden bowl. Unveil it, O
Pusan (Sun), so that I who have truth as my duty (satyadharma) may see it!" (Brhadaranyaka
V 15 1-4 and the brief IIsa Upanisad 15-18), Truth is superior to silence (Manusmriti), etc.
Combined with other words, satya acts as modifier, like "ultra" or "highest," or more
literally "truest," connoting purity and excellence. For example, satyaloka is the "highest
heaven' and Satya Yuga is the "golden age" or best of the four cyclical cosmic ages in
Hinduism, and so on.

Middle Ages

Avicenna

In early Islamic philosophy, Avicenna (Ibn Sina) defined truth in his work Kitab Al-Shifa
The Book of Healing, Book I, Chapter 8, as:

"What corresponds in the mind to what is outside it."[61]

Avicenna elaborated on his definition of truth later in Book VIII, Chapter 6:

"The truth of a thing is the property of the being of each thing which has been established in
it."[62]

However, this definition is merely a rendering of the medieval Latin translation of the work
by Simone van Riet.[63] A modern translation of the original Arabic text states:

"Truth is also said of the veridical belief in the existence [of something]".[64]

Aquinas

Reevaluating Avicenna, and also Augustine and Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas stated in his
Disputed Questions on Truth:

A natural thing, being placed between two intellects, is called true insofar as it conforms to
either. It is said to be true with respect to its conformity with the divine intellect insofar as it
fulfills the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect... With respect to its
conformity with a human intellect, a thing is said to be true insofar as it is such as to cause a
true estimate about itself.[65]

Thus, for Aquinas, the truth of the human intellect (logical truth) is based on the truth in
things (ontological truth).[66] Following this, he wrote an elegant re-statement of Aristotle's
view in his Summa I.16.1:
211

Veritas est adæquatio intellectus et rei.

(Truth is the conformity of the intellect to the things.)

Aquinas also said that real things participate in the act of being of the Creator God who is
Subsistent Being, Intelligence, and Truth. Thus, these beings possess the light of
intelligibility and are knowable. These things (beings; reality) are the foundation of the truth
that is found in the human mind, when it acquires knowledge of things, first through the
senses, then through the understanding and the judgement done by reason. For Aquinas,
human intelligence ("intus", within and "legere", to read) has the capability to reach the
essence and existence of things because it has a non-material, spiritual element, although
some moral, educational, and other elements might interfere with its capability.

Changing concepts of truth in the Middle Ages

Richard Firth Green examined the concept of truth in the later Middle Ages in his A Crisis of
Truth, and concludes that roughly during the reign of Richard II of England the very meaning
of the concept changes. The idea of the oath, which was so much part and parcel of for
instance Romance literature,[67] changes from a subjective concept to a more objective one (in
Derek Pearsall's summary).[68] Whereas truth (the "trouthe" of Sir Gawain and the Green
Knight) was first "an ethical truth in which truth is understood to reside in persons", in
Ricardian England it "transforms...into a political truth in which truth is understood to reside
in documents".[69]

Modern age

Immanuel Kant endorses a definition of truth along the lines of the correspondence theory of
truth.[60] Kant writes in the Critique of Pure Reason: "The nominal definition of truth, namely
that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed".[70]
However, Kant denies that this correspondence definition of truth provides us with a test or
criterion to establish which judgements are true. Kant states in his logic lectures:

"(...) Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of
this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its
object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognizing it.
Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for
truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on
is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object. The ancients
called such a circle in explanation a diallelon. And actually the logicians were always
reproached with this mistake by the sceptics, who observed that with this definition of truth it
is just as when someone makes a statement before a court and in doing so appeals to a
witness with whom no one is acquainted, but who wants to establish his credibility by
maintaining that the one who called him as witness is an honest man. The accusation was
grounded, too. Only the solution of the indicated problem is impossible without qualification
and for every man. (...)"[71]

This passage makes use of his distinction between nominal and real definitions. A nominal
definition explains the meaning of a linguistic expression. A real definition describes the
essence of certain objects and enable us to determine whether any given item falls within the
212

definition.[72] Kant holds that the definition of truth is merely nominal and, therefore, we
cannot employ it to establish which judgements are true. According to Kant, the ancient
skeptics were critical of the logicians for holding that, by means of a merely nominal
definition of truth, they can establish which judgements are true. They were trying to do
something that is "impossible without qualification and for every man".[71]

Hegel

Georg Hegel distanced his philosophy from psychology by presenting truth as being an
external self-moving object instead of being related to inner, subjective thoughts. Hegel's
truth is analogous to the mechanics of a material body in motion under the influence of its
own inner force. "Truth is its own self-movement within itself."[73] Teleological truth moves
itself in the three-step form of dialectical triplicity toward the final goal of perfect, final,
absolute truth. According to Hegel, the progression of philosophical truth is a resolution of
past oppositions into increasingly more accurate approximations of absolute truth. Chalybäus
used the terms "thesis", "antithesis", and "synthesis" to describe Hegel's dialectical triplicity.
The "thesis" consists of an incomplete historical movement. To resolve the incompletion, an
"antithesis" occurs which opposes the "thesis." In turn, the "synthesis" appears when the
"thesis" and "antithesis" become reconciled and a higher level of truth is obtained. This
"synthesis" thereby becomes a "thesis," which will again necessitate an "antithesis," requiring
a new "synthesis" until a final state is reached as the result of reason's historical movement.
History is the Absolute Spirit moving toward a goal. This historical progression will finally
conclude itself when the Absolute Spirit understands its own infinite self at the very end of
history. Absolute Spirit will then be the complete expression of an infinite God.

Schopenhauer

For Arthur Schopenhauer,[74] a judgment is a combination or separation of two or more

concepts. If a judgment is to be an expression of knowledge, it must have a sufficient reason
or ground by which the judgment could be called true. Truth is the reference of a judgment to
something different from itself which is its sufficient reason (ground). Judgments can have
material, formal, transcendental, or metalogical truth. A judgment has material truth if its
concepts are based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a judgment
has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called logical or formal. If a
judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure science, is based on the forms (space,
time, causality) of intuitive, empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental
truth.

Kierkegaard

When Søren Kierkegaard, as his character Johannes Climacus, ends his writings: My thesis
was, subjectivity, heartfelt is the truth, he does not advocate for subjectivism in its extreme
form (the theory that something is true simply because one believes it to be so), but rather
that the objective approach to matters of personal truth cannot shed any light upon that which
is most essential to a person's life. Objective truths are concerned with the facts of a person's
being, while subjective truths are concerned with a person's way of being. Kierkegaard agrees
that objective truths for the study of subjects like mathematics, science, and history are
relevant and necessary, but argues that objective truths do not shed any light on a person's
inner relationship to existence. At best, these truths can only provide a severely narrowed
perspective that has little to do with one's actual experience of life.[75]
213

While objective truths are final and static, subjective truths are continuing and dynamic. The
truth of one's existence is a living, inward, and subjective experience that is always in the
process of becoming. The values, morals, and spiritual approaches a person adopts, while not
denying the existence of objective truths of those beliefs, can only become truly known when
they have been inwardly appropriated through subjective experience. Thus, Kierkegaard
criticizes all systematic philosophies which attempt to know life or the truth of existence via
theories and objective knowledge about reality. As Kierkegaard claims, human truth is
something that is continually occurring, and a human being cannot find truth separate from
the subjective experience of one's own existing, defined by the values and fundamental
essence that consist of one's way of life.[76]

Nietzsche

Friedrich Nietzsche believed the search for truth, or 'the will to truth', was a consequence of
the will to power of philosophers. He thought that truth should be used as long as it promoted
life and the will to power, and he thought untruth was better than truth if it had this life
enhancement as a consequence. As he wrote in Beyond Good and Evil, "The falseness of a
judgment is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgment... The question is to what extent
it is life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding..."
(aphorism 4). He proposed the will to power as a truth only because, according to him, it was
the most life-affirming and sincere perspective one could have.

Robert Wicks discusses Nietzsche's basic view of truth as follows:

"(...) Some scholars regard Nietzsche's 1873 unpublished essay, "On Truth and Lies in a
Nonmoral Sense" ("Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn") as a keystone in his
thought. In this essay, Nietzsche rejects the idea of universal constants, and claims that what
we call "truth" is only "a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms."
His view at this time is that arbitrariness completely prevails within human experience:
concepts originate via the very artistic transference of nerve stimuli into images; "truth" is
nothing more than the invention of fixed conventions for merely practical purposes,
especially those of repose, security and consistence. (...)"[77]

Whitehead

Alfred North Whitehead, a British mathematician who became an American philosopher,

said: "There are no whole truths; all truths are half-truths. It is trying to treat them as whole
truths that plays the devil".[78]

The logical progression or connection of this line of thought is to conclude that truth can lie,
since half-truths are deceptive and may lead to a false conclusion.

Nishida

According to Kitaro Nishida, "knowledge of things in the world begins with the
differentiation of unitary consciousness into knower and known and ends with self and things
becoming one again. Such unification takes form not only in knowing but in the valuing (of
truth) that directs knowing, the willing that directs action, and the feeling or emotive reach
that directs sensing."[79]
214

Fromm

Erich Fromm finds that trying to discuss truth as "absolute truth" is sterile and that emphasis
ought to be placed on "optimal truth". He considers truth as stemming from the survival
imperative of grasping one's environment physically and intellectually, whereby young
children instinctively seek truth so as to orient themselves in "a strange and powerful world".
The accuracy of their perceived approximation of the truth will therefore have direct
consequences on their ability to deal with their environment. Fromm can be understood to
define truth as a functional approximation of reality. His vision of optimal truth is described
partly in "Man from Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics" (1947), from which
excerpts are included below.

the dichotomy between 'absolute = perfect' and 'relative = imperfect' has been superseded
in all fields of scientific thought, where "it is generally recognized that there is no absolute
truth but nevertheless that there are objectively valid laws and principles".

In that respect, "a scientifically or rationally valid statement means that the power of reason
is applied to all the available data of observation without any of them being suppressed or
falsified for the sake of a desired result". The history of science is "a history of inadequate
and incomplete statements, and every new insight makes possible the recognition of the
inadequacies of previous propositions and offers a springboard for creating a more adequate
formulation."

As a result "the history of thought is the history of an ever-increasing approximation to the

truth. Scientific knowledge is not absolute but optimal; it contains the optimum of truth
attainable in a given historical period." Fromm furthermore notes that "different cultures
have emphasized various aspects of the truth" and that increasing interaction between
cultures allows for these aspects to reconcile and integrate, increasing further the
approximation to the truth.

Foucault

Truth, says Michel Foucault, is problematic when any attempt is made to see truth as an
"objective" quality. He prefers not to use the term truth itself but "Regimes of Truth". In his
historical investigations he found truth to be something that was itself a part of, or embedded
within, a given power structure. Thus Foucault's view shares much in common with the
concepts of Nietzsche. Truth for Foucault is also something that shifts through various
episteme throughout history.[80]

Baudrillard

Jean Baudrillard considered truth to be largely simulated, that is pretending to have

something, as opposed to dissimulation, pretending to not have something. He took his cue
from iconoclasts who he claims knew that images of God demonstrated that God did not
exist.[81] Baudrillard wrote in "Precession of the Simulacra":

The simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth—it is the truth which conceals that
there is none. The simulacrum is true.

—Ecclesiastes[82][83]
215

Some examples of simulacra that Baudrillard cited were: that prisons simulate the "truth" that
society is free; scandals (e.g., Watergate) simulate that corruption is corrected; Disney
simulates that the U.S. itself is an adult place. One must remember that though such examples
seem extreme, such extremity is an important part of Baudrillard's theory. For a less extreme
example, consider how movies usually end with the bad being punished, humiliated, or
otherwise failing, thus affirming for viewers the concept that the good end happily and the
bad unhappily, a narrative which implies that the status quo and established power structures
are largely legitimate.[81]

In medicine and psychiatry

There is controversy as to the truth value of a proposition made in bad faith self-deception,
such as when a hypochondriac has a complaint with no physical symptom.[84]

In religion: omniscience
Main article: Omniscience

In a religious context, perfect knowledge of all truth about all things (omniscience) is
regarded by some religions, particularly Buddhism (source?) and the Abrahamic religions
(Christianity, Islam, and Judaism), as an attribute of a divine being.[85] In the Abrahamic
view, God can exercise divine judgment, judging the dead on the basis of perfect knowledge
of their lives.[86][87]

See also

 Thinking portal

 Theory of justification
 Aletheia
 Asha
 Belief
 Confirmation holism
 Contextualism
 Contradiction
 Degrees of truth
 Disposition
 Eclecticism
 Imagination
 Independence
 Interpretation
 Invariance
 Lie
 McNamara fallacy
 Normative science
 On truth and lies in a nonmoral sense
 Perjury
 Perspectivism
 Physical symbol system
 Post-truth politics
216

 Proof
 Public opinion
 Revision theory
 Relativism
 Religious views on truth
 Satya
 Slingshot argument
 Statistical independence
 Tautology (logic)
 Tautology (rhetoric)
 Truth prevails
 Truthiness
 Truthlikeness
 Two truths doctrine
 Unity of the proposition
 Verisimilitude
 Veritas
 What is truth (disambiguation)

Major theorists

 Thomas Aquinas
 Aristotle
 J.L. Austin
 Brand Blanshard
 John Dewey
 Hartry Field
 Gottlob Frege
 Jürgen Habermas
 G. W. F. Hegel
 Martin Heidegger
 Augustine of Hippo
 Paul Horwich
 William James
 Harold Joachim
 Saul Kripke
 Friedrich Nietzsche
 Charles Sanders Peirce
 Plato
 Karl Popper
 W.V. Quine
 Frank P. Ramsey
 Bertrand Russell
 Arthur Schopenhauer
 Socrates
 P.F. Strawson
 Alfred Tarski
 Ludwig Wittgenstein
217

Related topics

 Belief  Knowledge  Reproducibility

 Epistemology  Pragmatism  Scientific method
 Information  Pragmaticism  Testability
 Inquiry  Pragmatic maxim  Verificationism


 Mertonian norms
 Normal science
 Post-normal science
 Science studies
 Sociology of scientific knowledge
o
 11 Notes
 12 References
 13 Further reading
 14 External links
 Ineffability
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ineffability


 Philosophy portal

Notes and references

1.

 Philosophy of Mind. Jaegwon Kim. 2005. Westview Press, p. 75. (ISBN 0813342694)
  Verstehen: The Uses of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Michael Martin. 2000. Transaction
Publishers, p. 64 (ISBN 1560004169)

  Knowledge in Ferment: Dilemmas in Science, Scholarship and Society. Adriaan in ’t Groen, Henk
Jan de Jonge, Eduard Klasen, Hilje Papma, and Piet van Slooten, Eds. 2007. Leiden University Press, p.
265 (ISBN 9789087280178)

4.  The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science and Religion. Ken Wilbur. 1998.
Random House (ISBN 0375500545)

 The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science and Religion. Ken Wilber. 1998. Random
House (ISBN 0375500545)

Categories:

 Philosophy of mind
 Philosophy of science
 Epistemology
 Sociology of science
218

 Subjective experience

http://journal.frontiersin.org/researchtopic/2287/towards-an-embodied-science-of-
intersubjectivity-widening-the-scope-of-social-understanding-research

http://sociologyindex.com/intersubjectivity.htm

http://sfwork.com/nlp-science-and-intersubjectivity

NLP, Science and Intersubjectivity

Mark McKergow, Principal Consultant, Mark McKergow Associates

Jaap Hollander's recent article ('NLP and Science - Six Recommendations for a Better
Relationship, Hollander, 1999) is a welcome and informed addition to the debate about NLP
and science. I particularly like his suggestion of the 'modelling trail' method of description,
which would help others to be more clear about the claims and limitations of models derived
using NLP (or any other) methods. I also acknowledge the stubbornness and closed-minded
reception accorded to NLP ideas by "scientists" with little understanding or interest in the
field. In my view these people devalue their profession by failing to find out about NLP
before commenting.

The relationship between NLP and science is in interesting one, with potential for
misunderstandings on both sides. As a one-time professional scientist myself (with a physics
PhD to show for it) I will address some of the points raised by Jaap Hollander, and hope to
outline a number of possible alternative ways for improving the relationship. I will start off
by examining the question as to what scientists believe, which in my view turns out to be
more NLP-friendly than Hollander might suppose. We will follow this with the ways in
which science could investigate NLP, and finally look at how similar processes are being
used to investigate other psycho-social processes.

The process of "science"

Let us start by looking at a definition of science. Microsoft Encarta 2000 defines the word
thus:

Science may be defined as the systematic investigation of objectively verifiable material

phenomena. In the purest-minded view of the profession, its tools are rationality,
experimentation, objectivity, and the free exchange of reliable information.

It is this desire for reliable information that lies at the heart of the scientific endeavour. It is
tempting to look at the concept of reliability here as a digital parameter - either something is
reliable, and hence 'scientifically proven', or it is not. However, most scientists would agree
that reliability is more of an analogue parameter - we might think of a scale of reliability.

So how can we define reliable in this context? We may start by examining Hollander's
(unsourced) claim that scientists believe

'that there is a universal truth, that statistically evaluated experiments generate the best
understanding of this truth, and that this understanding will be beneficial to mankind.'
219

This may be Hollander's view. I cannot find these words elsewhere, nor do I believe they are
the words a scientist would choose. I think that Hollander sets up a straw man - a caricature
of a scientist - which he then objects to. The issues of subjectivity and epistemology in
science have been known about (and worried about) by thoughtful scientists and philosophers
for many years. There are regrettably still people adhering to Ascientism (the belief that all
knowledge should be like physics or some other scientific branch) and it may be such people
that Hollander has had run-ins with in the past. However, they are outside the mainstream of
thoughtful scientists.

Those scientists who take these matters seriously have a different and useful view. Professor
John Ziman, formerly Professor of Physics at the University of Bristol and, coincidentally,
my former Head of Department, has put forward a considered view of the way in which
scientific knowledge is gathered and judgements of reliability may be made. In his book
Reliable Knowledge (1978), Ziman considers the philosophical issues of subjectivity and
objectivity, and states that the 'goal of scientific method is reliable knowledge - knowledge
which is coherent and maximally consensual'.

The idea of consensuality is very interesting. Ziman states that, rather than getting bogged
down in the old arguments about objectivity, the scientific process can be very accurately
described as a process talking about subjectivity - but subjectivity created between people, in
the form of socially constructed and tested shared knowledge. We might think of
intersubjective knowledge - that which is agreed on by different people.

I have seen this kind of intersubjective knowledge being used at NLP conferences. When I
ask someone to 'pass me a handout please ', they usually respond by picking up some papers
and handing them to me. We have agreed, intersubjectively and without comment, that that
thing is, for us, a handout. Situation normal - two people agree that there is a pile of handouts,
which makes it a bit more reliable. Now other people approach the pile - there's a shout from
the back, 'Are there handouts?' - 'Yes!', cry two or three others. Before we know where we
are, there are twenty or thirty people who will have joined in our intersubjective game of
reliably knowing about handouts.

There is another possibility, of course. I ask for the handout and am met by blank looks and
puzzled grunts. 'The handouts!!' I exclaim. 'No, no handouts here mate'. Unreliable
knowledge - not shared, not intersubjective.

This idea is laid out very nicely in Fritz Simon's book 'My Psychosis, My Bicycle and I'
(1996), and shown in Figure 1. The 'objective' is the shared intersection between two
subjective individual descriptions.

[Figure 1] Caption: Intersubjectivity: Two individuals concur to create a piece of 'objective'

(for them) knowledge. After Simon, 1996.

Ziman's point is that the more people concur with a piece of knowledge, the more reliable it
is. Knowledge can be more or less reliable - an example near to the 'totally reliable' end being
the force we call gravity (for example that an object, when released and in the absence of
other restraining forces, moves downwards towards the earth's surface). This can be easily
and quickly tested by anyone with a stone, a cannonball or an apple to hand. An example
nearer the 'unreliable' end would be the 'cold fusion' issue - a few people have observed rather
different things from the majority and results are impossible to reproduce.
220

When we start to look at science as intersubjective, the process of scientific observation takes
on a different light. Rather than each scientist publishing his work and claiming it to be 'true',
we see a range of trained observers each reporting 'what they have observed'. Scientific
papers are always clearly labelled with the names of the observers, so we know whose
subjective reports we're looking at.

The communication and repeatability of results is therefore central to science. This demands
a reduction of ambiguity in communicating results - how else can we know that we are
comparing like with like. Hence the preference for numbers, which less ambiguous than
words (as long as the numbers relate to something well defined, of course!).

I always used to wonder about the scientific status of unrepeatable events. For example, did
England beat West Germany by 4 goals to 2 in the soccer World Cup final of 1966? If we
were to repeat the 'experiment' later on, even one day afterwards, the result would not be the
same - a different game would be played, sometimes with a different winner. In the
intersubjective view, the consenuality comes from the fact that there were several
independent observers (about 100,000 at the stadium, with millions more watching on TV,
that there are many recordings the event on film, tape and in the press, that there are relics of
the day (the ball, the jerseys), and that all these reports basically fit together. There are still
disputes about whether England's third goal crossed the line or not, but everyone involved
agrees that the goal was given. That, as they say, is (as close as we can get) a fact.

This mode of study works very well with the natural sciences, where the observations are
usually seen to be consensual quite easily. Is this an accident? No - the physicists study the
things they study precisely BECAUSE these things are tractable using the method. The
results are generally established as consensual, sometimes after a period of debate and
disagreement, and are 'firmly established and accepted without serious doubt by an
overwhelming majority of competent well qualified scientists' (Ziman).

Application of 'science' processes to psycho-social areas.

The extension of the scientific method outlined above into the vastly more complex areas of
human actions and relationships is fraught with difficulties. However, I submit that it is not as
insurmountable a problem as Hollander suggests. Hollander paints a gloomy picture with his
outline experiment for examining opinion-development in children. Although the lines of his
experiment are logically correct, he seeks to be very rigorous and reliable about a small piece
of knowledge - so reliable that the attempt ends up looking ludicrous. As a piece of
stimulating overstatement this is entertaining, and makes Hollander's point for him. In terms
of taking a sensible scientific line to psycho-social research it is comedic.

If we look at what knowledge can be gathered reliably and consensually, and accept that there
are degrees of both these things, then some different possibilities begin to emerge. NLP is
about helping people to find the well-loved 'difference that makes a difference', and as
Hollander points out this involves working with a sample of one. The 'right' method for that
individual is indeed the one that works.

The point, surely, is to what extent that person finds benefit from the process. There are, in
addition to the qualitative research approach outlined by Hollander, various ways to do this.
These are commonly employed in evaluating psychotherapeutic approaches.
221

1. Outcome research. This quantitative broad-brush approach simply looks at the extent to
which the individuals involved meet their goals. For example, someone who asks for help
with their depression will be asked about whether they are less depressed. There are a number
of variants, following the NLP 1st, 2nd and 3rd positions - most often the individual will be
asked for their own assessment, the therapist or operator may be asked for their assessment
by definition not so good as the client is in a better position to know about their own
depression, but useful too. A 3rd position assessment might include standardised
questionnaires as well, or the views of others who know the client. This may be done straight
after treatment, and/or at some more distant time such as 6 months later.

It's interesting to ponder what this approach measures. Assuming the operator is doing 'their
thing' rather than following some standard procedure, it measures the efficacy of the operator.
It says little about the Method, other than this particular operator's degree of skill with it. So,
a zero result could equally be a sign of a hopeless operator as it was a sign of an ineffective
method. However, a high result equally does not indicate that the method 'works' - it indicates
that this operator produces these results. In terms of validating a method, then, it's not much
help, other than indicating that there may be something worth further investigation here. This
in itself is valuable - it weeds out the charlatans who claim that they can provide results, and
then don't. Ziman says that its in nobody's interest that interesting phenomena are ignored,
and this is one way of finding out how interesting the phenomenon under study is.

This method could be made a little more reliable and consensual by having different
operators carry out the same kinds of study, and seeing how the results match up. Where
there is a consistent good performance, there is more reliable evidence of something worth
investigating.

2. Empirical quantitative research. This is a first step along the road to validating a particular
method. For this, outcome data is obtained as above, but in addition the operators follow
some kind of agreed process. There may also be a comparison or 'control' of this process with
something else - another method or doing nothing. Where the method under study shows
good results, particularly in comparison with the control, we start to get mildly-reliable
knowledge that the method is helping some people.

This method is in use, however, to examine the effectiveness of solution focused brief
therapy (SFBT). SFBT, although stemming from similar roots to NLP in terms of Erickson,
Bateson, systemic therapies and language, has a much simpler model than NLP (see for
example de Shazer, 1988 and Berg & De Jong, 1998). The derivation of an agreed procedure
which allowed flexibility for the therapist to respond to their clients individually, and yet
have enough commonality to be doing something like the same thing, was merely agonising
and slow rather than next to impossible.

The results gathered so far (Gingerich and Eisenhardt, 1999) are interesting. In the 15 studies
published to date, clients reported improvement in 60 - 80% of cases. These studies have
been carried out in a wide variety of settings, including mental health, school behaviour
problems, anger management, family and marital therapy, occupational health and
rehabilitation, problem drinking and prison. These figures are as good or better than
comparative treatments, were mostly achieved in between one and five sessions.
Interestingly, in all but one of the studies the work was implemented by relatively
inexperienced workers, in many cases just recently trained.
222

This step towards empirical validation is seen by those in the SFBT community as a way of
demonstrating that their model has a wide application and demonstrable results, and thence to
garner support from funding bodies, controlling institutions and so on. When Hollander
claims that, on his reading of science, 'no psycho-social method can honestly claim to be
scientifically supported', I suggest that there are matters of degree, and the some have sought
support more effectively than others.

How could NLP be supported 'scientifically'?

I must start this section by agreeing with Hollander that NLP is not about applying a recipe
book approach to a given situation. Rather, it is about applying a set of beliefs,
presuppositions and skills to the situation in hand to reach an outcome. This does indeed
involve studying the exceptions, and taking every case afresh, an approach derived from
Erickson. This means that conventional experiments which look at bits of NLP-ish stuff,
interesting though they are, are not 'full' tests of NLP per se. (Neither do they claim to be.)
Examples may be found in Hancox and Bass (1995), where altering submodalities changed
the rate of saliva production in human subjects. If we assume that it would be desirable to
have some ammunition to counter Hollander's Scientism devotees, then there is at least one
way forward.

Outcome research

I've always thought that NLP was particularly amenable to this approach. With the focus on
outcome - acuity - flexibility, the well formed outcome gives an excellent basis for evaluating
progress. As I pointed out above, this kind of research primarily examines the efficacy of the
practitioners concerned, rather than 'the model'. However, it would give some kind of basis
that there was something there to investigate further. It would also give Jaap Hollander
something to tell his English tobacco smoking scientists about. I am not aware of any such
study, and would certainly be most interested learn of those which may have been done

I have written in these pages before about one particularly controversial meta-study of
outcome research. Miller, Duncan and Hubble (1997) examined outcome research from
different therapy models, and concluded that the therapeutic model made no difference to the
number of patients who were successfully treated! Rather, they found that the differences
which made differences overall were the therapeutic relationship, the client, hope,
expectation and chance events. I asked then, and I ask again, whether the NLP community is
interested in responding to these findings. I have seen no response to date.

Empirical quantitative research

This method seeks to compare the NLP way of doing things with something else to obtain
comparative data. I have already mentioned the difficulty of arriving at a simple description
of what the NLP way of doing things. An extension of outcome research might be possible,
but the scientific community may still be sceptical if what's done is not well documented.

There is a kind of experiment I've seen suggested by well-meaning but ignorant scientists,
along the lines of 'Do a V/K dissociation on 50 people with phobias and we'll find out
whether NLP works'. This ignores, of course, the possibility that the client may be producing
their phobia by another means, and so would not be a good test even of that, let alone the
223

whole canon of NLP. Indeed the richness and complexity of NLP would make the design of
the agreed process difficult, if not impossible, and probably futile too.

'But NLP is about subjective experience?'

There are those who may be thinking at this point that NLP states that it is the study of the
structure of subjective experience, and therefore cannot be examined using fuddy-duddy old
'objective' science. I think that the view of science as intersubjective gives a useful new angle.
If different people find similar things happen to their subjective experience (insofar as they
can be compared), then that's potentially scientific knowledge.

Also, if NLP is to help people be better communicators, therapists, influencers and so on,
there must be some kind of impact on an external level. The basic way we interact with others
is by doing things - talking, moving around, gesturing, wearing things - which the other
person can sense and respond to. Such changes may start at in internal subjective level, but
must then show themselves to make an interactional difference to the world. If we want the
world to respond differently to us, we must surely make some kind of change to the world.
The differences may be subtle, small, even unconscious - but they must be there for a
difference to be made. And as soon as an external difference is made, then we are out of the
solely subjective world and into the intersubjective one.

NLP and science - a relationship

Hollander concludes his piece with recommendations to improve the relationship between
NLP and science. His first four recommendations were for scientists. I can think of braver
places than NLP World to publish finger-wagging criticisms of the world scientific
community, and so will hold my ideas for scientists until my next paper in Nature. The
following ideas may appeal to NLPW readers, be you scientists or not.

1. The view of science as an intersubjective process gives an interesting way of viewing

'knowledge' which may be helpful to NLPers. After all, if NLP is totally subjective, why the
need for journals, trainings or conferences?

2. I think that there are various ways in which NLP could be researched 'scientifically'. These
include outcome research as a possible first step.

3. The extent to which the NLP community is interested in collaborating with scientists
seems questionable. The field has been around for nearly 25 years now, with little in the way
of scientific activity to be seen. Indeed, all the papers listed over the years of NLP Abstracts
have been from 'NLP' journals (Rapport, Anchor Point etc). There is no sign that the NLP
community wants or welcomes independent observation or examination. This is a choice that
we can all make.

4. If we all choose not to pursue a scientific line, then scientists will most likely continue to
suck their teeth and question what we do. We can choose to live with that or not.

5. Anyone who states in response to some negative finding that NLP is the study of the
structure of subjective experience and so has nothing to say about the outside world is
engaging in sophistry, and might consider prefacing their work by announcing 'This may not
help you to change the way you respond to the world'.
224

Finally, Hollander says that scientists have never proved that the scientific method will lead,
immediately or eventually, to better results than non-scientific methods. Is there a
generalisation here? To which fields of endeavour is Hollander referring? Taking a few fields
at random, the scientific method has given us antiseptics, electricity and the computer on
which I write this. Please send examples of the results of non-scientific methods, by foot, to
the NLP World offices.

References

Berg IK and De Jong P, Interviewing for Solutions, Brooks/Cole (1998)

De Shazer S, Clues: Investigating Solutions in Brief Therapy, WW Norton (1988)

Gingerich WJ and Eisengart S, paper prepared for presentation to the International Family
Therapy Association, Akron Ohio, April 15 1999. More information at www.gingerich.net

Hancox J and Bass A, NLP World 2, No 3 pp 43 - 52 (1995)

Hollander J, NLP World Vol 6, No 3, pp 45 - 75 (1999)

McKergow M, Dinosaur or dolphin, NLP World 5, No 2 pp 63 - 65 (1998)

Miller S, Duncan B and Hubble M, Escape from Babel, WW Norton (1997)

Simon F, My Psychosis, My Bicycle and I, Aronson (1996)

Ziman J, Reliable Knowledge, Cambridge University Press (1978)

https://sbinstitute.com/aw/srhepaper.pdf

In this paper I shall present a radical alternative to metaphysical re-

alism, a view that underlies most literature on science and religion,
and yet may also set science and religion in fundamental opposition
to each other. Those who advocate metaphysical realism maintain
that (1) the real world consists of mind-independent objects, (2)
there is exactly one true and complete description of the way the
world is, and (3) truth involves some sort of correspondence be-
tween an independently existent world and our descriptions of it.
1
Various sorts of cultural relativism and constructivism have been ad-
vocated as alternatives to metaphysical realism, but while they have
proven appealing to many philosophers, they are generally found to
be inadequate by practicing scientists and theologians alike.
2
In this
paper, I propose a third alternative that emphasizes the intersubjec-
tive nature of both scientific and religious truth-claims, one which
rejects the leap of faith required for metaphysical realism and
equally shuns the nihilism that is implicit in so many versions of
225

relativism. The central theme of this intersubjective view is that sci-

ence and religion express truths arrayed along a spectrum of “invari-
ance” among diverse cognitive frameworks. All truth-claims are em-
bedded in experience, and their validity is put to the test within the
“lived world” of human experience. They are neither confirmed nor
refuted in relation to some hypothetical “real, objective world” that
exists independently of experience.
Unlike scientific discoveries that may be witnessed first hand by multiple
“third persons” in an intersubjective domain of experience, the verification or
mind
refutation of a mathematical proof is a private, first-person event. The external
manifestation of a sophisticated mathematical proof is unintelligible to the
nonmathematician, so the evaluation of its validity is confined to professional
mathematicians.

https://www2.units.it/episteme/L&PS_Vol9No1/L&PS_Vol9No1_2011_51_Amoretti_Vassal
lo.pdf
L&PS
–
Logic and Philosophy of Science
Vol. IX, No. 1, 2011, pp.
Scientific Knowledge: Situatedness and Intersubjectivity without Standpoints
https://tesisnetwork.wordpress.com/

TESIS — Towards an Embodied Science of InterSubjectivity — is an integrated Marie-Curie

ITN programme to investigate the foundations of human sociality. It brings together the
complementary expertise of 13 European research institutes, clinical centres and private
enterprises that span the biomedical sciences and the humanities. Thus, TESIS provides
critical mass in the fields of philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology,
psychiatry and societal outreach.

The network will advance our understanding of human intersubjectivity based on the
following research and training objectives:

(1) To investigate the neural underpinnings of affective exchange with others, of shared
action spaces and joint object relations, endorsing a novel interactive embodied neuroscience;

(2) To investigate the development of social skills in infants in the context of the awareness
of others during interaction, yielding an interactive concept of embodied social cognition;

(3) To investigate the inter-subjective factors affecting psychopathologies, especially

schizophrenia, autism and somatoform disorders and to draw implications for treatment;

(4) To investigate in toddlers and young children the understanding of toys, objects and
cultural artefacts and the links between materiality and sociality;

(5) To investigate cultural interactive patterns and shared practices such as group learning,
playing, teamwork, distributed cognition, creating applied knowledge for education,
management, and organizational development.
226

By integrating state of the art and novel approaches to studying interactive situations, TESIS
will significantly extend the individualistic and static paradigm still dominant in social
cognition research. The major breakthrough to be expected from TESIS is a comprehensive
framework for embodied inter-subjectivity applicable in the biomedical sciences, the
humanities, and society in general, showing how we become human by embodied interaction
with others from the beginning.

https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/intersubjectivity/book204688

Articulate and perceptive, Intersubjectivity is a text that explains the notions of intersubjectivity as a
central concern of philosophy, sociology, psychology, and politics. Going beyond this broad-ranging
introduction and explication, author Nick Crossley provides a critical discussion of intersubjectivity as
an interdisciplinary concept to shed light on our understanding of selfhood, communication,
citizenship, power, and community. The volume traces the contributions of key thinkers engaged
within the intersubjectivist tradition, including Husserl, Buber, Kojeve, Merlau-Ponty, Mead,
Wittgenstein, Schutz, and Habermas. A clear, concise introduction to a range of difficult concepts
and thinkers, Intersubjectivity demystifies this very interdisciplinary subject for advanced and
graduate-level students of philosophy, sociology, social psychology, and social and political theory.

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368111000860

Another parting of the ways: Intersubjectivity and the objectivity of

science
Michael Friedman defines the scientific enterprise as an ongoing project with a dynamics of
reason that persists through scientific revolutions: The coherence and continuity of science
owes to a communicative rationality that is operative at all times. It assures us of our shared
objective world by transforming subjective points of view into intersubjectively binding
agreements. Though it takes a very broad approach epistemologically, this conception of
science may yet be too narrow in respect to notions of objectivity. It excludes a prominent
mode of knowledge production that might be called technoscientific. This exclusion becomes
particularly evident in Friedman’s discussion of Heidegger as a critic of Cassirer and Carnap
and as a critic of objectivity as “universal validity” of scientific propositions. If one tends to
Heidegger’s own account of objectivity, one encounters a non-propositional notion of truth.
Science is seen as a technology that brings forth phenomena and processes. Accordingly,
even where modern physics appears to be concerned primarily with the formulation of
theories and the testing of hypotheses, it uses mathematical and representational techniques to
conceive and create the modern world. And more powerfully than intersubjective agreement,
technologies assure us of the unity and objectivity of our simultaneously social as well as
natural world. There may be good reasons to hold fast to the close affiliation of
communicative rationality, science, and enlightenment. However, to the extent that it turns a
blind eye to technoscientific knowledge production and the technological character of
science, a philosophy of technoscience needs to develop an alternative perspective on
questions of objectivity, explanation, inference, or validation.

Keywords

 Michael Friedman;
 Martin Heidegger;
227

 Communicative rationality;
 Objectivity and intersubjectivity;
 Science and technology;
 Thing and object;
 Technoscience

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9406/

From Intersubjectivity to Interinstrumentality: The example of Surface

Science
My aim is to show how a strategy used in the experimental sciences, which I name
“interinstrumentality”, can minimize the role of sociological factors when one tries to
understand how the debates about the interpretation of data come to an end. To defend
this view, two examples are presented. The first is historical – the invention of the Scanning
Tunneling Microscope (STM) – and the second is collected during an ethnographic study in a
surface science laboratory. I would like to emphasize that interinstrumentality contributes to
objectivity of the experimental results and constitutes a part of it as well as
intersubjectivity.

http://study.com/academy/lesson/intersubjectivity-definition-examples.html

Intersubjectivity: Definition & Examples - Video & Lesson Transcript | Study.com

n this lesson, we will learn about intersubjectivity. You will learn what intersubjectivity means, how
it is used in literature, and see two examples of intersubjectivity in novels.

Definition of Intersubjectivity

A good way to think about intersubjectivity is to imagine how you relate to your family and
friends. Maybe your mother enjoyed playing tennis. She took you with her when she
practiced, and you always had a good time. Growing up, you decided to join the school tennis
team. If your mother had not played tennis with you growing up, you may not have grown to
like the sport. Your experience with tennis can be called intersubjective because it was
influenced by another person (your mother). In order to better understand intersubjectivity,
228

we first need to define a subject and an object. A subject is the person experiencing an action
or event. An object is what is being experienced.

When we say something is objective, we mean that it is factually true. When we say that
something is subjective, we mean that it is based on an opinion, or a biased viewpoint, not on
hard facts. In literature, subjectivity means that the story is told from a biased viewpoint,
whether it is told by a character or an unnamed narrator. Everyone in the world has their own
subjective viewpoint. Intersubjectivity means that we all influence and are all influenced by
others to some degree. The principle of intersubjectivity can be applied to almost any
decision we make, big or small. We always have to consider how our actions will affect
others. We ourselves are constantly affected by the actions and words of the people around
us.

Intersubjectivity in Literature

In literature, intersubjectivity means that several subjective viewpoints are being put together
in a story. Each character has his or her own unique opinion of the events that are happening.
These subjective characters may meet and influence each other's viewpoints. A person may
also be affected by larger cultural norms, in addition to other individuals.

Intersubjectivity can also be a tool for analyzing literature. We know that in a story, the
protagonist, or the main character, must overcome some obstacle in order to achieve a goal. It
is easy to view a story only as the protagonist's journey toward that goal. However, if we
analyze a novel or short story using intersubjectivity, we would look at how other characters
influenced the protagonist on his or her journey. We would also look at how the protagonist
influenced other characters, and how his or her actions fit into the social norms of the time.

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You are viewing lesson 11 in chapter 1 of the course:

10th Grade English: Tutoring Solution

17 chapters | 222 lessons

Ch 1. Text Analysis and Close Reading for 10th...

 Get the Gist of an Essay & Improve Reading Comprehension 7:56

 How to Use Context to Determine the Meaning of Words 5:54
 What is Inference? - How to Infer Intended Meaning 5:42
 Constructing Meaning with Context Clues, Prior Knowledge & Word Structure 5:45
 Reading Strategies Using Visualization 4:23
 What Are Connotation and Denotation? - Definitions & Examples 7:32
 Understanding Tone and Mood in a Reading Passage 5:06
 What is Structure in Writing and How Does it Affect Meaning? 4:45
 Close Reading vs. Big Picture Reading Strategies 5:26
 Interpreting Literary Meaning: How to Use Text to Guide Your Interpretation 3:47
 Intersubjectivity: Definition & Examples 4:35
229

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232923984_The_Architecture_and_Dynamics_of
_Intersubjectivity_in_Science_Classrooms

http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/47919167/0_Intro.pdf

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40236963?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

http://www.worldcat.org/title/subjectivity-objectivity-intersubjectivity-a-new-paradigm-for-
religion-and-science/oclc/235028569

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02273552

Varieties of methodological intersubjectivity — the relations with

qualitative and quantitative research, and with objectivity

Three traditional kinds of intersubjectivity, that is consensual, regimented and explicit

intersubjectivity are differentiated from two alternative kinds, namely argumentative and
dialogical intersubjectivity. An essential part of argumentative intersubjectivity is the
methodological discourse in which the participants have to strive for the so-called ideal
speech situation. (Socrates and Habermas. How far is the Socratic Method an attempt to
develop intersubjective or interpersonal agreement by means of conceptual analysis and
rational agreement arrived at about those clarified or defined concepts?)) Dialogical
intersubjectivity includes argumentative intersubjectivity, but the interaction between
researchers as well as between researchers and subjects is more symmetrical and less
rationalistic.

In qualitative research strictly regimented intersubjectivity is not, or only partly, adequate or

relevant, while dialogical intersubjectivity is typical. In quantitative research dialogical
intersubjectivity in a full sense is not, or only partly, adequate or relevant, while regimented
intersubjectivity is typical.

Although methodological intersubjectivity — certainly in the sense of argumentative

intersubjectivity —is essential to the whole scientific enterprise, methodological objectivity
— if it implies doing justice to the object of study — is even more important.

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https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/245398/

In a highly recognized paper from 2015 L. A. Paul shaped the notion of transformative
experiences. She hereby means experiences so fundamental that one is incapable of
assessing ex ante how one's life will be affected by them. Whereas Paul uses this notion to
make a (surely laudable) case against Rational-Choice-Theory I argue that the notion has a
more profound impact on contemporary philosophy. In particular, it challenges the concept
of intersubjectivity which has become central to a number of ethical theories, e. g.
pragmatism and Critical Theory. By questioning men's competence for, at least roughly,
anticipating how they will perceive future experiences, Paul's research a fortiori questions
their competence for understanding how others perceive certain experiences. However, this
competence is a necessary condition of any ethically meaningful account of intersubjectivity.
I defend the concept of intersubjectivity against the challenge thus sketched and thereby
distinguish two approaches for overcoming the challenge: the scientific and the narrative
approach. The scientific approach, as I define it, gathers as many facts about the
experience as possible. The narrative approach relies on stories about the experience
especially as they appear in literature (broadly conceived). I argue that there is
overwhelming evidence that the first approach is likely to fail. Moreover I outline why the
232

second approach is likely to succeed whereby the supposition that stories about experiences
shape how experiences are perceived will prove essential. Beyond its core argument my
paper has two further implications. The one is the insight that, opposed to most
philosophical accounts, conceptualizations of intersubjectivity need to start from a concept
of narration. The other is that, in line with previous evidence, narration is not an enemy of
the sciences but its ally in the wider quest to determine, as closely as possible, how things
are (which includes how they are felt).

https://philpapers.org/rec/ALLFIT My aim is to show how a strategy used in the

experimental sciences, which I name “interinstrumentality”, can minimize the role of
sociological factors when one tries to understand how the debates about the interpretation
of data come to an end. To defend this view, two examples are presented. The first is
historical – the invention of the Scanning Tunneling Microscope – and the second is
collected during an ethnographic study in a surface science laboratory. I would like to
emphasize that interinstrumentality contributes to objectivity of the experimental results
and constitutes a part of it as well as intersubjectivity

BibTeX / EndNote / RIS / etc

Export this page:

Culture & Psychology

16(4) 465–475
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The Author(s) 2010
Reprints and permissions:
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DOI: 10.1177/1354067X10380160
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Commentary
Intersubjectivity,
interobjectivity, and the
embryonic fallacy in
developmental science
Fathali M. Moghaddam
Georgetown University, USA
Abstract
Traditional research adopts the embryonic fallacy : the assumption that as soon
as life begins, the individual becomes the source of psychological experiences.
The embryonic fallacy has resulted in intersubjectivity being treated as ‘a
problem’: how can each individual, the source of private experiences, understand
the private experiences of ‘self-contained’ others? This ‘problem’ disappears
when we recognize that intersubjectivity is regulated through interobjectivity: how
individuals understand others arises out of the cultural collective in which they are
socialized. The source of our understandings of others is ‘out there’ in the social
world.
Keywords
collective processes, embryonic fallacy, interobjectivity, intersubjectivity,
socialization
233

Search Results

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Sammanfattning summary

The purpose of the present article was to gain knowledge about what aspects of, and in
what way, contextual and conceptual intersubjectivity contribute to emergent science
knowledge about sound. Starting from a Vygotskian theoretical base, the article rests on the
work of Fleer (early learning and development. Cultural-historical concepts in play, 2010),
Hedegaard and Fleer (studying children—a cultural historical approach, 2008), and
Hedegaard et al. (motives in children’s development, 2012). Data analyses were carried out
on video recordings and transcripts of teachers’ process of ongoing science work with ten
preschool children aged 3–6 years. During the work, teachers took the role of planning
activities in which play and playful experiences were used as means, in accordance with the
preschool tradition. The results show that emergent science knowledge is developed when it
is enhanced by teachers’ double move between conceptual and contextual intersubjectivity.
The use of contextual and conceptual intersubjectivity, and their connectedness during the
double move process, shows how teachers combine play and learning and contribute to
emergent science knowledge. Further, in this way, they also contribute to bridging children’s
everyday understandings to scientific concepts.

Länkar links

 http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1007/s13158-
012-0078-6

http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=buy.optionToBuy&id=2008-06603-007
235

Psychology has been a deductive science where theory and hypotheses precede investigation
of new knowledge. Data inform theory which then leads to more refined hypotheses. The
recent move toward a cultural psychology calls for an unfurling of this perspective. This
involves consideration of an epistemology at the core of anthropology, a shift toward first-
person points of view, where ethnography is the inductive method based on a practical
philosophy. This paper examines what is at stake for psychology to enter the interpretive
social sciences where culturally-constituted subjectivity and intersubjectivity are the objects
of investigation. An anthropological imagination is a critical supplement to a multi-method
approach in psychology, or an alternative epistemology, that augments knowledge of cultural
persons. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

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TESIS — Towards an Embodied Science of InterSubjectivity — is an integrated Marie-Curie ITN

programme to investigate the foundations of human sociality.
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https://books.google.com › Language Arts & Disciplines › Linguistics › General

The hitherto dominant approach in modern cognitive science has viewed ... proposing that the
human mind is fundamentally based on "intersubjectivity" the ...

INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND TECHNO-SCIENCE: JÜRGEN HABERMAS.

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by C BOGDAN - 2013 - Cited by 1 - Related articles

Abstract: By emphasizing the relationship between techno-science and intersubjectivity, the present
text critically explores some of Jürgen Habermas's central ...

intersubjectivity definition philosophy

intersubjectivity examples
245

http://journal.frontiersin.org/researchtopic/2287/towards-an-
embodied-science-of-intersubjectivity-widening-the-scope-of-social-
understanding-research Towards an embodied science of
intersubjectivity: Widening the scope of social understanding
research
http://sfwork.com/nlp-science-and-intersubjectivity

Jaap Hollander's recent article ('NLP and Science - Six Recommendations for a Better
Relationship, Hollander, 1999) is a welcome and informed addition to the debate about NLP
and science. I particularly like his suggestion of the 'modelling trail' method of description,
which would help others to be more clear about the claims and limitations of models derived
using NLP (or any other) methods. I also acknowledge the stubbornness and closed-minded
reception accorded to NLP ideas by "scientists" with little understanding or interest in the
field. In my view these people devalue their profession by failing to find out about NLP
before commenting.

The relationship between NLP and science is in interesting one, with potential for
misunderstandings on both sides. As a one-time professional scientist myself (with a physics
PhD to show for it) I will address some of the points raised by Jaap Hollander, and hope to
outline a number of possible alternative ways for improving the relationship. I will start off
by examining the question as to what scientists believe, which in my view turns out to be
more NLP-friendly than Hollander might suppose. We will follow this with the ways in
which science could investigate NLP, and finally look at how similar processes are being
used to investigate other psycho-social processes.

The process of "science"

Let us start by looking at a definition of science. Microsoft Encarta 2000 defines the word
thus:

Science may be defined as the systematic investigation of objectively verifiable material

phenomena. In the purest-minded view of the profession, its tools are rationality,
experimentation, objectivity, and the free exchange of reliable information.

It is this desire for reliable information that lies at the heart of the scientific endeavour. It is
tempting to look at the concept of reliability here as a digital parameter - either something is
reliable, and hence 'scientifically proven', or it is not. However, most scientists would agree
that reliability is more of an analogue parameter - we might think of a scale of reliability.

So how can we define reliable in this context? We may start by examining Hollander's
(unsourced) claim that scientists believe

'that there is a universal truth, that statistically evaluated experiments generate the best
understanding of this truth, and that this understanding will be beneficial to mankind.'
246

This may be Hollander's view. I cannot find these words elsewhere, nor do I believe they are
the words a scientist would choose. I think that Hollander sets up a straw man - a caricature
of a scientist - which he then objects to. The issues of subjectivity and epistemology in
science have been known about (and worried about) by thoughtful scientists and philosophers
for many years. There are regrettably still people adhering to Ascientism (the belief that all
knowledge should be like physics or some other scientific branch) and it may be such people
that Hollander has had run-ins with in the past. However, they are outside the mainstream of
thoughtful scientists.

Those scientists who take these matters seriously have a different and useful view. Professor
John Ziman, formerly Professor of Physics at the University of Bristol and, coincidentally,
my former Head of Department, has put forward a considered view of the way in which
scientific knowledge is gathered and judgements of reliability may be made. In his book
Reliable Knowledge (1978), Ziman considers the philosophical issues of subjectivity and
objectivity, and states that the 'goal of scientific method is reliable knowledge - knowledge
which is coherent and maximally consensual'.

The idea of consensuality is very interesting. Ziman states that, rather than getting bogged
down in the old arguments about objectivity, the scientific process can be very accurately
described as a process talking about subjectivity - but subjectivity created between people, in
the form of socially constructed and tested shared knowledge. We might think of
intersubjective knowledge - that which is agreed on by different people.

I have seen this kind of intersubjective knowledge being used at NLP conferences. When I
ask someone to 'pass me a handout please ', they usually respond by picking up some papers
and handing them to me. We have agreed, intersubjectively and without comment, that that
thing is, for us, a handout. Situation normal - two people agree that there is a pile of handouts,
which makes it a bit more reliable. Now other people approach the pile - there's a shout from
the back, 'Are there handouts?' - 'Yes!', cry two or three others. Before we know where we
are, there are twenty or thirty people who will have joined in our intersubjective game of
reliably knowing about handouts.

There is another possibility, of course. I ask for the handout and am met by blank looks and
puzzled grunts. 'The handouts!!' I exclaim. 'No, no handouts here mate'. Unreliable
knowledge - not shared, not intersubjective.

This idea is laid out very nicely in Fritz Simon's book 'My Psychosis, My Bicycle and I'
(1996), and shown in Figure 1. The 'objective' is the shared intersection between two
subjective individual descriptions.

[Figure 1] Caption: Intersubjectivity: Two individuals concur to create a piece of 'objective'

(for them) knowledge. After Simon, 1996.

Ziman's point is that the more people concur with a piece of knowledge, the more reliable it
is. Knowledge can be more or less reliable - an example near to the 'totally reliable' end being
the force we call gravity (for example that an object, when released and in the absence of
other restraining forces, moves downwards towards the earth's surface). This can be easily
and quickly tested by anyone with a stone, a cannonball or an apple to hand. An example
nearer the 'unreliable' end would be the 'cold fusion' issue - a few people have observed rather
different things from the majority and results are impossible to reproduce.
247

When we start to look at science as intersubjective, the process of scientific observation takes
on a different light. Rather than each scientist publishing his work and claiming it to be 'true',
we see a range of trained observers each reporting 'what they have observed'. Scientific
papers are always clearly labelled with the names of the observers, so we know whose
subjective reports we're looking at.

The communication and repeatability of results is therefore central to science. This demands
a reduction of ambiguity in communicating results - how else can we know that we are
comparing like with like. Hence the preference for numbers, which less ambiguous than
words (as long as the numbers relate to something well defined, of course!).

I always used to wonder about the scientific status of unrepeatable events. For example, did
England beat West Germany by 4 goals to 2 in the soccer World Cup final of 1966? If we
were to repeat the 'experiment' later on, even one day afterwards, the result would not be the
same - a different game would be played, sometimes with a different winner. In the
intersubjective view, the consenuality comes from the fact that there were several
independent observers (about 100,000 at the stadium, with millions more watching on TV,
that there are many recordings the event on film, tape and in the press, that there are relics of
the day (the ball, the jerseys), and that all these reports basically fit together. There are still
disputes about whether England's third goal crossed the line or not, but everyone involved
agrees that the goal was given. That, as they say, is (as close as we can get) a fact.

This mode of study works very well with the natural sciences, where the observations are
usually seen to be consensual quite easily. Is this an accident? No - the physicists study the
things they study precisely BECAUSE these things are tractable using the method. The
results are generally established as consensual, sometimes after a period of debate and
disagreement, and are 'firmly established and accepted without serious doubt by an
overwhelming majority of competent well qualified scientists' (Ziman).

Application of 'science' processes to psycho-social areas.

The extension of the scientific method outlined above into the vastly more complex areas of
human actions and relationships is fraught with difficulties. However, I submit that it is not as
insurmountable a problem as Hollander suggests. Hollander paints a gloomy picture with his
outline experiment for examining opinion-development in children. Although the lines of his
experiment are logically correct, he seeks to be very rigorous and reliable about a small piece
of knowledge - so reliable that the attempt ends up looking ludicrous. As a piece of
stimulating overstatement this is entertaining, and makes Hollander's point for him. In terms
of taking a sensible scientific line to psycho-social research it is comedic.

If we look at what knowledge can be gathered reliably and consensually, and accept that there
are degrees of both these things, then some different possibilities begin to emerge. NLP is
about helping people to find the well-loved 'difference that makes a difference', and as
Hollander points out this involves working with a sample of one. The 'right' method for that
individual is indeed the one that works.

The point, surely, is to what extent that person finds benefit from the process. There are, in
addition to the qualitative research approach outlined by Hollander, various ways to do this.
These are commonly employed in evaluating psychotherapeutic approaches.
248

1. Outcome research. This quantitative broad-brush approach simply looks at the extent to
which the individuals involved meet their goals. For example, someone who asks for help
with their depression will be asked about whether they are less depressed. There are a number
of variants, following the NLP 1st, 2nd and 3rd positions - most often the individual will be
asked for their own assessment, the therapist or operator may be asked for their assessment
by definition not so good as the client is in a better position to know about their own
depression, but useful too. A 3rd position assessment might include standardised
questionnaires as well, or the views of others who know the client. This may be done straight
after treatment, and/or at some more distant time such as 6 months later.

It's interesting to ponder what this approach measures. Assuming the operator is doing 'their
thing' rather than following some standard procedure, it measures the efficacy of the operator.
It says little about the Method, other than this particular operator's degree of skill with it. So,
a zero result could equally be a sign of a hopeless operator as it was a sign of an ineffective
method. However, a high result equally does not indicate that the method 'works' - it indicates
that this operator produces these results. In terms of validating a method, then, it's not much
help, other than indicating that there may be something worth further investigation here. This
in itself is valuable - it weeds out the charlatans who claim that they can provide results, and
then don't. Ziman says that its in nobody's interest that interesting phenomena are ignored,
and this is one way of finding out how interesting the phenomenon under study is.

This method could be made a little more reliable and consensual by having different
operators carry out the same kinds of study, and seeing how the results match up. Where
there is a consistent good performance, there is more reliable evidence of something worth
investigating.

2. Empirical quantitative research. This is a first step along the road to validating a particular
method. For this, outcome data is obtained as above, but in addition the operators follow
some kind of agreed process. There may also be a comparison or 'control' of this process with
something else - another method or doing nothing. Where the method under study shows
good results, particularly in comparison with the control, we start to get mildly-reliable
knowledge that the method is helping some people.

This method is in use, however, to examine the effectiveness of solution focused brief
therapy (SFBT). SFBT, although stemming from similar roots to NLP in terms of Erickson,
Bateson, systemic therapies and language, has a much simpler model than NLP (see for
example de Shazer, 1988 and Berg & De Jong, 1998). The derivation of an agreed procedure
which allowed flexibility for the therapist to respond to their clients individually, and yet
have enough commonality to be doing something like the same thing, was merely agonising
and slow rather than next to impossible.

The results gathered so far (Gingerich and Eisenhardt, 1999) are interesting. In the 15 studies
published to date, clients reported improvement in 60 - 80% of cases. These studies have
been carried out in a wide variety of settings, including mental health, school behaviour
problems, anger management, family and marital therapy, occupational health and
rehabilitation, problem drinking and prison. These figures are as good or better than
comparative treatments, were mostly achieved in between one and five sessions.
Interestingly, in all but one of the studies the work was implemented by relatively
inexperienced workers, in many cases just recently trained.
249

This step towards empirical validation is seen by those in the SFBT community as a way of
demonstrating that their model has a wide application and demonstrable results, and thence to
garner support from funding bodies, controlling institutions and so on. When Hollander
claims that, on his reading of science, 'no psycho-social method can honestly claim to be
scientifically supported', I suggest that there are matters of degree, and the some have sought
support more effectively than others.

How could NLP be supported 'scientifically'?

I must start this section by agreeing with Hollander that NLP is not about applying a recipe
book approach to a given situation. Rather, it is about applying a set of beliefs,
presuppositions and skills to the situation in hand to reach an outcome. This does indeed
involve studying the exceptions, and taking every case afresh, an approach derived from
Erickson. This means that conventional experiments which look at bits of NLP-ish stuff,
interesting though they are, are not 'full' tests of NLP per se. (Neither do they claim to be.)
Examples may be found in Hancox and Bass (1995), where altering submodalities changed
the rate of saliva production in human subjects. If we assume that it would be desirable to
have some ammunition to counter Hollander's Scientism devotees, then there is at least one
way forward.

Outcome research

I've always thought that NLP was particularly amenable to this approach. With the focus on
outcome - acuity - flexibility, the well formed outcome gives an excellent basis for evaluating
progress. As I pointed out above, this kind of research primarily examines the efficacy of the
practitioners concerned, rather than 'the model'. However, it would give some kind of basis
that there was something there to investigate further. It would also give Jaap Hollander
something to tell his English tobacco smoking scientists about. I am not aware of any such
study, and would certainly be most interested learn of those which may have been done

I have written in these pages before about one particularly controversial meta-study of
outcome research. Miller, Duncan and Hubble (1997) examined outcome research from
different therapy models, and concluded that the therapeutic model made no difference to the
number of patients who were successfully treated! Rather, they found that the differences
which made differences overall were the therapeutic relationship, the client, hope,
expectation and chance events. I asked then, and I ask again, whether the NLP community is
interested in responding to these findings. I have seen no response to date.

Empirical quantitative research

This method seeks to compare the NLP way of doing things with something else to obtain
comparative data. I have already mentioned the difficulty of arriving at a simple description
of what the NLP way of doing things. An extension of outcome research might be possible,
but the scientific community may still be sceptical if what's done is not well documented.

There is a kind of experiment I've seen suggested by well-meaning but ignorant scientists,
along the lines of 'Do a V/K dissociation on 50 people with phobias and we'll find out
whether NLP works'. This ignores, of course, the possibility that the client may be producing
their phobia by another means, and so would not be a good test even of that, let alone the
250

whole canon of NLP. Indeed the richness and complexity of NLP would make the design of
the agreed process difficult, if not impossible, and probably futile too.

'But NLP is about subjective experience?'

There are those who may be thinking at this point that NLP states that it is the study of the
structure of subjective experience, and therefore cannot be examined using fuddy-duddy old
'objective' science. I think that the view of science as intersubjective gives a useful new angle.
If different people find similar things happen to their subjective experience (insofar as they
can be compared), then that's potentially scientific knowledge.

Also, if NLP is to help people be better communicators, therapists, influencers and so on,
there must be some kind of impact on an external level. The basic way we interact with others
is by doing things - talking, moving around, gesturing, wearing things - which the other
person can sense and respond to. Such changes may start at in internal subjective level, but
must then show themselves to make an interactional difference to the world. If we want the
world to respond differently to us, we must surely make some kind of change to the world.
The differences may be subtle, small, even unconscious - but they must be there for a
difference to be made. And as soon as an external difference is made, then we are out of the
solely subjective world and into the intersubjective one.

NLP and science - a relationship

Hollander concludes his piece with recommendations to improve the relationship between
NLP and science. His first four recommendations were for scientists. I can think of braver
places than NLP World to publish finger-wagging criticisms of the world scientific
community, and so will hold my ideas for scientists until my next paper in Nature. The
following ideas may appeal to NLPW readers, be you scientists or not.

1. The view of science as an intersubjective process gives an interesting way of viewing

'knowledge' which may be helpful to NLPers. After all, if NLP is totally subjective, why the
need for journals, trainings or conferences?

2. I think that there are various ways in which NLP could be researched 'scientifically'. These
include outcome research as a possible first step.

3. The extent to which the NLP community is interested in collaborating with scientists
seems questionable. The field has been around for nearly 25 years now, with little in the way
of scientific activity to be seen. Indeed, all the papers listed over the years of NLP Abstracts
have been from 'NLP' journals (Rapport, Anchor Point etc). There is no sign that the NLP
community wants or welcomes independent observation or examination. This is a choice that
we can all make.

4. If we all choose not to pursue a scientific line, then scientists will most likely continue to
suck their teeth and question what we do. We can choose to live with that or not.

5. Anyone who states in response to some negative finding that NLP is the study of the
structure of subjective experience and so has nothing to say about the outside world is
engaging in sophistry, and might consider prefacing their work by announcing 'This may not
help you to change the way you respond to the world'.
251

Finally, Hollander says that scientists have never proved that the scientific method will lead,
immediately or eventually, to better results than non-scientific methods. Is there a
generalisation here? To which fields of endeavour is Hollander referring? Taking a few fields
at random, the scientific method has given us antiseptics, electricity and the computer on
which I write this. Please send examples of the results of non-scientific methods, by foot, to
the NLP World offices.

References

Berg IK and De Jong P, Interviewing for Solutions, Brooks/Cole (1998)

De Shazer S, Clues: Investigating Solutions in Brief Therapy, WW Norton (1988)

Gingerich WJ and Eisengart S, paper prepared for presentation to the International Family
Therapy Association, Akron Ohio, April 15 1999. More information at www.gingerich.net

Hancox J and Bass A, NLP World 2, No 3 pp 43 - 52 (1995)

Hollander J, NLP World Vol 6, No 3, pp 45 - 75 (1999)

McKergow M, Dinosaur or dolphin, NLP World 5, No 2 pp 63 - 65 (1998)

Miller S, Duncan B and Hubble M, Escape from Babel, WW Norton (1997)

Simon F, My Psychosis, My Bicycle and I, Aronson (1996)

Ziman J, Reliable Knowledge, Cambridge University Press (1978)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersubjective_verifiability

Intersubjective verifiability is the capacity of a concept to be readily and accurately

communicated between different individuals ("intersubjectively"), and to be reproduced
under varying circumstances for the purposes of verification. It is a core principle of
empirical, scientific investigation.[1][2][3]

Although there are areas of belief that do not consistently employ intersubjective verifiability
(e.g., many religious claims), intersubjective verifiability is a near-universal way of
arbitrating truth claims used by people everywhere. In its basic form, it can be found in
colloquial expressions, e.g., "I'm from Missouri. Show me!" or "Seeing is believing." The
scientific principle of replication of findings by investigators other than those that first
reported the phenomenon is simply a more highly structured form of the universal principle
of intersubjective verifiability.

Contents

 1 Subjective experience
 2 Congruence and incongruence
 3 Intersubjective verifiability versus belief based on faith
 4 See also
 5 Notes and references
252

BEWARE OF –ISMS IN YOUR THINKING

http://ismbook.com/amoralism.html

The Ism Book: List of Isms

absolutism
abstractionism
accidentalism
aestheticism
agnosticism
altruism
amoralism
anarchism
animism
anthropocentrism
antinomianism
apriorism
Aristotelianism
asceticism
ascriptivism
associationalism
atheism
atomism
authoritarianism
automatism
behaviorism
Buddhism
capitalism
Cartesianism
Christianity
classicism
cognitivism
coherentism
collectivism
communalism
communism
communitarianism
compatibilism
conceptualism
concretism
Confucianism
consequentialism
conservatism
constructivism
contextualism
conventionalism
creationism
253

cynicism
Darwinism
deconstructionism
deism
deontologism
descriptivism
determinism
dialectical materialism
dogmatism
dualism
dynamism
eclecticism
egalitarianism
egoism
emotionalism
emotivism
empiricism
environmentalism
Epicureanism
essentialism
eternalism
ethnocentrism
eudaimonism
existentialism
experimentalism
expressionism
fallibilism
falsificationism
fascism
fatalism
feminism
fideism
formalism
foundationalism
Freudianism
functionalism
gnosticism
hedonism
Hegelianism
henotheism
Hinduism
historical determinism
historicism
holism
humanism
hylozoism
idealism
illusionism
immaterialism
immoralism
254

incompatibilism
indeterminism
individualism
instrumentalism
intellectualism
intentionalism
interactionism
interpretivism
intuitionism
irrationalism
Islam
ism
Judaism
Kantianism
legalism
liberalism
libertarianism
logical positivism
logicism
Manicheism
Marxism
materialism
mechanism
meliorism
mentalism
modernism
monism
monotheism
mysticism
naturalism
necessitarianism
neo-Aristotelianism
neo-Confucianism
neo-Platonism
nihilism
nominalism
objectivism
occasionalism
operationalism
optimism
organicism
pacifism
panpsychism
pantheism
particularism
perfectionism
personalism
perspectivism
pessimism
phenomenalism
255

physicalism
Platonism
pluralism
polylogism
polytheism
positivism
postmodernism
pragmatism
prescriptivism
probabilism
progressivism
psychologism
Pyrrhonism
Pythagoreanism
rationalism
realism
reductionism
relativism
representationalism
romanticism
scholasticism
scientism
secularism
sensationalism
sensualism
situationalism
skepticism
Social Darwinism
socialism
Socraticism
solipsism
spiritualism
statism
Stoicism
structuralism
subjectivism
symbolism
syncretism
Taoism
teleologism
theism
Thomism
totalitarianism
transcendentalism
universalism
utilitarianism
utopianism
verificationism
vitalism
256

voluntarism
Zoroastrianism

The Ism Book by Peter Saint-Andre

No Rights Reserved

http://interrupting-oppression.tumblr.com/post/102351553722/list-of-isms

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/-ism

ism is a suffix in many English words, originally derived from the Ancient Greek suffix -
ισμός (-ismós), reaching English through the Latin -ismus, and the French -isme.[1] It is often
used in philosophy to define specific ideologies, and, as such, at times it is used as a noun
when referring to a broad range of ideologies in a general sense.[2] The suffix 'ism' qua ism is
neutral and therefore bears no connotations associated with any of the many ideologies it has
been appended to; such determinations can only be informed by public opinion regarding
specific ideologies.

Contents

 1 History
 2 See also
 3 References
 4 Further reading

History

The first recorded usage of the suffix ism as a separate word in its own right was in 1680. By
the nineteenth century it was being used by Thomas Carlyle to signify a pre-packaged
ideology. It was later used in this sense by such writers as Julian Huxley and George Bernard
Shaw. In the United States of the mid-nineteenth century, the phrase "the isms" was used as a
collective derogatory term to lump together the radical social reform movements of the day
(such as slavery abolitionism, feminism, alcohol prohibitionism, Fourierism, pacifism, early
socialism, etc.) and various spiritual or religious movements considered non-mainstream by
the standards of the time (such as Transcendentalism, spiritualism or "spirit rapping",
Mormonism, the Oneida movement often accused of "free love", etc.). Southerners often
prided themselves on the American South being free from all of these pernicious "Isms"
(except for alcohol temperance campaigning, which was compatible with a traditional
Protestant focus on strict individual morality). So on September 5 and 9, 1856, the Examiner
newspaper of Richmond, Virginia ran editorials on "Our Enemies, the Isms and their
Purposes", while in 1858 "Parson" Brownlow called for a "Missionary Society of the South,
for the Conversion of the Freedom Shriekers, Spiritualists, Free-lovers, Fourierites, and
Infidel Reformers of the North" (see The Freedom-of-thought Struggle in the Old South by
Clement Eaton). In the present day, it appears in the title of a standard survey of political
thought, Today's Isms by William Ebenstein, first published in the 1950s, and now in its 11th
edition.

Merriam-Webster Dictionary declared in December 2015, this word -ism to be the Word of
the Year. A suffix is the Word of the Year because a small group of words that share this
257

three-letter ending triggered both high volume and significant year-over-year increase in
lookups at Merriam-Webster.com. Taken together, these seven words represent millions of
individual dictionary lookups.[3]

See also

For examples of the use of -ism as a suffix:

 List of philosophies
 Glossary of philosophy
 List of political ideologies
 List of art movements

References

1.

 "-ism". Oxford English Dictionary online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2014. (subscription
required)
  "ism n.". Oxford English Dictionary online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2014. (subscription
required)

3.  "The Word of the Year is: -ism | Merriam-Webster".

Further reading
 Today's Isms: Socialism, Capitalism, Fascism, Communism, Libertarianism by Alan Ebenstein,
William Ebenstein and Edwin Fogelman (11th ed, Pearson, 1999, ISBN 978-0130257147)

 Isms and Ologies: 453 Difficult Doctrines You've Always Pretended to Understand by Arthur
Goldwag (Quercus, 2007, ISBN 978-1847241764) ranges from Abolitionism to Zoroastrianism.

 Isms: Understanding Art by Stephen Little (A & C Black, 2004, ISBN 978-0713670110), one of a
series of similar titles including ... Architecture, ... Modern Art, ... Fashion and ... Religions.

http://ismbook.com/
http://phrontistery.info/isms.html
Philosophical Isms

Here are 234 different isms, each representing a philosophical, political or moral doctrine or
a belief system. In selecting terms for the list, I have deliberately avoided any word which
apply ism to a personal name, so that Marxism doesn't count although it is otherwise an ideal
candidate for the list. I also excluded isms which do not refer to a specific belief system,
such as impressionism (an artistic movement) or alcoholism (a disease). Despite these
omissions, enough remain to leave an ism in every pot, including beliefs about proper
government, God, and the nature of existence itself. Of the terms on the list that are of a
religious nature, most are Christian, which is not unexpected, but I'm open to adding isms
from other world religions.
http://www.morewords.com/contains/isms/
258

http://www.beliefnet.com/columnists/religion101/2012/07/ten-essential-
isms-part-one.html
259

COGNITIVE BIASES

Beware of and identify bias in your thinking.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_bias

A cognitive bias refers to the systematic pattern of deviation from norm or rationality in
judgment, whereby inferences about other people and situations may be drawn in an illogical
fashion.[1] Individuals create their own "subjective social reality" from their perception of the
input. An individual's construction of social reality, not the objective input, may dictate their
behaviour in the social world.[2] Thus, cognitive biases may sometimes lead to perceptual
distortion, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation, or what is broadly called
irrationality.[3][4][5]

Some cognitive biases are presumably adaptive. Cognitive biases may lead to more effective
actions in a given context.[6] Furthermore, cognitive biases enable faster decisions when
timeliness is more valuable than accuracy, as illustrated in heuristics.[7] Other cognitive biases
are a "by-product" of human processing limitations,[8] resulting from a lack of appropriate
mental mechanisms (bounded rationality), or simply from a limited capacity for information
processing.[9][10]

A continually evolving list of cognitive biases has been identified over the last six decades of
research on human judgment and decision-making in cognitive science, social psychology,
and behavioral economics. Kahneman and Tversky (1996) argue that cognitive biases have
efficient practical implications for areas including clinical judgment, entrepreneurship,
finance, and management.[11][12]

Contents

 1 Overview
 2 Types
o 2.1 List
 3 Practical significance
 4 Reducing
 5 Criticisms
 6 See also
 7 References
 8 Further reading
 9 External links

Overview

Bias arises from various processes that are sometimes difficult to distinguish. These include

 information-processing shortcuts (heuristics)[13]

 noisy information processing (distortions in the process of storage in and retrieval from
memory)[14]
 the brain's limited information processing capacity[15]
260

 emotional and moral motivations[16]

 social influence[17]

The notion of cognitive biases was introduced by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in
1972[18] and grew out of their experience of people's innumeracy, or inability to reason
intuitively with the greater orders of magnitude. Tversky, Kahneman and colleagues
demonstrated several replicable ways in which human judgments and decisions differ from
rational choice theory. Tversky and Kahneman explained human differences in judgement
and decision making in terms of heuristics. Heuristics involve mental shortcuts which provide
swift estimates about the possibility of uncertain occurrences (Baumeister & Bushman, 2010,
p. 141). Heuristics are simple for the brain to compute but sometimes introduce "severe and
systematic errors" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1125).[7]

For example, the representativeness heuristic is defined as the tendency to "judge the
frequency or likelihood" of an occurrence by the extent of which the event "resembles the
typical case" (Baumeister & Bushman, 2010, p. 141). The "Linda Problem" illustrates the
representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983[19]). Participants were given a
description of "Linda" that suggests Linda might well be a feminist (e.g., she is said to be
concerned about discrimination and social justice issues). They were then asked whether they
thought Linda was more likely to be a "(a) bank teller" or a "(b) bank teller and active in the
feminist movement". A majority chose answer (b). This error (mathematically, answer (b)
cannot be more likely than answer (a)) is an example of the "conjunction fallacy"; Tversky
and Kahneman argued that respondents chose (b) because it seemed more "representative" or
typical of persons who might fit the description of Linda. The representativeness heuristic
may lead to errors such as activating stereotypes and inaccurate judgements of others
(Haselton et al., 2005, p. 726).

Alternatively, critics of Kahneman and Tversky such as Gerd Gigerenzer argue that heuristics
should not lead us to conceive of human thinking as riddled with irrational cognitive biases,
but rather to conceive rationality as an adaptive tool that is not identical to the rules of formal
logic or the probability calculus.[20] Nevertheless, experiments such as the "Linda problem"
grew into the heuristics and biases research program which spread beyond academic
psychology into other disciplines including medicine and political science.

Types

Biases can be distinguished on a number of dimensions. For example,

 there are biases specific to groups (such as the risky shift) as well as biases at the individual
level.
 Some biases affect decision-making, where the desirability of options has to be considered
(e.g., sunk costs fallacy).
 Others such as illusory correlation affect judgment of how likely something is, or of whether
one thing is the cause of another.
 A distinctive class of biases affect memory,[21] such as consistency bias (remembering one's
past attitudes and behavior as more similar to one's present attitudes).

Some biases reflect a subject's motivation,[22] for example, the desire for a positive self-image
leading to egocentric bias[23] and the avoidance of unpleasant cognitive dissonance. Other
biases are due to the particular way the brain perceives, forms memories and makes
261

judgments. This distinction is sometimes described as "hot cognition" versus "cold

cognition", as motivated reasoning can involve a state of arousal.

Among the "cold" biases,

 some are due to ignoring relevant information (e.g. neglect of probability)

 some involve a decision or judgement being affected by irrelevant information (for example
the framing effect where the same problem receives different responses depending on how
it is described; or the distinction bias where choices presented together have different
outcomes than those presented separately)
 others give excessive weight to an unimportant but salient feature of the problem (e.g.,
anchoring)

The fact that some biases reflect motivation, and in particular the motivation to have positive
attitudes to oneself[23] accounts for the fact that many biases are self-serving or self-directed
(e.g. illusion of asymmetric insight, self-serving bias). There are also biases in how subjects
evaluate in-groups or out-groups; evaluating in-groups as more diverse and "better" in many
respects, even when those groups are arbitrarily-defined (ingroup bias, outgroup homogeneity
bias).

Some cognitive biases belong to the subgroup of attentional biases which refer to the paying
of increased attention to certain stimuli. It has been shown, for example, that people addicted
to alcohol and other drugs pay more attention to drug-related stimuli. Common psychological
tests to measure those biases are the Stroop task[24][25] and the dot probe task.

List

Main article: List of cognitive biases

The following is a list of the more commonly studied cognitive biases:

Name Description

Also known as the correspondence bias (Baumeister & Bushman, 2010) is the
tendency for people to over-emphasize personality-based explanations for
behaviours observed in others. At the same time, individuals under-emphasize the
Fundamental
role and power of situational influences on the same behaviour. Jones and Harris’
attribution error
(1967)[26] classic study illustrates the FAE. Despite being made aware that the
(FAE)
target’s speech direction (pro-Castro/anti-Castro) was assigned to the writer,
participants ignored the situational pressures and attributed pro-Castro attitudes
to the writer when the speech represented such attitudes.

The tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one's
preconceptions. In addition, individuals may discredit information that does not
Confirmation
support their views.[27] The confirmation bias is related to the concept of cognitive
bias
dissonance. Whereby, individuals may reduce inconsistency by searching for
information which re-confirms their views (Jermias, 2001, p. 146).[28]

Self-serving bias The tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures. It may also
manifest itself as a tendency for people to evaluate ambiguous information in a
262

way beneficial to their interests.

When one's evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by their

Belief bias
belief in the truth or falsity of the conclusion.

Framing Using a too-narrow approach and description of the situation or issue.

Sometimes called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect, is the inclination to see past

Hindsight bias
events as being predictable.

A 2012 Psychological Bulletin article suggests that at least 8 seemingly unrelated biases can
be produced by the same information-theoretic generative mechanism.[14] It is shown that
noisy deviations in the memory-based information processes that convert objective evidence
(observations) into subjective estimates (decisions) can produce regressive conservatism, the
belief revision (Bayesian conservatism), illusory correlations, illusory superiority (better-
than-average effect) and worse-than-average effect, subadditivity effect, exaggerated
expectation, overconfidence, and the hard–easy effect.

Practical significance
Further information: Confirmation bias § Consequences

Many social institutions rely on individuals to make rational judgments.

The securities regulation regime largely assumes that all investors act as perfectly rational
persons. In truth, actual investors face cognitive limitations from biases, heuristics, and
framing effects.

A fair jury trial, for example, requires that the jury ignore irrelevant features of the case,
weigh the relevant features appropriately, consider different possibilities open-mindedly and
resist fallacies such as appeal to emotion. The various biases demonstrated in these
psychological experiments suggest that people will frequently fail to do all these things.[29]
However, they fail to do so in systematic, directional ways that are predictable.[5]

Cognitive biases are also related to the persistence of superstition, to large social issues such
as prejudice, and they also work as a hindrance in the acceptance of scientific non-intuitive
knowledge by the public.[30]

However, in some academic disciplines, the study of bias is very popular. For instance, bias
is a wide spread phenomenon and well studied, because most decisions that concern the
minds and hearts of entrepreneurs are computationally intractable[12]

Reducing

Similar to Gigerenzer (1996),[31] Haselton et al. (2005) state the content and direction of
cognitive biases are not "arbitrary" (p. 730).[8] Moreover, cognitive biases can be controlled.
Debiasing is a technique which aims to decrease biases by encouraging individuals to use
controlled processing compared to automatic processing (Baumeister & Bushman, 2010,
p. 155).[32] In relation to reducing the FAE, monetary incentives[33] and informing participants
they will be held accountable for their attributions[34] have been linked to the increase of
263

accurate attributions. Training has also shown to reduce cognitive bias. Morewedge and
colleagues (2015) found that research participants exposed to one-shot training interventions,
such as educational videos and debiasing games that taught mitigating strategies, exhibited
significant reductions in their commission of six cognitive biases immediately and up to 3
months later.[35]

Cognitive bias modification refers to the process of modifying cognitive biases in healthy
people and also refers to a growing area of psychological (non-pharmaceutical) therapies for
anxiety, depression and addiction called cognitive bias modification therapy (CBMT). CBMT
is sub-group of therapies within a growing area of psychological therapies based on
modifying cognitive processes with or without accompanying medication and talk therapy,
sometimes referred to as applied cognitive processing therapies (ACPT). Although cognitive
bias modification can refer to modifying cognitive processes in healthy individuals, CBMT is
a growing area of evidence-based psychological therapy, in which cognitive processes are
modified to relieve suffering[36][37] from serious depression,[38] anxiety,[39] and addiction.[40]
CBMT techniques are technology assisted therapies that are delivered via a computer with or
without clinician support. CBM combines evidence and theory from the cognitive model of
anxiety,[41] cognitive neuroscience,[42] and attentional models.[43]

Criticisms

There are criticisms against theories of cognitive biases based on the fact that both sides in a
debate often claim each other's thoughts to be in human nature and the result of cognitive
bias, while claiming their own viewpoint as being the correct way to "overcome" cognitive
bias. This is not due simply to debate misconduct but is a more fundamental problem that
stems from psychology's making up of multiple opposed cognitive bias theories that can be
non-falsifiably used to explain away any viewpoint.[44][45]

See also

 Psychology portal

 Thinking portal

 Cognitive bias mitigation

 Cognitive bias modification
 Cognitive dissonance
 Cognitive distortion
 Cognitive psychology
 Cognitive traps for intelligence analysis
 Critical thinking
 Cultural cognition
 Emotional bias
 Evolutionary psychology
 Expectation bias
 Fallacy
 Jumping to conclusions
 List of cognitive biases
 Theory-ladenness
 Prejudice
264

 Rationality

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases

Cognitive biases are tendencies to think in certain ways that can lead to systematic deviations
from a standard of rationality or good judgment, and are often studied in psychology and
behavioral economics.

Although the reality of these biases is confirmed by replicable research, there are often
controversies about how to classify these biases or how to explain them.[1] Some are effects
of information-processing rules (i.e., mental shortcuts), called heuristics, that the brain uses
to produce decisions or judgments. Such effects are called cognitive biases.[2][3] Biases have a
variety of forms and appear as cognitive ("cold") bias, such as mental noise,[4] or motivational
("hot") bias, such as when beliefs are distorted by wishful thinking. Both effects can be
present at the same time.[5][6]

There are also controversies over some of these biases as to whether they count as useless or
irrational, or whether they result in useful attitudes or behavior. For example, when getting to
know others, people tend to ask leading questions which seem biased towards confirming
their assumptions about the person. However, this kind of confirmation bias has also been
argued to be an example of social skill: a way to establish a connection with the other
person.[7]

Although this research overwhelmingly involves human subjects, some findings that
demonstrate bias have been found in non-human animals as well. For example, hyperbolic
discounting has been observed in rats, pigeons, and monkeys.[8]

Contents

 1 Decision-making, belief, and behavioral biases

 2 Social biases
 3 Memory errors and biases
 4 Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases
 5 Individual differences in decision making biases
 6 Debiasing
 7 See also
 8 Notes
 9 References

Decision-making, belief, and behavioral biases

Many of these biases affect belief formation, business and economic decisions, and human
behavior in general. They arise as a replicable result to a specific condition. When confronted
with a specific situation, the deviation from what is normally expected can be characterized
by:

Name Description
265

The tendency to avoid options for which missing information makes the
Ambiguity effect
probability seem "unknown".[9]

The tendency to rely too heavily, or "anchor", on one trait or piece of

Anchoring or focalism information when making decisions (usually the first piece of information
acquired on that subject)[10][11]

Anthropomorphism or The tendency to characterize animals, objects, and abstract concepts as

personification possessing human-like traits, emotions, and intentions.[12]

The tendency of our perception to be affected by our recurring

Attentional bias
thoughts.[13]

The tendency to depend excessively on automated systems which can lead

Automation bias
to erroneous automated information overriding correct decisions.[14]

The tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with greater

Availability heuristic "availability" in memory, which can be influenced by how recent the
memories are or how unusual or emotionally charged they may be.[15]

A self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more

Availability cascade plausibility through its increasing repetition in public discourse (or "repeat
something long enough and it will become true").[16]

The reaction to disconfirming evidence by strengthening one's previous

Backfire effect
beliefs.[17] cf. Continued influence effect.

The tendency to do (or believe) things because many other people do (or
Bandwagon effect
believe) the same. Related to groupthink and herd behavior.[18]

The tendency to ignore base rate information (generic, general

Base rate fallacy or Base
information) and focus on specific information (information only pertaining
rate neglect
to a certain case).[19]

An effect where someone's evaluation of the logical strength of an

Belief bias
argument is biased by the believability of the conclusion.[20]

A person who has performed a favor for someone is more likely to do

Ben Franklin effect another favor for that person than they would be if they had received a
favor from that person.

The tendency to misinterpret statistical experiments involving conditional

Berkson's paradox
probabilities.

The tendency to see oneself as less biased than other people, or to be able
Bias blind spot
to identify more cognitive biases in others than in oneself.[21]

The tendency for people to appear more attractive in a group than in

Cheerleader effect
isolation.[22]

Choice-supportive bias The tendency to remember one's choices as better than they actually
266

were.[23]

The tendency to overestimate the importance of small runs, streaks, or

Clustering illusion clusters in large samples of random data (that is, seeing phantom
patterns).[11]

The tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember information

Confirmation bias
in a way that confirms one's preconceptions.[24]

The tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, instead

Congruence bias
of testing possible alternative hypotheses.[11]

The tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than
Conjunction fallacy
general ones.[25]

Conservatism (belief The tendency to revise one's belief insufficiently when presented with new
revision) evidence.[4][26][27]

The tendency to believe previously learned misinformation even after it

Continued influence
has been corrected. Misinformation can still influence inferences one
effect
generates after a correction has occurred.[28] cf. Backfire effect

The enhancement or reduction of a certain perception's stimuli when

Contrast effect
compared with a recently observed, contrasting object.[29]

The tendency to give an opinion that is more socially correct than one's
Courtesy bias
true opinion, so as to avoid offending anyone.[30]

When better-informed people find it extremely difficult to think about

Curse of knowledge
problems from the perspective of lesser-informed people.[31]

The belief that a society or institution is tending towards decline.

Declinism Particularly, it is the predisposition to view the past favourably (rosy
retrospection) and future negatively.[32]

Preferences for either option A or B change in favor of option B when

Decoy effect
option C is presented, which is similar to option B but in no way better.

The tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small

Denomination effect
amounts (e.g., coins) rather than large amounts (e.g., bills).[33]

The tendency to sell an asset that has accumulated in value and resist
Disposition effect
selling an asset that has declined in value.

The tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when evaluating

Distinction bias
them simultaneously than when evaluating them separately.[34]

The tendency for unskilled individuals to overestimate their own ability

Dunning–Kruger effect
and the tendency for experts to underestimate their own ability.[35]

Duration neglect The neglect of the duration of an episode in determining its value
267

The tendency to underestimate the influence or strength of feelings, in

Empathy gap
either oneself or others.

The tendency for people to demand much more to give up an object than
Endowment effect
they would be willing to pay to acquire it.[36]

Based on the estimates, real-world evidence turns out to be less extreme

Exaggerated expectation than our expectations (conditionally inverse of the conservatism
bias).[unreliable source?][4][37]

The tendency for experimenters to believe, certify, and publish data that
Experimenter's or agree with their expectations for the outcome of an experiment, and to
expectation bias disbelieve, discard, or downgrade the corresponding weightings for data
that appear to conflict with those expectations.[38]

Focusing effect The tendency to place too much importance on one aspect of an event.[39]

The observation that individuals will give high accuracy ratings to

descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically
Forer effect or Barnum for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide
effect range of people. This effect can provide a partial explanation for the
widespread acceptance of some beliefs and practices, such as astrology,
fortune telling, graphology, and some types of personality tests.

Drawing different conclusions from the same information, depending on

Framing effect
how that information is presented

The illusion in which a word, a name, or other thing that has recently come
to one's attention suddenly seems to appear with improbable frequency
shortly afterwards (not to be confused with the recency illusion or
Frequency illusion
selection bias).[40] This illusion may explain some examples of the Baader-
Meinhof Phenomenon, when someone repeatedly notices a newly learned
word or phrase shortly after learning it.

Functional fixedness Limits a person to using an object only in the way it is traditionally used.

The tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events,
when in reality they are unchanged. The fallacy arises from an erroneous
Gambler's fallacy conceptualization of the law of large numbers. For example, "I've flipped
heads with this coin five times consecutively, so the chance of tails coming
out on the sixth flip is much greater than heads."

Based on a specific level of task difficulty, the confidence in judgments is

Hard–easy effect
too conservative and not extreme enough[4][41][42][43]

Sometimes called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect, the tendency to see past

Hindsight bias
events as being predictable[44] at the time those events happened.

Hot-hand fallacy The "hot-hand fallacy" (also known as the "hot hand phenomenon" or "hot
hand") is the fallacious belief that a person who has experienced success
268

with a random event has a greater chance of further success in additional

attempts.

Discounting is the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for

more immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs. Hyperbolic discounting
leads to choices that are inconsistent over time – people make choices
Hyperbolic discounting
today that their future selves would prefer not to have made, despite using
the same reasoning.[45] Also known as current moment bias, present-bias,
and related to Dynamic inconsistency.

The tendency to respond more strongly to a single identified person at risk

Identifiable victim effect
than to a large group of people at risk.[46]

The tendency for people to place a disproportionately high value on

IKEA effect objects that they partially assembled themselves, such as furniture from
IKEA, regardless of the quality of the end result.

The tendency to overestimate one's degree of influence over other

Illusion of control
external events.[47]

Belief that furtherly acquired information generates additional relevant

Illusion of validity
data for predictions, even when it evidently does not.[48]

Illusory correlation Inaccurately perceiving a relationship between two unrelated events.[49][50]

A tendency to believe that a statement is true if it is easier to process, or if

Illusory truth effect it has been stated multiple times, regardless of its actual veracity. These
are specific cases of truthiness.

The tendency to overestimate the length or the intensity of the impact of

Impact bias
future feeling states.[51]

Information bias The tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action.[52]

Insensitivity to sample
The tendency to under-expect variation in small samples.
size

The phenomenon where people justify increased investment in a decision,

based on the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence
Irrational escalation
suggesting that the decision was probably wrong. Also known as the sunk
cost fallacy.

Law of the instrument "If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail."

The tendency to prefer a smaller set to a larger set judged separately, but
Less-is-better effect
not jointly.

An apparently statistically significant observation may have actually arisen

Look-elsewhere effect
by chance because of the size of the parameter space to be searched.

Loss aversion The disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated
269

with acquiring it.[53] (see also Sunk cost effects and endowment effect).

The tendency to express undue liking for things merely because of

Mere exposure effect
familiarity with them.[54]

The tendency to concentrate on the nominal value (face value) of money

Money illusion
rather than its value in terms of purchasing power.[55]

The tendency of a track record of non-prejudice to increase subsequent

Moral credential effect
prejudice.

Psychological phenomenon by which humans have a greater recall of

Negativity bias or unpleasant memories compared with positive memories.[56][57] (see also
Negativity effect actor-observer bias, group attribution error, positivity effect, and
negativity effect).[58]

The tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision

Neglect of probability
under uncertainty.[59]

The refusal to plan for, or react to, a disaster which has never happened
Normalcy bias
before.

Aversion to contact with or use of products, research, standards, or

Not invented here
knowledge developed outside a group. Related to IKEA effect.

When a researcher expects a given result and therefore unconsciously

Observer-expectancy
manipulates an experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it (see
effect
also subject-expectancy effect).

The tendency to judge harmful actions as worse, or less moral, than

Omission bias
equally harmful omissions (inactions).[60]

The tendency to be over-optimistic, overestimating favorable and pleasing

Optimism bias outcomes (see also wishful thinking, valence effect, positive outcome
bias).[61][62]

Ostrich effect Ignoring an obvious (negative) situation.

The tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of based

Outcome bias
on the quality of the decision at the time it was made.

Excessive confidence in one's own answers to questions. For example, for

Overconfidence effect certain types of questions, answers that people rate as "99% certain" turn
out to be wrong 40% of the time.[4][63][64][65]

A vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) is perceived as

significant, e.g., seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, the man in the
Pareidolia
moon, and hearing non-existent hidden messages on records played in
reverse.

Pessimism bias The tendency for some people, especially those suffering from depression,
270

to overestimate the likelihood of negative things happening to them.

Planning fallacy The tendency to underestimate task-completion times.[51]

Post-purchase The tendency to persuade oneself through rational argument that a

rationalization purchase was good value.

The tendency to have an excessive optimism towards an invention or

Pro-innovation bias innovation's usefulness throughout society, while often failing to identify
its limitations and weaknesses.

The tendency to overestimate how much our future selves share one's
Projection bias current preferences, thoughts and values, thus leading to sub-optimal
choices.[66][67][57]

The tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is

Pseudocertainty effect
positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes.[68]

The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a

Reactance need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice
(see also Reverse psychology).

Devaluing proposals only because they purportedly originated with an

Reactive devaluation
adversary.

The illusion that a word or language usage is a recent innovation when it is

Recency illusion
in fact long-established (see also frequency illusion).

A certain state of mind wherein high values and high likelihoods are
Regressive bias overestimated while low values and low likelihoods are
underestimated.[4][69][70][unreliable source?]

The tendency to overestimate one's ability to show restraint in the face of

Restraint bias
temptation.

Rhyming statements are perceived as more truthful. A famous example

Rhyme as reason effect being used in the O.J Simpson trial with the defense's use of the phrase "If
the gloves don't fit, then you must acquit."

Risk compensation /
The tendency to take greater risks when perceived safety increases.
Peltzman effect

Selective perception The tendency for expectations to affect perception.

Semmelweis reflex The tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts a paradigm.[27]

Sexual overperception
The tendency to over-/underestimate sexual interest of another person in
bias / sexual
oneself.
underperception bias

Social comparison bias The tendency, when making hiring decisions, to favour potential
271

candidates who don't compete with one's own particular strengths.[71]

The tendency to over-report socially desirable characteristics or behaviours

Social desirability bias in oneself and under-report socially undesirable characteristics or
behaviours.[72]

The tendency to like things to stay relatively the same (see also loss
Status quo bias
aversion, endowment effect, and system justification).[73][74]

Expecting a member of a group to have certain characteristics without

Stereotyping
having actual information about that individual.

The tendency to judge probability of the whole to be less than the

Subadditivity effect
probabilities of the parts.[75]

Perception that something is true if a subject's belief demands it to be

Subjective validation
true. Also assigns perceived connections between coincidences.

Concentrating on the people or things that "survived" some process and

Survivorship bias inadvertently overlooking those that didn't because of their lack of
visibility.

Underestimations of the time that could be saved (or lost) when increasing
(or decreasing) from a relatively low speed and overestimations of the time
Time-saving bias
that could be saved (or lost) when increasing (or decreasing) from a
relatively high speed.

Belief that mass communicated media messages have a greater effect on

Third-person effect
others than on themselves.

The tendency to give disproportionate weight to trivial issues. Also known

as bikeshedding, this bias explains why an organization may avoid
Triviality / Parkinson's
specialized or complex subjects, such as the design of a nuclear reactor,
Law of
and instead focus on something easy to grasp or rewarding to the average
participant, such as the design of an adjacent bike shed.[76]

The tendency to want to finish a given unit of a task or an item. Strong

Unit bias
effects on the consumption of food in particular.[77]

Weber–Fechner law Difficulty in comparing small differences in large quantities.

Well travelled road Underestimation of the duration taken to traverse oft-traveled routes and
effect overestimation of the duration taken to traverse less familiar routes.

Preference for reducing a small risk to zero over a greater reduction in a

Zero-risk bias
larger risk.

A bias whereby a situation is perceived to be like a zero-sum game (i.e.,

Zero-sum bias
one person gains at the expense of another).
272

Social biases

Most of these biases are labeled as attributional biases.

Name Description

The tendency for explanations of other individuals' behaviors to

overemphasize the influence of their personality and underemphasize the
influence of their situation (see also Fundamental attribution error), and
Actor–observer bias
for explanations of one's own behaviors to do the opposite (that is, to
overemphasize the influence of our situation and underemphasize the
influence of our own personality).

The tendency to attribute greater accuracy to the opinion of an authority

Authority bias
figure (unrelated to its content) and be more influenced by that opinion.[78]

Defensive attribution Attributing more blame to a harm-doer as the outcome becomes more
hypothesis severe or as personal or situational similarity to the victim increases.

Occurs when people claim more responsibility for themselves for the
Egocentric bias
results of a joint action than an outside observer would credit them with.

An exception to the fundamental attribution error, when people view

Extrinsic incentives bias others as having (situational) extrinsic motivations and (dispositional)
intrinsic motivations for oneself

The tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree
False consensus effect
with them.[79]

The tendency to give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their

Forer effect (aka personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in
Barnum effect) fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. For
example, horoscopes.

The tendency for people to over-emphasize personality-based explanations

for behaviors observed in others while under-emphasizing the role and
Fundamental attribution
power of situational influences on the same behavior[57] (see also actor-
error
observer bias, group attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity
effect).[58]

The biased belief that the characteristics of an individual group member

are reflective of the group as a whole or the tendency to assume that
Group attribution error
group decision outcomes reflect the preferences of group members, even
when information is available that clearly suggests otherwise.

The tendency for a person's positive or negative traits to "spill over" from
Halo effect one personality area to another in others' perceptions of them (see also
physical attractiveness stereotype).[80]

Illusion of asymmetric People perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers'
273

insight knowledge of them.[81]

Illusion of external When people view self-generated preferences as instead being caused by
agency insightful, effective and benevolent agents

People overestimate others' ability to know them, and they also

Illusion of transparency
overestimate their ability to know others.

Overestimating one's desirable qualities, and underestimating undesirable

Illusory superiority qualities, relative to other people. (Also known as "Lake Wobegon effect",
"better-than-average effect", or "superiority bias".)[82]

The tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others they

Ingroup bias
perceive to be members of their own groups.

The tendency for people to want to believe that the world is fundamentally
Just-world hypothesis just, causing them to rationalize an otherwise inexplicable injustice as
deserved by the victim(s).

The tendency for people to ascribe greater or lesser moral standing based
Moral luck
on the outcome of an event.

Naïve cynicism Expecting more egocentric bias in others than in oneself.

The belief that we see reality as it really is – objectively and without bias;
Naïve realism that the facts are plain for all to see; that rational people will agree with us;
and that those who don't are either uninformed, lazy, irrational, or biased.

Outgroup homogeneity Individuals see members of their own group as being relatively more varied
bias than members of other groups.[83]

The tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures. It

may also manifest itself as a tendency for people to evaluate ambiguous
Self-serving bias
information in a way beneficial to their interests (see also group-serving
bias).[84]

Known as the tendency for group members to spend more time and
energy discussing information that all members are already familiar with
Shared information bias
(i.e., shared information), and less time and energy discussing information
that only some members are aware of (i.e., unshared information).[85]

The disproportionally higher representation of words related to social

interactions, in comparison to words related to physical or mental aspects
of behavior, in most languages. This bias attributed to nature of language
Sociability bias of as a tool facilitating human interactions. When verbal descriptors of
language human behavior are used as a source of information, sociability bias of
such descriptors emerges in factor-analytic studies as a factor related to
pro-social behavior (for example, of Extraversion factor in the Big Five
personality traits [57]
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The tendency to defend and bolster the status quo. Existing social,
economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and
System justification
alternatives disparaged, sometimes even at the expense of individual and
collective self-interest. (See also status quo bias.)

The tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in terms

Trait ascription bias of personality, behavior, and mood while viewing others as much more
predictable.

Similar to the fundamental attribution error, in this error a person is likely

Ultimate attribution
to make an internal attribution to an entire group instead of the individuals
error
within the group.

Worse-than-average A tendency to believe ourselves to be worse than others at tasks which are
effect difficult.[86]

Memory errors and biases

Main article: List of memory biases

In psychology and cognitive science, a memory bias is a cognitive bias that either enhances
or impairs the recall of a memory (either the chances that the memory will be recalled at all,
or the amount of time it takes for it to be recalled, or both), or that alters the content of a
reported memory. There are many types of memory bias, including:

Name Description

Bizarreness effect Bizarre material is better remembered than common material.

In a self-justifying manner retroactively ascribing one's choices to be more

Choice-supportive bias
informed than they were when they were made.

After an investment of effort in producing change, remembering one's past

Change bias
performance as more difficult than it actually was[87][unreliable source?]

Childhood amnesia The retention of few memories from before the age of four.

Tendency to remember high values and high

Conservatism or likelihoods/probabilities/frequencies as lower than they actually were and
Regressive bias low ones as higher than they actually were. Based on the evidence,
memories are not extreme enough[69][70]

Incorrectly remembering one's past attitudes and behaviour as resembling

Consistency bias
present attitudes and behaviour.[88]

That cognition and memory are dependent on context, such that out-of-
context memories are more difficult to retrieve than in-context memories
Context effect
(e.g., recall time and accuracy for a work-related memory will be lower at
home, and vice versa)

Cross-race effect The tendency for people of one race to have difficulty identifying members
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of a race other than their own.

A form of misattribution where a memory is mistaken for imagination,

Cryptomnesia
because there is no subjective experience of it being a memory.[87]

Recalling the past in a self-serving manner, e.g., remembering one's exam

Egocentric bias grades as being better than they were, or remembering a caught fish as
bigger than it really was.

A bias in which the emotion associated with unpleasant memories fades

Fading affect bias
more quickly than the emotion associated with positive events.[89]

False memory A form of misattribution where imagination is mistaken for a memory.

That self-generated information is remembered best. For instance, people

Generation effect (Self-
are better able to recall memories of statements that they have generated
generation effect)
than similar statements generated by others.

The tendency to forget information that can be found readily online by

Google effect
using Internet search engines.

The inclination to see past events as being more predictable than they
Hindsight bias
actually were; also called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect.

That humorous items are more easily remembered than non-humorous

ones, which might be explained by the distinctiveness of humor, the
Humor effect
increased cognitive processing time to understand the humor, or the
emotional arousal caused by the humor.[90]

That people are more likely to identify as true statements those they have
previously heard (even if they cannot consciously remember having heard
Illusion of truth effect them), regardless of the actual validity of the statement. In other words, a
person is more likely to believe a familiar statement than an unfamiliar
one.

Illusory correlation Inaccurately remembering a relationship between two events.[4][50]

The phenomenon whereby learning is greater when studying is spread out

Lag effect over time, as opposed to studying the same amount of time in a single
session. See also spacing effect.

Memory distortions introduced by the loss of details in a recollection over

time, often concurrent with sharpening or selective recollection of certain
details that take on exaggerated significance in relation to the details or
Leveling and sharpening
aspects of the experience lost through leveling. Both biases may be
reinforced over time, and by repeated recollection or re-telling of a
memory.[91]

Levels-of-processing That different methods of encoding information into memory have

effect different levels of effectiveness.[92]
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A smaller percentage of items are remembered in a longer list, but as the

List-length effect length of the list increases, the absolute number of items remembered
increases as well.[93][further explanation needed]

Memory becoming less accurate because of interference from post-event

Misinformation effect
information.[94]

That memory recall is higher for the last items of a list when the list items
Modality effect
were received via speech than when they were received through writing.

Mood-congruent
The improved recall of information congruent with one's current mood.
memory bias

That a person in a group has diminished recall for the words of others who
Next-in-line effect
spoke immediately before himself, if they take turns speaking.[95]

That being shown some items from a list and later retrieving one item
Part-list cueing effect
causes it to become harder to retrieve the other items.[96]

That people seem to perceive not the sum of an experience but the
Peak-end rule average of how it was at its peak (e.g., pleasant or unpleasant) and how it
ended.

Persistence The unwanted recurrence of memories of a traumatic event.[citation needed]

The notion that concepts that are learned by viewing pictures are more
Picture superiority effect easily and frequently recalled than are concepts that are learned by
viewing their written word form counterparts.[97][98][99][100][101][102]

That older adults favor positive over negative information in their

Positivity effect
memories.

Primacy effect, recency That items near the end of a sequence are the easiest to recall, followed by
effect & serial position the items at the beginning of a sequence; items in the middle are the least
effect likely to be remembered.[103]

Processing difficulty That information that takes longer to read and is thought about more
effect (processed with more difficulty) is more easily remembered.[104]

The recalling of more personal events from adolescence and early

Reminiscence bump
adulthood than personal events from other lifetime periods[105]

Rosy retrospection The remembering of the past as having been better than it really was.

That memories relating to the self are better recalled than similar
Self-relevance effect
information relating to others.

Confusing episodic memories with other information, creating distorted

Source confusion
memories.[106]

Spacing effect That information is better recalled if exposure to it is repeated over a long
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span of time rather than a short one.

The tendency to overestimate the amount that other people notice your
Spotlight effect
appearance or behavior.

Memory distorted towards stereotypes (e.g., racial or gender), e.g., "black-

Stereotypical bias sounding" names being misremembered as names of criminals.[87][unreliable
source?]

Diminishment of the recency effect because a sound item is appended to

Suffix effect
the list that the subject is not required to recall.[107][108]

A form of misattribution where ideas suggested by a questioner are

Suggestibility
mistaken for memory.

The tendency to displace recent events backward in time and remote

Telescoping effect events forward in time, so that recent events appear more remote, and
remote events, more recent.

The fact that you more easily remember information you have read by
Testing effect
rewriting it instead of rereading it.[109]

When a subject is able to recall parts of an item, or related information,

Tip of the tongue but is frustratingly unable to recall the whole item. This is thought to be an
phenomenon instance of "blocking" where multiple similar memories are being recalled
and interfere with each other.[87]

Overestimating the significance of the present.[110] It is related to the

Travis Syndrome enlightenment Idea of Progress and chronological snobbery with possibly
an appeal to novelty logical fallacy being part of the bias.

That the "gist" of what someone has said is better remembered than the
Verbatim effect verbatim wording.[111] This is because memories are representations, not
exact copies.

That an item that sticks out is more likely to be remembered than other
Von Restorff effect
items[112]

That uncompleted or interrupted tasks are remembered better than

Zeigarnik effect
completed ones.

Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases

 Bounded rationality – limits on optimization and rationality

o Prospect theory
o Mental accounting
o Adaptive bias – basing decisions on limited information and biasing them based on
the costs of being wrong.
 Attribute substitution – making a complex, difficult judgment by unconsciously substituting
it by an easier judgment[113]
 Attribution theory
278

o Salience
o Naïve realism
 Cognitive dissonance, and related:
o Impression management
o Self-perception theory
 Heuristics in judgment and decision making, including:
o Availability heuristic – estimating what is more likely by what is more available in
memory, which is biased toward vivid, unusual, or emotionally charged examples[49]
o Representativeness heuristic – judging probabilities on the basis of resemblance[49]
o Affect heuristic – basing a decision on an emotional reaction rather than a
calculation of risks and benefits[114]
 Some theories of emotion such as:
o Two-factor theory of emotion
o Somatic markers hypothesis
 Introspection illusion
 Misinterpretations or misuse of statistics; innumeracy.

A 2012 Psychological Bulletin article suggested that at least eight seemingly unrelated biases
can be produced by the same information-theoretic generative mechanism that assumes noisy
information processing during storage and retrieval of information in human memory.[4]

Individual differences in decision making biases

People do appear to have stable individual differences in their susceptibility to decision

biases such as overconfidence, temporal discounting, and bias blind spot.[115] That said, these
stable levels of bias within individuals are possible to change. Participants in experiments
who watched training videos and played debiasing games showed medium to large reductions
both immediately and up to three months later in the extent to which they exhibited
susceptibility to six cognitive biases: anchoring, bias blind spot, confirmation bias,
fundamental attribution error, projection bias, and representativeness.[116]

Debiasing

Debiasing is the reduction of biases in judgment and decision making through incentives,
nudges, and training. Cognitive bias mitigation and cognitive bias modification are forms of
debiasing specifically applicable to cognitive biases and their effects.

See also

 Psychology portal

 Sociology portal

 Thinking portal

 Logic portal

 Affective forecasting
 Anecdotal evidence
 Apophenia
279

 Black swan theory

 Chronostasis
 Cognitive bias in animals
 Cognitive bias mitigation
 Cognitive distortion
 Cross-race effect
 Dysrationalia
 Feedback
 Frame rate
 List of common misconceptions
 List of fallacies
 List of memory biases
 List of topics related to public relations and propaganda
 Lists of thinking-related topics
 Media bias
 Mind projection fallacy
 Pollyanna principle
 Positive feedback
 Prevalence effect
 Publication bias
 Raster scan
 Recall bias
 Saccade
 Saccadic masking
 Saccadic suppression of image displacement
 Self-handicapping
 Systematic bias
 Transsaccadic memory

http://lifehacker.com/this-graphic-explains-20-cognitive-biases-that-affect-y-
1730901381
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http://mentalfloss.com/article/68705/20-cognitive-biases-affect-your-decisions

20 Cognitive Biases That Affect Your Decisions

http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases

Cognitive bias describes the inherent thinking errors that humans make in processing
information. Some of these have been verified empirically in the field of psychology, while
others are considered general categories of bias. These thinking errors prevent one from
accurately understanding reality, even when confronted with all the needed data and evidence
to form an accurate view. Many conflicts between science and religion are due to cognitive
biases preventing people from coming to the same conclusions with the same evidence.
Cognitive bias is intrinsic to human thought, and therefore any systematic system of
acquiring knowledge that attempts to describe reality must include mechanisms to control for
bias or it is inherently invalid.

The best known system for vetting and limiting the consequences of cognitive bias is the
scientific method, as it places evidence and methodology behind the idea under open
scrutiny. By this, many opinions and separate analyses can be used to compensate for the bias
of any one individual. It is important to remember, however, that in every day life, just
knowing about these biases doesn't necessarily free you from them.[1]

Contents
[hide]

 1 Decision-making and behavioral biases

 2 Biases in probability and belief
 3 Social biases
 4 Memory errors
 5 Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases
 6 See also
 7 External links
 8 References
 9 References

Decision-making and behavioral biases

Many of these biases are studied for how they affect belief formation and business decisions
and scientific research.

 Bandwagon effect — the tendency to do (or believe) things because many other people do
(or believe) the same. Related to groupthink, crowd psychology, herd behaviour, and
manias.
 Bias blind spot — the tendency not to compensate for one's own cognitive biases.
 Choice-supportive bias — the tendency to remember one's choices as better than they
actually were.
 Confirmation bias — the tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that
confirms one's preconceptions.
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 Congruence bias — the tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, in
contrast to tests of possible alternative hypotheses.
 Contrast effect — the enhancement or diminishment of a weight or other measurement
when compared with recently observed contrasting object.
 Déformation professionnelle — the tendency to look at things according to the conventions
of one's own profession, forgetting any broader point of view.
 Endowment effect — "the fact that people often demand much more to give up an object
than they would be willing to pay to acquire it".[2]
 Exposure-suspicion bias — a knowledge of a subject's disease in a medical study may
influence the search for causes.
 Extreme aversion — most people will go to great lengths to avoid extremes. People are
more likely to choose an option if it is the intermediate choice.
 Focusing effect — prediction bias occurring when people place too much importance on one
aspect of an event; causes error in accurately predicting the utility of a future outcome.
 Framing — drawing different conclusions from the same information, depending on how
that information is presented.
 Hyperbolic discounting — the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for more
immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs, the closer to the present both payoffs are.
 Illusion of control — the tendency for human beings to believe they can control or at least
influence outcomes that they clearly cannot.
 Impact bias — the tendency for people to overestimate the length or the intensity of the
impact of future feeling states.
 Information bias — the tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action.
 Irrational escalation — the tendency to make irrational decisions based upon rational
decisions in the past or to justify actions already taken.
 Loss aversion — "the disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated
with acquiring it".[3] (see also sunk cost effects and Endowment effect).
 Neglect of probability — the tendency to completely disregard probability when making a
decision under uncertainty.
 Mere exposure effect — the tendency for people to express undue liking for things merely
because they are familiar with them.
 Obsequiousness bias — the tendency to systematically alter responses in the direction they
perceive desired by the investigator.
 Omission bias — the tendency to judge harmful actions as worse, or less moral, than equally
harmful omissions (inactions).
 Outcome bias — the tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of based
on the quality of the decision at the time it was made.
 Planning fallacy — the tendency to underestimate task-completion times. Also formulated
as Hofstadter's Law: "It always takes longer than you expect, even when you take into
account Hofstadter's Law."
 Post-purchase rationalization — the tendency to persuade oneself through rational
argument that a purchase was a good value.
 Pseudocertainty effect — the tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome
is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes.
 Reactance — the urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to
resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice.
 Selective perception — the tendency for expectations to affect perception.
 Status quo bias — the tendency for people to like things to stay relatively the same (see also
Loss aversion and Endowment effect).[4]
 Survivorship bias — a form of selection bias focusing on what has survived to the present
and ignoring what must have been lost.
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 Unacceptability bias — questions that may embarrass or invade privacy are refused or
evaded.
 Unit bias — the tendency to want to finish a given unit of a task or an item with strong
effects on the consumption of food in particular
 Von Restorff effect — the tendency for an item that "stands out like a sore thumb" to be
more likely to be remembered than other items.
 Zero-risk bias — the preference for reducing a small risk to zero over a greater reduction in a
larger risk. It is relevant e.g. to the allocation of public health resources and the debate
about nuclear power.

Biases in probability and belief

Many of these biases are often studied for how they affect business and economic decisions
and how they affect experimental research.

 Ambiguity effect — the avoidance of options for which missing information makes the
probability seem "unknown".
 Anchoring — the tendency to rely too heavily, or "anchor," on a past reference or on one
trait or piece of information when making decisions.
 Anthropic bias — the tendency for one's evidence to be biased by observation selection
effects.
 Attentional bias — neglect of relevant data when making judgments of a correlation or
association.
 Availability heuristic — a biased prediction, due to the tendency to focus on the most
salient and emotionally-charged outcome.
 Clustering illusion — the tendency to see patterns where actually none exist.
 Conjunction fallacy — the tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable
than general ones.
 Frequency illusion — the phenomenon in which people who just learn or notice something
start seeing it everywhere. Also known as the Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon.[5]
 Gambler's fallacy — the tendency to assume that individual random events are influenced
by previous random events. For example, "I've flipped heads with this coin five times
consecutively, so the chance of tails coming out on the sixth flip is much greater than
heads."
 Hindsight bias — sometimes called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect: the inclination to see
past events as being predictable, based on knowledge of later events.
 Hostile media effect — the tendency to perceive news coverage as biased against your
position on an issue.
 Illusory correlation — beliefs that inaccurately suppose a relationship between a certain
type of action and an effect.
 Ludic fallacy — the analysis of chance related problems with the narrow frame of games.
Ignoring the complexity of reality, and the non-gaussian distribution of many things.
 Neglect of prior base rates effect — the tendency to fail to incorporate prior known
probabilities which are pertinent to the decision at hand.
 Observer-expectancy effect — when a researcher expects a given result and therefore
unconsciously manipulates an experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it (see also
subject-expectancy effect).
 Optimism bias — the systematic tendency to be over-optimistic about the outcome of
planned actions. Found to be linked to the "left inferior frontal gyrus" section of the brain,
and disrupting this section of the brain removes the bias. Article summarising this finding
 Overconfidence effect — the tendency to overestimate one's own abilities.
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 Positive outcome bias — a tendency in prediction to overestimate the probability of good

things happening to them (see also wishful thinking, optimism bias and valence effect).
 Primacy effect — the tendency to weigh initial events more than subsequent events.
 Recency effect — the tendency to weigh recent events more than earlier events (see also
'peak-end rule').
 Reminiscence bump — the effect that people tend to recall more personal events from
adolescence and early adulthood than from other lifetime periods.
 Rosy retrospection — the tendency to rate past events more positively than they had
actually rated them when the event occurred.
 Subadditivity effect — the tendency to judge probability of the whole to be less than the
probabilities of the parts.
 Telescoping effect — the effect that recent events appear to have occurred more remotely
and remote events appear to have occurred more recently.
 Texas sharpshooter fallacy — the fallacy of selecting or adjusting a hypothesis after the data
are collected, making it impossible to test the hypothesis fairly.

Social biases

Most of these biases are labeled as attributional biases.

 Actor-observer bias — the tendency for explanations for other individual's behaviors to
overemphasize the influence of their personality and underemphasize the influence of their
situation. This is coupled with the opposite tendency for the self in that one's explanations
for their own behaviors overemphasize their situation and underemphasize the influence of
their personality. (see also fundamental attribution error).
 Dunning-Kruger effect — "...when people are incompetent in the strategies they adopt to
achieve success and satisfaction, they suffer a dual burden: Not only do they reach
erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of
the ability to realize it. Instead, ...they are left with the mistaken impression that they are
doing just fine."[6] (See also the Lake Wobegon effect, and overconfidence effect).
 Egocentric bias — occurs when people claim more responsibility for themselves for the
results of a joint action than an outside observer would.
 Forer effect (aka Barnum Effect) — the tendency to give high accuracy ratings to
descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in
fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. For example, horoscopes.
 False consensus effect — the tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which
others agree with them.
 Fundamental attribution error — the tendency for people to over-emphasize personality-
based explanations for behaviors observed in others while under-emphasizing the role and
power of situational influences on the same behavior (see also actor-observer bias, group
attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).
 Halo effect — the tendency for a person's positive or negative traits to "spill over" from one
area of their personality to another in others' perceptions of them (see also physical
attractiveness stereotype).
 Herd instinct — a common tendency to adopt the opinions and follow the behaviors of the
majority to feel safer and to avoid conflict.
 Illusion of asymmetric insight — people perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass
their peers' knowledge of them.
 Illusion of transparency — people overestimate others' ability to know them, and they also
overestimate their ability to know others.[7]
285

 Ingroup bias — the tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others they
perceive to be members of their own groups.
 Just-world phenomenon — the tendency for people to believe that the world is "just" and
therefore people "get what they deserve."
 Lake Wobegon effect — the human tendency to report flattering beliefs about oneself and
believe that one is above average (see also worse-than-average effect, and overconfidence
effect).
 Notational bias — a form of cultural bias in which a notation induces the appearance of a
nonexistent natural law.
 Outgroup homogeneity bias — individuals see members of their own group as being
relatively more varied than members of other groups.
 Projection bias — the tendency to unconsciously assume that others share the same or
similar thoughts, beliefs, values, or positions.
 Self-serving bias — the tendency to attribute successes to internal characteristics while
blaming failures on outside forces. It may also manifest itself as a tendency for people to
evaluate ambiguous information in a way beneficial to their interests (see also group-serving
bias).
 Modesty bias — The tendency to blame failures on oneself while attributing successes to
situational factors. Opposite of self-serving bias.
 Self-fulfilling prophecy — the tendency to engage in behaviors that elicit results which will
(consciously or subconsciously) confirm our beliefs.
 System justification — the tendency to defend and bolster the status quo, i.e. existing
social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives
disparaged sometimes even at the expense of individual and collective self-interest.
 Trait ascription bias — the tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in
terms of personality, behavior and mood while viewing others as much more predictable.
 Ultimate attribution error — A sub-type of the fundamental attribution error above, the
ultimate attribution error occurs when negative behavior in one's own group is explained
away as circumstantial, but negative behavior among outsiders is believed to be evidence of
flaws in character.

Memory errors

 Beneffectance — perceiving oneself as responsible for desirable outcomes but not

responsible for undesirable ones. (Term coined by Greenwald (1980))
 Consistency bias — incorrectly remembering one's past attitudes and behaviour as
resembling present attitudes and behaviour.
 Cryptomnesia — a form of misattribution where a memory is mistaken for imagination.
 Egocentric bias — recalling the past in a self-serving manner, e.g. remembering one's exam
grades as being better than they were, or remembering a caught fish as being bigger than it
was
 Confabulation or false memory — Remembering something that never actually happened.
 Hindsight bias — filtering memory of past events through present knowledge, so that those
events look more predictable than they actually were; also known as the 'I-knew-it-all-along
effect'.
 Selective Memory and selective reporting
 Suggestibility — a form of misattribution where ideas suggested by a questioner are
mistaken for memory. Often a key aspect of hypnotherapy.
286

Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases

 Attribution theory, especially:

o Salience
 Cognitive dissonance, and related:
o Impression management
o Self-perception theory
 Heuristics, including:
o Availability heuristic
o Representativeness heuristic
 Adaptive Bias

See also

 Apophenia
 Groupthink
 Logical fallacy
 Salem Hypothesis

External links

 An excellent paper (PDF) on this topic

 Why People Believe Weird Things and 8 Ways to Change Their Minds
 Bias entry in LessWrong Wiki
 Overcoming Bias blog, Robin Hanson
 How Do You Think? blog, Gerald Guild
 Mind Matters, David Berreby
 13 Cognitive Biases That Really Screw Things Up For You, Huffington Post, 10 December 2016

References

 Baron, J. (2000). Thinking and deciding (3d. edition). New York: Cambridge University Press.
ISBN 0-521-65030-5
 Bishop, Michael A & Trout, J.D. (2004). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human
Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-516229-3
 Gilovich, T. (1993). How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday
Life. New York: The Free Press. ISBN 0-02-911706-2
 Gilovich, T., Griffin D. & Kahneman, D. (Eds.). (2002). Heuristics and biases: The psychology of
intuitive judgment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-79679-2
 Greenwald, A. (1980). "The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History"
American Psychologist, Vol. 35, No. 7
 Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-28414-7
 Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. (1991). "Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias." The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 5(1):193-206.
 Plous, S. (1993). The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making. New York: McGraw-Hill.
ISBN 0-07-050477-6
 Schacter, D. L. (1999). "The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights From Psychology and Cognitive
Neuroscience" American Psychologist Vol. 54. No. 3, 182-203
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 Tetlock, Philip E. (2005). Expert Political Judgment: how good is it? how can we know?.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-12302

https://betterhumans.coach.me/cognitive-bias-cheat-sheet-55a472476b18

Four problems that biases help us address:

Information overload, lack of meaning, the need to act fast, and how to know what needs to be
remembered for later.

Problem 1: Too much information.

There is just too much information in the world, we have no choice but to filter almost all of
it out. Our brain uses a few simple tricks to pick out the bits of information that are most
likely going to be useful in some way.

 We notice things that are already primed in memory or repeated often. This is the simple
rule that our brains are more likely to notice things that are related to stuff that’s recently
been loaded in memory.
See: Availability heuristic, Attentional bias, Illusory truth effect, Mere exposure effect,
Context effect, Cue-dependent forgetting, Mood-congruent memory bias, Frequency illusion,
Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon, Empathy gap, Omission bias, Base rate fallacy
 Bizarre/funny/visually-striking/anthropomorphic things stick out more than non-
bizarre/unfunny things. Our brains tend to boost the importance of things that are unusual
or surprising. Alternatively, we tend to skip over information that we think is ordinary or
expected.
See: Bizarreness effect, Humor effect, Von Restorff effect, Picture superiority effect, Self-
relevance effect, Negativity bias
 We notice when something has changed. And we’ll generally tend to weigh the significance
of the new value by the direction the change happened (positive or negative) more than re-
evaluating the new value as if it had been presented alone. Also applies to when we
compare two similar things.
See: Anchoring, Contrast effect, Focusing effect, Money illusion, Framing effect, Weber–
Fechner law, Conservatism, Distinction bias
 We are drawn to details that confirm our own existing beliefs. This is a big one. As is the
corollary: we tend to ignore details that contradicts our own beliefs.
See: Confirmation bias, Congruence bias, Post-purchase rationalization, Choice-supportive
bias, Selective perception, Observer-expectancy effect, Experimenter’s bias, Observer effect,
Expectation bias, Ostrich effect, Subjective validation, Continued influence effect,
Semmelweis reflex
 We notice flaws in others more easily than flaws in ourselves. Yes, before you see this
entire article as a list of quirks that compromise how other people think, realize that you are
also subject to these biases.
See: Bias blind spot, Naïve cynicism, Naïve realism

Problem 2: Not enough meaning.

The world is very confusing, and we end up only seeing a tiny sliver of it, but we need to
make some sense of it in order to survive. Once the reduced stream of information comes in,
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we connect the dots, fill in the gaps with stuff we already think we know, and update our
mental models of the world.

 We find stories and patterns even in sparse data. Since we only get a tiny sliver of the
world’s information, and also filter out almost everything else, we never have the luxury of
having the full story. This is how our brain reconstructs the world to feel complete inside our
heads.
See: Confabulation, Clustering illusion, Insensitivity to sample size, Neglect of probability,
Anecdotal fallacy, Illusion of validity, Masked man fallacy, Recency illusion, Gambler’s fallacy,
Hot-hand fallacy, Illusory correlation, Pareidolia, Anthropomorphism
 We fill in characteristics from stereotypes, generalities, and prior histories whenever there
are new specific instances or gaps in information. When we have partial information about
a specific thing that belongs to a group of things we are pretty familiar with, our brain has no
problem filling in the gaps with best guesses or what other trusted sources provide.
Conveniently, we then forget which parts were real and which were filled in.
See: Group attribution error, Ultimate attribution error, Stereotyping, Essentialism,
Functional fixedness, Moral credential effect, Just-world hypothesis, Argument from fallacy,
Authority bias, Automation bias, Bandwagon effect, Placebo effect
 We imagine things and people we’re familiar with or fond of as better than things and
people we aren’t familiar with or fond of. Similar to the above but the filled-in bits
generally also include built in assumptions about the quality and value of the thing we’re
looking at.
See: Halo effect, In-group bias, Out-group homogeneity bias, Cross-race effect, Cheerleader
effect, Well-traveled road effect, Not invented here, Reactive devaluation, Positivity effect
 We simplify probabilities and numbers to make them easier to think about. Our
subconscious mind is terrible at math and generally gets all kinds of things wrong about the
likelihood of something happening if any data is missing.
See: Mental accounting, Normalcy bias, Appeal to probability fallacy, Murphy’s Law,
Subadditivity effect, Survivorship bias, Zero sum bias, Denomination effect, Magic number
7+-2
 We think we know what others are thinking. In some cases this means that we assume that
they know what we know, in other cases we assume they’re thinking about us as much as
we are thinking about ourselves. It’s basically just a case of us modeling their own mind after
our own (or in some cases after a much less complicated mind than our own).
See: Curse of knowledge, Illusion of transparency, Spotlight effect, Illusion of external
agency, Illusion of asymmetric insight, Extrinsic incentive error
 We project our current mindset and assumptions onto the past and future. Magnified also
by the fact that we’re not very good at imagining how quickly or slowly things will happen or
change over time.
See: Hindsight bias, Outcome bias, Moral luck, Declinism, Telescoping effect, Rosy
retrospection, Impact bias, Pessimism bias, Planning fallacy, Time-saving bias, Pro-innovation
bias, Projection bias, Restraint bias, Self-consistency bias

Problem 3: Need to act fast.

We’re constrained by time and information, and yet we can’t let that paralyze us. Without the
ability to act fast in the face of uncertainty, we surely would have perished as a species long
ago. With every piece of new information, we need to do our best to assess our ability to
affect the situation, apply it to decisions, simulate the future to predict what might happen
next, and otherwise act on our new insight.
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 In order to act, we need to be confident in our ability to make an impact and to feel like
what we do is important. In reality, most of this confidence can be classified as
overconfidence, but without it we might not act at all.
See: Overconfidence effect, Egocentric bias, Optimism bias, Social desirability bias, Third-
person effect, Forer effect, Barnum effect, Illusion of control, False consensus effect,
Dunning-Kruger effect, Hard-easy effect, Illusory superiority, Lake Wobegone effect, Self-
serving bias, Actor-observer bias, Fundamental attribution error, Defensive attribution
hypothesis, Trait ascription bias, Effort justification, Risk compensation, Peltzman effect
 In order to stay focused, we favor the immediate, relatable thing in front of us over the
delayed and distant. We value stuff more in the present than in the future, and relate more
to stories of specific individuals than anonymous individuals or groups. I’m surprised there
aren’t more biases found under this one, considering how much it impacts how we think
about the world.
See: Hyperbolic discounting, Appeal to novelty, Identifiable victim effect
 In order to get anything done, we’re motivated to complete things that we’ve already
invested time and energy in. The behavioral economist’s version of Newton’s first law of
motion: an object in motion stays in motion. This helps us finish things, even if we come
across more and more reasons to give up.
See: Sunk cost fallacy, Irrational escalation, Escalation of commitment, Loss aversion, IKEA
effect, Processing difficulty effect, Generation effect, Zero-risk bias, Disposition effect, Unit
bias, Pseudocertainty effect, Endowment effect, Backfire effect
 In order to avoid mistakes, we’re motivated to preserve our autonomy and status in a
group, and to avoid irreversible decisions. If we must choose, we tend to choose the option
that is perceived as the least risky or that preserves the status quo. Better the devil you
know than the devil you do not.
See: System justification, Reactance, Reverse psychology, Decoy effect, Social comparison
bias, Status quo bias
 We favor options that appear simple or that have more complete information over more
complex, ambiguous options. We’d rather do the quick, simple thing than the important
complicated thing, even if the important complicated thing is ultimately a better use of time
and energy.
See: Ambiguity bias, Information bias, Belief bias, Rhyme as reason effect, Bike-shedding
effect, Law of Triviality, Delmore effect, Conjunction fallacy, Occam’s razor, Less-is-better
effect

Problem 4: What should we remember?

There’s too much information in the universe. We can only afford to keep around the bits that
are most likely to prove useful in the future. We need to make constant bets and trade-offs
around what we try to remember and what we forget. For example, we prefer generalizations
over specifics because they take up less space. When there are lots of irreducible details, we
pick out a few standout items to save and discard the rest. What we save here is what is most
likely to inform our filters related to problem 1’s information overload, as well as inform
what comes to mind during the processes mentioned in problem 2 around filling in
incomplete information. It’s all self-reinforcing.

 We edit and reinforce some memories after the fact. During that process, memories can
become stronger, however various details can also get accidentally swapped. We sometimes
accidentally inject a detail into the memory that wasn’t there before.
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See: Misattribution of memory, Source confusion, Cryptomnesia, False memory,

Suggestibility, Spacing effect
 We discard specifics to form generalities. We do this out of necessity, but the impact of
implicit associations, stereotypes, and prejudice results in some of the most glaringly bad
consequences from our full set of cognitive biases.
See: Implicit associations, Implicit stereotypes, Stereotypical bias, Prejudice, Negativity bias,
Fading affect bias
 We reduce events and lists to their key elements. It’s difficult to reduce events and lists to
generalities, so instead we pick out a few items to represent the whole.
See: Peak–end rule, Leveling and sharpening, Misinformation effect, Duration neglect, Serial
recall effect, List-length effect, Modality effect, Memory inhibition, Part-list cueing effect,
Primacy effect, Recency effect, Serial position effect, Suffix effect
 We store memories differently based on how they were experienced. Our brains will only
encode information that it deems important at the time, but this decision can be affected by
other circumstances (what else is happening, how is the information presenting itself, can
we easily find the information again if we need to, etc) that have little to do with the
information’s value.
See: Levels of processing effect, Testing effect, Absent-mindedness, Next-in-line effect, Tip of
the tongue phenomenon, Google effect

Great, how am I supposed to remember all of this?

You don’t have to. But you can start by remembering these four giant problems our brains
have evolved to deal with over the last few million years (and maybe bookmark this page if
you want to occasionally reference it for the exact bias you’re looking for):

1. Information overload sucks, so we aggressively filter. Noise becomes signal.

2. Lack of meaning is confusing, so we fill in the gaps. Signal becomes a story.
3. Need to act fast lest we lose our chance, so we jump to conclusions. Stories become
decisions.
4. This isn’t getting easier, so we try to remember the important bits. Decisions inform our
mental models of the world.

In order to avoid drowning in information overload, our brains need to skim and filter
insane amounts of information and quickly, almost effortlessly, decide which few things in
that firehose are actually important and call those out.

In order to construct meaning out of the bits and pieces of information that come to our
attention, we need to fill in the gaps, and map it all to our existing mental models. In the
meantime we also need to make sure that it all stays relatively stable and as accurate as
possible.

In order to act fast, our brains need to make split-second decisions that could impact our
chances for survival, security, or success, and feel confident that we can make things happen.

And in order to keep doing all of this as efficiently as possible, our brains need to remember
the most important and useful bits of new information and inform the other systems so
they can adapt and improve over time, but no more than that.
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Sounds pretty useful! So what’s the downside?

In addition to the four problems, it would be useful to remember these four truths about how
our solutions to these problems have problems of their own:

1. We don’t see everything. Some of the information we filter out is actually useful and
important.
2. Our search for meaning can conjure illusions. We sometimes imagine details that were
filled in by our assumptions, and construct meaning and stories that aren’t really there.
3. Quick decisions can be seriously flawed. Some of the quick reactions and decisions we jump
to are unfair, self-serving, and counter-productive.
4. Our memory reinforces errors. Some of the stuff we remember for later just makes all of
the above systems more biased, and more damaging to our thought processes.

By keeping the four problems with the world and the four consequences of our brain’s
strategy to solve them, the availability heuristic (and, specifically, the Baader-Meinhof
phenomenon) will insure that we notice our own biases more often. If you visit this page to
refresh your mind every once in a while, the spacing effect will help underline some of these
thought patterns so that our bias blind spot and naïve realism is kept in check.

Nothing we do can make the 4 problems go away (until we have a way to expand our minds’
computational power and memory storage to match that of the universe) but if we accept that
we are permanently biased, but that there’s room for improvement, confirmation bias will
continue to help us find evidence that supports this, which will ultimately lead us to better
understanding ourselves.

ince learning about confirmation bias, I keep seeing it everywhere!”

Cognitive biases are just tools, useful in the right contexts, harmful in others. They’re the
only tools we’ve got, and they’re even pretty good at what they’re meant to do. We might as
well get familiar with them and even appreciate that we at least have some ability to process
the universe with our mysterious brains.

Update: A couple days after posting this, John Manoogian III asked if it would be okay to do
a “diagrammatic poster remix” of it, to which I of course said YES to. Here’s what he came
up with:
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If you feel so inclined, you can buy a poster-version of the above image here. If you want to
play around with the data in JSON format, you can do that here.

I’ll leave you with the first part of this little poem by Emily Dickinson:

The Brain — is wider — than the Sky

For — put them side by side — 
The one the other will contain
With ease — and You — beside —

 Psychology
 Cognitive Bias
 Mental Models
 Logical Fallacies
 Human Behavior

http://io9.gizmodo.com/5974468/the-most-common-cognitive-biases-that-
prevent-you-from-being-rational
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FALLACIES IN THINKING
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy

A fallacy is the use of invalid or otherwise faulty reasoning, or "wrong moves"[1] in the
construction of an argument.[2][3] A fallacious argument may be deceptive by appearing to be
better than it really is. Some fallacies are committed intentionally to manipulate or persuade
by deception, while others are committed unintentionally due to carelessness or ignorance.
Lawyers acknowledge that the extent to which an argument is sound or unsound depends on
the context in which the argument is made.[4]

Fallacies are commonly divided into "formal" and "informal". A formal fallacy can be
expressed neatly in a standard system of logic, such as propositional logic,[2] while an
informal fallacy originates in an error in reasoning other than an improper logical form.[5]
Arguments containing informal fallacies may be formally valid, but still fallacious.[6]

Contents

 1 Formal
o 1.1 Common examples
 2 Aristotle
 3 Whately's grouping
 4 Intentional
 5 Deductive
 6 Paul Meehl
 7 Measurement
 8 Other systems of classification
 9 Assessment — pragmatic theory
 10 Logical fallacies
o 10.1 Examples of types of logical fallacies
 10.1.1 Hasty generalization
 10.1.2 Missing the point
 10.1.3 Post hoc (false cause)
 10.1.4 Slippery slope
 11 See also
 12 References
 13 Further reading
 14 External links

Formal
Main article: Formal fallacy

A formal fallacy is a common error of thinking that can neatly be expressed in standard
system of logic.[2] An argument that is formally fallacious is rendered invalid due to a flaw in
its logical structure. Such an argument is always considered to be wrong.

The presence of a formal fallacy in a deductive argument does not imply anything about the
argument's premises or its conclusion. Both may actually be true, or may even be more
probable as a result of the argument; but the deductive argument is still invalid because the
conclusion does not follow from the premises in the manner described. By extension, an
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argument can contain a formal fallacy even if the argument is not a deductive one: for
instance, an inductive argument that incorrectly applies principles of probability or causality
can be said to commit a formal fallacy.

Common examples

Main article: List of fallacies § Formal fallacies

Aristotle

Aristotle was the first to systematize logical errors into a list, as being able to refute an
opponent's thesis is one way of winning an argument.[7] Aristotle's "Sophistical Refutations"
(De Sophisticis Elenchis) identifies thirteen fallacies. He divided them up into two major
types Linguistic fallacies and Non-linguistic fallacies, some depending on language and
others that do not depend on language.[8][9] These fallacies are called verbal fallacies and
material fallacies, respectively. A material fallacy is an error in what the arguer is talking
about, while a verbal fallacy is an error in how the arguer is talking. Verbal fallacies are those
in which a conclusion is obtained by improper or ambiguous use of words.[10] An example of
a language dependent fallacy is given as a debate as to who amongst humanity are learners:
the wise or the ignorant.[11] Language-independent fallacies may be more complex, e.g.:

1. "Coriscus is different from Socrates."

2. "Socrates is a man."
3. "Therefore, Coriscus is different from a man."[12]

Whately's grouping

Richard Whately defines a fallacy broadly as, "any argument, or apparent argument, which
professes to be decisive of the matter at hand, while in reality it is not".[13]

Whately divided fallacies into two groups: logical and material. According to Whately,
logical fallacies are arguments where the conclusion does not follow from the premises.
Material fallacies are not logical errors because the conclusion does follow from the
premises. He then divided the logical group into two groups: purely logical and semi-logical.
The semi-logical group included all of Aristotle's sophisms except:ignoratio elenchi, petitio
principii, and non causa pro causa, which are in the material group.[14]

Intentional

Sometimes a speaker or writer uses a fallacy intentionally. In any context, including

academic debate, a conversation among friends, political discourse, advertising, or for
comedic purposes, the arguer may use fallacious reasoning to try to persuade the listener or
reader, by means other than offering relevant evidence, that the conclusion is true.

Examples of this include the speaker or writer:[15]

1. Diverting the argument to unrelated issues with a red herring (Ignoratio elenchi)
2. Insulting someone's character (argumentum ad hominem)
3. Assume the conclusion of an argument, a kind of circular reasoning, also called "begging the
question" (petitio principi)
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4. Making jumps in logic (non-sequitur)

5. Identifying a false cause and effect (post hoc ergo propter hoc)
6. Asserting that everyone agrees (bandwagoning)
7. Creating a "false dilemma" ("either-or fallacy") in which the situation is oversimplified
8. Selectively using facts (card-stacking)
9. Making false or misleading comparisons (false equivalence and false analogy)
10. Generalizing quickly and sloppily (hasty generalization)

In humor, errors of reasoning are used for comical purposes. Groucho Marx used fallacies of
amphiboly, for instance, to make ironic statements; Gary Larson employs fallacious
reasoning in many of his cartoons. Wes Boyer and Samuel Stoddard have written a humorous
essay teaching students how to be persuasive by means of a whole host of informal and
formal fallacies.[16]

Deductive
Main articles: Deductive fallacy and formal fallacy

In philosophy, the term formal fallacy is used for logical fallacies and defined formally as: a
flaw in the structure of a deductive argument which renders the argument invalid. The term is
preferred as logic is the use of valid reasoning and a fallacy is an argument that uses poor
reasoning therefore the term logical fallacy is an oxymoron. However, the same terms are
used in informal discourse to mean an argument which is problematic for any reason. A
logical form such as "A and B" is independent of any particular conjunction of meaningful
propositions. Logical form alone can guarantee that given true premises, a true conclusion
must follow. However, formal logic makes no such guarantee if any premise is false; the
conclusion can be either true or false. Any formal error or logical fallacy similarly invalidates
the deductive guarantee. Both the argument and all its premises must be true for a statement
to be true.

Paul Meehl

In Why I Do Not Attend Case Conferences[17] (1973), psychologist Paul Meehl discusses
several fallacies that can arise in medical case conferences that are primarily held to diagnose
patients. These fallacies can also be considered more general errors of thinking that all
individuals (not just psychologists) are prone to making.

 Barnum effect: Making a statement that is trivial, and true of everyone, e.g. of all patients,
but which appears to have special significance to the diagnosis.
 Sick-sick fallacy ("pathological set"): The tendency to generalize from personal experiences
of health and ways of being, to the identification of others who are different from ourselves
as being "sick". Meehl emphasizes that though psychologists claim to know about this
tendency, most are not very good at correcting it in their own thinking.
 "Me too" fallacy: The opposite of Sick-sick. Imagining that "everyone does this" and thereby
minimizing a symptom without assessing the probability of whether a mentally healthy
person would actually do it. A variation of this is Uncle George's pancake fallacy. This
minimizes a symptom through reference to a friend/relative who exhibited a similar
symptom, thereby implying that it is normal. Meehl points out that consideration should be
given that the patient is not healthy by comparison but that the friend/relative is unhealthy.
 Multiple Napoleons fallacy: "It's not real to us, but it's 'real' to him." A relativism that Meehl
sees as a waste of time. There is a distinction between reality and delusion that is important
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to make when assessing a patient and so the consideration of comparative realities can
mislead and distract from the importance of a patient's delusion to a diagnostic
decision.[clarification needed]
 Hidden decisions: Decisions based on factors that we do not own up to or challenge, and for
example result in the placing of middle- and upper-class patients in therapy while lower-
class patients are given medication. Meehl identifies these decisions as related to an implicit
ideal patient who is young, attractive, verbal, intelligent, and successful (YAVIS). He sees
YAVIS patients as being preferred by psychotherapists because they can pay for long-term
treatment and are more enjoyable to interact with.
 The spun-glass theory of the mind: The belief that the human organism is so fragile that
minor negative events, such as criticism, rejection, or failure, are bound to cause major
trauma to the system. Essentially not giving humans, and sometimes patients, enough credit
for their resilience and ability to recover.[17]

 “Crummy criterion fallacy”: This fallacy refers to how psychologists would inappropriately
explain away the technical aspects of tests rather than incorporate them into the interview,
life-history, and other material being presented at case conferences. [17]
 “Understanding it makes it normal”: The act of normalizing or excusing a behavior just
because you understand the cause or function of it, regardless of its normalcy or
appropriateness. For example, a psychologist would be guilty of committing this fallacy if he
or she began to see the behavior of criminal clients as normal because of understanding how
such behavior came about. [17]
 “Assumptions that content and dynamics explain why this person is abnormal”: Those who
seek psychological services have certain characteristics associated with the fact they are
seeking services. However, not only do they have the characteristics of clients but also
characteristics because of being human. To attribute one’s complete life dysfunction to the
same attributes that make them a patient is to negate the fact that being a mere human
being comes with its own areas of dissatisfaction. [17]
 “Identifying the softhearted with the softheaded”: The belief that those who have sincere
concern for the suffering (i.e., the softhearted) are often seen as one in the same as those
who tend to be wrong in logical and empirical decisions (i.e., softheaded).
 “Ad hoc fallacy”: An innate tendency to create explanations after we have been presented
with evidence that is consistent with what has now been proven. For example, in clinical
psychology, it this comes about through explaining why a patient is the way he or she is
based on all the available and relevant evidence is presented. [17]
 “Doing it the hard way”: Going about a task in the a more difficult manner when an
equivalent easier option exists; particularly in clinical psychology, when extensive
instruments or procedures are used that can be difficult and time consuming while the same
information can be ascertained through interactive means. [17]
 “Social scientists’ anti-biology bias”: Meehl’s belief that social scientists like psychologists,
sociologists, and psychiatrists have a tendency to react negatively to biological factors in
abnormality, therefore tending to be anti-drug, anti-genetic, and anti-EST. [17]
 “Double standard of evidential morals”: When standards for evidence change depending on
who is presenting; that is, when oneself is making an argument less evidence is required
compared to when someone else is and the same person is far more critical. [17]

Measurement

Increasing availability and circulation of big data are driving proliferation of new metrics for
scholarly authority,[18][19] and there is lively discussion regarding the relative usefulness of
such metrics for measuring the value of knowledge production in the context of an
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"information tsunami."[20] Where mathematical fallacies are subtle mistakes in reasoning

leading to invalid mathematical proofs, measurement fallacies are unwarranted inferential
leaps involved in the extrapolation of raw data to a measurement-based value claim. The
ancient Greek Sophist Protagoras was one of the first thinkers to propose that humans can
generate reliable measurements through his "human-measure" principle and the practice of
dissoi logoi (arguing multiple sides of an issue).[21][22] This history helps explain why
measurement fallacies are informed by informal logic and argumentation theory.

 Anchoring fallacy: Anchoring is a cognitive bias, first theorized by Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, that "describes the common human tendency to rely too heavily on the first
piece of information offered (the 'anchor') when making decisions." In measurement
arguments, anchoring fallacies can occur when unwarranted weight is given to data
generated by metrics that the arguers themselves acknowledge is flawed. For example,
limitations of the Journal Impact Factor (JIF) are well documented,[23] and even JIF pioneer
Eugene Garfield notes, "while citation data create new tools for analyses of research
performance, it should be stressed that they supplement rather than replace other
quantitative-and qualitative-indicators."[24] To the extent that arguers jettison acknowledged
limitations of JIF-generated data in evaluative judgments, or leave behind Garfield's
"supplement rather than replace" caveat, they court commission of anchoring fallacies.
 Naturalistic fallacy: In the context of measurement, a naturalistic fallacy can occur in a
reasoning chain that makes an unwarranted extrapolation from "is" to "ought," as in the
case of sheer quantity metrics based on the premise "more is better"[20] or, in the case of
developmental assessment in the field of psychology, "higher is better."[25]
 False analogy: In the context of measurement, this error in reasoning occurs when claims
are supported by unsound comparisons between data points, hence the false analogy's
informal nickname of the "apples and oranges" fallacy.[26] For example, the Scopus and Web
of Science bibliographic databases have difficulty distinguishing between citations of
scholarly work that are arms-length endorsements, ceremonial citations, or negative
citations (indicating the citing author withholds endorsement of the cited work).[27] Hence,
measurement-based value claims premised on the uniform quality of all citations may be
questioned on false analogy grounds.
 Argumentum ex silentio: An argument from silence features an unwarranted conclusion
advanced based on the absence of data. For example, Academic Analytics' Faculty Scholarly
Productivity Index purports to measure overall faculty productivity, yet the tool does not
capture data based on citations in books. This creates a possibility that low productivity
measurements using the tool may constitute argumentum ex silentio fallacies, to the extent
that such measurements are supported by the absence of book citation data.
 Ecological fallacy: An ecological fallacy is committed when one draws an inference from data
based on the premise that qualities observed for groups necessarily hold for individuals; for
example, "if countries with more Protestants tend to have higher suicide rates, then
Protestants must be more likely to commit suicide."[28] In metrical argumentation, ecological
fallacies can be committed when one measures scholarly productivity of a sub-group of
individuals (e.g. "Puerto Rican" faculty) via reference to aggregate data about a larger and
different group (e.g. "Hispanic" faculty).[29]

Other systems of classification

Of other classifications of fallacies in general the most famous are those of Francis Bacon
and J. S. Mill. Bacon (Novum Organum, Aph. 33, 38 sqq.) divided fallacies into four Idola
(Idols, i.e. False Appearances), which summarize the various kinds of mistakes to which the
human intellect is prone. With these should be compared the Offendicula of Roger Bacon,
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contained in the Opus maius, pt. i. J. S. Mill discussed the subject in book v. of his Logic, and
Jeremy Bentham's Book of Fallacies (1824) contains valuable remarks. See Rd. Whateley's
Logic, bk. v.; A. de Morgan, Formal Logic (1847) ; A. Sidgwick, Fallacies (1883) and other
textbooks.

Assessment — pragmatic theory

According to the pragmatic theory,[30] a fallacy can in some instances be an error a fallacy,
use of a heuristic (short version of an argumentation scheme) to jump to a conclusion.
However, even more worryingly, in other instances it is a tactic or ploy used inappropriately
in argumentation to try to get the best of a speech part unfairly. There are always two parties
to an argument containing a fallacy — the perpetrator and the intended victim. The dialogue
framework required to support the pragmatic theory of fallacy is built on the presumption that
argumentative dialogue has both an adversarial component and a collaborative component. A
dialogue has individual goals for each participant, but also collective (shared) goals that apply
to all participants. A fallacy of the second kind is seen as more than simply violation of a rule
of reasonable dialogue. It is also a deceptive tactic of argumentation, based on sleight-of-
hand. Aristotle explicitly compared contentious reasoning to unfair fighting in athletic
contest. But the roots of the pragmatic theory go back even further in history to the Sophists.
The pragmatic theory finds its roots in the Aristotelian conception of a fallacy as a sophistical
refutation, but also supports the view that many of the types of arguments traditionally
labelled as fallacies are in fact reasonable techniques of argumentation that can be used, in
many cases, to support legitimate goals of dialogue. Hence on the pragmatic approach, each
case needs to analyzed individually, to determine by the textual evidence whether the
argument is fallacious or reasonable.

Logical fallacies

Fallacies are defects that weaken arguments; Logical fallacies are errors in reasoning that
invalidate the argument. McMullin (2000), a clinical psychologist, explains that: "Logical
fallacies are unsubstantiated assertions that are often delivered with a conviction that makes
them sound as though they are proven facts".[31] It is important to understand what fallacies
are so that you can recognize them in either your own or others’ writing. Avoiding fallacies
will strengthen your ability to produce strong arguments. It is important to note that;

Fallacious arguments are very, very common and can be quite persuasive, at least to the
casual reader or listener. You can find dozens of examples of fallacious reasoning in
newspapers, advertisements, and other sources. It is sometimes hard to evaluate whether an
argument is fallacious. An argument might be very weak, somewhat weak, somewhat strong,
or very strong. An argument that has several stages or parts might have some strong sections
and some weak ones.

Examples of types of logical fallacies

Hasty generalization

Definition: Making assumptions about a whole group or range of cases based on a sample
that is inadequate (usually because it is atypical or just too small). Stereotypes about people
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("frat boys are drunkards," "grad students are nerdy," “women don’t enjoy sport” etc.) are a
common example of the principle underlying hasty generalization.

Missing the point

Definition: The premises of an argument do support a particular conclusion--but not the

conclusion that the arguer actually draws.

Post hoc (false cause)

This fallacy gets its name from the Latin phrase "post hoc, ergo propter hoc," which
translates as "after this, therefore because of this." Definition: Assuming that because B
comes after A, A caused B. Of course, sometimes one event really does cause another one
that comes later—for example, if I register for a class, and my name later appears on the roll,
it's true that the first event caused the one that came later. But sometimes two events that
seem related in time aren't really related as cause and event. That is, correlation isn't the same
thing as causation.

Slippery slope

Definition: The arguer claims that a sort of chain reaction, usually ending in some dire
consequence, will take place, but there's really not enough evidence for that assumption. The
arguer asserts that if we take even one step onto the "slippery slope," we will end up sliding
all the way to the bottom; he or she assumes we can't stop halfway down the hill.[32]

See also

 Logic portal

 Thinking portal

 Psychology portal

Lists

 List of cognitive biases

 List of fallacies
 List of memory biases
 List of paradoxes

Concepts

 Anti-pattern
 Association fallacy
 Cogency
 Cognitive bias
 Cognitive distortion
 Demagogue
 Evidence
 Fallacies of definition
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 False premise
 False statement
 Invalid proof
 Jumping to conclusions
 Mathematical fallacy
 Paradox
 Prosecutor's fallacy
 Sophism
 Soundness
 Truth
 Validity
 Victim blaming

Works

 Attacking Faulty Reasoning

 Straight and Crooked Thinking

http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallacy/

A fallacy is a kind of error in reasoning. The list of fallacies below contains 222 names of the
most common fallacies, and it provides brief explanations and examples of each of them.
Fallacies should not be persuasive, but they often are. Fallacies may be created
unintentionally, or they may be created intentionally in order to deceive other people. The
vast majority of the commonly identified fallacies involve arguments, although some involve
explanations, or definitions, or other products of reasoning. Sometimes the term "fallacy" is
used even more broadly to indicate any false belief or cause of a false belief. The list below
includes some fallacies of these sorts, but most are fallacies that involve kinds of errors made
while arguing informally in natural language.

An informal fallacy is fallacious because of both its form and its content. The formal fallacies
are fallacious only because of their logical form. For example, the Slippery Slope Fallacy has
the following form: Step 1 often leads to step 2. Step 2 often leads to step 3. Step 3 often
leads to ... until we reach an obviously unacceptable step, so step 1 is not acceptable. That
form occurs in both good arguments and fallacious arguments. The quality of an argument of
this form depends crucially on the probabilities that each step does lead to the next. Notice
that the probabilities involve the argument's content, not merely its form.

The discussion that precedes the long alphabetical list of fallacies begins with an account of
the ways in which the term "fallacy" is vague. Attention then turns to the number of
competing and overlapping ways to classify fallacies of argumentation. For pedagogical
purposes, researchers in the field of fallacies disagree about the following topics: which name
of a fallacy is more helpful to students' understanding; whether some fallacies should be de-
emphasized in favor of others; and which is the best taxonomy of the fallacies. Researchers in
the field are also deeply divided about how to define the term "fallacy" itself, how to define
certain fallacies, and whether any theory of fallacies at all should be pursued if that theory's
goal is to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing between fallacious
and non-fallacious reasoning generally. Analogously, there is doubt in the field of ethics
regarding whether researchers should pursue the goal of providing necessary and sufficient
conditions for distinguishing moral actions from immoral ones.
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Taxonomy of Fallacies
3. Pedagogy
4. What is a fallacy?
5. Other Controversies
6. Partial List of Fallacies
7. References and Further Reading

http://writingcenter.unc.edu/handouts/fallacies/
Arguments

Most academic writing tasks require you to make an argument—that is, to present reasons for
a particular claim or interpretation you are putting forward. You may have been told that you
need to make your arguments more logical or stronger. And you may have worried that you
simply aren’t a logical person or wondered what it means for an argument to be strong.
Learning to make the best arguments you can is an ongoing process, but it isn’t impossible:
“Being logical” is something anyone can do, with practice.

Each argument you make is composed of premises (this is a term for statements that express
your reasons or evidence) that are arranged in the right way to support your conclusion (the
main claim or interpretation you are offering). You can make your arguments stronger by

1. using good premises (ones you have good reason to believe are both true and relevant to
the issue at hand),
2. making sure your premises provide good support for your conclusion (and not some other
conclusion, or no conclusion at all),
3. checking that you have addressed the most important or relevant aspects of the issue (that
is, that your premises and conclusion focus on what is really important to the issue), and
4. not making claims that are so strong or sweeping that you can’t really support them.

You also need to be sure that you present all of your ideas in an orderly fashion that readers
can follow. See our handouts on argument and organization for some tips that will improve
your arguments.

This handout describes some ways in which arguments often fail to do the things listed
above; these failings are called fallacies. If you’re having trouble developing your argument,
check to see if a fallacy is part of the problem.

It is particularly easy to slip up and commit a fallacy when you have strong feelings about
your topic—if a conclusion seems obvious to you, you’re more likely to just assume that it is
true and to be careless with your evidence. To help you see how people commonly make this
mistake, this handout uses a number of controversial political examples—arguments about
subjects like abortion, gun control, the death penalty, gay marriage, euthanasia, and
pornography. The purpose of this handout, though, is not to argue for any particular position
on any of these issues; rather, it is to illustrate weak reasoning, which can happen in pretty
much any kind of argument. Please be aware that the claims in these examples are just
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made-up illustrations—they haven’t been researched, and you shouldn’t use them as evidence
in your own writing.

What are fallacies?

Fallacies are defects that weaken arguments. By learning to look for them in your own and
others’ writing, you can strengthen your ability to evaluate the arguments you make, read,
and hear. It is important to realize two things about fallacies: first, fallacious arguments are
very, very common and can be quite persuasive, at least to the casual reader or listener. You
can find dozens of examples of fallacious reasoning in newspapers, advertisements, and other
sources. Second, it is sometimes hard to evaluate whether an argument is fallacious. An
argument might be very weak, somewhat weak, somewhat strong, or very strong. An
argument that has several stages or parts might have some strong sections and some weak
ones. The goal of this handout, then, is not to teach you how to label arguments as fallacious
or fallacy-free, but to help you look critically at your own arguments and move them away
from the “weak” and toward the “strong” end of the continuum.

So what do fallacies look like?

For each fallacy listed, there is a definition or explanation, an example, and a tip on how to
avoid committing the fallacy in your own arguments.

Hasty generalization

Definition: Making assumptions about a whole group or range of cases based on a sample
that is inadequate (usually because it is atypical or too small). Stereotypes about people
(“librarians are shy and smart,” “wealthy people are snobs,” etc.) are a common example of
the principle underlying hasty generalization.

Example: “My roommate said her philosophy class was hard, and the one I’m in is hard, too.
All philosophy classes must be hard!” Two people’s experiences are, in this case, not enough
on which to base a conclusion.

Tip: Ask yourself what kind of “sample” you’re using: Are you relying on the opinions or
experiences of just a few people, or your own experience in just a few situations? If so,
consider whether you need more evidence, or perhaps a less sweeping conclusion. (Notice
that in the example, the more modest conclusion “Some philosophy classes are hard for some
students” would not be a hasty generalization.)

Missing the point

Definition: The premises of an argument do support a particular conclusion—but not the

conclusion that the arguer actually draws.

Example: “The seriousness of a punishment should match the seriousness of the crime. Right
now, the punishment for drunk driving may simply be a fine. But drunk driving is a very
serious crime that can kill innocent people. So the death penalty should be the punishment for
drunk driving.” The argument actually supports several conclusions—”The punishment for
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drunk driving should be very serious,” in particular—but it doesn’t support the claim that the
death penalty, specifically, is warranted.

Tip: Separate your premises from your conclusion. Looking at the premises, ask yourself
what conclusion an objective person would reach after reading them. Looking at your
conclusion, ask yourself what kind of evidence would be required to support such a
conclusion, and then see if you’ve actually given that evidence. Missing the point often
occurs when a sweeping or extreme conclusion is being drawn, so be especially careful if you
know you’re claiming something big.

Post hoc (also called false cause)

This fallacy gets its name from the Latin phrase “post hoc, ergo propter hoc,” which
translates as “after this, therefore because of this.”

Definition: Assuming that because B comes after A, A caused B. Of course, sometimes one
event really does cause another one that comes later—for example, if I register for a class,
and my name later appears on the roll, it’s true that the first event caused the one that came
later. But sometimes two events that seem related in time aren’t really related as cause and
event. That is, correlation isn’t the same thing as causation.

Examples: “President Jones raised taxes, and then the rate of violent crime went up. Jones is
responsible for the rise in crime.” The increase in taxes might or might not be one factor in
the rising crime rates, but the argument hasn’t shown us that one caused the other.

Tip: To avoid the post hoc fallacy, the arguer would need to give us some explanation of the
process by which the tax increase is supposed to have produced higher crime rates. And that’s
what you should do to avoid committing this fallacy: If you say that A causes B, you should
have something more to say about how A caused B than just that A came first and B came
later.

Slippery slope

Definition: The arguer claims that a sort of chain reaction, usually ending in some dire
consequence, will take place, but there’s really not enough evidence for that assumption. The
arguer asserts that if we take even one step onto the “slippery slope,” we will end up sliding
all the way to the bottom; he or she assumes we can’t stop partway down the hill.

Example: “Animal experimentation reduces our respect for life. If we don’t respect life, we
are likely to be more and more tolerant of violent acts like war and murder. Soon our society
will become a battlefield in which everyone constantly fears for their lives. It will be the end
of civilization. To prevent this terrible consequence, we should make animal experimentation
illegal right now.” Since animal experimentation has been legal for some time and
civilization has not yet ended, it seems particularly clear that this chain of events won’t
necessarily take place. Even if we believe that experimenting on animals reduces respect for
life, and loss of respect for life makes us more tolerant of violence, that may be the spot on
the hillside at which things stop—we may not slide all the way down to the end of
civilization. And so we have not yet been given sufficient reason to accept the arguer’s
conclusion that we must make animal experimentation illegal right now.
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Like post hoc, slippery slope can be a tricky fallacy to identify, since sometimes a chain of
events really can be predicted to follow from a certain action. Here’s an example that doesn’t
seem fallacious: “If I fail English 101, I won’t be able to graduate. If I don’t graduate, I
probably won’t be able to get a good job, and I may very well end up doing temp work or
flipping burgers for the next year.”

Tip: Check your argument for chains of consequences, where you say “if A, then B, and if B,
then C,” and so forth. Make sure these chains are reasonable.

Weak analogy

Definition: Many arguments rely on an analogy between two or more objects, ideas, or
situations. If the two things that are being compared aren’t really alike in the relevant
respects, the analogy is a weak one, and the argument that relies on it commits the fallacy of
weak analogy.

Example: “Guns are like hammers—they’re both tools with metal parts that could be used to
kill someone. And yet it would be ridiculous to restrict the purchase of hammers—so
restrictions on purchasing guns are equally ridiculous.” While guns and hammers do share
certain features, these features (having metal parts, being tools, and being potentially useful
for violence) are not the ones at stake in deciding whether to restrict guns. Rather, we restrict
guns because they can easily be used to kill large numbers of people at a distance. This is a
feature hammers do not share—it would be hard to kill a crowd with a hammer. Thus, the
analogy is weak, and so is the argument based on it.

If you think about it, you can make an analogy of some kind between almost any two things
in the world: “My paper is like a mud puddle because they both get bigger when it rains (I
work more when I’m stuck inside) and they’re both kind of murky.” So the mere fact that you
can draw an analogy between two things doesn’t prove much, by itself.

Arguments by analogy are often used in discussing abortion—arguers frequently compare

fetuses with adult human beings, and then argue that treatment that would violate the rights of
an adult human being also violates the rights of fetuses. Whether these arguments are good or
not depends on the strength of the analogy: do adult humans and fetuses share the properties
that give adult humans rights? If the property that matters is having a human genetic code or
the potential for a life full of human experiences, adult humans and fetuses do share that
property, so the argument and the analogy are strong; if the property is being self-aware,
rational, or able to survive on one’s own, adult humans and fetuses don’t share it, and the
analogy is weak.

Tip: Identify what properties are important to the claim you’re making, and see whether the
two things you’re comparing both share those properties.

Appeal to authority

Definition: Often we add strength to our arguments by referring to respected sources or

authorities and explaining their positions on the issues we’re discussing. If, however, we try
to get readers to agree with us simply by impressing them with a famous name or by
appealing to a supposed authority who really isn’t much of an expert, we commit the fallacy
of appeal to authority.
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Example: “We should abolish the death penalty. Many respected people, such as actor Guy
Handsome, have publicly stated their opposition to it.” While Guy Handsome may be an
authority on matters having to do with acting, there’s no particular reason why anyone should
be moved by his political opinions—he is probably no more of an authority on the death
penalty than the person writing the paper.

Tip: There are two easy ways to avoid committing appeal to authority: First, make sure that
the authorities you cite are experts on the subject you’re discussing. Second, rather than just
saying “Dr. Authority believes X, so we should believe it, too,” try to explain the reasoning
or evidence that the authority used to arrive at his or her opinion. That way, your readers have
more to go on than a person’s reputation. It also helps to choose authorities who are
perceived as fairly neutral or reasonable, rather than people who will be perceived as biased.

Ad populum

Definition: The Latin name of this fallacy means “to the people.” There are several versions
of the ad populum fallacy, but in all of them, the arguer takes advantage of the desire most
people have to be liked and to fit in with others and uses that desire to try to get the audience
to accept his or her argument. One of the most common versions is the bandwagon fallacy, in
which the arguer tries to convince the audience to do or believe something because everyone
else (supposedly) does.

Example: “Gay marriages are just immoral. 70% of Americans think so!” While the opinion
of most Americans might be relevant in determining what laws we should have, it certainly
doesn’t determine what is moral or immoral: there was a time where a substantial number of
Americans were in favor of segregation, but their opinion was not evidence that segregation
was moral. The arguer is trying to get us to agree with the conclusion by appealing to our
desire to fit in with other Americans.

Tip: Make sure that you aren’t recommending that your readers believe your conclusion
because everyone else believes it, all the cool people believe it, people will like you better if
you believe it, and so forth. Keep in mind that the popular opinion is not always the right one.

Ad hominem and tu quoque

Definitions: Like the appeal to authority and ad populum fallacies, the ad hominem (“against
the person”) and tu quoque (“you, too!”) fallacies focus our attention on people rather than on
arguments or evidence. In both of these arguments, the conclusion is usually “You shouldn’t
believe So-and-So’s argument.” The reason for not believing So-and-So is that So-and-So is
either a bad person (ad hominem) or a hypocrite (tu quoque). In an ad hominem argument, the
arguer attacks his or her opponent instead of the opponent’s argument.

Examples: “Andrea Dworkin has written several books arguing that pornography harms
women. But Dworkin is just ugly and bitter, so why should we listen to her?” Dworkin’s
appearance and character, which the arguer has characterized so ungenerously, have nothing
to do with the strength of her argument, so using them as evidence is fallacious.

In a tu quoque argument, the arguer points out that the opponent has actually done the thing
he or she is arguing against, and so the opponent’s argument shouldn’t be listened to. Here’s
an example: imagine that your parents have explained to you why you shouldn’t smoke, and
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they’ve given a lot of good reasons—the damage to your health, the cost, and so forth. You
reply, “I won’t accept your argument, because you used to smoke when you were my age.
You did it, too!” The fact that your parents have done the thing they are condemning has no
bearing on the premises they put forward in their argument (smoking harms your health and
is very expensive), so your response is fallacious.

Tip: Be sure to stay focused on your opponents’ reasoning, rather than on their personal
character. (The exception to this is, of course, if you are making an argument about
someone’s character—if your conclusion is “President Jones is an untrustworthy person,”
premises about her untrustworthy acts are relevant, not fallacious.)

Appeal to pity

Definition: The appeal to pity takes place when an arguer tries to get people to accept a
conclusion by making them feel sorry for someone.

Examples: “I know the exam is graded based on performance, but you should give me an A.
My cat has been sick, my car broke down, and I’ve had a cold, so it was really hard for me to
study!” The conclusion here is “You should give me an A.” But the criteria for getting an A
have to do with learning and applying the material from the course; the principle the arguer
wants us to accept (people who have a hard week deserve A’s) is clearly unacceptable. The
information the arguer has given might feel relevant and might even get the audience to
consider the conclusion—but the information isn’t logically relevant, and so the argument is
fallacious. Here’s another example: “It’s wrong to tax corporations—think of all the money
they give to charity, and of the costs they already pay to run their businesses!”

Tip: Make sure that you aren’t simply trying to get your audience to agree with you by
making them feel sorry for someone.

Appeal to ignorance

Definition: In the appeal to ignorance, the arguer basically says, “Look, there’s no conclusive
evidence on the issue at hand. Therefore, you should accept my conclusion on this issue.”

Example: “People have been trying for centuries to prove that God exists. But no one has yet
been able to prove it. Therefore, God does not exist.” Here’s an opposing argument that
commits the same fallacy: “People have been trying for years to prove that God does not
exist. But no one has yet been able to prove it. Therefore, God exists.” In each case, the
arguer tries to use the lack of evidence as support for a positive claim about the truth of a
conclusion. There is one situation in which doing this is not fallacious: if qualified
researchers have used well-thought-out methods to search for something for a long time, they
haven’t found it, and it’s the kind of thing people ought to be able to find, then the fact that
they haven’t found it constitutes some evidence that it doesn’t exist.

Tip: Look closely at arguments where you point out a lack of evidence and then draw a
conclusion from that lack of evidence.

Straw man
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Definition: One way of making our own arguments stronger is to anticipate and respond in
advance to the arguments that an opponent might make. In the straw man fallacy, the arguer
sets up a weak version of the opponent’s position and tries to score points by knocking it
down. But just as being able to knock down a straw man (like a scarecrow) isn’t very
impressive, defeating a watered-down version of your opponent’s argument isn’t very
impressive either.

Example: “Feminists want to ban all pornography and punish everyone who looks at it! But
such harsh measures are surely inappropriate, so the feminists are wrong: porn and its fans
should be left in peace.” The feminist argument is made weak by being overstated. In fact,
most feminists do not propose an outright “ban” on porn or any punishment for those who
merely view it or approve of it; often, they propose some restrictions on particular things like
child porn, or propose to allow people who are hurt by porn to sue publishers and
producers—not viewers—for damages. So the arguer hasn’t really scored any points; he or
she has just committed a fallacy.

Tip: Be charitable to your opponents. State their arguments as strongly, accurately, and
sympathetically as possible. If you can knock down even the best version of an opponent’s
argument, then you’ve really accomplished something.

Red herring

Definition: Partway through an argument, the arguer goes off on a tangent, raising a side
issue that distracts the audience from what’s really at stake. Often, the arguer never returns to
the original issue.

Example: “Grading this exam on a curve would be the most fair thing to do. After all, classes
go more smoothly when the students and the professor are getting along well.” Let’s try our
premise-conclusion outlining to see what’s wrong with this argument:

Premise: Classes go more smoothly when the students and the professor are getting along
well.

Conclusion: Grading this exam on a curve would be the most fair thing to do.

When we lay it out this way, it’s pretty obvious that the arguer went off on a tangent—the
fact that something helps people get along doesn’t necessarily make it more fair; fairness and
justice sometimes require us to do things that cause conflict. But the audience may feel like
the issue of teachers and students agreeing is important and be distracted from the fact that
the arguer has not given any evidence as to why a curve would be fair.

Tip: Try laying your premises and conclusion out in an outline-like form. How many issues
do you see being raised in your argument? Can you explain how each premise supports the
conclusion?

False dichotomy

Definition: In false dichotomy, the arguer sets up the situation so it looks like there are only
two choices. The arguer then eliminates one of the choices, so it seems that we are left with
only one option: the one the arguer wanted us to pick in the first place. But often there are
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really many different options, not just two—and if we thought about them all, we might not
be so quick to pick the one the arguer recommends.

Example: “Caldwell Hall is in bad shape. Either we tear it down and put up a new building,
or we continue to risk students’ safety. Obviously we shouldn’t risk anyone’s safety, so we
must tear the building down.” The argument neglects to mention the possibility that we might
repair the building or find some way to protect students from the risks in question—for
example, if only a few rooms are in bad shape, perhaps we shouldn’t hold classes in those
rooms.

Tip: Examine your own arguments: if you’re saying that we have to choose between just two
options, is that really so? Or are there other alternatives you haven’t mentioned? If there are
other alternatives, don’t just ignore them—explain why they, too, should be ruled out.
Although there’s no formal name for it, assuming that there are only three options, four
options, etc. when really there are more is similar to false dichotomy and should also be
avoided.

Begging the question

Definition: A complicated fallacy; it comes in several forms and can be harder to detect than
many of the other fallacies we’ve discussed. Basically, an argument that begs the question
asks the reader to simply accept the conclusion without providing real evidence; the argument
either relies on a premise that says the same thing as the conclusion (which you might hear
referred to as “being circular” or “circular reasoning”), or simply ignores an important (but
questionable) assumption that the argument rests on. Sometimes people use the phrase “beg
the question” as a sort of general criticism of arguments, to mean that an arguer hasn’t given
very good reasons for a conclusion, but that’s not the meaning we’re going to discuss here.

Examples: “Active euthanasia is morally acceptable. It is a decent, ethical thing to help

another human being escape suffering through death.” Let’s lay this out in premise-
conclusion form:

Premise: It is a decent, ethical thing to help another human being escape suffering through
death.

Conclusion: Active euthanasia is morally acceptable.

If we “translate” the premise, we’ll see that the arguer has really just said the same thing
twice: “decent, ethical” means pretty much the same thing as “morally acceptable,” and “help
another human being escape suffering through death” means something pretty similar to
“active euthanasia.” So the premise basically says, “active euthanasia is morally acceptable,”
just like the conclusion does. The arguer hasn’t yet given us any real reasons why euthanasia
is acceptable; instead, she has left us asking “well, really, why do you think active euthanasia
is acceptable?” Her argument “begs” (that is, evades) the real question.

Here’s a second example of begging the question, in which a dubious premise which is
needed to make the argument valid is completely ignored: “Murder is morally wrong. So
active euthanasia is morally wrong.” The premise that gets left out is “active euthanasia is
murder.” And that is a debatable premise—again, the argument “begs” or evades the question
of whether active euthanasia is murder by simply not stating the premise. The arguer is
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hoping we’ll just focus on the uncontroversial premise, “Murder is morally wrong,” and not
notice what is being assumed.

Tip: One way to try to avoid begging the question is to write out your premises and
conclusion in a short, outline-like form. See if you notice any gaps, any steps that are
required to move from one premise to the next or from the premises to the conclusion. Write
down the statements that would fill those gaps. If the statements are controversial and you’ve
just glossed over them, you might be begging the question. Next, check to see whether any of
your premises basically says the same thing as the conclusion (but in different words). If so,
you’re probably begging the question. The moral of the story: you can’t just assume or use as
uncontroversial evidence the very thing you’re trying to prove.

Equivocation

Definition: Equivocation is sliding between two or more different meanings of a single word
or phrase that is important to the argument.

Example: “Giving money to charity is the right thing to do. So charities have a right to our
money.” The equivocation here is on the word “right”: “right” can mean both something that
is correct or good (as in “I got the right answers on the test”) and something to which
someone has a claim (as in “everyone has a right to life”). Sometimes an arguer will
deliberately, sneakily equivocate, often on words like “freedom,” “justice,” “rights,” and so
forth; other times, the equivocation is a mistake or misunderstanding. Either way, it’s
important that you use the main terms of your argument consistently.

Tip: Identify the most important words and phrases in your argument and ask yourself
whether they could have more than one meaning. If they could, be sure you aren’t slipping
and sliding between those meanings.

So how do I find fallacies in my own writing?

Here are some general tips for finding fallacies in your own arguments:

 Pretend you disagree with the conclusion you’re defending. What parts of the argument
would now seem fishy to you? What parts would seem easiest to attack? Give special
attention to strengthening those parts.
 List your main points; under each one, list the evidence you have for it. Seeing your claims
and evidence laid out this way may make you realize that you have no good evidence for a
particular claim, or it may help you look more critically at the evidence you’re using.
 Learn which types of fallacies you’re especially prone to, and be careful to check for them
in your work. Some writers make lots of appeals to authority; others are more likely to rely
on weak analogies or set up straw men. Read over some of your old papers to see if there’s a
particular kind of fallacy you need to watch out for.
 Be aware that broad claims need more proof than narrow ones. Claims that use sweeping
words like “all,” “no,” “none,” “every,” “always,” “never,” “no one,” and “everyone” are
sometimes appropriate—but they require a lot more proof than less-sweeping claims that
use words like “some,” “many,” “few,” “sometimes,” “usually,” and so forth.
 Double check your characterizations of others, especially your opponents, to be sure they
are accurate and fair.
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Can I get some practice with this?

Yes, you can. Follow this link to see a sample argument that’s full of fallacies (and then you
can follow another link to get an explanation of each one). Then there’s a more well-
constructed argument on the same topic.

Works Consulted

We consulted these works while writing the original version of this handout. This is not a
comprehensive list of resources on the handout’s topic, and we encourage you to do your own
research to find the latest publications on this topic. Please do not use this list as a model for
the format of your own reference list, as it may not match the citation style you are using. For
guidance on formatting citations, please see the UNC Libraries citation tutorial.

Hurley, Patrick J. A Concise Introduction to Logic. Thornson Learning, 2000

Lunsford, Andrea and John Ruszkiewicz. Everything’s an Argument. Bedford Books, 1998.

Copi, Irving M. and Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic. Prentice Hall, 1998.

https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/
A logical fallacy is a flaw in reasoning. Logical fallacies are like tricks or illusions of thought, and
they're often very sneakily used by politicians and the media to fool people. Don't be fooled! This
website has been designed to help you identify and call out dodgy logic wherever it may raise its
ugly, incoherent head. Rollover the icons above and click for examples. If you see someone
committing a fallacy, link them to it e.g. yourlogicalfallacyis.com/strawman
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place that has walls.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fallacies
http://examples.yourdictionary.com/examples-of-fallacies.html
https://literarydevices.net/fallacy/
http://www.fallacyfiles.org/
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If you can tear yourself away from the tax forms long enough, philosopher Alan Hájek offers
you a "philosophy tool kit" for thinking:

Philosophers pride themselves on thinking clearly by seeing what follows from what, exposing
sophisms, spotting fallacies, and generally policing our reasoning. … But these skills are not the
exclusive property of rarefied sages, accessed only with a secret handshake and insider training, as
much as some philosophers wish this were so. Instead, some of these skills can be captured by
generalisable, all-purpose techniques for the proper conduct of thought, whatever the topic. Many
of these are easily taught and learned. As such, they can be utilised by non-philosophers too. At a
time when we are bombarded more than ever with specious claims and spurious inferences, clear
thinking provides a much-needed safeguard that we should all strive towards.1

It's not a full philosophical "tool kit", as it contains only a few tools. Rather, it's like the kind
of small kit you might keep in your car in case of a breakdown on the road, so you might
think of it as a tool kit in case of a philosophical emergency.

Hájek shows how to use the tools by applying them to some traditional philosophical
problems but, as he mentions, they can be applied to many other types of intellectual,
conceptual, and logical problems.

The tools in the kit are philosophical heuristics, but what is a philosophical heuristic? Well,
wait: what is a heuristic? It's a rule of thumb2. Hájek gives the following example: "Here’s a
good one for mathematics: if you are not making headway on a problem, modify it slightly to
make it easier, and solve that one." I think this is a good rule of thumb for problem-solving in
general, not just mathematics. The point of using heuristics is that, while they don't always
work, they work often enough to be useful; also, even when they don't solve the problem,
they may help point the way to a solution.

One reason I point you to this article is that many of the topics that Hájek discusses have been
discussed here in The Fallacy Files, so you can compare his treatment of the issues to mine3:

 Definite descriptions4
 "False dichotomies"5
 Confirmation bias6
 Reductio ad absurdum
 Analogical reasoning
 Refutation by logical analogy7: Hájek calls it "proving too much", but this is what he's talking
about. I think "proving too much" actually applies more accurately to a different criticism,
but that's another story.
 The argument from design for God's existence: I've alluded to this argument in passing,
especially in connection with the "fine-tuning" argument, and mentioned the importance of
Hume's pre-Darwin refutation of it. Hájek gives a clear and more thorough explanation of
Hume's criticisms.
 The problem of evil8

This should keep you busy until I can get around to posting something new.

Notes:

1. Alan Hájek, "Philosophy Took Kit", Aeon, 4/3/2017

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2. And, no, the phrase "rule of thumb" does not come from a law allowing a man to beat his
wife with any stick no thicker than his thumb. See: Cecil Adams, "Does 'rule of thumb' refer
to an old law permitting wife beating?", The Straight Dope, 5/12/2000
3. A useful tool that Hájek doesn't mention is "the second opinion".
4. "A" v. "The", 7/19/2008
5. "False Dichotomy"
6. Puzzle it Out, 7/3/2015
7. Q&A, 5/21/2013
8. The Logical Problem of Evil, 4/6/2015 https://aeon.co/essays/with-the-use-of-heuristics-
anybody-can-think-like-a-philosopher